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0 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 1<br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia<br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania<br />
Honorary Consulate of Latvia in Bucharest<br />
The Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies<br />
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS<br />
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS<br />
(1918-1958)<br />
Edited by<br />
Silviu Miloiu, Ēriks Jēkabsons<br />
Laima Jēkabsone, Alexandru Ghişa
Translations:<br />
Eva Eihmane: Latvian to English<br />
S.C. Acta.Doc SRL: Romanian to English<br />
Cover: Dan Mărgărit<br />
Desktop-publishing: Mihaela Moagher<br />
Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naţionale a României<br />
The Romanian-Latvians <strong>relations</strong> : <strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>documents</strong> : 1918-<br />
1958 /<br />
Silviu Miloiu, Ēriks Jēkabsons, Laima Jēkabsone, Alexandru Ghişa<br />
–<br />
Târgovişte : Cetatea de Scaun, 2012<br />
ISBN 978-606-537-149-1<br />
I. Miloiu, Silviu<br />
II. Jēkabsons, Ēriks<br />
III. Jēkabsone, Laima<br />
IV. Ghişa, Alexandru<br />
327(498:474.3)<br />
94(498:474.3)<br />
Volumul apare cu sprijinul Administrației Fondului Cultural Național<br />
Prețul unui exemplar este de: 40,60 ron fara tva<br />
© ARSBN, Targoviste, 2012<br />
ISBN 978-606-537-149-1<br />
Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgovişte, 2012<br />
Tel./Fax.: 0245 218318; email: editura@cetateadescaun.ro www.cetateadescaun.ro
Table of Contents<br />
Preface ..................................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Editors’ note and acknowledgements ............................................................................ 17<br />
List of <strong>documents</strong> ............................................................................................................... 19<br />
Documents ........................................................................................................................... 39<br />
Proper Names Index ....................................................................................................... 480
Preface<br />
By <strong>the</strong> mid of <strong>the</strong> 1920s <strong>the</strong> concept of Border States had already been established in <strong>the</strong><br />
political and <strong>diplomatic</strong> vocabulary of European chancelleries. It referred to <strong>the</strong> belt of<br />
countries from Finland to <strong>the</strong> north and down to Romania to <strong>the</strong> south, neighbouring <strong>the</strong><br />
most ideologically charged border of Europe. It stood witness of a divided Europe,<br />
functioning at differing speeds and acting based on most urgent security needs and<br />
concerns. While <strong>the</strong> dialogue between Western and Central Europe was unlocked at least<br />
temporarily following <strong>the</strong> Locarno Pact (1925), <strong>the</strong> Border States persisted to be widely seen<br />
as a locus of clash between <strong>the</strong> old bourgeoisie world and <strong>the</strong> rising communist one. The<br />
countries situated on this belt were still in search of <strong>diplomatic</strong> and political tools to back<br />
up stability and regional balance. The Polish-Romanian and <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Estonian political<br />
and military alliances, set up in 1921, were <strong>the</strong> foundations of international order in <strong>the</strong><br />
area, and plans to merge <strong>the</strong>m into a grand Border States league continued to be nurtured<br />
although with less enthusiasm than it had been done a few years earlier. The Declaration of<br />
Common Aims of <strong>the</strong> Independent Mid-European nations adopted in <strong>the</strong> convention<br />
assembled at Independence Hall of Philadelphia in 1918 remained a generous statement of<br />
goodwill but a chimera in practical terms. Particularly <strong>the</strong> Polish-Lithuanian confrontation with<br />
regard to <strong>the</strong> belonging of <strong>the</strong> historical capital of <strong>the</strong> Grand Duchy of Lithuania proved to be<br />
Achilles' heel of Border States solidarity. It paved <strong>the</strong> way to German and Soviet policy of Divide<br />
et Impera and backfired <strong>the</strong> creation of a Baltic union or a Border States league spanned<br />
between Helsinki and Bucharest. The lack of mutual knowledge, particularly when it comes to<br />
Romanian-Baltic or Romanian-Finnish relation, <strong>the</strong> divergent national aspirations, <strong>the</strong><br />
ideological clashes, Polish bossy attitude in <strong>the</strong> region stood in <strong>the</strong> way of reaching an<br />
agreement between <strong>the</strong> small and mid-sized nations situated in <strong>the</strong> area. The answer to <strong>the</strong><br />
question what to do with Soviet Russia also evoked conflicting answers. The Right typically<br />
believed that Russia should be closely monitored but surrounded by a cordon sanitaire. It<br />
should not be allowed to participate in decisions ei<strong>the</strong>r at regional or European level. The Left<br />
customarily had a different opinion. It sought for rapprochement between East and West in<br />
order to safeguard not solely <strong>the</strong>ir independence but <strong>the</strong>ir economy and trade, too. The<br />
Baltic Left placed emphasis on <strong>the</strong> economic gains to be achieved from <strong>the</strong> restoration of<br />
trade between Europe and Russia. Torn between conflicting aspirations, it was never easy<br />
to find a lasting reconciliation between <strong>the</strong> Border States and <strong>the</strong> USSR. The Soviet policy<br />
would not encourage that, too, transmitting conflicting signals to its neighbours also given<br />
<strong>the</strong> twofold policy of <strong>the</strong> Soviet state and <strong>the</strong> Third International. Even when <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Union proclaimed its support for <strong>the</strong> international order based on Paris peace treaties, <strong>the</strong><br />
Komintern continued to be perceived as an instrument devised to weaken resistance of <strong>the</strong><br />
Border States from inside. By 1928, <strong>the</strong> Briand-Kellogg Pact was signed and <strong>the</strong> same year<br />
Romania opened a Legation in Riga, <strong>the</strong> biggest town in Baltic States, centrally located on<br />
<strong>the</strong> flow of information concerning <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. But what was <strong>the</strong> intention behind<br />
Romania’s interest to establish a permanent legation on <strong>the</strong> eastern shores of <strong>the</strong> Baltic?
6 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
To answer this question, we have to fare ten years back in time when <strong>the</strong> independent<br />
states of Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Moldovan Democratic Republic were given birth from <strong>the</strong> ashes of<br />
<strong>the</strong> succumbing empire of Russia. The former emerged as an independent state from a<br />
combination of domestic ideological clashes and armed expulsion of foreign intruders. The<br />
young state gained international recognition from, inter alia, <strong>the</strong> inheritor of <strong>the</strong> former<br />
mo<strong>the</strong>r country, Soviet Russia, according to <strong>the</strong> Peace Treaty of August 11 th , 1920. The<br />
Supreme Council of Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Belgium) on<br />
January 26 th , 1921, <strong>the</strong> Kingdom of Romania on February, 15 th 1921 (communicated to Latvia<br />
on February 26 th ), <strong>the</strong> United States of America (July 1922) and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r sovereign nations<br />
on <strong>the</strong> globe gave a few years later <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>diplomatic</strong> recognition to <strong>the</strong> country situated on<br />
<strong>the</strong> eastern shores of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea. The Moldovan Democratic Republic had but a brief<br />
existence and grasped <strong>the</strong> first opportunity to join <strong>the</strong>ir fellow Romanians in <strong>the</strong> Kingdom<br />
of Romania on April 9 th (or Old Calendar: March 27 th ) 105 years after <strong>the</strong>ir separation from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Principality of Moldova. The unification was backed at <strong>the</strong> time by <strong>the</strong> Central Powers<br />
in <strong>the</strong>ir power game in <strong>the</strong> Balkans and in Eastern Europe. It was eventually recognized<br />
internationally by <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Paris of October 28 th , 1920 signed by France, Great Britain,<br />
Italy, Japan and Romania, but never ratified by <strong>the</strong> Land of Rising Sun and strongly<br />
denounced by Soviet Russia. In fact, <strong>the</strong> need to secure <strong>the</strong> belonging of Bessarabia to<br />
Romania and <strong>the</strong> ideological threat posed by <strong>the</strong> Soviet policy by spreading its ideological<br />
values constituted <strong>the</strong> fundamentals of Bucharest’s eastern policy. This created immediate<br />
incentives of cooperation with <strong>the</strong> states situated on <strong>the</strong> western border of Soviet Russia,<br />
and not in <strong>the</strong> least with Latvia.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> inter-state dialogue between Latvia and Romania begun in <strong>the</strong> early 1920s, it<br />
already had incentives and needs of two societies to answer. One of <strong>the</strong> first areas of<br />
cooperation was in terms of humanitarian relief granted to <strong>the</strong> large number of soldiers<br />
and civilians caught by <strong>the</strong> Civil War on Russian territory. With <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> Nansen<br />
Commission, various relief agencies and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States 18,373 Romanians, 88% of whom<br />
had travelled through <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, reached <strong>the</strong>ir homes in <strong>the</strong> aftermath of World War I. 1<br />
Similarly Latvian refugees were repatriated to <strong>the</strong>ir country using Romanian territory, as<br />
this volume of <strong>documents</strong> demonstrates.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> atrocities of <strong>the</strong> Russian Civil War threatened <strong>the</strong> very existence of <strong>the</strong>se refugees<br />
and POWs, <strong>the</strong> Soviet policy of “export of revolution” endangered <strong>the</strong> stability and<br />
sovereignty of <strong>the</strong> neighbouring countries which sought means to safeguard <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
existence. Their geopolitical position was not enviable by any possible means. Latvia,<br />
central among <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, sometimes considered as <strong>the</strong> only Baltic nation due to<br />
Estonia’s bonds to Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Europe and Lithuania’s connections to Central Europe, is<br />
linked up with <strong>the</strong> sea and with <strong>the</strong> river of Daugava which connects it to <strong>the</strong> inner areas of<br />
western Russia. This historically encouraged <strong>the</strong> inflow of people towards and from <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic Sea. Latvia’s situation was also affected by <strong>the</strong> fact that it possessed <strong>the</strong> only western<br />
ice-free ports for <strong>the</strong> Russian hinterland. The Latvian harbours of Ventspils, Riga and<br />
Liepāja have traditionally played an important role in connecting <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea human<br />
1<br />
Silviu Miloiu, "The Baltic escape from hell. The Nansen Office and <strong>the</strong> Romanian POWs (1919-1921)." Valahian<br />
Journal of Historical Studies 15 (2011): 65-82.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 7<br />
communities. 1 It must also be emphasized that in <strong>the</strong> case of Latvia a large share of its<br />
population lived in one single city, <strong>the</strong> capital Riga.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, Romania, although a larger (295,000 sq.km), better populated (over<br />
19 million inhabitants in 1939) country enjoying wider recognition on international arena,<br />
was not faring better during <strong>the</strong> interwar period. The length of its frontiers was no less than<br />
3,400 km and three of its neighbours harboured revisionist aims against Romanian<br />
territory: <strong>the</strong> USSR, Hungary and Bulgaria. Moreover, its natural riches attracted <strong>the</strong><br />
interest of o<strong>the</strong>r powers such as Germany. 2<br />
Alike Latvia, Romania also placed its trust in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and concluded<br />
regional alliances such as <strong>the</strong> Little Entente (1920-1921), <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish Alliance<br />
(March 1921) and <strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente (February 1934), some of which served as a model for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic Entente which will be finally concluded among <strong>the</strong> Baltic States in 1934. It, too,<br />
lost its trust into <strong>the</strong> League of Nations by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1930s and attempted a policy of<br />
balance between <strong>the</strong> Great Powers. 3 Romania was <strong>the</strong> Little Entente’s most devoted<br />
member just like Latvia was <strong>the</strong> most faithful member of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Entente. Romania<br />
shared <strong>the</strong> concern of both Soviet and German designs, although it was more afraid of<br />
Soviet revisionism than of German imperialism. Control over <strong>the</strong> Black Sea was also a long<br />
term concern of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union as it was <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea. Both Romania and<br />
Latvia’s interests were better served if <strong>the</strong> sea was not under <strong>the</strong> control of any Great Power<br />
and <strong>the</strong> connection to wide sea was maintained. Latvia could but remember that it was by<br />
sea that it had received <strong>the</strong> essential British help that supported it safeguard its<br />
independence in <strong>the</strong> aftermath of WWI.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong>se prerequisites, Latvia and Romania had a rich common agenda. Indeed, at<br />
<strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> interwar period projects had been under way for concluding a grand<br />
alliance binding Poland, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and Finland toge<strong>the</strong>r, sometimes talks being held<br />
on joining <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish alliance to this system. Between 1919 and 1926 thirty-one<br />
conferences were held among <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, Finland and Poland (or some of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
countries) at various levels, only one of which, held in September 1922 in Warsaw, was<br />
attended by Romania. 4 Romania and Latvia were co-signatories on April 1 st 1925 of The<br />
protocol concerning informative cooperation against Soviet Union and started to exchange<br />
information about issues such as <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union’s troop deployment, <strong>the</strong> strategic<br />
situation <strong>the</strong>reof etc. 5 Talks about an extension of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish alliance to <strong>the</strong><br />
eastern Baltic shores or <strong>the</strong> merging of <strong>the</strong> aforementioned alliance with a Baltic Union<br />
were topical at <strong>the</strong> beginning of 1920s and continued to be so for a decade despite <strong>the</strong><br />
Finnish decision to pull out of this cooperation in 1922. Public speeches, newspapers<br />
interviews, handling of ceremonies such as <strong>the</strong> award of credentials to <strong>the</strong> Heads of States<br />
1<br />
Joseph S. Roucek, “Geopolitical Trends in Central-Eastern Europe”, The Annals of <strong>the</strong> American Academy of<br />
Political and Social Science 271 (1950): 12-13.<br />
2<br />
Petre Otu, “Situaţia geopolitică a României în anii 1939-1940. Consideraţii de ordin militar,” E.I. Emandi, Gh.<br />
Buzatu, V.S. Cucu , eds, Geopolitica, vol. 1 (Iaşi: Glasul Bucovinei 1994): 476-477.<br />
3<br />
This is treated in Rebecca Haynes, Romanian Policy Towards Germany, 1936-40 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).<br />
4<br />
Marko Lehti, A Baltic League as a construct of <strong>the</strong> New Europe. Envisioning a Baltic region and small state<br />
sovereignty in <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> First World War (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999), 547-548<br />
5<br />
Centrul pentru Studierea şi Păstrarea Arhivelor Militare Istorice, Piteşti [Center for <strong>the</strong> Study and Preservation of<br />
Historical Military Archives], Fund Ministerul Apărării, Cabinetul Ministrului [Defence Ministry. The Cabinet of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Minister], vol. 91/1925, sheets 18-29
8 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
occasioned <strong>the</strong> voicing of <strong>the</strong> shared aims of <strong>the</strong>se nations. They professed “Soviet<br />
exception” with regard to disarmament plans put forward in <strong>the</strong> 1920s. Thereby, <strong>the</strong> Border<br />
States underlined <strong>the</strong> huge risk of <strong>the</strong>ir disarming in a situation where Soviet Union was<br />
undertaking a rearming policy and where <strong>the</strong> Soviet arsenal could not be assessed in any<br />
possible way. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> Border States insisted on a common handling of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong><br />
with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, although this gentlemen’s agreement looked better on paper than in<br />
reality.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, this solidarity did not restrain <strong>the</strong> Border States when <strong>the</strong> need was felt<br />
for negotiating and concluding separate treaties or economic agreements with <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Union. Sometimes a certain Border State had to hold out to <strong>the</strong> pressure exerted on <strong>the</strong>m<br />
by o<strong>the</strong>rs as it was <strong>the</strong> case with <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> demarche of Romanian, Polish, Estonian<br />
and Finnish envoys in early February 1932 designed to postpone Latvia’s signing of nonaggression<br />
treaties with Soviet Union (<strong>documents</strong> 64 and 65 in this volume).<br />
As a new state on <strong>the</strong> international arena, Latvia was interested after 1918 in integrating<br />
itself into <strong>the</strong> existing system of international <strong>relations</strong> before attempting to domesticate<br />
<strong>the</strong>m based on Latvian interests. The Romanian Government also approved Latvia’s<br />
proposal to appoint a diplomat to Bucharest in <strong>the</strong> person of its envoy with residence in<br />
Warsaw. This was achieved in May 1922 and <strong>the</strong> Latvian representation in Romania will<br />
remain entrusted to <strong>the</strong> Legation in Warsaw for much of <strong>the</strong> interwar period. 1 The first<br />
Latvian diplomat to fill <strong>the</strong> position of envoy to Bucharest was Martiņš Nukša (1878-1942).<br />
An architect by training 2 , Nukša commenced his <strong>diplomatic</strong> career in 1920 with an<br />
appointment to Paris as First Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Legation. He was eventually assigned<br />
in 1921 as envoy to Warsaw. After having been appointed to Romania (where he was<br />
accredited until March 1930), he also received <strong>the</strong> credentials for serving his country’s<br />
interests in Czechoslovakia in 1923 and Austria in 1925 with residence in <strong>the</strong> capital of<br />
Poland. When he started his <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Romania, this country had concluded,<br />
in March 1921, an alliance with Poland 3 and <strong>the</strong> possibility of enlarging this alliance along<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea shore was being assessed.<br />
Nukša will eventually be appointed for six years as <strong>the</strong> envoy of his country in<br />
Czechoslovakia (1933-1939) and in this capacity he was re-appointed to Bucharest in 1935<br />
with residence in Prague (November 1935 to May 1939). 4 Perhaps, this decision was taken as<br />
recognition of Romania’s worsening <strong>relations</strong> with Poland and <strong>the</strong> enhancing Romanian-<br />
Czechoslovakian bonds. By <strong>the</strong>n, Poland had improved its <strong>relations</strong> with Germany<br />
following <strong>the</strong> Non-Aggression Pact signed in January 1934 and Romania gravitated around<br />
<strong>the</strong> French-Czechoslovakian-Soviet constellation of powers. Being represented by <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe ([The Diplomatic Archives of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs] hereafter,<br />
DARMFA), fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. General, vol. 1, s. 2-4, Alexandru Florescu’s dispatch no. 12 of 11 July 1924;<br />
Idem, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940, The Legation, vol. 93, s. 1; Florin Anghel, “O încercare românească de politică<br />
baltică. România şi Letonia în perioada interbelică”, in Gheorghe Lazăr, Ovidiu Cristea, coord., Naţional şi<br />
universal în istoria românilor (Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică 1998), 437; Silviu Miloiu, România şi Ţările Baltice<br />
în perioada interbelică (Târgovişte: Ed. Cetatea de Scaun, 2003).<br />
2<br />
He is <strong>the</strong> author of an elegant apartment building in Art Nouveau fashion on Strēlnieku Street 2 in Riga<br />
3<br />
Pe larg la Florin Anghel, Construirea sistemului „Cordon sanitaire”. Relaţii româno-polone, 1919-1926 (Cluj-<br />
Napoca: Editura Nereamia Napocae, 2003).<br />
4<br />
Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale (The Romanian National Archives hereafter, RNA), fund Casa Regală-Regele<br />
Carol al II-lea. Mareşalat, file 140/1935, s. 251, Pro Memoria Martiņš Nukša; Ē. Jēkabsons, V. Ščerbinskis, Latvijas<br />
ārlietu dienesta darbinieki. 1918 – 1991 (Rīga, 2003), 217-218, 367.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 9<br />
envoy in Czechoslovakia was likely to be tantamount to receiving better information with<br />
regard to Romania’s foreign policy. Therefore, Nukša established a long-standing relation<br />
with Romania where he travelled every now and <strong>the</strong>n and reported to Riga based mostly on<br />
information he received from <strong>the</strong> Polish and eventually Czechoslovak political and<br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> circles.<br />
As Nukša was travelling only seldom to Romania in order to solve <strong>the</strong> current issues<br />
involving citizens of <strong>the</strong> two countries and <strong>the</strong>ir businesses, a network of consulates was<br />
established. The Consulate in Bucharest was funded in December 1923 and turned into a<br />
General Consulate in November 1928 until incorporation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States into Soviet<br />
Union in August 1940, when it was closed down. The position was held all <strong>the</strong>se years by<br />
Theodor Orghidan (born 1888) 1 . Orghidan was often delegated to attend public ceremonies<br />
on behalf of Latvia such as, for instance, <strong>the</strong> burial of King Ferdinand I in 1927. 2 In his<br />
capacity of Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Trade Chamber, he was also assigned <strong>the</strong> duty of streng<strong>the</strong>ning<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian export to Romania and solving <strong>the</strong> difficult bureaucratic hindrances standing in<br />
<strong>the</strong> way of its progress. Also, a Vice-Consulate was set up in Bucharest in November 1928 at<br />
<strong>the</strong> head of which Iuliu Sfetea (born 1898) was assigned. Consulates were also established<br />
for a short while in <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian city of Chişinău (August 1921-July 1922) with Jänis<br />
Viksne at its lead, in <strong>the</strong> Danubian harbour of Galaţi (November 1925-1940) headed by<br />
Panait Avghenio (born 1885) and in <strong>the</strong> Black Sea harbour of Constanţa (November 1926-<br />
1940) under Constantin Constantinescu (born 1883). The location of <strong>the</strong>se consulates<br />
reflect Latvian state’s interests in promoting to <strong>the</strong> maximum possible extent commercial<br />
ties with Romania given that exports of <strong>the</strong>se two countries where partly overlapping. 3<br />
The need to open a Romanian <strong>diplomatic</strong> and consular office was felt already in 1921<br />
when Romanian Bessarabians residing temporarily in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States (perhaps, among<br />
<strong>the</strong>m, also former POWs) were asking for visas to travel to Romania in order to regulate<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir juridical status. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs empowered <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation of<br />
Helsinki under <strong>the</strong> head of Dimitrie Plesnilă to deal with <strong>the</strong>se issues. 4 Soon, o<strong>the</strong>r issues<br />
surfaced that required <strong>the</strong> presence of a Romanian representative. Such was <strong>the</strong> case of a<br />
Romanian citizen expropriated without compensation according to <strong>the</strong> Latvian land<br />
reform. 5<br />
The Romanian envoy to Warsaw Alexandru Florescu (1863-1925) also pressed for <strong>the</strong><br />
opening of a legation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. Instead, <strong>the</strong> Romanian Government appointed<br />
1<br />
He may be one and <strong>the</strong> same person with Teodor Orghidan, descend of a well-known Transylvanian family, <strong>the</strong><br />
founder in 1919 of <strong>the</strong> first Romanian-US Chamber of Commerce where <strong>the</strong> most important banks where<br />
represented, Ion Stanciu, În umbra Europei. Relaţiile României cu Statele Unite în anii 1919-1939 (Bucureşti, 1996),<br />
37.<br />
2<br />
RNA, fund Casa Regală-Regele Ferdinand I, file 54/1925, Notification no. 41.558 of 24 July 1927 of <strong>the</strong> Direction of<br />
Personal, Protocol and Chancellary of <strong>the</strong> Orders to <strong>the</strong> Marshal of <strong>the</strong> Royal House.<br />
3<br />
DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Legation, Vol. 88 bis; Ē. Jēkabsons and V. Ščerbinskis, 387.<br />
4<br />
DARMFA, fund 82, Estonia, 1925-1940, vol. 88 bis, Tel. no. 466 of 26 August 1921 from <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in<br />
Stockholm (signed I.D. Conduraki).<br />
5<br />
Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. General, vol. 1, s. 2-4, dispatch no. 12 of 11 July 1924 from Romanian Legation in<br />
Riga. In fact, <strong>the</strong> Latvian land reform was one of <strong>the</strong> most radical in Europe, <strong>the</strong> manorial estates (belonging<br />
mostly to Baltic Germans) being distributed to as many Latvians as possible “for all Latvian farmers to feel at<br />
home”, Katrina Z. S. Schwartz, ''The Occupation of Beauty'': Imagining Nature and Nation in Latvia, East European<br />
Politics and Societies 21 (2007), 265.
10 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Florescu by Royal decree of March 21 st , 1924 as <strong>the</strong> first Romanian envoy to Riga with<br />
residence in <strong>the</strong> Polish capital. His mandate started on April 1 st . 1<br />
In a report of August 3 rd , 1924, <strong>the</strong> experienced diplomat Florescu confessed to <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that <strong>the</strong> Baltic States constituted a “marvellous observation<br />
point not only for what is going on in Russia but also in-between Germany and Russia”.<br />
Already in this report Florescu emphasized <strong>the</strong> geopolitical pressure over <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
He insisted for a legation to be established in Riga consisting of an envoy and a Legation<br />
secretary. In his opinion, Riga was best suited for this purpose because it was “more<br />
civilized” and centrally located. Florescu had been accredited to Warsaw from 13 August<br />
1921 and will be replaced in January 1925 by his deputy, Alexandru Iacovaky. 2<br />
In his first <strong>diplomatic</strong> dispatch from Riga, a copy of which was circulated to King<br />
Ferdinand I and to Prime Minister Ioan I.C. Brătianu, Florescu finds new arguments for<br />
opening a permanent Romanian legation in Riga. Some countries such as France, Italy,<br />
Germany, Russia, Great Britain, <strong>the</strong> USA, <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands had appointed a representative<br />
for all Baltic States in Kaunas or Riga. Poland had an envoy in Riga and ano<strong>the</strong>r envoy in<br />
Tallinn (for obvious reasons due to <strong>the</strong> Vilnius dispute it was not represented in Kaunas),<br />
while Hungary had a representative for Estonia and Latvia (Budapest’s good <strong>relations</strong> with<br />
Poland prevented <strong>the</strong> appointment of an envoy to Kaunas). Only Austria and Belgium had<br />
appointed <strong>the</strong>ir envoys to Warsaw in <strong>the</strong> same capacity in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, but, as he<br />
rightly concluded, <strong>the</strong> interests of those states in <strong>the</strong> area could not be compared with <strong>the</strong><br />
interests of Romania. 3<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> Romanian diplomacy seemed still unresolved over its interests in <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States. The international situation was gradually improving and one may say that <strong>the</strong><br />
period from 1925 (when <strong>the</strong> Locarno Agreements were signed) to 1929 (at <strong>the</strong> advent of <strong>the</strong><br />
world depression) was <strong>the</strong> most peaceful throughout <strong>the</strong> entire interwar period.<br />
Alexandru Iacovaky (1876-1949) was appointed to Latvia and Estonia in January 1925 4<br />
and presented his credentials to <strong>the</strong> first President of Latvia Jānis Čakste (1859-1927) on<br />
March 5 th . While Iacovaky stressed in his discourse <strong>the</strong> common interests of <strong>the</strong> two<br />
countries and <strong>the</strong> idea of peace, President Čakste was more unreserved when arguing that<br />
countries situated on <strong>the</strong> Western borders of Russia ought to struggle to ensure <strong>the</strong> peace<br />
<strong>the</strong>y needed for <strong>the</strong>ir free development. He insisted that his country’s efforts were to be<br />
directed towards founding a Baltic union because “union means strength”. 5 Thus, President<br />
Čakste employed an “O<strong>the</strong>rness” discourse referring to Soviet Union 6 and included <strong>the</strong><br />
Estonia and Lithuania in <strong>the</strong> inner circle of Latvia’s foreign policy and Romania and <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r Border States (as <strong>the</strong> countries surrounding <strong>the</strong> USSR on its Western border were<br />
1<br />
Idem, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940. The Legation, s. 2.<br />
2<br />
Anuar <strong>diplomatic</strong> şi consular (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională, 1942), 185.<br />
3<br />
Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Lithuania. Relations with Germany, Italy, Romania, Sweden, USA, Vatican, vol. 4, s. 255-<br />
256, Forescu’s dispatch no. 3358 of 3 August 1924. A resolution on <strong>the</strong> document required its expedition to <strong>the</strong><br />
King Ferdinand I and to Prime Minister Ioan I.C. Brătianu.<br />
4<br />
DARMFA, fund 82, Estonia, 1925-1940, vol. 88 bis, s. 9.<br />
5<br />
DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 53-54, Iacovaky’s<br />
dispatch from Riga no. 4 of 5 March 1925.<br />
6<br />
Even nowadays such a o<strong>the</strong>rness discourse deemed as “cultural geopolitics” is blamed on Central European<br />
intellectuals (who also hold political power), Merje Kuus, “Intellectuals and geopolitics: The ‘cultural politicians’<br />
of Central Europe”, Geoforum 38 (2007), 241–251
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 11<br />
called) in <strong>the</strong> outer (or surrounding) circle. The signal was clear and required a more<br />
decisive step to be taken in <strong>the</strong> cooperation between <strong>the</strong>se states with regard to <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> most influential Latvian politician, Foreign Minister Zigfrīds Anna<br />
Meierovics (1887-1925), was even more outspoken in a private conversation when he<br />
confessed his opinion that when Soviet Union will attack one of its Western neighbours <strong>the</strong><br />
war will spread in <strong>the</strong> whole Border States area. He remarked that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union only<br />
cared for power and insisted on <strong>the</strong> importance of unity among <strong>the</strong> Border States.<br />
Meierovics also stressed <strong>the</strong> importance of exchanging information about Russia’s politics<br />
as part of an anti-Communist cooperation with Romania. 1 Opposing to rumours circulating<br />
in Riga that between May and August a Soviet attack on Romania to retake Bessarabia was<br />
forthcoming, Meierovics calmed down <strong>the</strong> Romanian diplomat’s apprehensions by arguing<br />
that a rapprochement was in progress between <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and France and thus an<br />
attack was excluded. 2 No clearer signal could have been sent to Bucharest from Riga.<br />
However, due to <strong>the</strong> lack of knowledge about <strong>the</strong> Baltic States both within political circles<br />
and public opinion, <strong>the</strong>re was almost no person prepared to hear it and thus <strong>the</strong> signal was<br />
not translated into activation of Romania’s policy vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
When Iacovaky travelled again to Latvia to participate in this country’s celebration of its<br />
independence on 18 November 1925, he was again offered a long talk to President Čakste<br />
who proved his interest in Romanian developments. 3 The conversation occasioned <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian President <strong>the</strong> expression of hopes that a bond similar to <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish<br />
alliance will be created among <strong>the</strong> eastern Baltic States, too. The President of Latvia<br />
confessed his wish of seeing Latvia consolidating <strong>the</strong> defence line against <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.<br />
Čakste also recognized Poland’s “pivot” role in <strong>the</strong> eastern Baltic, but he complained of<br />
Polish aggressive policy towards Lithuania and of Polish inability to turn its potential into<br />
power. 4<br />
During Iacovaky’s mandate to Estonia and Latvia <strong>the</strong> Romanian Consulate to Riga was<br />
created on May 1 st , 1925 in order to deal with <strong>the</strong> current issues of <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian<br />
<strong>relations</strong> and encounters. The first Romanian consul to Riga from August 1925 to 1927 was<br />
Jänis Zebergs (1871-1927) who will be succeeded by Alexandre Percy von Zimmrmann or<br />
under his Latvian name Aleksandrs Persijs Cimmermans from November 1927 to 1940. 5<br />
Carol Davilla (1886-1963) was <strong>the</strong> last Romanian envoy residing in Warsaw to represent<br />
<strong>the</strong> interests of his country in Latvia and Estonia, his appointment starting November 10 th ,<br />
1927. 6 Nicolae Titulescu who started his first mandate as Minister of Foreign Affairs of<br />
Romania on November 24 th , 1927 was resolute to open <strong>the</strong> Legation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States for<br />
which Alexandru Florescu and Alexandru Iacovaky had so eagerly insisted. While writing in<br />
his recount of his foreign policy handling in 1937, he notices that by 1928 only <strong>the</strong> common<br />
vicinity of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union marked <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong>se countries. Instead, he<br />
recognized in <strong>the</strong>se countries “elements of <strong>the</strong> first order” in Europe given <strong>the</strong> level of<br />
1<br />
DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 44-49, Iacovaky’s<br />
dispatch from Riga no. 9 of 9 March 1925.<br />
2<br />
Ibid., s. 50-52, Iacovaky’s dispatch from Riga no. 3 of 3 March 1925.<br />
3<br />
Ibid., s. 65-66, Iacovaky’s dispatch from Riga no. 64 of 19 November 1925.<br />
4<br />
Ibid., s. 67-69, Iacovaky’s dispatch from Riga no. 67 of 21 November 1925.<br />
5<br />
Idem, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940, vol. 93, s. 21; Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland,<br />
Romania, vol. 8, s. 127-132, Vasile Stoica’s dispatch no. 86 of 27 February 1937 from Riga.<br />
6<br />
Anuar <strong>diplomatic</strong>…, 185.
12 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
civilization <strong>the</strong>y had reached and confessed that he wanted a “business card” of Romania (a<br />
legation) in this area. 1 Foreign Minister Titulescu initiated <strong>the</strong> opening of this legation<br />
approved by <strong>the</strong> Parliament on December 21 st and by <strong>the</strong> Regency on December 31 st , 1927 2 .<br />
This was devised to increase Romania’s ability to project its influence among <strong>the</strong> Border<br />
States. On December 26 th , Titulescu requested <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Warsaw to<br />
inform <strong>the</strong> Latvian authorities on <strong>the</strong> decision of Romanian authorities to open a legation<br />
in Riga, a piece of news that enjoyed a good reception in Latvia. 3<br />
The Legation was officially set up on January 1 st , 1928 4 , but <strong>the</strong> first Romanian diplomat<br />
to reside in Latvia, Charge d’Affaires Prince Mihail R. Sturdza travelled to Riga only in May.<br />
He was assisted in his <strong>diplomatic</strong> tasks by Legation secretary Eugeniu Lukasiewicz. This<br />
was exactly <strong>the</strong> arrangement Alexandru Florescu had pleaded for in 1924. Mihail R. Sturdza<br />
(1886–1980), a former diplomat in <strong>the</strong> United States and a future Iron Guard Foreign<br />
Minister of Romania in 1940-1941, held conservative and right-wing political views prone to<br />
see <strong>the</strong> international scene in a Cold War dichotomist tone. His first <strong>diplomatic</strong> report<br />
bears witness to his world views. He saw his <strong>diplomatic</strong> assignment at <strong>the</strong> head of a<br />
Legation as an occasion to affirm himself and assumed that <strong>the</strong> most important task laying<br />
ahead was to ga<strong>the</strong>r information about Soviet Union from local politicians, diplomats,<br />
traders, travellers, local press and from <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions established in Riga. In this<br />
purpose, he acknowledged “<strong>the</strong> extraordinary richness of this land” and <strong>the</strong> espionage and<br />
counter-espionage in which <strong>the</strong> bigger legations of <strong>the</strong> USSR, <strong>the</strong> USA and Great Britain<br />
and <strong>the</strong> locals were engaged. 5 In his memoirs, he also recalls <strong>the</strong> informational support he<br />
had received from local politicians, intellectuality, clerks, etc. who were familiarized with<br />
<strong>the</strong> situation and state of affairs in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. 6<br />
Sturdza’s assessment is partly supported and party invalidated from o<strong>the</strong>r sources.<br />
George F. Kennan who spent few years (1931-1933) in <strong>the</strong> Russian Section of <strong>the</strong> US Legation<br />
in Riga terms <strong>the</strong> section “a research unit” and remembers <strong>the</strong> guidelines of his activity as<br />
being more routine-like than Sturdza believed. They read newspapers and o<strong>the</strong>r written<br />
sources and acquired information from <strong>the</strong> local diplomats and reported to <strong>the</strong> US<br />
Government to <strong>the</strong> best of <strong>the</strong>ir ability about <strong>the</strong> situation in <strong>the</strong> USSR and especially<br />
about economic developments. He denies that this unit was “a sinister espionage centre” as<br />
accused by <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and underlined that <strong>the</strong>re were no spies employed at <strong>the</strong><br />
Legation. 7 This assertion is confirmed by researches of historian Eero Medijainen who<br />
emphasized <strong>the</strong> lack of involvement of <strong>the</strong> members of this section in Baltic affaires. 8<br />
1<br />
Nicolae Titulescu, Politica externă a României (1937), ed. De George Potra, Constantin Turcu şi Ion M. Oprea<br />
(Bucureşti: Ed. Enciclopedică, 1994), 224.<br />
2<br />
Constantin I. Turcu, “Nicolae Titulescu – promotor al largirii relatiilor <strong>diplomatic</strong>e ale Romaniei,” in Gh. Buzatu<br />
coord., Nicolae Titulescu si strategia pacii (Iasi: Ed. Junimea, 1982), 96.<br />
3<br />
DARMFA, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940, vol. 93, s. 5, 7, Titulescu’s address of 26 Dcember 1927 to Carl Davilla,<br />
Warsaw and Gheorghe Davidescu’s dispatch no. 5268 of 30 December 1927 to Titulescu.<br />
4<br />
Ibidem, s. 8-9, Decree of <strong>the</strong> Regency no. 3809 of 31 December 1927.<br />
5<br />
Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 76-79.<br />
6<br />
Mihail Sturdza, România şi sfârşitul Europei. Amintiri din ţara pierdută (Alba Iulia-Paris: Editura Fronde, 1994),<br />
65.<br />
7<br />
George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 47-48.<br />
8<br />
Eero Medijainen, „The Riga Group” and <strong>the</strong> Origins of <strong>the</strong> Cold War”, în „Muille maille vierahille…”.Kalervo Hovi<br />
ja yleinen historia” (Vaasa: Julkaisija Turun Historiallinen Yhdistys, 2002), 73-90.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 13<br />
During Sturdza’s appointment in Riga, Romania and Latvia were among <strong>the</strong> cosignatories<br />
on February 9 th , 1929 of <strong>the</strong> agreement on putting into effect ahead of schedule<br />
<strong>the</strong> Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) on <strong>the</strong> renunciation of war as an instrument of national<br />
policy. Eventually, in 1932 Finland (January 21 st ) 1 , Latvia (February 5 th ) 2 and Estonia ( May<br />
4 th ) 3 , <strong>the</strong> three countries where Sturdza was accredited, signed non-aggression treaties with<br />
Soviet Union to <strong>the</strong> dismay of Romanian diplomat.<br />
After a failed attempt to appoint <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian politician Ion Pelivan as envoy to Riga<br />
in 1930, <strong>the</strong> Romanian Government finally raised Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> position of envoy<br />
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary on June 1 st , 1932. 4 Sturdza had just been<br />
involved in <strong>the</strong> Riga-held failed negotiations of 1932 with <strong>the</strong> USSR. Despite <strong>the</strong> USSR’s<br />
promises that it would not bring into discussion <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian issue, <strong>the</strong> Bulgarian born<br />
Soviet diplomat Boris Spiridonovich Stomoniakov (1882–1941) did not hold on to that<br />
promise which he wanted to address in a preamble to <strong>the</strong> treaty. 5 This will leave Sturdza<br />
with a lasting grievance towards Titulescu who opposed to <strong>the</strong> negotiations with <strong>the</strong> USSR<br />
in <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>y were conducted by foreign ministers Dimitrie Ghica (1931-1932) and<br />
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (1932). In his memoirs, Sturdza bluntly accuses Titulescu of being<br />
“Moscow’s Trojan Horse”. 6<br />
To replace Nukša, Oļģerds Grosvalds was selected (1884-1962), who represented his<br />
country in Romania starting with March 1930. Similar to his predecessor, he also started his<br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> career in France in 1919 as a secretary of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Delegation to <strong>the</strong> Peace<br />
Conference before being appointed as a diplomat in Belgium and <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands and<br />
eventually posted to Warsaw in 1930. According to Latvian Foreign Ministry publications,<br />
Grosvalds ended his assignment in Romania in September 1934. 7 However, he was<br />
designated as Latvia’s representative at <strong>the</strong> Romanian National Holiday celebration of May<br />
10 th , 1935. 8 Already at <strong>the</strong> time he was <strong>the</strong> envoy of his country in France, Spain and<br />
Portugal with residence in Paris. 9 During <strong>the</strong> tenure of <strong>the</strong>ir position as envoys by<br />
Grosvalds and Sturdza, Romania and Latvia were again co-signatories of an important<br />
international instrument, <strong>the</strong> Convention for <strong>the</strong> Definition of Aggression signed in<br />
London on July 3 rd , 1933. 10 The Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu interpreted this<br />
document as a new unbeatable juridical guarantee for his country’s integrity.<br />
Whereas in November 1935 Nukša was re-appointed as envoy to Bucharest, Romania<br />
chose to entrust <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> Legation to Constantin Văllimărescu (1896-1972) who will<br />
also be <strong>the</strong> first Romanian envoy accredited to Kaunas in January 1936. 11 In fact, President<br />
Kārlis Ulmanis of Latvia will be numbered among <strong>the</strong> personalities who insisted for a<br />
Romanian <strong>diplomatic</strong> presence in Kaunas. Ulmanis was assessing favourably in September<br />
1<br />
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (Oct., 1933), 171-174.<br />
2<br />
Ibid., 182-184.<br />
3<br />
Ibid., 167-169.<br />
4<br />
DARMFA, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940, vol. 93, s. 10, King Carol II’s decree no. 1762 of 20 May 1932.<br />
5<br />
Sturdza, 69-71.<br />
6<br />
Ibid., 73-75.<br />
7<br />
Ē. Jēkabsons and V. Ščerbinskis, 367.<br />
8<br />
RNA, fund Casa Regală- Regele Carol al II-lea, file 140/1935, s. 142-147.<br />
9<br />
Ē. Jēkabsons and V. Ščerbinskis, 126.<br />
10<br />
The Soviet designs are approached in Christi Scott Bartman, Lawfare. Use of <strong>the</strong> Definition of Aggressive War by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet and Russian Federation Governments (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 36-41.<br />
11<br />
DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Lithuania, vol. 4, s. 265, 141-145.
14 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1935 <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>relations</strong> with Romania in a speech occasioned by <strong>the</strong> cessation of<br />
Sturdza’s mandate in Riga, while Sturdza emphasized ideals of peace, harmony, order and<br />
frontier stability as a basis for <strong>the</strong> progress of <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two countries. 1 At <strong>the</strong><br />
beginning of Văllimărescu’s <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Riga in November 1935, Ulmanis also<br />
remarked <strong>the</strong> “perfect harmony” between two states that support peace and stability in<br />
Europe. 2<br />
Eventually, Vasile Stoica (1895-1967) will be <strong>the</strong> dissatisfied but effective envoy of<br />
Romania in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. 3 Stoica’s feeling of being side-lined by his posting to Riga<br />
resonated perhaps to <strong>the</strong> perception of many a Romanian diplomat at <strong>the</strong> time. Although<br />
he will soon be charmed by <strong>the</strong> good organization and progress of <strong>the</strong>se countries, he was<br />
still complaining to Foreign Minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen in September 1938 that “I<br />
cannot shake off <strong>the</strong> feeling that I‘m wasting my time”. 4 Despite his continuous complaints,<br />
Stoica’s contribution to <strong>the</strong> development of Romania-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> until spring 1939<br />
when he ended his mission was notable. 5 He will also insist for <strong>the</strong> maintenance of a<br />
legation in Riga at least under <strong>the</strong> head of Chargé d'Affaires, a proposal that will be<br />
accepted by <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6<br />
At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1930s, <strong>the</strong> Soviet diplomacy and espionage agreed to <strong>the</strong> conclusion<br />
that Germany planned <strong>the</strong> attack of Soviet Union through <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
regarded this area as being of a key strategic importance. Soon, news arrived at Kremlin<br />
informing that Estonia and Lithuania were almost ready to accept an inevitable German<br />
occupation, while Latvia was engaged in secret talks with <strong>the</strong> Reich. Although such<br />
apprehensions were greatly exaggerated as we know it today, <strong>the</strong> Soviet leaders were very<br />
concerned and decided to slow down <strong>the</strong> process by inviting in 1936 <strong>the</strong> heads of <strong>the</strong><br />
general staffs of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States to Moscow for “consultations”. In 1937, Foreign Minister of<br />
Latvia Vilhelms Munters visited Moscow and held a long talk with Stalin. 7<br />
To some extent Soviet Union’s evaluations of German interests were well placed and<br />
Germany did look at <strong>the</strong> Baltic States as a part of <strong>the</strong> German Lebensraum. Never<strong>the</strong>less,<br />
by 1939 <strong>the</strong>se states were “fairly incidental among Hitler’s concerns and objectives” as<br />
noted by Alexander Dallin. 8 The Germans were also prepared to trade <strong>the</strong> fate of Baltic<br />
States as <strong>the</strong>y will soon give ample proof. Never<strong>the</strong>less, it is impossible to document any<br />
Baltic governments’ plan of giving up sovereignty to Germany, nor any proof can be found<br />
to state that Baltic nations’ public opinion was pro-German. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, as a result of<br />
previous tensions between German Balts minority and local majorities, even in what<br />
Moscow considered <strong>the</strong> most pro-German state of Estonia, a survey of April 1939<br />
1<br />
Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 93, Sturdza’s dispatch no.<br />
86 of 13 September 1935.<br />
2<br />
Ibid., s. 127-132, Stoica’s dispatch no. 86 of 27 February 1937; RNA, fund Casa Regală-Regele Carol II, file 145/1930,<br />
s. 15.<br />
3<br />
He complained on 23 February 1937 about being “thrown up” to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States to his friend, historian Charles<br />
Upson Clark, Idem, fund Vasile Stoica, file I/69, s. 16.<br />
4<br />
DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 3, s. 138-141, Stoica’s letter of 8 September 1938.<br />
5<br />
Ioan Opriş, Vasile Stoica în serviciul României (Bucureşti: Ed. Oscar Print, 2008), 220-253; Miloiu 2003, 188-194.<br />
6<br />
DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with o<strong>the</strong>r states, vol. 7, Stoica’s dispatch no. 152 of 4 February<br />
1939.<br />
7<br />
L Sotskov, “The Baltics and Geopolitics”, International Affairs 53 (2007), 105-107.<br />
8<br />
Alexander Dallin, “The Baltic States between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia,” in V. Stanley Vardys, Romuald J.<br />
Misiunas eds., The Baltic States in Peace and War, 1917–1945 (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 102.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 15<br />
discovered that in nine out of eleven counties Germany was considered <strong>the</strong> bigger threat<br />
and <strong>the</strong> population believed that it was better to accept <strong>the</strong> arrival of <strong>the</strong> Russians than <strong>the</strong><br />
arrival of <strong>the</strong> Germans. 1 As regards <strong>the</strong> foreign policy of Latvia and Estonia, especially, after<br />
placing <strong>the</strong>ir trust for a long time in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, at <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1930s <strong>the</strong>y<br />
began recognizing <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> League and started to move into <strong>the</strong> direction of<br />
neutrality. As Munters confessed to British envoy to Riga Charles William Orde in February<br />
1939, “Latvia has always said, and proved, that it would join no bloc, and its independent<br />
stance has preserved it from getting involved in <strong>the</strong> conflicts of o<strong>the</strong>rs.” Therefore, Latvia<br />
and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States, members of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Entente, decided in September 1938 that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y will take part in <strong>the</strong> sanctions imposed by <strong>the</strong> League of Nations only on a case by case<br />
basis. 2<br />
At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1930s Romania will be represented in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States by chargé<br />
d’affaires, first by Marcel Romanescu, <strong>the</strong> gifted son of a Craiova magnate and former<br />
mayor family, from July 1 st 1939 3 , and after his nervous breakdown by chargé d’affaires<br />
Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti (from September 1 st 1939) 4 who will witness Latvia’s<br />
incorporation by <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. His testimonies are included in this volume. It is ironic<br />
that Vice-Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong> People's Commissaries, Andrey Januarevich<br />
Vyshinsky, was <strong>the</strong> main actor of <strong>the</strong> play designed to incorporate Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Union and communize Romania. The first event found Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti as<br />
Chargé d’Affaires in Riga, <strong>the</strong> second one as Foreign Minister of Romania.<br />
The German conquest of Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1939 will open <strong>the</strong> possibility of<br />
setting up a permanent Latvian <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Bucharest, which was first brought<br />
into discussion in November 1938 soon after <strong>the</strong> Munich Agreement. 5 In a conversation<br />
with envoy Stoica, Foreign Minister Munters had expressed his intention to upgrade <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>relations</strong> with Romania. 6 Indeed, on October 18 th , 1939 a new Latvian envoy, Ludvigs Ēķis<br />
(1892-1943), a former Finance Minister of Latvia, presented his credentials to King Carol II,<br />
his residence being set in Bucharest. 7 Ēķis was very energetic and tried to be involved as<br />
much as possible with his colleagues in order to understand <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> Soviet-<br />
German <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> consequences on small and mid-sized nations of Eastern<br />
Europe. 8 He happened to be <strong>the</strong> last Latvian diplomat appointed to Romania and<br />
important accounts of <strong>the</strong> closing of <strong>the</strong> Latvian <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Bucharest are<br />
included in this volume.<br />
1<br />
Olaf Mertelsmann, “How <strong>the</strong> Russians turned into <strong>the</strong> image of <strong>the</strong> “national enemy” of <strong>the</strong> Estonians”, Pro<br />
Ethnologia 19 (2005), 48.<br />
2<br />
John Hiden, Patrick Salmon, editors, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: reports and papers from <strong>the</strong> Foreign<br />
Office Confidential Print, Part II: From <strong>the</strong> First to <strong>the</strong> Second World War, Series F, Europe, 1919-1939, Vol. 67,<br />
Scandinavia and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, 1938-1939 (University Publications of America, 1996), 29-30.<br />
3<br />
DARMFA, fund Marcel Romanescu, Vol. II, Royal decree no. 2229 of 30 May 1939.<br />
4<br />
Ibid., Royal decree of 30 August 1939.<br />
5<br />
Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 157, Stoica’s dispatch no.<br />
1254 of 14 November 1938.<br />
6<br />
Ibid., s. 158, Stoica’s dispatch no. 152 of 4 February 1939.<br />
7<br />
RNA, fund Preşedinţia Consiliului de Miniştri, file 269/1939, s. 45, Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti’s dispatch no. 1263<br />
of 4 October 1939; Regele Carol al II-lea al României, Însemnări zilnice, vol. II, 13 martie – 15 decembrie 1939<br />
(Bucureşti: Ed. Scripta, 1997), 253; Ē. Jēkabsons and V. Ščerbinskis, 95-97.<br />
8<br />
Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto [The Archives of <strong>the</strong> Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs], fund 5 C14, Ensio<br />
Hiitonen’s dispatch no. 27 of 4 December 1939.
16 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
The annexation of <strong>the</strong> Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> communization of Romania<br />
created a half a century hiatus in <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two states. Moreover, according<br />
to a protocol signed in Moscow on March 7 th 1958 between <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Popular<br />
Republic of Romania and <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Union of <strong>the</strong> Socialist Soviet Republics<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> regulation of <strong>the</strong>ir mutual claims related to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia,<br />
included in this volume, Romania consented to give its recognition, implicitly though, to <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet incorporation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
Several decades later, when Latvia re-proclaimed its independence according to <strong>the</strong><br />
Constitutional Law of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Latvia "On <strong>the</strong> Statehood of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Latvia"<br />
of August 21 st , 1991, Romania numbered among <strong>the</strong> first countries to give international<br />
recognition to <strong>the</strong> reborn Baltic state on August 26 th by a note from <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs of Romania, Adrian Năstase 1 . This formed <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two<br />
states, which are today partner countries in <strong>the</strong> EU and <strong>the</strong> NATO.<br />
Silviu Miloiu<br />
1<br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/ministry/exhibitions/20-anniversary/ (accessed,<br />
10.10.2012).
Editors’ note and acknowledgements<br />
This volume of <strong>documents</strong> appears as a pay tribute to <strong>the</strong> 90 th anniversary of <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment of <strong>the</strong> first Latvian Legation in Romania with residence in Warsaw. Martiņš<br />
Nukša, <strong>the</strong> first Latvian Minister in Romania, presented his credentials to King Ferdinand I on<br />
May 31 st , 1922. Two years later, on March 21 st , 1924, Romania also appointed its first Envoy<br />
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Latvia in <strong>the</strong> person of its experienced diplomat<br />
settled in Warsaw Alexandru G. Florescu. It was not by chance that <strong>the</strong> first envoys of <strong>the</strong> two<br />
countries resided in Poland. The reborn state of Poland, winner over <strong>the</strong> Red Army, was at <strong>the</strong><br />
time <strong>the</strong> strongest political actor in <strong>the</strong> region and <strong>the</strong> mediator of <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between<br />
Romania and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. To a large extent <strong>the</strong> Romanian Baltic policy, subordinated to<br />
<strong>the</strong> larger Romanian Eastern policy, was subsumed to <strong>the</strong> priorities of its alliance with Poland<br />
set up in March 1921. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> also had <strong>the</strong>ir own agenda,<br />
extending from <strong>the</strong> collective security centred around <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, <strong>the</strong> trade <strong>relations</strong><br />
between <strong>the</strong> two countries, <strong>the</strong> travellers or scientists’ interactions, <strong>the</strong> connections between<br />
<strong>the</strong> radical right-wing movements to <strong>the</strong> bonds between <strong>the</strong> German and Jewish minorities.<br />
When Czechoslovakia and Poland fell pray to <strong>the</strong> aggressive goals of Nazi Germany in 1939,<br />
Latvia decided to appoint a former distinguished Finance Minister Ludvigs Ēķis as its Envoy<br />
Extraordinary in Romania and Hungary with residence in Bucharest.<br />
A significant part of this complex reality is incorporated into this volume. The selected 205<br />
<strong>documents</strong> are presented in full in Romanian and Latvian language original and <strong>the</strong>ir English<br />
language translation in order to provide access to a larger audience from Romania, from Latvia<br />
and from abroad to <strong>the</strong>ir content. The editors’ interventions in <strong>the</strong> text are minor and are only<br />
meant to correct some obvious grammar or spelling mistakes. Whenever it was deemed<br />
necessary, <strong>the</strong> editors inserted footnotes with additional explanations or comments meant to<br />
facilitate a better understanding of <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> respective <strong>documents</strong>. A list containing a<br />
brief description of each of <strong>the</strong> selected <strong>documents</strong> was integrated into this volume in order to<br />
give readers an overview of <strong>the</strong> content of this book and to facilitate <strong>the</strong>ir access to <strong>the</strong> desired<br />
material. A proper names index was also appended with <strong>the</strong> purpose of giving <strong>the</strong> readers a<br />
leisurely access to information.<br />
The editors would like to express <strong>the</strong>ir gratitude to a number of institutions and persons<br />
who contributed to <strong>the</strong> publication of this volume. We would like to express <strong>the</strong> earnest<br />
gratitude to <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Romanian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and especially to His<br />
Excellency Mr. Einars Semanis for <strong>the</strong>ir patronage of this book. The main support into<br />
completing it came from <strong>the</strong> Honorary Consulate of Latvia in Bucharest and Niro Investment<br />
Group. His Excellency Ambassador Ioan Donca, The Honorary Consul of Latvia in Bucharest,<br />
and Mr. Nicolae Dumitru, President of Niro Investment Group, extended <strong>the</strong>ir generous<br />
support to this project and made it possible to be accomplished. The National Cultural Fund<br />
Administration deserves <strong>the</strong> merit of showing <strong>the</strong>ir awareness to <strong>the</strong> significance of this project<br />
and offering <strong>the</strong>ir full assistance and sponsorship.<br />
The editors wish to seize this opportunity to express to all <strong>the</strong>se highly respected<br />
institutions and persons <strong>the</strong> deepest appreciation and reverence.
18 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Our gracious gratefulness also goes to Latvian historian Eva Eihmane, for <strong>the</strong> marvellous<br />
adaptation of Latvian <strong>documents</strong> into English language. We would also like to thank <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian company S.C. Acta.Doc SRL for <strong>the</strong>ir consistent translation of Romanian <strong>documents</strong><br />
into English language. Mihaela Moagher and Laima Jēkabsone did an excellent job as regards<br />
<strong>the</strong> transcription of <strong>the</strong> archival <strong>documents</strong> enclosed in this volume. I would also like to<br />
express my gratitude to Magdalena Ionescu who helped translating some <strong>documents</strong> from<br />
French language into Romanian.<br />
Last but not least, we would like to express our appreciation to our collaborators of <strong>the</strong><br />
Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House for <strong>the</strong>ir commitment and assistance in <strong>the</strong> appearance of<br />
this book.<br />
This volume continues <strong>the</strong> consistent efforts of The Romanian Association for Baltic and<br />
Nordic Studies (www.arsbn.ro) of bringing <strong>the</strong> Baltic sea region nations and <strong>the</strong> Romanians<br />
closer toge<strong>the</strong>r by means of enriched knowledge, awareness and interchange.
