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BROADCASTING POLICY 95 support and care for its public cultural institutions. As many scholars and activists argue, the segregation of policy between ‘profitable’ commercial (telecommunications, digital technologies) and non-profitable (PSB, cultures and arts) sectors compounds to the institutional weakening of the policy-making trajectory for PSBs. The chronic underfunding of the arts in general with which often PSBs are closely linked is a direct symptom of this problem. Industry Canada has deeper pockets and greater negotiating power and is much closer to commercial actors with considerable effectiveness in representing their interests at the policy level. The same cannot be said for the Department of Canadian Heritage, which deals with the softer ‘cultural’ dimensions of policy. The case of Canada shows the immense difficulties that PSBs and non-commercial communications organizations generally face in a climate of increased liberalization. Something old, something new? Defending and seeking public service In this global environment, the EU Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam is a lonely but significant statement about the role of public media services and their relationship to citizens. The protocol was the result of a fierce struggle of an alliance among competing actors (state, broadcasters and civil society) that saw in the prescriptive actions of the Commission and the private sector the danger of losing control over public service broadcasting. At the same time, at a symbolic level, the concept of public property and public, free from commercial interests, communicative space is seen to come under attack anew (Sarikakis 2004c). However, although commercial media have a simple and powerful argument for their legitimacy, the logic of profit making and consumer sovereignty, public service actors are juggling with a variety of national and cultural mandates that can be impossible to fulfil. Hoffmann-Riem (1996); Burgelman and Perceval (1996); Jakubowicz (1996); Vipond and Jackson (2002); and Born (2003), among others, point out the difficult, yet crucial, role that PSBs are called to play in the current era of a reregulated competitiondriven communications market. PSBs are called to provide programming that helps build cultural cohesion, yet offer a forum for the representation of ‘minorities’ and special groups, succeed in providing balanced political coverage and educational programmes, fulfil journalistic values of impartiality and objectivity and act as a watchdog of the government. A public service broadcasting system is expected to cater for quality and work for universality. It is also seen as one of the most important ‘commons’ alongside independent and community media. Its role in safeguarding democracy or at least its role in serving as an indicator of democratic
96 MEDIA POLICY AND GLOBALIZATION participation belong to the normative debate regarding the future of PSBs as well as constituting part of their assessment. Although the functions of the public service broadcasters are relevant or fulfilled at various degrees in various countries, they remain common characteristics that distinguish this form of broadcasting from the commercial one. Across Europe, but also in countries with similar concerns of financial viability, this domination of US-originated content in domestic markets, political dependence and the shrinking of the social ‘safety’ net, in the form of the welfare state, have severely destabilized the position of PSBs in domestic politics and society. This is manifested in attempts to change the structural organization of PSBs (exemplified in the case of the BBC) and reevaluate the conditions under which PSBs are supported in their mandate. Not only Western Europe but also the ‘transitional’ democracies of Eastern Europe are facing these dilemmas. The liberalization of the communications sector has affected PSBs at multiple fronts. In several Eastern European countries, the transition of their social and economic organization into a system that embraces Western capitalism has proved wrong in its claims that media market liberalization goes hand in hand with democratic media as the dominance of political elites over state media continued undisturbed. This time, the new discourse bases its legitimacy on the ideas that PSBs are pivotal in ensuring diversity, an idea that is used ‘as a cover for paternal or authoritarian communication systems’ (Williams 1976: 134, cited in Splichal 1995: 63). New political elites (some of which derive from the previous regime) base their rule over the media on the rhetoric of ‘ “democratic” organs of the new “pluralistic” party state, that is, in the same way it was regarded by the old authorities’ (Splichal 1995: 63). The emergence of public service broadcasting systems adhering to the ideals of servicing the public rather than the state is caught between state control and the market and there is little evidence to suggest that a social or public broadcasting system is flourishing in Eastern Europe (Jakubowicz 1996; Vartanova and Zassoursky 1995; Zernetskaya 1996). In most Eastern European countries, broadcasting policies have been successful in introducing media liberalization to their system but have failed to articulate an ‘idealistic’ form of public service broadcasting, the ‘civic’ or ‘social’ broadcasting system that has been the aim of critics of the old regime (Jakubowicz 2004). Instead, a ‘transfusion’ of Western guidelines and formats was introduced that is not compatible with the participatory model of public broadcasting envisioned by the intelligentsia – and not necessarily the civil society, if we accept that there is a lack of such a society, at least as understood in the West. Nor does it manage to overcome the problems of control by political elites. Differences in the political but also professional, in particular journalistic, cultures in central and eastern
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BROADCASTING POLICY 95<br />
support <strong>and</strong> care for its public cultural institutions. As many scholars <strong>and</strong><br />
activists argue, the segregation of policy between ‘profitable’ commercial<br />
(telecommunications, digital technologies) <strong>and</strong> non-profitable (PSB, cultures<br />
<strong>and</strong> arts) sectors compounds to the institutional weakening of the<br />
policy-making trajectory for PSBs. The chronic underfunding of the arts<br />
in general with which often PSBs are closely linked is a direct symptom<br />
of this problem. Industry Canada has deeper pockets <strong>and</strong> greater negotiating<br />
power <strong>and</strong> is much closer to commercial actors with considerable<br />
effectiveness in representing their interests at the policy level. The same<br />
cannot be said for the Department of Canadian Heritage, which deals<br />
with the softer ‘cultural’ dimensions of policy. The case of Canada shows<br />
the immense difficulties that PSBs <strong>and</strong> non-commercial communications<br />
organizations generally face in a climate of increased liberalization.<br />
Something old, something new? Defending<br />
<strong>and</strong> seeking public service<br />
In this global environment, the EU Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam<br />
is a lonely but significant statement about the role of public media services<br />
<strong>and</strong> their relationship to citizens. The protocol was the result of a<br />
fierce struggle of an alliance among competing actors (state, broadcasters<br />
<strong>and</strong> civil society) that saw in the prescriptive actions of the Commission<br />
<strong>and</strong> the private sector the danger of losing control over public service<br />
broadcasting. At the same time, at a symbolic level, the concept of public<br />
property <strong>and</strong> public, free from commercial interests, communicative<br />
space is seen to come under attack anew (Sarikakis 2004c). However, although<br />
commercial media have a simple <strong>and</strong> powerful argument for their<br />
legitimacy, the logic of profit making <strong>and</strong> consumer sovereignty, public<br />
service actors are juggling with a variety of national <strong>and</strong> cultural m<strong>and</strong>ates<br />
that can be impossible to fulfil. Hoffmann-Riem (1996); Burgelman<br />
<strong>and</strong> Perceval (1996); Jakubowicz (1996); Vipond <strong>and</strong> Jackson (2002); <strong>and</strong><br />
Born (2003), among others, point out the difficult, yet crucial, role that<br />
PSBs are called to play in the current era of a reregulated competitiondriven<br />
communications market. PSBs are called to provide programming<br />
that helps build cultural cohesion, yet offer a forum for the representation<br />
of ‘minorities’ <strong>and</strong> special groups, succeed in providing balanced political<br />
coverage <strong>and</strong> educational programmes, fulfil journalistic values of impartiality<br />
<strong>and</strong> objectivity <strong>and</strong> act as a watchdog of the government. A public<br />
service broadcasting system is expected to cater for quality <strong>and</strong> work<br />
for universality. It is also seen as one of the most important ‘commons’<br />
alongside independent <strong>and</strong> community media. Its role in safeguarding<br />
democracy or at least its role in serving as an indicator of democratic
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