Media Policy and Globalization - Blogs Unpad
Media Policy and Globalization - Blogs Unpad Media Policy and Globalization - Blogs Unpad
STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA POLICY 17 aims, means and scope’ (2003: 186); the second period between the Second World War and the 1980s/1990s characterized by the public-service media paradigm and shaped according to political and normative – rather than technological – considerations; and the third is the current period of ‘communications policy’ where the issue of technological and economic convergence is expressed through decision-making that reflects the connection of telecommunications and media. The authors’ basis is that these distinct periods have produced media and communications policy that correspond to particular perceptions of the state about the role of the media. During the first period then, they argue, only the press was seen to have a political, normative function and it was only regulated with rights to report freely on current social and political affairs (freedom of expression). The second period perceived the electronic media as of political and social significance (given their use throughout the Second World War) and extended the pursuit of national cohesion and stability (2003: 191). According to the authors, media policy was dominated by sociopolitical rather than economic concerns (2003: 191). The current third period is one where ‘pragmatism and populism increasingly drive policy’ (2003: 197) especially following the ‘ “decline in ideology” and the fall of Communism, the increased scope and respectability of the free market and the shift to the right in European politics’ (2003: 197). As van Cuilenburg and McQuail rightly point out, in the European terrain, the communications policy philosophy is based on the idea of the market, which is not dissimilar to the priorities of US communications policy and indeed policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF on the ‘developing’ world. The authors ‘predict’ three core values in an emerging communications paradigm: freedom of communication, access and accountability (2003: 203). From the other side of the Atlantic, Marc Raboy (1995), writing about the public-broadcasting media, echoes some of these predictions. For Raboy, if the public-service broadcasting system is to have any future, it would need to pursue and achieve a status of accountability in the era of fierce competition from private broadcasters. As he notes ‘the promotion of the public interest can only come through regulation guaranteeing system access for all with something to communicate, as well as for receivers’(1995:14). Both sets of authors seem to argue for state intervention in the media market but not state control over them. Indeed, state intervention has been identified in terms of policy – whether as a positive or negative strategy – as a determining factor in shaping the course of policy philosophy and ideology, objectives and output. Communications policy scholars, such as Abramson and Raboy (1999); Collins (1994, 2003); Harcourt (2005); Harrison and Woods (2001);
18 MEDIA POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION Humphreys (1996); and Moore (1997), despite their differences, tend to agree on the categorization of communications policy according to the degree of state intervention. The term dirigisme for example has been used to describe a philosophy of active state involvement in policy matters, especially in the European Union terrain, as opposed to laissez-faire policies (Collins 1994; Harcourt 2005; Moore 1997; etc.). It is certainly the case, however, that regulating for a neoliberalist framework of media policies involves at least as much state intervention as in the cases of dirigisme. Or, as several scholars have pointed out, deregulation of communications has required a new set of regulations (for example, Humphreys 1996), so that we are actually referring to reregulation. The politics of neoliberalism has succeeded in defining the ways in which we debate the role of the state in communications policy to a rather significant degree. Dirigisme is considered an ill, to be avoided at any cost in international relations and global policy as some of the most influential neoliberal think tanks advise (e.g. Bandow 1994). The state here is presented as ‘corrupt’ in the case of the ‘developing’ world, not to be trusted with funds or other support by the ‘international community’ or, in the case of the ‘developed’ countries, as a rather asphyxiating paternalistic nanny that hinders progress and individual freedom. In this book, we try and map the shifting role of the nation-state in relation to the market and society, paying attention to structural similarities as well as historical specificities of this process. Scholars have attempted to address this changing role, often indirectly by mapping out the institutional changes that take place at the national level, as direct responses to the profound pressures of the processes of globalization. Within the field of communications and media studies, there has been a growing interest in studying cultural and media policymaking, where scholars have focused their attention on the shifting and historically specific relationships between states, markets and social actors who make policy (Lewis and Miller 2002). Also, scholars have concerned themselves not only with the macro-level questions of globalization, neoliberalism and the role of the media (McChesney 2004) but also with ‘meso-level’ issues of institutional arrangements and policymaking. So for example, Mansell (2001, 2002) points to the institutional processes, strategies and rhetoric to define policy problems related to the ‘new media’; Abramson and Raboy (1999) explore the institutional responses of the Canadian state to adapt to the definitions and visions of a global information society; Hamelink (1995) analyses the institutional interactions of international organizations in the process of determining policy paradigms. International and supranational policy developments continue to attract the attention of scholars and activists. More recently,
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STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA POLICY 17<br />
aims, means <strong>and</strong> scope’ (2003: 186); the second period between the Second<br />
World War <strong>and</strong> the 1980s/1990s characterized by the public-service<br />
media paradigm <strong>and</strong> shaped according to political <strong>and</strong> normative – rather<br />
than technological – considerations; <strong>and</strong> the third is the current period<br />
of ‘communications policy’ where the issue of technological <strong>and</strong> economic<br />
convergence is expressed through decision-making that reflects<br />
the connection of telecommunications <strong>and</strong> media. The authors’ basis is<br />
that these distinct periods have produced media <strong>and</strong> communications<br />
policy that correspond to particular perceptions of the state about the<br />
role of the media. During the first period then, they argue, only the press<br />
was seen to have a political, normative function <strong>and</strong> it was only regulated<br />
with rights to report freely on current social <strong>and</strong> political affairs (freedom<br />
of expression). The second period perceived the electronic media as of<br />
political <strong>and</strong> social significance (given their use throughout the Second<br />
World War) <strong>and</strong> extended the pursuit of national cohesion <strong>and</strong> stability<br />
(2003: 191). According to the authors, media policy was dominated by<br />
sociopolitical rather than economic concerns (2003: 191). The current<br />
third period is one where ‘pragmatism <strong>and</strong> populism increasingly drive<br />
policy’ (2003: 197) especially following the ‘ “decline in ideology” <strong>and</strong><br />
the fall of Communism, the increased scope <strong>and</strong> respectability of the free<br />
market <strong>and</strong> the shift to the right in European politics’ (2003: 197). As van<br />
Cuilenburg <strong>and</strong> McQuail rightly point out, in the European terrain, the<br />
communications policy philosophy is based on the idea of the market,<br />
which is not dissimilar to the priorities of US communications policy<br />
<strong>and</strong> indeed policies imposed by the World Bank <strong>and</strong> the IMF on the<br />
‘developing’ world. The authors ‘predict’ three core values in an emerging<br />
communications paradigm: freedom of communication, access <strong>and</strong><br />
accountability (2003: 203).<br />
From the other side of the Atlantic, Marc Raboy (1995), writing about<br />
the public-broadcasting media, echoes some of these predictions. For<br />
Raboy, if the public-service broadcasting system is to have any future, it<br />
would need to pursue <strong>and</strong> achieve a status of accountability in the era of<br />
fierce competition from private broadcasters. As he notes ‘the promotion<br />
of the public interest can only come through regulation guaranteeing<br />
system access for all with something to communicate, as well as for receivers’(1995:14).<br />
Both sets of authors seem to argue for state intervention<br />
in the media market but not state control over them. Indeed, state intervention<br />
has been identified in terms of policy – whether as a positive or<br />
negative strategy – as a determining factor in shaping the course of policy<br />
philosophy <strong>and</strong> ideology, objectives <strong>and</strong> output.<br />
Communications policy scholars, such as Abramson <strong>and</strong> Raboy (1999);<br />
Collins (1994, 2003); Harcourt (2005); Harrison <strong>and</strong> Woods (2001);