19189<br />
1920<br />
1921<br />
LIST OF DOCUMENTS<br />
Document 1 ......................................................................................................................... 39<br />
Declaration of Common Aims of <strong>the</strong> Independent Mid-European nations in convention<br />
assembled at Independence Hall Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America,<br />
1918<br />
Document 2 ........................................................................................................................ 40<br />
January, The Latvian <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative in Warsaw to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />
informing on <strong>the</strong> transit through Romanian territory of Latvian refugees from Russia<br />
Document 3 ......................................................................................................................... 41<br />
16 January, The Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia to Latvia’s<br />
military representative in Poland with regard to <strong>the</strong> transit through Romanian territory of<br />
Latvian refugees from Russia<br />
Document 4 ......................................................................................................................... 41<br />
24 February, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania to representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of<br />
Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus granting permission to Latvian nurses and officers to travel from<br />
Russia to Latvia through Romania<br />
Document 5 ........................................................................................................................ 42<br />
2 March, The Representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus to <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong><br />
General Staff of Romania with respect to <strong>the</strong> permission granted to Latvian nurses and<br />
officers to travel from Russia to Latvia through Romania<br />
Document 6 ........................................................................................................................ 42<br />
2 March, Representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister of<br />
Romania with respect to <strong>the</strong> permission granted to Latvian nurses and officers to travel<br />
from Russia to Latvia through Romania<br />
Document 7 ........................................................................................................................ 43<br />
2 March, The Representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus to <strong>the</strong> Military Attaché<br />
of Poland in Romania with regard to <strong>the</strong> permission granted to Latvian nurses and officers<br />
to travel from Russia to Latvia through Romania<br />
Document 8 ........................................................................................................................ 43<br />
26 February, Envoy of Romania in Copenhagen to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia<br />
communicating <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Government of Romania has recognised Latvia’s<br />
independence<br />
Document 9 ........................................................................................................................ 43<br />
15 April, The Envoy of Latvia in Finland to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia<br />
following a conversation with <strong>the</strong> new Minister of Romania in Helsinki with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Polish alliance and <strong>the</strong> creation of a Border States defence union against Russia
20 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1922<br />
1923<br />
1924<br />
Document 10 ....................................................................................................................... 44<br />
16 April, The Minister of Romania in Finland to Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> Latvian appeal<br />
to Romania to contribute to <strong>the</strong> lowing of <strong>the</strong> political tension between Poland and<br />
Lithuania<br />
Document 11........................................................................................................................ 45<br />
23 April, Director of <strong>the</strong> Politico-Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
of Latvia to Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki commenting on Latvia’s position in regard to<br />
Romania, Poland and <strong>the</strong> Border States’ cooperation<br />
Document 12 ....................................................................................................................... 47<br />
20 May, The Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki to Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Latvian political and <strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Romanian desire to support<br />
<strong>the</strong> Border States cooperation<br />
Document 13 ....................................................................................................................... 49<br />
22 May, The Romanian Minister in Finland to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry following talks with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister concerning <strong>the</strong> cooperation of <strong>the</strong> Border States<br />
Document 14 ........................................................................................................................52<br />
26 May, The interim head of <strong>the</strong> Legation of Latvia in Poland to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs about <strong>the</strong> prospects of a Border States defence union, <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian<br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> situation in Bessarabia and Ukraine<br />
Document 15 ........................................................................................................................ 53<br />
28 May, The Politico-Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Legation in Warsaw about <strong>the</strong> Latvian <strong>diplomatic</strong> representation in Romania<br />
Document 16 ....................................................................................................................... 54<br />
31 May, The speech of Martiņš Nukša, <strong>the</strong> first Minister Plenipotentiary appointed in<br />
Romania with residence in Warsaw, on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> presentation of his credentials<br />
in <strong>the</strong> hands of King of Romania Ferdinand I<br />
Document 17 ....................................................................................................................... 56<br />
4 November, Envoy of Latvia in Warsaw to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to<br />
<strong>the</strong> coronation of <strong>the</strong> sovereigns of Romania<br />
Document 18 ....................................................................................................................... 63<br />
14 December, The Romanian Minister in Poland to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning a<br />
Soviet proposal of Non-Aggression Pact with Latvia<br />
Document 19 ....................................................................................................................... 64<br />
21 March, The decree of King Ferdinand I of appointing a Romanian Minister in Latvia and<br />
Estonia
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 21<br />
1925<br />
1926<br />
1927<br />
Document 20 ...................................................................................................................... 66<br />
March, Report by Envoy in Warsaw to Ministry of Foreign Affairs about his visit to<br />
Romania in February 1925 and <strong>the</strong> talks with Romanian leading politicians about <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong>, consular, political and economic <strong>relations</strong> between Romania and Latvia and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Border States cooperation<br />
Document 21 ....................................................................................................................... 79<br />
2 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
menace to <strong>the</strong> Border States and <strong>the</strong> latter’s cooperation in order to keep <strong>the</strong> Soviet threat<br />
at bay<br />
Document 22 ....................................................................................................................... 85<br />
3 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with respect to an<br />
interview given to Latvian newspaper Rīgas Ziņas on <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 23 ....................................................................................................................... 87<br />
4 April, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs with<br />
regard to <strong>the</strong> Riga Military Conference (March-April 1925) of <strong>the</strong> Border States designed to<br />
improve <strong>the</strong> exchange of information among <strong>the</strong> participating countries concerning Soviet<br />
Union<br />
Document 24 ...................................................................................................................... 88<br />
24 April, Latvia’s Minister of War to Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to sound <strong>the</strong><br />
opinion of <strong>the</strong> Romanian party on <strong>the</strong> entrusting of <strong>the</strong> acting military agent in Poland<br />
also with <strong>the</strong> duties of military agent in Romania<br />
Document 25 ....................................................................................................................... 89<br />
28 July, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs about<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet proposals to Poland and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States of mutual non-aggression treaty<br />
Document 26 ...................................................................................................................... 89<br />
21 November, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry following a<br />
conversation with <strong>the</strong> Latvian President Jānis Čakste on <strong>the</strong> role of Latvia, Romania, Soviet<br />
Union and Poland in <strong>the</strong> Border States area<br />
Document 27 ....................................................................................................................... 94<br />
19 August, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs with<br />
respect to <strong>the</strong> prospect of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian trade <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
situation of Romania<br />
Document 28 ...................................................................................................................... 95<br />
9 May, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian-Romanian trade <strong>relations</strong>
22 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1928<br />
1929<br />
1930<br />
Document 29 ...................................................................................................................... 96<br />
11 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
informing about his talks in Bucharest concerning <strong>the</strong> appointment of a new Romanian<br />
envoy in Latvia<br />
Document 30 ...................................................................................................................... 97<br />
22 February, The instructions of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania to <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian Legation in Latvia restricting its ability to issue visas to former Bessarabian<br />
subjects of <strong>the</strong> Russian Empire<br />
Document 31 ....................................................................................................................... 97<br />
2 March, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
analysing <strong>the</strong> visit of Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to Warsaw and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-<br />
Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 32 ....................................................................................................................... 98<br />
June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry approaching <strong>the</strong><br />
perspectives of regional cooperation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea rim area and <strong>the</strong> choices opened to<br />
Latvia in this respect<br />
Document 33 ...................................................................................................................... 104<br />
30 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with <strong>the</strong><br />
role of plaque tournante of Riga as a center of diplomacy and espionage with regard to<br />
Soviet Union<br />
Document 34 ...................................................................................................................... 107<br />
28 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry,<br />
miscellaneous: <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian prospects of a trade and financial agreement, <strong>the</strong><br />
reflection of Romania in Latvian press, <strong>the</strong> evolutions in Lithuania and <strong>the</strong> regional<br />
implications<br />
Document 35 ...................................................................................................................... 110<br />
October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry following a<br />
meeting with <strong>the</strong> Latvian Prime Minister on <strong>the</strong> spontaneous solidarity of Border States<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Soviet menace<br />
Document 36 ..................................................................................................................... 110<br />
November, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning a<br />
Latvian proposal of concluding a trade treaty with Romania<br />
Document 37 ....................................................................................................................... 111<br />
4 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with<br />
<strong>the</strong> regional policy in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea area with effect on <strong>the</strong> solidarity of <strong>the</strong> Border States<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union<br />
Document 38...................................................................................................................... 114
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 23<br />
14 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire and <strong>the</strong> Achilles' heel of <strong>the</strong> defense, Bessarabia<br />
Document 39 ..................................................................................................................... 116<br />
20 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry emphasizing<br />
<strong>the</strong> necessity of continuity at <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Riga due to <strong>the</strong> pivotal role of t<strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> mission situated at <strong>the</strong> crossroads of <strong>the</strong> bourgeoisie and communist systems<br />
Document 40 ...................................................................................................................... 117<br />
24 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
appointment of a new Latvian envoy to Romania with residence in Warsaw<br />
Document 41 ...................................................................................................................... 118<br />
5 June, Instructions of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Foreign Minister to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia<br />
asking him to summon Latvia’s support for <strong>the</strong> Romanian candidate for <strong>the</strong> Permanent<br />
Court of International Justice<br />
Document 42 ..................................................................................................................... 120<br />
9 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry conveying <strong>the</strong><br />
positive answer of <strong>the</strong> Latvian authorities for <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> Romanian candidate for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Permanent Court of International Justice<br />
Document 43 ...................................................................................................................... 120<br />
15 July, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Prime Minister and Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs describing <strong>the</strong> enthronement of King Carol II, <strong>the</strong> Romanian domestic and<br />
foreign policies and <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 44 ..................................................................................................................... 126<br />
9 September, The Romanian legation secretary in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with<br />
respect to <strong>the</strong> reflection in <strong>the</strong> Latvian press criticism of <strong>the</strong> treatment by Romanian<br />
authorities of Latvian pilots in Bucharest<br />
Document 45...................................................................................................................... 127<br />
22 September, The Romanian Foreign Ministry to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia with<br />
regard to <strong>the</strong> circumstances leading to <strong>the</strong> troubled reception of Latvian pilots in<br />
Bucharest<br />
Document 46 ..................................................................................................................... 128<br />
24 September, The Romanian legation secretary in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />
informing on <strong>the</strong> explanations given to <strong>the</strong> Latvian Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong> visit<br />
of Latvian pilots to Bucharest accepted by <strong>the</strong> Latvian authorities<br />
Document 47...................................................................................................................... 129<br />
23 October, Commercial agreement between Romania and Latvia<br />
Document 48 ..................................................................................................................... 132<br />
9 December, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard<br />
to Polish-Romanian alliance and possibilities to improve it modeled on <strong>the</strong> Estonian-<br />
Latvian treaty, thus streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea – Black Sea anti-Soviet front
24 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1931<br />
Document 49 ..................................................................................................................... 138<br />
15 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Border States cooperation with regard to Soviet Union<br />
Document 50 ..................................................................................................................... 139<br />
13 April, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs with<br />
regard to <strong>the</strong> prospects of a Little Entente customs union and <strong>the</strong> evolutions of <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 51 ...................................................................................................................... 140<br />
14 April, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet attempts to fragment <strong>the</strong> Border States bloc and <strong>the</strong> financial incentives given to<br />
Latvia in this respect<br />
Document 52 ...................................................................................................................... 145<br />
15 May, The Romanian Foreign Ministry to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia detailing <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Polish plans of having <strong>the</strong> non-aggression treaties between Soviet Union and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Border States signed concomitantly<br />
Document 53 ...................................................................................................................... 146<br />
17 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing <strong>the</strong><br />
economic bases of Soviet growing influence in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> interest of<br />
Romania of keeping tightly united <strong>the</strong> Border States group in order to avoid <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />
isolation<br />
Document 54....................................................................................................................... 151<br />
June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dispatched in <strong>the</strong><br />
circumstances of <strong>the</strong> preparations for <strong>the</strong> opening of <strong>the</strong> disarmament conference,<br />
emphasizing <strong>the</strong> necessity of Border States cooperation and outlining <strong>the</strong> alleged Soviet<br />
secret plans of divide et impera<br />
Document 55 ...................................................................................................................... 155<br />
July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing on <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian General Staff commitment to maintain <strong>the</strong> Border States solidarity<br />
Document 56 ..................................................................................................................... 156<br />
6 October, The Romanian Foreign Ministry to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia concerning<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade agreement and <strong>the</strong> need for Latvian consensus of <strong>the</strong><br />
provisions of this treaty<br />
Document 57 ...................................................................................................................... 157<br />
12 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />
concerning <strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade settlement and <strong>the</strong> need for Latvian consensus of<br />
<strong>the</strong> provisions of this treaty<br />
Document 58 ..................................................................................................................... 158<br />
October, The Romanian Foreign Ministry to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-German trade agreement and <strong>the</strong> need for Latvian consensus of <strong>the</strong> provisions<br />
of this treaty
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 25<br />
1932<br />
Document 59 ..................................................................................................................... 158<br />
October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Latvian trade <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 60 ..................................................................................................................... 159<br />
16 December, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing<br />
about <strong>the</strong> Latvian wholehearted endorsement of Romanian-Soviet negations to take place<br />
in Riga<br />
Document 61 ...................................................................................................................... 159<br />
8 January, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing on<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian Foreign Minister support for a common Border States policy in dealings with<br />
Moscow<br />
Document 62 ..................................................................................................................... 160<br />
16 January, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with respect<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Polish withdrawal from a common position of <strong>the</strong> Border States in negotiations<br />
with Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> consequences for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />
Document 63 ..................................................................................................................... 161<br />
30 January, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister emphasizing<br />
<strong>the</strong> necessity of a common standing of <strong>the</strong> Border States on <strong>the</strong> issue of ratifying <strong>the</strong> nonaggression<br />
treaties with Soviet Union<br />
Document 64 ..................................................................................................................... 163<br />
4 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister detailing <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> demarche of Romanian, Polish, Estonian and Finnish envoys in order to<br />
postpone Latvia’s signing of non-aggression treaties with Soviet Union<br />
Document 65 ..................................................................................................................... 164<br />
5 February, The Romanian Prime Minister to <strong>the</strong> legations in Paris and Geneva asking <strong>the</strong><br />
French support for <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> demarche of Romanian, Polish, Estonian and Finnish<br />
envoys in Riga in order to postpone Latvia’s signing of non-aggression treaties with Soviet<br />
Union<br />
Document 66 ..................................................................................................................... 165<br />
7 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister informing on<br />
<strong>the</strong> concluding of <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact between Latvia and <strong>the</strong> USSR<br />
Document 67 ..................................................................................................................... 166<br />
12 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister evoking <strong>the</strong><br />
evolution of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Soviet negotiations in Riga, <strong>the</strong> atmosphere in which <strong>the</strong>y took<br />
place and <strong>the</strong> regional implications of <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong>se discussions<br />
Document 68 ..................................................................................................................... 173<br />
11 April, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
sketching out <strong>the</strong> main topics of conversation between Romanian Foreign Minister and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Polish leaders during <strong>the</strong> former’s visit to Poland
26 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1933<br />
Document 69 ..................................................................................................................... 174<br />
15 April, The Romanian Foreign Minister to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia about <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Polish exchange of views, occasioned by a visit of Marshal Józef Piłsudski to<br />
Bucharest, on <strong>the</strong> Polish position towards <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts proposed by Soviet<br />
Union<br />
Document 70 ..................................................................................................................... 176<br />
3 May, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about<br />
<strong>the</strong> dissolution of <strong>the</strong> Border States’ common stance with regard to Soviet Union<br />
Document 71 ...................................................................................................................... 180<br />
16 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister regarding <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
interest in Bessarabia and <strong>the</strong> desire to dissolving <strong>the</strong> Border States bloc<br />
Document 72 ...................................................................................................................... 185<br />
31 December, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet economic and political pressure on Latvia<br />
Document 73 ...................................................................................................................... 187<br />
10 February, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet menace and <strong>the</strong> debates on disarmament<br />
Document 74...................................................................................................................... 191<br />
20 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry outlining <strong>the</strong> first<br />
consequences in Latvia following Hitler’s appointment as chancellor of Germany<br />
Document 75 ...................................................................................................................... 193<br />
April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong> security<br />
concerns in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> growing Latvian interest in <strong>the</strong> Little Entente<br />
Document 76 ..................................................................................................................... 194<br />
3 April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry sketching <strong>the</strong> German-<br />
Latvian tensions and <strong>the</strong> lowering of <strong>the</strong> prospects of a Baltic alliance<br />
Document 77 ...................................................................................................................... 195<br />
15 April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> renewed<br />
interest in <strong>the</strong> neutrality of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />
Document 78 ..................................................................................................................... 197<br />
4 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> personality and<br />
political views of <strong>the</strong> new Latvian Minister in France<br />
Document 79 ..................................................................................................................... 198<br />
26 July, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong> common<br />
demarche with <strong>the</strong> Czechoslovak Minister in protest of a defamatory article on a ga<strong>the</strong>ring<br />
of veterans to be held in Cluj-Napoca published by a Riga German right-wing newspaper . 3
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 27<br />
1934<br />
Document 80 ..................................................................................................................... 201<br />
2 October, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> leading<br />
Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> in<br />
September 1933<br />
Document 81 ....................................................................................................................... 211<br />
30 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />
dealing with <strong>the</strong> appointment of a new Soviet Minister and his political views as expressed<br />
in an interview given to <strong>the</strong> Latvian press<br />
Document 82 ..................................................................................................................... 214<br />
1 November, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />
on <strong>the</strong> leading Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian<br />
<strong>relations</strong> in October 1933<br />
Document 83...................................................................................................................... 222<br />
21 November, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
detailing <strong>the</strong> evolutions of <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> Little Entente and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union<br />
and <strong>the</strong> developments in <strong>the</strong> Balkans<br />
Document 84 .....................................................................................................................228<br />
2 December, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />
on <strong>the</strong> main Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong><br />
in November 1933<br />
Document 85 ..................................................................................................................... 234<br />
18 January, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />
consequences of <strong>the</strong> various European and regional projects of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers and <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian interest in bringing about a Scandinavian-Baltic union<br />
Document 86 ..................................................................................................................... 236<br />
29 January, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong><br />
consequences in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States of <strong>the</strong> German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact (26 January) .<br />
Document 87 ..................................................................................................................... 239<br />
20 February, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> extension<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Estonian alliance and its regional implications<br />
Document 88 .................................................................................................................... 240<br />
3 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> main Latvian<br />
domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> in February 1934<br />
Document 89 ..................................................................................................................... 247<br />
6 April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> extension of<br />
<strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts between Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States until 1945<br />
Document 90 .................................................................................................................... 249<br />
18 May, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing <strong>the</strong><br />
circumstances leading to Kārlis Ulmanis’s coup d’etat in Latvia
28 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1935<br />
Document 91 ...................................................................................................................... 252<br />
4 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing <strong>the</strong> nature of<br />
<strong>the</strong> new political regime in Latvia and its foreign policy orientation<br />
Document 92 ..................................................................................................................... 255<br />
13 July, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> ideas<br />
circulated in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States about a North-Eastern mutual assistance pact<br />
Document 93 ..................................................................................................................... 257<br />
5 August, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on<br />
<strong>the</strong> main Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> in<br />
July 1934<br />
Document 94 .................................................................................................................... 260<br />
14 August, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> prospects of<br />
a mutual assistance pact in eastern Baltic and Latvian attitude in this respect<br />
Document 95 .................................................................................................................... 262<br />
27 August, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
position towards <strong>the</strong> various projects of regional security and <strong>the</strong>ir reluctance to accept a<br />
scheme which will leave Germany and Poland among <strong>the</strong> non-signatory powers or to<br />
approve <strong>the</strong> passage of Red Army through <strong>the</strong>ir territory<br />
Document 96 .....................................................................................................................265<br />
3 September, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
content of <strong>the</strong> Agreement of Solidarity and Cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and.<br />
Lithuania initialed on 29 August 1934, in Riga, which will be signed on 12 September<br />
Document 97 .................................................................................................................... 270<br />
18 September, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing <strong>the</strong><br />
content of <strong>the</strong> Agreement of Solidarity and Cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and.<br />
Lithuania<br />
Document 98 ..................................................................................................................... 273<br />
25 September, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong><br />
appointment of a new Latvian Minister in Poland<br />
Document 99 ..................................................................................................................... 274<br />
9 October, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> Polish and<br />
Latvian views of <strong>the</strong> projected French-Soviet alliance<br />
Document 100 ....................................................................................................................276<br />
December, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong> Eastern<br />
Pact project and <strong>the</strong> Latvian views in this respect<br />
Document 101 .................................................................................................................... 283<br />
23 January, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with <strong>the</strong><br />
German reintegration of Saar territory and <strong>the</strong> implications for <strong>the</strong> evolutions in <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States, especially given <strong>the</strong> prospects of an Eastern Locarno
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 29<br />
Document 102 ................................................................................................................... 286<br />
2 April 1935, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
following talks with Romanian Minister in Poland regarding <strong>the</strong> issue of Klaipeda, <strong>the</strong><br />
Polish foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> regional security in Central Europe<br />
Document 103 ................................................................................................................... 289<br />
5 July, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
position towards <strong>the</strong> Franco-Czechoslovak-Soviet constellation of powers<br />
Document 104 ................................................................................................................... 290<br />
24 July, The Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Western Department of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs with respect to <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian trade <strong>relations</strong> and<br />
<strong>the</strong> regime of import taxation in Romania<br />
Document 105 .................................................................................................................... 291<br />
15 August, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />
about <strong>the</strong> prospects of a Latvian agreement with <strong>the</strong> Franco-Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance<br />
Document 106 ................................................................................................................... 292<br />
30 August, Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to Latvian<br />
position towards <strong>the</strong> Italian-Abyssinian international tensions<br />
Document 107 .................................................................................................................... 293<br />
5 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on<br />
<strong>the</strong> main Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions in September 1934<br />
Document 108 ....................................................................................................................295<br />
14 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on<br />
<strong>the</strong> prospects of a Latvian-Soviet consultation agreement and <strong>the</strong> Italian-Abyssinian<br />
conflict<br />
Document 109 ................................................................................................................... 296<br />
21 October, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs on<br />
Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong> and Germany’s policy in <strong>the</strong> Balkans following <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
military attaché attending of Romanian military manoeuvres<br />
Document 110 ....................................................................................................................297<br />
25 November, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing his<br />
conversations with Latvian Prime Minister about <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong><br />
regional implications of <strong>the</strong> majority/minority tensions in Lithuania<br />
Document 111 .................................................................................................................... 298<br />
4 December, The Latvian Minister in Czechoslovakia to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of<br />
Romania concerning <strong>the</strong> new regime of external trade of Romania and <strong>the</strong> impact on <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian-Romanian commercial <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 112 ..................................................................................................................... 303<br />
7 December, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing <strong>the</strong><br />
presentation of his credentials to <strong>the</strong> President of Latvia and <strong>the</strong> conversations about <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Latvian political leaders
30 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1936<br />
1937<br />
Document 113 .....................................................................................................................305<br />
7 December, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about an interview<br />
given to <strong>the</strong> newspaper Rigasche Rundschau regarding <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 114 .................................................................................................................... 306<br />
21 February, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs revealing <strong>the</strong> subject of his talks to <strong>the</strong> new Romanian representative in<br />
Warsaw and <strong>the</strong> directions of Polish foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 115 .................................................................................................................... 309<br />
10 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> role of a<br />
model of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente for <strong>the</strong> Baltic Entente<br />
Document 116..................................................................................................................... 310<br />
22 October, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to<br />
Nicolae Titulescu’s sacking from <strong>the</strong> position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and changes in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian <strong>diplomatic</strong> apparatus<br />
Document 117 ..................................................................................................................... 312<br />
26 November, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning<br />
<strong>the</strong> visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romanian Victor Antonescu to Warsaw and <strong>the</strong><br />
restoration of confidence in <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 118 ..................................................................................................................... 316<br />
27 February, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />
presentations of his credentials to <strong>the</strong> Latvian Head of State and <strong>the</strong> political<br />
conversations with respect to <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian <strong>relations</strong> with Latvian leaders<br />
Document 119.................................................................................................................... 320<br />
24 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry requesting printed<br />
material for <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Lithuanian newspapers showing an interest in publishing<br />
articles about Romanian issues<br />
Document 120 .................................................................................................................... 321<br />
10 April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> British<br />
policy in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States aiming at maintaining peace and political stability in <strong>the</strong> area<br />
Document 121 ..................................................................................................................... 323<br />
27 April, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />
comments with regard to Polish Foreign Minister visit to Bucharest<br />
Document 122 .................................................................................................................... 324<br />
10 May, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> premises of<br />
Polish Foreign Minister visit to Bucharest<br />
Document 123 .................................................................................................................... 325<br />
13 May, The Latvian Minister in Czechoslovakia to head of <strong>the</strong> Law Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs about trade negotiations with Romania
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 31<br />
1938<br />
Document 124 .................................................................................................................... 325<br />
20 May, The Latvian Minister in Czechoslovakia to head of <strong>the</strong> Law Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs about trade negotiations with Romania<br />
Document 125 .................................................................................................................... 326<br />
7 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> reflection in<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> circles of <strong>the</strong> visit of Polish President in Romania and <strong>the</strong> future directions<br />
of Romanian foreign policy<br />
Document 126 .................................................................................................................... 327<br />
12 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with <strong>the</strong> visit of<br />
<strong>the</strong> British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ivor Miles Windsor-Clive, 2nd Earl<br />
of Plymouth to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> message of economic, cultural and political<br />
support conveyed by <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania<br />
Document 127 .................................................................................................................... 336<br />
28 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to <strong>the</strong><br />
visit of Romanian King in Poland<br />
Document 128 .................................................................................................................... 337<br />
30 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />
Polish-Romanian plan to upgrade <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions to <strong>the</strong> rank of embassies<br />
Document 129 .................................................................................................................... 338<br />
3 July, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs about <strong>the</strong><br />
streng<strong>the</strong>ning of <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>the</strong> belt between Soviet Russia and Germany as a<br />
consequence of <strong>the</strong> improved Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 130 .................................................................................................................... 341<br />
17 September, Administrative and Protocol Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
of Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Law Department about <strong>the</strong> agreement on holding trade negotiations<br />
between Latvia and Romania<br />
Document 131 ..................................................................................................................... 341<br />
30 December, First Secretary of Latvia’s Legation in Prague to Envoy M. Nukša detailing<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian Bucharest trade negotiations which settled favourably for <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian interests<br />
Document 132 ....................................................................................................................344<br />
12 January, The Latvian Minister in Czechoslovakia to Minister of Foreign Affairs analysing<br />
<strong>the</strong> visit of Romanian Foreign Minister to Prague and <strong>the</strong> state of Romanian-<br />
Czechoslovakian <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 133.................................................................................................................... 348<br />
5 February, Director of Trade and Industry Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Finance to<br />
Acting Director of Legal and Administrative Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
concerning <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian trade <strong>relations</strong>
32 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1939<br />
Document 134 ................................................................................................................... 348<br />
31 May, Agent “Liepa” of <strong>the</strong> Political Authority of Latvia’s Ministry of Interior to Chief of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Authority’s Jelgava division about a meeting between <strong>the</strong> extreme right-wing Latvian<br />
and Romanian leaders Gustavs Celmiņš and Corneliu Zelea Codreanu<br />
Document 135 ................................................................................................................... 349<br />
4 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Polish military <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> position of Romania in case of a Red Army<br />
transit request in order to give assistance to Czechoslovakia<br />
Document 136 ....................................................................................................................350<br />
22 August, Latvia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Legation in Prague about <strong>the</strong> business<br />
trip of Latvian administrator of State Sugar Monopoly to Poland, Romania and Bulgaria<br />
Document 137 .................................................................................................................... 351<br />
13 September, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
information that Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Jews travelling to Palestine by Romanian<br />
territory settled in Romania<br />
Document 138 .................................................................................................................... 351<br />
21 October, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs analysing <strong>the</strong><br />
results of Polish Foreign Minister visit to Romania and <strong>the</strong> latter’s position with regard to<br />
<strong>the</strong> consequences of <strong>the</strong> Munich Agreement<br />
Document 139 .................................................................................................................... 353<br />
25 October, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing on <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian and Lithuanian perception of Romania’s international behavior in respect to its<br />
ally Czechoslovakia dismembered according to <strong>the</strong> Munich Agreement<br />
Document 140 .................................................................................................................... 353<br />
6 November, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry requesting <strong>the</strong><br />
mandate to represent Romania at <strong>the</strong> 20 th anniversary of Latvia’s independence and<br />
suggesting a music program dedicated to Latvia at Radio Romania<br />
Document 141 ..................................................................................................................... 354<br />
4 February, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />
representation of Latvia in Bucharest and of Romania in Riga<br />
Document 142 .................................................................................................................... 355<br />
8 March, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs about <strong>the</strong> visit of<br />
Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigore Gafencu to Poland, <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish<br />
<strong>relations</strong> project of a waterway channel to connect <strong>the</strong> Baltic and <strong>the</strong> Black Seas<br />
Document 143 .................................................................................................................... 358<br />
5 May, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> prospect of<br />
a German-Latvian non-aggression pact
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 33<br />
Document 144 .................................................................................................................... 359<br />
28 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> and Latvia’s perspectives on <strong>the</strong> Anglo-French-Soviet<br />
negotiations in Moscow<br />
Document 145 ................................................................................................................... 360<br />
11 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with respect to<br />
<strong>the</strong> visit of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Foreign Ministry Political Director Artūrs Stegmanis to Bucharest<br />
Document 146 .................................................................................................................... 361<br />
12 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on Latvia’s<br />
approach with respect to <strong>the</strong> Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow<br />
Document 147 .................................................................................................................... 361<br />
14 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry outlining <strong>the</strong><br />
perfect symmetry of Romania and Baltic States’ policies toward <strong>the</strong> Anglo-French-Soviet<br />
negotiations in Moscow<br />
Document 148 .................................................................................................................... 362<br />
8 August, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to<br />
<strong>the</strong> visit of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Foreign Ministry Political Director Artūrs Stegmanis to Bucharest<br />
Document 149 .................................................................................................................... 362<br />
8 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Latvian perspectives of <strong>the</strong> Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and <strong>the</strong> beginning of World<br />
War II<br />
Document 150 ................................................................................................................... 364<br />
14 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry requesting<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian agreement for a Latvian Minister to be posted in Bucharest<br />
Document 151 ..................................................................................................................... 365<br />
18 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry evoking<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian and Baltic States concerns following <strong>the</strong> Red Army aggression against Poland<br />
Document 152 ................................................................................................................... 366<br />
21 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing<br />
about <strong>the</strong> Soviet accusations against alleged Baltic States’ violations of neutrality rules<br />
Document 153 .................................................................................................................... 367<br />
29 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian perceptions of <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Treaty (28 September)<br />
and <strong>the</strong> hopes that Latvia will get better deal from its big neighbor<br />
Document 154 ................................................................................................................... 368<br />
6 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analysing and<br />
comparing <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Latvian and <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance treaties<br />
Document 155 ................................................................................................................... 369<br />
8 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong><br />
repatriation of Baltic Germans to <strong>the</strong> Reich
34 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Document 156 ....................................................................................................................370<br />
9 October, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to<br />
Latvia’s <strong>diplomatic</strong> representation in Romania and Hungary<br />
Document 157 .................................................................................................................... 371<br />
23 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing <strong>the</strong><br />
new economic and commercial understandings between <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Union and <strong>the</strong>ir implications<br />
Document 158 .................................................................................................................... 375<br />
24 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing<br />
on <strong>the</strong> agreement to put into force <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Treaty<br />
Document 159 .................................................................................................................... 375<br />
26 October, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to<br />
Latvia’s <strong>diplomatic</strong> representation in Romania<br />
Document 160 .................................................................................................................... 376<br />
4 November, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry passing <strong>the</strong><br />
information leaks from <strong>the</strong> Latvian party concerning <strong>the</strong> Soviet plan to move against<br />
Romania after <strong>the</strong> completion of <strong>the</strong> Winter War<br />
Document 161..................................................................................................................... 377<br />
9 November, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about <strong>the</strong><br />
developments in South-eastern Europe at <strong>the</strong> beginning of World War II and <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian perceptions of developments in <strong>the</strong> Eastern Baltic<br />
Document 162 .................................................................................................................... 381<br />
17 November, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs following a<br />
meeting with <strong>the</strong> Romanian Prime Minister about <strong>the</strong> Romanian external and internal<br />
stakes<br />
Document 163 .................................................................................................................... 385<br />
4 December, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning<br />
<strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> Soviet attack against Finland on Romanian foreign policy and <strong>the</strong><br />
German growing influence in <strong>the</strong> Balkans<br />
Document 164 ................................................................................................................... 389<br />
9 December, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect<br />
to <strong>the</strong> perception of <strong>the</strong> Winter War in Romania and <strong>the</strong> defence preparations in<br />
Bessarabia<br />
Document 165 .................................................................................................................... 391<br />
9-19 December, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs following a<br />
meeting with <strong>the</strong> Romanian Prime Minister about Romanian foreign and domestic<br />
policies and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 166 ................................................................................................................... 394<br />
19 December, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs describing<br />
<strong>the</strong> handing of his letters of credence to King of Romania Carol II
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 35<br />
1940<br />
Document 167 ................................................................................................................... 396<br />
10 January, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
perception of Baltic States of <strong>the</strong> Winter War and <strong>the</strong>ir support for a pacific resolution of<br />
<strong>the</strong> conflict<br />
Document 168 .................................................................................................................... 397<br />
15 January, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs assessing <strong>the</strong><br />
mood of Romanian ruling circles about <strong>the</strong> Winter War<br />
Document 169 ................................................................................................................... 399<br />
18 January, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about<br />
Romanian foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> situation of Polish refugees<br />
Document 170 ................................................................................................................... 402<br />
29 January, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about<br />
Romanian neutrality and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 171 .................................................................................................................... 403<br />
31 January, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about<br />
Romanian external and internal policies and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 172 ................................................................................................................... 406<br />
13 February, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente meeting and <strong>the</strong> Romanian foreign policy goals<br />
Document 173 .................................................................................................................... 410<br />
23 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>relations</strong> between Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States in <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> Winter War<br />
Document 174 .................................................................................................................... 411<br />
6 March, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Romanian<br />
foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> rumours circulating in Bucharest in this respect<br />
Document 175 .................................................................................................................... 415<br />
13 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing <strong>the</strong><br />
views of Baltic governments of <strong>the</strong> Winter War and <strong>the</strong> subsequent Moscow Peace Treaty<br />
and <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> two war coalitions in <strong>the</strong> war unfolding in Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Europe<br />
Document 176 .................................................................................................................... 416<br />
15 March, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Romanian<br />
foreign policy concerns and <strong>the</strong> lesson of Finnish resistance<br />
Document 177 .................................................................................................................... 418<br />
26 March, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Romanian<br />
foreign and economic policy<br />
Document 178 .................................................................................................................... 423<br />
27 March, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs describing <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> environment in Romania and <strong>the</strong> censorship of <strong>the</strong> press
36 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Document 179 .................................................................................................................... 425<br />
4 April, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Latvia’s<br />
Honorary Consul T. V. Orghidan<br />
Document 180 .................................................................................................................... 427<br />
13 April, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> impact of<br />
<strong>the</strong> German attack on Norway and Denmark, Romania’s military preparations <strong>the</strong> British-<br />
German economic war on <strong>the</strong> Danube and <strong>the</strong> Romanian perception of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />
Document 181 ..................................................................................................................... 431<br />
22 April, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Romanian-<br />
Soviet and Baltic States-Soviet <strong>relations</strong><br />
Document 182 ....................................................................................................................434<br />
27 April, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs on Romanian-<br />
German trade <strong>relations</strong> and miscellaneous<br />
Document 183 .................................................................................................................... 435<br />
2 May, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry pointing out to<br />
<strong>the</strong> views of Baltic governments of <strong>the</strong> war scenarios and drawing parallels with <strong>the</strong><br />
international behavior of Balkan states<br />
Document 184 ................................................................................................................... 436<br />
14 May, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
impact of <strong>the</strong> German attack on France, Belgium and Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands on Romanian decisionmakers<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Romanian domestic and foreign policies<br />
Document 185 ................................................................................................................... 442<br />
3 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about<br />
information leaks from <strong>the</strong> Latvian General Staff with regard to <strong>the</strong> Soviet troop<br />
concentrations at <strong>the</strong> border with Romania<br />
Document 186 ....................................................................................................................443<br />
13 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing about<br />
<strong>the</strong> political contacts between Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States preliminary to a possible<br />
streng<strong>the</strong>ning of Soviet military presence on <strong>the</strong> eastern shores of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea<br />
Document 187 ................................................................................................................... 444<br />
14 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about<br />
information leaks from <strong>the</strong> Latvian General Staff with regard to <strong>the</strong> Soviet troop<br />
concentrations at <strong>the</strong> border with Romania<br />
Document 188 ................................................................................................................... 445<br />
18 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing <strong>the</strong><br />
atmosphere surrounding <strong>the</strong> Soviet military occupation of Latvia<br />
Document 189 ................................................................................................................... 446<br />
21 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> new<br />
Latvian puppet government installed into power by Andrey Januarevich Vyshinsky
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 37<br />
Document 190 ................................................................................................................... 447<br />
4 July, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs regarding <strong>the</strong> new security regulations issued by <strong>the</strong> military commandant’s office<br />
of Bucharest in preparation for war<br />
Document 191.................................................................................................................... 449<br />
5 July, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Prime Minister about <strong>the</strong> evacuation of<br />
Bessarabia and <strong>the</strong> new foreign policy of Romania<br />
Document 192 ................................................................................................................... 450<br />
10 July, Note of conversation between Romanian Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu and<br />
Latvian Minister in Romania Ludvigs Ēķis with respect to <strong>the</strong> Soviet occupation of Latvia<br />
Document 193 ................................................................................................................... 450<br />
11 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet style elections designed to pave <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong> Soviet takeover of Baltic States<br />
Document 194 .................................................................................................................... 452<br />
15 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> new<br />
political climate in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> process of Soviet annexation<br />
Document 195 .................................................................................................................... 453<br />
16 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
arrest of Latvian former Minister of Foreign Affairs Vilhelms Munters<br />
Document 196 ................................................................................................................... 454<br />
19 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry predicting <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet annexation of Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> closing up of foreign <strong>diplomatic</strong> and consular<br />
missions in <strong>the</strong>se states<br />
Document 197 .................................................................................................................... 455<br />
21 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet-imposed Parliament decisions of communization and annexation of Latvia to<br />
Soviet Union<br />
Document 198 ................................................................................................................... 456<br />
21 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry emphasizing <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States achievements in 22 years of independence before <strong>the</strong> Soviet annexation<br />
Document 199 ................................................................................................................... 456<br />
26 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> end of<br />
Baltic States’ independence and <strong>the</strong> preparations to be made in order to close up <strong>the</strong><br />
foreign legations and consulates in <strong>the</strong>se states<br />
Document 200 ................................................................................................................... 457<br />
12 August, The Romanian Foreign Ministry’s instructions to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia<br />
to close up <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Riga<br />
Document 201 ................................................................................................................... 458<br />
13 August, Decree of King Carol II of recalling diplomat Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti from<br />
<strong>the</strong> position of Romania’s chargé d'affaires in Riga
38 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1942<br />
1957<br />
1958<br />
Document 202 .................................................................................................................. 459<br />
21 August, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet arrests and deportations of Latvian political and national elites<br />
Document 203 ................................................................................................................... 460<br />
23 December, Latvia’s former Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Head of Latvia’s <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />
service K. Zariņš, Washington, D.C. giving an account of his <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in<br />
Bucharest and <strong>the</strong> closing down of <strong>the</strong> local Latvian Legation he headed<br />
Document 204 ................................................................................................................... 477<br />
26 August, Note of conversation between a Romanian Foreign Ministry diplomat and a<br />
diplomat of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Embassy in Romania with regard to <strong>the</strong> mutual renouncing of all<br />
patrimonial and financial claims between Romania and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union resulting from<br />
<strong>the</strong> interwar Romania’s <strong>relations</strong> with former republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania<br />
Document 205 .................................................................................................................... 477<br />
7 March, Moscow Protocol between <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Romanian People’s Republic<br />
and Government of <strong>the</strong> Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on <strong>the</strong> settlement of mutual<br />
claims related to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
1. Declaration of Common Aims 1 of <strong>the</strong> Independent Mid-European 2 nations in<br />
convention assembled at Independence Hall Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States<br />
of America, 1918 3<br />
We, representing toge<strong>the</strong>r more than fifty million people constituting a chain of nations<br />
lying between <strong>the</strong> Baltic, <strong>the</strong> Adriatic and <strong>the</strong> Black Seas, comprising Czecho-Slovaks, Poles,<br />
Jugoslavs, Ukrainians, Uhro-Rusyns, Lithuanians, Roumanians and Italian Irredentists,<br />
Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians, Zionists and Armenians, wholly or partly subject to alien<br />
domination, deeply appreciating <strong>the</strong> aid and assistance given our peoples by <strong>the</strong> government<br />
and people of America and of <strong>the</strong> entente allies, on behalf of ourselves and our brethren at<br />
home, do hereby solemnly declare that we place our all - peoples and resources - at <strong>the</strong> disposal<br />
of our allies for use against our common enemy, and in order that <strong>the</strong> whole world may know<br />
what we deem are <strong>the</strong> essential and fundamental doctrines which shall be embodied in <strong>the</strong><br />
constitutions hereafter adopted by <strong>the</strong> peoples of our respective independent nations, as well as<br />
<strong>the</strong> purpose which shall govern our common and united action, we accept and subscribe to <strong>the</strong><br />
following as basic principles for all free peoples.<br />
First. That all governments derive <strong>the</strong>ir just power from <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> governed.<br />
Second. That it is <strong>the</strong> inalienable right of every people to organize <strong>the</strong>ir own government on<br />
such principles and in such form as <strong>the</strong>y believe will best promote <strong>the</strong>ir welfare, safety and<br />
happiness.<br />
Third. That <strong>the</strong> free and natural development of <strong>the</strong> ideals of any state should be allowed to<br />
pursue <strong>the</strong>ir normal and unhindered course unless such course harms or threatens <strong>the</strong><br />
common interest of all.<br />
Fourth. That <strong>the</strong>re should be no secret diplomacy, and all proposed treaties and agreements<br />
between nations should be made in public - prior to <strong>the</strong>ir adoption and ratification.<br />
Fifth. That we believe our peoples, having kindred ideals and purposes, should coordinate<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir efforts to insure <strong>the</strong> liberties of <strong>the</strong>ir individual nations for <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>rance of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
common welfare, provided such a union contributes to <strong>the</strong> peace and welfare of <strong>the</strong> world.<br />
Sixth. That <strong>the</strong>re should be formed a league of <strong>the</strong> nations of <strong>the</strong> world in a common and<br />
binding agreement for genuine and practical cooperation to secure justice and <strong>the</strong>refore peace<br />
among nations.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> course of our history, we have been subject to, and victims of aggressive and selfish<br />
nations and autocratic dynasties, and held in subjection by force of arms.<br />
We have suffered destruction of our cities, violation of our homes and lands, and have<br />
maintained our ideals only by stealth, and in spite of <strong>the</strong> tyranny of our oppressors.<br />
We have been deprived of proper representation and fair trial. We have been denied <strong>the</strong><br />
right of free speech, and <strong>the</strong> right freely to assemble and petition for <strong>the</strong> redress of our<br />
grievances. We have been denied free and friendly intercourse with our sister states, and our<br />
men have been impressed in war against <strong>the</strong>ir bro<strong>the</strong>rs and friends of kindred races.<br />
1<br />
Elaborated on 26 October at <strong>the</strong> meeting of <strong>the</strong> Democratic Mid-European Union held at Independence Hall of<br />
Philadephia between 23-26 October 1918, Romanian National Archives, fund Vasile Stoica, file I/137, sheets 1-36<br />
2<br />
The Democratic Mid-European Union was founded in Washington on 2 October 1918. Vasile Stoica, future<br />
Romanian envoy to Latvia, was First Vice-President of <strong>the</strong> organisation.<br />
3<br />
http://www.archive.org/stream/1919internationa01carnuoft/1919internationa01carnuoft_djvu.txt (accesed on<br />
12.09.2012).
40 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
The signers of this declaration, and representatives of o<strong>the</strong>r independent peoples, who may<br />
subscribe <strong>the</strong>ir names hereunto, do hereby pledge on behalf of <strong>the</strong>ir respective nations, that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y will unitedly strive to <strong>the</strong> end that <strong>the</strong>se wrongs shall be righted, that <strong>the</strong> sufferings of <strong>the</strong><br />
world war shall not have been in vain, and that <strong>the</strong> principles here set forth shall be<br />
incorporated in <strong>the</strong> organic laws of whatever governments our respective peoples may hereafter<br />
establish.<br />
2. Latvijas diplomātiskā pārstāvja Varšavā 1 A. Ķeniņa 2 1920. g. janv. (bez datuma)<br />
raksta ārlietu ministram Z. Meierovicam 3<br />
Jūsu rakstu no 20. novembra p[agājušā] g[ada] saņēmu tikai 1. janvārī š. g. 4 Stājos tūliņ<br />
sakaros ar vietējo Rumānijas priekšstāvi Floresku kungu, lai panāktu no Rumānijas valdības<br />
atļauju mūsu Dienvidu-Krievijas bēgļu caurbraukšanai. Floresku kungs laipni apsolījās mūsu<br />
rakstu nosūtīt tālāk viņa valdībai, bet aizrādīja uz ārkārtīgi lielām transporta grūtībām<br />
Rumānijā. Kad poļu valdība griezusies pie Rumānijas valdības ar līdzīgu lūgumu, pēdējā<br />
apsolījusi palīdzību tikai ar noteikumu, ja Polija nodos Rumānijas valdības rīcībā vajadzīgos<br />
vagonus, lokomotīves, smēreļļas un ogles.<br />
Neskatoties uz to, daži mūsu Dienvidu-Krievijas bēgļi laimīgi izbrauc Rumāniju un ierodas<br />
Varšavā. Ar pietiekošiem naudas līdzekļiem apgādātas personas sekmīgi pārvar pat Rumānijas<br />
ārkārtīgi grūtos transporta apstākļus.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 11. l., 69. Lp.<br />
2. Note by Latvia’s <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative in Warsaw 5 A. Ķeniņš 6 to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs Z. Meierovics 7 , January 1920 (undated)<br />
Your note of 20 th November l[ast] y[ear] I received only on 1 st January, this year. 8 I<br />
immediately contacted <strong>the</strong> local representative of Romania Mr. Florescu, in order to obtain<br />
from Romania’s government a transit permit for our refugees from Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Russia. Mr.<br />
Florescu kindly promised to forward my note to his government but mentioned <strong>the</strong> extreme<br />
transport difficulties in Romania. When Poland’s government turned to Romania’s government<br />
with a similar request, <strong>the</strong> latter promised assistance only on condition that Poland provides<br />
Romania’s government with <strong>the</strong> required number of wagons and carriages and <strong>the</strong> necessary<br />
amount of lubricants and coal. In spite of that some of our refugees from Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Russian<br />
1<br />
Šeit un turpmāk diplomātisko pārstāvju gadījumā virsrakstos minēta viņu rezidences jeb sēdekļa vieta.<br />
2<br />
Atis Ķeniņš (1874–1961), Latvijas dzejnieks, diplomāts. 1919.–1921. g. diplomātiskais pārstāvis Varšavā, 1941.–1944.<br />
un 1951.–1955. g. padomju apcietinājumā.<br />
3<br />
Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics (1887–1925), Latvijas valstsvīrs. 1918.–1924. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1921.–1922. un 1923.–1924.<br />
g. Ministru prezidents.<br />
4<br />
1919. gada otrajā pusē aktualizējās jautājums par latviešu bēgļu, karagūstekņu un dažādu armiju karavīru<br />
atgriešanos dzimtenē no dažādām Krievijas un Eiropas vietām, turklāt viens no lielākajiem šādiem centriem bija<br />
Dienvidkrievija. Tādēļ šajā laikā Latvijas Ārlietu ministrija sāka kārtot minēto jautājumu.<br />
5<br />
Here and hereinafter <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> representatives are listed after <strong>the</strong>ir place of residence.<br />
6<br />
Atis Ķeniņš (1874–1961), Latvian poet and diplomat. 1919–1921 <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative in Warsaw, 1941–1944<br />
and 1951–1955 – in Soviet imprisonment.<br />
7<br />
Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics (1887–1925), Latvian statesman. 1918–1924 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1921–1922 and<br />
1923–1924 Prime Minister.<br />
8<br />
In <strong>the</strong> second half of 1919 <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> repatriation of Latvian refugees, prisoners of war and soldiers serving in<br />
different armies from different places in Russia and Europe became topical. Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Russia was among <strong>the</strong><br />
largest of such centres. For this reason in <strong>the</strong> respective period <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia began to<br />
deal with <strong>the</strong> respective issue.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 41<br />
successfully travel through Romania and come to Warsaw. Persons who have sufficient amount<br />
of money successfully overcome even <strong>the</strong> extremely difficult transport conditions in Romania.<br />
State Historical Archives of Latvia (hereinafter SHAL), fund (hereinafter f.) 2575, description<br />
(hereinafter d.) 15, file 11, sheet (hereinafter s.) 69.<br />
3. Latvijas armijas virspavēlnieka štāba priekšnieka P. Radziņa 1 1920. g. 16. janv.<br />
raksts militārajam pārstāvim Varšavā M. Hartmanim 2<br />
Latvijas sūtnim Varšavā ir uzdots stāties sakarā ar Rumānijas sūtni dēļ Latvijas pavalstnieku<br />
caurlaišanas caur Rumāniju. Gadījumā, ja būtu vajadzīgs vest sarunas tieši ar Rumānijas valdību<br />
Bukarestē, uzdodu Jums tādā gadījumā doties uz turieni un tur atrisināt minēto jautājumu vai<br />
arī sūtīt savu palīgu.<br />
LVVA, 3601.,1. apr., 469. l., 59. lp.<br />
3. Note by Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia<br />
P.Radziņš 3 to Latvia’s military representative in Warsaw M. Hartmanis 4 , 16 th January,<br />
1920<br />
The Envoy of Latvia in Warsaw is instructed to contact <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Romania on <strong>the</strong> matter<br />
of <strong>the</strong> permission of transit of Latvia’s citizens through Romania. In case direct negotiations<br />
with Romania’s government in Bucharest become necessary, I instruct you to go <strong>the</strong>re in person<br />
or to send your assistant <strong>the</strong>re and to resolve <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned issue.<br />
SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 59.<br />
4. Rumānijas Ārlietu ministrijas 1920. g. 24. febr. raksts Latvijas armijas pārstāvim<br />
Kaukāzā H. Rācenim 5<br />
Ārlietu ministrija pagodinās paziņot Latvijas armijas pārstāvim Kaukāzā kapteinim H. L.<br />
Rācenim, ka viņa griezusies pie attiecīgām iestādēm, lai tiktu sperti attiecīgi soļi priekš<br />
apmēram 40–50 žēlsirdīgo māsu un 200–250 virsnieku caurbraukšanai Rumānijai. Virsnieki<br />
brauks partijās pa 15–20 vīru, pie kam tiem jābūt atbruņotiem.<br />
LVVA, 3601. f., 1. apr., 469. l., 163. lp. (1920. g. veikts tulkojums no franču valodas).<br />
1<br />
Pēteris Radziņš (1880–1930), Latvijas armijas ģenerālis (1920). 1919.–1920. g. Armijas virspavēlnieka štāba<br />
priekšnieks, no 1924. g. armijas komandieris, no 1928. g. – Virsnieku akadēmisko kursu priekšnieks.<br />
2<br />
Mārtiņš Hartmanis (1882–1941), Latvijas armijas ģenerālis (1929). 1919.–1921. g. militārais pārstāvis Polijā. 1934.–<br />
1939. g. Armijas štāba priekšnieks. 1940.–1941. g. padomju apcietinājumā, nogalināts.<br />
3<br />
Pēteris Radziņš (1880–1930), general of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1920). In 1919–1920 Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Supreme<br />
Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army, from 1924 Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army, from 1928 – chief of Academic officers’ course.<br />
4<br />
Mārtiņš Hartmanis (1882–1941), general of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1929). 1919–1921 military representative in Poland.<br />
1934–1939 Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Army. 1940-1941 in Soviet imprisonment, executed.<br />
5<br />
Herberts Leo Rācenis (1894–1960), Latvijas armijas kapteinis, diplomāts. No 1919. g. Latvijas armijā, 1920.–1921. g.<br />
Armijas virspavēlnieka štāba pārstāvis Kaukāzā. No 1924. g. sekretārs, atašejs diplomātiskajā un konsulārajās<br />
pārstāvniecībās Vācijā, 1939.–1940. g. goda vicekonsuls Antverpenē.
42 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
4. Note by <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania to representative of <strong>the</strong> Army<br />
of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus H. Rācenis 1 , 24 th February, 1920<br />
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has <strong>the</strong> honour to inform representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of<br />
Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus Captain H. L. Rācenis that it has addressed <strong>the</strong> relevant institutions to<br />
ensure that adequate steps are taken for approximately 40–50 sisters of mercy [nurses] and<br />
200–250 officers to have <strong>the</strong> permission to travel through Romania. Officers will travel in<br />
groups of 15–20 and <strong>the</strong>y must be disarmed.<br />
SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 163 (translated from French in 1920).<br />
5. Latvijas armijas pārstāvja Kaukāzā H. Rāceņa 1920. g. 2. marta raksts Rumānijas<br />
armijas Galvenā štāba priekšniekam<br />
Ar savu lēmumu Nr. 3809 Ārlietu ministrija man ziņo par no viņas spertiem soļiem, lai<br />
nodrošinātu Sulinā apmēram 250–300 virsnieku caurbraukšanu cauri Rumānijai partijās pa 15–<br />
20 cilvēku. Es ceru, mans ģenerāli, ka jūs būsiet labvēlīgi pret šo priekš mums tik svarīgo<br />
lēmumu, kurš dod latviešiem iespēju atgriezties pēc ilgas prombūšanas dzimtenē, lai strādātu<br />
Latvijas un viņas draugu labā.<br />
Es ceru, ka visi jautājumi, kuri varētu celties sakarā ar šo lietu, tiks nokārtoti starp Jūsu<br />
Galveno štābu un Polijas sūtni Rumānijā, kurš laipni uzņēmies vadīt latviešu tranzītu.<br />
LVVA, 3601. f., 1. apr., 469. l., 163. lp. (1920. g. veikts tulkojums no franču valodas).<br />
5. Note by representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus H. Rācenis to <strong>the</strong><br />
Chief of <strong>the</strong> General Staff of Romania, 2 nd March, 1920<br />
By its resolution No. 3809 <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs me of <strong>the</strong> measures it has<br />
taken to ensure <strong>the</strong> transit of approximately 250–300 officers through Sulina in Romania in<br />
groups of 15–20. I hope, my General, that you will consider favourably this resolution, which is<br />
so important for us and gives Latvians <strong>the</strong> chance after a long absence to return to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
mo<strong>the</strong>rland in order to work for <strong>the</strong> good of Latvia and its friends.<br />
I hope that all issues that may arise in connection with this matter will be resolved between<br />
Your Main Staff and <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Poland to Romania who has kindly assumed <strong>the</strong> management<br />
of <strong>the</strong> transit of Latvians.<br />
SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 163 (translated from French in 1920).<br />
6. Latvijas armijas pārstāvja Kaukāzā H. Rāceņa 1920. g. 2. marta raksts Rumānijas<br />
Ministru Prezidentam<br />
Pagodinos paziņot par raksta Nr. 3809 saņemšanu un reizē ar to izsaku Jūsu personā<br />
pateicību Karaliskajai valdībai par lietas ātru izšķiršanu.<br />
Es ceru, ka nākotnē Jūs izpalīdzēsiet mums tikpat labvēlīgi kā līdz šim un paziņoju Jums, ka<br />
Polijas atašejs laipni uzņēmies rūpēties par latviešu caurbraukšanu.<br />
LVVA, 3601. f., 1. apr., 469. l., 163. lp. (1920. g. veikts tulkojums no franču valodas).<br />
1<br />
Herberts Leo Rācenis (1894–1960), Captain of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia, diplomat. In <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia as of 1919, 1920–<br />
1921 representative of <strong>the</strong> staff of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Commander in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus. From 1924 Secretary and attaché in<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> and consular missions in Germany, 1939–1940 Vice Consul in Antwerp.
