HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

100
Despite what, in retrospect, may have
seemed a comedy of errors, the events of 10
December proved to be the decisive ones of the
operation at Tora Bora. The decision to augment
COBRA 25A with two SOTF personnel
proved very beneficial. Having observed and
recorded the events unfolding at the AQ strongpoint,
to include Ali’s retreat and the SOF evasion,
the SOTF soldiers successfully identified
AQ mortar positions and heavy machine-guns.
Upon the departure of friendly personnel on the
night of 10 December, these two soldiers, along
with the COBRA 25A JTAC, called air strikes
for 17 continual hours on 10-11 December,
knocking out principal AQ positions. The decisive
point in the battle for Tora Bora, the actions
on 10-11 December, caused AQ elements to
retreat to alternate positions and enabled the
Afghan militia to capture key terrain in the
vicinity of UBL’s potential location the following
day.
Events of 10 December also led the SOTF to
revise its plan. It had originally intended to
employ several small OPs while keeping the
bulk of its forces at General Ali’s headquarters
to provide a QRF. The purpose of the QRF was
to respond either to sightings of UBL or to
employ forces to assist Ali in exploiting an
advance. After his experiences of 9-10
December, the task force commander determined
that he needed more forces forward to
establish a front and thus entice Ali to hold terrain.
Additionally, he and
his men believed that
there would be nothing
“quick” about any
response from a rearward
position, given the difficulties
they had encountered
and their lack of any
rotary wing lift.
Thus, on the afternoon
of 11 December, the SOTF
elements began their
treks into the Tora Bora
Mountains. The task force
planned to insert at least
four OPs in a northern arc
and move them gradually
forward as they directed
joint fires onto AQ positions.
Two mission support sites (MSSs) would
deploy just behind the OPs to provide local, dismounted
QRF and logistics support and to liaise
with General Ali’s forces. For the most part, the
movements proved slow and hazardous. After a
short trip in the ubiquitous pickup trucks, the
various SOTF teams unloaded and moved forward
on foot with burros carrying their packs.
Moving into mountains where the altitude varied
from 10,000 to 12,000 feet, they progressed
slowly over rocky and narrow paths.
From 11 to 14 December, the SOTF teams
continually rained fire onto enemy positions as
the Afghan forces of Hazarat Ali began moving
into the canyons. The teams hit targets of
opportunity, to include the suspected locations of
UBL, all the while attempting to avoid fratricide
in the absence of any semblance of a front line
trace. On the afternoon of 11 December, in a
Byzantine twist, Ali’s erstwhile compatriot
turned rival, General Zaman, engaged in negotiations
with AQ elements for a conditional surrender.
CENTCOM refused to support the
action, but the negotiation caused the SOTF to
pause bombing for several hours to avoid fratricide.
For each evening through the 14
December, Ali’s and Zaman’s forces departed
from the terrain that they had seized to seek
shelter and eat. Ramadan had commenced, and
Eastern Alliance forces observed religious
requirements to fast during daylight hours. The
U.S. SOF were frequently the only individuals