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Bondarenko Dmitri M. Homoarchy

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27<br />

Eisenstatdt (1971: 74, 76) emphasizes, states and non-states differ not in<br />

presence or absence of political centralization but in “… the degree of<br />

structural differentiation with which they present themselves. … Primitive<br />

societies can therefore be said to have a decentralized centrality – if this<br />

expression is not too paradoxical.” “A state administration, from this<br />

perspective, is inherently bureaucratic”, Spencer (2003: 11185) resumes (see<br />

also Flannery 1972: 403; Cohen 1978a; 1978b: 36; Britan and Cohen 1983;<br />

Spencer and Redmond 2004: 173).<br />

4. The Weber’s legacy: bureaucracy, violence, legitimation, and political<br />

community<br />

Indeed, what makes the administrative apparatus specialized? It becomes<br />

specialized when it is “filled” with professional (i.e., permanent and full-time)<br />

administrators thus forming bureaucracy. As it is well known, that was Max<br />

Weber who elaborated the most authoritative concept of bureaucracy (see, e.g.,<br />

Vitkin 1981) and his ideas form an implicit or explicit background for most of<br />

influential modern theories of the state (though implicitly the idea of<br />

professional administration as a distinctive feature of the state was singled out<br />

in anthropology rather long before him, particularly by Morgan [1877]:<br />

actually, this is what he meant writing about separation of power from the<br />

populace as the second of the state’s three distinctive features; as it is well<br />

known, also before Weber this idea was developed in Morgan’s vein and under<br />

his direct influence by Engels [1985/1884]). While not all the famous Weber’s<br />

ten features of bureaucracy can be applied to preindustrial states (vide stricto<br />

Shifferd 1987: 48–49) 17 , mainly because his definition is based on executive<br />

and decision-making functions only (Morony 1987: 9–10), and although it is<br />

stressed sometimes (recently, e.g., by Claessen and Oosten [1996c: 5–6;<br />

Claessen 2003: 162], Kristiansen [1998: 45, 46], Johnson, A. W. and Earle<br />

[2000: 248], Chabal, Feinman, and Skalnнk [2004: 28], Christian [2004: 273–<br />

274], and Kradin [2004: 179]) that bureaucracy can be poorly developed in<br />

early states, it must be admitted that it still has to present as such if a given<br />

society is attributed as a state.<br />

Recently Alain Testart (2004) has made an attempt to create a theory<br />

of the “prebureaucratic” state which, within the theory’s framework,<br />

historically preceded the “bureaucratic state” while sometimes the former<br />

actually never transformed into the latter due to these or those particular<br />

circumstances which varied from case to case. The political system in nonbureaucratic<br />

states is based, according to Testart, on personal fidelity to a<br />

monarch of his retinue, royal slaves and “brothers by blood” being the closest<br />

to him, followed by clients, mercenaries, refugees, and debtors. With respect to<br />

this theory I shall note that it definitely captures an important mechanism of the<br />

process of state formation, before him most clearly represented in literature on<br />

state formation in medieval Europe with respect to political leaders’ military

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