6. Note by representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus H. Rācenis to <strong>the</strong><br />
Prime Minister of Romania, 2 nd March, 1920<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to inform you of <strong>the</strong> receipt of note No. 3809 and at <strong>the</strong> same time<br />
through you, I thank <strong>the</strong> Royal Government for <strong>the</strong> speedy resolution of <strong>the</strong> matter.<br />
I hope that you will continue to assist us with <strong>the</strong> same benevolence and I inform you that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Attaché of Poland has kindly assumed care for <strong>the</strong> transit of Latvians.<br />
SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 163 (translated from French in 1920).<br />
7. Latvijas armijas pārstāvja Kaukāzā H. Rāceņa 1920. g. 2. marta raksts Polijas<br />
militārajam atašejam Rumānijā<br />
Nosūtu Jums raksta Nr. 3809 norakstu un, tā kā man jābrauc darīšanās uz Kaukāzu, tad<br />
laipni lūdzu Jūs uzņemties latviešu tranzīta nokārtošanu.<br />
LVVA, 3601. f., 1. apr., 469. l., 163. lp. (1920. g. veikts tulkojums no franču valodas).<br />
7. Note by representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus H. Rācenis to <strong>the</strong><br />
Military Attaché of Poland in Romania, 2 nd March, 1920<br />
Hereby I forward to you a copy of note No. 3809 and as I have to go to <strong>the</strong> Caucasus on<br />
business, I kindly ask you to assume <strong>the</strong> organisation of <strong>the</strong> transit of Latvians.<br />
SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 163 (translated from French in 1920).<br />
8. Rumānijas sūtņa Kopenhāgenā M. Păclianu 1921. g. 26. febr. telegramma Latvijas<br />
ārlietu ministram Z. Meierovicam<br />
Priecājos paziņot Jūsu Ekselencei, ka Karaļa Valdība man uzdevusi Jums darīt zināmu, ka<br />
Rumānijas Valdība ir atzinusi Latvijas neatkarību. Izmantoju gadījumu, lai izteiktu Viņa<br />
Ekselencei manus personīgos vēlējumus Jūsu valsts labklājībai. Lūdzu apstipriniet šīs<br />
telegrammas saņemšanu.<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 3. apr., 1148. l., 60. lp.<br />
8. Telegram by Envoy of Romania in Copenhagen M. Păclianu to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs of Latvia Z. Meierovics, 26 th February, 1921<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> pleasure to inform Your Excellency that <strong>the</strong> King’s Government has instructed me<br />
to communicate to you <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Government of Romania has recognised Latvia’s<br />
independence. I avail myself of <strong>the</strong> opportunity to convey to Your Excellency my personal best<br />
wishes for <strong>the</strong> welfare of your country. Please confirm <strong>the</strong> receipt of this telegram.<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 3, file 1148, s. 60.<br />
9. Latvijas sūtņa Helsinkos K. Zariņa 1 1921. g. 15. apr. ziņojums ārlietu ministram<br />
Šodien legācijā ieradās jaunais Rumānijas pilnvarotais sūtnis Somijā Plesnilă, iepazinušies ar<br />
viņu bijām jau agrāk, un izteica prieku, ka Rumānijai izdevies tagad Latviju atzīt de iure.<br />
1<br />
Kārlis Reinholds Zariņš (1879–1963), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. No 1919. g. sūtnis Somijā, no 1923. g. – arī<br />
Zviedrijā, Norvēģijā un Dānijā ar sēdekli Helsinkos, 1925.–1930. g. sūtnis Zviedrijā, Norvēģijā un Dānijā ar sēdekli<br />
Stokholmā, 1930.–1933. g. sūtnis Igaunijā, 1931.–1933. g. arī ārlietu ministrs. No 1933. g. sūtnis Lielbritānijā. 1940. g.<br />
piešķirtas ārkārtējās pilnvaras pārstāvēt valsts intereses ārvalstīs valdības darbības ierobežošanas dēļ. Latvijas<br />
diplomātiskā un konsulārā dienesta vadītājs. Miris Lielbritānijā.
44 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Plesnilă kungs aizrādīja, ka viņu valdība ar Poliju noslēgušas vienību, tagad gribot to pašu<br />
darīt ar Somiju, Igauniju un Latviju. Kā Ār[lietu] ministrijā, tā arī citur Plesnilă ir uzstājies<br />
vienmēr par Baltijas valstu savienību, sākot no Somijas un ejot uz dienvidiem līdz Rumānijai un<br />
vēl tālāk.<br />
Sūtnis Plesnilă izteicās, ka viņu zeme vēl ļoti maz mūs pazīstot, un tamdēļ būtu no liela<br />
svara, ja mēs ieceltu sūtni Bukarestē, to pašu arī viņu valdība darīšot attiecībā pret Latviju.<br />
Sūtnis noteikti uzstājas par defensīvu apvienību pret Krieviju, jo kāda vara Krievija pie stūres<br />
arī nebūtu, nedz tagadējai Rumānijai, kurā ietilpstot agrākā Besarābija, nedz pārējām jaunām<br />
valstīm viņa labvēlīga nebūs.<br />
Sūtnis Plesnilă ļoti lūdza arī viņu informēt par mūsu ieskatiem Krievijas jautājumos, kā arī,<br />
kā mēs skatāmies par ciešākas draudzības noslēgšanu ar Rumāniju.<br />
Lūdzu dodat man kādus aizrādījumus attiecībā uz mūsu jauno draugu Rumāniju.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 3. l., 66. Lp.<br />
9. Report by Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki K. Zariņš 1 to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
of Latvia, 15 th April 1921<br />
Today Romania’s new Plenipotentiary Envoy to Finland Plesnilă came to me on a legation<br />
visit, we had met already before, and he voiced his pleasure with <strong>the</strong> fact that Romania had now<br />
succeeded to recognise Latvia de iure.<br />
Mr. Plesnilă remarked that his government had concluded an alliance with Poland and<br />
wanted to do <strong>the</strong> same with Finland, Estonia and Latvia. Both in <strong>the</strong> Foreign [Affairs] Ministry<br />
and elsewhere Plesnilă had always spoken in favour of a union with <strong>the</strong> Baltic States that would<br />
stretch southwards from Finland to Romania and beyond.<br />
Envoy Plesnilă said that his country still knew very little about us and <strong>the</strong>refore it would be<br />
very important if we appointed an Envoy in Bucharest, his country would do <strong>the</strong> same with<br />
regard to Latvia.<br />
The Envoy firmly spoke in favour of a defence union against Russia, because no matter what<br />
kind of government stood at <strong>the</strong> helm of Russia, it would not be favourable ei<strong>the</strong>r to Romania<br />
that encompasses <strong>the</strong> former Bessarabia, or to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r young states.<br />
Envoy Plesnilă entreated me to share with him our views on <strong>the</strong> issue of Russia and to voice<br />
our position on making friendship with Romania closer.<br />
Please give me some kind of instructions with regard to our new friend Romania.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 3, s. 66.<br />
10. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Helsinki Dimitrie Plesnilă 1 nr. 24<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Take Ionescu 2 , 16 aprilie 1921<br />
Ministrul Letoniei care mi-a mărturisit dorința întregii sale națiuni de a-și apăra<br />
independența pănă la ultima picătură de sânge, crede că România ar trebui să-și folosească<br />
1<br />
Kārlis Reinholds Zariņš (1879–1963), Latvian diplomat and statesman. From 1919 Envoy to Finland, from 1923 –<br />
also to Sweden, Norway and Denmark with seat in Helsinki. In 1925–1930 Envoy to Sweden, Norway and Denmark<br />
with seat in Stockholm, in 1930-1933 Envoy to Estonia, 1931–1933 – also Minister of Foreign Affairs, from 1933 –<br />
Envoy to <strong>the</strong> UK. In 1940 he was vested with extraordinary authority to represent <strong>the</strong> interests of Latvia abroad<br />
due to <strong>the</strong> restricted possibilities of action of Latvia’s government. Head of <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> and consular service of<br />
Latvia. Died in <strong>the</strong> UK.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 45<br />
toată influența în Polonia aliată pentru ca aceasta din urmă să ajungă cât mai repede la o<br />
înțelegere amiabilă cu Lituania pentru a o împiedica să se alieze cu Germania sau Rusia. 3<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 38.<br />
10. Report by Envoy of Romania in Helsinki Dimitrie Plesnilă 4 no. 24 to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs Take Ionescu 5 , 16 th April 1921<br />
The Minister of Latvia, who confessed to me <strong>the</strong> determination of his entire nation to<br />
defend its independence to <strong>the</strong> last drop of blood, believes that Romania should use all its<br />
influence with its ally Poland in order to bring about an early rapprochement with Lithuania<br />
with <strong>the</strong> purpose of preventing it from joining ranks with Germany or Russia.<br />
The Diplomatic Archives of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter<br />
DARMFA), fund (hereinafter f.) 71/1920-1944, Latvia, 1921-1940. Relations with Lithuania,<br />
Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Hungary, Vatican (hereinafter 71, Latvia), volume<br />
(hereinafter vol.) 8, sheet (hereinafter s.) 38.<br />
11. Latvijas Ārlietu ministrijas Politsiski-ekonomiskā departamenta direktora L.<br />
Sējas 6 1921. g. 23. apr. raksts sūtnim Helsinkos K. Zariņam<br />
Ar savu 15. apr. ziņojumu par satikšanos ar Rumānijas sūtni Jūs mūs tā pārsteidzāt, ka<br />
negribas pat ticēt tam, ka Plesnilă kunga domas par defensīvu apvienību no Somijas līdz<br />
Rumānijas ir ņemamas pilnīgi nopietni. Vēl pagājušā ziemā, kad Ķeniņš ar līdzīgu pret Krieviju<br />
vērstas defensīvas apvienības projektu iepazīstināja Rumānijas toreizējo ārlietu ministru, tad tas<br />
ar sevišķu interesi un labvēlību bija uzklausījis, bet atbildējis, ka praktiski rumāņu tauta nekad<br />
nesapratīšot, ja to nosūtīšot karā par Latviju, kuru tā vēl nepazīstot pat vārda pēc. Mēs esam šīs<br />
apvienības piekritēji. Bet pagaidām varētu notikt tikai savstarpēja iepazīšanās, informēšanās un<br />
defensīvas draudzības politikas vešana. Tikai pēc krievu – rumāņu miera noslēgšanas varēsim<br />
sākt nopietnas sarunas par apvienības slēgšanu. Nelabvēlīgo finansiālo apstākļu dēļ mums grūti<br />
būtu uzturēt savu sūtni Rumānijā. Tamdēļ minētais informēšanās un politikas veids pagaidām<br />
jāuzņemas mūsu jau pastāvošām sūtniecībām Somijā, Polijā un citur. Ar lielāko prieku un<br />
gandarījumu mēs redzētu Rumānijas priekšstāvja ierašanos Rīgā. Tas atvieglotu priekšdarbus<br />
apvienības slēgšanai un minētais priekšstāvis varētu arī savu valdību par mums skaidri<br />
1<br />
Dimitrie Plesnilă a fost un ziarist român apropiat de Take Ionescu. Primul ministru plenipotențiar al României la<br />
Helsinki (1921-1922).<br />
2<br />
Take Ionescu (1858-1922) a fost un om se stat și diplomat român. Inițial membru al Partidului Național-Liberal,<br />
ulterior s-a alăturat Partidului Conservator (1886) pentru ca mai târziu să fondeze și să conducă Partidului<br />
Conservator-Democrat. Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (Dec. 1921 – Ian. 1922), ministru al afacerilor străine<br />
(1920-1922), deținător al mai multor portofolii de ministru în diverse guverne. A fost unul dintre fondatorii Micii<br />
Înțelegeri. S-a stins din viață la Roma.<br />
3<br />
Originalul în limba franceză.<br />
4<br />
Dimitrie Plesnilă was a Romanian journalist and <strong>the</strong> first Romanian Minister in Finland (1921-1922).<br />
5<br />
Take Ionescu (1858-1922), Romanian statesman and diplomat. Initially a member of <strong>the</strong> National-Liberal Party,<br />
he joined <strong>the</strong> Conservative Party in 1886 and founded <strong>the</strong> Conservative-Democrat Party in 1908. President of <strong>the</strong><br />
Council of Ministers (Dec. 1921 – Jan. 1922), minister in various governments, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1920-<br />
1921). One of <strong>the</strong> founders of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente. Died in Rome.<br />
6<br />
Ludvigs Kārlis Sēja (1885–1962), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1920.–1921. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Politiskiekonomiskā<br />
departamenta direktors. No 1921. g. pārstāvis ASV, no 1923. g. sūtnis Lietuvā, 1924. g. – ārlietu<br />
ministrs, no 1925. g. – sūtnis ASV, no 1927. g. ģenerālkonsuls Londonā, 1933.–1934. g. departamenta direktors,<br />
1934.–1940. g. sūtnis Lietuvā.1945.–1954. g. padomju ieslodzījumā, miris Latvijā.
46 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
informēt. Interesanti būtu noskaidrot rumāņu–ukraiņu attiecības. Poļu nedraudzīgā iekšējā<br />
politika pret ukraiņiem un baltkrieviem un arī leišiem bez šaubām ir traucēklis apvienības<br />
realizēšanai. Mēs vēlētos, lai šie jautājumi tiktu visās apvienības valstīs nokārtoti puslīdz<br />
vienādi, jo sevišķi tamdēļ, ka ukraiņi var izvērsties par mūsu daudz aktīvākiem draugiem kā<br />
rumāņi. Vispār Ukraina jāuzskata par zemi, kura var lielā mērā bremzēt Lielkrievijas agresivitāti<br />
un ekspansijas kāri. Tamdēļ taisni šīs tautības apspiešana Rumānijā un Galīcijā skalda un dala<br />
viņas nacionālo enerģiju un līdz ar to pamazina spiedienu uz Lielkrieviju kā galveno<br />
ienaidnieku.<br />
Tagadējā brīdī mums šķiet šai jautājumā būtu jārīkojas sekojoši:<br />
1) Jānoskaidro, cik Plesnilă kunga projekti tiek ņemti nopietni.<br />
2) Kādi būtu Rumānijas priekšnoteikumi šīs apvienības dibināšanā.<br />
3) Mūsu priekšnoteikums būtu godīga miera noslēgšana ar Krieviju.<br />
4) Jānoskaidro, kā Rumānija skatās uz Ukrainas neatkarību un tālāku bijušās Krievijas<br />
dalīšanu patstāvīgās valstīs.<br />
Jūsu ziņojumu, kā arī mūsu atbildes norakstu piesūtam arī mūsu sūtniecībai Polijā.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 3. l., 65. Lp.<br />
11. Note by Director of <strong>the</strong> Politico-Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs of Latvia L. Sēja 1 to Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki K. Zariņš, 23 rd April, 1921<br />
You surprised me so much by your report of 15 th April about your meeting with <strong>the</strong> Envoy of<br />
Romania that I can hardly believe that Mr. Plesnilă’s ideas about a defensive union stretching<br />
from Finland to Romania are to be taken entirely seriously. Still last winter when Ķeniņš<br />
presented a project of a similar defensive union targeted against Russia to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs of Romania, <strong>the</strong> latter listened to him with great interest and benevolence but<br />
replied that in practice <strong>the</strong> Romanian people would never understand it if <strong>the</strong>y were sent to war<br />
to fight for Latvia, which <strong>the</strong>y did not know yet even by name. We are in favour of such a union.<br />
But for <strong>the</strong> time being only mutual becoming acquainted, exchange of information and<br />
pursuance of defensive policy of friendship are possible. Only after <strong>the</strong> Russian–Romanian<br />
peace is concluded we will be able to start serious negotiations on creating such a union. Due to<br />
an unfavourable financial situation it would be difficult for us to have an envoy in Romania. For<br />
this reason for <strong>the</strong> time being <strong>the</strong> mutual exchange of information and pursuance of <strong>the</strong> abovementioned<br />
type of policy have to be assumed by our existing legations in Finland, Poland and<br />
elsewhere. It would be with greatest pleasure and satisfaction that we would welcome a<br />
representative of Romania in Riga. It would facilitate <strong>the</strong> preparation for <strong>the</strong> conclusion of such<br />
a union and such a representative could also provide clear information about us to his/ her<br />
government. It would be interesting to inquire into Romanian–Ukrainian <strong>relations</strong>. Poland’s<br />
domestic policy, which is unfriendly to ethnic Ukrainians and Byelorussians as well as to<br />
Lithuanians, is no doubt an obstacle to such a union. We would like to see <strong>the</strong>se issues resolved<br />
in more or less <strong>the</strong> same way in all <strong>the</strong> member states of <strong>the</strong> union especially because <strong>the</strong><br />
Ukrainians may become much more active friends to us than Romanians. In general Ukraine<br />
1<br />
Ludvigs Kārlis Sēja (1885–1962), Latvian diplomat and statesman. 1920–1921 Director of <strong>the</strong> Politico-Economic<br />
Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1921 – Latvia’s representative in <strong>the</strong> USA, from 1923 – Envoy to<br />
Lithuania, in 1924 – Minister of Foreign Affairs, from 1925 – Envoy to <strong>the</strong> USA, from 1927 – General Consul in<br />
London, in 1933–1934 – Director of a Department, in 1934–1940 Envoy to Lithuania. 1945–1954 – in Soviet<br />
imprisonment, died in Latvia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 47<br />
should be regarded as a country, which can to a great extent hamper <strong>the</strong> aggression and<br />
expansion-craze of <strong>the</strong> Great-Russia. It is for this reason that <strong>the</strong> oppression of this ethnic group<br />
in Romania and Galicia splits and divides its national energy and thus lessens pressure on <strong>the</strong><br />
Great-Russia as <strong>the</strong> main enemy.<br />
Thus at <strong>the</strong> present moment we believe that we should act in <strong>the</strong> following way with regard<br />
to this issue:<br />
1) We should find out how seriously Mr. Plesnilă’s projects are perceived.<br />
2) [We should find out] what preconditions Romania sets for creating such a union.<br />
3) Our precondition would be fair peace with Russia.<br />
4) We should find out Romania’ position on Ukraine’s independence and on fur<strong>the</strong>r division<br />
of <strong>the</strong> former Russia into independent states.<br />
We forward your report as well as a copy of our reply to it to our Legation in Poland.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 3, s. 65.<br />
12. Latvijas sūtņa Helsinkos K. Zariņa 1921. g. 20. maija ziņojums ārlietu ministram Z.<br />
Meierovicam<br />
Sakarā ar ministrijas š. g. 26. aprīļa rakstu man šodien bija atkal garāka saruna ar Rumānijas<br />
ministru Somijā Plesnilu.<br />
Sūtnis Plesnilă man noteikti paskaidroja, ka, lai gan viņam nav bijis tieši uzdots Rumānijas<br />
valdības vārdā runāt ar Latvijas valsts priekšstāvi, bet viņš kā ilggadīgs Rumānijas ār[lietu]<br />
ministra Jonesku draugs un tuvākais līdzstrādnieks ļoti labi zinot Rumānijas ārpolitikas ieskatus<br />
un centienus. Plesnilă 25 gadus strādājis kopā kā jurists un žurnālists ar ār[lietu] ministru<br />
Jonesku.<br />
Viņš, sūtnis, zinot, ka Rumānija visu Pasaules kara laiku ar lielu sajūsmu apbrīnojusi latvju<br />
kareivju varonību. Tāpat pēc mūsu patstāvības proklamēšanas pastāvīgi sekojusi mūsu ārlietu<br />
politikai, apsveikusi mūsu panākumus un noteiktu virzienu. Tamdēļ Rumānijas simpātijas<br />
bijušas sevišķi par Latviju un vispār par Baltijas savienību.<br />
Augšējo kopā ņemot, sūtnis Plesnilă nepielaiž domas, ka Rumānijas ārlietu ministrs varētu<br />
vienaldzīgi izturēties attiecībā pret Latviju. Bet viņš pielaiž divas varbūtības – 1. varbūtība, ka<br />
mūsu sūtnis būtu viņu ār[lietu] ministru pārpratis, resp., pesimistiski uzķēris Jonesku vārdus un<br />
2., ka varbūt arī ministrs Jonesku, lai piespiestu Latviju drīzāki akreditēt sūtni pie Bukarestes<br />
valdības, teicis, ka rumāņu tauta un zaldāti vēl nezin, ko nozīmē vārds Latvija.<br />
Tālāk sūtnis aizrāda, cik liela nozīme tam, lai Latvijai tiešām būtu sūtnis Bukarestē. Nevar<br />
būt šaubu, saka sūtnis, ka Rumānijas viskarstākā vēlēšanās ir savienība ar Latviju un pārējām<br />
Baltijas valstīm, bet, lai savienība būtu reāla, ir nepieciešami vajadzīgs, lai rumāņu tauta,<br />
inteliģence un sabiedrība vairāk zinātu par Latviju. Nav vairs tie laiki, kur savienības un<br />
konvencijas noslēdz ministri aiz slēgtām durvīm, vajadzīgs, lai arī pašas tautas viena otru<br />
pabalstītu. Latvijas eventuālam sūtnim Rumānijas sabiedrībā, presē u. t. t. būtu ļoti labvēlīgs<br />
darba lauks, jo visur atrastu vislielāko pretimnākšanu. Arī Rumānijas karaļa nama durvis būtu<br />
atvērtas Latvijas sūtnim.<br />
Plesnilă vēl piebilda, ka sabiedrības dzīve Rumānijā esot stipri attīstīta un tamdēļ viņu<br />
informācijai liela nozīme.<br />
Sūtnis Plesnilă domā, ka vajadzētu Bukarestē pastāvīgu Latvijas sūtni, bet, ja nu tas nemaz<br />
nebūtu iespējams, tad varētu savienot ar mūsu Varšavas sūtniecību.
48 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Lai apstiprinātu viņa ieteiktos ieskatus, tad sūtnis apsolīja mūsu sarunas telegrāfiski paziņot<br />
Ār[lietu] ministrijai Bukarestē un atbildi man nekavējoties paziņot. Viņš arī domāja, ka vai nu<br />
Ār[lietu] ministrija uzdošot viņam jeb viņa kolēģim Varšavā, nobraukt uz Rīgu un tuvāk<br />
parunāt un informēties vienam par otru jeb varbūt arī tūliņ akreditēšot kādu personu pie<br />
Latvijas valdības. Sūtnis pilnīgi tam piekrīt, ka mums vēl daudz kas jāpārrunā un vairākos<br />
jautājumos jāsaprotas, lai varētu stāties pie savienības noslēgšanas sarunām. Bet šai pirmai<br />
stadijai viņš piegriež lielu vērību. Par konkrētiem jautājumiem runājot, sūtnis aizrādīja, ka<br />
Rumānija labvēlīgi skatoties kā uz Ukrainas patstāvību, tā arī uz citām patstāvīgām valstīm,<br />
kuras jau atdalījušās no Krievijas un vēl atdalīties varētu.<br />
Par augšminētiem un vēl dažiem citiem jautājumiem sūtnis solījās pieprasīt tuvākas<br />
informācijas no Bukarestes.<br />
Arī Igaunijas ār[lietu] ministrs Pīps 1 bija vakar apmeklējis sūtni. Sarunas vilkušās vairāk par<br />
stundu. Plesnilă ļoti apmierināts ar sarunu gaitu. Runāts apmēram par Baltijas savienību un<br />
Rumānijas ieiešanu viņā.<br />
Ja Plesnilă brauktu uz Rīgu savas valsts uzdevumā speciālā misijā jeb nodot akreditīvus, vai<br />
man viņš jāpavada jeb ne?<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 3. l., 45. lp.<br />
12. Report by Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki K. Zariņš to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z.<br />
Meierovics, 20 th May, 1921<br />
Owing to <strong>the</strong> Ministry’s note of 26 th April, this year today I again had a lengthy discussion<br />
with Romania’s minister [Envoy] in Finland Plesnilă.<br />
Envoy Plesnilă explained to me in a decisive manner that, although he had not been directly<br />
assigned to speak to a representative of <strong>the</strong> state of Latvia on behalf of Romania’s government,<br />
as a friend of many years standing of Romania’s Foreign [Affairs] Minister Ionescu and his<br />
closest colleague he knew very well <strong>the</strong> foreign policy views and aspirations of Romania.<br />
Plesnilă worked for 25 years toge<strong>the</strong>r with Foreign [Affairs] Minister Ionescu as a lawyer and<br />
journalist.<br />
He, <strong>the</strong> Envoy, said he knew that during all <strong>the</strong> years of <strong>the</strong> World War Romania with great<br />
enthusiasm admired <strong>the</strong> heroism of Latvian soldiers. After <strong>the</strong> proclamation of our<br />
independence it likewise constantly followed our foreign policy and congratulated us on our<br />
achievements and <strong>the</strong> determined course. For this reason Romania felt special affinity for Latvia<br />
and for <strong>the</strong> Baltic union in general.<br />
Considering <strong>the</strong> above-said, Envoy Plesnilă does not admit a possibility that Romania’s<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs could be indifferent vis-à-vis Latvia. However, he admits two<br />
possibilities: 1 st possibility: our Envoy could have misunderstood <strong>the</strong>ir Foreign [Affairs] Minister,<br />
i.e. has interpreted Ionescu’s words in a pessimistic manner and 2 nd : probably Minister Ionescu<br />
said that <strong>the</strong> Romanian people and soldiers did not know yet what <strong>the</strong> name Latvia meant in<br />
order to force Latvia as soon as possible to accredit an envoy with <strong>the</strong> government in Bucharest.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Envoy remarked how important it would be for Latvia to have an envoy in<br />
Bucharest. There was no doubt, <strong>the</strong> Envoy said, that union with Latvia and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic<br />
States was Romania’s most ardent desire, but for <strong>the</strong> union to be realistic, it was absolutely<br />
1<br />
Ants Pīps (Piip; 1884–1942), Igaunijas literāts, valstsvīrs, diplomāts. 1920.–1921. g. Ministru prezidents, 1921.–1922.,<br />
1925.–1926., 1932., 1933., 1939.–1940. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1923.–1925. g. sūtnis ASV.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 49<br />
necessary for <strong>the</strong> Romanian people, intellectuals and <strong>the</strong> society [in general] to know more<br />
about Latvia. It was no longer <strong>the</strong> time when unions and conventions were concluded by<br />
ministers behind a closed door, it was necessary for <strong>the</strong> peoples <strong>the</strong>mselves to support each<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r. The eventual Envoy of Latvia would have a very friendly working atmosphere in<br />
Romania’s society, <strong>the</strong> press etc., because everywhere he would encounter <strong>the</strong> greatest possible<br />
responsiveness. The doors of <strong>the</strong> house of <strong>the</strong> King of Romania would also be open to <strong>the</strong> Envoy<br />
of Latvia.<br />
Plesnilă added that social life in Romania was very well developed and thus its information<br />
[information obtained and spread in Romania] was of very great importance.<br />
Envoy Plesnilă thinks that <strong>the</strong>re is a need for a residing envoy of Latvia in Bucharest, but if<br />
that is not possible at all, representation of Latvia in Romania] could be combined with our<br />
legation in Warsaw.<br />
In order to give weight to <strong>the</strong> views that he had expressed, <strong>the</strong> Envoy promised by telegraph<br />
to inform <strong>the</strong> Foreign [Affairs] Ministry in Bucharest about our discussions and to advise me of<br />
its reply immediately. He also thought that <strong>the</strong> Foreign [Affairs] Ministry would ei<strong>the</strong>r instruct<br />
him or his colleague in Warsaw to go to Riga and to have a more detailed discussion and to<br />
share information about each o<strong>the</strong>r [‘s country] or probably would accredit a person with <strong>the</strong><br />
government of Latvia without any fur<strong>the</strong>r delay. The Envoy fully agrees that we still have many<br />
things to discuss and several issues to agree on before launching negotiations about <strong>the</strong><br />
conclusion of <strong>the</strong> union. But he attributes great attention to this first phase. Speaking about<br />
concrete issues, <strong>the</strong> Envoy noted that Romania regarded favourably <strong>the</strong> independence of<br />
Ukraine and o<strong>the</strong>r independent states, which had already seceded from Russia or could yet<br />
secede from it.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned and some o<strong>the</strong>r issues <strong>the</strong> Envoy promised to request more<br />
detailed information from Bucharest.<br />
Foreign [Affairs] Minister of Estonia Piip 1 had visited <strong>the</strong> Envoy yesterday. The discussion<br />
had lasted for more than an hour. Plesnilă is very satisfied with <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> discussion.<br />
They had talked about <strong>the</strong> Baltic union and Romania’s joining it.<br />
If Plesnilă went to Riga on a special mission on instruction of his government or to submit<br />
<strong>the</strong> letter of credence, should I accompany him or not?<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 3, s. 45.<br />
13. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Helsinki Dimitrie Plesnilă fără<br />
număr către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Take Ionescu, 22 mai 1921 2<br />
La câteva zile după sosirea mea am avut o întrevedere cu Ministrul Letoniei asupra<br />
intereselor noastre comune. Într-unul din rapoartele sale, Ministrul Letoniei, între altele, a<br />
comunicat guvernului său sosirea mea la Helsingfors 3 și bunele sentimente pe care le-am arătat.<br />
Ieri după-amiază Ministrul Letoniei a venit să mă vadă și fără niciun caracter oficial mi-a arătat<br />
o scrisoare primită de la Riga, în care Ministrul Afacerilor Străine spunea, printre altele, că este<br />
mulțumit de bunele sentimente ale Ministrului Românei la Helsingfors pentru Letonia, cu atât<br />
1<br />
Ant Piip (1884–1942), Estonian writer, statesman, diplomat. 1920–1921 Prime Minister, 1921–1922, 1925–1926, 1932,<br />
1933, 1939–1940 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1923–1925 Envoy to <strong>the</strong> USA.<br />
2<br />
Originalul raportului este în limba franceză.<br />
3<br />
Denumirea suedeză a orașului Helsinki.
50 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
mai mult cu cât el credea că România aproape ignoră existența Letoniei, întrucât în luna<br />
noiembrie a anului trecut domnul Take Ionescu, în timpul călătoriei sale la Varșovia, a declarat<br />
Ministrului Letoniei din Polonia, care era acolo pentru a participa la Conferința de la Dresda, că<br />
România nu este o țară care se conduce după himere, că Letonia este o țară necunoscută în<br />
România și că, în consecință, românii nu înțeleg de ce trebuie să lupte împotriva Rusiei dacă<br />
aceasta din urmă atacă Letonia.<br />
I-am răspuns imediat Ministrului Letoniei că nu știu nimic despre această pretinsă<br />
întrevedere de la Varșovia și nici despre ceea ce Ministrul leton din acest oraș ar fi putut să-l<br />
întrebe pe domnul Take Ionescu, dar i-am promis să vă comunic telegrafic chestiunea. I-am<br />
adăugat că în așteptarea răspunsului dumneavoastră nu pot decât să-mi manifest îndoiala<br />
asupra autenticității cuvintelor atribuite domnului Take Ionescu. I-am spus că ceea ce știam eu<br />
era că domnul Take Ionescu a fost unul dintre primii Miniștri ai Afacerilor Străine care au<br />
recunoscut oficial independența Letoniei a doua zi după decizia Societății Națiunilor și mi se<br />
pare că un om care a avut asemenea sentimente pentru Letonia nu ar putea în niciun caz să dea<br />
un răspuns care ar fi putut să-l autorizeze pe Ministrul Letoniei în Varșovia să concluzioneze și<br />
să comunice guvernului său că Ministrul Afacerilor Externe al României ar ignora existența sa.<br />
Trec la a doua problemă: Finlanda dorește să încheie cât mai repede un tratat de comerț;<br />
dacă acest lucru este adevărat sau dacă nu este decât o intrigă germană, a ajuns la urechile<br />
guvernului finlandez că Franța cere în schimb abolirea legii finlandeze care interzice consumul<br />
cu alcool. Guvernul finlandez acordă o mare importanță acestei legi și toate țările limitrofe<br />
Rusiei trebuie să-i fie recunoscătoare deoarece asigură menținerea ordinii împotriva anarhiei.<br />
În acest moment se află la Paris, cu scopul de a încheia tratatul comercial, o comisie<br />
finlandeză, sub președinția domnului Procopé 1 , fost ministru al Comerțului, un tânăr de viitor<br />
din care Franța trebuie să-și facă un prieten. Ministrul Franței la Helsingfors tocmai s-a întors<br />
de la Paris unde a fost în concediu. Am vorbit despre asta. El mi-a zis că a vorbit la Paris, dar<br />
crede că nu ar fi rău dacă domnul Daeschner 2 , Ministrul Franței la București, ar telegrafia la<br />
Paris, pentru a sfătui guvernul francez să menajeze sensibilitatea guvernului finlandez și, în<br />
scopul menținerii ordinii la granița Rusiei, să renunțe pentru moment la beneficiile celor câteva<br />
sute de mii .....(lipsă text) pe care producătorii de alcool francezi i-ar putea face pe piața<br />
finlandeză și să nu facă greșeala de a-l lăsa pe domnul Procopé 3 să plece cu mâinile goale de la<br />
Paris.<br />
Vă rog să binevoiți a comunica aceste lucruri domnului Daeschner..<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 39-40.<br />
1<br />
În text, Regcope.<br />
2<br />
Émile Daeschner (1863-1928) a fost un om politic și diplomat francez. Ministru plenipotentiar al Franței în<br />
Portugalia (1913-1920), România (1920-1924), S.U.A. (1924-1925) și Turcia (1926-1928).<br />
3<br />
Hjalmar Johan Fredrik Procopé (1889-1954) a fost un om politic și diplomat finlandez. Ministru al Comerțului și<br />
Industriilor (1920-1921, 1924), Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1924-1925, 1927-1931) și Ministru Plenipotențiar al<br />
Finlandei la Washington (1939-1944).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 51<br />
13. Diplomatic Report of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Helsinki Dimitrie Plesnilă to <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.G.Duca, Unnumbered, 22 nd May 1921 1<br />
A few days after my arrival I had a meeting with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia concerning our<br />
common interests. In one of his reports, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia announced my arrival to<br />
Helsingfors 2 and my good intentions. Yesterday afternoon <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia came to<br />
see me and unofficially showed me a letter that he had received from Riga, in which <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, among o<strong>the</strong>rs that he was content about <strong>the</strong> good<br />
intentions of <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania at Helsingfors concerning Latvia, <strong>the</strong> more so as he<br />
thought Romania almost ignored <strong>the</strong> existence of Latvia because during his trip to Warsaw<br />
from last November, Mr. Take Ionescu declared to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Poland, who<br />
was <strong>the</strong>re to participate at <strong>the</strong> Dresden Conference, that Romania was not a country ruled<br />
based on chimeras, that Latvia was an unknown country for Romania, and that, as a<br />
consequence, Romanians did not understand why <strong>the</strong>y should fight against Russia, if <strong>the</strong><br />
latter attacked Latvia.<br />
I immediately answered <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia that I did not know a thing about this so<br />
called meeting of Warsaw, nor what <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of this city could have asked Mr.<br />
Take Ionescu, but I promised him to telegraph you this information. I added that while<br />
waiting for your reply I could only express my doubt regarding <strong>the</strong> accuracy of <strong>the</strong> words<br />
that are attributed to Mr. Take Ionescu. I told him that I knew that Mr. Take Ionescu was<br />
one of <strong>the</strong> first ministers of foreign affairs who officially recognized <strong>the</strong> independence of<br />
Latvia <strong>the</strong> day after <strong>the</strong> release of <strong>the</strong> decision of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, and I believe that –<br />
under no circumstance – could a man who nurtured such feelings for Latvia give an answer<br />
meant to allow <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Warsaw to conclude and communicate to his<br />
Government that <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania would ignore its existence.<br />
On to <strong>the</strong> second issue: Finland wants to sign a trade agreement as soon as possible; if<br />
this is accurate or if this is only a German intrigue, <strong>the</strong> information about France<br />
demanding <strong>the</strong> abolition of <strong>the</strong> Finnish law, which forbids <strong>the</strong> consumption of alcohol<br />
reached <strong>the</strong> Finnish Government. The Finnish Government considers that this law is<br />
extremely valuable, and all <strong>the</strong> countries neighboring Russia have to be grateful because<br />
this country maintains order against <strong>the</strong> anarchy.<br />
At this moment a Finnish committee, led by Mr. Procopé 3 , former Minister of Trade, a<br />
promising young man whom France must be a friend with is in Paris to sign <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
agreement. The Minister of France in Helsingfors has just returned from Paris where he<br />
was on vacation. We conversed about this. He told me that he talked in Paris but that he<br />
thinks that it would not be a worthless idea if Mr. Daeschner 4 , <strong>the</strong> Minister of France in<br />
Bucharest dispatched a telegram to Paris, in order to advise <strong>the</strong> French government to be<br />
careful about <strong>the</strong> sensibility of <strong>the</strong> Finnish Government and, in order to maintain <strong>the</strong> order<br />
at <strong>the</strong> Russian borders, to give up for a moment <strong>the</strong> benefits of some few hundred<br />
1<br />
Hjalmar Johan Fredrik Procopé (1889-1954) was a Finnish politician and diplomat. Minister of Trade and Industry<br />
(1920-1921, 1924), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1924-1925, 1927-1931), Finland’s Envoy to <strong>the</strong> United States (1939-<br />
1944).<br />
2<br />
The Swedish name for Helsinki.<br />
3<br />
In original, Regcope.<br />
4<br />
Émile Daeschner (1863-1928) was a French politician and diplomat. France’s envoy in Portugal (1913-1920),<br />
Romania (1920-1924), USA (1924-1925) and Turkey (1926-1928).
52 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
thousand ….(missing text) that could be earned by <strong>the</strong> French alcohol producers on <strong>the</strong><br />
Finnish market and not to make <strong>the</strong> mistake of allowing Mr. Procopé to leave Paris empty<br />
handed.<br />
Please be kind enough and communicate <strong>the</strong>se matters to Mr. Daeschner.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 39-40.<br />
14. Latvijas sūtniecības pagaidu vadītāja Varšavā P. Oliņa 1 1921. g. 26. maija raksts<br />
Ārlietu ministrijai<br />
Sakarā ar Jūsu rakstu no 26. aprīļa apmeklēju vietējo Rumānijas sūtni Floresku. Līdz šim<br />
sūtnim nekas vēl neesot zināms par viņa valdības nodomiem censties noslēgt defensīvu<br />
apvienību ne tikai ar Poliju, bet arī ar Baltijas valstīm – kā to Plesnilă kungs Helsingforsā 2 ziņojis<br />
sūtnim Zariņam, somu Ārlietu ministrijai un citur. Tamdēļ sūtnis Floresku pieprasīšot savai<br />
valdībai vajadzīgos norādījumus. Lūdzu tajā pašā reizē izteikt Rumānijas valdībai mūsu prieku,<br />
redzot viņas pastāvīgā diplomātiskā priekšstāvja ierašanos Rīgā, kaut gan paši pagaidām esam<br />
spiesti – budžeta grūtību dēļ – atturēties no sava priekšstāvja iecelšanas Bukarestē.<br />
Sūtnis konstatē, ka Rumānijai neesot vajadzības slēgt mieru ar padomju Krieviju, jo ar<br />
pēdējo viņa nekad nekarojusi. Tamdēļ arī Rumānijas delegāts Rēvelē 3 priekš sarunu vešanas ar<br />
padomju valdību esot bijis pilnvarots vienoties tikai par bēgļu repatriēšanas, par navigācijas un<br />
citiem jautājumiem. Attiecībā uz Besarābijas jautājumu Rumānijas valdība kategoriski noraidot<br />
katru apspriešanas priekšlikumu, jo Besarābijas iedzīvotāji esot jau reiz galīgi izteikušies par<br />
pievienošanos Rumānijai; bez tam līdzīgu lēmumu esot pieņēmusi arī Sabiedroto Augstākā<br />
padome.<br />
Ukrainas 4 jautājumu sūtnis apzīmē kā „delikātu”. Rumānija labprāt redzētu sev kaimiņos<br />
neatkarīgu Ukrainu un tamdēļ ar simpātijām sekojot notikumu attīstīšanai šajā virzienā. Bet<br />
Rumānijas valdība uzmanīgi atturoties no aktīvas Ukrainas politikas: pirmkārt, tamdēļ, ka<br />
Rumānijas politika esot tomēr subordinēta Sabiedroto politikai, un pēdējā labprāt redzētu<br />
Ukrainas federāciju ar Krieviju; otrkārt, tamdēļ, ka Ukrainas aktuālais stāvoklis esot par daudz<br />
haotisks un nenoteikts, lai varētu šeit paredzēt notikumu gaitu.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 17. apr., 44. l., 257. lp.<br />
14. Note by interim Head of <strong>the</strong> Legation of Latvia in Warsaw P. Oliņš 5 to <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 th May, 1921<br />
Owing to your note of 26 th April I visited Envoy of Romania to this country Florescu. The<br />
Envoy said he did not know anything yet about his government’s intention of trying to<br />
conclude a defensive union not only with Poland, but also with <strong>the</strong> Baltic States – as Mr.<br />
1<br />
Pēteris Ziedonis Oliņš (1890–1962), Latvijas diplomāts.1919.–1921. g. Latvijas pārstāvniecības Polijā I šķiras<br />
sekretārs. Vairākkārt Ārlietu ministrijas nodaļas vadītājs, no 1935. g. pilnvarotais lietvedis Argentīnā un Brazīlijā ar<br />
sēdekli Buenosairesā. Miris Brazīlijā.<br />
2<br />
Helsingforsa – Helsinku oficiālais nosaukums līdz 1917. g.<br />
3<br />
Rēvele – Tallinas oficiālais nosaukums līdz 1918. g.<br />
4<br />
Runa ir par aplūkojamajā laikā savu teritoriju de facto nekontrolējošo, neatkarīgo Ukrainas Tautas Republiku,<br />
kuras valdība atradās Rietumos.<br />
5<br />
Pēteris Ziedonis Oliņš (1890–1962), Latvian diplomat. 1919–1921 First Secretary of Latvia’s mission in Poland. Head<br />
of several departments of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1935 – charge d’affaires in Argentina and Brazil with<br />
seat in Buenos Aires. Died in Brazil.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 53<br />
Plesnilă reported to Envoy Zariņš in Helsingfors 1 , to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland<br />
and o<strong>the</strong>r instances. Thus Envoy Florescu said he would request <strong>the</strong> necessary instructions<br />
from his government. I asked him at <strong>the</strong> same time to tell Romania’s government that we are<br />
pleased with <strong>the</strong> arrival of its permanent <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative in Riga although we<br />
ourselves are forced – due to budgetary difficulties – for <strong>the</strong> time being to restrain from<br />
appointing our representative in Bucharest.<br />
The Envoy has come to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that Romania has no need to sign peace with Soviet<br />
Russia as it has never been at war with <strong>the</strong> latter. For this reason <strong>the</strong> Romanian delegate sent to<br />
Reval 2 for negotiations with <strong>the</strong> Soviet government has been authorised to reach an agreement<br />
only on <strong>the</strong> repatriation of refugees, on navigation and o<strong>the</strong>r issues. As concerns <strong>the</strong> issue of<br />
Bessarabia, Romania’s government categorically rejects any proposal to discuss it, because <strong>the</strong><br />
population of Bessarabia has once and for all spoken in favour of joining Romania; besides, <strong>the</strong><br />
Allies’ Supreme Council has also adopted a similar decision.<br />
The Envoy describes <strong>the</strong> issue of Ukraine 3 as “sensitive”. Romania would be glad to have<br />
independent Ukraine as its neighbour and thus with feelings of affinity it followed <strong>the</strong><br />
developments in that direction [he said]. However, <strong>the</strong> Romanian government carefully<br />
restrained itself from an active Ukrainian policy: firstly because Romania’s policy was still<br />
subordinated to <strong>the</strong> Allies’ policy and <strong>the</strong> latter would prefer seeing Ukraine in Federation with<br />
Russia; secondly, because <strong>the</strong> actual situation in Ukraine was too chaotic and uncertain for <strong>the</strong><br />
eventual course of developments to be predicted [said <strong>the</strong> Envoy].<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 17, file 44, s. 257<br />
15. Latvijas Ārlietu ministrijas Politiski-ekonomiskā departamenta 1921. g. 28. maija<br />
raksts sūtniecībai Varšavā<br />
Piesūtam Jums informāciju dēļ K. Zariņa kunga ziņojuma par sarunām ar rumāņu sūtni<br />
Plesnilă kungu ar piezīmi, ka mūsu Rumānijas sūtņa uzdevumus Ministra kungs ir ar mieru<br />
uzlikt mūsu Varšavas sūtniecībai un šai ziņā ir sagaidāms attiecīgs rīkojums. Tamdēļ lūdzam arī<br />
Jūs interesēties par šo svarīgo jautājumu un par saviem novērojumiem un uzskatiem informēt<br />
Ārlietu ministriju.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 3. l., 44. lp.<br />
15. Note by <strong>the</strong> Politico-Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of<br />
Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Legation in Warsaw, 28 th May, 1921<br />
We are hereby sending you information with regard to Mr. K. Zariņš’ report about his<br />
discussion with Romanian Envoy Mr. Plesnilă with a comment that Mr. Minister agrees to<br />
assigning <strong>the</strong> duties of our Envoy to Romania to our Legation in Warsaw and a relevant<br />
resolution is to be expected. For this reason we ask you, too, to take interest in this very<br />
important issue and to inform <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs about your observations and<br />
views.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 3, s. 44.<br />
1<br />
Helsingfors – <strong>the</strong> official name of <strong>the</strong> present-day Helsinki until 1917.<br />
2<br />
Reval – <strong>the</strong> name of <strong>the</strong> present-day Tallinn until 1918.<br />
3<br />
What is meant here is <strong>the</strong> Independent People’s Republic of Ukraine, which at that time was not in de facto<br />
control over its territory and had its government residing in <strong>the</strong> West.
54 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
16. Discursul lui Martiņš Nukša, trimis extraordinar și ministru plenipotențiar al<br />
Letoniei la București, rostit cu ocazia ceremoniei prezentării scrisorilor de acreditare în<br />
mâinile regelui Ferdinand I 1 , 31 mai 1922<br />
Sire,<br />
Am onoarea de a prezenta Majestății Voastre scrisorile prin care Președintele Adunării<br />
Constituante a Letoniei mă acreditează pe lângă Augusta Dumneavoastră persoană în calitate<br />
de Trimis Special și Ministru Plenipotențiar.<br />
Permiteți-mi, Sire, să fiu interpretul sentimentelor de mare stimă pe care șeful statului leton<br />
mărturisește a le manifesta într-o înaltă măsură pentru Majestatea Voastră și al dorințelor<br />
sincere pe care acesta le nutrește pentru prosperitatea Regatului României și a oamenilor care o<br />
locuiesc.<br />
Sunt extrem de încântat că am onoarea de a fi desemnat pentru înalta misiune care mă face<br />
primul reprezentant al țării mele în această frumoasă țară românească, leagăn al anticii<br />
civilizații latine de pe malul Mării Negre.<br />
Purtat de o vie simpatie pentru România, voi face uz de toate eforturile mele pentru a<br />
consolida și mai mult relațiile de prietenie și interes reciproc care unesc deja cele două națiuni<br />
și sper că îngăduința Majestății Voastre și sprijinul guvernului regal îmi vor facilita realizarea<br />
acestei înalte misiuni.<br />
AMAE, Fond 24/Reprezentanți străini, N. 1.<br />
16. The speech of Martiņš Nukša, <strong>the</strong> first Minister Plenipotentiary appointed in<br />
Romania with residence in Warsaw, on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> presentation of his<br />
credentials in <strong>the</strong> hands of King of Romania Ferdinand I 2 , 31 st May 1922<br />
Sire,<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honor to tender to Your Majesty <strong>the</strong> letters by which <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong><br />
Constituent Assembly of Latvia accredits me to your Augusta person as Special Envoy and<br />
Minister Plenipotentiary.<br />
Allow me, Sire, to be <strong>the</strong> interpreter of <strong>the</strong> feelings of high esteem that <strong>the</strong> Latvian president<br />
testifies to cherish for Your Majesty and of <strong>the</strong> sincere desire that he fosters for <strong>the</strong> prosperity of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Kingdom of Romania and <strong>the</strong> people who inhabit it.<br />
I am extremely delighted that I am honored to be nominated for <strong>the</strong> high mission that<br />
makes me <strong>the</strong> first representative of my country in this beautiful Romanian country, cradle of<br />
ancient Latin civilizations on <strong>the</strong> shores of <strong>the</strong> Black Sea.<br />
Worn by a living sympathy for Romania, I shall use all my efforts to fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>ning<br />
<strong>the</strong> friendly <strong>relations</strong> and common interests that already unite <strong>the</strong> two nations, and I hope that<br />
Your Majesty’s indulgence and <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> Royal Government will help me achieve this<br />
high mission.<br />
DARMFA, f. 24, Foreign Representatives, N. 1.<br />
1<br />
Ferdinand I (născut Ferdinand Viktor Albert Meinrad von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 1865-1927) a fost rege al<br />
României (1914-1927), jucând un rol important în alăturarea țării sale Antantei și în crearea României Mari.<br />
2<br />
Ferdinand I (born Ferdinand Viktor Albert Meinrad von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 1865-1927) was <strong>the</strong> King of<br />
Romania (1914-1927), playing an essential role in Romania’s joining of <strong>the</strong> Entente and <strong>the</strong> creation of Greater<br />
Romania.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 55<br />
Document 1:<br />
The speech of Martiņš Nukša on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> presentation of his credentials
56 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
17. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1 1922. g. 4. novembra ziņojums Ārlietu<br />
ministrijai<br />
Rumānijas karaļa kronēšanas svētki. Par izpildīto uzdevumu reprezentēt Latviju Rumānijas<br />
karaļa kronēšanas svētkos, atļaujos sniegt īsu pārskatu, atzīmējot raksturīgākās vietas.<br />
Izbraucu no Varšavas apmēram nedēļu iepriekš, dabūjis zināt, ka karalis pieņems ārzemju<br />
misijas un priekšstāvjus dažas dienas pirms kronēšanas svētkiem, lai tie nodotu viņam pilnvaru<br />
grāmatas.<br />
Rumāņi izrādīja retu uzmanību pret viesiem. Jau tūliņ aiz Rumānijas robežas vagonā pie<br />
manis ienāca kāds augstāks policijas ierēdnis un paziņoja, ka viņam uzdots būt manā rīcībā līdz<br />
Bukarestei. Šo laipnību man nenācās izlietot. Bukarestē izkāpjot, ierēdnis atkal bija klāt un<br />
paziņoja, ka man istaba jau rezervēta viesnīcā.<br />
Divas dienas priekš kronēšanas, visas delegācijas izbrauca uz karaļa vasaras rezidenci<br />
Sinaiju, ļoti skaistā kalnu apgabalā, Karpatos, stundas 4 no Bukarestes. Nodevām savas pilnvaras<br />
un tikām ieaicināti pilī uz brokastīm. Visu misiju priekšnieki saņēma karaļa dāvātos ordeņus, to<br />
starpā arī Latvijas reprezentants – Grand Croix de la Couronne Roumaine. 2 Reprezentētas bija<br />
visas Eiropas valstis, Ziemeļamerikas Savienotās Valstis, Japāna un Persija, no Baltijas valstīm<br />
trūka Igaunijas, jo uzaicinājums viņai bija nonācis par vēlu. No delegātiem sevišķu vērību uz<br />
sevi vērsa maršals Fošs 3 un ģenerālis Vegāns. 4 Pirmais ar savām strupām, noteiktām replikām,<br />
otrais – ar lielo vienkāršību, klusumu un kautrību, īpašībām, kuras labi sakrīt ar savu sīko stāvu.<br />
Angliju reprezentēja Duke of York 5 – viens no prinčiem, Itāliju – Duc de Gênes, 6 kurš esot<br />
radnieciskos sakaros ar Rumānijas karaļa namu.<br />
Tās pašas dienas vakarā bijām atpakaļ Bukarestē un jau nākošā pēcpusdienā, sestdienā,<br />
izbraucām vairākos vilcienos uz Alba Juliju – priekš kara viņu sauca par Karlsburgu –<br />
Transilvānijā, kur notika kronēšana. Alba Julija ir maza provinces pilsētiņa, bet toties lielāka ir<br />
viņas nozīme Rumānijas tautas un valsts vēsturē. Nosaukums Alba Julija cēlies romiešu laikos,<br />
kad tie zem Trajana valdības še uzcēla vienu no tiem apcietinājumiem, kuri garā rindā stiepās<br />
caur veco Dačiju līdz pat Melnai jūrai.<br />
Alba Julija glabā Rumānijas vecākās tradīcijas jau tādēļ, ka rumāņi uzskata sevi par latīņu<br />
tautu un seno romiešu pēcnācējiem, bet jo vairāk aiz tā iemesla, ka taisni no šīs pilsētas Mihai<br />
Viteazul (Drosmīgais) ap 1600. gadu, kaut arī uz īsu laiku, apvienoja visas rumāņu apdzīvotās<br />
zemes, tās pašas, kuras no jauna sakusušas kopā tagad pēc pagājušā pasaules kara. Rumānija<br />
tura Mihai Viteazul par savu nacionālo varoni un viņa ģīmetni sliktā reprodukcijā sastop<br />
gandrīz katrā rumāņu būdā vai darbnīcā. Alba Julijā turēja apcietinājumā un notiesāja 1784. un<br />
1848. gadā rumāņu revolucionāru varoņus. Beidzot Alba Julijā proklamēja visu rumāņu zemju<br />
apvienošanu 18. novembrī 1918. gadā. Rumāņi bija patīkami aizkustināti, kad viņiem aizrādīju,<br />
ka taisni šinī pašā dienā Latvija pasludināja savu neatkarību.<br />
1<br />
Mārtiņš Augusts Nukša (1878–1942), Latvijas diplomāts. 1921.–1930. g. sūtnis Polijā, no 1922. g. – arī Rumānijā, no<br />
1925. g. – arī Austrijā ar sēdekli Varšavā, 1930.–1933. g. sūtnis Zviedrijā, Dānijā un Norvēģijā ar sēdekli Stokholmā,<br />
1933.–1939. g. sūtnis Čehoslovākijā, no 1935. g. – arī Rumānijā ar sēdekli Prāgā, 1939.–1940. g. Ārlietu ministrijas<br />
ģenerālsekretārs. Nogalināts padomju apcietinājumā.<br />
2<br />
Grand Croix de la Couronne Roumaine (franču val.) – Rumānijas Kroņa Lielkrusts.<br />
3<br />
Ferdināns Fošs (Fosh; 1851–1929), Francijas armijas maršals.<br />
4<br />
Maksims Veigāns (Weygand; 1876–1965), Francijas armijas ģenerālis.<br />
5<br />
Duke of York (angļu val.) – Jorkas hercogs.<br />
6<br />
Duc de Gênes (franču val.) – Dženovas hercogs.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 57<br />
Pēc svinīgā dievkalpojuma jaunuzceltā katedrālē gājiens iznāca ailu iežogotā baznīcu<br />
pagalmā, kur uz īpaša paaugstinājuma notika kronēšanas ceremonija. No karaļa proklamācijas<br />
tautai, ko nolasīja 4 ziņneši uz četrām debesu pusēm, atzīmēšu vietu attiecībā uz zemes<br />
reformu, kuru arī Rumānijā izved diezgan radikāli: „Es vēlos, lai zemnieki, pilntiesīgi īpašnieki<br />
par to zemi, kuru viņi saņēmuši, dod tai visu ražīguma spēju, kā savā, tā sabiedrības labā.”<br />
Ar proklamācijas nolasīšanu, kronēšanas ceremonija bija beigusies. Sākās apsveikumi no<br />
ārvalstu misijām, tad nāca brokastis galvenām oficiālām personām ar apmēram 400 kuveriem 1 ,<br />
kamēr kādās citās telpās mielojās dažāda līmeņa rumāņu delegācijas, ap 2000 personas. Pēc<br />
brokastīm – spīdoša karaspēka parāde, vakars un atgriešanās uz Bukaresti, kur nonācām otrā<br />
rītā.<br />
Lietaina diena lielā mērā traucēja svinības Bukarestē. Programma: iebraukšana Bukarestē,<br />
dievkalpojums katedrālē, brokastis parlamentā, vēsturisks gājiens gar Mihai Viteazul<br />
pieminekli, vakara dineja pilī. Sevišķu interesi skatītājos modināja vēsturiskais gājiens, kur<br />
hronoloģiskā kārtībā paslīdēja garām rumāņu tautas dzīves svarīgākie momenti, sākot no<br />
seniem dačiešiem, pāri viduslaikiem un nacionālās brīvības cīnītājiem 1784. un 1848. gadā, līdz<br />
pat tagadnei. Gājienu noslēdza 10.000 pilsētu un lauku komūnu vecākie (maires) no visas<br />
Rumānijas, grupējušies pēc provincēm un apvidiem, savos nacionālos izrakstītos kostīmos,<br />
kuros, skatoties pēc apgabaliem, ir liela dažādība krāsu un formu ziņā.<br />
Trešās svētku dienas rītā, karalis pieņēma visas ārzemju misijas atvadīšanās audiencē, pēc<br />
tam bija intīmas brokastis Kotrokeni pilī, Bukarestes priekšpilsētā. Vakarā – svinīga izrāde<br />
Nacionālā teātrī ar gadījumam piemērotu programmu. Ar to triju dienu ilgās kronēšanas<br />
svinības beidzās.<br />
Austrumu jautājums. Pirms aizbraukšanas no Rumānijas, man bija garāka saruna ar ārlietu<br />
ministru I. Duku par dažiem politiskiem un saimnieciskiem jautājumiem.<br />
Ministrs izteicās diezgan optimistiski par Dardaneļu un Bosfora jautājumu nokārtošanu,<br />
būdams pārliecināts, ka sarunu neitralitāti izdosies izvest priekšā stāvošā konferencē, kurā<br />
piedalīsies arī Rumānija (domājams, ka turp brauks pats ārlietu ministrs). Tomēr viņš neslēpa,<br />
ka Rumānija ar visu uzmanību sekos spēku pārgrupējumiem Austrumos: Francijas attiecībām<br />
pret Turciju un it īpaši pret Krieviju, sakarā ar Erio 2 sarunām Maskavā. Jo, ja Francijai un<br />
Krievijai ir kopīgas intereses Austrumos, kā izteicies Erio Maskavā, Francijai ir arī, kā to pierāda<br />
Ankāras norunas – tāda paša interešu kopība Tuvajos Austrumos ar Turciju. Vēl gan starp<br />
Krieviju un Franciju nekas nav izdarīts: sarunās ir liela daļa koķetēšanas, kaut arī uz<br />
saimnieciskiem pamatiem. Rumānijā valda uzskats, ka Erio ceļojums, ja arī nenesīs tūliņ tieši<br />
taustāmus rezultātus, tad tomēr jau tagad dod pilnīgu iemeslu domāt, ka Francijas vadošo<br />
personu līdzšinējā politiskā sistēmā notiek milzīga pārmaiņa. Un bez šaubām, tas ceļš, kuru<br />
patlaban taisa starp Parīzi un Maskavu, iet caur Ankāru, kas varbūt dos pirmo reizi vēsturē<br />
gadījumu redzēt ap šaurumiem, starp Melno un Vidusjūru, Krieviju un Turciju kopā ar Franciju.<br />
Rumānijai nāksies pielikt daudz pūļu, lai noturētu savu tagadējo privileģēto stāvokli pie Melnās<br />
jūras un viņas izejas plašākos ūdeņos.<br />
1<br />
Kuvers – aploksnes apzīmējums, acīmredzot domātas saskaņā ar etiķeti uz galda izvietojamās aploksnes ar<br />
brokastu dalībnieku vārdiem katram paredzētajā vietā.<br />
2<br />
Edvārs Erio (Herriot; 1872–1957), Francijas valstsvīrs, Lionas pilsētas galva. Radikālās partijas priekšsēdētājs,<br />
1924.–1925., 1926. un 1932. g. premjerministrs. Realizēja Padomju Savienībai labvēlīgu politiku.
