HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
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An SF Soldier assists Eastern Alliance Soldiers in supervising al Qaeda Prisoners.<br />
occupying terrain from the combined effort, save<br />
nominal Afghan security details.<br />
Despite the challenges, each day the various<br />
SOTF OPs would also move forward to call for<br />
more accurate fire and support the movement of<br />
Ali’s forces. Each night, as the enemy forces<br />
would light their campfires to keep warm, the<br />
teams used their thermal imagers and optics to<br />
bring in bombs and fire missions from a variety<br />
of aircraft, including AC-130 gunships. Having<br />
obviated the need for OPs 25B and 25A, the task<br />
force commander pulled both elements on the<br />
early mornings of 13 and 14 December, respectively.<br />
By 14 December, the task force commander<br />
convinced Ali and his men to occupy<br />
overnight the terrain that they had captured.<br />
The noose around AQ tightened consistently<br />
through 17 December, and the enemy pocket<br />
shrank accordingly. By 17 December, Ali<br />
declared victory. The general consensus<br />
remained that the surviving AQ forces had<br />
either fled to Pakistan or melted into the local<br />
population. SOTF forces departed the battlefield<br />
on 19 December, but without knowing<br />
whether they had killed UBL and destroyed AQ<br />
in Afghanistan.<br />
The enemy had fought stubbornly; yet, their<br />
fortifications proved no match for the tons of ordnance,<br />
coordinated by SOF in OPs. Estimates of<br />
AQ dead from the battle were hard to determine.<br />
the SOTF’s ground force commander estimated<br />
about 250. What has since been determined<br />
with reasonable certainty was that UBL was<br />
indeed in Tora Bora in December 2001. All<br />
source reporting corroborated his presence on<br />
several days from 9-14 December. The fact that<br />
SOF came as close to capturing or killing UBL<br />
as U.S. forces have to date makes Tora Bora a<br />
controversial fight. Given the commitment of<br />
fewer than 100 American personnel, U.S. forces<br />
proved unable to block egress routes from Tora<br />
Bora south into Pakistan, the route that UBL<br />
most likely took. Regardless, the defeat for AQ<br />
at Tora Bora, coupled with the later defeat during<br />
Operation ANACONDA, ensured that neither<br />
AQ, nor the Taliban would mass forces to<br />
challenge American troops in the field until<br />
2006. SOF elements proved once again that<br />
combining airpower in support of a surrogate<br />
force could result in a decisive defeat of a wellfortified<br />
and numerically superior enemy force,<br />
no matter how disciplined.<br />
With the capture of Kabul and Kandahar<br />
and the destruction of organized resistance in<br />
Tora Bora, Afghanistan was now in effect liberated.<br />
It had taken fewer than 60 days of concentrated<br />
military operations and only a few hundred<br />
soldiers to seize the country from the<br />
Taliban and its terrorist allies. On 11 December<br />
2001 Hamid Karzai was sworn in as Prime<br />
Minister of the interim government.<br />
Operation ANACONDA<br />
But, the success of the SOCCENT UW campaign<br />
did not mean that all Taliban or AQ had<br />
been killed or driven out of Afghanistan. The<br />
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