Media Policy and Globalization - Blogs Unpad
Media Policy and Globalization - Blogs Unpad
Media Policy and Globalization - Blogs Unpad
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46 MEDIA POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION<br />
of international development communication see: Hamelink 1994:<br />
Chapter 7.<br />
8. The power of transnational corporations to shape communication<br />
policy was especially strong in the Caribbean <strong>and</strong> Latin America,<br />
partially because of the US’ overwhelming influence in the region<br />
economically <strong>and</strong> militarily (Martin-Berbero 1993). The experiences<br />
of these nations in the 1960s would lead to the dependency movement<br />
which itself spurred many of the first critiques of international<br />
‘development’ within the field of communications (Mattelart 2002).<br />
9. In Brazil, domestic private capital in the form of the Globo multimedia<br />
group played a more direct role in shaping policy with the<br />
backing of both the authoritarian Brazilian state in the 1970s <strong>and</strong><br />
1980s, <strong>and</strong> the US’ tacit support. In contrast in India, despite the<br />
growing popularity of commercial television in the 1980s, the state<br />
remained the dominant player in shaping broadcasting policy until<br />
the 1990s with the unexpected entry of satellite television. For a<br />
rich account of the institutional <strong>and</strong> cultural history of television in<br />
India, see Rajagopal 2001.<br />
10. Mattelart (2002) notes that between 1967 <strong>and</strong> 1972, the number of<br />
countries governed by military chiefs of staff more than doubled.<br />
In the US, technocratic development ‘experts’ like political scientist<br />
Lucian Pye initiated a series of studies on the role of mass media in<br />
ensuring national development through military administrations. In<br />
this period, the US government actively promoted ‘nation-building’<br />
whereby modernization <strong>and</strong> authoritarian rule went h<strong>and</strong> in h<strong>and</strong> in<br />
Egypt, Indonesia, Brazil, Chile <strong>and</strong> Peru. See: 153–6.<br />
11. Objectives of the NIEO included democratizing multilateral agencies<br />
like the World Bank <strong>and</strong> the IMF, institutions that functioned primarily<br />
in Third World nations with very minimal Third World participation<br />
or management. Other objectives included opening northern<br />
markets to southern exports, improving terms of trade for agricultural<br />
<strong>and</strong> mining exports, establishing codes for technological transfers,<br />
<strong>and</strong> codes of conduct for multinational corporations (See Mattelart<br />
2002: 180; <strong>and</strong> McMichael 2003: 120–1). While the NIEO was radical<br />
in its calls for redistribution at the international level, it was silent on<br />
internal inequalities, including gender inequalities (Kabeer 2003: 71).<br />
12. The NWICO debates as well as the politics of conducting research<br />
for <strong>and</strong> publishing the MacBride Commission Report have been<br />
analyzed by several researchers involved in the UNESCO process.<br />
For more see: Hamelink 1994; Braman 1991, 1999; Servaes 1999;<br />
<strong>and</strong> Nordenstrang 1984.<br />
13. It was only once the debt crisis was officially diagnosed by the<br />
World Bank <strong>and</strong> the IMF – institutions that had been centrally