58 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Zemes reforma. Pārrunājām arī par zemes reformu. Rumānija to izved plašos apmēros, īsā<br />
uzmetumā stāvoklis un reformas principi ir šādi.<br />
Bezzemnieku Rumānijā priekš kara bija ap 600 000 ģimeņu uz 6 milj. iedzīvotājiem. Lielās<br />
latifundijas atradās nedaudzu laimīgo rokās, kuri bieži vien ar zemkopību nemaz nenodarbojās<br />
un Rumānijā pat nedzīvoja, bet visu laiku uzturējās, skatoties pēc sezonas, Nicā, Parīzē vai<br />
Dovilā. Zemi izdeva apstrādāšanai zemes strādnieku asociācijām (arteļiem).<br />
Zemes reformu sāka izvest tūliņ pēc vācu karaspēka izvākšanas un, kā man stāstīja, pats<br />
karalis te devis pirmo priekšzīmi, sadalīdams savas muižas. Reformas iesākuma darbi tūliņ<br />
izvesti uz visas teritorijas, atdalot atsavināmās daļas no neatsavināmām un nododot atsavinātās<br />
plašības, vispirms bez sīkākas parcelācijas, 1 zemes strādnieku asociāciju apstrādāšanā. Tāds<br />
paņēmiens Rumānijā bija samērā viegli izvedams, jo ļaudis te dzīvo ciematos (sādžās) un šo<br />
ciematu iekārtu rumāņi paturēs arī pie galīgās zemes sadalīšanas individuālos gabalos. Iesākt ar<br />
sīku parcelāciju jau no paša pirmā gala nav bijis iespējams mērnieku, taksatoru un visu pārējo<br />
kompetento darbinieku trūkuma dēļ. Reformu galīgā veidā vispirms izvedīs tā sauktā karalistē<br />
un tad pāries uz Besarābiju un Transilvāniju.<br />
Agrākam īpašniekam tiesības paturēt vismazākais 100 hekt[āru] pēc pašas izvēles, bet<br />
vispārīgi, atstāj, skatoties pēc zemes pieprasījuma daudzuma, zemes labuma un stādu kultūras<br />
iespējamības 200–250–400 hekt[āru], bet nekādā ziņā ne vairāk par 500 hekt[āriem]. Tiem<br />
zemes īpašniekiem, kuru dēli studē zemkopību, ir tiesības vēl ņemt klāt priekš katra tāda dēla<br />
50 hekt[āru] ar noteikumu, ka šis dēls piecu gadu laikā pabeigs studijas un pēc tam tiešām pats<br />
sāks kopt viņam atstātos 50 hekt[ārus]. Zināmus atvieglojumus neatsavināmas plašības ziņā dod<br />
arī priekšzīmīgām saimniecībām. Visu zemi atsavina ārzemniekiem un tā sauktiem<br />
„promesošiem” t. i. Rumānijas pavalstniekiem, kuri, kā jau teikts, paši dzīvoja ārzemēs un par<br />
zemi neinteresējās. Pret pēdējiem zemē bijis zināms īgnums. Atmaksa ārzemniekiem tāda pati<br />
kā Rumānijas pavalstniekiem, izņemot Besarābiju, kuru pievienojot, angļu un franču valdības<br />
pieprasījušas no Rumānijas citu, stipri augstāku, zemes taksāciju. Bet angļu īpašumi Besarābijā<br />
kādi 3, franču – laikam 7.<br />
Zemnieks, kas 5 gadu laikā rentējis un pastāvīgi apstrādājis zināmu gabalu zemes, ja viņš tur<br />
uzcēlis ēkas, iekopis augļu jeb vīna dārzu, saņem šo gabalu par savu īpašumu.<br />
Zemes saņēmēji maksā atlīdzību agrākajiem īpašniekiem, izmaksāšana notiek 40 gados.<br />
Maksā pēc priekš kara vērtības. Agrākie īpašnieki, protams, nemierā, atzīdami atmaksu par<br />
mazu. Jāievēro tas, ka lielās latifundijas priekš kara atrada samērā ļoti maz pircēju, zeme reti<br />
kad pārgāja no rokas rokā un tādēļ arī tirgus vērtība zemei priekš kara bija maza. Bez tam,<br />
maksāšanu izdara ar tagadējo rumāņu leju, kura līdzinājas apmēram 2 L[atvijas] r[ubļiem].<br />
Vispārīgi ministrs, kurš, blakus piezīmējot, ir bijis galvenais zemes likuma izstrādātājs, atzīst, ka<br />
lielgruntnieki nav sevišķi daudz protestējuši pret reformu, nojauzdami viņas sociālo<br />
neizbēgamību. Ministrs vēl piebilda, ka likums par zemes reformu pieņemts agrākajā, cenza<br />
parlamentā.<br />
Lai jaunsaimniekiem nāktu palīgā ar kredītu, visā zemē nodibināts šim nolūkam īpašs banku<br />
tīkls.<br />
Produktivitāte šim brīžam nav tik liela, kā priekš kara, uz ko sevišķi aizrāda zemes reformas<br />
pretinieki. Bet, vai neatsavinot zemi un neizvedot reformu, būtu sasniegti labāki rezultāti? Maz<br />
cerams. Ražīguma pamazināšana izskaidrojama nevis ar reformas izvešanu, bet gan ar citiem<br />
1<br />
Domāta sadalīšana.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 59<br />
apstākļiem, kurus radījis karš, izpostīdams zemi, sagraudams mājas, iznīcinādams lopus,<br />
izklīdinādams un padarīdams nabagus iedzīvotājus. Šie apstākļi izsauktu ražīguma<br />
pamazināšanos tādā pat mērā, ja būtu palikušas agrākās lielsaimniecības.<br />
Uz priekšdienām ministrs sagaida produktivitātes pieaugšanu pāri pār priekš kara ražīgumu,<br />
ievērojot to, ka priekš kara lielsaimniecības Rumānijā veda visai ekstensīvu saimniecību.<br />
Mazsaimnieki turpretim ievedīs intensīvas saimniecības veidu. Mājlopu skaits arī Rumānijā,<br />
tāpat kā Latvijā, dažos apvidos jau esot pārsniedzis priekškara laika normu.<br />
Blakus ministra informācijai, iepazīstināju viņu ar zemes reformas stāvokli Latvijā, ko viņš<br />
uzklausījās ar lielu interesi.<br />
Šķiroties ministrs griezās pie manis ar uzaicinājumu nākošā braucienā uz Rumāniju atlicināt<br />
vairāk laika un apsolījās gādāt par to, lai tad mani iepazīstinātu uz vietas tieši darbā uz laukiem,<br />
ar Rumānijas zemes reformas stāvokli un panākumiem ar zemes sociālo iekārtu, parašām un ar<br />
galvenām industrijas nozarēm.<br />
Vai tas mums izdosies, to grūti pareģot, neskatoties uz optimismu no abām pusēm. Pa šo<br />
laiku Rumānijas liberāļiem, kuri ir šimbrīžam pie valsts stūres, gatavojās stiprs uzbrukums, jo<br />
opozīcijas partijas ved sarunas par apvienošanos, par kopīgu taktiku pret valdību un varbūt jau<br />
arī par nākamo kabinetu.<br />
LVVA 2575. f., 2. apr., 130. l., 37.–39. lp.<br />
17. Report by Envoy of Latvia in Warsaw M. Nukša 1 to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs,<br />
4 th November, 1922<br />
The Coronation Festivities of <strong>the</strong> King of Romania. I take <strong>the</strong> liberty of giving a brief survey<br />
about <strong>the</strong> fulfilled task of representing Latvia in <strong>the</strong> festivities of <strong>the</strong> coronation of <strong>the</strong> King of<br />
Romania with focus on <strong>the</strong> most distinctive aspects.<br />
I left Warsaw about a week before [<strong>the</strong> festivities] because I had learned that a few days<br />
before <strong>the</strong> coronation festivities <strong>the</strong> King would receive <strong>the</strong> missions and representatives of<br />
foreign countries, so that <strong>the</strong>y can hand him <strong>the</strong>ir books [letters] of credence.<br />
The Romanians treated <strong>the</strong>ir guests with rarely surpassed attention. Right after we crossed<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian border a high-ranking police officer entered <strong>the</strong> railway coach, approached me<br />
and announced that he had been assigned to be at my command until we reach Bucharest. I did<br />
not need to use this kindness. As I got off <strong>the</strong> train in Bucharest, <strong>the</strong> officer approached me<br />
again and announced that a hotel room had already been reserved for me.<br />
Two days before <strong>the</strong> coronation all <strong>the</strong> delegations left for <strong>the</strong> King’s summer residency in<br />
Sinaia, a very beautiful region in <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Mountains, 4 hours drive from Bucharest. We<br />
handed in our credentials and were invited to breakfast in <strong>the</strong> palace. The heads of all missions<br />
received from <strong>the</strong> King official decorations, among <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> representative of Latvia – Grand<br />
Croix de la Couronne Roumaine. 2 All European countries, <strong>the</strong> United States of North America,<br />
Japan and Persia were represented, among <strong>the</strong> Baltic States Estonia was missing because <strong>the</strong><br />
invitation had reached <strong>the</strong>m too late. Among <strong>the</strong> delegates Marshal Foch 3 and General<br />
1<br />
Mārtiņš Augusts Nukša (1878–1942), Latvian diplomat. 1921–1930 Envoy to Poland, from 1922 – also to Romania,<br />
from 1925 – also to Austria with seat in Warsaw, 1930–1933 Envoy to Sweden, Denmark and Norway with seat in<br />
Stockholm, 1933–1939 Envoy to Czechoslovakia, from 1935 – also to Romania with seat in Prague, 1939–1940<br />
Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Executed in Soviet imprisonment.<br />
2<br />
Grand Croix de la Couronne Roumaine (French) – The Grand Cross of <strong>the</strong> Crown of Romania.<br />
3<br />
Ferdinand Foch (1851–1929), Marshal of <strong>the</strong> Army of France.
60 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Weygand 1 drew special attention to <strong>the</strong>mselves. The former with his abrupt, resolute remarks,<br />
<strong>the</strong> latter – with his great simplicity, calm and shyness, features that match well his small<br />
stature. England was represented by Duke of York – one of <strong>the</strong> princes and Italy – by Duc de<br />
Gênes 2 who is said to be a kinsman of <strong>the</strong> Royal House of Romania.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> evening of <strong>the</strong> same day we went back to Bucharest and already in <strong>the</strong> afternoon of<br />
<strong>the</strong> next day, which was Saturday, we left by several trains to Alba Iulia, before <strong>the</strong> war called<br />
Karlsburg, in Transylvania, where <strong>the</strong> Coronation Ceremony took place. Alba Iulia is a small<br />
provincial town, <strong>the</strong> importance of which for <strong>the</strong> people and in <strong>the</strong> history of Romania is<br />
however greater than its size. The name Alba Iulia comes from <strong>the</strong> Roman times when under<br />
<strong>the</strong> rule of Trajan <strong>the</strong>y built here a fortification, one in <strong>the</strong> long row stretching through <strong>the</strong> old<br />
Dacia to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea.<br />
Alba Iulia guards <strong>the</strong> most ancient traditions of Romania if only because <strong>the</strong> Romanians<br />
regard <strong>the</strong>mselves as a Latin people and descendants of <strong>the</strong> ancient Romans, but even more so<br />
because it was from this town that around <strong>the</strong> year 1600 Mihai Viteazul (<strong>the</strong> Courageous) 3 ,<br />
although only for a short period, united all <strong>the</strong> lands inhabited by <strong>the</strong> Romanians, <strong>the</strong> same<br />
lands that now, after <strong>the</strong> last war have again melted toge<strong>the</strong>r. Romania regards Mihai Viteazul<br />
as its national hero and his portrait, in a poor-quality reproduction, can be seen almost in any<br />
Romanian hut and workshop. It was in Alba Iulia that <strong>the</strong> revolutionary heroes were kept under<br />
arrest and convicted in 1784 and 1848. Finally it was in Alba Iulia that <strong>the</strong> unification of all<br />
Romanian lands was proclaimed on 18 th November, 1918. The Romanians were pleasantly<br />
touched when I remarked that it was on this very day that Latvia, too, proclaimed its<br />
independence.<br />
After a solemn public worship in a newly built ca<strong>the</strong>dral <strong>the</strong> procession walked into a<br />
churchyard, surrounded by aisles, where <strong>the</strong> coronation took place on a special podium. Of <strong>the</strong><br />
King’s Proclamation to <strong>the</strong> People read out by four messengers [turned] towards <strong>the</strong> four<br />
cardinal directions, I will note <strong>the</strong> section, which concerns <strong>the</strong> land reform that Romania, too,<br />
carries out in a ra<strong>the</strong>r radical manner: “I wish farmers, full-fledged owners of <strong>the</strong> land, which <strong>the</strong>y<br />
have received, to fully utilize <strong>the</strong> potential of its productivity, both for <strong>the</strong>ir own and <strong>the</strong> public<br />
good.”<br />
The reading of <strong>the</strong> Proclamation concluded <strong>the</strong> Coronation Ceremony. Then followed<br />
congratulations from foreign missions and breakfast for <strong>the</strong> key officials with approximately<br />
400 envelopes 4 , while in some o<strong>the</strong>r rooms Romanian delegations of various ranks feasted,<br />
around 2000 persons in total. After <strong>the</strong> breakfast – a lustrous military parade, evening and<br />
departure for Bucharest where we arrived on <strong>the</strong> next morning.<br />
Rain to a large extent interfered with <strong>the</strong> celebrations in Bucharest. The programme: arrival<br />
in Bucharest, public worship in <strong>the</strong> Ca<strong>the</strong>dral, breakfast in <strong>the</strong> Parliament, a historical pageant<br />
past <strong>the</strong> monument to Mihai Viteazul, dinner in <strong>the</strong> palace. The onlookers were particularly<br />
interested in <strong>the</strong> historical pageant, which in a chronological order let slip by <strong>the</strong> most<br />
important moments in <strong>the</strong> life of <strong>the</strong> Romanian people, from <strong>the</strong> ancient Dacians, through <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Maxim Weygand (1876–1965), General of <strong>the</strong> Army of France.<br />
2<br />
Duc de Gênes (French) – Duke of Genoa.<br />
3<br />
Michael <strong>the</strong> Brave (1558-1601) was <strong>the</strong> Prince of Wallachia (1593–1601), of Transylvania (1599–1600), and of<br />
Moldavia (1600). He ruled <strong>the</strong> three principalities in a personal union for a short period of time.<br />
4<br />
By „envelope” <strong>the</strong> Envoy obviously meant envelopes that in compliance with etiquette were placed on <strong>the</strong> table<br />
with names of <strong>the</strong> guests on <strong>the</strong>m to indicate where <strong>the</strong> respective person was to be seated.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 61<br />
Middle Ages and <strong>the</strong> national freedom fighters in 1784 and 1848 until our time. The pageant was<br />
tailed by <strong>the</strong> elders (maires) of 10 000 towns and rural communities from all over Romania,<br />
grouped according to <strong>the</strong>ir respective provinces and regions, dressed in <strong>the</strong>ir embroidered<br />
national costumes, which, depending on <strong>the</strong> region, display a great variety of colours and<br />
shapes.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> morning of <strong>the</strong> third day of festivities <strong>the</strong> King received all foreign missions on a<br />
farewell audience, followed by intimate breakfast in Cotroćeni palace in <strong>the</strong> outskirts of<br />
Bucharest. In <strong>the</strong> evening – a festive performance in <strong>the</strong> National Theatre with a programme<br />
that matched <strong>the</strong> occasion. With it <strong>the</strong> three days long Coronation Festivities were over.<br />
The Eastern issue. Before leaving Romania I had a lengthy discussion with Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs I. Duca on miscellaneous political and economic issues.<br />
Minister spoke ra<strong>the</strong>r optimistically about <strong>the</strong> resolution of <strong>the</strong> Dardanelles and Bosporus<br />
issues, being confident that in <strong>the</strong> upcoming conference, where Romania, too, will take part<br />
(<strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs himself is expected to attend it) <strong>the</strong> neutrality would be<br />
affirmed. Yet he did not conceal that Romania with full attention would follow <strong>the</strong> re-grouping<br />
of forces in <strong>the</strong> East: <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> of France with Turkey and especially with Russia in<br />
connection with Herriot’s 1 talks in Moscow. Because, if France and Russia had shared interests<br />
in <strong>the</strong> East, as Herriot said in Moscow, in <strong>the</strong> Middle East France – as demonstrated by <strong>the</strong><br />
Ankara agreements – shared interests with Turkey, too. Nothing yet is done between Russia<br />
and France: <strong>the</strong> negotiations largely consist of coquetry, although on economic foundations. In<br />
Romania <strong>the</strong> opinion dominates that Herriot’s visit, even if it will not bring tangible result<br />
immediately, already now gives a good reason to believe that a huge change is taking place in<br />
<strong>the</strong> existing political system of <strong>the</strong> leading officials of France. And no doubt, <strong>the</strong> road, which is<br />
now being paved between Paris and Moscow, goes through Ankara that probably for <strong>the</strong> first<br />
time in history will give us a chance to see Russia and Turkey standing toge<strong>the</strong>r with France<br />
around <strong>the</strong> straits, between <strong>the</strong> Black and <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean Seas. Romania will have to exert<br />
much effort to safeguard its privileged position by <strong>the</strong> Black Sea and its access to <strong>the</strong> high<br />
waters.<br />
Land reform. We discussed <strong>the</strong> land reform, too. Romania carries it out on a large scale, in<br />
brief <strong>the</strong> situation and <strong>the</strong> principles of <strong>the</strong> reform are as follows:<br />
Before <strong>the</strong> war in Romania with <strong>the</strong> population of 6 million <strong>the</strong>re were about 600 000<br />
landless households. The large latifundia were in <strong>the</strong> hands of a few lucky ones, who often did<br />
not deal with agriculture at all and even did not live in Romania but spent all <strong>the</strong>ir time,<br />
depending on <strong>the</strong> season, in Nice, Paris or Doville. The land was rented to associations of rural<br />
workers (artels) for cultivation.<br />
The land reform was launched right after <strong>the</strong> withdrawal of <strong>the</strong> German troops and, as I was<br />
told, <strong>the</strong> King himself showed an example by distributing his manors. The first steps of <strong>the</strong><br />
reform were taken on <strong>the</strong> whole territory right way: <strong>the</strong> plots that were to be expropriated were<br />
separated from <strong>the</strong> ones that were not to be expropriated and <strong>the</strong> expropriated land was given<br />
to co-operative associations of workers for cultivation, at first without fur<strong>the</strong>r parcellation 2 . This<br />
1<br />
Edward Herriot (1872–1957), French statesman, head of <strong>the</strong> city of Lyon. Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Radical Party, 1924–<br />
1925, 1926 and 1932 Prime Minister. Pursued a policy favourable to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.<br />
2<br />
This word is of <strong>the</strong> Envoy’s own choosing and was placed by him in <strong>the</strong> Latvian text, meaning dividing into<br />
smaller plots (translator’s note).
62 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
method was ra<strong>the</strong>r easy to be carried out in Romania, because here people live in villages and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanians will keep this village system also after <strong>the</strong> final division of land into individual<br />
plots. It had been impossible to start with smaller parcellation from <strong>the</strong> very beginning due to<br />
<strong>the</strong> lack of surveyors, cruisers and o<strong>the</strong>r competent specialists. First of all <strong>the</strong> reform will be<br />
carried out to <strong>the</strong> completion in <strong>the</strong>-so-called kingdom and <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>y will turn to Bessarabia<br />
and Transylvania.<br />
The former owner has <strong>the</strong> right to keep at least 100 hect[ars], if he chooses to, but in general<br />
<strong>the</strong>y leave him 200–250–400 hect[ars], depending on <strong>the</strong> quantity of requests for land, <strong>the</strong><br />
quality of soil and <strong>the</strong> possible type of crop [that can be grown in <strong>the</strong> respective soil], but never<br />
more than 500 hect[ars]. Those landowners whose sons study agriculture have <strong>the</strong> right to<br />
receive 50 additional hect[ars] for each such son on condition that <strong>the</strong> son finishes his studies in<br />
five years and after that starts to cultivate <strong>the</strong> 50 hect[ars] left for him. Model farms also are<br />
given certain privileges in terms of non-expropriated land. Foreigners and <strong>the</strong> so-called<br />
“absentees”, i.e. citizens of Romania who, as mentioned before, lived abroad and did not take<br />
any interest in <strong>the</strong>ir land, are expropriated all of it. Towards <strong>the</strong> latter <strong>the</strong>re has been certain<br />
resentment in <strong>the</strong> country. Foreigners receive <strong>the</strong> same size of compensation as <strong>the</strong> citizens of<br />
Romania, except in Bessarabia, upon <strong>the</strong> incorporation of which <strong>the</strong> English and French<br />
governments required from Romania a different, much higher taxation of land. But in<br />
Bessarabia <strong>the</strong>re were about 3 English-owned estates and I guess 7 French-owned ones.<br />
The farmer who has rented and constantly cultivated a plot of land for five years, if he has<br />
built buildings on it, cultivated an orchard or a vineyard, receives <strong>the</strong> respective plot as his<br />
property.<br />
Those who receive land pay compensation to <strong>the</strong> former owners, <strong>the</strong> payment [of <strong>the</strong> value<br />
of <strong>the</strong> plot] takes place over 40 years. Payment is based on <strong>the</strong> pre-war value. The former<br />
owners certainly are dissatisfied, considering <strong>the</strong> compensation too small. It should also be<br />
considered that before <strong>the</strong> war <strong>the</strong> large latifundia found ra<strong>the</strong>r few buyers, plots of land<br />
seldom changed hands and for this reason before <strong>the</strong> war <strong>the</strong> market value of land was low.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, paying is done in <strong>the</strong> current Romanian lei, one leu being approximately 2<br />
L[atvian] r[oubles]. The Minister who, by <strong>the</strong> way, has been <strong>the</strong> main author of <strong>the</strong> Law on<br />
Land, admits that on <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>the</strong> large landowners have not protested much against <strong>the</strong><br />
reform, sensing its social inevitability. The Minister also added that <strong>the</strong> Law on Land was<br />
adopted by <strong>the</strong> former, <strong>the</strong> census parliament.<br />
To assist <strong>the</strong> new farmers with a bank loan, a special network of banks has been established<br />
for this purpose all over <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
The productivity so far has not been as good as before <strong>the</strong> war, which fact is especially<br />
remarked on by <strong>the</strong> opponents of <strong>the</strong> reform. But would <strong>the</strong> result have been better if <strong>the</strong> land<br />
was not expropriated and <strong>the</strong> reform not carried out? Unlikely. The decrease of productivity is<br />
due not to <strong>the</strong> reform but to o<strong>the</strong>r circumstances caused by <strong>the</strong> war that devastated land,<br />
ruined homes, killed cattle, dispersed and impoverished people. These circumstances would<br />
have caused decrease of productivity to <strong>the</strong> same degree, even if <strong>the</strong> large farms continued to<br />
exist.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> future <strong>the</strong> Minister expects <strong>the</strong> increase of productivity above <strong>the</strong> pre-war level,<br />
considering that in Romania before <strong>the</strong> war large farms pursued ra<strong>the</strong>r extensive agriculture.<br />
The small owners in contrast will introduce intensive type of agriculture. The numbers of cattle
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 63<br />
in Romania, same as in Latvia, in some regions is said to have already exceeded <strong>the</strong> pre-war<br />
figures.<br />
Apart from listening to <strong>the</strong> Minister I informed him about <strong>the</strong> situation with <strong>the</strong> land<br />
reform in Latvia that he listened to with great interest.<br />
As we were saying good-bye <strong>the</strong> Minister urged me to spare more time for my next trip to<br />
Romania and promised to arrange it that I am acquainted directly on site, in countryside with<br />
<strong>the</strong> situation of <strong>the</strong> Romanian land reform and achievements in <strong>the</strong> country’s social system,<br />
customs and <strong>the</strong> main branches of industry.<br />
Whe<strong>the</strong>r we shall be able to do it, it is difficult to predict, in spite of optimism from both<br />
sides. Meanwhile <strong>the</strong> Romanian liberals, who are currently at <strong>the</strong> helm of <strong>the</strong> state, are<br />
expecting a powerful attack as <strong>the</strong> opposition parties are negotiating a merger, a joint tactics<br />
against <strong>the</strong> government and perhaps already a new cabinet [of ministers] also.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 2, file 130, s. 37–39.<br />
18. Telegrama ministrului României la Varșovia Alexandru Florescu 1 nr. 6086 către<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României I.G. Duca 2 , 14 decembrie 1923<br />
Confidențial<br />
Subsecretarul de Stat la Ministerul Afacerilor Străine m-a informat că guvernul leton trebuia<br />
să răspundă chiar azi Sovietelor că propunerea ce i s-a făcut a unui pact de neagresiune nu se<br />
poate examina decât în urma unei discuții generale între puterile adunate la Moscova în<br />
decembrie anul trecut adică Finlanda, Estonia, Letonia și Polonia.<br />
Se pare că nu s-ar vorbi în acest răspuns de Lituania. Nici numele României nu este<br />
pronunțat.<br />
Nota de răspuns propune orașul Riga pentru o eventuală întrunire.<br />
Întrunirea însă ar fi [programată] ulterior Conferinței Statelor Baltice, care trebuie să aibă<br />
loc la Tallinn 3 la 21 ianuarie viitor.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1918-1944, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, fila 10.<br />
18. Telegram no. 6086 of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Warsaw Alexandru Florescu 4 to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.G. Duca 5 , 14 th December 1923<br />
Confidential.<br />
The Undersecretary of State at <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed me that <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian Government should have answered already today to <strong>the</strong> Soviets that <strong>the</strong> proposal<br />
concerning <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact can only be examined following a general discussion<br />
1<br />
Alexandru G. Florescu (1867-1925) a fost un politician conservator, diplomat și autor dramatic. Secretar General<br />
la Ministerului Afacerilor Străine (1899-1901), numit în 1911 Ministru Plenipotenţiar la Atena, iar în 1919 a fost<br />
desemnat în calitate de cel dintâi Ministru Plenipotentiar al României la Varșovia (până în 1925).<br />
2<br />
I.G. Duca (1879-1933) a fost un om politic român, președinte al Partidului Național Liberal (1930-1933). A fost<br />
Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (1933) și Ministru al Afacerilor Străine (1922-1926). S-a stins din viață la Sinaia<br />
la 29 decembrie 1933 fiind asasinat la ordinele Legiunii Arhanghelului Mihail.<br />
3<br />
În text, Teheran.<br />
4<br />
Alexandru G. Florescu (1867-1925) was a conservative politician, diplomat and drama playwriter. Secretary<br />
General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1899-1901), appointed Envoy to Greece (1911) and to Poland (1919-1925).<br />
5<br />
I.G. Duca (1879-1933) was a Romanian politician, President of <strong>the</strong> National Liberal Party (1930-1933). President of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1933) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1930-1933). Murdered in Sinaia by members of <strong>the</strong><br />
right-wing Legion of Archangel Michael.
64 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
between <strong>the</strong> powers that met in Moscow in December last year, namely: Finland, Estonia,<br />
Latvia and Poland.<br />
It seems that this answer makes no reference to Latvia. Romania’s name is not<br />
mentioned ei<strong>the</strong>r. The response note proposes <strong>the</strong> city of Riga for a possible meeting. The<br />
meeting is supposed to take place after <strong>the</strong> Conference of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, which should<br />
take place in Tallinn 1 next year on January 21 st .<br />
AMAE, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940. USSR, vol. 9, s. 10.<br />
19. Decretul regelui Ferdinand I nr. 1074 de acreditare a lui Alexandru G. Florescu<br />
din ziua de 1 aprilie 1924 în calitate de ministru plenipotențiar pe lângă Guvernele<br />
Republicilor Letoniei și Estoniei, 21 martie 1924<br />
Ferdinand I<br />
Prin grația lui Dumnezeu și voința națională<br />
Rege al României<br />
La toți de față și viitori Sănătate<br />
Asupra raportului Ministrului NOSTRU Secretar de Stat la Departamentul Afacerilor<br />
Străine, sub nr. 15143<br />
AM DECRETAT ȘI DECRETĂM:<br />
ART.I. – Domnul Alexandru G. Florescu, Trimis extraordinar și Ministru plenipotențiar al<br />
NOSTRU pe lângă Președintele Republicii Statului Polon, este acreditat pe ziua de 1 aprilie 1924<br />
în aceeași calitate și pe lângă Guvernele Republicilor Letoniei și Estoniei.<br />
ART.II. - Ministrul NOSTRU Secretar de Stat la Departamentul Afacerilor Străine este<br />
însărcinat cu executarea acestui decret.<br />
AMAE, Problema 77/Dosare personale, F. 13, vol. II, Alexandru G. Florescu<br />
19. Decree no. 1074 of King Ferdinand of April 1 st 1924 concerning <strong>the</strong> Accreditation of<br />
Alexandru G. Florescu as a Plenipotentiary Minister to <strong>the</strong> Governments of <strong>the</strong><br />
republics of Latvia and Estonia, 21 st March 1924<br />
Ferdinand I<br />
By <strong>the</strong> grace of God and <strong>the</strong> national will<br />
King of Romania<br />
Bless you all here present and those to come<br />
On <strong>the</strong> report no. 15143 of OUR Minister Secretary of State of <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />
Foreign Affairs<br />
I DECREED AND WE DECREE:<br />
ART.I. – Mr. Alexandru G. Florescu, Envoy Extraordinary and OUR Plenipotentiary<br />
Minister to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Polish Republic, is accredited on April 1 st , 1924 in <strong>the</strong> same<br />
capacity to <strong>the</strong> governments of <strong>the</strong> republics of Latvia and Estonia.<br />
ART.II. – OUR Minister State Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Department of Foreign Affairs is<br />
instructed to execute this decree.<br />
DARMFA, f. 77, Personal Files, F. 13, vol. II, Alexandru G. Florescu.<br />
1<br />
In <strong>the</strong> text, Teheran
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 65<br />
Document 2<br />
Decree of King Ferdinand concerning <strong>the</strong> Accreditation of Alexandru G. Florescu as<br />
a Plenipotentiary Minister of <strong>the</strong> Governments of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Latvia and Estonia
66 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
20. Sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1925. g. marta ziņojums ārlietu ministram Z.<br />
Meierovicam par savu vizīti Rumānijā februārī<br />
[..] Iesākšu šo ziņojumu ar tā beigām – ar tiem slēdzieniem, pie kādiem nonācu. Tas<br />
vajadzīgs tādēļ, ka gribētos vispirms īsumā aizrādīt uz Rumānijā iegūtiem uzskatiem un<br />
izklaidēt jau pašā sākumā to tendenciozo, naidīgo informāciju, ko par Rumāniju snieguši vācu<br />
un krievu avoti.<br />
Sociālais stāvoklis Rumānijā jāatzīst par stabilu, no lieliniecisma izaugšanas valsts iekšienē<br />
nav daudz jābaidās. Zemnieki, galvenā iedzīvotāju masa, dabūjusi zemi, pēc kuras tie bija gadu<br />
desmitiem prasījuši un kuras dēļ tie bija pat reizēm dumpojušies. Zemnieku interese piegriezta<br />
zemei un savas iedzīves ierīkošanai. Tādēļ lielinieku aģitācijai, kura intensīva, ir maz panākumu.<br />
Pat Besarābijā, kur iedzīvotāji pieder pie vairākām tautībām, rumāņu un vācu elements<br />
izturoties naidīgi pret lieliniecismu.<br />
[..] Saimnieciskais stāvoklis Rumānijā grūts: trūkst naudas, trūkst kredītu [..]. Zemes reforma<br />
ir labi pavirzīta uz priekšu [..]. Nekāda politiskā pārgrupēšanās Balkānu valstu starpā nav<br />
paredzama; Mazās Antantes nozīme nav palikusi mazāka.<br />
Rumānijas strīds ar Vāciju nokārtosies bez muitas kara; pret šādu karu ir visas saimnieciskās<br />
aprindas. Pretēji vācu informācijas apgalvojumiem, Rumānija līdz šim nav lietojusi pret Vāciju<br />
vai vācu pilsoņiem nekādus spaidus, ne politiskus, ne ekonomiskus.<br />
No pārējām Balkānu valstīm stāvoklis politiskā ziņā visnedrošākais ir Bulgārijā, mazāk<br />
Jugoslāvijā un Grieķijā. Rumānijā pastāv uzskats, ka visās šinīs valstīs līdzšinējais režīms ņems<br />
virsroku pār nemiera kustību.<br />
Pēc šāda nomierinoša ievada varu pāriet pie stāstīšanas.<br />
Ceļā no Polijas robežas līdz Bukarestei jau var konstatēt, ka rumāņiem daudz darāms, lai<br />
uzlabotu dzelzceļu satiksmi; redzams, ka trūkst vagonu un lokomotīves, ka kara laikā<br />
uzspridzinātie tilti vēl nav atjaunoti pat uz galvenām līnijām. Iztiek ar vācu okupācijas varas<br />
celtiem dzelzs pagaidu tiltiem. Personāla un ierēdņu daudz, bet tie bieži vien nezin, kas viņiem<br />
darāms. Rodas tāds iespaids, ka, ja Rumānija būtu pret pašas gribu spiesta karot ar Krieviju<br />
Besarābijas dēļ, tad viena no viņas pirmajām un galvenajām grūtībām būtu nenoorganizētā un<br />
nepietiekošā dzelzceļa satiksme.<br />
Nobraucis Bukarestē, tūliņ pirmā dienā nodevu savu karti pie ārlietu ministra. Jau nākošā<br />
rītā no Protokola direkcijas man zvanīja un ziņoja, ka ministrs labprāt vēlētos mani redzēt<br />
zināmā stundā pie sevis. Tur nogājušu, ministrs Duka mani bez kavēšanās pieņēma un jau pie<br />
pirmiem vārdiem centās pastrīpot Rumānijas simpātijas priekš Latvijas, kuras attīstībai<br />
Rumānijā sākot sekot ar pastāvīgi augošu interesi; viņš ļoti priecātos, ja abu valstu kopdarbība jo<br />
vairāk izveidotos. Atbildēju ministram, ka tādas pat jūtas visā Latvijā ir pretim Rumānijai, un, ka<br />
arī mans uzdevums un mana vēlēšanās ir – strādāt pie šīs kopdarbības padziļināšanas. Abi par<br />
to priecājāmies. Pēc šī sirsnīgā ievada Duka steigšus uzstādīja jautājumu: Kādas Jums ziņas par<br />
Krieviju? Kas tur notiek, vai Jūs domājiet, ka viņa mums uzbruks, vai nē? Varēja redzēt, ka šis<br />
jautājums rumāņus jo sevišķi interesē; izrādījās arī, ka viņi ļoti maz par Krieviju informēti. Tas<br />
pilnīgi saprotams, jo Rumānijai pašai nav nekādu attiecību ar Krieviju, un visi Krievijas<br />
satiksmes ceļi ar Vakareiropu atrodas tālu no Rumānijas. Manu sniegto informāciju un uzskatus<br />
par Krieviju ministrs noklausījās, cik varēju redzēt, ar lielu interesi. Mūsu saruna šoreiz nebija<br />
gara, jo pienāca ziņa, ka karalis, kurš bija saslimis, vēlētos ministru tūliņ redzēt. Vēl Duka mani
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 67<br />
informēja īsumā par Rumānijas apstākļiem un šķiroties izteica vēlēšanos drīzumā redzēties, lai<br />
tuvāk pārrunātu mūs interesējošos jautājumus.<br />
Satiku ministru pēc tam pie viņa mājās brokastīs, kuras viņš man deva. Bez manis bija vēl<br />
klāt daži ministri un pāris sūtņi ar kundzēm.<br />
Norunājām satikties nākošā dienā ministrijā. Šoreiz Duka mani iepazīstināja vispārīgos<br />
vilcienos ar stāvokli Balkānos. Pēc viņa domām, visvairāk bažas rada Bulgārija. Komunistu<br />
aģitācija tur laidusi dziļas saknes Stambolijska 1 valdības laikā. Tauta esot tik tāl saviļņota, ka<br />
tagadējam kabinetam nākoties ļoti grūti atrast ceļu, pa kuru tikt pie zināma nomierinājuma [..].<br />
Tomēr, pēc ministra pēdējām informācijām, viņam liekoties, ka tagadējā valdība varēšot aso<br />
nemieru kustību noslāpēt, tā, ka līdz režīma apvērsumam nenonākšot.<br />
Bez Bulgārijas Rumānija lielu vērību piegriež ari kroātu 2 kustībai Jugoslāvijā. Duka<br />
neuzkrauj visu vainu kroātiem. Viņš atrod, ka kroātu tautas masa nebūt nesimpatizējot<br />
lieliniecismam. Kroātu zemnieks esot samēra turīgs un ja viņš pabalstot Radiču 3 ar tā<br />
politiskajiem draugiem, kuriem, bez šaubām, esot sakari ar Maskavu, tad šī pabalstīšana<br />
notiekot aiz tā iemesla, ka kroāti esot stipri nemierā ar līdzšinējo sastingušo Pašiča 4 režīmu.<br />
Pašičs esot stūrgalvīgs un vecs, tik vecs, ka ar viņu netiekot galā Serbijā neviens; pat karalim<br />
nākoties ārkārtīgi grūti sarunās ar viņu tikt pie kāda rezultāta. Duka domā, ka Jugoslāvijā<br />
stāvoklis drīzumā noskaidrošoties un zaudēšot asumu.<br />
Par Grieķiju komunistiskās imunitātes ziņā Duka izteicās vēl optimistiskāk. Viļņošanās un<br />
kustības, kas tur notiek, esot pazaudētā kara sekas. Arī Mazāzijas grieķu emigrantu novietošana<br />
darot lielas rūpes. Turcijā visi grieķi bijuši tirgotāji. Tagad, pārnākuši tēvijā, tie radot nevēlamu<br />
konkurenci. Grūtības viņai esot arī vēl ar Jugoslāviju; Rumānija mēģinot iespaidot abas valstis<br />
uz saprašanos. Tieši noteiktas komunistiskas kustības Grieķijā, pēc ministra domām, neesot.<br />
Komunistu aģitācijas centrs, kurš līdz šim atrodas Vīnē, tikšot pārnests uz Balkāniem, tomēr<br />
tas tur atradīšoties laikam zem Berlīnes centrālās vadības.<br />
Tā, visumā kopā ņemot, Rumānija mazāk baidoties no komunisma izcelšanās pie sevis, nekā<br />
pie saviem kaimiņiem, caur ko Rumānija būtu ielenkta no lieliniecisma. Pašā Rumānijā<br />
komunisti varot radīt atsevišķus terora aktus, bet ne vairāk. Lielinieku iebrukumu Tatarbunārā<br />
pagājušā gadā vietējie iedzīvotāji paši palīdzējuši atsist.<br />
Šādu ministra informāciju pēc tam apstiprināja vietējie ārvalstu sūtņi; arī tie atzina<br />
Rumānijas sociālo stāvokli par stabilu. Ja Besarābijā visas lietas nenorisinās gludi, tad tas, pēc šo<br />
kolēģu domām, notiekot trūcīgās administrācijas un pērkamo ierēdņu dēļ. Uz Besarābiju esot<br />
sūtīti par administratoriem ļaudis ar sakariem, bet ar pasīvu materiālu un morālu bilanci; savu<br />
materiālo bilanci viņi tur drīz uzlaboja, bet morālo – nē. Tas pilnīgi saprotams, jo pie zemā<br />
vispārīgā kultūras līmeņa valdībai nācās ļoti grūti atrast ierēdņus iegūtām provincēm Besarābijā<br />
un Transilvānijā. Ierēdņi saņem niecīgu atalgojumu; kā vācu sūtnis man teica, policists saņemot<br />
800 lejas (Ls 20) mēnesī. Ar šādu algu nav iespējams dzīvot, neskatoties uz to, ka dzīve<br />
Rumānijā ir lētāka nekā Latvijā.<br />
1<br />
Aleksandars Stambolijskis (1879–1923), Bulgārijas valstsvīrs. 1919.–1923. g. premjerministrs, nogalināts valsts<br />
apvērsumā.<br />
2<br />
Kroāti – horvāti.<br />
3<br />
Stepjans Radičs (Radić; 1871–1928), horvātu politisks darbinieks, Serbu, horvātu un slovēņu karalistes<br />
(Dienvidslāvijas) valstsvīrs. 1925.–1927.g. izglītības ministrs.<br />
4<br />
Nikola Pašičs (Pašić; 1845–1926), Serbijas, pēc tam Serbu, horvātu un slovēņu karalistes (Dienvidslāvijas)<br />
valstsvīrs. 1921.–1926. g. premjerministrs.
68 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Kad ievaicājos ministram, cik taisnības ir ziņām par jaunas pretlielinieciskas valstu koalīcijas<br />
dibināšanos Balkānos, pie kam Anglija iegūtu tur lielāku iespaidu, Duka ļoti noteikti atbildēja,<br />
ka no kādas jaunas grupēšanās Balkānos neesot un nevarot būt runas. Anglija, kura labprāt<br />
pavisam atteiktos no aktīvas politikas uz Eiropas cietzemes, neesot i domājusi ņemt dalību<br />
Balkānu politikā. Mazā Antante paliek joprojām kā aktīvs politisks faktors: sargāt Viduseiropā<br />
to stāvokli, kādu tur radījuši pēc lielā kara noslēgtie miera līgumi. Drīzumā Bukarestē jāsanāk<br />
Mazās Antantes valstu ārlietu ministriem un tur es varēšot pārliecināties, ka nekādu nesaskaņu<br />
starp viņiem nav [..].<br />
Pārgājām uz jautājumu par tirdzniecības līgumu. Uz manu ierosinājumu Duka atbildēja ar<br />
lielāko pretimnākšanu un, man liekas, neliekuļotu prieku. Man gribētos apgalvot, ka rumāņi<br />
šimbrīžam politiskā ziņā jūtas stipri vientuļi un tādēļ katru draudzības žestu, katru vēlēšanos<br />
stāties ar viņiem tuvāk attiecībās tie jo silti apsveic. Iepazīstināju ministru ar mūsu līdz šim<br />
noslēgtiem līgumiem, ar šo līgumu pamatprincipiem un īpatnībām – klauzulām, atbalstot tās ar<br />
attiecīgiem argumentiem. Pēc ministra uzskatiem, Rumānija pret šīm klauzulām iebildumus<br />
necelšot, tomēr viņš nevarot dot galīgu atbildi, jo viņam esot jāsazinās ar saviem kolēģiem –<br />
finanšu un tirdzniecības ministru. Tomēr, kā vēlāk sarunā ar ministrijas ģenerālsekretāru<br />
Filodoru noskaidrojās, Rumānija līdz šim nav tirdzniecības līgumus, vārda pilnā nozīmē,<br />
slēgusi; viņa šīs attiecības nokārtojusi vienkāršā īsu notu apmaiņas ceļā, piemērojot savstarpēji<br />
lielākās labvēlības principu. Tādā veidā Rumānijas tirdzniecības attiecības nokārtotas ar<br />
daudzām valstīm. Apmainījāmies iepazīšanās nolūkā ar dokumentiem. Savu atturību tuvāk<br />
precizēta tirdzniecības līguma slēgšanā rumāņi izskaidro ar nenokārtoto saimniecisko stāvokli<br />
zemē ar tarifu trūkumu un ekonomiskās politikas neizveidotību.<br />
Iztikām vispārīgos vilcienos arī jautājumu par juridiskās palīdzības konvenciju un par<br />
konvenciju, zīmējoties uz ekstradīciju. Juridiskās palīdzības konvencija mums vairāk vajadzīga<br />
nekā rumāņiem. Mūsu pilsoņu Rumānijā ir diezgan prāvs skaits un, kā mūsu konsuls Orgidans 1<br />
apgalvo, tie ieņemot tur diezgan labu stāvokli. Juridiskās palīdzības konvenciju Rumānija šī<br />
gada februārī parakstījusi ar Austriju. Vienu eksemplāru no tās paņēmu līdzi; tāpat arī no<br />
ekstradīcijas konvencijas, ko Rumānija pagājušā gadā noslēgusi ar Ziem[eļamerikas] Savienotām<br />
Valstīm. Pēdējā atzīmējams tas, ka Rumānija neapņemas izdot Amerikas Savienotām valstīm<br />
tos noziedzniekus, kam draud nāves sods. Rumānijā nāves sods nepastāv.<br />
Savā laikā jau ziņoju ministrijai Rīgā, ka Rumānija atvērs pie mums goda konsulātu. Izejot<br />
no šī nodoma un atbalstoties uz maniem novērojumiem, ka Duka un Filodors ir ļoti trūcīgi<br />
informēti par Krievijas apstākļiem – gandrīz vienīgi no poļu avotiem, novedu viņus pamazām<br />
pie domām par sūtniecības ierīkošanu Rīgā. Aizrādīju, ka šimbrīžam Rīga ir tas centrs, kurā<br />
saplūst visa informācija no Krievijas. Caur Rīgu notiek Krievijas satiksme ar Vakareiropu. Visi<br />
ārvalstu sūtņi pie padomju valdības brauc uz Maskavu un no turienes caur Rīgu; Rīgā pastāvīgi<br />
uzturas ārzemju laikrakstu un lielo telegrāfa aģentūru korespondenti; dažas sūtniecības uztur<br />
speciālu plašu ierēdņu štatu Krievijas novērošanai.<br />
Vēlāk kādā sarunā Filodors man pastāstīja, ka ministrs Duka gribot ar 1926. budžeta gadu<br />
atvērt Rīgā pastāvīgu sūtniecību un tam nolūkam nolēmis uzņemt budžeta projektā attiecīgās<br />
summas. Rumānijai bijusi sūtniecība Helsingforsā, bet to viņa likvidējusi priekš pāris gadiem.<br />
Kad satikos ar pašu ministru, tad neslēpu to, ko ģenerālsekretārs Filodors man bija teicis par<br />
1<br />
Teodors Orgidans (Orghidan; 1888 – pēc 1940), Rumānijas uzņēmējs, no 1923. g. Latvijas goda konsuls, 1928.–<br />
1940. g. goda ģenerālkonsuls Bukarestē.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 69<br />
sūtniecības atvēršanu. Duka šo ziņu apstiprināja, uz ko es reaģēju ar attiecīgu frāzi par labo<br />
iespaidu un jo dziļākām simpātijām, ko šāds Rumānijas valdības solis izsauks Latvijā un arī<br />
pārējās Baltijas valstīs.<br />
Mūsu uzaicinājums sūtīt delegātu uz kopējo apspriedi atbruņošanas jautājumā atstāja<br />
Bukarestē ļoti labu iespaidu. Tiklīdz Duka bija saņēmis šo ziņu, viņš bija licis aicināt mani uz<br />
Ārlietu ministriju, kur man paziņoja, ka Rumānija savu delegātu sūtīs un lūdza mani to darīt<br />
zināmu manai valdībai, kā arī izzināt apspriedes atklāšanas dienu. Diemžēl mans sekretariāts<br />
Varšavā man bija iedevis līdzi šifru nepilnīgā veidā (bez instrukcijas), tā kā nevarēju šifrēt.<br />
Sazināšanos bija jāizdara ar abu Varšavas sūtniecību starpniecību, kas aizņēma vairāk laika.<br />
Ziņu par nolikto apspriedes dienu rumāņi saņēma par vēlu, lai varētu laikā ierasties. Starp<br />
Bukaresti un Varšavu tiešā satiksmē ir tikai divi vilcieni nedēļā; arī gaisa satiksme vēl nav<br />
ierīkota. Tādēļ rumāņi nāca ar lūgumu atlikt apspriedi par dažām dienām vēlāk. Rumānijas<br />
delegāts ir pulkvedis Kenesku, bijušais ķēniņa adjutants, kurš tagad komandē pulku<br />
Transilvānijā. Pie delegāta izraudzīšanas, kā liekas, ir ņēmis dalību arī ķēniņš. Cik varēju manīt,<br />
tad poļiem šis delegāts nepatīk vai vismaz viņi bija vēlējušies redzēt citu personu, jo poļu kara<br />
priekšstāvis Rumānijā, Dzeržikraj-Moravskis 1 bija atnācis pie manis, teikdams, ka caur šādu<br />
izlasi delegāta sūtīšana novēlošoties. Kenesku neesot nemaz ar Baltijas valstīm pazīstams; viņu<br />
ģenerālštāba priekšnieks nebūtu sūtījis, bet pēdējais nemaz neesot ticis prasīts un tādēļ tas esot<br />
briesmīgi noskaities. Štāba priekšnieka kandidāts esot pulkvedis Dimitresku, kurš pārrunājamos<br />
jautājumus labi pārzinot. Ko lai darot. Izteicos, ka šī lieta ir rumāņu mājas lieta, kurā man, kas<br />
te tikai retumis ierodos, nav nekādi iespējams iejaukties, pat ne indirekti. Ar to jautājumu<br />
izbeidzām; palika, ka brauks Kenesku.<br />
Uzturēdamies Bukarestē, apmeklēju vairākas reizes mūsu konsulātu, kuru vada Teodors V.<br />
Orgidans, veikls, nepilnus 40 gadus vecs, neliela auguma vīrs, kurš pieder jau kopš vairākām<br />
paaudzēm pie turīgas tirgotāju ģimenes; pie tādas pat ģimenes, cik zinu, pieder arī viņa kundze.<br />
Studējis Vācijā. Bijis neilgi atpakaļ Bukarestes Tirdzniecības kameras viceprezidents un stāvējis<br />
rumāņu delegācijas priekšgalā pie sarunu vešanas Anglijā par privātparādu konsolidāciju, ko<br />
izvedis ar labām sekmēm. Tirdzniecības sakarus viņš uzturot galvenā kārtā ar Angliju (audumi<br />
vairumā).<br />
Konsulāts darbojas no 18. aprīļa 1924. g. Konsuls piegriezis atzīstamu vērību un uzmanību<br />
savam oficiālam pienākumam, piem[ēram]: neizdod vīzas, neapprasījies iepriekš policijā, tā<br />
vispārīgā, kā politiskā, vai vīzas lūdzējam tur nav kāds dossier. 2 Darbvedība norit kārtīgi. Daži<br />
sīki pārpratumi, kas notikuši, darbību uzsākot, izskaidrojami ar tuvāku instrukciju trūkumu<br />
tobrīd; tie tagad novērsti.<br />
Noskaidroju jautājumu par konsulārā tīkla paplašināšanu Rumānijā. Saņēmu arī ziņu, ka to<br />
vēloties saimniecisko organizāciju apspriede. Pēc mana ieskata, konsulāti būtu atverami Galacā<br />
un Konstancā. Abās pilsētās ieceļami goda konsuli. Galaca ar 73 000 iedzīvotājiem ir lielākā<br />
Rumānijas ostas pilsēta uz Donavas, augstāk par otru ostas pilsētu Brailu ar 67 000<br />
iedzīvotājiem [..]. Uz Melnās jūras krasta guļ Konstanca (28 000 iedzīvotāju). Tā ir ierīkota<br />
vispirms kā naftas osta; uz turieni iet tieši vadi no naftas apgabaliem. Kad Galacas osta ziemā<br />
nav pieejama, kustība pārceļas uz Konstancu.<br />
1<br />
Vitolds Dzeržikrajs-Moravskis (Dzierżykraj-Morawski; 1895–1944), Polijas armijas pulkvedis. 1923.–1926. g.<br />
militārais atašejs Rumānijā.<br />
2<br />
Dossier (franču val.) – dosjē, šajā gadījumā domātas kompromitējošas ziņas.
