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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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An SF Soldier assists Eastern Alliance Soldiers in supervising al Qaeda Prisoners.<br />

occupying terrain from the combined effort, save<br />

nominal Afghan security details.<br />

Despite the challenges, each day the various<br />

SOTF OPs would also move forward to call for<br />

more accurate fire and support the movement of<br />

Ali’s forces. Each night, as the enemy forces<br />

would light their campfires to keep warm, the<br />

teams used their thermal imagers and optics to<br />

bring in bombs and fire missions from a variety<br />

of aircraft, including AC-130 gunships. Having<br />

obviated the need for OPs 25B and 25A, the task<br />

force commander pulled both elements on the<br />

early mornings of 13 and 14 December, respectively.<br />

By 14 December, the task force commander<br />

convinced Ali and his men to occupy<br />

overnight the terrain that they had captured.<br />

The noose around AQ tightened consistently<br />

through 17 December, and the enemy pocket<br />

shrank accordingly. By 17 December, Ali<br />

declared victory. The general consensus<br />

remained that the surviving AQ forces had<br />

either fled to Pakistan or melted into the local<br />

population. SOTF forces departed the battlefield<br />

on 19 December, but without knowing<br />

whether they had killed UBL and destroyed AQ<br />

in Afghanistan.<br />

The enemy had fought stubbornly; yet, their<br />

fortifications proved no match for the tons of ordnance,<br />

coordinated by SOF in OPs. Estimates of<br />

AQ dead from the battle were hard to determine.<br />

the SOTF’s ground force commander estimated<br />

about 250. What has since been determined<br />

with reasonable certainty was that UBL was<br />

indeed in Tora Bora in December 2001. All<br />

source reporting corroborated his presence on<br />

several days from 9-14 December. The fact that<br />

SOF came as close to capturing or killing UBL<br />

as U.S. forces have to date makes Tora Bora a<br />

controversial fight. Given the commitment of<br />

fewer than 100 American personnel, U.S. forces<br />

proved unable to block egress routes from Tora<br />

Bora south into Pakistan, the route that UBL<br />

most likely took. Regardless, the defeat for AQ<br />

at Tora Bora, coupled with the later defeat during<br />

Operation ANACONDA, ensured that neither<br />

AQ, nor the Taliban would mass forces to<br />

challenge American troops in the field until<br />

2006. SOF elements proved once again that<br />

combining airpower in support of a surrogate<br />

force could result in a decisive defeat of a wellfortified<br />

and numerically superior enemy force,<br />

no matter how disciplined.<br />

With the capture of Kabul and Kandahar<br />

and the destruction of organized resistance in<br />

Tora Bora, Afghanistan was now in effect liberated.<br />

It had taken fewer than 60 days of concentrated<br />

military operations and only a few hundred<br />

soldiers to seize the country from the<br />

Taliban and its terrorist allies. On 11 December<br />

2001 Hamid Karzai was sworn in as Prime<br />

Minister of the interim government.<br />

Operation ANACONDA<br />

But, the success of the SOCCENT UW campaign<br />

did not mean that all Taliban or AQ had<br />

been killed or driven out of Afghanistan. The<br />

101

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