HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

naissance of the Tora Bora area on 8 December.
He caught a glimpse of just how well-defended
the AQ fortifications were during this reconnaissance.
After entering the northeastern portion
of the main battle area, the reconnaissance
party received accurate small arms and mortar
fire. Fortunately, the party took no casualties.
The SOTF commander also discovered that
General Ali’s forces maintained no real front line
trace, but rather clusters of troops in the Agam
Valley that were scattered willy-nilly.
The restrictions placed on COBRA 25 prevented
them from observing activity in the center
and south of the battle area. The SOTF commander
planned on
inserting several OPs
forward of OPs 25A
and 25B during hours
of darkness on 10
December, and augment
both 25A and
25B OPs with two
SOTF operators each.
In the late afternoon
on 10 December,
however, General Ali
requested that several
SOF personnel accompany
him to the front
to direct CAS in support
of a planned
frontal assault. With
only a five-minute
notice, the SOF commander
sent two SOF
and one translator to
support the general
and show that Americans would face the same
dangers his men did. At about 1600 local,
Afghan troops reported that they had not only
spotted UBL but had him surrounded, and
asked for additional help. Changing mission
from planning to execution, the SOTF commander
directed his task force (33 soldiers) to move
quickly to the front to support Ali. With darkness
rapidly approaching, the SOF element
spent at least a half-hour convincing Ali’s rear
echelon to provide guides to the front. Guides
secured, the SOF element loaded into six Toyota
pickups to begin its ten kilometer trek at 1730
local. Midway en route while traversing a steep,
Air Strikes in the Tora Bora Mountains.
99
one vehicle trail, the Americans ran into a convoy
of Ali and his men departing the battlespace.
As the Afghan forces passed by, Ali promised the
TF commander that he would turn his convoy
around at the bottom of the hill to continue the
pursuit of UBL. Neither Ali nor his forces would
return that night.
In the meantime, the two SOF operators who
had accompanied Ali began receiving effective
fire from multiple AQ positions in the northeast
quadrant of the battlespace. Upon receiving
fire, the remaining Afghan soldiers fled the battlefield,
leaving the two special operators and
their translator both stranded and potentially
surrounded. These SOF
personnel radioed their
evasion codeword and
began moving under
enemy fire toward friendly
positions. Fortunately,
the SOF evaders had
communications with the
SOTF soldiers in 25A OP;
they sent word to the task
force, now mounted and
roughly two-thirds of its
way to the front.
As the evaders
attempted to clear the
danger areas, the men of
the SOTF tried to locate
any Afghan OP with eyes
on the AQ front line and
UBL specifically. No
such position existed.
The Afghan guides who
accompanied the SOF
personnel grew extremely nervous as the party
approached known AQ positions and refused to
go farther. Faced with the improbable circumstance
of Ali’s return, much less pinpointing
UBL’s position at night, the quick reaction force
(QRF) turned its attention to recovering the
evaders. After moving several kilometers under
cover of darkness, attempting to ascertain friend
from foe, and negotiating through “friendly”
checkpoints without requisite dollars for the
required levy to pass, the evaders finally linked
up with their parent element. All returned to
base to reassess the situation and plan for subsequent
insertion the following day.