70 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Kas attiecas uz konsulāta ierīkošanu Kišiņevā, tad lai man būtu atļauts izteikties pagaidām<br />
pret to. Iemesli tam sekojošie: Kišiņeva ir galvenā pilsēta Besarābijā, kuras piederību pie<br />
Rumānijas Padomju Krievija, kā tas visiem zināms, ļoti skaļi apstrīd. Ja mēs tur atvērtu<br />
konsulātu, jau tuvākās dienās padomju valdība mums iesniegtu protesta notu, kuru pavadītu<br />
rinda uzbrukumu Maskavas presē. Citas valstis arī vēl nav steigušās atvērt konsulātus Kišiņevā.<br />
Bez tam, Kišiņevā vēl ir ļoti grūti atrast konsula amatam piemērotu personu. Tirdzniecība<br />
atrodas žīdu un pa daļai arī krievu rokās; kā vieni, tā otri ar Rumāniju tikpat kā nemaz nav<br />
saistīti. Par rumāņu firmām, kas tur beidzamā laikā nometušās, labākā gadījumā nevar teikt ne<br />
labu, ne ļaunu. Šaubīgu elementu ļoti daudz.<br />
Konsulāti tātad būtu atverami Galacā un Konstancā. Esmu jau interesējies par piemērotām<br />
personām, sazinoties ar attiecīgām saimnieciskām organizācijām un ar Rumānijas Ārlietu<br />
ministriju.<br />
Biju ļoti sagatavojies uz atgriešanos Varšavā, apgādājies ar dzelzceļa biļeti, kad saņēmu no<br />
galma maršala, ķēniņa uzdevumā, uzaicinājumu uz dineju pilī. Noskaidroju apstākļus, nācu pie<br />
slēdziena, ka izbraukšana jāatliek. Tādas dinejas misiju priekšniekiem un viņu kundzēm notiek<br />
tikai reizi gadā. Man, kas reti ierodas Rumānijā, bija jo sevišķi neērti braukt prom, kad ielūgumu<br />
jau biju saņēmis; to Rumānijā nesaprastu vai pārprastu. Pie dinejas ķēniņš nepiedalījās; bija<br />
saslimis. Prezidēja ķēniņiene un princese héritière, 1 kamēr pats kroņprincis sēdēja ķēniņienei pa<br />
labi. Pēc dinejas bija rauts ar koncertu. Viss galms un viņa iekārta ir visai demokrātiska, tomēr<br />
atstatums personīgās attiecībās starp valdošā nama locekļiem un pilsoņiem ir stipri lielāks, nekā<br />
starp republikas prezidentu un pilsoņiem.<br />
Pirms aizbraukšanas biju atvadīties no ārlietu ministra, pateikties par laipnu pretimnākšanu<br />
no Rumānijas iestāžu puses un par parādītām simpātijām pret Latviju. Ministrs vēlreiz un jo<br />
sevišķi uzsvēra, ka šīs simpātijas ir īstas un nevis konvencionālas, jo Rumānija, lai gan vecāka<br />
par Latviju, tomēr ļoti dzīvi vēl atceras, cik dārga ir neatkarība tiem, kas pēc viņas centušies un<br />
beidzot ieguvuši; aizrādīja, ka Rumānija ar patiesu prieku raugās uz Latvijas un pārējo Baltijas<br />
valstu attīstību un tautas enerģisko darbu; lūdza mani darīt zināmu manai valdībai un pastrīpot<br />
jo sevišķi, ka Rumānija vēlas strādāt arvienu jo lielākā un ciešākā kopdarbībā ar Latviju. Ar to<br />
šķīrāmies.<br />
[..]. Sakarā ar teritorijas paplašināšanu no kādiem 140 000 kv. kilometriem uz 295 000<br />
kilometriem Rumānija ir spiesta paplašināt arī savas politiskās darbības apvārsni. Agrāk Karpati<br />
šķīra Rumāniju no Viduseiropas, tagad viņa sevi uzskata kā pie tās piederošu. Tādēļ, kādas arī<br />
nebūtu viņas domstarpības ar dažām agrākās Austro-Ungārijas mantiniecēm, Rumānijai ir ar<br />
tām daudz kopēju interešu. Rumānija nevar palaist vienaldzīgi garām vācu–angļu–franču<br />
sarunas par drošības līgumu vakaros. 2 Viņas politiķi ne bez iemesla aizrāda, ka, ja Vakareiropā<br />
pastāv domstarpības par dažiem robežas punktiem, tad austrumos no Reinas nav vairs gandrīz<br />
nevienas drošas robežas, kaut gan tās ar līgumu atzītas. Attiecībā uz Rumānijas robežām<br />
Krievija, Ungārija, Bulgārija protestē katra izdevīga gadījuma. Lai tagadējo robežu aizsargāšanas<br />
iespēja būtu nodrošināta, Rumānija noslēgusi divas sabiedrības: ar Poliju un ar Mazo Antanti;<br />
viņa arī rēķinās ar Tautu Savienības pakta 10. pantu. 3 Bet tagad no 10. panta daudz vairs neatliek<br />
1<br />
Héritière (franču val.) – mantiniece.<br />
2<br />
Runa ir par t. s. Lokarno sarunām, kuru rezultātā tika noslēgti Vācijas Rietumu robežu garantējošie līgumi. Ar<br />
vārdu „vakari” domāti rietumi.<br />
3<br />
Tautu Savienības statūtu 10. pants uzlika dalībvalstīm par pienākumu aizstāvēt pret ārējiem uzbrukumiem visu<br />
savienības dalībvalstu teritoriālo neaizskaramību un politisko neatkarību.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 71<br />
pāri [..]. Principā Rumānija neceļ iebildumus pret atsevišķu valstu grupu izlīgumiem. Pēc viņas<br />
domām, angļu–vācu projektam ir zināmas pozitīvas vērtības. Šis priekšlikums ir nopietns<br />
mēģinājums organizēt Eiropu, iesākot no vakariem, kur grib ieviest kārtību, drošību un<br />
autoritāti, kas tad no šī centra izplatītos tālāk uz visu Eiropu. Rumānijā izsaka domas, ka caur<br />
šādu paktu Vācija tiks tuvāk saistīta ar Vakareiropas demokrātijām, ka līdz ar to lielā mērā<br />
mazināsies viņas revanša tieksmes un cenšanās šinī nolūkā saprasties ar Padomju Krieviju. Bez<br />
tam, Rumānija grib redzēt šajā solī Anglijas saistīšanos ar Eiropas kontinentu, caur ko tā<br />
uzņemtos līdz arī atbildību par šī kontinenta politisko un ekonomisko organizāciju. No Reinas<br />
tad miera attiecību organizēšanai būtu pakāpeniski jāattīstās uz austrumiem. Bet vai tas notiks,<br />
tā visi Rumānijā jautā. Atbildēs izskan šaubas. Politiskā doma še nosveras uz to, ka ja piecu<br />
valstu pakts garantē vienīgi rietumu robežu neaizskaramību, ja viņš pielaiž principā, atklāti vai<br />
aizklāti, iespējamību revidēt robežas austrumos, viņš ar to dos iespēju uzstādīt visas prasības,<br />
uzkūdīs visas tieksmes un pacels kājās visus tos, kas nemierā ar līgumiem, slēgtiem pēc lielā<br />
kara [..].<br />
Jāatzīst, ka Rumānija ar lielu neatlaidību mēģina organizēt un apvienot Balkānu valstis<br />
zināmā interešu kopībā. Pirmie mēģinājumi bija vairāk dinastiska rakstura: Rumānija saistījās<br />
tādā veidā ar Grieķiju un ar Jugoslāviju; no tā sagaidīja šo abu valstu attiecību uzlabošanos. Pēc<br />
dinastijas neveiksmes Grieķijā, kā dzirdams, šis plāns vēl nav atmests [..].<br />
Rumānijas attiecības ar Padomju Krieviju smaguma punkts guļ Besarābijas jautājumā, kura<br />
atrisināšana nebūt nav pavirzījusies uz priekšu. Arī Maskavas nodibinātā Moldāvijas republika<br />
viņpus Dņestras rada rumāņiem rūpes. Šinī republikā gan neesot vairāk kā 300 000–400 000<br />
iedzīvotāju, bet viņai ir nozīme kā propagandas centram. Maskava tur dibina skolas ar rumāņu<br />
valodu, atver mājturības kursus, ierīko zemkopības skolas priekš zemniekiem un arodu skolas<br />
priekš strādniekiem: dod visu to, ko Rumānija tādos apmēros nav spējīga sniegt otrā Dņestras<br />
krastā. Rumāņiem ir lielas bažas, ka ar šādas Moldāvijas republikas nodibināšanu Kominterne 1<br />
nesāk attīstīt vēl intensīvāku propagandu Besarābijā, nekā līdz šim; no tā var celties incidenti,<br />
no incidentiem var izaugt konflikts; Sarkanā armija var vēl lielākā daudzumā nostāties gar<br />
robežu. Rumānija ļoti baidās no bruņota konflikta; Padomju valdība to labi zin un tādēļ var sev<br />
visu atļauties. Tā rīkodamās, tā sasniedz jau ārpus tiešā Besarābijas jautājuma divus mērķus:<br />
pirmkārt, pabalsta komunistisko kustību Rumānijā un Balkānos; otrkārt, traucē Rumāniju<br />
dabūt kārtējo aizņēmumu [..].<br />
No lielvalstīm visiespaidīgākā Rumānijā vēl arvien ir Francija. Zināmu lomu te spēlē atmiņas<br />
par kara laikā sniegto palīdzību, kad sevišķi franču ģenerālis Bertlo 2 ieguvis lielu popularitāti, pa<br />
daļai tas izskaidrojams ar franču kultūras dziļo iespaidu rumāņu inteliģencē. Man liekas,<br />
Rumānijā daudz vairāk lasa franču grāmatu, nekā rumāņu. Pie katra avīžu pārdevēja var dabūt<br />
Parīzes laikrakstus samērā bagātā izvēlē. Satiekoties savā starpā, rumāņi bieži vien sarunājas<br />
franciski, gluži tāpat, kā pie mums Latvijā, teikšu, agrāk – vāciski. Daudzi no rumāņu<br />
valstsvīriem, juristiem studējuši Francijā. Viss tas rada dabiskas saites, kas franču iespaidam<br />
Rumānijā palīdz nostiprināties [..]<br />
Pāris reizes nogāju uz parlamentu – apakšnamu, lai gūtu vispārīgu iespaidu par viņa darba<br />
veidu. Apakšnams atrodas speciāli šim nolūkam celtā ēkā ar amfiteātra veidīgu sēžu zāli. Uzkrīt<br />
1<br />
Kominterne – Komunistiskās internacionāles nosaukuma saīsinājums.<br />
2<br />
Anrī Bertlo (Ber<strong>the</strong>lot; 1861–1931), Francijas armijas ģenerālis. 1916.–1919. g. Francijas militārās misijas vadītājs<br />
Rumānijā.
72 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
tas, ka priekš publikas ir sevišķi daudz telpu, kuras triju rangu veidā apliecas ap sēžu zāli.<br />
Deputātu bija maz; lielākā daļa no tiem ir pilsētnieki – inteliģenti; īstus zemniekus redzēju<br />
retumis. Iekšējā disciplīna dienvidnieciska [..].<br />
No manām sarunām ar parlamenta locekļiem un politiķiem dabūju iespaidu, ka Rumānijā<br />
vispārīgi partiju fizionomija nav noteikta un programma nav precizēta. Es to gribu izskaidrot ar<br />
vēlētāju masas zemo izglītības līmeni un politisko neattīstību. Kad par šo jautājumu sāku tuvāk<br />
interesēties, tad no rumāņu puses nāca atbilde, ka tagad parlamentārisma ziņā jau sperts liels<br />
solis uz priekšu. Agrāk opozīcijas cīņa ar pozīciju notikusi mazāk parlamentāriskā formā [..].<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 398. l., 35.–70. lp.; 2575. f., 15. apr., 18. l., 197.–213. lp.<br />
20. Report by Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Meierovics<br />
about his visit to Romania in February 1925, March 1925<br />
[..] I will start <strong>the</strong> report with [what should have stood at] <strong>the</strong> end of it – with <strong>the</strong><br />
conclusions that I reached. It is necessary because I would like first of all briefly to point out <strong>the</strong><br />
views that I developed in [on] Romania and at <strong>the</strong> very beginning to refute <strong>the</strong> biased, hostile<br />
information that German and Russian sources have provided on Romania.<br />
The social situation in Romania should be described as stable, <strong>the</strong> growth of Bolshevism in<br />
<strong>the</strong> country is not to be feared much. The farmers – <strong>the</strong> largest part of <strong>the</strong> population, have<br />
received land, which <strong>the</strong>y had demanded for years and for which <strong>the</strong>y had sometimes even<br />
rebelled. The farmers’ interest is now focused on land and <strong>the</strong> organisation of <strong>the</strong>ir households.<br />
For this reason <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik propaganda, which is intensive, has little success. Even in<br />
Bessarabia, a home of several ethnic groups, <strong>the</strong> Romanian and <strong>the</strong> German elements are said<br />
to be hostile against Bolshevism.<br />
[..] The economic situation in Romania is difficult: money is scarce, bank-loans are scarce<br />
[...] The land reform is well advanced [...] No political re-grouping among <strong>the</strong> Balkan states is to<br />
be expected; <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente has not decreased.<br />
Romania’s discords with Germany will get settled without a customs war; all economic<br />
circles are against such a war. Contrary to German information statements, so far Romania has<br />
not exerted any pressure, ei<strong>the</strong>r political or economic, against Germany or German citizens.<br />
Among <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Balkan states situation in political sphere is most precarious in Bulgaria<br />
and least so in Yugoslavia and Greece. In Romania <strong>the</strong>y believe that <strong>the</strong> existing regimes will get<br />
<strong>the</strong> upper hand over <strong>the</strong> insurgence movements in all <strong>the</strong>se states.<br />
After such a reassuring introduction I may now proceed with my story.<br />
Already on <strong>the</strong> way from <strong>the</strong> Polish border to Bucharest one can see that <strong>the</strong> Romanians still<br />
have much work to do to improve <strong>the</strong> railway service; <strong>the</strong> lack of wagons and engines is<br />
obvious, same as <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> bridges, which had been blown up during <strong>the</strong> war, have not<br />
been renovated yet even on <strong>the</strong> main communication lines. They get along with temporary iron<br />
bridges built by <strong>the</strong> German occupation authorities. The personnel and civil servants are<br />
numerous, but <strong>the</strong>y often do not know <strong>the</strong>ir job. One gets <strong>the</strong> impression that if against its will<br />
Romania was forced to make war against Russia for Bessarabia, one of <strong>the</strong> first and foremost<br />
difficulties that it would face would be <strong>the</strong> ill-organized and inadequate railway service.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> very first day after arriving in Bucharest I sent my card to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs. Already on <strong>the</strong> next morning I got a call from <strong>the</strong> Protocol Department and was told<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Minister would be glad to see me in his office at a concrete hour. When I arrived <strong>the</strong>re,
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 73<br />
Minister Duca received me right away and with his very first words tried to underline<br />
Romania’s affinity for Latvia whose development <strong>the</strong>y in Romania had started to follow with<br />
constantly growing interest; he would be very happy if <strong>the</strong> co-operation between <strong>the</strong> two<br />
countries developed fur<strong>the</strong>r. I replied that all over Latvia <strong>the</strong>re were similar feelings towards<br />
Romania and that it was my task and my wish, too, to work on <strong>the</strong> deepening of such cooperation.<br />
We both were pleased about it. After <strong>the</strong> cordial introduction Duca hurried to ask<br />
me <strong>the</strong> question: What news do you have about Russia? What is going on <strong>the</strong>re and what do<br />
you think – will <strong>the</strong>y attack us or not? It was obvious that this issue was of particular interest to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanians; it also turned out that <strong>the</strong>y are very poorly informed about Russia. It is fully<br />
understandable because Romania does not have any direct <strong>relations</strong> with Russia and all <strong>the</strong><br />
communication lines between Russia and Western Europe are far from Romania. As much as I<br />
could see <strong>the</strong> Minister listened to <strong>the</strong> information that I gave him and to my views with great<br />
interest. This time our discussion was not long because a message came that <strong>the</strong> King, who had<br />
fallen ill, wanted to see <strong>the</strong> Minister immediately. Duca also briefly informed me about <strong>the</strong><br />
situation in Romania and on parting expressed a wish to see me again soon in order to discuss<br />
<strong>the</strong> issues of mutual interest in more detail.<br />
Later I met <strong>the</strong> Minister at breakfast that he hosted in his home. Apart from me <strong>the</strong>re were<br />
some Ministers and a couple of envoys with <strong>the</strong>ir spouses present.<br />
We arranged a meeting on <strong>the</strong> next day at <strong>the</strong> Ministry. This time Duca along <strong>the</strong> general<br />
lines informed me about <strong>the</strong> situation in <strong>the</strong> Balkans. He believes that Bulgaria gives <strong>the</strong><br />
greatest reason for concern. The Communist propaganda had laid deep root <strong>the</strong>re during <strong>the</strong><br />
Stamboliyski’s 1 government [he said]. According to him, <strong>the</strong> people are so agitated [<strong>the</strong>re] that<br />
it is very difficult for <strong>the</strong> existing cabinet to find a way to some kind of appeasement [...] Yet<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> latest information at <strong>the</strong> Minister’s disposal, he thought that <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
government would be able to stifle <strong>the</strong> movement of acute unrest so that it would not go as far<br />
as <strong>the</strong> overthrowing of <strong>the</strong> regime.<br />
Romania, as he told me, besides Bulgaria attributed great attention also to <strong>the</strong> Croatian<br />
movement in Yugoslavia. Duca does not put all <strong>the</strong> blame entirely on <strong>the</strong> Croatians. He thinks<br />
that <strong>the</strong> mass of <strong>the</strong> Croatian people does not like Bolshevism at all. The Croatian farmer,<br />
according to him, is ra<strong>the</strong>r well-off and if he does support Radić 2 and his political friends, who<br />
no doubt have contacts with Russia, it is because <strong>the</strong> Croatians are very dissatisfied with <strong>the</strong><br />
existing stiff [conservative] Pašić’s 3 regime. Pašić is said to be stubborn and old, so old that<br />
nobody can cope with him in Serbia; even <strong>the</strong> King has extremely difficult time to come to any<br />
result in a discussion with him. Duca thinks that <strong>the</strong> situation in Yugoslavia will soon become<br />
clear and will lose <strong>the</strong> edge.<br />
About Greece Duca spoke even more optimistically in terms of its immunity to<br />
Communism. The agitation and movement taking place <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>the</strong> consequence of <strong>the</strong> lost<br />
war, he said. The settlement of Greek emigrants from Asia Minor also caused much concern. In<br />
Turkey all Greeks had been merchants. Now, having returned to <strong>the</strong>ir fa<strong>the</strong>rland <strong>the</strong>y caused<br />
undesirable competition. [The Minister said that] it [his country] also had difficulties with<br />
1<br />
Aleksandar Stamboliyski (1879–1923), Bulgarian statesman. 1919–1923 Prime Minister, killed during a coup d’etat.<br />
2<br />
Stepjan Radić (1871–1928), Croatian politician, statesman in <strong>the</strong> Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians<br />
(Yugoslavia). 1925–1927 Minister of Education.<br />
3<br />
Nikola Pašić (1845–1926), statesman in Serbia, later in <strong>the</strong> Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians.<br />
(Yugoslavia). 1921–1926 Prime Minister.
74 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Yugoslavia; Romania was trying to sway both countries towards a mutual agreement. According<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>the</strong>re is no direct and established Communist movement in Greece.<br />
The Communist propaganda centre, which is currently located in Vienna, [he believes], will<br />
be transferred to <strong>the</strong> Balkans, yet <strong>the</strong>re it will probably be subordinated to <strong>the</strong> central<br />
administration in Berlin.<br />
Thus, all in all, [he told me], Romania was less afraid of <strong>the</strong> emergence of Communism at<br />
home than in <strong>the</strong> neighbouring countries because in such case Romania would be surrounded<br />
by Bolshevism. In Romania itself <strong>the</strong> Communists were in <strong>the</strong> capacity to organise individual<br />
acts of terror, but not more than that. In Tatar-Bunar <strong>the</strong> local population had <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
helped to fight back a Bolshevik attack last year.<br />
The foreign envoys to Romania later confirmed <strong>the</strong> information that <strong>the</strong> Minister gave me;<br />
<strong>the</strong>y, too, recognised Romania’s social situation as stable. If not all things happen smoothly in<br />
Bessarabia, it, according to <strong>the</strong>se colleagues of mine, is because of <strong>the</strong> poor administration and<br />
<strong>the</strong> corrupt civil servants. To Bessarabia as administrators were sent people with contacts but<br />
with passive material and moral balance; <strong>the</strong>re <strong>the</strong>y soon improved <strong>the</strong>ir material balance but<br />
not <strong>the</strong> moral one. It is fully understandable because in <strong>the</strong> conditions of <strong>the</strong> low overall<br />
cultural level it was very difficult for <strong>the</strong> government to find civil servants for <strong>the</strong> acquired<br />
provinces in Bessarabia and Transylvania. Civil servants have low salaries: as <strong>the</strong> German Envoy<br />
told me, <strong>the</strong> policeman earned 800 lei (20 LVL) per month. It is not possible to live on such a<br />
salary although in Romania living is cheaper than in Latvia.<br />
When I asked <strong>the</strong> Minister how much truth <strong>the</strong>re was in <strong>the</strong> talks about <strong>the</strong> creation of a<br />
new anti-Bolshevism coalition of states in <strong>the</strong> Balkans through which, moreover England would<br />
acquire greater influence <strong>the</strong>re, Duca answered very firmly that no new grouping in <strong>the</strong> Balkans<br />
had been discussed and that it was out of <strong>the</strong> question. England, which [according to him]<br />
would prefer withdrawing from active politics on <strong>the</strong> continent of Europe altoge<strong>the</strong>r, had not<br />
even considered taking active part in <strong>the</strong> Balkan politics. The Little Entente still remained an<br />
active political factor: [its function was] to safeguard in Central Europe <strong>the</strong> situation created<br />
<strong>the</strong>re by <strong>the</strong> peace treaties concluded after <strong>the</strong> Great War. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Little Entente were to meet in Bucharest soon and <strong>the</strong>re [<strong>the</strong> Minister said] I would be able<br />
to see for myself that <strong>the</strong>re were no discords among <strong>the</strong>m [...]<br />
Then we turned to <strong>the</strong> issue of a trade agreement. Duca took my proposal in an extremely<br />
responsive manner and, it seemed to me, with true joy. I dare say that at present <strong>the</strong> Romanians<br />
feel very lonely in political sense and for this reason <strong>the</strong>y very warmly welcome any gesture of<br />
friendship, any wish to establish closer <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong>m. I informed <strong>the</strong> Minister about <strong>the</strong><br />
agreements that we have concluded to date, about <strong>the</strong> basic principles and specifics of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
agreements – <strong>the</strong> clauses and justified <strong>the</strong>m with relevant arguments. The Minister believes<br />
that Romania will not object to such clauses, however he said that he could not give a final reply<br />
yet because first he had to contact his colleagues – <strong>the</strong> ministers of finance and trade. However<br />
as it later turned out in a discussion with Ministry’s Secretary General Filodor 1 , to date Romania<br />
has not concluded any trade agreement, in <strong>the</strong> full sense of <strong>the</strong> word, yet; it [Romania] has<br />
organised such <strong>relations</strong> by way of a simple exchange of brief memoranda [and] by mutual<br />
application of <strong>the</strong> principle of most-favoured nation. In this way Romania’s trade <strong>relations</strong> have<br />
1<br />
Nicolae N. Filodor was a Romanian diplomat who accomplished <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions in A<strong>the</strong>ns (1913-1920)<br />
Prague (1925-1928). He was Secretary General of Romanian Foreign Ministry.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 75<br />
been settled with many countries. In order to become acquainted, we exchanged <strong>documents</strong>.<br />
The Romanians say that <strong>the</strong>ir reticence with regard to conclusion of a detailed trade agreement<br />
is due to <strong>the</strong> unsettled economic situation in <strong>the</strong>ir country, lack of tariffs and underdeveloped<br />
economic policy.<br />
In general lines we addressed also <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> convention on legal assistance and <strong>the</strong><br />
convention pertaining to extradition. We need <strong>the</strong> convention on legal assistance more than<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanians do. There are a ra<strong>the</strong>r large number of our citizens in Romania and, as our<br />
consul Orghidan 1 said, <strong>the</strong>y are in a ra<strong>the</strong>r good situation <strong>the</strong>re. This February Romania signed<br />
a convention on legal assistance with Austria. I took a copy of it with me; same as of <strong>the</strong><br />
convention on extradition that Romania signed with <strong>the</strong> United States of North [America] last<br />
year. Concerning <strong>the</strong> latter one should note that Romania does not commit itself to extradition<br />
of <strong>the</strong> criminals who are punishable with death to <strong>the</strong> United States of America. Death penalty<br />
does not exist in Romania.<br />
I already informed <strong>the</strong> Ministry in Riga that Romania was planning to open an honorary<br />
consulate in our country. Following from this intention and based on my observations that<br />
Duca and Filodor are very poorly informed about <strong>the</strong> situation in Russia – [<strong>the</strong>y rely] almost<br />
solely on Polish sources – I gradually led <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> thoughts about opening a legation in Riga.<br />
I noted that Riga currently was <strong>the</strong> centre where all information from Russia flowed toge<strong>the</strong>r. It<br />
was through Riga that Russia’s communication with Western Europe was taking place. All<br />
foreign envoys to <strong>the</strong> Soviet government went to Moscow and from <strong>the</strong>re [travelled] through<br />
Riga; correspondents of foreign newspapers and large telegraph agencies were permanently<br />
stationed in Riga; some legations kept a large staff of special civil servants [in Riga] to observe<br />
Russia.<br />
Later in a discussion Filodor told me that Minister Duca wanted to open a residing legation<br />
in Riga with <strong>the</strong> budget of <strong>the</strong> year of 1926 and for this purpose had decided to include <strong>the</strong><br />
required amount of money into <strong>the</strong> draft budget. Romania had a legation in Helsingfors but<br />
closed it a couple of years ago. When I met <strong>the</strong> Minister, I did not keep back what Secretary<br />
General Filodor had told me about <strong>the</strong> opening of a legation. Duca confirmed this information<br />
and I reacted to it with an adequate phrase about a good impression and even deeper feelings of<br />
affinity that such a step by <strong>the</strong> Romanian government would cause in Latvia and also in <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States.<br />
Our invitation to send a delegate to <strong>the</strong> joint meeting on <strong>the</strong> disarmament issue left a very<br />
good impression in Bucharest. As soon as Duca was informed about it, he had me invited to <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he announced that Romania would send its delegate <strong>the</strong>re<br />
and asked me to inform my government about it and to find out <strong>the</strong> opening date. Regretfully<br />
my secretariat in Warsaw had given me an incomplete cipher (without an instruction) so I<br />
could not decipher it. Communication had to be made via <strong>the</strong> two legations in Warsaw that<br />
required more time.<br />
The information about <strong>the</strong> planned date of <strong>the</strong> opening of <strong>the</strong> meeting reached <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians too late for <strong>the</strong>m to be able to come in time. Between Bucharest and Warsaw <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are only two direct trains per week; air traffic has not been opened yet ei<strong>the</strong>r. For this reason<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanians came out with <strong>the</strong> request to postpone <strong>the</strong> meeting for a few days. The<br />
1<br />
Theodor Orghidan (1888 – after 1940), Romanian entrepreneur, from 1923 Honorary Consul of Latvia, 1928–1940,<br />
Honorary General Consul in Bucharest.
76 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Romanian delegate is Colonel Cenescu, <strong>the</strong> former aide-de-camp to <strong>the</strong> King who now<br />
commands a regiment in Transylvania. It seems that <strong>the</strong> King has participated in selecting <strong>the</strong><br />
delegate. As much as I could see <strong>the</strong> Poles do not like <strong>the</strong> delegate or at least <strong>the</strong>y would have<br />
preferred to see a different person instead: military representative of Poland in Romania<br />
Dzierżykraj-Morawski 1 visited me and said that such a choice would delay <strong>the</strong> sending of <strong>the</strong><br />
delegate. Cenescu [he told me] was not familiar with <strong>the</strong> Baltic States at all; <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong><br />
General Staff would not have sent him but <strong>the</strong> latter’s opinion had not even been asked and it<br />
had made him horribly angry. The Chief of Staff’s preferred candidate was colonel Dimitrescu<br />
who was well familiar with <strong>the</strong> issues to be discussed. Nothing doing. I remarked that it was<br />
Romanians’ internal matter, in which I, as a person who came here only from time to time, had<br />
no possibility to intervene, not even indirectly. With this we closed <strong>the</strong> issue; it remained so<br />
that Cenescu will go.<br />
During my stay in Bucharest I several times visited our consulate headed by Theodor V.<br />
Orghidan, an agile less than 40 years old short man who belongs to a family of wealthy<br />
merchants in several generations; as far as I know, his spouse comes from a similar family. [He]<br />
has studied in Germany. Not so long ago he was vice-president of <strong>the</strong> Bucharest Chamber of<br />
Commerce and headed <strong>the</strong> Romanian delegation in negotiations in England on consolidation<br />
of private debt that he had run successfully. He is said to maintain trade contacts mostly with<br />
England (wholesale of textiles).<br />
The Consulate is open as of 18 th April, 1924. The Consul is said to have attributed laudable<br />
attention and care to his official duties, for example: he does not issue visas without beforehand<br />
making inquiries in <strong>the</strong> Police, both in <strong>the</strong> general as well as in <strong>the</strong> political one, if <strong>the</strong>re is any<br />
dossier 2 on <strong>the</strong> visa-applicant <strong>the</strong>re. The clerical work is in good order. A few minor<br />
misunderstandings, which had taken place in <strong>the</strong> beginning of his work, were due to <strong>the</strong> lack of<br />
more detailed instructions; now <strong>the</strong>y [<strong>the</strong> flaws] have been rectified. I clarified <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong><br />
extension of <strong>the</strong> consular network in Romania. I also received information that <strong>the</strong> meeting of<br />
business organisations wanted it. In my opinion consulates should be opened in Galați and<br />
Constanța. In both <strong>the</strong>se towns Honorary Consuls should be appointed. Galați with <strong>the</strong><br />
population of 73 000 is <strong>the</strong> largest Romanian port town on <strong>the</strong> Danube, higher upstream than<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r port city Brăila with 67 000 residents [..] Constanța (population 28 000) lies on <strong>the</strong><br />
shore of <strong>the</strong> Black Sea. At first it was meant to serve as an oil port; direct pipes from oil regions<br />
go <strong>the</strong>re. When Galați port is inaccessible in winter, <strong>the</strong> traffic moves to Constanța.<br />
As concerns <strong>the</strong> opening of a consulate in Chișinău, if I may, I would opt against it for <strong>the</strong><br />
time being. My reasons are following: Chișinău is <strong>the</strong> key city in Bessarabia, <strong>the</strong> belonging of<br />
which to Romania, as we all know, is very loudly contested by Soviet Russia. If we opened a<br />
consulate <strong>the</strong>re, already on <strong>the</strong> first days <strong>the</strong> Soviet government would hand us a note of protest<br />
followed by a range of attacks on us in <strong>the</strong> Moscow press. O<strong>the</strong>r countries, too, have not<br />
hurried to open <strong>the</strong>ir consulates in Chișinău. Moreover in Chișinău it is still very difficult to find<br />
a suitable person for <strong>the</strong> consul’s job. Trade <strong>the</strong>re is in <strong>the</strong> hands of Jews and partly also<br />
Russians; both have almost no connections with Romania. About <strong>the</strong> Romanian companies that<br />
had perched <strong>the</strong>re lately in <strong>the</strong> best case nothing good or bad can be said. There are very many<br />
shady elements <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
1<br />
Witold Dzierżykraj-Morawski (1895–1944), Colonel of <strong>the</strong> Army of Poland. 1923–1926 military attaché in Romania<br />
2<br />
Dossier (French) – dossier, in this case meant as compromising information.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 77<br />
Thus consulates should be opened in Galați and Constanța. I have already made inquiries<br />
about suitable persons by contacting <strong>the</strong> relevant business organisations and <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs of Romania.<br />
I had very much prepared myself for returning to Warsaw and had acquired a train ticket<br />
when through <strong>the</strong> Marshal of <strong>the</strong> Court I received an invitation from <strong>the</strong> King to a dinner in <strong>the</strong><br />
palace. I investigated <strong>the</strong> circumstances and came to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that my departure had to<br />
be postponed. Such dinners are hosted for heads of missions and <strong>the</strong>ir spouses once a year. I,<br />
[as a person] who seldom comes to Romania, felt especially uneasy about leaving after having<br />
already received <strong>the</strong> invitation; <strong>the</strong>y in Romania would not understand or would<br />
misunderstand it. The King did not attend <strong>the</strong> dinner; he had been taken ill. The Queen and<br />
princess héritière 1 were presiding [at <strong>the</strong> dinner], <strong>the</strong> crown prince himself sitting to <strong>the</strong> right of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Queen. After <strong>the</strong> dinner <strong>the</strong>re was a rout [reception] with a concert. The entire court and its<br />
structure is ra<strong>the</strong>r democratic, however <strong>the</strong> distance in <strong>the</strong> personal <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong><br />
members of <strong>the</strong> ruling house and <strong>the</strong> citizens is much larger than between <strong>the</strong> President and<br />
citizens in a republic.<br />
Before departure I paid a farewell visit to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs to thank him for <strong>the</strong><br />
kind co-operation from <strong>the</strong> part of Romania’s authorities and for <strong>the</strong> affinity demonstrated<br />
towards Latvia. The Minister emphasised once again and strongly so that <strong>the</strong> affinity was<br />
genuine ra<strong>the</strong>r than conventional because Romania, although older than Latvia, still vividly<br />
remembered how precious freedom was to those who had strived for it and finally acquired it;<br />
[he] remarked that it was with true joy that Romania was following <strong>the</strong> development of Latvia<br />
and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> energetic work of <strong>the</strong> people; [he] asked me to inform my<br />
government and to underline particularly to it that Romania wished to work in ever closer cooperation<br />
with Latvia. With this we parted.<br />
[..] Due to <strong>the</strong> extension of its territory from around 140 000 sq. kilometres to 295 000 [sq.]<br />
kilometres Romania is forced to extend <strong>the</strong> horizon of its political activities as well. Earlier <strong>the</strong><br />
Carpathian Mountains separated Romania from Central Europe, now it [Romania] regards itself<br />
as part of it [Central Europe]. Thus, in spite of its controversies with a few heirs of former<br />
Austro-Hungary, Romania shares many interests with <strong>the</strong>m. Romania cannot observe<br />
indifferently <strong>the</strong> German–English–French negotiations on a security treaty in <strong>the</strong> West 2 . Its<br />
[Romania’s] politicians remark not without a reason that, while in Western Europe <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
controversies about some border issues, to <strong>the</strong> east of <strong>the</strong> Rhine <strong>the</strong>re is almost no secure<br />
border left although <strong>the</strong>y had been recognised in a treaty. Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria protest<br />
against Romania’s borders on every opportune occasion. In order to safeguard <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
borders, Romania has concluded two societies [unions]: with Poland and with <strong>the</strong> Little<br />
Entente; it takes into consideration Clause 10 of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations’ Pact. 3 Now however<br />
nothing much is left of Clause 10 [..] On principle Romania does not raise objections against<br />
reconciliation among separate groups of countries. It believes that <strong>the</strong> English–German project<br />
has some positive values. This proposal is a serious attempt to organise Europe, starting from<br />
<strong>the</strong> West where <strong>the</strong>y want to introduce order, security and authority, which would <strong>the</strong>n spread<br />
1<br />
Héritière (French) – heiress.<br />
2<br />
The author means <strong>the</strong>-so-called Locarno talks, as a result of which treaties that guaranteed <strong>the</strong> Western border<br />
of Germany were concluded.<br />
3<br />
Clause 10 of <strong>the</strong> Statutes of <strong>the</strong> League of <strong>the</strong> Nations obliged <strong>the</strong> member states to defend <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
integrity and political independence of any member state of <strong>the</strong> League against external threats.
78 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r from this centre all over Europe. Views are being voiced in Romania that through such a<br />
pact Germany would be tied closer toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> West European democracies that would<br />
largely curb <strong>the</strong> former’s disposition to revenge and its aspirations to come to understanding<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia towards this purpose. Besides, Romania wants to see England through<br />
this step binding itself with <strong>the</strong> European continent and assuming also liability for <strong>the</strong> political<br />
and economic organization of this continent. Then from <strong>the</strong> Rhine <strong>the</strong> organisation of peace<br />
<strong>relations</strong> should gradually develop eastwards. But will it indeed happen, this is what everybody<br />
is asking in Romania. In <strong>the</strong> answers doubt can be discerned. The political opinion leans<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> belief that <strong>the</strong> pact of <strong>the</strong> five countries guarantees only <strong>the</strong> inviolability of <strong>the</strong><br />
western borders, if in principle, directly or indirectly, it [<strong>the</strong> pact] allows <strong>the</strong> possibility of <strong>the</strong><br />
revision of borders in <strong>the</strong> East, it will thus allow bringing forward all kinds of claims, will incite<br />
all kinds of aspirations and will rouse everyone who is dissatisfied with treaties concluded after<br />
<strong>the</strong> Great War [..]<br />
It must be admitted that Romania with great tenacity tries to organize and unite <strong>the</strong> Balkan<br />
states in a certain community of interests. The first attempts were mostly of a dynastic nature:<br />
in this way Romania communicated with Greece and Yugoslavia; it expected from it <strong>the</strong><br />
improving of <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong>se countries. They say that after <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> dynasty in<br />
Greece <strong>the</strong> plan has not been altoge<strong>the</strong>r dropped yet [..]<br />
The centre of gravity of Romania’s <strong>relations</strong> with Soviet Russia lies on <strong>the</strong> issue of<br />
Bessarabia, <strong>the</strong> resolution of which has not moved forward at all. The Republic of Moldavia,<br />
established by Moscow on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side of <strong>the</strong> Dniester, also causes concern for <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians. Although this republic is said to have less than 300 000 – 400 000 inhabitants, it<br />
has importance as a centre of propaganda. There Moscow opens schools with <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
language of instruction, organises courses in home economics, establishes agricultural schools<br />
for farmers and vocational schools for workers: it gives everything that Romania is unable to<br />
give on such a scale on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side of <strong>the</strong> Dniester. Romanians have great concern that with<br />
<strong>the</strong> foundation of such a republic of Moldavia <strong>the</strong> Comintern 1 could launch even more intensive<br />
propaganda in Bessarabia; incidents might spring up from it, from incidents a conflict may<br />
grow; <strong>the</strong> Red Army might take positions along <strong>the</strong> border in even greater numbers. Romania is<br />
very much afraid of an armed conflict; <strong>the</strong> Soviet government knows it very well and for this<br />
reason it ventures to do whatever it pleases. By acting this way it reaches two goals apart from<br />
<strong>the</strong> direct issue of Bessarabia: firstly, it supports <strong>the</strong> Communist movement in Romania and <strong>the</strong><br />
Balkans [in general]; secondly, it makes it more difficult for Romania to receive ano<strong>the</strong>r loan [..]<br />
Of <strong>the</strong> great powers France is still <strong>the</strong> most influential in Romania. A certain role here is<br />
played by memories of <strong>the</strong> assistance received during <strong>the</strong> war when French General Ber<strong>the</strong>lot 2<br />
became especially popular; partly it is due to <strong>the</strong> deep influence of <strong>the</strong> French culture on <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian intellectuals. It seems to me that French books are much better read in Romania<br />
than <strong>the</strong> Romanian ones. Each newspaper vendor offers a ra<strong>the</strong>r rich choice of Paris<br />
newspapers. Romanians often communicate with each o<strong>the</strong>r in French, I would say same as we<br />
at home in Latvia – in German. Many Romanian statesmen and lawyers have studied in France.<br />
All this create natural ties that help <strong>the</strong> French influence to take root in Romania [..]<br />
1<br />
Comintern – abbreviation for <strong>the</strong> Communist International.<br />
2<br />
Henri Ber<strong>the</strong>lot (1861–1931), General of <strong>the</strong> Army of France. 1916–1919 head of <strong>the</strong> Military mission of France in<br />
Romania.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 79<br />
I went several times to <strong>the</strong> Parliament – to <strong>the</strong> Lower House, in order to get a general<br />
impression of its style of work. The Lower House sits in a building specially built for it with a<br />
meeting room in <strong>the</strong> style of an amphi<strong>the</strong>atre. What is striking is that <strong>the</strong>re are especially many<br />
rooms for <strong>the</strong> public, making a circle in three rows around <strong>the</strong> meeting room. There were few<br />
members of parliament <strong>the</strong>re; <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong>m are city dwellers – intellectuals; it was only<br />
rarely that I saw real farmers. The internal discipline is of a sou<strong>the</strong>rn style [..]<br />
From my discussions with members of parliament and politicians I got an impression that in<br />
Romania in general <strong>the</strong> physiognomy of parties is uncertain and <strong>the</strong>ir programmes have not<br />
been elaborated in detail. I would like to ascribe it <strong>the</strong> low educational level and political<br />
underdevelopment of <strong>the</strong> mass of electorate. When I started to make inquiries about this issue,<br />
an answer came from <strong>the</strong> Romanian side that a large step forward had been made in terms of<br />
parliamentarianism. Previously <strong>the</strong> opposition’s struggle with <strong>the</strong> position had taken place in a<br />
less parliamentary form [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 398, s. 35–70; f. 2575, d. 15, file 18, s. 197–213.<br />
21. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Riga Alexandru Iacovaky 1 nr. 2<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României I.G. Duca, 2 martie 1925<br />
A se aduce la cunoștința Regelui Ferdinand I și Președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri I.I.C.<br />
Brătianu 2<br />
Părerile Domnului Meierovics asupra chestiunilor de politică externă care interesează<br />
Letonia și România<br />
Știrea pe care am avut onoarea a o comunica Excelenței Voastre prin telegrama mea cifrată<br />
nr. 1 din 28 februarie anul curent mi-a fost adusă de Directorul Presei din Ministerul Afacerilor<br />
Străine, din partea Domnului Pusta 3 , în momentul plecării mele din Reval, unde am avut<br />
plăcerea de a fi întovărășit la gară de câteva persoane între care: subsecretarul de stat de la<br />
Ministerul Afacerilor Străine, Domnul Tofer 4 , și de toți directorii de servicii din acel minister.<br />
Știrea cum că Comitetul executiv al partidului comunist ar fi hotărât, sub îndemnul lui Frunză 5<br />
și al lui Zinoviev 6 , să decidă prin război soarta Basarabiei, reîncorporând-o la Rusia, cu<br />
precizarea că operațiunile militare de care depinde soarta acestei provincii se vor desfășura între<br />
lunile mai și august anul curent, mi s-a părut destul de importantă pentru a o controla prin<br />
mijloacele de care pot dispune aci. Ziariștii pe care i-am întâlnit mi-au spus lămurit că credința<br />
1<br />
Alexandru N. Iacovaky (1876-1949) a fost un diplomat român care s-a alăturat Ministerului Afacerilor Străine la<br />
începutul sec. al XX-lea și a lucrat în subordinea lui Alexandru Florescu căruia i-a succedat în calitate de ministru<br />
al României la Varșovia (1925-1927).<br />
2<br />
Ion I.C. Brătianu (1864-1927) a reprezentat personalitatea cea mai impozantă a Partidului Național Liberal din<br />
primul sfert al secolului al XX-lea. Președinte al acestui partid (1909-1927), a fost Președinte al Consiliului de<br />
Miniștri în mai multe rânduri (1914-1916, 1918-1919, 1922-1926, 1927). A jucat rolul determinant în intrarea României<br />
în Primul Război Mondial, realizarea Marii Uniri de la 1918 și reformele agrară și electorală elaborate după război.<br />
3<br />
Kaarel Robert Pusta (1883-1964) a fost un politician și diplomat estonian, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1920,<br />
1924-1925), ministru plenipotențiar în Franța, Polonia și România.<br />
4<br />
Karl Tofer (1885-1942) a fost un diplomat estonian, Ministru al Estoniei în Italia și Ungaria (cu sediul la Roma) –<br />
1927-1931, Polonia, Cehoslovacia și România (cu sediul la Varșovia) – 1930-1932, Uniunea Sovietică (1933-1936) și<br />
Germania (1936-1939). A murit într-un lagăr din Rusia.<br />
5<br />
Mihail Vasilievici Frunze (1885-1925), ortografiat și – sau Frunză, tatăl său fiind de origine română. A fost un<br />
politician comunist rus, lider al forțelor militare roșii care și-au înfrânt adversarii în timpul Războiului Civil.<br />
Președinte al Consiliului Militar Revoluționar.<br />
6<br />
Grigori Zinoviev (1883-1936) a fost un conducător politic comunist rus, membru al Politburo, lider al<br />
Kominternului și membru al troicăi care a preluat puterea în Uniunea Sovietică după moartea lui Lenin.
80 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
lor este că Rusia ne va ataca mai curând sau mai târziu, pentru a ne relua Basarabia. Verificând<br />
aceeași știre prin mijlocirea organelor Ministerului de Externe, am avut impresia unui pericol<br />
mai puțin iminent.<br />
Domnul Meierovics, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine, căruia am avut onoarea a-i remite, în<br />
dimineața zilei de 28 februarie, copia scrisorilor de rechemare a Domnului Alexandru Florescu,<br />
copia propriilor mele scrisori de acreditare, precum și a discursului ce voi rosti în ziua de joi, 6<br />
martie, cu ocazia remiterii acelor scrisori Președintelui Republicii în audiență solemnă, mi-a<br />
spus că deocamdată nu vede niciun indiciu care să-l îndemne a crede la o asemenea<br />
eventualitate. Domnia sa a adăugat că, din informațiile pe care le-a primit de la reprezentantul<br />
său din Moscova, rezultă că în momentul de față politica Rusiei tinde la o apropiere de Franța,<br />
că în decursul acestor zile au avut loc la Moscova importante conferințe între ambasadorul<br />
Franței și dirigenții politicii sovietice, între care și Krasin 1 , care vor avea ca rezultat probabil o<br />
încercare de apropiere, mai ales economică, cu Franța. Domnul Meierovics nu cunoștea<br />
obiectul prim al acestor conferințe, dar mi-a spus că faptul în sine i-ar fi fost confirmat de<br />
Ministrul Germaniei, domnul Köster 2 , personaj asupra a cărui importanță domnul Meierovics a<br />
insistat, care i-ar fi spus că balanța politicii Rusiei se apleacă acum spre Franța, după cum<br />
oscilase odinioară spre Germania, sau spre Anglia, știut fiind că Rusia găsește întotdeauna<br />
argumente pentru a deștepta speranțele Guvernelor care cred că cu dânsa s-ar putea întemeia<br />
ceva durabil, după cum o crezuse și Ra<strong>the</strong>nau 3 , în momentul când semnase cu Rusia convenția<br />
de la Rapallo 4 . Din aceste încercări de apropiere economică cu Franța, fapt care mi-a fost<br />
confirmat de altfel și la Legația Franței, cu singura deosebire că domnul Barret, reprezentantul<br />
Franței, crede că Rusia încearcă să înșele pe toată lumea, primind totul și nedând nimic în<br />
schimb, Domnul Meierovics trage însă concluzia că politica sovietelor față de statele mărginașe<br />
Rusiei va avea în viitor un caracter mai puțin agresiv și aceasta din cauză că Franța va cere<br />
Rusiei să renunțe la politica ei de azi față de aceste state și că, prin urmare, evenimentele care se<br />
desfășoară la Moscova trebuie să ne bucure.<br />
Am avut grijă să insist pe lângă Secretarul General al Ministerului, rugându-l să controleze<br />
știrea ce aveam despre politica războinică pe care Rusia ar avea intenția să o desfășoare față de<br />
noi, și Domnia sa mi-a promis că o va face, adăugând că în ce privește Basarabia de câtva timp<br />
încoace nu mai aflase nimic de la informatorii săi, și a adăugat că până acum știrile acestea<br />
fuseseră confirmate de realitatea faptelor.<br />
Examinând interesele permanente care leagă Letonia de România, Domnul Meierovics a<br />
constat că aceste interese sunt în perfectă concordanță și mi-a mulțumit pentru expresia<br />
simpatiei sincere pe care i-o exprimasem din partea Guvernului Regal, și a adăugat că apreciază<br />
cu atât mai mult declarațiile mele cu cât Domnia sa era de părere că numai atunci când Rusia va<br />
ajunge la convingerea că în ziua când va ataca unul din statele ce alcătuiesc cordonul de apărare<br />
1<br />
Leonid Borisovici Krasin (1870-1926) a fost un membru al Comitetului Central al P.C.U.S. și diplomat sovietic.<br />
2<br />
Adolf Köster (1883-1930) a fost un politician social-democrat, Ministru de Externe (1920) și ulterior Ministru de<br />
Interne al Republicii de la Weimar (1921-1922). A fost Ministru al Germaniei în Letonia (1923-1928) și Iugoslavia<br />
(1928-1930).<br />
3<br />
Wal<strong>the</strong>r Ra<strong>the</strong>nau (1867-1922) a fost un politician german membru al Partidului Democrat German. În calitate de<br />
Ministru de Externe al Germaniei a semnat Tratatul de la Rapallo cu Rusia Sovietică (1922) prin care încerca să<br />
scoată Germania din izolarea internațională. A murit ucis de naționaliștii extremiști germani.<br />
4<br />
Tratatul de la Rapallo (16 aprilie 1922) a fost un tratat complex ce a vizat reluarea legăturilor <strong>diplomatic</strong>e dintre<br />
Germania și Rusia Sovietică, renunțarea la pretențiile financiare una față de celalaltă, precum și colaborarea în<br />
spirit de bună înțelegere între acestea.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 81<br />
antibolșevic războiul se va întinde pe tot frontul, atunci numai am putea spera la ceva liniște,<br />
știut fiind că forța este singurul argument de care Rusia ține seamă și că în situația prezentă nu<br />
vom putea în adevăr fi tari, decât numai dacă vom fi uniți.<br />
În această ordine de idei domnul Meierovics a emis părerea că participarea unui expert<br />
militar român la conferința pentru limitarea armamentelor care se va întruni la Riga la 24<br />
martie anul curent ar fi o măsură bine chibzuită. Domnia sa, ca și contele Skrzyński 1 , crede că<br />
participarea unui delegat al României la aceste dezbateri – care vor avea un caracter cu totul<br />
secret – ar fi utilă intereselor noastre comune; că departe de a conchide la putința micșorării<br />
armamentelor noastre, conferința experților militari va conchide din contră, după examinarea<br />
forțelor de care dispunem față de cele mereu crescânde ale Rusiei, care tinde la înarmarea<br />
întregii națiuni, că este nevoie să sporim armamentele noastre. Văzând dorința pe care<br />
Ministrul de Externe al Letoniei o avea de a cunoaște părerea Guvernului nostru în această<br />
privință, l-am sfătuit a se folosi de prezența actuală a domnului Nukša la București pentru a ști<br />
dacă Guvernul nostru este dispus a trimite un delegat la acea Conferință, pe care domnul<br />
Meierovics l-ar fi văzut în persoana însuși a șefului Marelui nostru Stat Major.<br />
În dorința de a stabili relații cât mai intime pentru apărarea noastră contra propagandei<br />
comuniste, pe care Domnul Meierovics mi-a spus că Letonia o combate prin mijloace cât se<br />
poate de energice, Ministrul de Externe m-a rugat să întreb pe Excelența Voastră dacă o<br />
asemenea colaborare nu ar fi potrivită, știut fiind că Letonia ar pune la dispoziția noastră toate<br />
informațiile de care dispune. Încheind această parte a conversației noastre, Ministrul de Externe<br />
al Letoniei a exprimat dorința de a stabili cu Polonia legături politice cât mai intime; această<br />
țară fiind astăzi legată de noi printr-o convenție militară, în modul acesta Republicile baltice<br />
sunt legate și de România și s-ar putea stabili astfel un front unic de la Marea Neagră până la<br />
Baltică. Realizarea acestui stăvilar menit să apere statele direct interesate ar asigura și Europei<br />
apusene un sprijin pe care din nenorocire aceasta din urmă nu-l apreciază îndestul. Domnul<br />
Meierovics a găsit astfel prilej de a se plânge de politica afară din cale de mercantilă a statelor<br />
Europei Occidentale care consimt chiar să înarmeze sovietele numai pentru a desface produsele<br />
propriei lor industrii.<br />
În ceea ce privește flota rusă de la Baltica, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Letoniei a luat act<br />
cu mulțumire de declarația făcută de Domnul Herriot 2 în fața comisiei afacerilor străine a<br />
Senatului francez, conform căreia flota Wrangel va servi Franței ca garanție până când Rusia va<br />
da soluții satisfăcătoare cererilor pe care ea se crede în drept a le ridica contra fostei ei aliate.<br />
Această amânare „sine die” a liniștit deocamdată pe domnul Meierovics, care a adăugat că<br />
predarea flotei Wrangel nu s-ar putea face fără pericol decât numai în Marea Albă sau la<br />
Vladivostok. Aici, ca și la Reval și la Stockholm, apariția flotei de la Bizerte în Marea Baltică era<br />
considerată ca o catastrofă, cu toate că în trecerea sa prin Riga Domnul Herbette 3 o calificase de<br />
„pușcoci de ciocolată”, apreciere la care domnul Meierovics a răspuns că în acest caz ar fi fost<br />
mult mai logic ca Franța să păstreze la dânsa această indezirabilă jucărie.<br />
1<br />
Aleksander Józef Skrzyński (1882-1931) a fost Ministru al Poloniei în România (1919-1923), Prim-Ministru al țării<br />
sale (1925-1926) și Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1922-1923, 1924-1926).<br />
2<br />
Édouard Marie Herriot (1872-1957) a fost politician radical fracez, Președinte al Consiliului de Ministru al Franței<br />
(1924-1925, 1926, 1932), Președinte al Camerei Deputaților (1925-1926, 1936-1940) și Președinte al Adunării<br />
Naționale a Franței (1947-1954), cunoscut pentru simpatiile sale pentru Uniunea Sovietică.<br />
3<br />
Jean Herbette (1878-1960) era Ministrul Franței în Uniunea Sovietică (1924-1931).
82 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Încheind convorbirea sa, Domnul Meierovics m-a însărcinat să fiu pe lângă Excelența<br />
Voastră interpretul mulțumirilor sale sincere pentru simpatia și interesul pe care țara noastră îl<br />
arată Letoniei, care apreciază cu atât mai mult atitudinea noastră, cu cât ea rezultă din însăși<br />
firea lucrurilor și nu poate avea decât rezultatele cele mai favorabile pentru apărarea intereselor<br />
ambelor noastre țări.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 44-47.<br />
21. Diplomatic Report no. 2 of Alexandru Iacovaky 1 , Minister of Romania in Riga, to<br />
I.G. Duca, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Romania, 2 nd March 1925<br />
To be notified to King Ferdinand I and to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers I.I.C.<br />
Brătianu 2<br />
The opinions of Mr. Meierovics on foreign policy matters of interest for Latvia and<br />
Romania.<br />
The news that I had <strong>the</strong> honour to communicate to Your Excellency in my telegram no.<br />
1 dated February 28 th current year was brought to me by <strong>the</strong> Press Director of <strong>the</strong> Ministry<br />
of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pusta 3 , on my departure from Reval, where I had <strong>the</strong> pleasure to be<br />
accompanied to <strong>the</strong> railway station by a few persons among whom: Mr. Tofer 4 , <strong>the</strong><br />
Undersecretary of State of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by all services directors of<br />
that ministry. The news according to which <strong>the</strong> Executive Committee of <strong>the</strong> Communist<br />
Party, prompted by Frunză 5 and Zinoviev 6 , had decided to resolve <strong>the</strong> fate of Bessarabia by<br />
war, with <strong>the</strong> purpose of reattaching it to Russia, mentioning that military operations on<br />
which <strong>the</strong> fate of this province depends were to be carried out between May - August<br />
current year, seemed to be important enough to be controlled by those means that are<br />
available to me here. The journalists whom I met told me loud and clear that <strong>the</strong>y believed<br />
that sooner or later Russia would attack us as <strong>the</strong>y want to retake Bessarabia. When<br />
checking <strong>the</strong> same piece of news using <strong>the</strong> bodies of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I had<br />
<strong>the</strong> sense of a less imminent danger.<br />
Mr. Meierovics, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom I had <strong>the</strong> honour to relegate<br />
<strong>the</strong> copy of <strong>the</strong> recall letter of Mr. Alexandru Florescu, <strong>the</strong> copy of my own letters of<br />
accreditation, as well as <strong>the</strong> copy of <strong>the</strong> speech that I will deliver on Thursday, March 6 th ,<br />
1<br />
Alexandru N. Iacovaky (1876-1949) was a Romanian diplomat who joined <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry early in <strong>the</strong><br />
Twentieth Century and worked under <strong>the</strong> authority of Alexandru Florescu whom he succeeded as Minister of<br />
Romania in Warsaw (1925-1927).<br />
2<br />
Ion I.C. Bratianu (1864-1927) was a towering personality of <strong>the</strong> Liberal National Party in <strong>the</strong> first quarter of <strong>the</strong><br />
twentieth century. Chairman of <strong>the</strong> party (1909-1927), President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers on several occasions<br />
(1914-1916, 1918-1919, 1922-1926, 1927). He played <strong>the</strong> decisive role in Romania's entry into World War I, <strong>the</strong> Great<br />
Union of 1918 and agrarian and electoral reforms enacted after <strong>the</strong> war.<br />
3<br />
Kaarel Robert Pusta (1883-1964) was an Estonian politician and diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1920, 1924-<br />
1925), Minister of Estonia in France and eventually in Poland and Romania.<br />
4<br />
Karl Tofer (1885-1942) was an Estonian diplomat, Minister of Estonia in Italy and Hungary (based in Rome) –<br />
1927-1931, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania (based in Warsaw) – 1930-1932, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union (1933-1936) and<br />
Germany (1936-1939). He died in a camp in Russia.<br />
5<br />
Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze (1885-1925), also spelled Frunză – because of his fa<strong>the</strong>r of Romanian origin. He was a<br />
Russian Communist politician, military leader who defeated Red Army opponents during <strong>the</strong> Civil War. Chairman<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Revolutionary Military Council.<br />
6<br />
Grigory Zinoviev (1883-1936) was a Russian communist political leader, member of <strong>the</strong> Politburo, <strong>the</strong> leader of<br />
Comintern and member of <strong>the</strong> troika that took power in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union following Lenin's death.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 83<br />
with <strong>the</strong> occasion of presenting of those letters to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic in solemn<br />
hearing, told me during <strong>the</strong> morning of February 28 th that, for now, he did not see any<br />
indication leading him to believe in such possibility. He added that information that he<br />
had received from his representative in Moscow showed that, currently, <strong>the</strong> Russian policy<br />
tends towards an approach to France, and that <strong>the</strong>se days important conferences are held<br />
in Moscow between <strong>the</strong> French ambassador and <strong>the</strong> leaders of Soviet policy, Krasin 1 among<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs, conferences that might result in a rapprochement to France, especially of<br />
economical nature. Mr. Meierovics had no information on <strong>the</strong> main <strong>the</strong>me of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
conferences, but he told me that aforementioned fact was confirmed by Mr. Köster 2 , <strong>the</strong><br />
German Minister, a character thought by Mr. Meierovics to be of importance, who had told him<br />
that <strong>the</strong> balance of Russia’s policy is now leaning towards France, as it once did towards<br />
Germany or England, Russia being known to always find arguments to raise <strong>the</strong> hopes of<br />
Governments that think <strong>the</strong>y could build lasting <strong>relations</strong> with it, as Ra<strong>the</strong>nau 3 also used to<br />
think, when he signed <strong>the</strong> Rapallo convention 4 with Russia. Based on <strong>the</strong>se economical<br />
rapprochement attempts to France, which were also confirmed by <strong>the</strong> French Legation with <strong>the</strong><br />
only difference that Mr. Barret, <strong>the</strong> French representative, considers Russia to be misleading<br />
while getting what it wants and giving nothing in exchange, Mr. Meierovics concludes that in<br />
<strong>the</strong> future <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> Soviets will be less aggressive as France shall ask Russia to give up its<br />
current policy towards its neighbouring states and <strong>the</strong>refore events currently under way in<br />
Moscow should please us.<br />
I insisted on <strong>the</strong> General Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Ministry asking him to control <strong>the</strong> news which<br />
I received on <strong>the</strong> war policy that Russia intends to pursue towards us, and His Excellency<br />
promised me to act consequently, adding that with regard to Bessarabia his informers had<br />
not been telling him anything for some time, and he added that until now this news was<br />
confirmed by actual facts.<br />
Assessing <strong>the</strong> permanent interests that connect Latvia and Romania, Mr. Meierovics<br />
remarked that <strong>the</strong>y were in perfect harmony and thanked me for conveying to him <strong>the</strong><br />
sincere sympathy of <strong>the</strong> Royal Government, adding that he was fond of my declarations<br />
even more as His Excellency thought that only when Russia would come to believe that <strong>the</strong><br />
day when it attacked one of <strong>the</strong> states in <strong>the</strong> anti-Bolshevik defence belt <strong>the</strong> war would<br />
extend on <strong>the</strong> entire front, only <strong>the</strong>n we can hope to find peace, knowing that force is <strong>the</strong><br />
only argument that Russia has in mind and also that presently we are not strong enough<br />
unless we are united.<br />
In this context, Mr. Meierovics issued <strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong> participation of a Romanian<br />
military expert to a conference of weapons restriction which is to be held in Riga on March<br />
24 th current year, would be a well inspired measure. His Excellency, toge<strong>the</strong>r with count<br />
1<br />
Leonid Borisovich Krasin (1870-1926) was a member of <strong>the</strong> Central Committee of <strong>the</strong> CPSU and Soviet diplomat.<br />
2<br />
Adolf Köster (1883-1930) was a Social-Democrat politician, Foreign Minister (1920) and later Minister of <strong>the</strong><br />
Interior of <strong>the</strong> Weimar Republic (1921-1922). He was <strong>the</strong> Minister of Germany in Latvia (1923-1928) and Yugoslavia<br />
(1928-1930).<br />
3<br />
Wal<strong>the</strong>r Ra<strong>the</strong>nau (1867-1922) was a German politician, member of <strong>the</strong> German Democratic Party. As Foreign<br />
Minister of Germany he signed <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia (1922) trying to pull Germany out of<br />
international isolation. He was murdered by German extremist nationalists.<br />
4<br />
The Treaty of Rapallo (April 16th, 1922) was a complex treaty aimed at resuming <strong>diplomatic</strong> ties between<br />
Germany and Soviet Russia, renouncing at financial claims against each o<strong>the</strong>r and working in a spirit of mutual<br />
understanding between <strong>the</strong>m.
