Bondarenko Dmitri M. Homoarchy
Bondarenko Dmitri M. Homoarchy Bondarenko Dmitri M. Homoarchy
92 not by a group of brothers [see Bromley 1981: 202–210] 71 ), a basically communal complex society can well turn out not less homoarchic than even a preindustrial state which in principle cannot be built up by a community matrix as no community type presupposes administering by professionals (as well as taxation – a specifically state’s way of getting means for paying those specifically state’s administrators). The process of community leaders’ specialization in administration “from spare time to part time to full time” may be launched only from outside the community – by the supracommunity political institutions (Befu 1966). One could doubt that the family size really affects the community’s heterarchy on the following grounds. As is well known, there is a curvilinear relationship between family size and cultural complexity: the small families are more typical for both the most simple and most complex societies, whereas the large extended ones are for the medium complexity societies (Nimkoff and Middleton 1960; Osmond 1969; Blumberg and Winch 1972; McNett 1973; Levinson and Malone 1980: 86–87; Ember, C. R. and Levinson 1991: 83). However, the correlation between the number of levels of political hierarchy above the community and the family size (considered as a proper and verifiable criterion of a society’s cultural complexity level) turned out significantly positive (a fast growth of the proportion of large extended families in relation to small ones with the formation of the supracommunity levels) for simpler societies (Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000c: table 3), whereas we got a significant negative correlation for more complex ones (Ibid.: table 4). The supposition that the family size influences the community’s heterarchy / homoarchy not directly but through the factor of the very degree of community’s complexity is also discredited by our results: the community’s complexity and the family size affect the community’s heterarchy / homoarchy rather independently (Ibid.: tables 19 – 22). Similarly to the family size, polygyny affects the community’s heterarchy negatively. In general, monogamous societies appear to have democratic communities significantly more frequently than the polygynous ones (Korotayev and Bondarenko 2000a: table 2). Like the family size, the polygyny also significantly correlates with such indicators of cultural complexity as the number of supracommunity levels and community / settlement size (Ibid.: tables 3, 4). As it was with the family size, there are grounds to maintain that polygyny is related to the community heterarchy relatively independently from the factor of cultural complexity. In general, the family structure (determined in its turn by a large number of independent factors, both material, e.g. economic, and ideal, e.g. religious) can affect significantly the overall socio-political type and evolutionary trend of the respective societies. The family structure affects primarily organization of the community through its associated socialization practices (Ibid.: 197–201; see also Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000b) while, in
- Page 134: 67 embracing kinship terminology (a
- Page 138: 69 territorial ties turned out hard
- Page 142: 71 Bondarenko 1993b: 193-194; 1998c
- Page 146: 73 appointed or confirmed outside t
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- Page 166: 83 So, none of the territorial unit
- Page 170: 85 might and wealth (Talbot 1926: I
- Page 174: 87 total observation of the age and
- Page 178: 89 in the late 1 st millennium BC -
- Page 182: 91 V How to Call Benin? 1. The loca
- Page 188: 94 1998: 26-27). However, even ther
- Page 192: 96 fact, from the viewpoint of soci
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- Page 204: 102 revealed themselves especially
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92<br />
not by a group of brothers [see Bromley 1981: 202–210] 71 ), a basically<br />
communal complex society can well turn out not less homoarchic than even a<br />
preindustrial state which in principle cannot be built up by a community matrix<br />
as no community type presupposes administering by professionals (as well as<br />
taxation – a specifically state’s way of getting means for paying those<br />
specifically state’s administrators). The process of community leaders’<br />
specialization in administration “from spare time to part time to full time” may<br />
be launched only from outside the community – by the supracommunity<br />
political institutions (Befu 1966).<br />
One could doubt that the family size really affects the community’s<br />
heterarchy on the following grounds. As is well known, there is a curvilinear<br />
relationship between family size and cultural complexity: the small families are<br />
more typical for both the most simple and most complex societies, whereas the<br />
large extended ones are for the medium complexity societies (Nimkoff and<br />
Middleton 1960; Osmond 1969; Blumberg and Winch 1972; McNett 1973;<br />
Levinson and Malone 1980: 86–87; Ember, C. R. and Levinson 1991: 83).<br />
However, the correlation between the number of levels of political hierarchy<br />
above the community and the family size (considered as a proper and verifiable<br />
criterion of a society’s cultural complexity level) turned out significantly<br />
positive (a fast growth of the proportion of large extended families in relation to<br />
small ones with the formation of the supracommunity levels) for simpler<br />
societies (<strong>Bondarenko</strong> and Korotayev 2000c: table 3), whereas we got a<br />
significant negative correlation for more complex ones (Ibid.: table 4). The<br />
supposition that the family size influences the community’s heterarchy /<br />
homoarchy not directly but through the factor of the very degree of<br />
community’s complexity is also discredited by our results: the community’s<br />
complexity and the family size affect the community’s heterarchy / homoarchy<br />
rather independently (Ibid.: tables 19 – 22).<br />
Similarly to the family size, polygyny affects the community’s<br />
heterarchy negatively. In general, monogamous societies appear to have<br />
democratic communities significantly more frequently than the polygynous<br />
ones (Korotayev and <strong>Bondarenko</strong> 2000a: table 2). Like the family size, the<br />
polygyny also significantly correlates with such indicators of cultural<br />
complexity as the number of supracommunity levels and community /<br />
settlement size (Ibid.: tables 3, 4). As it was with the family size, there are<br />
grounds to maintain that polygyny is related to the community heterarchy<br />
relatively independently from the factor of cultural complexity.<br />
In general, the family structure (determined in its turn by a large<br />
number of independent factors, both material, e.g. economic, and ideal, e.g.<br />
religious) can affect significantly the overall socio-political type and<br />
evolutionary trend of the respective societies. The family structure affects<br />
primarily organization of the community through its associated socialization<br />
practices (Ibid.: 197–201; see also <strong>Bondarenko</strong> and Korotayev 2000b) while, in