84 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Skrzyński 1 , think that <strong>the</strong> attendance of a Romanian delegate to in <strong>the</strong>se debates – which<br />
will have a completely confidential character – could be necessary for our common<br />
interests; that, far from deciding on possibility to cut down our weaponry, <strong>the</strong> conference<br />
of military experts will, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, conclude, after examination of our current forces<br />
against <strong>the</strong> increasing strength of Russia, which tends to arm <strong>the</strong> whole nation, that we<br />
need to supplement our weapons. Considering <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs’<br />
desire to be informed on our Government’s opinion, I advised him to make use of <strong>the</strong><br />
presence of Mister Nukša in Bucharest in order to find out whe<strong>the</strong>r our Government is<br />
willing to send to that Conference a delegate, whom Mr. Meierovics had considered in <strong>the</strong><br />
person of <strong>the</strong> Chief of our General Staff.<br />
Based on <strong>the</strong> desire to establish <strong>the</strong> most intimate possible <strong>relations</strong> for our defence<br />
against communist propaganda, on which Mr. Meierovics told me that Latvia was fighting<br />
against using very energetic methods, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs charged me with<br />
asking Your Excellency if such collaboration would not be appropriate, knowing that Latvia<br />
would provide us with all information it possesses. Ending this part of our conversation,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his will to establish more intimate<br />
political connections with Poland; as this country is nowadays linked to us by a military<br />
convention, <strong>the</strong>refore Baltic Republics are also bounded to Romania and <strong>the</strong>refore a<br />
common front from <strong>the</strong> Black Sea to <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea could be established. The development<br />
of such barrier destined to protect interested states would also support Western Europe,<br />
which unfortunately fails to provide <strong>the</strong> appreciation such support deserves. Mr.<br />
Meierovics found <strong>the</strong> opportunity to complain on <strong>the</strong> trading activities of Western<br />
European states that have even agreed to arm <strong>the</strong> Soviets in order to sell <strong>the</strong> products of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own industry.<br />
In what <strong>the</strong> Russian fleet in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea is concerned, <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs gladly noticed <strong>the</strong> declaration made by Mr. Herriot 2 before <strong>the</strong> French Senate’s<br />
Committee of Foreign Affairs , based on which <strong>the</strong> Wrangel fleet will serve France as a warranty<br />
until Russia gives course to <strong>the</strong> request that it thinks itself entitled to take against its former<br />
ally. This sine die delay has calmed Mr. Meierovics down for now, who added that surrender of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Wrangel fleet could not be done without any danger, unless carried out in <strong>the</strong> White Sea or<br />
Vladivostok. Here, just like in Reval and Stockholm, <strong>the</strong> apparition of Bizerte fleet into <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic Sea was considered to be a catastrophe, although when he passed through Riga Mr.<br />
Herbette 3 qualified it as a “big chocolate gun”, appreciation to which Mr. Meierovics responded<br />
that in this case it would have been logical for France to keep this undesirable toy.<br />
Closing his conversation, Mr. Meierovics instructed me to be, near Your Excellency, <strong>the</strong><br />
conveyor of his sincere thanks for <strong>the</strong> sympathy and interest that our country shows to Latvia,<br />
that he appreciates our position even more as it comes naturally and it can only reveal<br />
favourable results when defending <strong>the</strong> interest of both countries.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 44-47.<br />
1<br />
Aleksander Józef Skrzyński (1882-1931) was Minister of Poland in Romania (1919-1923), Prime Minister of his<br />
country (1925-1926) and Foreign Minister (1922-1923, 1924-1926).<br />
2<br />
Édouard Marie Herriot (1872-1957) was a French Radical politician, President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Minister of France<br />
(1924-1925, 1926, 1932), President of <strong>the</strong> Chamber of Deputies (1925-1926, 1936-1940) and Chairman of <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Assembly of France (1947-1954), known for his sympathies for <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union<br />
3<br />
Jean Herbette (1878-1960), journalist and diplomat, was Minister of France in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union (1924-1931).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 85<br />
22. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Riga Alexandru Iacovaky nr. 3<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României I.G. Duca, 3 martie 1925<br />
Am onoarea a trimite Excelenței Voastre, alăturat, traducerea în română a interviului pe<br />
care l-am dat aici ziarului Rīgas Ziņas, al cărui redactor politic mi-a fost recomandat de<br />
Directorul Protocolului din Ministerul Afacerilor Străine.<br />
Ziarul Rīgas Ziņas, destul de răspândit în Riga, este un ziar de informație în felul ziarului Le<br />
Matin.<br />
Declarațiile pe care am crezut că este locul a le face au fost apreciate de Ministerul Afacerilor<br />
Străine, fiind considerate ca mărturia concretă a cordialității relațiilor româno-letone, pe care<br />
guvernul din Riga dorește să o aducă cât mai des la cunoștința vecinilor noștri de la est.<br />
Traducerea română a interviului dat de Ministrul României în Letonia ziarului independent<br />
Rīgas Ziņas:<br />
Un stat prieten în sudul Europei<br />
- O întrevedere cu ministrul României –<br />
Ministrul României de curând sosit aici, Domnul Iacovaky, a avut o convorbire cu unul<br />
dintre colaboratorii noștri în cursul căreia i-a spus:<br />
„Instrucțiunile mele tind la crearea unor relații de prietenie sinceră și cordială între România<br />
și poporul leton și guvernul său. La baza simpatiilor noastre se găsesc interesele comune care<br />
unesc România de Estonia și Letonia. România vede în colaborarea ei cu aceste două popoare o<br />
garanție a păcii dorită de toate națiunile Europei. România resimte nu numai o simpatie adâncă<br />
pentru Letonia, dar chiar un simțământ de respect, deoarece poporul leton vrea să trăiască liber<br />
și este hotărât, la nevoie, să își apere libertatea cu prețul sângelui său. Am fost martorul marilor<br />
manifestații de simpatie estono-letonă care s-au desfășurat la Reval 1 . Aceste manifestații sunt,<br />
după părerea mea, cea mai bună garanție nu numai pentru menținerea păcii, dar chiar și pentru<br />
libera dezvoltare a acestor două tinere țări.<br />
România dorește să apere alături de Dvs. civilizația și ordinea și de a face față alături de Dvs.<br />
la orice pericol care v-ar amenința. România nu are în politica ei alt scop, în Țările Baltice, decât<br />
o colaborare amicală la menținerea păcii pe care o dorește.”<br />
Este cunoscută Letonia în România?<br />
„Statele baltice sunt puțin cunoscute în România deoarece știrile despre Țările Baltice ne<br />
veneau înainte de război prin mijlocirea Rusiei. Acum suntem la curent în România cu situația<br />
Dvs. atât din punct de vedere geographic, cât și etnic; cunoaștem vechea Dvs. civilizație, marile<br />
progrese pe care le-ați realizat ne sunt de asemenea cunoscute și sperăm că în curând vom<br />
putea să înțelegem mai bine viața Dvs. politică și intelectuală. Din partea mea voi face tot ce-mi<br />
stă în putință pentru a apropia Letonia de România și sper că ne vom putea înțelege cu ușurință<br />
și în privința dezvoltării relațiilor noastre comerciale.”<br />
Care sunt mărfurile pe care România le poate exporta?<br />
„În genere vorbind: petrolul, grâul, lemnul, lâna, sarea și pieile brute. Mărfurile noastre pot fi<br />
exportate către Țările Baltice prin Polonia, ca țară de tranzit, sau pe mare.”<br />
Care vă sunt relațiile cu Rusia și cum stă azi chestiunea Basarabiei?<br />
1<br />
Denumirea germană, suedeză și daneză a capitalei Estoniei, Tallinn.
86 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
„Situația în Basarabia este cu totul liniștită. Reformele economice și sociale săvârșite de<br />
guvernul român au dovedit fraților noștri din Basarabia că vrem să întemeiem viitorul țării<br />
noastre nu pe fraze goale, dar pe reforme politice, economice și sociale matur cugetate.”<br />
Care sunt principiile politicii românești?<br />
„Înțelegându-și bine datoria, guvernul român dorește să întrețină relații corecte și normale<br />
cu toți vecinii săi. Programul său politic exclude ura față de orișice popor, singurul lucru pe care<br />
România îl cere este ca drepturile ce-i sunt recunoscute prin tratate, să fie respectate.”<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 51-52.<br />
22. Diplomatic report no. 3 of Alexandru Iacovaky, Minister of Romania, to I.G.Duca,<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Romania, 3 rd March 1925<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honor to send Your Excellency, appended, <strong>the</strong> translation in Romanian of <strong>the</strong><br />
interview that I gave here to Rīgas Ziņas newspaper, <strong>the</strong> political editor of which <strong>the</strong><br />
Director of <strong>the</strong> Protocol from <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended to me.<br />
Fairly widespread in Riga, Rīgas Ziņas newspaper is an information newspaper of <strong>the</strong><br />
kind of Le Matin.<br />
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appreciated <strong>the</strong> statements that I appreciated worth<br />
delivering, considering <strong>the</strong>m a concrete testimony of <strong>the</strong> cordiality of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-<br />
Latvian <strong>relations</strong>, which <strong>the</strong> Riga government wishes to communicate to our Eastern<br />
neighbors as often as possible.<br />
The Romanian translation of <strong>the</strong> interview given by <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania in Latvia,<br />
Rīgas Ziņas newspaper.<br />
A friend state in <strong>the</strong> South of Europe<br />
- A meeting with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania –<br />
Mr. Iacovaky, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania, who arrived here recently, entertained a<br />
conversation with one of our collaborators during which he told him:<br />
“My instructions tend to <strong>the</strong> establishment of genuine friendly <strong>relations</strong> between<br />
Romanian and <strong>the</strong> Latvian people and its government. At <strong>the</strong> heart of our sympathies lie<br />
<strong>the</strong> common interests that unite Romania with Estonia and Latvia. Romanian sees in this<br />
collaboration with <strong>the</strong>se two countries a warranty of <strong>the</strong> peace all of Europe’s nations<br />
desire. Romania experiences not only a deep sympathy for Latvia, but even a feeling of<br />
respect because <strong>the</strong> Latvian people want to live freely and <strong>the</strong>y are determined, if needed,<br />
to protect <strong>the</strong>ir freedom with <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong>ir own blood. I was <strong>the</strong> witness of <strong>the</strong> great<br />
manifestations of Estonian-Latvian sympathy that took place in Reval 1 . These<br />
manifestations are, in my opinion, <strong>the</strong> best warranty not only for maintaining <strong>the</strong> peace,<br />
but even for <strong>the</strong> free development of <strong>the</strong>se two young countries.”<br />
Romania wishes to protect, as you also want, <strong>the</strong> civilization and order, and to face<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r with you any danger that could threaten you. The policy of Romania does not<br />
have ano<strong>the</strong>r purpose, in <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries, but a friendly collaboration in order to<br />
maintain <strong>the</strong> peace that it genuinely seeks.<br />
Is Latvia known in Romania?<br />
1<br />
The German, Swedish and Danisg name for <strong>the</strong> capital of Estonia, Tallinn.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 87<br />
“The Baltic states are poorly known in Romania because <strong>the</strong> news about <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
countries reached us before <strong>the</strong> war by mediation of Russia. Nowadays, in Romania we are<br />
aware of your situation both from a geographical point of view as well as from an ethnical<br />
point of view; we know your ancient civilization, <strong>the</strong> great progresses that you have<br />
accomplished are also known to us and we hope that soon we will understand your<br />
intellectual and political life better. As far as I am concerned, I will do my best to get Latvia<br />
closer to Romania, and I hope that we can easily understand each o<strong>the</strong>r concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
development of our commercial <strong>relations</strong>.”<br />
Which are <strong>the</strong> goods that Romania may export?<br />
“Generally speaking: oil, wheat, wood, wool, salt and raw lea<strong>the</strong>r. Our merchandise may<br />
be exported to <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries through Poland, as a transit country, or by sea.”<br />
Which are <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with Russia and what is new with respect to Bessarabia?”<br />
“The situation in Bessarabia is perfectly calm. The economic and social reforms<br />
performed by <strong>the</strong> Romanian government proved to our bro<strong>the</strong>rs from Bessarabia that we<br />
want to build <strong>the</strong> future of our country based not on empty words, but on well thought out<br />
politic, economic and social reforms.<br />
Which are <strong>the</strong> principles of <strong>the</strong> Romanian policy?<br />
“Understanding its mission very well, <strong>the</strong> Romanian Government wishes to maintain<br />
fair and normal <strong>relations</strong> with all of its neighbors. Its political program excludes hate<br />
towards any o<strong>the</strong>r people, <strong>the</strong> only thing that Romania asks for is that its rights recognized<br />
by treaties to be respected.”<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 51-52<br />
23. Sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1925. g. 4. apr. ziņojums ārlietu ministram Z.<br />
Meierovicam<br />
[..] Militārapspriede 1 uzbudinājusi šejienes Padomju sūtniecību. Politiskā departamenta<br />
direktors Dr. Baders 2 man Ārlietu ministrijā teica, ka pie viņa ieradies SSSR 3 sūtniecības<br />
padomnieks Besjadovskis 4 un oficiālā kārtā, svinīgā tonī prasījis, kas tā par kara apspriedi, kura<br />
patlaban notiekot Rīgā un kur ņemot dalību Polija, Rumānija un Baltijas valstis. Dr. Baders uz<br />
to atbildējis, ka šī apspriede notiek uz Tautu Savienības pamatiem un tur apskata vienīgi<br />
tehniskas dabas jautājumus, šī vārda šaurākā nozīmē. Tie attiecoties uz vispārīgo atbruņošanos<br />
un par tiem būšot drīzumā runa Ženēvā. Par apspriedes tīri tehnisko raksturu liecinot tas fakts,<br />
ka tur ņem dalību tikai pa vienam virsniekam un pie tam ar samērā zemu dienesta pakāpi [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 18. l., 180. lp.<br />
1<br />
1925. g. 30. martā – 3. apr. Rīgā kā atbruņošanās ekspertu apspriede notika Igaunijas, Latvijas, Polijas un<br />
Rumānijas armiju izlūkdienestu pārstāvju apspriede (piedalījās arī Somijas armijas pārstāvis kā novērotājs). Cita<br />
starpā apspriedē tika nolemts informācijas apmaiņas uzlabošanai iecelt Latvijas militāro atašeju (kara aģentu)<br />
Rumānijā.<br />
2<br />
Karols Baders (1887–1957), Polijas diplomāts. 1924.–1931. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Politiskā departamenta direktors.<br />
3<br />
Domāta PSRS.<br />
4<br />
Grigorijs Besjadovskis – PSRS diplomāts, sūtniecības padomnieks Polijā.
88 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
23. Report by Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Meierovics,<br />
4 th April, 1925<br />
[..] The military conference 1 has alarmed <strong>the</strong> local Soviet Legation. In <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs Director of Political Department Dr. Bader 2 told me that Councillor of <strong>the</strong> SSSR 3<br />
Legation Besjadovsky 4 had visited him and in a solemn voice officially demanded what kind of<br />
war [military] meeting was that, which was taking place in Riga at that time with <strong>the</strong><br />
participation of Poland, Romania and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. Dr. Bader had replied that <strong>the</strong> meeting<br />
was taking place on <strong>the</strong> foundations of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and that only issues of technical<br />
nature, in <strong>the</strong> narrowest sense of <strong>the</strong> word, were being addressed <strong>the</strong>re. They concerned general<br />
disarmament and would soon be addressed in Geneva. The purely technical nature of <strong>the</strong><br />
meeting was attested to by <strong>the</strong> fact that only one officer [per country], of a ra<strong>the</strong>r low rank at<br />
that, was taking part in it [...]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 18, s. 180.<br />
24. Latvijas kara ministra R. Bangerska 5 1925. g. 24. apr. raksts ārlietu ministram Z.<br />
Meierovicam<br />
Sakarā ar to, ka kara resors nodomājis uzdot tagadējam kara aģentam Polijā pulkvedimleitnantam<br />
Grīnbergam 6 izpildīt tanī pašā laikā arī kara aģenta pienākumus Rumānijā, lūdzu<br />
neatteikt noskaidrot un paziņot, vai Rumānijas valdība neceltu iebildumus pret minētā<br />
virsnieka iecelšanu kara aģenta amatā Rumānijā. 7<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 1. apr., 179. l., 2. lp.<br />
24. Note by Latvia’s Minister of War R. Bangerskis 8 to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z.<br />
Meierovics, 24 th April, 1925<br />
Due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> war [military] department has decided to charge <strong>the</strong> acting war<br />
[military] agent in Poland Colonel-Lieutenant Grīnbergs 9 also with <strong>the</strong> duties of war [military]<br />
agent in Romania, please, do not refuse finding out and informing me whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> government<br />
1<br />
In Riga on 30 th March – 3 rd April, 1925 in <strong>the</strong> capacity of experts of disarmament met representatives of<br />
intelligence services of <strong>the</strong> armies of Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Romania (a representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Finland<br />
also attended <strong>the</strong> meeting as an observer). Among o<strong>the</strong>r things <strong>the</strong> participants decided to send a military attaché<br />
(called war agent) of Latvia to Romania in order to improve exchange of information.<br />
2<br />
Carol Bader (1887–1957), Polish diplomat. 1924–1931 Director of <strong>the</strong> Political Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs.<br />
3<br />
Meaning <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />
4<br />
Grigory Besjadovsky – USSR diplomat, Councillor of Legation in Poland.<br />
5<br />
Rūdolfs Bangerskis (1878–1958), Latvijas armijas ģenerālis (1925), valstsvīrs. 1924.–1925., 1926.–1928. g. kara<br />
ministrs.<br />
6<br />
Gustavs Jēkabs Grīnbergs (1884–1981), Latvijas armijas pulkvedis (1931). 1924.–1927. g. kara aģents Polijā, no 1925.<br />
g. arī Rumānijā.<br />
7<br />
1925. g. 3. nov. Rumānijas sūtniecība Varšavā informēja Latvijas sūtniecību, ka nav nekādu šķēršļu G. Grīnberga<br />
iecelšanai par militāro atašeju (kara aģentu) Rumānijā (LVVA, 2574. f., 1. apr., 179. l., 13. lp.).<br />
8<br />
Rūdolfs Bangerskis (1878–1958), General of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1925), statesman. 1924–1925, 1926–1928 Minister of<br />
War.<br />
9<br />
Gustavs Jēkabs Grīnbergs (1884–1981), Colonel of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1931). 1924–1927 war [military] agent in<br />
Poland, from 1925 also in Romania.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 89<br />
of Romania would not object to <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned officer to <strong>the</strong> position of<br />
war [military] agent in Romania. 1<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 1, file 179, s. l–2.<br />
25. Sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1925. g. 28. jūl. ziņojums ārlietu ministram Z.<br />
Meierovicam<br />
[..] Rumānijas sūtnis Jakovaki man stāstīja, ka Pad. Krievija esot pavasarī griezusies pie<br />
Polijas ar priekšlikumu noslēgt savstarpēju neuzbrukšanas līgumu. Nesastapusi pie Polijas<br />
gaidīto pretimnākšanu, SSSR esot tad taisījusi tādu pat priekšlikumu Baltijas valstīm, bet, viņš<br />
cerot, ka tā tur atradusi līdzīgu noraidījumu. Pēc tam SSSR esot savu priekšlikumu Polijai<br />
atkārtojusi, bet ar tikpat maz sekmēm, kā pirmo reiz; Polija esot prasījusi, lai SSSR formulē<br />
noteiktāk savu priekšlikumu; līdz ar to no poļu puses esot aizrādīts, ka bez Rumānijas viņi<br />
nekādas sarunas nevedīšot. Jakovaki bija laimīgs par tādu Polijas atbildi; neiespējama tā nav.<br />
Ārlietu ministrija no savas puses nenoliedza šādus SSSR soļus: taisni otrādi, aiz iemesliem, kuri<br />
ir visai saprotami, viņa pati labprāt šīs ziņas izplata. Pēc tiem pašiem avotiem, Padomju valdība,<br />
saņēmusi tādu Polijas atbildi, neesot pēc tā vairs ar līguma projektu nākusi; tā esot devusi<br />
saprast, ka ar Rumāniju nevēlas neuzbrukšanas līgumu slēgt Besarābijas jautājuma dēļ. Zināmas<br />
šaubas par visas šīs versijas pareizību ir vietā [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 18. l., 24.–25. lp.<br />
25. Report by Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Meierovics,<br />
28 th July, 1925<br />
[..] Envoy of Romania Iacovaky told me that in <strong>the</strong> spring Sov[iet] Russia had turned to<br />
Poland with a proposal to conclude a mutual non-aggression treaty. Not having been met with<br />
<strong>the</strong> expected responsiveness from Poland, <strong>the</strong> USSR had <strong>the</strong>n made <strong>the</strong> same proposal to <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States, but he hopes that <strong>the</strong>re it was met with similar rejection. After that <strong>the</strong> USSR had<br />
repeated its proposal to Poland, but with as little success as <strong>the</strong> first time; Poland had required<br />
<strong>the</strong> USSR to formulate its proposal in more detail; simultaneously <strong>the</strong> Polish part had also<br />
pointed out that <strong>the</strong>y would not engage in any negotiations without Romania. Iacovaky was<br />
happy about such an answer from Poland; such an answer is not impossible. The Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs of Poland on its part did not deny that <strong>the</strong> USSR had taken such steps: on <strong>the</strong><br />
contrary, due to reasons that are well understandable it willingly spreads such information<br />
itself. According to <strong>the</strong> same sources, <strong>the</strong> Soviet government, having received such a reply from<br />
Poland, had not returned with a draft treaty; it had alluded that it did not want to conclude a<br />
non-aggression treaty with Romania due to <strong>the</strong> issue of Bessarabia. Certain doubt about <strong>the</strong><br />
accurateness of this entire version is in place. [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 18, s. 24–25.<br />
26. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Riga Alexandru Iacovaky nr. 67<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României I.G. Duca, 21 noiembrie 1925<br />
A se aduce la cunoștința Regelui Ferdinand I și Președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri I.I.C.<br />
Brătianu<br />
1<br />
On 3 rd November, 1925 <strong>the</strong> Legation of Romania in Warsaw informed <strong>the</strong> Legation of Latvia that <strong>the</strong>re were no<br />
obstacles for G. Grīnbergs to be appointed military attaché (war agent) in Romania (SHAL, f. 2574, d. 1, file 179, s.<br />
13).
90 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Audiența ministrului României la Riga la Președintele Republicii Letone<br />
Am avut onoarea de a fi primit astăzi în audiență de Excelența Sa Domnul Čakste 1 ,<br />
Președintele Republicii Letone.<br />
La începutul convorbirii Președintele Republicii și-a exprimat regretul de a vedea că<br />
părăsesc așa de curând Letonia; am răspuns Șefului Statului că întoarcerea mea la Varșovia era<br />
motivată de faptul că eram dator să mă întorc acolo, pentru a lua contact cu noul Guvern, care<br />
se va forma după limpezirea actualei crize ministeriale.<br />
Conversația s-a legat atunci de situația în Polonia care după părerea Președintelui Republicii<br />
lasă mult de dorit căci – zicea Domnul Čakste – „în Polonia se muncește prea puțin și se<br />
cheltuiește prea mult. Polonia, a adăugat domnul Čakste, este o țară mare, dar nu este<br />
puternică, ea este în genere prost administrată. Mă mir cum polonezii nu au învățat mai mult<br />
din timpul cât au stat sub dominație rusă. Se cheltuiește prea mult pentru armată, și armata<br />
polonă a fugit în fața rușilor, pe când armata letonă a ținut piept trupelor de elită germane și a<br />
învins cu ușurință pe bolșevici în războiul pentru independența țării noastre.”<br />
Am considerat că aceste păreri severe erau defavorabile scopului ce-mi propusesem, adică<br />
de a arăta că Polonia este singurul factor pe care Letonia poate conta în eventualitatea unui<br />
război cu Rusia. Președintele m-a întrebat apoi care erau legăturile care ne unesc cu Polonia; i-<br />
am spus că se semnase acum cinci ani un tratat de alianță care era completat printr-o convenție<br />
militară ale căror detalii erau ținute la curent de Statele majore ale ambelor țări, că situația în<br />
ceea ce privește frontul polono-român mi se părea asigurată și că ar fi de dorit ca o situație<br />
identică să se înfăptuiască până la Golful Finlandei. Președintele mi-a spus apoi: „valoarea<br />
politicii scandinave este slăbită din cauza îngustimii de vedere care caracterizează politica<br />
Suediei și a Norvegiei și prin abținerea Finlandei de la ideea realizării „Uniunii Baltice”, care, la<br />
rândul ei, este slăbită prin atitudinea Lituaniei și de diferendul care desparte această țară de<br />
Polonia. Lituania duce – mi-a spus Domnul Čakste – o politică de neînduplecată rezistență; dar<br />
și Polonia a greșit atunci când și-a apropiat Vilna prin forța armelor (acțiunea întreprinsă în<br />
februarie 1921 de generalul Želigovskį 2 ). Am căutat întotdeauna să mijlocim o apropiere între<br />
Polonia și Lituania; la chemările noastre, Polonia a răspuns întotdeauna, Lituania s-a abținut<br />
sistematic de la orice împăcare, ba chiar ne-a acuzat că lucrând pentru rezolvarea diferendului<br />
polono-lituanian, urmărim o hegemonie asupra poporului lituanian înrudit nouă, care este mai<br />
puțin dezvoltat pe teren cultural. Acuzația este neîntemeiată și am impresia că „degetul<br />
Germaniei nu este străin acestei politici”. Totuși, mi-a zis domnul Čakste, „nimeni nu pune la<br />
îndoială la noi că pivotul situației Europei Orientale este Polonia și înțelegem că trebuie să ne<br />
apropiem de această țară pentru a consolida linia de apărare care eventual urmează a fi opusă<br />
Rusiei.”<br />
„Situația în Rusia, mi-a spus Domnul Čakste, este caracterizată prin slăbiciunea actualului<br />
Guvern care prezintă pentru vecinii Rusiei mai puțin pericol decât oricare altul, fie bolșevic,<br />
dacă acest regim s-ar consolida, fie țarist, dacă vechiul regim ar putea să revină la cârma<br />
Statului.”<br />
1<br />
Jānis Čakste (1859-1927) a fost un avocat și politician leton, Președinte al Consiliului Național (sau Popular) –<br />
Tautas Padome care a declarat independența Letoniei, Președinte al Adunării Constituante (1920-1922) și primul<br />
Președinte al Letoniei (1922–1927).<br />
2<br />
La 7 octombrie 1920 s-au semnat acordurile polono-lituaniene de la Suwałki. În aceeaşi noapte, generalul Lucjan<br />
Żeligowski, la ordinele Varșoviei, a început operațiunea de ocuparea a Vilniusului și a proclamat Republica<br />
Lituania Centrală (teritoriu de 13.500 km 2 şi populaţie de 500.000 locuitori).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 91<br />
Oricare ar fi situația de astăzi, trebuie să ne gândim la cea care va fi peste câțiva ani, când se<br />
vor ivi partidul, oamenii sau omul „care va aduna sub o conducere energică poporul rus, incult<br />
și răbdător”. Zic că regimul Sovietic, ca și cel țarist, este un regim slab pentru că el nu este în<br />
stare să ducă un război ofensiv.<br />
Sunt convins – mi-a spus Președintele – că un asemenea război ar aduce cu sine prăbușirea<br />
regimului sovietic. Ca și armata țaristă, armata sovietică poate înăbuși numai răscoale sporadice<br />
și să stăpânească prin teroare masele amorfe ale unui popor care nu se gândește mai departe<br />
decât să-și asigure traiul, și dacă e vorba de o preocupare politică, aceasta se limitează numai<br />
strict la interesele comunei (Mir), sau cel mult ale provinciei.<br />
Dar în ziua când Rusia va fi guvernată de un dictator sau de un țar, prima grijă a noului<br />
regim va fi de a-și mări prestigiul printr-un război de cucerire. De aceea Statele mărginașe<br />
amenințate toate de un pericol identic trebuie să se pregătească pentru ziua când Rusia va fi din<br />
nou supusă unui om sau unui grup de oameni care vor tinde spre cuceriri. Dacă examinez<br />
fruntaria care desparte astăzi Statele mărginașe de Rusia sovietică trebuie să mărturisesc că<br />
aceste hotare nu mi se par cu totul stabile și trebuie să ne pregătim pentru ziua când<br />
independența țărilor noastre va fi amenințată. Privesc, ca și toți concetățenii mei, politica<br />
României față de Rusia cu cel mai viu interes, urmărind neîncetat dezvoltarea chestiunii<br />
Basarabiei și suntem perfect conștienți că un război pentru cucerirea acestei provincii ar<br />
influența foarte mult propria noastră situație.<br />
S-a urmărit la noi cu mult interes războiul dus de georgieni pentru independența lor. Nu am<br />
putut să-i ajutăm deoarece Caucazul este o regiune care iese cu totul din cadrul posibilităților<br />
noastre. Pentru România însă interesul este mult mai viu: avem puțină știință despre țara<br />
Dumneavoastră și despre trecutul ei, dar ne dăm seama de forța ce reprezintă, de continuitatea<br />
politicii sale, al cărui singur scop este consolidarea păcii.<br />
Președintele Čakste s-a interesat apoi despre sistemul nostru de alianțe care constituie Mica<br />
Înțelegere, despre rostul și însemnătatea ei. Chestiunile balcanice fiindu-i străine, m-a rugat să i<br />
le lămuresc. Când eram la Paris – mi-a zis Domnia Sa – pentru a apăra interesele țării mele<br />
renăscute, ni se arunca adeseori învinuirea că vroim să balcanizăm Nordul Europei; nu<br />
înțelegeam atunci ce însemna această comparație, de atunci însă i-am înțeles sensul. La<br />
rugămintea Domnului Čakste, i-am explicat politica urmărită de România în Balcani, politică<br />
care tinde la menținerea păcii și a echilibrului politic stabilit de tratate. Președintele a ascultat<br />
cu mult interes expunerea ce i-am făcut, cu atât mai mult cu cât mi-am permis a-i face o scurtă<br />
descriere a istoriei contemporane a țării noastre, de la Tratatul de la Paris (1856) până în zilele<br />
noastre, punând în legătură dezvoltarea noastră politică cu dezvoltarea noastră economică,<br />
pentru deplina lămurire a căreia am luat ca subiect chestiunea Dunării și a strâmtorilor,<br />
arătându-i că dacă sforțările noastre au fost câteodată încoronate cu succes, datorăm această<br />
izbândă faptului că am făcut întotdeauna o politică europeană, al cărei scop tindea la<br />
armonizarea propriilor noastre interese cu interesele Marilor Puteri.<br />
Interesat de expunerea mea, Președintele Čakste a spus:<br />
„Mă ocup mult cu studiul istoriei, îmi lipsesc însă cărți despre viața și istoria poporului<br />
român.” Cum este firesc m-am grăbit a spune Președintelui că-mi voi face o plăcere din a-i oferi<br />
câteva cărți care ar putea să formeze miezul informațiilor sale despre România. Îmi permit deci<br />
a ruga pe Excelența Voastră să binevoiască a dispune ca Direcția Presei și Propagandei să-mi
92 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
pună la dispoziție materialul de cărți care ar putea interesa pe Domnul Čakste și pe care îmi voi<br />
face o plăcere a i le oferi din partea Excelenței Voastre cu ocazia viitoarei mele vizite la Riga.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 67-69.<br />
26. Diplomatic report no. 67 of Alexandru Iacovaky, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania in Riga,<br />
to I.G.Duca, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs in Romania, 21 st November 1925<br />
To be notified to King Ferdinand I and to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers I.I.C.<br />
Brătianu<br />
The audience of <strong>the</strong> minister of Romania in Riga to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Latvia.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> start of conversation, <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic expressed his regret in seeing<br />
that I had to leave Latvia so soon; I answered <strong>the</strong> Chief of State that my return to Warsaw<br />
was motivated by <strong>the</strong> fact that it was my duty to go back <strong>the</strong>re, in order to contact <strong>the</strong> new<br />
Government that would be established after <strong>the</strong> settlement of current ministerial crisis.<br />
We discussed <strong>the</strong> situation in Poland which, according to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic,<br />
is disappointing as – based on Mr. Čakste 1 ’s words – Poland works less and spends too<br />
much. Poland, Mr. Čakste added, is a large but weak country, and it is generally poorly<br />
administered. I am surprised that <strong>the</strong> Polish did not learn more while <strong>the</strong>y were under<br />
Russian control. Too much money is spent on army, and <strong>the</strong> Polish army fled when faced<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Russians, while <strong>the</strong> Latvian army fought against <strong>the</strong> elitist German troops and<br />
easily defeated <strong>the</strong> Bolsheviks in our country’s war for independence.<br />
I have considered that <strong>the</strong>se severe opinions were not favourable to my goals, meaning<br />
that I intended to show that Poland was <strong>the</strong> only factor which Latvia may counted on in<br />
case of a war against Russia. The president asked me what were <strong>the</strong> links connecting us to<br />
Poland; I told him that five years ago, an alliance treaty had been signed, that was<br />
supplemented by a military convention whose details were kept up to date by <strong>the</strong> general<br />
staffs of both countries, that <strong>the</strong> situation of Polish-Romanian front seemed to be secured<br />
and it would be desirable for an identical situation to be developed up to <strong>the</strong> Gulf of<br />
Finland. The president <strong>the</strong>n told me that: <strong>the</strong> quality of Scandinavian policy was reduced<br />
by <strong>the</strong>ir narrow perception that characterized <strong>the</strong> policy of Sweden and Norway and<br />
because Finland held itself against <strong>the</strong> idea of developing <strong>the</strong> “Baltic Union”, which was in<br />
turn weakened by <strong>the</strong> attitude of Latvia and <strong>the</strong> disagreement that separated this country<br />
from Poland. Latvia carries – I was told by Mr. Čakste – a policy of strong resistance, but<br />
Poland also made a mistake when it got close to Vilna through <strong>the</strong> force of weapons (an<br />
action that was carried out in February 1921 by general Želigovskį 2 ). We have always wanted<br />
to mediate a relation between Poland and Lithuania; Poland always answered our calls,<br />
Lithuania refrained systematically from any reconciliation, fur<strong>the</strong>rmore it even accused us<br />
that working for settlement of Polish – Lithuania differences, our intention would be to<br />
achieve a hegemony on Lithuania people which is related to our people, yet less developed<br />
1<br />
Jānis Čakste (1859-1927) was a Latvian lawyer and politician, President of <strong>the</strong> National (or People’s) Council –<br />
Tautas Padome who declared independence of Latvia, Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Constituent Assembly (1920-1922) and first<br />
President of Latvia (1922-1927).<br />
2<br />
On 7 October 1920, Polish-Lithuanian agreements were signed in Suwalki. That night, General Lucjan Želigovskį,<br />
ordered by Warsaw, began <strong>the</strong> occupying of Vilnius and proclaimed <strong>the</strong> Republic of Central Lithuania (territory of<br />
13,500 km 2 and population of 500,000 inhabitants).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 93<br />
on a cultural level. This accusation is ill-founded and I sense that “<strong>the</strong> finger of Germany is<br />
not unacquainted with this policy”. Even though, Mr. Čakste said, nobody doubts that<br />
Poland is pivotal for <strong>the</strong> situation in Eastern Europe and we understand that we need to get<br />
closer to this country in order to consolidate <strong>the</strong> defence line that is to be raised against<br />
Russia.<br />
“The situation in Russia, Mr. Čakste said, is characterized by <strong>the</strong> weakness of <strong>the</strong><br />
current Government, who poses, to its neighbours, less danger than any o<strong>the</strong>r, whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Bolshevik, if this regime consolidates, or tsarist, if <strong>the</strong> old regime would be reinforced in<br />
<strong>the</strong> State.”<br />
Regardless of today’s situation, we have to think what would be like in a few years, when<br />
<strong>the</strong> party, <strong>the</strong> people or <strong>the</strong> man shall rise “to ga<strong>the</strong>r illiterate and patient Russian people<br />
under a dynamic command”. I say that <strong>the</strong> Soviet regime, as well as <strong>the</strong> Tsarist one, is a<br />
weak regime because it cannot carry on an offensive war.<br />
I am convinced – <strong>the</strong> President told me – that such war would bring along <strong>the</strong> fall of <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet regime. Like <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> Tsarist army, <strong>the</strong> Soviet army may only suppress<br />
sporadic riots and command, through terror, armed masses of people that are only<br />
concerned with securing <strong>the</strong>ir own living, and as for <strong>the</strong> political concern, this is limited<br />
strictly to <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> commune (Mir), or at best to <strong>the</strong> province’s.<br />
But on <strong>the</strong> day when Russia will be governed by a dictator or tsar, <strong>the</strong> first concern of<br />
<strong>the</strong> new regime will be to increase its prestige through a war of conquest. That is why <strong>the</strong><br />
Border States that are threatened by a similar danger have to prepare for <strong>the</strong> day when<br />
Russia will be again submitted to a man or a group of men who want to conquest<br />
territories. If I examine <strong>the</strong> border that separates today <strong>the</strong> Border States from Soviet<br />
Russia, I would have to say that <strong>the</strong>se areas do not seem entirely solid and we have to<br />
prepare ourselves for <strong>the</strong> day when independence of our country will be threatened. I<br />
watch Romania’s policy concerning Russia with <strong>the</strong> liveliest interest, just like my fellow<br />
countrymen, continuously checking <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian issue, and we are<br />
perfectly aware that a war for <strong>the</strong> conquest of this province would be of high influence on<br />
our own situation.<br />
We watched closely <strong>the</strong> war carried out by <strong>the</strong> Georgians for <strong>the</strong>ir independence. We<br />
could not help <strong>the</strong>m as Caucasus is a region that is completely out of our reach. For<br />
Romania, this concern is more lively: we know little about your country and about its past,<br />
but we are aware of <strong>the</strong> force that it represents, of <strong>the</strong> continuity of its policy, which has<br />
<strong>the</strong> only purpose to consolidate peace.<br />
President Čakste fur<strong>the</strong>r asked about our alliance system that constitutes <strong>the</strong> Little<br />
Entente, about its purpose and its meaning. As <strong>the</strong> Balkan matters were unknown to him,<br />
he asked me to explain it. When I was in Paris –His Excellency said – to defend <strong>the</strong><br />
interests of my reborn country, we were always accused to be pursuing Balkanization of <strong>the</strong><br />
Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Europe; back <strong>the</strong>n, I did not understand this comparison, but since <strong>the</strong>n I came<br />
to apprehend its meaning. Upon Mr. Čakste’s demand, I explained <strong>the</strong> Romanian policy’s<br />
goals in <strong>the</strong> Balkans, policy that aims maintaining <strong>the</strong> peace and <strong>the</strong> political balance as set<br />
forth in treaties. The President heard my speech with great interest, all <strong>the</strong> more so as I<br />
took <strong>the</strong> permission of providing a short description of our country’s modern history,<br />
between <strong>the</strong> Paris Treaty (1856) and current time, linking <strong>the</strong> political development of our
94 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
country with our economic development, for whose full description I approached <strong>the</strong><br />
matter of Danube and of <strong>the</strong> Straits, showing that if our endeavours were sometimes<br />
successful, we owe this to always making European-wide politics, pursuing harmonization<br />
of our own interests with <strong>the</strong> interest of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers.<br />
Interested in my speech, President Čakste said:<br />
“I dedicate a lot of time to <strong>the</strong> study of history, but I need books on <strong>the</strong> history and life<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Romanian people.” Naturally, I hurried to tell <strong>the</strong> President that it will be my<br />
pleasure to offer him some books that could form <strong>the</strong> core of his information about<br />
Romania. I <strong>the</strong>refore took <strong>the</strong> liberty of asking Your Excellency to request that <strong>the</strong> Media<br />
and Propaganda Direction shall offer books that could prove of interest to Mr. Čakste and<br />
that I will be glad to offer <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> name of Your Excellency upon my next visit in Riga.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 67-69.<br />
27. Sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1926. g. 19. aug. ziņojums ārlietu ministram K. Ulmanim<br />
Atļaujos Jūs informēt par to stāvokli, kādā atrodas iekustinātie jautājumi par tirdzniecības<br />
līgumiem ar Balkānu valstīm un par konsulāro pārstāvību tīkla izveidošanu šinīs zemēs.<br />
Sarunās ar sūtni Jakovaki pilnīgi apstiprinājās no jauna, ka Rumānijas viedoklis nav grozījies.<br />
Rumānija joprojām neslēdz tirdzniecības līgumus parastā kārtā, bet veido savas ekonomiskās<br />
attiecības ar citām valstīm vienīgi notu apmaiņas ceļā, pie kam abas puses garantē viena otrai<br />
vislielāko labvēlību. Šo pašu atbildi biju dabūjis jau agrāk Bukarestē. Esmu pārliecināts, ka<br />
tālākas sarunas šimbrīžam nav iespējamas, ja negribam apmierināties ar notu apmaiņu. Vēl<br />
vairāk, – ja sarunas notiktu ar sūtni Jakovaki Varšavā vai Rīgā, tad paredzu pat, ka grūtības<br />
rastos pie klauzulu ievietošanas notu tekstā. Jakovaki jau agrāk man izteicās, ka trūkst līdzsvara<br />
starp Rumānijas vislielāko labvēlību un Latvijas ierobežoto labvēlību. Jakovaki pēc dabas ir<br />
bailīgs, ietiepīgs un sīks; ar tādu sarunas neveiktos. Bukarestē, Dukas laikos, bija daudz vieglāk<br />
tikt pie rezultāta, jo ministrs pats mīlēja izlemt jautājumus ātri un noteikti. Tagad, sakarā ar<br />
kabineta maiņu, Bukarestē Ārlietu ministrijā ir nākuši jauni ļaudis, kurus tuvāk nepazīstu. Esmu<br />
pārliecināts, ka Rumānijas principiālais uzskats – neslēgt tirdzniecības līgumus parastā veidā,<br />
bet apmierināties, pagaidām, ar notu apmaiņu – paliek joprojām spēkā; to prasa nenokārtotais<br />
ekonomiskais stāvoklis valstī un iekšējo saimniecisko attiecību neskaidrība, kas cēlusies,<br />
pievienojot Rumānijai lielās provinces: Besarābiju, Bukovinu, Transilvāniju.<br />
Jakovaki aizbraucis atvaļinājumā; nesagaidu no viņa pēc atgriešanās citas atbildes.<br />
Rumānijas tirgus līdz šim interesējis mūsu gumijas un linoleuma rūpniecību. Šīm nozarēm<br />
tagad nebūs iespējams konkurēt ar citām valstīm, jo, kā dzirdu, tad, uz šī gada jūnija dekrēta<br />
pamata, pastāvošā muitas tarifa likmes tām valstīm, kuras nav nokārtojušas savas ekonomiskās<br />
attiecības ar Rumāniju ar notām, tiek dubultotas.<br />
Paceļas jautājums, vai mums ir no svara pieturēties tik neatlaidīgi pie uzskata, ka notu<br />
apmaiņas ceļā mēs savas ekonomiskās attiecības ar citām valstīm nekārtojam. Austrumu zemēs<br />
tāda neatlaidība novedīs pie tādiem ieilgumiem, pie kādiem neesam pieraduši. Zīmējoties uz<br />
Rumāniju, ir grūti paredzēt, kad viņa būs gatava slēgt tirdzniecības līgumu parastā kārtībā [..].<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 505. l., 3.–5. lp.
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27. Report by Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Ulmanis,<br />
19 th August, 1926<br />
I take <strong>the</strong> liberty to inform you about <strong>the</strong> current status of <strong>the</strong> raised issues regarding trade<br />
agreements with <strong>the</strong> Balkan states and about <strong>the</strong> creation of <strong>the</strong> network of consular<br />
representation in <strong>the</strong>se states.<br />
In discussions with Envoy Iacovaky it was reaffirmed that Romania’s position had not<br />
changed. Romania still does not conclude any trade agreements in <strong>the</strong> customary form, but<br />
instead develops its economic <strong>relations</strong> with o<strong>the</strong>r countries only by way of exchanging notes,<br />
both parties, fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, guaranteeing each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> most-favoured-nation treatment. I had<br />
received <strong>the</strong> same reply in Bucharest earlier. I am sure that fur<strong>the</strong>r negotiations are not possible<br />
at <strong>the</strong> moment, if we do not agree to make a shift with an exchange of notes. Even more – if<br />
negotiations took place through Envoy Iacovaky ei<strong>the</strong>r in Warsaw or in Riga, I expect<br />
difficulties to arise even with inserting clauses in <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> notes. Iacovaky mentioned to<br />
me earlier that <strong>the</strong>re was a lack of balance between most-favoured-nation treatment from<br />
Romania’s side and limited favour Latvia’s side. Iacovaky is by nature timid, stubborn and petty;<br />
with such a man negotiations would not get on well. In Bucharest, in Duca’s time, it was much<br />
easier to achieve a result, because <strong>the</strong> Minister liked to make decisions himself quickly and<br />
firmly. Now, due to <strong>the</strong> change of Cabinet, new people whom I do not know have joined <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest. I am sure that Romania’s principal position – not to<br />
conclude trade agreements in <strong>the</strong> customary form but, for <strong>the</strong> time being, to make shift with an<br />
exchange of notes – is still in force; it is dictated by <strong>the</strong> unsettled economic situation in <strong>the</strong><br />
country and <strong>the</strong> uncertainty of <strong>the</strong> domestic economic <strong>relations</strong> that arouse when Romania<br />
annexed <strong>the</strong> large provinces: Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania.<br />
Iacovaky has left on a vacation; I do not expect a different answer from him when he comes<br />
back.<br />
So far Romania’s market has attracted our rubber and linoleum industries. Now <strong>the</strong>se<br />
branches will not be able to compete with [those of] o<strong>the</strong>r countries because, as I hear,<br />
pursuant to a decree of this June, <strong>the</strong> existing rate of customs tariff is doubled for those<br />
countries, which had not regularized <strong>the</strong>ir economic <strong>relations</strong> with Romania by way of notes.<br />
A question arises whe<strong>the</strong>r it is important for us to keep that consistently to <strong>the</strong> position that<br />
we do not settle our economic <strong>relations</strong> with o<strong>the</strong>r countries by way of exchanging notes. In<br />
oriental countries such persistence will lead to delays that we are not accustomed to. As<br />
concerns Romania, it is difficult to predict, when it will be ready to conclude a trade agreement<br />
in <strong>the</strong> customary form […]<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 505, s. 3–5.<br />
28. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1927. g. 9. maija ziņojums ārlietu ministram F.<br />
Cielēnam 1<br />
Saņēmu Jūsu telegrammu, kurā Jūs piekrītat 5 dienu komandējumam uz Rumānijas valsts<br />
svētkiem. Tik īsā laikā šis brauciens nav izdarāms. Tiešas satiksmes vilcieni starp Varšavu un<br />
Bukaresti neiet ik dienas. Jau aiz tā tehniskā iemesla man būtu vajadzīgas vismaz 9 dienas. Bet<br />
patiesībā ar tām vēl nepietiek. Neesmu pēdējos divi gados, darba apstākļu dēļ, bijis Rumānijā.<br />
1<br />
Fēlikss Cielēns (1888–1964), Latvijas kreisais politiķis, valstsvīrs, diplomāts. 1923. g. bijis ārlietu ministra biedrs,<br />
1926.–1928. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1933.–1934. g. sūtnis Francijā, Spānijā un Portugālē ar sēdekli Parīzē. Miris Zviedrijā.
96 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Tagad es būtu spiests palikt tur vismaz pāris nedēļas, ņemot vērā īpatnējos vietējos apstākļus,<br />
galma formālismu un gausību. Beidzot atradu par labāku uz Bukaresti nebraukt, jo dabūju<br />
zināt, ka ārlietu ministram Mitilineu jābūt jau 12. maijā Čehoslovākijā uz Mazās Antantes<br />
konferenci. Tādā gadījumā man nebūtu bijis iespējams runāt ar viņu par tirdzniecības līgumu.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 573. l., 137. lp.<br />
28. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs F.<br />
Cielēns 1 , 9 th May, 1927<br />
I received your telegram whereby you approve a 5-day official trip to Romania’s National<br />
Day celebrations. This trip cannot be made in such a short time. It is not every day that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are direct trains between Warsaw and Bucharest. For this reason alone I would need at least 9<br />
days. But in fact that, too, would be insufficient. I have not been to Romania in <strong>the</strong> last two<br />
years, due to work. Now I would have to stay <strong>the</strong>re at least a couple of weeks, considering <strong>the</strong><br />
specific local conditions, <strong>the</strong> formalism and slowness of <strong>the</strong> court. Finally I came to <strong>the</strong><br />
conclusion that it would be better not to go to Bucharest because I heard that already on 12 th<br />
May Minister of Foreign Affairs Mitilineu had to be in Czechoslovakia to attend <strong>the</strong> conference<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente. In such case I would not have had <strong>the</strong> chance to talk to him about <strong>the</strong><br />
trade agreement.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 573, s. 137.<br />
29. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1928. g. 11. jūn. ziņojums ārlietu ministram A.<br />
Balodim 2<br />
Bukarestē uzstādīju jautājumu, kad tiks iecelts Rumānijas sūtnis Latvijā. Ministrs Duka man<br />
atbildēja, ka viņš tikai atvieto savu kolēģi Titulesku un tādēļ jautājuma izšķiršanu atstāj<br />
ministram pašam. Duka domā, ka Titulesku varēšot atgriezties Bukarestē ap jūnija vidu. Pēc<br />
tam jautājums par sūtņa iecelšanu Rīgā tikšot visā drīzumā nokārtots. Kandidāti šinī sarunā<br />
netika minēti; no citas puses dabūju zināt, ka to esot vairāk un tādēļ grūtāk esot noteikt, uz<br />
kuru kritīs izvēle. Starp citiem turpina minēt Grigorkea. To pabalsta sūtnis Varšavā Davila, kurš<br />
pats savu tagadējo posteni dabūjis, pateicoties Titulesku labvēlībai. Tā Grigorkea, kuru jau reiz<br />
minēju kā kandidātu, ir zināmas izredzes tikt uz Rīgu.<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 1. apr., 209. l., 25. lp.<br />
29. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs A.<br />
Balodis 3 , 11 th June, 1928<br />
In Bucharest I asked when an Envoy of Romania to Latvia would be appointed. Minister<br />
Duca replied to me that he was only replacing his colleague Titulescu and for that reason would<br />
leave <strong>the</strong> making of <strong>the</strong> decision to <strong>the</strong> Minister himself. Duca thinks that Titulescu will be able<br />
1<br />
Fēlikss Cielēns (1888–1964), left-wing Latvian politician, statesman, diplomat. 1923 deputy Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs, 1926–1928 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1933–1934 Envoy to France, Spain and Portugal with seat in Paris.<br />
Died in Sweden.<br />
2<br />
Antons Balodis (1880–1942), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1920.–1924. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Baltijas valstu nodaļas<br />
vadītājs, no 1924. g. sūtnis Lietuvā, 1928.–1930. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1930.–1933. g. sūtnis Somijā. Gājis bojā padomju<br />
ieslodzījumā.<br />
3<br />
Antons Balodis (1880–1942), Latvian diplomat, statesman. 1920–1924 Head of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1924 Envoy to Lithuania, 1928–1930 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1930–1933 Envoy<br />
to Finland. Perished in Soviet imprisonment.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 97<br />
to return to Bucharest around mid-June. After that <strong>the</strong> issue of appointing an Envoy in Riga will<br />
be settled soon. Candidates were not mentioned in this discussion; from a different source I<br />
learned that <strong>the</strong>re were several of <strong>the</strong>m and thus it was difficult to know who would be chosen.<br />
Grigorcea is still mentioned among <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. He is supported by Envoy in Warsaw Davila who<br />
had got his present position thanks to Titulescu’s benevolence. Thus Grigorcea, whom I once<br />
already mentioned as a candidate, has a certain chance to get to Riga.<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 1, file 209, s. 25.<br />
30. Telegrama lui Gheorghe Filality de la Ministerul Afacerilor Străine al României<br />
nr. 11528 către Legația României la Riga, 22 februarie 1929<br />
Fiind informați că numeroși basarabeni neștiutori [ai] limbii noastre și plecați din țară de<br />
mult timp încearcă a se reîntoarce în țară prezentând pașapoarte române de emigrare sau tot<br />
felul de certificate sau recomandări oficiale (?) de la prietenii din România, dintre care unele<br />
false emanând [de la] funcționari, parlamentari sau persoane influente din Basarabia, binevoiți<br />
vă rog a nu le acorda [în] niciun caz pașapoarte sau acte de călătorie dacă aveți cea mai mică<br />
bănuială că ar fi suspecte. Vă rog să transmiteți aceste instrucțiuni consulatelor dependente.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 45<br />
30. Telegram by Gheorghe Filality of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania no.<br />
11528 to <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Riga, 22 nd February 1929<br />
Being informed that numerous Bessarabians who do not speak our language and who<br />
left <strong>the</strong> country a long time ago, are trying to come back, making use of Romanian<br />
emigration passports or all sorts of certificates or official petitions from Romanian friends<br />
such as officials, members of <strong>the</strong> Parliament or influential persons from Bessarabia, some of<br />
which are false, I kindly ask you not to grant <strong>the</strong>m by any means passports or travel<br />
<strong>documents</strong>, if you have <strong>the</strong> slightest suspicion that <strong>the</strong>y are doubtful.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 45.<br />
31. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1929. g. 2. marta ziņojums ārlietu ministram A.<br />
Balodim<br />
Rumānijas ārlietu ministrs Mironesku viesojās Varšavā 25. un 26. februārī. Kā parasts tādos<br />
gadījumos, viņa atbraukšana un uzturēšanās Polijā bija savienota ar daudzām svinībām,<br />
mielastiem, rautiem un runām, kuras tomēr maz apgaismoja vizītes nolūkus un nozīmi.<br />
Pirmā kārtā šo vizīti jāuzskata kā draudzības aktu no Rumānijas puses savai sabiedrotai<br />
Polijai; tai vajadzēja rādīt, ka abu valstu attiecībās nekas nav mainījies [..].<br />
Nevar gan apgalvot, ka politiskā konstelācija austrumos būtu palikusi tāda pati, kāda viņa<br />
bija tolaik, kad Polijas–Rumānijas sabiedrība radās. Toreiz abas valstis raudzījās ar neuzticību<br />
uz PSRS un baidījās no tās. Rumānija šo uzskatu nav mainījusi; citādi tas Polijā. Polija no PSRS<br />
vairs nebaidās; vēl vairāk, viņas ārējo attiecību vārīgākais punkts meklējams tagad vakaros. Uz<br />
turieni, galvenā kārtā, vērsta Polijas nacionālā enerģija un šinī virzienā Rumānija Polijai var dot<br />
ļoti maz. Bez tam, Polija vispārīgi nestāda ļoti augstu Rumāniju, kā sabiedroto, militārā ziņā.<br />
Polijai pat nebūtu nekas pretim uzlabot savas attiecības ar PSRS un izkopt tās, sevišķi<br />
saimnieciskā nozarē. Te sabiedrība ar Rumāniju viņai drīzāk ir par traucējumu [..].<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 688. l., 19.–20. lp.
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31. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs A.<br />
Balodis, 2 nd March, 1929<br />
Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mironescu visited Warsaw on 25 th and 26 th February.<br />
As is usual on such occasions, his arrival and stay in Poland were accompanied with many<br />
celebrations, feasts, routs [receptions] and speeches, which however shed little light on <strong>the</strong><br />
goals and importance of <strong>the</strong> visit.<br />
This visit should be regarded first and foremost as an act of friendship from <strong>the</strong> part of<br />
Romania towards its ally Poland; it was supposed to signalize that nothing had changed in <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two countries [...]<br />
One however cannot assure that <strong>the</strong> political constellation in <strong>the</strong> East has stayed <strong>the</strong> way it<br />
was when Poland–Romania alliance was born. Then both countries regarded <strong>the</strong> USSR with<br />
distrust and were afraid of it. Romania has not changed its position in this regard; but <strong>the</strong><br />
situation in Poland is different. Poland is no longer afraid of <strong>the</strong> USSR; even more so, now <strong>the</strong><br />
tender spot of its external <strong>relations</strong> is in <strong>the</strong> West. It is this direction that Poland’s national<br />
energy is oriented in <strong>the</strong> first instance and in this regard Romania can give Poland very little.<br />
Besides, Poland does not value Romania very high in general, in <strong>the</strong> military sense as an ally.<br />
Poland would not even mind to improve its <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> USSR and to cultivate <strong>the</strong>m,<br />
especially in <strong>the</strong> field of economy. In this regard its alliance with Romania is ra<strong>the</strong>r an obstacle<br />
on its path [...]<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 688, s. 19–20.<br />
32. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza 1 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu 2 , iunie<br />
1929<br />
Unele evenimente petrecute în ajunul sau după sosirea mea în Riga – atentatul din Kowno 3 ,<br />
schimbul vizitelor baltice – au animat opinia și presa acestei capitale punând personalitățile<br />
politice, cu care am avut ocazia să mă întrețin, într-o stare mai comunicativă decât cea<br />
obișnuită; ele mi-au dat de asemenea prilejul unor conversații interesante cu colegii mei dintre<br />
care cei mai mulți, acreditați și în una sau două din țările vecine, au putut completa în Kowno și<br />
Reval informațiile și impresiile lor.<br />
Atentatul împotriva domnului Voldemaras 4 a pus încă o dată în mod cu totul indirect, dar<br />
dramatic, în evidență ireductibilitatea conflictului dintre Polonia și Lituania, iar seria de vizite<br />
între Riga, Reval și capitalele nord-baltice ar putea indica noua îndrumare ce Estonia și Letonia,<br />
definitiv descurajate de acest conflict, înțeleg să o dea politicii lor în căutarea unei completări<br />
morale dacă nu formale a alianței ce le leagă.<br />
1<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza (1886-1980) a fost un om politic cu vederi de extremă dreapta și diplomat român. A intrat în<br />
diplomație în 1913 și a îndeplinit misiuni <strong>diplomatic</strong>e la Durazzo, Berna, Budapesta, Viena, Washington, Riga,<br />
Helsinki și Copenhaga. Însărcinat cu afaceri și apoi Ministru al României în Letonia și Estonia (1929-1932, 1932-<br />
1935), Ministru al României la Copenhaga (1938-1939), Ministru al Afacerilor Străine (1940).<br />
2<br />
Gheorghe G. Mironescu (1874-1949) a fost un politician român, membru al Partidului Conservator-Democrat și al<br />
Partidului Național-Țărănesc. Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (1930, 1930-1931), Ministru al Afacerilor Străine<br />
(1928-1930, 1930-1931, 1932).<br />
3<br />
Denumirea lituaniană a localității este Kaunas (apare și sub forma de Kovno).<br />
4<br />
Încercarea de asasinat a avut loc la 6 mai 1929.
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Nu rămâne cea mai mică îndoială că Acordul Politic din Varșovia din 17 martie 1922 între<br />
Polonia, Finlanda, Estonia și Letonia, care prin art. 6 al său conținea germenii unei atât de<br />
puternice grupări politice și militare, nu era, în spiritul guvernelor din Riga, Reval și Helsingfors,<br />
destinat să fie pus în vigoare decât în ziua când, potolindu-se învrăjbirile dezlănțuite odată cu<br />
legiunile lui Želigovskį, Lituania s-ar fi decis să adere și ea pactului de apărare al celor patru<br />
republici. Oameni de stat letoni și estonieni au judecat cu drept cuvânt că perfectarea unei<br />
asemenea alianțe în orișice alte împrejurări decât cele implicând maximul posibil de eficacitate<br />
și prestigiu ar fi fost mai mult vătămătoare decât folositoare siguranței lor, o imprudentă<br />
provocare față de Rusia sovietică, fără de nicio reală garanție față de reacția posibilă a ei.<br />
Tratatul Skirmunt 1 , de altfel dezavuat în urmă de Finlanda, a rămas de aceea neratificat de Riga<br />
și Reval, care în așteptarea unor posibilități de realizări mai largi au înjghebat alianța militară<br />
din 1 noiembrie 1923 redusă geografic, dar tehnic completă.<br />
Domnul Balodis, care a fost lung timp Ministru al Letoniei în Kowno, mi-a istorisit<br />
zadarnicele sale sforțări pentru a reduce resentimentul lituanian până la posibilitatea unei<br />
reconcilieri cât de teoretică cu Polonia, reconciliere ce ar fi lăsat deschisă calea unei grupări de<br />
forțe, pe care cred că atât Dl Balodis cât și elementele politice cele mai numeroase în Letonia și<br />
Estonia o considerau în mod foarte sincer ca soluția optimă a problemei veșnic deschise a<br />
menținerii independenței naționale a micilor republici vecine.<br />
S-ar părea că astăzi aceleași elemente au renunțat la această soluție și că printr-un<br />
reviriment, probabil numai momentan, ce nu a mirat pe cei ce cunosc pretențiile de<br />
scandinavism crescând în Țările Baltice de la sud spre nord, Estonia și Letonia se întreabă dacă<br />
nu le-ar fi posibilă retragerea de pe un câmp politic atât de puțin atrăgător, retragere pe care<br />
Finlanda a efectuat-o, probabil, când în 1922 a dezavuat atât de repede pe Dl. Holsti 2 , ministrul<br />
său al Afacerilor Străine.<br />
Schimbul de vizite între capii de stat și oamenii politici ai țărilor baltice ar fi astfel<br />
preliminariile unei noi orientări a politicii Estoniei și Letoniei, în cadrul bineînțeles al<br />
principalului lor interes comun, cel al menținerii independenței lor naționale.<br />
În asemenea împrejurări o întrebare firească este cred următoarea. O dată exclusă<br />
posibilitatea unei alianțe baltice integrale, adică una din care Polonia și Lituania ar face<br />
împreună parte (alianța optimă pentru noi și prietenii noștri deoarece prin trăsătura de uniune<br />
polonă s-ar completa rețeaua neîntreruptă de legături militare și politice împotriva estului de la<br />
Baltica la Marea Neagră), nu este soluția actuală a unei alianțe militare formale, redusă [la]<br />
Letonia și Estonia, dar menținută prin forța lucrurilor în câmpul de gravitație politică a<br />
Poloniei, cea mai avantajoasă pentru noi? Cu alte cuvine cum trebuie să considerăm extinderea<br />
acestei alianțe până la Finlanda și eventual, într-un mod teoretic, chiar cu Suedia?<br />
Întrebarea nu este zadarnică și las Domnului Balodis cuvântul pentru a ne spune dacă ideea<br />
unei apropieri balto-scandinave ocupă astăzi un colț al imaginației unora din oamenii de stat ai<br />
acestor țări.<br />
1<br />
Constantin Skirmunt (1866–1949) a fost un politician și diplomat polonez, membru al Comitetului Național<br />
Polonez de la Paris (1917-1918), Ministru în Italia (1919-1921), Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1921-1922) și Ministru<br />
în Marea Britanie (1919-1934).<br />
2<br />
Eino Rudolf Woldemar Holsti (1881-1945) a fost un om politic, jurnalist, diplomat și profesor finlandez. Membru<br />
al Partidului Național-Progresist. Ministru al Afacerilor Externe al Finlandei (1919-1922 și 1936-1938), delegat al<br />
Finlandei la Societatea Națiunilor. Profesor la Stanford University.
100 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
„Relațiile între Finlanda și Letonia erau în ultimii ani atât de răcite că o reapropiere apărea<br />
extrem de importantă. Ținând cont că relațiile dintre cele două state în primii ani ai<br />
independenței lor erau excepțional de calde și animate, aveam ferma speranță că voi reuși să<br />
aduc și astăzi între ele o apropiere amicală și vie... În discursurile mele am exprimat în principal<br />
gândul unei conlucrări necesare între statele Ost 1 -baltice. Și dacă [este] posibil trebuie atrasă în<br />
această strânsă grupare prietenească și Scandinavia (so sollte auch Skandinavien in diesen<br />
engen Freundschaftsbund mit hineingezogen werden)....<br />
Înainte de toate am fost de acord cu colegul meu finlandez că datoria principală a Finlandei<br />
și a Letoniei era necesitatea de a menține și întări independența lor... O altă îndatorire a politicii<br />
noastre externe este de întări mai departe legăturile și cu celelalte state nordice, în special cu<br />
Suedia... Trebuie să spun că în această călătorie în Finlanda am ajuns la convingerea că putem<br />
aștepta cu siguranță o nouă dezvoltare a legăturilor prietenești între Finlanda și Letonia...”<br />
Colegul meu [neclar] direct interesate consideră cu drept cuvânt că o politică externă<br />
letono-estoniană bazată pe aspirațiile platonice exprimate de Dl. Balodis la Helsingfors sau de<br />
Dl Zemgals 2 la Stockholm ar fi prea fantezistă ca asemenea eventualitate să fie luată serios în<br />
considerație de către noi. Nimeni nu își poate închipui că cele două republici baltice ar căuta în<br />
Suedia și chiar în Finlanda un echivalent pentru garanția ce la un moment dat le-o poate oferi<br />
Polonia sau că aceste două din urmă țări ar fi gata să dea această garanție.<br />
Totuși, după cum convenea atașatul militar al unei alte țări aliate, privită sub un alt unghi o<br />
asemenea acțiune din partea Letoniei și Estoniei ar putea părea mai puțin absurdă. Ea ar putea<br />
să privească nu atât o înțelegere relativă la o rezistență comună împotriva unui atac dinspre est<br />
pe cât căutarea unor noi legături cu caracter mult mai puțin provocator care să pună și pe cele<br />
două mici republici în afară de axa probabilă a unui asemenea atac, situație de care beneficiază<br />
astăzi și Suedia și foarte probabil și Finlanda. Nicio îndoială nu pare într-adevăr a exista aici că<br />
în situația actuală Letonia și Estonia ar participa fără ezitare la respingerea unui atac bolșevic<br />
chiar dacă el ar fi la început îndreptat numai împotriva Poloniei. În ceea ce privește Finlanda<br />
însă, atașatul militar în chestiune (care este considerat aici persoana cea mai bine informată în<br />
chestiunile politice și militare ale Balticii și a cărui sferă de competență se întinde de la Kowno<br />
la Helsingfors) îmi afirma convingerea sa că Finlanda nu se va solidariza cu vecinele sale de la<br />
sud decât în cazul când va fi ea însăși victima unei agresiuni moscovite si că o asemenea<br />
agresiune îi pare din punct de vedere politic improbabilă, iar din punct de vedere militar<br />
geografic imposibilă. O înțelegere între cele trei state baltice în chestiune, înțelegere ce ar<br />
cuprinde și eventualitatea unei acțiuni militare sovietice, nu ar fi realizabilă decât dacă ar avea<br />
ca bază un angajament de dezinteresare în cazul unui conflict polono-rus, angajament ce<br />
Letonia și Estonia nu l-ar putea lua decât ispitite de o garanție de altă valoare decât cea pe care<br />
le-o poate da Suedia.<br />
Expunând cele ce preced Excelenței Voastre cu restricțiile la care sunt încă îndreptățit de<br />
prea scurta mea ședere aici aș greși dacă aș da impresia că în cercurile prietene nouă, cu care m-<br />
am întreținut de la sosirea mea în Riga, ar exista vreo îngrijorare privitoare la semnificația<br />
conversațiilor și vizitelor ai căror martori suntem astăzi în Baltica. Impresia în aceste cercuri<br />
1<br />
Est-baltice, de la cuvântul german Ost, est.<br />
2<br />
Gustavs Zemgals (1871-1939) a fost om de stat și jurnalist leton, al doilea șef de stat al Letoniei. A fost implicat în<br />
lupta pentru obținerea independenței (vicepreședinte al Tautas Padome) și a deținut mai multe funcții<br />
guvernamentale și în administrația locală.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 101<br />
este dimpotrivă mai mult una de optimism și de încredere că atât în Letonia cât și în Estonia<br />
cercurile competente civile și militare realizează complet solidaritatea intereselor țărilor<br />
amenințate de primejdia rusească. Totuși sunt indicii că, în cadrul acestor [neclar], unele<br />
grupuri descurajate de nesfârșitul conflict polono-lituanian caută să asigure țărilor lor noi soluții<br />
eventuale problemelor ce le sunt particulare. Convingerea rămâne însă că în împrejurările grave<br />
la care este natural să ne gândim bunul simț va triumfa asupra unor tendințe de caracter mai<br />
mult speculativ și fără sau aproape fără nicio contraparte materială. Îmi permit a adăuga că<br />
posibilitatea de a completa sau controla eu însumi în Reval impresiile mele sau opiniile<br />
interlocutorilor mei mi-ar fi în asemenea împrejurare foarte folositoare.<br />
În ceea ce privește probabilitatea sau proximitatea acestor împrejurări grave, cuvintele<br />
colegului meu american 1 (un veteran al terenului politic baltic, decanul corpului <strong>diplomatic</strong> aici<br />
și în cele două țări vecine, cu un personal de treizeci de persoane sub ordinele sale) rezumă,<br />
cred, opinia generală răspândită: „două lucruri sunt tot atât de sigure: întâi că niciodată<br />
Sovietele nu au fost mai îndepărtate decât astăzi de posibilitatea militară și economică de a<br />
ataca, al doilea că vor ataca odată vecinii lor vestici determinați sau de dezvoltarea până la<br />
explozie a stărilor lor economice sau dimpotrivă ca ultimă carte înainte de sinucidere, de<br />
dărâmarea completă a acestor stări. În acest ultim caz, adaugă atașatul militar, la care mă<br />
refeream mai sus, atacul va fi foarte probabil dirijat înspre micile puteri baltice în căutarea unui<br />
succes ușor, succes de care Sovietele ar avea imediat nevoie din punct de vedere intern.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 102-<br />
106.<br />
32. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza 2 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu 3 , June 1929<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> events that happened in <strong>the</strong> eve or after my arrival in Riga – such as <strong>the</strong><br />
Kowno attempt 4 , <strong>the</strong> Baltic visits exchange, have animated <strong>the</strong> public and <strong>the</strong> media of this<br />
capital, making <strong>the</strong> political figures with whom I had <strong>the</strong> chance to deal more<br />
communicative than usually; <strong>the</strong>y also gave me <strong>the</strong> privilege to have interesting<br />
conversations with my colleagues, and as most of <strong>the</strong>m were accredited in one or two<br />
neighboring countries <strong>the</strong>y could complete <strong>the</strong>ir information and impressions in Kowno<br />
and Reval.<br />
The attempt on Mr. Voldemaras 5 has once again stressed, in a totally indirect, yet<br />
dramatic manner, <strong>the</strong> irreducibility of <strong>the</strong> conflict between Poland and Lithuania, while <strong>the</strong><br />
series of visits between Riga, Reval and <strong>the</strong> North-Baltic capitals could indicate <strong>the</strong> new<br />
direction that Estonia and Latvia, hopelessly discouraged by this conflict, want to give to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir policy, in <strong>the</strong> search of a moral, if not formal, completion of <strong>the</strong>ir alliance.<br />
1<br />
Frederick W.B. Coleman (1874-1947) a fost ministru al S.U.A. în Letonia în perioada 1922-1932.<br />
2<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza (1886-1980) was a Romanian politician with right-wing views and diplomat. He entered in<br />
diplomacy in 1913 and accomplished <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions in Durazzo, Bern, Budapest, Vienna, Washington, Riga,<br />
Helsinki and Copenhagen. Chargé d'Affaires and <strong>the</strong>n Minister of Romania in Latvia and Estonia (1929-1932, 1932-<br />
1935), Minister of Romania in Copenhagen (1938-1939), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1940).<br />
3<br />
Gheorghe G. Mironescu (1874-1949) was a Romanian politician, member of <strong>the</strong> Democratic Conservative and <strong>the</strong><br />
National Peasant parties. Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1930, 1930-1931), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1928-<br />
1930, 1930-1931, 1932).<br />
4<br />
Or Kovno. The Lithuanian name of <strong>the</strong> locality is Kaunas.<br />
5<br />
May 6 th , 1929
102 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
We do not have <strong>the</strong> slightest doubt that <strong>the</strong> Political Agreement of Warsaw of March<br />
17 th , 1922 between Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, which, according to its 6 th article,<br />
contained <strong>the</strong> germs of such a powerful political and military group, was not, in <strong>the</strong> spirit<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Riga, Reval and Helsingfors governments, to be put into effect until <strong>the</strong> day when,<br />
<strong>the</strong> quarrels unleashed along with Želigovskį’s legion having been tempered, Lithuania<br />
would have decided to adhere to <strong>the</strong> defense pact of <strong>the</strong> four republics. Latvian and<br />
Estonian statesmen rightfully judged that <strong>the</strong> perfection of such an alliance in any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
circumstances, except for those involving <strong>the</strong> maximum possible efficiency and prestige,<br />
would have been ra<strong>the</strong>r troublesome than useful to <strong>the</strong>ir safety, an imprudent provocation<br />
to Soviet Russia, with no real guarantee against its reaction. The Treaty of Skirmunt 1 ,<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise disavowed by Finland, has consequently remained unapproved by Riga and Reval<br />
which, while leaving <strong>the</strong> possibilities of larger achievements open, had built up <strong>the</strong><br />
geographically reduced but technically complete military alliance of November 1 st 1929.<br />
Mr. Balodis, who has been <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Kowno for a long time, recounted<br />
me his futile efforts of reducing <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian resentfulness up to <strong>the</strong> possibility of a<br />
<strong>the</strong>oretical reconciliation with Poland, a reconciliation that would have left open <strong>the</strong> way<br />
to a group of forces, which I think that Mr. Balodis, as well as most numerous political<br />
elements from Latvia and Estonia, honestly considered as being <strong>the</strong> optimal solution of <strong>the</strong><br />
everlasting problem of maintaining <strong>the</strong> national independence of <strong>the</strong> small border<br />
republics.<br />
Today, it seems that <strong>the</strong> same elements have given up this solution and that through a<br />
temporary recommencement, which did not surprise those who were aware of <strong>the</strong><br />
increasing Scandinavianist claims of <strong>the</strong> Baltic states from South to North, Estonia and<br />
Latvia wonder whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y could retreat from such an unattractive political field, a retreat<br />
that Finland probably achieved in 1922 when <strong>the</strong>y promptly disavowed Mr. Holsti 2 , <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs.<br />
The visit exchange between <strong>the</strong> heads of state and <strong>the</strong> politicians from <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
countries would thus constitute <strong>the</strong> preliminaries of a new political orientation of Estonia<br />
and Latvia, within, of course, <strong>the</strong>ir main common interest, that of maintaining <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
national independence.<br />
In such circumstances, I believe that a fair question would be <strong>the</strong> one that follows. Once<br />
<strong>the</strong> possibility of a general Baltic alliance, in which Poland and Lithuania would take part<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r, is excluded (<strong>the</strong> optimal alliance for us and for our friends since, through <strong>the</strong><br />
feature of Polish union, <strong>the</strong> network of military and political links against <strong>the</strong> East from <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic Sea to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea would be complete), isn’t <strong>the</strong> actual solution of a formal military<br />
alliance, reduced to Latvia and Estonia, however inevitably maintained under <strong>the</strong> political<br />
influence of Poland, <strong>the</strong> most convenient for us? In o<strong>the</strong>r words, how should we consider<br />
<strong>the</strong> expansion of this alliance up to Finland and, <strong>the</strong>oretically, even up to Sweden?<br />
1<br />
Constantin Skirmunt (1866–1949) was a Polish politician and diplomat, member of <strong>the</strong> Polish National<br />
Committee in Paris (1917-1918), Minister in Italy (1919-1921), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1921-1922) and Minister in<br />
<strong>the</strong> United Kingdom (1919-1934).<br />
2<br />
Eino Rudolf Woldemar Holsti (1881-1945) was a Finnish politician, journalist, diplomat and professor. Member of<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Progressive Party. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland (1919-1922 and 1936-1938), Finland’s delegate<br />
to <strong>the</strong> League of Nations. Professor at Stanford University.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 103<br />
The question is not useless, and I give <strong>the</strong> floor to Mr. Balodis, in order for him to tell us<br />
if <strong>the</strong> idea of a Baltic-Scandinavian contiguity finds a place in <strong>the</strong> imagination of some of<br />
<strong>the</strong> statesmen of those countries.<br />
“The <strong>relations</strong> between Finland and Latvia were freezing in <strong>the</strong> last years, so that a new<br />
approach seemed to be extremely important. Bearing in mind that <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between<br />
<strong>the</strong> two states in <strong>the</strong> first years of <strong>the</strong>ir independence were exceptionally friendly and<br />
animated, I cherish <strong>the</strong> steady hope that I will succeed in establishing a friendly, vivid<br />
approach between <strong>the</strong>m even <strong>the</strong>se days…. In my speeches, I mainly expressed <strong>the</strong> thought<br />
of a necessary cooperation among <strong>the</strong> Ost 1 -Baltic states. And, if possible, Scandinavia<br />
should be attracted in this tight group (Scandinavia should also be involved in this close<br />
friendship alliance).<br />
First of all I agreed with my Finnish colleague that <strong>the</strong> main duty of Finland and Latvia<br />
was <strong>the</strong> necessity to maintain and consolidate <strong>the</strong>ir independence… Ano<strong>the</strong>r duty of our<br />
policy is to fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Nordic countries, especially with<br />
Sweden… I must say that during this journey to Finland, I came to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that we<br />
can certainly expect a new development of <strong>the</strong> friendly ties between Finland and Latvia…”<br />
My colleague [unclear] directly concerned rightfully believes that a Latvian – Estonian<br />
foreign policy based on <strong>the</strong> platonic aspirations expressed by Mr. Balodis at Helsingfors or<br />
by Mr. Zemgals 2 at Stockholm would be too fanciful to be taken into consideration by us.<br />
Nobody can imagine that <strong>the</strong> two Baltic republics would seek in Sweden and even in<br />
Finland an equivalent for <strong>the</strong> assurance that Poland could give <strong>the</strong>m at some point, or that<br />
<strong>the</strong> latter ones would be ready to offer this assurance.<br />
However, as <strong>the</strong> military attaché of an allied country agreed, regarded from a different<br />
viewpoint, such an action may seem absurd. It could concern not an agreement regarding a<br />
common resistance against an attack from <strong>the</strong> East, but <strong>the</strong> search of new <strong>relations</strong> with a<br />
far less challenging feature, which would set <strong>the</strong> two small republics outside <strong>the</strong> probable<br />
axis of such an attack, a position enjoyed <strong>the</strong>se days by Sweden and most likely even by<br />
Finland. There seems to be no doubt here that in <strong>the</strong> given situation, Latvia and Estonia<br />
would participate without hesitation to <strong>the</strong> driving back of a Bolshevik attack even if it<br />
would only aim at Poland, at first. As for Finland, however, <strong>the</strong> military attaché in question<br />
(who is considered to be, in this case, <strong>the</strong> most well informed person in what concerns <strong>the</strong><br />
political and military issues of <strong>the</strong> Baltic zone and whose area of competence extends from<br />
Kowno to Helsingfors) told me about his conviction that Finland would not sympathize<br />
with its Sou<strong>the</strong>rn neighbors unless it would be itself <strong>the</strong> victim of a Russian aggression, and<br />
that such an aggression seems to be politically improbable and impossible from a militarygeographical<br />
viewpoint. An agreement between <strong>the</strong> three Baltic states in question,<br />
agreement that would include <strong>the</strong> likeliness of a Soviet military action, would not be<br />
achievable unless it was based on a commitment of neutrality in <strong>the</strong> case of a Polish –<br />
Russian conflict, commitment that <strong>the</strong>y would only agree upon if <strong>the</strong>y were tempted by a<br />
guarantee of a different value than <strong>the</strong> one that can be offered by Sweden.<br />
1<br />
East Baltic, from <strong>the</strong> German term Ost, East<br />
2<br />
Gustavs Zemgals (1871-1939) was a Latvia statesman and journalist, <strong>the</strong> second President of Latvia. He was<br />
involved in <strong>the</strong> struggle for independence (Vice-President of Tautas Padome) and held several positions in<br />
government and local administration.
104 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
By relating <strong>the</strong> foregoing to Your Excellency with <strong>the</strong> restrictions to which I am entitled<br />
by my too short stay here, it would be wrong to give <strong>the</strong> impression that in our friendly<br />
circles, in which I have stayed since my arrival in Riga, <strong>the</strong>re are worries concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
meaning of <strong>the</strong> conversations and visits whose witnesses we are today in <strong>the</strong> Baltic region.<br />
The general impression in those circles is actually one of optimism and trust that in Latvia,<br />
as well as in Estonia, <strong>the</strong> competent civil and military circles are fully aware of <strong>the</strong><br />
solidarity of <strong>the</strong> interests that <strong>the</strong> countries threatened by Russia menace. However, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is evidence showing that, under <strong>the</strong>se [unclear], some groups that are discouraged by <strong>the</strong><br />
never-ending Polish – Lithuanian conflict are searching for new potential solutions to<br />
peculiar problems for <strong>the</strong>ir countries. My belief remains, never<strong>the</strong>less, that in <strong>the</strong>se serious<br />
circumstances, which it is natural to contemplate, <strong>the</strong> common sense will triumph against<br />
certain tendencies that are ra<strong>the</strong>r speculative, without having any or much material<br />
substance. I dare adding that <strong>the</strong> possibility of completing or controlling myself, in Reval,<br />
my impressions or <strong>the</strong> opinions of my interlocutors, would be, in such circumstances, very<br />
useful.<br />
In what concerns <strong>the</strong> possibility or likeliness of those severe circumstances, <strong>the</strong> words of<br />
my American colleague 1 (a veteran of <strong>the</strong> Baltic political field, <strong>the</strong> dean of <strong>the</strong> Diplomatic<br />
Corps here and in <strong>the</strong> two neighboring countries, with a staff of over thirty subordinates)<br />
summarize, in my opinion, <strong>the</strong> general widespread belief: “two things are certain; first,<br />
never have <strong>the</strong> Soviets been so far from <strong>the</strong> military and economic potential of attacking as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are today. The second aspect is that <strong>the</strong>y will attack <strong>the</strong>ir Western neighbors,<br />
determined ei<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> development to <strong>the</strong> point of explosion of <strong>the</strong>ir economic situation<br />
or, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, as <strong>the</strong>ir last card, before suicide, before <strong>the</strong> demolishment of this<br />
status.” In this later case, <strong>the</strong> military attaché to whom I previously referred adds that <strong>the</strong><br />
attack would most probably be directed towards <strong>the</strong> small Baltic powers in <strong>the</strong> search of an<br />
effortless victory, a victory that <strong>the</strong> Soviets would immediately need from a domestic<br />
viewpoint.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 102-106.<br />
33. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 45 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 30<br />
iunie 1929<br />
Dacă extrem de scurtul timp pe care l-am petrecut până acum în Riga și în parte grijile<br />
instalării unei legații nu mi-au dat încă prilejul să beneficiez decât în mod cu totul superficial și<br />
indirect de terenul de informație constituit de Țările Baltice și în special de Letonia, am putut<br />
grație indicațiilor colegilor mei din legațiile aliate sau amice să-mi formez ușor o opinie despre<br />
deosebita bogăție a acestui teren.<br />
Dau Excelenței Voastre câteva amănunte, obligatoriu limitate, suficiente cred pentru a arăta<br />
importanța atribuită de alții acestui punct de observație și contraobservație. În afară de<br />
publicațiile și agențiile mai puțin importante, următoarele au agentul lor special aici: Reuters,<br />
Telegraph Union, Exchange Telegraph, Tass, Le Temps, Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily<br />
News, Chicago Tribune, Vossische Zeitung, Havas, Izvestia etc. Legația americană are un<br />
personal de 11 persoane înscrise în lista corpului <strong>diplomatic</strong> sau consular de carieră și în total<br />
1<br />
Frederick W.B. Coleman (1874-1947) was minister of <strong>the</strong> U.S. in Latvia during <strong>the</strong> period 1922-1932.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 105<br />
peste 20 de amploiați, Anglia 12 înscriși în liste și numeroși auxiliari. Sovietele au nouă persoane<br />
înscrise, dar un număr indefinit și veșnic reînnoit de personal auxiliar. Legația Sovietică este<br />
instalată în două mari imobile din care unul îndeosebi este un stabiliment de mărimea unei<br />
adevărate clădiri publice comparându-se cu orișicare minister [de] aici.<br />
Nu este numai experiența mea din activitatea mai ales a două legații din care am făcut parte,<br />
că chiar în ceea ce privește informația specială nu agenții profesionali și retribuiți sunt cei care<br />
aduc cele mai multe informații utile, ci cei de ocazie a căror întâlnire trebuie căutată în cercurile<br />
cele mai variate. Aici, pe lângă cele ce intră în programul obișnuit al unei activități<br />
bineînțeleasă: colegii, personalul inferior al legațiilor și consulatelor, cercurile politice locale,<br />
presa locală, reprezentanții presei străine, vizitatorii străini în reîntoarcere din călătoriile estice,<br />
cercurile financiare etc..., este și categoria deosebit de interesantă a marilor și micilor<br />
comercianți, care mai mult decât orișicare alții au numeroase ocazii și speciale ușurințe de a<br />
străbate granițele rusești.<br />
Dacă întâmplarea poate fi câteodată suficientă pentru a aduce chiar informațiile cele mai<br />
prețioase, o misiune de natura celei de care mai toate legațiile par a fi însărcinate, misiune care,<br />
trebuie observat, implică în anumite cazuri o răspundere specială, nu poate fi conștiincios<br />
bazată decât pe relațiile cele mai diverse și pe contacte continue. Zic continue fiindcă o vizită<br />
sau o întâlnire unică și ad-hoc cu persoana apropiată de cele mai multe ori nu aduce informația<br />
specială căutată care ar fi dată împreună cu altele în cursul unor raporturi mai lungi creatoare<br />
de încredere, de simpatie și de ocazii propice.<br />
Pe cât îmi este de neplăcut de a reveni cu această ocazie asupra unei chestiuni care pare de<br />
caracter mai personal, sunt obligat a semnala cât de greu mi-ar fi îndeplinirea obligațiilor<br />
inerente misiunii mele dacă s-ar reduce chiar în cea mai mică proporție apuntamentele ce din<br />
ordinele Excelenței Voastre mi-au fost atribuite la plecarea mea din București, apuntamente ce<br />
nu cuprindeau decât jumătate din cheltuielile de reprezentare prevăzute de lege (printr-un<br />
calcul făcut cu coeficienți inadecvați) pentru îndeplinirea unei misiuni ce nu este defel una de<br />
simplă prezență (ca de pildă ce a Ministrului Spaniei sau Reprezentantului Argentinei în<br />
localitate), ci una prin excelență de contact permanent cu toate cercurile locale.<br />
Suma lunară de care dispun în momentul de față îmi permite de abia cu sacrificii personale<br />
istovitoare de a monta și întreține în urmă o casă ce este o legație de la care se așteaptă toată<br />
ospitalitatea unei legații, ospitalitate la care sunt de altfel obligat, după cum exprimam mai sus,<br />
sub primejdia de a zădărnici rezultatele primei misiuni ce îmi este încredințată în mod<br />
permanent.<br />
În aceeași ordine de idei, îmi permit a semnala Excelenței Voastre că scrisorile mele de<br />
acreditare în Estonia pentru redactarea cărora se dăduseră instrucțiuni înainte de plecarea mea<br />
nu mi-au parvenit încă. Colegii mei trag cel mai mare folos din posibilitatea de a completa și<br />
controla informațiile lor din Reval. Toate puterile ce au interes cât de mic în supravegherea<br />
împrejurărilor în Baltica când nu sunt reprezentate efectiv în ambele sau chiar cele trei capitale,<br />
întind în schimb competența reprezentantului lor.<br />
Din citirea raportului meu nr. 15 Excelența Voastră va înțelege a atribui un interes particular<br />
posibilității de a fi în Reval cu ocazia sosirii Majestății Sale Regele Suediei 1 . Acest eveniment se<br />
va repeta într-adevăr și aici, dar caracterul mult mai comunicativ al oamenilor politici estonieni<br />
îmi va permite a trage mai multe beneficii din aceste împrejurări speciale. De aceea aș fi fericit<br />
1<br />
Gustaf V, rege al Suediei (1907-1950).
106 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
dacă aș putea prezenta cât mai degrabă scrisorile mele de acreditare în Reval unde de altfel miam<br />
dat în principiu întâlnire cu atașatul nostru militar; competența colonelului Nicolaescu se<br />
întinde de la Varșovia prin Riga la Reval.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 107-110.<br />
33. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 45 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 30 th June 1929<br />
Although <strong>the</strong> short time I have spent in Riga so far and, partially, <strong>the</strong> concerns of<br />
establishing a legation, have given me <strong>the</strong> privilege of benefiting only superficially and<br />
indirectly from <strong>the</strong> field of information constituted by <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries and especially by<br />
Latvia, thanks to <strong>the</strong> indications of my colleagues from <strong>the</strong> allied or friendly legations, I<br />
had <strong>the</strong> possibility to easily elaborate an opinion about <strong>the</strong> distinctive richness of this field.<br />
I shall give to Your Excellency some details, unavoidably limited but sufficient, I think,<br />
in order to illustrate <strong>the</strong> importance attributed by o<strong>the</strong>rs to this point of observation and<br />
counter-observation. Except for <strong>the</strong> less important publications and agencies, <strong>the</strong> following<br />
have <strong>the</strong>ir own special agent here: Reuters, Telegraph Union, Exchange Telegraph, Tass, Le<br />
Temps, Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily News, Chicago Tribune, Vossiche Zeitung,<br />
Havas, Izvestia etc. The American legation has a staff of 11 persons enlisted in <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> or consular corps and a total of over 20 employees; England has 12 persons<br />
enlisted and numerous auxiliaries. The Soviets have nine persons enlisted, but also an<br />
indefinite and constantly renewed number of auxiliary staff. The Soviet legation is installed<br />
in two big buildings, one of which has <strong>the</strong> size of a public building, comparable to any<br />
ministry here.<br />
It is not only my belief resulting especially from <strong>the</strong> activity of two legations in which I<br />
was posted, that even in what concerns <strong>the</strong> special information, it is not <strong>the</strong> professional<br />
paid agents that bring <strong>the</strong> most useful information, but those occasional agents whose<br />
presence must be sought in <strong>the</strong> most varied circles. Here, in addition to <strong>the</strong> habitual<br />
schedule of a self-understood activity: <strong>the</strong> colleagues, <strong>the</strong> inferior staff of legations and<br />
consulates, <strong>the</strong> local political circles, <strong>the</strong> local press, <strong>the</strong> representatives of foreign press,<br />
foreign visitors or those returning from Eastern journeys, financial circles etc…, <strong>the</strong>re is also<br />
<strong>the</strong> particularly interesting category of small and big merchants who, more than everyone<br />
else, enjoy numerous occasions and special facilities of going abroad.<br />
If chance can sometimes be sufficient in order to bring even <strong>the</strong> most precious<br />
information, a mission <strong>the</strong> kind of which almost all legations seem to be involved, a<br />
mission that must be observed involves in some cases a special responsibility can only be<br />
thoroughly based on <strong>the</strong> most different <strong>relations</strong> and continuous contacts. I say continuous<br />
because a visit or a single and ad-hoc meeting with <strong>the</strong> close person usually does not bring<br />
<strong>the</strong> special information that is sought and that would be given toge<strong>the</strong>r with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
information in <strong>the</strong> course of longer <strong>relations</strong>, <strong>relations</strong> that would result in trust, sympathy<br />
and proper occasions.<br />
As unpleasant as it is for me to return on this occasion to a seemingly personal issue, I<br />
have to signal how hard it would be for me to fulfill <strong>the</strong> obligations of my mission if <strong>the</strong><br />
remuneration that, as an effect of Your Excellency’s order, has been given to me at my<br />
departure from Bucharest, would suffer even <strong>the</strong> slightest reduction; a remuneration which
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 107<br />
only comprised half of <strong>the</strong> statutory representation expenses (through a calculation made<br />
using inappropriate coefficients) for <strong>the</strong> fulfillment of a mission that is not one of mere<br />
presence (as, for example, that of <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Spain or <strong>the</strong> Representative of Argentina in<br />
<strong>the</strong> city), but one of permanent contact with <strong>the</strong> local circles par excellence.<br />
The monthly sum that I receive at <strong>the</strong> moment is hardly allowing me to assemble and<br />
maintain a house, that is a legation from which great hospitality is expected, hospitality to<br />
which I am actually obliged, as I previously said, in order to avoid compromising <strong>the</strong> results<br />
of my first permanent mission.<br />
I take <strong>the</strong> permission to signal Your Excellency that my credentials for Estonia, which<br />
were ordered before my departure, have not reached me so far. My colleagues take <strong>the</strong><br />
greatest benefit from <strong>the</strong> possibility of completing and controlling <strong>the</strong>ir information from<br />
Reval. All <strong>the</strong> powers that have <strong>the</strong> slightest interest in supervising <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea<br />
surroundings, when <strong>the</strong>y are not effectively represented in both or all three of <strong>the</strong> capitals,<br />
extend this competence to <strong>the</strong>ir representative.<br />
After reading my report no. 15, Your Excellency will understand <strong>the</strong> need to attribute a<br />
particular interest in <strong>the</strong> possibility of being in Reval on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> arrival of His<br />
Majesty, <strong>the</strong> King of Sweden 1 . This event will probably continue here, but <strong>the</strong> more<br />
communicative nature of <strong>the</strong> Estonian politicians will allow me to gain more benefits from<br />
<strong>the</strong>se special circumstances. That is why I would be happy if I was able to present my<br />
credentials as soon as possible in Reval, where I actually arranged, in principle, a meeting<br />
with our military attaché; Colonel Nicolaescu’s area of competence ranges from Warsaw via<br />
Riga to Reval.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 107-110.<br />
34. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al secretarului de legație al României la Riga Eugeniu<br />
Lukasiewicz nr. 38p. către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G.<br />
Mironescu, 28 septembrie 1929<br />
Azi dimineață am fost primit de Domnul Balodis, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine, întors zilele<br />
acestea de la Geneva. Felicitându-l pentru succesul înregistrat de Letonia prin alegerea Domniei<br />
sale cu un mare număr de voturi pentru unul din locurile de vicepreședinți ai Adunării 2 ,<br />
Domnia sa s-a arătat încântat de ultima sesiune a Ligii. Mi-a vorbit apoi cu multă satisfacție<br />
despre Excelența Sa Dl. Ministru Mironescu ale cărui curtoazie și afabilitate l-au impresionat<br />
plăcut.<br />
Acordurile feroviare încheiate de noi cu Polonia în anul acesta, precum și acordul deja<br />
existent între Polonia și Letonia ar ușura mult traficul între ambele țări.<br />
Îmi permit a atrage atenția Excelenței Voastre că în raportul meu nr. 179 din 23 august,<br />
referitor la publicarea unui număr consacrat României de către ziarul local „Latvijas Tirgotājs”,<br />
raport asupra căruia nu am avut până în prezent vreun răspuns, am semnalat deja<br />
oportunitatea stabilirii unor legături comerciale mai strânse între ambele țări.<br />
În această ordine de idei cred că o primă necesitate ar fi ca Banca Națională și Banca<br />
Letoniei să intre în contact pentru a se putea ajunge la ușurarea operațiunilor bancare. Întradevăr,<br />
până în momentul de față nici leul nu este cotat la Riga, nici latul la București. Adesea<br />
1<br />
Gustaf V, King of Sweden (1907-1950).<br />
2<br />
Adunarea Societății Națiunilor.
108 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
am primit plângeri la Legație și cereri de a schimba lei; băncile din localitate nu au aproape<br />
nicio legătură cu cele din București și chiar pentru trimiterea unui cec sunt greutăți aproape<br />
insurmontabile. Amintesc în treacăt că fondurile expediate de Minister acestui oficiu sosesc cu<br />
întârzieri adesea extrem de neplăcute, operațiunile urmând a fi efectuate prin intermediul<br />
diferitelor bănci engleze, germane, suedeze etc.<br />
Revenind la conversația mea cu Domnul Balodis, la întrebarea ce i-am pus asupra părerii<br />
Domniei sale cu privire la schimbarea de guvern din Lituania, Domnia sa nu s-a putut lipsi de a-<br />
și manifesta satisfacția pentru căderea lui Voldemaras 1 : „Voilà un bon débarras pour tout le<br />
monde” a fost exclamația cu care Dl Balodis a răspuns întrebării mele. (În treacăt fie amintit că<br />
Domnia sa a fost acum câțiva ani reprezentant al Letoniei la Kowno și nu a avut a se lăuda de<br />
raporturile Domniei Sale cu Voldemaras).<br />
„Tūbelis est un homme plus conciliant et avec lequel on pourra causer plus facilement” este<br />
părerea Domnului Balodis asupra noului președinte al Consiliului lituanian. Chestiunea cea mai<br />
delicată între ambele țări, adică a imigranților lituanieni refugiați în Letonia (aderenți ai lui<br />
Pletkchaitis 2 și alți conspiratori ejusdem farinae 3 ), asupra cărora Voldemaras se arăta de o<br />
intransigență violentă, cerând expulzarea lor, va putea de acum încolo intra într-o fază mai<br />
calmă. Domnul Balodis crede că noul guvern din Kowno se va ocupa în special de ameliorarea<br />
situației economice și financiare, Dl. Tūbelis 4 – care, între paranteze fie zis, e foarte bolnăvicios<br />
– fiind un specialist în materie agrară și cooperativă.<br />
E de așteptat, crede Domnul Balodis, ca regimul de teroare, stare de asediu, cenzură etc.<br />
care domnește în țara vecină să fie puțin atenuat de noul Guvern; în ceea ce privește însă<br />
politica externă a Lituaniei și în special raporturile cu Polonia, nu trebuie să ne facem nicio<br />
iluzie, directivele noului cabinet fiind identice cu cele urmate până acum de Voldemaras.<br />
În fond, căderea acestuia se datorează, după părerea Domnului Balodis, în cea mai mare<br />
parte aroganței sale și modului brutal 5 cu care se obișnuise a trata pe colegii săi de cabinet și<br />
chiar pe președintele Republicii, Smetona 6 , căruia voia să-i impună toate concepțiile sale.<br />
Maniera Domnului Voldemaras a avut de altfel darul de a-i aliena multe simpatii europene și de<br />
a șoca adesea membrii Adunării de la Geneva.<br />
În fine, Dl. Balodis a exprimat regretul pentru eșecul propunerii susținute de Finlanda de<br />
ajutorare cel puțin financiară a Statelor atacate, și venind a vorbi de chestiunile financiare și de<br />
atotputernicia americană, Dl. Balodis a terminat conversația cu o butadă, făcând comparația<br />
între „Golf Stream-ul” care ne vine din America și „Gold Stream-ul” care se revarsă din Europa<br />
spre America.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 140-<br />
142.<br />
1<br />
Augustinas Voldemaras (1883-1942) a fost un politician nationalist lituanian, Prim Ministru (1918, 1926-1929), a<br />
susținut lovitura de stat din 1926 și s-a apropiat ulterior de forțele de extrema dreaptă.<br />
2<br />
Autorul se referă probabil la liderul social-democrat lituanian J. Plečkaitis.<br />
3<br />
De aceeași natură, expresie latinească.<br />
4<br />
Juozas Tūbelis (1882-1939) a fost un politician lituanian, Prim Ministru (1929-1934) și ministru în mai multe<br />
rânduri.<br />
5<br />
În original, brusc.<br />
6<br />
Antanas Smetona (1874-1944) a fost un politician naționalist lituanian care și-a adus o contribuție esențială la<br />
independența acestei țări, a fost primul său președinte democrat (1919-1920) și apoi președinte autoritar al acestei<br />
țări (1926-1940).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 109<br />
34. Diplomatic report by Romanian Legation Secretary in Riga Eugeniu Lukasiewicz<br />
no. 38p. to Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 28 th September 1929<br />
This morning Mr. Balodis, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs, who just came from Geneva,<br />
received me. As I congratulated him for <strong>the</strong> success that Latvia had through his election,<br />
with a large number of votes, as a vice-president of <strong>the</strong> Assembly 1 , he expressed his delight<br />
with <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> latest League session. Then, he showed much satisfaction when<br />
talking about His Excellency, Minister Mironescu, whose courtesy and affability pleasantly<br />
impressed him.<br />
The railway agreements that we completed with Poland this year, as well as <strong>the</strong> already<br />
existing agreement between Poland and Latvia would considerably facilitate <strong>the</strong> traffic<br />
between <strong>the</strong> two countries.<br />
I take <strong>the</strong> permission to bring into Your Excellency’s attention that in my report no. 179<br />
of August 23 rd , referring to <strong>the</strong> publication of an issue dedicated to Romania of <strong>the</strong> local<br />
newspaper “Latvija Tirgotajs”, report to which I have not receive any answer so far, I have<br />
already announced <strong>the</strong> opportunity of establishing stronger commercial ties between <strong>the</strong><br />
two countries.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, I believe that one of <strong>the</strong> main necessities would be for <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Bank and <strong>the</strong> Bank of Latvia establish a contact in order to facilitate <strong>the</strong> banking<br />
operations. It is true that up to now, nei<strong>the</strong>r is <strong>the</strong> leu marketable in Riga, nor <strong>the</strong> lat in<br />
Bucharest. I have frequently received complaints at <strong>the</strong> Legation and requests of<br />
exchanging lei; <strong>the</strong> local banks have almost no connections to those from Bucharest and<br />
one is confronted with almost insurmountable difficulties even for sending a cheque. I<br />
briefly remind you that <strong>the</strong> funds sent by <strong>the</strong> Ministry to this office arrive with delays that<br />
are often extremely unpleasant, <strong>the</strong> operations being made by <strong>the</strong> means of different<br />
English, German, Swedish, etc. banks.<br />
As for my conversation with Mr. Balodis, when I asked for his opinion concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
change of government in Lithuania, he could not refrain from expressing his satisfaction<br />
caused by Voldemaras 2 ’s fall. “Here’s a good riddance for everyone” he exclaimed, as an<br />
answer to my question. (I briefly remind you that he used to be, some years ago, <strong>the</strong><br />
representative of Latvia in Kowno and he could not have said anything good about his<br />
<strong>relations</strong> with Voldemaras).<br />
“Tūbelis 3 is a more conciliatory person and with whom we can speak more easily” is Mr.<br />
Balodis’ opinion concerning <strong>the</strong> new president of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian Council. The most<br />
delicate issue in both countries, that of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian refugees in Latvia (adherents of<br />
Pletkachaitis 4 and o<strong>the</strong>r conspirators ejusdem farinae 5 ) to whom Voldemaras showed a<br />
violent intransigency, asking for <strong>the</strong>ir expulsion, will henceforth enter a calmer phase. Mr.<br />
Balodis believes that <strong>the</strong> new government from Kowno will especially try to improve <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Assembly of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations.<br />
2<br />
Augustinas Voldemaras (1883-1942), Lithuanian nationalist, Prime-Minister in 1918 and 1926-1929, supported <strong>the</strong><br />
1926 coup and eventually drew closer to <strong>the</strong> extreme right forces.<br />
3<br />
Juozas Tūbelis (1882-1939) was a Lithuanian politician, Prime Minister (1929-1934) and minister on several<br />
occasions.<br />
4<br />
The author perhaps refers to Social-Democrat leader J. Plečkaitis.<br />
5<br />
For <strong>the</strong> same fear (Latin)
110 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
economic and financial situation, Mr. Tūbelis – who, by <strong>the</strong> way, is very sickly – being a<br />
specialist in agrarian and co-operative matters.<br />
It is likely, as Mr. Balodis believes, that <strong>the</strong> terror regime, <strong>the</strong> curfew, censorship etc,<br />
that governs <strong>the</strong> neighboring country, will be slightly diminished by <strong>the</strong> new Government;<br />
however, in what concerns Lithuania’s foreign policy and especially <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with<br />
Poland, we should not make any illusions, <strong>the</strong> new government’s directives being identical<br />
to those followed until now by Voldemaras.<br />
Ultimately, his fall is due, according to Mr. Balodis, mostly to his arrogance and his rude<br />
manner of treating his cabinet colleagues and even <strong>the</strong> president of <strong>the</strong> Republic, Smetona 1 ,<br />
upon whom he wanted to impose his ideas. Mr. Voldemaras’ manner alienated many of his<br />
European sympathies and frequently shocked <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> Assembly of Geneva.<br />
Finally, Mr. Balodis expressed his regret for <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> proposition sustained by<br />
Finland to help, at least financially, <strong>the</strong> attacked states and, by speaking of <strong>the</strong> financial<br />
issues and of <strong>the</strong> American almightiness, Mr. Balodis ended <strong>the</strong> conversation with an irony,<br />
comparing <strong>the</strong> “Golf Stream” that comes from America and <strong>the</strong> “Gold Stream” that effuses<br />
from Europe to America.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 140-142.<br />
35. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 42<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, octombrie 1929<br />
Într-o întrevedere ce am avut-o astăzi cu Domnul Celmiņš, Președintele Consiliului,<br />
Domnia sa a găsit ocazia a exprima încrederea în solidaritatea spontană ce ar reuni țările din<br />
Estul Europei egal interesate în apărarea independenței lor naționale, dacă această<br />
independență ar fi vreodată amenințată de un vecin comun. Domnia sa a adăugat că o<br />
asemenea amenințare nu i s-a părut niciodată mai îndepărtată decât astăzi.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 111<br />
35. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 42 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, October 1929<br />
In a meeting I had today with Mr. Celminš, <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council, he found <strong>the</strong><br />
occasion to express his trust in <strong>the</strong> spontaneous solidarity that would reunite <strong>the</strong> countries<br />
of Eastern Europe equally interested in defending <strong>the</strong>ir national independence, if this<br />
independence had ever been threatened by a common neighbor. He added that such a<br />
threat never seemed more unlikely than today.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 111.<br />
36. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 50<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, noiembrie 1929<br />
Dl. Balodis mi-a reînnoit astăzi propunerile făcute Excelenței Voastre la Geneva relative la<br />
Tratatul de Comerț. Domnia sa m-a rugat a-l informa dacă aceste propuneri sunt primite în<br />
principiu spre a aviza de comun acord începerea negocierilor. Dl. Balodis ar dori ca pe bază de<br />
1<br />
Antanas Smetona (1874-1944), Lithuanian nationalist playing an important role in <strong>the</strong> proclamation of<br />
Lithuania’s independence in 1918, <strong>the</strong> first President of democratic Lithuania (1919-1920) and its authoritarian<br />
President (1926-1940).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 111<br />
reciprocitate să fie stabilite liste de mărfuri beneficiind de tarif minimal; tariful leton este ca și al<br />
nostru pe două coloane. Letonia luptând pentru dezvoltarea [unui] bilanț comercial activ și<br />
suferind [în] unele privințe supraproducție industrială, este de așteptat ca de partea sa lista să<br />
cuprindă toate mărfurile prezentând interes oarecare.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 118<br />
36. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 50 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, November 1929<br />
Today, Mr. Balodis renewed <strong>the</strong> propositions he made to Your Excellency at Geneva<br />
with regard to <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Commerce. He asked me to inform him if <strong>the</strong>se propositions<br />
are received in principle in order to commonly approve <strong>the</strong> commencement of<br />
negotiations. Mr. Balodis would like, on <strong>the</strong> basis of mutuality, to establish lists of<br />
merchandises that would benefit from minimal tariffs; <strong>the</strong> Latvian tariff lies, <strong>the</strong> same as<br />
ours, on two columns. As Latvia is struggling to develop an active balance sheet and suffers,<br />
in some respects, from industrial overproduction, as far as <strong>the</strong>y are concerned, <strong>the</strong>ir list<br />
would contain all <strong>the</strong> potentially interesting merchandise.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 118.<br />
37. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 90 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 4<br />
martie 1930<br />
Presa baltică a înregistrat zilele acestea zvonurile unei posibile vizite a Domnului<br />
Strandman 1 , Președintele de Stat Estonian, la Kowno. Informându-mă în locul competent, am<br />
aflat că de o asemenea vizită nu este într-adevăr vorba. Am câștigat impresia totuși că aceste<br />
zvonuri ar putea să aibă foarte bine Revalul ca origine, constituind o parte din manopera de<br />
învăluire prin care se încearcă a se hotărî Guvernul leton de organizare a vizitei Președintelui<br />
Zemgals la Varșovia în timpul cuvenit pentru ca Președintele Republicii Polone să poată înapoia<br />
în aceeași călătorie vizitele la Riga și Reval.<br />
Curentele de opinie favorabile unei apropieri mai strânse între Letonia și Estonia, pe de o<br />
parte, și Lituania, pe de alta, câștigaseră mai ales în Riga, în ultimele vremuri, o deosebită<br />
consistență. Partizanii acestei „Mici Antante Baltice” care se recrutează nu numai din cercurile<br />
social-democrate, dar chiar din cele mai puțin susceptibile de a fi acuzate de sentimente<br />
favorabile Sovietelor, propovăduiesc acest nou curs al politicii externe letone, combinându-l cu<br />
un proces de apropiere economică de Rusia și Germania. Afară de cercurile și presa germană<br />
acest curent nu pare a fi găsit mulți adepți în Estonia, dar dacă el ar triumfa sau chiar dacă ar<br />
mai lua oarecare dezvoltare în Letonia ar constitui pentru politica polonă în Țările Baltice o<br />
adevărată primejdie.<br />
Față de această stare de fapt guvernul din Varșovia, perfect informat de reprezentanții săi, s-<br />
ar hotărî a lua taurul de coarne și a provoca în Letonia, prin surpriza creată de vizita Domnului<br />
1<br />
Otto August Strandman (1875-1941) a fost politician și diplomat estonian cu vederi de centru stânga, unul dintre<br />
realizatorii reformei agrare de după cucerirea independenței și a Constituției din 1920. Șef de stat (1929-1931), Prim<br />
Ministru (1919), Ministru de Externe (1918, 1920-1921, 1924), președinte al adunării legislative (1917-1918, 1921),<br />
Ministru al Estoniei la Varșovia (1927-1929). S-a sinucis pentru a nu fi arestat de autoritățile de ocupație sovietice.
112 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Strandman în Varșovia, o criză de opinie al cărei deznodământ acești reprezentanți optimiști îl<br />
prevăd favorabil reafirmării autorității Poloniei în Țările Baltice.<br />
Pentru a ușura situația guvernului leton față de grupurile majorității parlamentare ostile<br />
ideii vizitei Domnului Zemgals în Varșovia, guvernul polon a remis 1 până în august călătoria<br />
Domnului Mościcki 2 la Reval, și dând dovadă de mult tact politic a declarat că nu numai [că] nu<br />
ar vedea cu ochi răi o vizită prealabilă a Domnului Zemgals la Kowno, dar chiar s-ar ferici de un<br />
asemenea eveniment. Situația guvernului Domnului Celmiņš, care beneficiază în Parlament de<br />
o majoritate numai de cinci voturi, este așa de șubredă însă că chiar (sic!) în asemenea condiții<br />
ezită a înfrunta curentele ostile vizitei polone. Anunțarea călătoriei Domnului Strandman la<br />
Kowno ar fi destinată a folosi de imbold opiniei publice letone care s-ar putea crede în<br />
primejdie de a vedea țara ei luată înainte și pe această cale de vecina ei, vecină ce până acum a<br />
avut monopolul inițiativelor în politica baltică.<br />
Este evident că dacă programul schimburilor de vizite în Baltica și între Baltica și Polonia s-<br />
ar îndeplini exact după dorințele guvernului din Varșovia, aceasta ar însemna un deplin succes<br />
pentru politica sa, care este una de preponderență în Estonia și Letonia FĂRĂ A DISTRUGE<br />
LEGĂTURILE DE PRIETENIE ÎNTRE ACESTE DOUĂ ȚĂRI ȘI LITUANIA. Aflu însă că guvernul<br />
din Kowno, cu intransigența sa obișnuită, pune vizitei Domnului Zemgals unele condiții de<br />
natură a anula tot avantajul ce această vizită l-ar prezenta din punct de vedere al pacificării<br />
spiritelor în această parte a Europei. Minimul ce s-ar cere Domnului Zemgals este de a asculta<br />
fără a reacționa declarații virulente ale colegului său lituanian în chestiunea Vilnei. Este sigur că<br />
Polonia nu ar admite aceasta și tot atât de sigur, după declarațiile colegului meu lituanian, că<br />
Kowno nu va primi pe domnul Zemgals cât timp Domnia sa nu se va declara gata a admite că<br />
aceasta nu este capitala țării pe care o vizitează.<br />
Din conversațiile pe care le-am avut în locurile cuvenite m-am putut convinge că Dl.<br />
Celmiņš este personal cu totul favorabil vizitei Președintelui Zemgals în Varșovia; înainte de a<br />
căuta o hotărâre însă el va aștepta realegerea acestuia ce va avea loc în mai. Am cules însă<br />
totodată impresia că opoziția în Parlament și opinia publică pe care Dl. Celmiņš sau alt<br />
Președinte de Consiliu le-ar întâlni sunt atât de importante încât Letonia ar putea să fie silită să<br />
renunțe la această manifestație de solidaritate politică cu aliata și vecina ei Estonia.<br />
Dacă un asemenea lucru se va întâmpla, dacă contrariul celor ce am văzut cu ocazia<br />
schimbului de vizite cu Suedia Guvernul leton de astă dată va desolidariza politica sa externă de<br />
cea a Estoniei și se va hotărî definitiv a nu urma față de Varșovia politica de apropiere, de alianță<br />
de fapt, urmată de vecina sa, mă întreb dacă nu va trebui să considerăm că un nou curs politic a<br />
fost inaugurat în Baltica, un curs politic ce ne interesează în primul grad deoarece ar<br />
compromite opera de solidificare a zidului statelor burgheze în buna cale de alcătuire de la<br />
Marea Neagră la cea Baltică. Mă întreb de asemenea dacă nu s-ar indica ca, în limita foarte<br />
redusă într-adevăr a posibilităților noastre, să participăm la încercarea de a evita sau de a<br />
controla o atât de importantă preschimbare. Cred că în această privință prezența intermitentă a<br />
unui reprezentant român în Kowno ar putea prezenta sensibile avantaje.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 211-214.<br />
1<br />
A amânat.<br />
2<br />
Ignacy Mościcki (1867-1946) a fost un profesor, cercetător și om de stat polonez, Președinte al Poloniei (1926-<br />
1939). Retras în România din fața trupelor germane, ulterior s-a stabilit lângă Geneva unde s-a stins din viață.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 113<br />
37. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 90 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 4 th March 1930<br />
The Baltic press noted <strong>the</strong>se days <strong>the</strong> rumors of a potential visit of Mr. Strandman 1 , <strong>the</strong><br />
Estonian Chief of State, to Kowno. As I ga<strong>the</strong>red my information from reliable sources, I<br />
learned that such a visit was not actually possible. I got, however, <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
rumors could well stem from Reval, constituting a part of <strong>the</strong> flanking maneuver by which<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian Government was trying to organize President Zemgals’s visit to Warsaw in due<br />
time so that <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Polish Republic would be able to return <strong>the</strong> visit within<br />
<strong>the</strong> same trip to Riga and Reval.<br />
The groundswells in favor of a closer <strong>relations</strong>hip between Latvia and Estonia, on <strong>the</strong><br />
one hand, and Romania, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, have gained lately, especially in Riga, a distinct<br />
consistency. The partisans of this “Little Baltic Entente” who are recruited not only from<br />
<strong>the</strong> social-democratic circles, but also from <strong>the</strong> ones less susceptible of being accused of<br />
maintaining favorable connections with <strong>the</strong> Soviets, militate for this new course of Latvian<br />
foreign policy and integrate it with a friendly economic process in <strong>relations</strong> with Russia and<br />
Germany. Except for <strong>the</strong> German circles and press, this movement does not seem to have<br />
ga<strong>the</strong>red many followers in Estonia, but if this movement gained <strong>the</strong> upper hand or if it<br />
were to be fur<strong>the</strong>r developed in Latvia, it could be considered a real danger for <strong>the</strong> Polish<br />
politics throughout <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries.<br />
With regard to this state of affairs, <strong>the</strong> government of Warsaw, which is thoroughly<br />
informed by its representatives, could decide to take <strong>the</strong> bull by its horns and cause an<br />
opinion crisis in Latvia by means of <strong>the</strong> surprise created by <strong>the</strong> Mr. Strandman’s visit in<br />
Warsaw. These optimistic representatives consider <strong>the</strong> resolution of this opinion crisis to<br />
be favorable as regards <strong>the</strong> Polish authority within <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
In order to make things easier for <strong>the</strong> Latvian government in respect to <strong>the</strong> groups of<br />
<strong>the</strong> parliamentary majority which are hostile to <strong>the</strong> idea of Mr. Zemgals visiting Warsaw,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Polish government have delayed until August Mr. Mościcki 2 ’s voyage to Reval and by<br />
proving great political abilities, <strong>the</strong>y have declared that <strong>the</strong>y would not see Mr. Zemgals’<br />
visit to Kowno with woeful eyes, but on <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong>y would be happy to see this<br />
happening. The situation of Mr. Celmiņš’ government, which benefits from a majority of<br />
only five votes inside <strong>the</strong> Parliament, has become so weakened, that, under <strong>the</strong>se<br />
circumstances, it hesitates to confront <strong>the</strong> hostile currents of <strong>the</strong> Polish visit. The<br />
announcement of Mr. Strandman’s trip to Kowno should be used as an impulse for <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian public opinion which might think <strong>the</strong>y are in jeopardy of seeing <strong>the</strong>ir country be<br />
outdone by <strong>the</strong>ir neighbor who has had so far <strong>the</strong> upper hand of <strong>the</strong> initiatives regarding<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic politics.<br />
It is obvious that if <strong>the</strong> visit exchange programme within <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and between<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic States and Poland was fulfilled according to <strong>the</strong> wishes of <strong>the</strong> Warsaw<br />
1<br />
Otto August Strandman (1875-1941) was a center-left Estonian politician and diplomat, one of <strong>the</strong> creators of <strong>the</strong><br />
land reform after independence and <strong>the</strong> Constitution of 1920. Head of State (1929-1931), Prime Minister (1919),<br />
Foreign Minister (1918, 1920-1921, 1924), President of <strong>the</strong> Legislative Assembly (1917-1918, 1921), Minister of Estonia<br />
in Warsaw (1927-1929) . He committed suicide to avoid being arrested by Soviet occupation authorities.<br />
2<br />
Ignacy Mościcki (1867-1946) was a Polish professor, renown scholar and statesman. President of Poland (1926-<br />
1939). He withdrew to Romania to avoind being captured by German troops and subsequently settled near Geneva<br />
where he died.
114 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
government, it would be considered a great success for its policy of seeking preponderance<br />
in Estonia and Latvia, WITHOUT DESTROYING THE FRIENDSHIP RELATIONS<br />
BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES AND LITHUANIA. I learn that <strong>the</strong> Kowno<br />
government, known for its intransigency, lays down certain conditions to Mr. Zemgals’<br />
visit, conditions that might quash <strong>the</strong> advantage that this visit brings regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
pacification of <strong>the</strong> spirits in this part of Europe. The only thing that Mr. Zemgals is required<br />
to do is to listen without giving virulent statements to his Lithuanian colleague with regard<br />
to <strong>the</strong> matter of Vilnius. It is certain that Poland would not admit it, and it is almost certain<br />
that, according to my Lithuanian colleague, Kowno would not receive Mr. Zemgals as long<br />
as he does not acknowledge that this city is not <strong>the</strong> capital of <strong>the</strong> country he is about to<br />
visit.<br />
Taking into account <strong>the</strong> conversations that I had in appropriate places, I became<br />
convinced that Mr. Celmiņš was in complete agreement with President Zemgal’s visit to<br />
Warsaw; before taking a decision, he will wait for his reelection in May. I have got <strong>the</strong><br />
impression that <strong>the</strong> opposition inside <strong>the</strong> Parliament and <strong>the</strong> public opinion that Mr.<br />
Celmiņš and any o<strong>the</strong>r President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers would encounter is so weighty<br />
that Latvia could be forced to give up this manifestation of political solidarity with its ally<br />
and its neighbor, Estonia.<br />
Should such a thing happen, should, contrary to what I have seen on <strong>the</strong> occasion of<br />
visit exchange with Sweden, <strong>the</strong> Latvian government dissociate its external politics from its<br />
Estonian mate and decide not to accept <strong>the</strong> intimate, in fact alliance policy with Warsaw<br />
followed by its neighbor, I wonder if we should not state that a new political course has<br />
been inaugurated in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, a fresh political course that we are interested in<br />
mainly because it would compromise <strong>the</strong> solidification work of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois states’ wall. I<br />
also wonder, whe<strong>the</strong>r, in spite of our possibilities reduced in this respect, we should try to<br />
avoid or control such an important conversion. I think that <strong>the</strong> intermittent presence of a<br />
Romanian representative in Kowno would bring sensitive advantages in this respect.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 211-214.<br />
38. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 105 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />
14 martie 1930<br />
Strict confidențial<br />
Colegul meu polon, dl Arciszewski 1 , mi-a făcut, cu toate menajamentele cuvenite,<br />
următoarea comunicare.<br />
Colonelul Pełczyński 2 , șeful Biroului 2 al Statului Major din Varșovia, a părăsit zilele acestea<br />
Riga după o călătorie de contact și inspecție în capitalele celor două țări baltice și de-a lungul<br />
granițelor estice ale Letoniei și Estoniei. Domnia sa s-a arătat foarte satisfăcut de soliditatea<br />
acestor granițe atât din punctul de vedere al spiritului populației (după planul defensiv al<br />
Statelor Majore baltice acoperirea granițelor este încredințată elementelor de recrutare locale,<br />
1<br />
Mirosław Arciszewski (1892–1963) a fost diplomat polonez, Ministru al Poloniei la Riga (1929-1932) și București<br />
(1932-1938), adjunct al Ministrului de Externe (1938-1939).<br />
2<br />
Tadeusz Pełczyński (1892-1985) a fost general maior polonez, șef al Secției a II-a a Marelui Stat Major (informații<br />
militare), șef de Stat Major și apoi Comandant adjunct al armatei de rezistență din Polonia – Armia Krajowa (1941-<br />
1944).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 115<br />
mobilizate și concentrate în aceeași operațiune) cât și din punctul de vedere al dispozițiilor<br />
adoptate și al înzestrării tehnice (întărituri și drumuri în special).<br />
Fiind adus a se exprima asupra valorii comparative de rezistență a porțiunilor graniței<br />
Europei burgheze de la Marea Baltică la Marea Neagră, colonelul Pełczyński a informat pe dl.<br />
Arciszewski că după părerea Statului Major polon porțiunea cea mai fragilă este granița<br />
Basarabiei – aceasta din cauza neîndestulării mijloacelor de comunicație și din cauza spiritului<br />
populației, spirit pe care îl atribuie mai ales insuficienței din punctul de vedere moral și național<br />
al administrației locale – Nota Bene: Observația colonelului Pełczyński nu se referea la valoarea<br />
comparativă a armatelor respective, ci numai la elementul precis al rezistenței granițelor.<br />
Am făcut observația Domnului Arciszewski că opinia Biroului 2 era probabil în mare parte<br />
bazată pe informațiile exagerate ale ziarelor noastre; nu m-am crezut însă autorizat a o păstra<br />
fără a transmite mai departe comunicarea domniei sale.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 219-<br />
220.<br />
38. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 105 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 14 th March 1930<br />
Strictly confidential<br />
My Polish colleague, Mr. Arciszewski, has informed me of <strong>the</strong> following matters, with all <strong>the</strong><br />
appropriate respect.<br />
Colonel Pełczyński 1 , <strong>the</strong> Head of <strong>the</strong> Second Bureau of <strong>the</strong> General Staff in Warsaw, has<br />
recently left Riga after taking a trip to inspect <strong>the</strong> capitals of <strong>the</strong> two Baltic States and<br />
across <strong>the</strong> Eastern borders of Latvia and Estonia. He was pleased by <strong>the</strong> strength of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
borders, both in terms of <strong>the</strong> spirit of <strong>the</strong> population (according to <strong>the</strong> defensive plan of <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic General Staffs, <strong>the</strong> boundary protection is assigned to <strong>the</strong> elements of local<br />
recruitment which are mobilized and centralized within <strong>the</strong> same operation) and of <strong>the</strong><br />
adopted dispositions and <strong>the</strong> technical endowment (fortifications and roads, especially).<br />
Being asked to comment on <strong>the</strong> comparative value of resistance, regarding <strong>the</strong> borders<br />
of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois Europe from <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea, Colonel Pełczyński has<br />
informed Mr. Arciszewski that, according to <strong>the</strong> Polish General Staff, <strong>the</strong> most vulnerable<br />
section is <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian border – because of <strong>the</strong> inexistence of means of communication<br />
and because of <strong>the</strong> population spirit, an attitude he morally and nationally associated to<br />
<strong>the</strong> local administration. Nota Bene: Colonel Pełczyński’s remark did not concern <strong>the</strong><br />
comparative value of <strong>the</strong> respective armies, but only <strong>the</strong> precise element of border<br />
resistance.<br />
I mentioned to Mr. Arciszewski’s that <strong>the</strong> opinion of <strong>the</strong> Second Bureau was probably<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> exaggerated information released by our newspapers; I did not think of me as<br />
an authorized person to keep his message just for myself and not share it.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 219-220.<br />
1<br />
Tadeusz Pełczyński (1892-1985) was a Polish Major General, Chief of Second Section of <strong>the</strong> General Staff (military<br />
intelligence), Chief of Staff and <strong>the</strong>n Deputy Commander of <strong>the</strong> Polish Home Army - <strong>the</strong> Armia Krajowa (1941-<br />
1944 )
116 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
39. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 130 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />
20 martie 1930<br />
Răspuns la telegrama nr. 17989 din martie curent.<br />
Am comunicat domnului secretar Lukasiewicz 1 ordinul de transferare la Budapesta pe ziua<br />
de 15 aprilie. Voi regreta mult plecarea domnului Lukasiewicz, a cărui colaborare învățasem a o<br />
aprecia.<br />
În cazul mai ales când voi urma să fiu succedat în această legație de o persoană în afară de<br />
carieră 2 , după cum mi-o anunțaseră telegramele Excelenței Voastre, aș crede foarte util ca<br />
înlocuitorul domnului Lukasiewicz să vină cât mai curând posibil la Riga, aceasta pentru a-mi<br />
da timpul a-l pune cât mai complet la curent cu serviciul Domniei sale și împrejurările locale.<br />
Într-un mod general îmi permit a face următoarele sugestii în ceea ce privește completarea<br />
personalului Legației din Riga. Aceasta, în afară de personalul actual (șeful misiunii, un secretar,<br />
o interpretă-dactilografă) ar trebui, cred, să cuprindă: un cancelar dactilograf român și un atașat<br />
de presă. Amintesc că, după ultimele liste ale Ministerului Afacerilor leton, Legația Statelor<br />
Unite întrebuințează 34 funcționari, cea a Marii Britanii 17, cea a Sovietelor 87 etc. Acestea și<br />
alte legații dispun în plus de serviciile reprezentanților ziarelor și agențiilor de presă ale țării lor.<br />
Completarea personalului său ar permite acestei legații regale a face pentru propriul său<br />
cont ceea ce Legațiile Statelor Unite și a Marii Britanii fac cu atâta atenție: urmărirea presei<br />
rusești și în special a revistelor și publicațiilor tehnice pentru culegerea, confruntarea și<br />
controlul cifrelor și indicațiilor de natură economică, financiară, comercială, agrară etc, cifre și<br />
indicații care prezintă mai mult interes și mai multă temeinicie decât orișice alt izvor de<br />
informație.<br />
Într-adevăr, în afară de cazul problematic al unei revoluții de palat sau al altor evenimente<br />
dramatice în Kremlin, evoluția evenimentelor în Rusia va fi după toate probabilitățile guvernată<br />
exclusiv de o chestiune de cifre. S-a observat că nu de puține ori cele date de înseși serviciile<br />
statistice ale Sovietelor permiteau a rectifica informațiile răspândite de ele pe altă cale, aceasta<br />
explicându-se prin dificultatea, imposibilitatea chiar de a coordona falsificarea sau alterarea<br />
întregului aparat de cifre reprezentând activitatea economică a unei țări. Pentru a trage însă din<br />
controlul acestui aparat prețioasele indicații ce le ține sau le-ar putea ține la dispoziția noastră,<br />
mărirea indicată aici la personalul Legației Române din Riga, ar fi, cred, un minim<br />
indispensabil.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 228-<br />
229.<br />
39. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 130 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 20 th March 1930<br />
Response to <strong>the</strong> telegram no. 17989 from March, this year:<br />
I communicated to <strong>the</strong> Secretary, Mr. Lukasiewicz 3 , <strong>the</strong> order of transfer to Budapest on<br />
April 15 th . I will greatly regret Mr. Lukasiewicz’s leaving, especially now that I learned to<br />
appreciate his collaboration.<br />
1<br />
Sau Lucasiewicz.<br />
2<br />
Referire la fruntașul basarabean Ion Pelivan.<br />
3<br />
Or, else, Lucasiewicz.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 117<br />
In case I am to be succeeded at <strong>the</strong> head of this legation by a person from outside <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> corps 1 as I learned from <strong>the</strong> telegrams of Your Excellency, I think that it would<br />
be useful for Mr. Lukasiewicz’s replacement to come as soon as possible to Riga, so that I<br />
can accustom him with his duties and <strong>the</strong> local circumstances.<br />
Generally speaking, I dare make <strong>the</strong> following suggestions regarding <strong>the</strong> completion of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Riga Legation staff. This legation, apart from <strong>the</strong> existing staff (<strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> mission,<br />
a secretary, an interpreter – typist) should consist, I think, of: Romanian chancellor – typist<br />
and press members. I remind you that, according to <strong>the</strong> latest lists of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Ministry<br />
of Affairs, <strong>the</strong> Legation of <strong>the</strong> United States uses 34 employees, Great Britain uses 17<br />
employees, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union uses 87 employees etc. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>se legations dispose<br />
of <strong>the</strong> services of <strong>the</strong> representative of newspaper and press agencies from <strong>the</strong>ir country.<br />
The supplement of its staff would allow this royal legation to achieve <strong>the</strong> same results as<br />
<strong>the</strong> United States and Great Britain accomplish so thoroughly: monitoring <strong>the</strong> Russian<br />
press, especially <strong>the</strong> technical magazines and publications for ga<strong>the</strong>ring, confronting and<br />
controlling <strong>the</strong> figures and indications within <strong>the</strong> economic, financial, commercial, and<br />
agrarian fields, figures and indications which present more interest and reliability than any<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r information source.<br />
It is true that, apart from <strong>the</strong> problematic case of a palace revolution or any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
dramatic events occurring in Kremlin, <strong>the</strong> evolution of events in Russia will be probably<br />
exclusively governed by figures. It has been observed that <strong>the</strong> Soviet statistical services<br />
allow for a rectification of <strong>the</strong> information spread by <strong>the</strong>m by o<strong>the</strong>r means. That can be<br />
explained by taking into account <strong>the</strong> difficulty and even <strong>the</strong> impossibility to coordinate <strong>the</strong><br />
falsification and alteration of <strong>the</strong> whole figure system that represents <strong>the</strong> economic activity<br />
of a country. In order to draw from <strong>the</strong> control of this system <strong>the</strong> precious indications<br />
which are placed or can be placed at our disposal, <strong>the</strong> increase of <strong>the</strong> personnel of <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian Legation in Riga would be <strong>the</strong> minimum essential thing to be done.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 228-229.<br />
40. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 150 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />
24 martie 1930<br />
Domnul Grosvalds, al cărui agrement ca Ministru în București și Varșovia este cerut de<br />
guvernul leton, a fost Ministru al Letoniei în Paris și Helsingfors.<br />
Domnia sa și soția Domniei sale sunt de raporturi sociale extrem de agreabile. Tatăl<br />
domnului Grosvalds fusese el însuși ministru al Letoniei în Stockholm. Domnia sa precum și<br />
familia Domniei sale sunt de obârșie și simțăminte sănătoase burgheze.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 234.<br />
40. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 150 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 24 th March 1930<br />
Mr. Grosvalds, whose presence as Minister in Bucharest and Warsaw is asked by <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian government, was Minister of Latvia in Paris and Helsingfors.<br />
1<br />
He refers at Ion Pelivan, a leader from Bessarabia.
118 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
He and His Excellency’s wife are in <strong>the</strong> finest social <strong>relations</strong>hip. Mr. Grosvald’s fa<strong>the</strong>r<br />
was <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Stockholm. His Excellency and His family come from healthy<br />
bourgeois families.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 234.<br />
41. Instrucțiuni ale ministrului afacerilor străine al României Gheorghe G.<br />
Mironescu adresate însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr.<br />
35856, 5 iunie 1930<br />
În septembrie viitor vor avea loc alegerile pentru cele 15 locuri de judecători la Curtea<br />
Permanentă de Justiție Internațională, Adunarea și Consiliul Societății Națiunilor fiind organele<br />
care vor proceda la aceste alegeri.<br />
În urma invitației oficiale a Secretariatului General al Societății Națiunilor și pe baza art. 5 și<br />
6 din Statutul Curții Permanente de Justiție Internațională, grupul național român al Curții de<br />
Arbitraj s-a întrunit în ziua de 20 mai a.c. și a recomandat pe Dl. Demetru Negulescu, profesor<br />
universitar, judecător supleant la Curtea Permanentă de Justiție Internațională în calitate de<br />
candidat național pentru viitoarele alegeri.<br />
Rugându-vă să aduceți cele ce preced la cunoștință guvernului leton și celui estonian, veți<br />
binevoi totodată a face cu tot tactul potrivit demersurile verbale ce veți socoti utile spre a căuta<br />
să obțineți votul delegației sale în favoarea candidatului nostru.<br />
Un argument puternic în favoarea candidaturii Domnului Demetru Negulescu este acela că<br />
dânsul, pe lângă cunoașterea teoretică a dreptului internațional, a îndeplinit timp de 9 ani<br />
funcția de judecător la Curtea Permanentă de Justiție Internațională, satisfăcând astfel dorința<br />
exprimată de a X-a Adunare a Societății Națiunilor care cere candidaților nu numai o<br />
competență testată, dar și o competență practică în materie de drept internațional, tocmai<br />
pentru a permite foștilor judecători ai Curții de a avea ascendență asupra celorlalți și a contribui<br />
astfel la continuarea judecăților Curții, conservându-se pe cât va fi posibil foștii magistrați.<br />
Iată rezoluția votată la 14 Septembrie 1929 de a X-a Adunare a Societății Națiunilor:<br />
„L`Assemblée fait sien le voeu ci-après qui a été adopté par la Conférence:<br />
La Conférence exprime le vœu que, conformément à l'esprit des articles 2 et 39 du Statut de<br />
la Cour, les carndidats présentés par les groupes nationaux possèdent une experiénce practique<br />
notoire de droit international et qu`ils soient en mesure de pouvoir au moins lire les deux<br />
langues officielles de la Cour et de parler l`une ou l’autre: elle estime également souhaitable<br />
qu`à la présentation des candidats soit joint un état de leurs services justifiant leur<br />
candidatures.”<br />
Cum dintre numeroșii candidați la viitoarele alegeri (aproximativ 100, unul sau doi de fiecare<br />
stat din cele 54 care compun Societatea Națiunilor) sunt puțini care au funcționat ca judecători<br />
la Curtea Permanentă, vă rog a insista asupra acestei condiții împlinită de candidatul nostru,<br />
condiție care corespunde cerințelor unei Curți permanente, pentru perpetuarea jurisprudenței<br />
sale.<br />
Aici alăturat în copie veți găsi o notiță privitoare la meritele și lucrările care justifică<br />
candidatura Domnului Demetru Negulescu 1 .<br />
Vă rog binevoiți a-mi comunica rezultatul intervenției Dumneavoastră.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 247.<br />
1<br />
CV-ul în limba franceză nu a fost inclus în cadrul acestui volum.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 119<br />
41. Instructions of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu to <strong>the</strong><br />
Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza no. 35856, 5 th June 1930<br />
The elections for filling <strong>the</strong> 15 judge positions of <strong>the</strong> Permanent Court of International<br />
Justice will be carried out next September. The Assembly and <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong> League of<br />
Nations are <strong>the</strong> institutions that will deal with <strong>the</strong>se elections.<br />
Following <strong>the</strong> official invitation of <strong>the</strong> General Secretariat of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and<br />
according to articles 5 and 6 of <strong>the</strong> Statute of <strong>the</strong> Permanent Court of International Justice,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian national group of <strong>the</strong> Arbitration Court has ga<strong>the</strong>red on May 20 th this year<br />
and recommended Mr. Demetru Negulescu, university professor, alternate judge at <strong>the</strong><br />
Permanent Court of International Justice, as national candidate for future elections.<br />
By kindly asking you to inform <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Estonian governments on <strong>the</strong> above<br />
mentioned matter, I am also asking you to be kind enough to make <strong>the</strong> verbal demarches<br />
in order to obtain <strong>the</strong> vote of <strong>the</strong>ir delegations in favor of our candidate.<br />
A strong argument in favor of Mr. Demetru Negulescu’s candidacy is that apart from<br />
knowing <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical part of <strong>the</strong> international law, he was also employed as judge at <strong>the</strong><br />
Permanent Court of International Justice for 9 years thus fulfilling <strong>the</strong> request of <strong>the</strong> 10 th<br />
Assembly of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations asking candidates not only a tested competence but also<br />
a practical competence regarding <strong>the</strong> international law, precisely to enable <strong>the</strong> former<br />
judges of <strong>the</strong> Court to have ascendancy over <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs and to carry on <strong>the</strong> cases of <strong>the</strong><br />
Court.<br />
Here is <strong>the</strong> resolution voted on September 14 th , 1929 by <strong>the</strong> 10 th Assembly of <strong>the</strong> League<br />
of Nations:<br />
„The Assembly endorses <strong>the</strong> following vow which has been adopted by <strong>the</strong> Conference:<br />
The Conference expresses <strong>the</strong> hope that, according to <strong>the</strong> meaning of articles 2 and 39<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Statute of <strong>the</strong> Court, <strong>the</strong> candidates presented by <strong>the</strong> national groups have a widelyknown<br />
practical experience in international law and that <strong>the</strong>y are able to read at least <strong>the</strong><br />
two official languages of <strong>the</strong> Court and to speak one or <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r; it also agrees that it<br />
would be desirable for a service record of <strong>the</strong> candidates, which justifies <strong>the</strong>ir candidatures,<br />
to be attached to <strong>the</strong>ir presentation.”<br />
As among <strong>the</strong> numerous candidates for <strong>the</strong> future elections (almost 100, one or two for<br />
each of <strong>the</strong> 54 states that make <strong>the</strong> League of Nations) <strong>the</strong>re are few who have worked as<br />
judges at <strong>the</strong> Permanent Court, I ask you to insist on this condition met by our candidate, a<br />
condition which corresponds to <strong>the</strong> requirements of a Permanent Court, in order to<br />
perpetuate its jurisprudence.<br />
Enclosed in copy you will find a notice regarding <strong>the</strong> merits and <strong>the</strong> <strong>documents</strong> that<br />
justify Mr. Demetru Negulescu’s candidacy 1 .<br />
I kindly ask you to inform me about <strong>the</strong> results of your intervention.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 247.<br />
1<br />
The CV in French is not included in this volume.
120 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
42. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 339 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 9<br />
iulie 1930<br />
Răspunzând adresei ministeriale nr. 35856 din 5 iunie curent, am onoarea a informa<br />
Excelența Voastră că Guvernul leton, care este hotărât să nu propună candidat național pentru<br />
locurile de judecători la Curtea Permanentă, mi-a făgăduit formal sprijinul pentru candidatul<br />
României și chiar pentru cei doi candidați ai Micii Înțelegeri, în cazul când s-ar hotărî<br />
prezentarea a două candidaturi din partea acestei grupări politice.<br />
Această făgăduință, bineînțeles, nu prevede cazul, fără nicio probabilitate de altfel, în care<br />
Letonia ar prezenta candidatul ei.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 257.<br />
42. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 339 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 9 th July 1930<br />
As a response to <strong>the</strong> Ministerial address no. 35856 of June 5 th of <strong>the</strong> current year, I’m<br />
honored to inform Your Excellency that <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government, which has decided not to<br />
support a national candidate for a judge position at <strong>the</strong> Permanent Court, has formally<br />
promised me to support <strong>the</strong> Romanian candidate and even <strong>the</strong> two candidates of <strong>the</strong> Little<br />
Entente, in case two candidacies from this political group would be decided.<br />
Of course, this promise does not mention <strong>the</strong> case in which Latvia were to present its<br />
candidate.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 257.<br />
43. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā O. Grosvalda 1 1930. g. 15. jūl. ziņojums Ministru<br />
prezidentam un ārlietu ministram H. Celmiņam 2<br />
Pagodinos ziņot par savu komandējuma braucienu uz Rumāniju.<br />
Izbraucu no Varšavas 6. jūnijā un ierados Bukarestē 8. jūnijā, saziņā ar Rumānijas valdību,<br />
kura bija nolikusi manu audienci pie Pavaldonības uz 10. jūniju. Šis apstāklis jau pierāda, ka<br />
prinča Karola atgriešanās diena (6. jūnija vakars) bijusi zināma tikai nedaudzām personām<br />
Rumānijā. Prinča nodomi valdībai bez šaubām bija zināmi, bet atgriešanās datums nolikts<br />
saziņā tikai ar dažiem prinča tuvākiem draugiem un militāriem palīgiem.<br />
8. jūnijā Bukareste atradās entuziasma varā un vienā dienā ar lielu sajūsmu izveda visas<br />
režīma maiņas valststiesiskās formalitātes. Abas likumdevējas iestādes anulēja nelaiķa karaļa<br />
Ferdinanda 1926. g. 4. janvāra aktu un iecēla princi Karolu par valdnieku. Būtu lieki atkārtot no<br />
preses pazīstamos faktus, gribu tikai īsumā attēlot iespaidus, kādus guvu kā šo notikumu<br />
aculiecinieks.<br />
Karola iecelšanu par valdnieku galvaspilsēta un visa zeme apsveica ar lielu sajūsmu.<br />
Rumānijas sliktais saimnieciskais stāvoklis pēdējā laikā bija palicis sevišķi akūts un pavaldonība<br />
1<br />
Oļģerds Grosvalds (1884–1962), Latvijas diplomāts. 1919.–1924. g. diplomātiskais pārstāvis, sūtnis Francijā, no 1921.<br />
g. – arī Beļģijā un Nīderlandē ar sēdekli Parīzē, 1925.–1930. g. sūtnis Somijā, 1930.–1934. g. sūtnis Polijā un<br />
Rumānijā ar sēdekli Varšavā (1930.–1931. g. arī Austrijā, 1932.–1934. g. arī Ungārijā), no 1934. g. sūtnis Francijā.<br />
Miris Parīzē.<br />
2<br />
Hugo Eduards Celmiņš (1877–1941), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1920.–1921. g. zemkopības ministrs, 1923.–1924.<br />
g. izglītības ministrs, 1924.–1925. un 1928.–1931. g. Ministru prezidents (1930.–1931. g. arī ārlietu ministrs), 1931.–<br />
1935. g. Rīgas pilsētas galva, 1935.–1938. g. sūtnis Vācijā, Austrijā un Nīderlandē ar sēdekli Berlīnē. Nogalināts<br />
padomju apcietinājumā.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 121<br />
nebija pratusi tikt ar grūtībām galā. Šis orgāns, kā zināms, sastādījās no prinča Nikolaja, nelaiķa<br />
karaļa Ferdinanda otra dēla, Kasācijas tiesas priekšsēdētāja un Metropolīta. Princis Nikolajs,<br />
kuram Pavaldonībā pienācās pirmā vieta, maz interesējās par valsts darīšanām un vēlējās pat<br />
atstāt Rumāniju, lai dzīvotu ārzemēs ar kādu dāmu. Karaliene – māte, Marija, zem kuras<br />
iespaida princis Karols savā laikā tika izraidīts un tika nodibināta Pavaldonība, sanāca konfliktā<br />
arī ar otro dēlu – princi Nikolaju un nepretojās vairs aktīvi prinča Karola atnākšanai. Tādā veidā<br />
Pavaldonība izvērtās par nespēcīgu un bālu institūtu, un valdošā agrāriešu partija, kurai<br />
parlamentā pieder nospiedošais vairākums, sāka gatavot ceļu prinča Karola atbraukšanai.<br />
Opozīcijā palika tikai liberāļu partija, kurai mazs biedru skaits, bet kura rekrutējas galvenā kārtā<br />
no lielo finansistu aprindām. Atsaucot atpakaļ princi Karolu un nosēdinot to uz troņa, agrārieši<br />
cerēja atspiest pie malas liberāļus un nostiprināt savu stāvokli. Šis manevrs agrāriešiem spīdoši<br />
izdevies, jo 8. jūnija apvērsums visā valstī noritēja mierīgi, bez mazākās nekārtības.<br />
Galvaspilsētā notika sajūsmas pilnas manifestācijas, un no sarunām ar dažādu aprindu<br />
pārstāvjiem guvu iespaidu, ka sabiedrība apmierināta ar jauno režīmu un sagaida no tā apstākļu<br />
uzlabošanos.<br />
[..] No ārienes skatoties, Rumānijas tagadējais režīms izliekas pietiekoši stabilizēts. Lielā<br />
agrāriešu partija, kas parlamentā sastāda 4/5 vairākumu, pārvalda situāciju. Liberāļu partija, kā<br />
dzirdēju Bukarestē no diplomātu aprindām, rudenī, parlamenta sanākšanas laikā, pilnīgi<br />
piesliešoties jaunajam režīmam.<br />
Bet grūtības meklējamas iekšējos apstākļos. „Īsta karaļa” nostāšanās valsts priekšgalā, „stipra<br />
vara” un partiju samierināšanās tagadējā brīdī var apžilbināt tautas acis, bet grūtības, kuru<br />
priekšā atrodas Rumānija, paliek tās pašas. Ja tās grib uzskaitīt, tad jāmin vispirms karaliskās<br />
ģimenes nesaskaņas un dēkas, jaunā karaļa vieglais raksturs un valdnieka amatam nesagatavotā<br />
personība. Te var slēpties monarhistiskā režīma krišanas pazīmes. Tad – ārkārtīgi grūtais<br />
apvienošanas darbs, kas vēl „Lielajā Rumānijā” („Romania Mare”) nav nobeigts. Rumānija no<br />
mazas valsts (7 milj. pirms kara) pārvērtusies par lielu valsti (17 milj.), un agrākās<br />
Austroungārijas Transilvānija, Banats un Bukovina, kā arī agrākās Krievijas Besarābija<br />
saimnieciski, administratīvi un juridiski vēl dzīvo savu īpatnējo dzīvi. Rumānija, kurai šie gardie<br />
kumosi iekrita mutē pēc pasaules kara, nav vēl pratusi asimilēt šos lielos apgabalus (kuros dzīvo<br />
ļoti stipras minoritātes). Ja Besarābijā Rumānijai darīšana ar zemāku – krievu – kultūru, tad<br />
Transilvānijā jaunais Rumānijas režīms nav spējis atvietot ungāru civilizatorisko darbību un<br />
labo administrāciju. Pēdīgi, jāmin rumāņu tautas vājības – korupcija, nekārtība, slinkums, kā arī<br />
visas Eiropas agrārās valstis aptverošā smagā lauksaimniecības krīze.<br />
Ārējā politika. Rumānijā visvairāk atbalstās uz Franciju un abām Mazās Antantes valstīm –<br />
Čehoslovākiju un Jugoslāviju. Tomēr ar šo pēdējo valsti attiecības nav vislabākās, jo<br />
Dienvidslāvija nav īsti apmierināta ar robežas novilkšanu. Vispārīgi jāsaka, ka visu valstu starpā,<br />
kuru teritorija pieaugusi pēc pasaules kara, Rumānija saņēmusi no Sabiedrotajiem ar<br />
visdevīgāko roku kaisītas dāvanas. Ienaidnieki saka, ka Rumānija dabūjusi tik treknus kumosus,<br />
ka nu nezinot, kā tos sagremot. No šejienes izriet viņas nesamierināmais konflikts ar Ungāriju,<br />
kura nekad neaizmirsīs bagāto Transilvāniju un dažus miljonus ungāru tautas brāļus, kā arī<br />
vienmēr vēl draudošais Besarābijas jautājums.<br />
Iekšējā politikā jāatzīmē, ka Rumānijā, kā agrārvalstī, nav asu šķiru pretišķību; nerunājot<br />
nemaz par komunismu, pat sociāldemokrātijai te tikai pavisam niecīgs skaits piekritēju. Nav te<br />
arī sadrumstaloto politisko partiju cīņas, jo patiesībā jārēķinās tikai ar divām lielām partijām –
122 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
agrāriešiem un liberāļiem, kura viena pēc otras valdījušas pēc angļu sistēmas (ja tāds<br />
salīdzinājums būtu iespējams). Ja nu vēl ņem vērā šīs zemes lielās dabas bagātības (petroleja,<br />
labība, sāls, dārgmetāli u. t. t.), tad „Lielai Rumānijai”, šķiet, varētu pareģot spīdošu nākotni. Bet<br />
tomēr šī valsts pārdzīvo smagu krīzi, uz kuras cēloņiem esmu jau agrāk aizrādījis. Dinastiskā<br />
iekārtā, administrācijā, saimnieciskā organizācijā un tautas morālē saskatāmi tik lieli trūkumi,<br />
ka Rumānijas stabilitāte nebūt neliekas pilnīgi nodrošināta, un ka politiski un saimnieciski<br />
satricinājumi ļoti iespējami.<br />
Ierados Bukarestē 8. jūnijā, ar „lettres de créance” 1 uz karaļa Mihaja vārdu. Kaut gan sākumā<br />
man deva cerību, ka varēšot iesniegt šo dokumentu (ar Mūsu Valsts Prezidenta telegrāfisku<br />
papildinājumu), tad tomēr pēc dažām dienām man paziņoja, ka vajagot jaunas pilnvaras<br />
(acīmredzot, jaunais karalis uz to bija pastāvējis). Biju tās jau tūliņ 8. jūnijā izlūdzies telegrāfiski<br />
no Rīgas; tās ar lielu precizitāti tika Rīgā izgatavotas un izsūtītas, tā kā jau 16. jūnijā jaunās<br />
lettres de créance bija man rokā. Tomēr mana audience pie karaļa tika nolikta tikai uz 20. jūniju!<br />
Te jāpiezīmē, ka Rumānijā viss iet ļoti lēni, laiks te nespēlē nekādu lomu, un uz doto vārdu grūti<br />
paļauties. Biju atbraucis Rumānijā ļoti neizdevīgā brīdī, jo visi prāti bija aizņemti ar režīma<br />
maiņu un iekšējiem jautājumiem. Bet šos notikumus, kā jau teicu, neviens nevarēja iepriekš<br />
paredzēt un Rumānijas valdība man bija noteikti solījusi audienci uz 10. jūniju.<br />
Kaut gan nevarēju vēl taisīt oficiālas vizītes, tad tomēr izlietoju laiku, lai apmeklētu ārlietu<br />
ministru Mironesku, Ārlietu ministrijas augstākos ierēdņus un kolēģus, kā arī, lai iepazītos ar<br />
Rumānijas politiku un saimniecību. Iepazinos arī ar tirdzniecības un rūpniecības ministru V.<br />
Madgearu, spējīgu un ievērojamu valstsvīru. Jākonstatē, ka Latvija un vispārīgi Ziemeļu valstis<br />
Rumānijā tikpat kā nepazīstamas, un ka sabiedrībai par šo Eiropas daļu nav nekādas intereses.<br />
Latvijas labā ļoti daudz darījis mūsu enerģiskais un rosīgais ģenerālkonsuls T. Orgidans,<br />
Bukarestes Tirdzniecības kameras priekšsēdētājs un sabiedrībā vispār ļoti iecienīta persona.<br />
Rumāņu preses apstākļus labi raksturo tas fakts, ka ārzemju sūtņiem, ja tie vēlas laikrakstos<br />
ievietot kādu interview, 2 vienkārši par to – jāmaksā redakcijai, un pie tam vēl diezgan sālīta<br />
cena... Man tomēr izdevās vairākās avīzēs ievietot sarunas, pateicoties ģenerālkonsula Orgidana<br />
palīdzībai, kurš šim nolūkam izlietoja žurnālistus, kas stāv viņa vadītās Tirdzniecības kameras<br />
dienestā.<br />
Tirdzniecības līguma lietā man bija garāka saruna ar tirdzniecības un rūpniecības ministru<br />
Madgearu, kurš izsacījās, ka Rumānija vispirms vēloties nobeigt iesāktās līguma sarunas ar<br />
Angliju, Franciju, Vāciju, Čehoslovākiju un Poliju, un tad iesākt sarunas ar mums. Kā Ārlietu<br />
ministrijā noskaidroju, tad princis Sturdza nebija pilnvarots vest sarunas (vismaz līdz tam<br />
laikam nē). Jau pēc manas aizbraukšanas no Bukarestes nāca paziņojums par minimālo likmju<br />
piemērošanas termiņa pagarināšanu līdz 1. septembrim un uzaicinājums slēgt pagaidu<br />
tirdzniecības nolīgumu.<br />
20. jūnijā mani aizveda vecmodīgā galma karietē uz pili, kur mani pieņēma karalis Karols II.<br />
Pasniedzu viņam savas pilnvaras un sūtņa M. Nukšas kunga atsaukšanas grāmatas, ar runu,<br />
kuras tekstu te pielieku klāt. Audiencē piedalījās karaļa brālis princis Nikolajs un ārlietu<br />
ministrs Mironesku. Karalis atbildēja man ar sirsnīgu runu, kuras tekstu tas nolasīja no papīra.<br />
(Tekstu man neizsniedza, jo tas neesot parasts, pēc turienes etiķetes). Runā atkārtots apmēram<br />
1<br />
Lettres de créance (franču val.) – akreditācijas raksts.<br />
2<br />
Interview (angļu val.) – intervija.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 123<br />
tas pats domu gājiens, kā manā uzrunā. Pēc tam apmainījāmies ar karali parastām laipnības<br />
frāzēm. Pilī man stādīja priekšā karaļa civilo un militāro namu.<br />
Pie pils bija uzstādīta goda sardze ar karogu, pie kam orķestris nospēlēja Latvijas valsts<br />
himnu.<br />
Pēc tam mani ar to pašu ceremoniālu aizvadīja uz viesnīcu.<br />
Caur Ārlietu ministriju nodevu arī mūsu Valsts Prezidenta A. Kvieša 1 kunga paziņojumu par<br />
stāšanos amatā un sūtņa M. Nukšas kunga lettres de créance uz karaļa Mihaja vārda, kas man<br />
bija uzdots.<br />
21. jūnijā izbraucu uz Austriju.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 750. l., 169.–177. lp.<br />
43. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw O. Grosvalds 2 to Prime Minister and Minister<br />
of Foreign Affairs H. Celmiņš 3 , 15 th July 1930<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to report to you about my official trip to Romania.<br />
I left Warsaw on 6 th June and arrived in Bucharest on 8 th June as had been agreed on with<br />
Romania’s government, which had made an appointment for me with <strong>the</strong> Regency on 10 th June.<br />
This fact alone shows that only a few persons in Romania knew <strong>the</strong> date of Prince Carol’s return<br />
(evening of 6 th June). The Prince’s intentions were, no doubt, known to <strong>the</strong> government, but <strong>the</strong><br />
date of his return had been planned in communication with only a few closest friends and<br />
military allies of <strong>the</strong> Prince.<br />
On 8 th June Bucharest was overwhelmed with enthusiasm and with great delight performed<br />
all <strong>the</strong> judicial formalities of <strong>the</strong> change of regime. The both legislative authorities annulled late<br />
King Ferdinand’s act of 4 th January, 1926 and appointed Prince Carol 4 as <strong>the</strong> monarch. It would<br />
be redundant to repeat <strong>the</strong> facts, which are well-known from <strong>the</strong> press, I would like only briefly<br />
to describe <strong>the</strong> impressions that I got as an eyewitness of <strong>the</strong> respective events.<br />
Carol’s appointment as <strong>the</strong> monarch was welcomed by <strong>the</strong> capital and entire country with<br />
great enthusiasm. Of late <strong>the</strong> poor economic situation of Romania has become particularly<br />
acute and <strong>the</strong> Regency has been unable to cope with <strong>the</strong> difficulties. This body, as we know,<br />
consisted of Prince Nicolae 5 , late King Ferdinand’s second son, <strong>the</strong> chairman of <strong>the</strong> Supreme<br />
Court of Appeal and <strong>the</strong> Metropolitan. Prince Nicolae, who was due to be number one in <strong>the</strong><br />
regency, took little interest in state affairs and even wanted to leave Romania in order to live<br />
abroad with a lady. The queen-mo<strong>the</strong>r Marie, under <strong>the</strong> impact of whom Prince Carol had been<br />
exiled and <strong>the</strong> board of regents was founded, came into conflict also with her second son –<br />
1<br />
Alberts Kviesis (1881–1944), Latvijas valstsvīrs. 1921.–1923. g. iekšlietu ministrs, 1926.–1930. g. Saeimas<br />
priekšsēdētāja biedrs, 1930.–1936. g. Valsts prezidents.<br />
2<br />
Oļģerds Grosvalds (1884–1962), Latvian diplomat. 1919–1924 <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative, Envoy of Latvia to France,<br />
from 1921 – also to Belgium and Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands with seat in Paris, 1925–1930 Envoy to Finland, 1930–1934 Envoy to<br />
Poland and Romania with seat in Warsaw (1930–1931 also to Austria and 1932–1934 – also to Hungary), from 1934<br />
Envoy to France. Died in Paris.<br />
3<br />
Hugo Eduards Celmiņš (1877–1941), Latvian diplomat, statesman. 1920–1921 Minister of Agriculture, 1923–1924<br />
Minister of Education, 1924–1925 and 1928–1931 Prime Minister (1930–1931 also Minister of Foreign Affairs), 1931–<br />
1935 May or of Riga City, 1935–1938 Envoy to Germany, Austria and Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands with seat in Berlin. Executed in<br />
Soviet imprisonment.<br />
4<br />
Carol II of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (1893-1953) was King of Romania (1930-1940). Famous by his amorous<br />
escapades, nicknamed <strong>the</strong> Playboy King.<br />
5<br />
Prince Nicolae of Romania, Prince of Hohenzollern (1903-1978), was <strong>the</strong> second son of King Ferdinand I.<br />
Memeber of <strong>the</strong> Regency Council between 1927-1930.
124 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Prince Nicolae – and no longer actively resisted <strong>the</strong> return of Prince Carol. In this way <strong>the</strong> board<br />
of regents turned into a feeble and colourless institution and <strong>the</strong> leading Farmers’ Party, which<br />
has overwhelming majority in <strong>the</strong> parliament, began to pave <strong>the</strong> way for Prince Carol’s return.<br />
In opposition <strong>the</strong>re remained only <strong>the</strong> Liberal Party, which has a small number of members,<br />
who, however, are recruited mainly from <strong>the</strong> circles of large financiers. By calling Prince Carol<br />
back and placing him on <strong>the</strong> throne, <strong>the</strong> Farmers hoped to push <strong>the</strong> Liberals aside and to secure<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own positions. The Farmers have performed this manoeuvre with signal success, because<br />
<strong>the</strong> coup of 8 th June took place peacefully, without <strong>the</strong> least disorder in <strong>the</strong> entire country.<br />
Enthusiastic manifestations took place in <strong>the</strong> capital and from discussions with representatives<br />
of various circles I gained <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> society is satisfied with <strong>the</strong> new regime and<br />
expects from it improvement of <strong>the</strong> situation.<br />
[...] Looking from outside, <strong>the</strong> present regime in Romania seems to be sufficiently stabilised.<br />
The large Farmers’ Party, which has <strong>the</strong> majority of 4/5 in <strong>the</strong> parliament, is in control of <strong>the</strong><br />
situation. In <strong>the</strong> autumn as <strong>the</strong> parliament convenes <strong>the</strong> Liberal Party, as I heard in <strong>the</strong><br />
diplomats’ circle in Bucharest, will fully side with <strong>the</strong> new regime.<br />
The difficulties, however, hide in <strong>the</strong> preceding conditions. At <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong> coming of “a<br />
real king” at <strong>the</strong> helm of <strong>the</strong> nation, “strong rule” and reconciliation of parties may dazzle <strong>the</strong><br />
people, but difficulties that Romania is facing, remain <strong>the</strong> same. If one wants to list it, one<br />
should start with <strong>the</strong> discords and affairs in <strong>the</strong> Royal family, <strong>the</strong> new King’s flippant character<br />
and his personality, which is unprepared for <strong>the</strong> position of a monarch. This aspect may hide<br />
signals of <strong>the</strong> fall of <strong>the</strong> monarchist regime. Then – <strong>the</strong> extremely difficult task of unification in<br />
“Great Romania” („Romania Mare”) that has not been completed yet. From a small country<br />
(population of 7 million before <strong>the</strong> war) Romania has turned into a large country (population of<br />
17 million) and previously Austro-Hungary’s Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina as well as<br />
previously Russia’s Bessarabia in economic, administrative and juridical terms still live <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own specific lives. Having <strong>the</strong>se tasty morsels fall into its mouth after <strong>the</strong> World War, Romania<br />
still has not been able to assimilate <strong>the</strong>se large regions (inhabited by very strong ethnic<br />
minorities). While in Bessarabia Romania has to deal with a lower – Russian – culture, in<br />
Transylvania <strong>the</strong> new Romanian regime has not been able to replace <strong>the</strong> civilizing work and<br />
good administration of <strong>the</strong> Hungarians. Finally, one must mention <strong>the</strong> weak points of <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian people: corruption, lack of order and laziness as well as <strong>the</strong> grave agricultural crisis,<br />
which encompasses all <strong>the</strong> agrarian countries in Europe.<br />
Foreign policy. Romania most of all relies on France and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two members of <strong>the</strong> Little<br />
Entente: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. However, its <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> latter are not <strong>the</strong> best,<br />
because Yugoslavia is not quite satisfied with <strong>the</strong> delineation of <strong>the</strong> border. In general, one<br />
should say that of <strong>the</strong> two countries, whose territory has grown after <strong>the</strong> war, Romania has<br />
received <strong>the</strong> most generous gifts from <strong>the</strong> Allies. Enemies say that Romania has got morsels so<br />
fat that now it is not able to digest <strong>the</strong>m. From this follows its irreconcilable conflict with<br />
Hungary, which will never forget <strong>the</strong> wealthy Transylvania and a few millions of its Hungarian<br />
bro<strong>the</strong>rs, and <strong>the</strong>re is also <strong>the</strong> constantly threatening issue of Bessarabia.<br />
Domestic policy: In this regard it should be noted that, Romania being an agrarian country,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re are no sharp class differences <strong>the</strong>re; let alone Communism, even Social Democracy has<br />
only a very small number of supporters. A struggle among fragmented political parties is also<br />
missing, because in fact <strong>the</strong>re are only two large parties – <strong>the</strong> Farmers and <strong>the</strong> Liberals – which
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 125<br />
have taken turns to govern following <strong>the</strong> English system (if such a comparison was possible). If<br />
we also consider <strong>the</strong> rich natural resources of this country (kerosene [oil], grain, salt, precious<br />
metals etc.), it seems that a bright future can be predicted for “Great Romania”. Yet this country<br />
is going through a difficult crisis, <strong>the</strong> causes of which I have mentioned earlier. Faults so great<br />
can be seen in <strong>the</strong> dynastic system, administration, organization of economy and <strong>the</strong> people’s<br />
morals that Romania’s stability does not seem fully secured at all and political and economic<br />
shocks are very likely.<br />
I arrived in Romania on 8 th June with „lettres de créance” 1 addressed to King Mihai 2 .<br />
Although at first I was given hope that I would be allowed to hand in this document (with a<br />
supplement by our President received by telegraph), a few days later I was told that I needed<br />
new credentials (apparently <strong>the</strong> new King had insisted on that). Right away on 8 th June I had<br />
requested <strong>the</strong>m by telegraph; <strong>the</strong>y were drawn up in Riga and dispatched with great precision<br />
so that already on 16 th June I had <strong>the</strong> new lettres de créance. However, my audience with <strong>the</strong><br />
King was scheduled only for 20 th June! It should be remarked here that in Romania everything<br />
happens very slowly, time plays no role here and one can hardly rely on <strong>the</strong> given word. I had<br />
arrived in Romania at a very inconvenient time because all minds were busy with <strong>the</strong> change of<br />
regime and with domestic issues. But nobody could have predicted <strong>the</strong>se events, as I said<br />
earlier, and Romania’s government had firmly promised me an audience on 10 th June.<br />
Although I could not pay official visits, I used <strong>the</strong> time to visit Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
Mironescu, <strong>the</strong> highest-ranking civil servants at <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and my<br />
colleagues as well as to become acquainted with Romania’s politics and economy. I also made<br />
acquaintance with Minister of Commerce and Industry V. Madgearu 3 , an able and prominent<br />
statesman. One has to draw <strong>the</strong> conclusion that Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn countries in general<br />
are almost unknown in Romania and <strong>the</strong> public shows no interest at all in this part of Europe.<br />
For Latvia very much has been done by our energetic and active General Consul T. Orghidan,<br />
Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Bucharest Chamber of Commerce and in general a very popular person in<br />
society.<br />
The condition of <strong>the</strong> Romanian press is well characterized by <strong>the</strong> fact that foreign envoys, if<br />
<strong>the</strong>y wish to have an interview with a newspaper, simply have to pay for it – and a ra<strong>the</strong>r stiff<br />
price at that... Never<strong>the</strong>less I managed to place discussions [interviews] in several newspapers,<br />
thanks to General Consul Orghidan, who for this purpose used journalists who are in <strong>the</strong><br />
service of <strong>the</strong> Chamber of Commerce that he administrates.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> issue of trade agreement I had a lengthy discussion with Minister of Commerce and<br />
Industry Madgearu, who said that Romania first wanted to finalize <strong>the</strong> commenced<br />
negotiations on <strong>the</strong> agreement with England, France, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland and<br />
<strong>the</strong>n to begin negotiations with us. In <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs I found out that Prince<br />
Sturdza had not been authorised to conduct negotiations (at least not by that time). After I had<br />
1<br />
Lettres de créance (French) – letters of credence.<br />
2<br />
Mihai I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (born 1921), King of Romania (1927-1930 – under regency and 1940-1947),<br />
dethroned by <strong>the</strong> Communist regime. Awarded with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Order of Victory by Stalin. Lives in Romania.<br />
3<br />
Virgil Madgearu (1887-1940) was a Romanian politician, economist and sociologist, ideologist of <strong>the</strong> doctrine of<br />
Țărănism. Murdered by <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard.<br />
irgil Traian N. Madgearu (n. 14 decembrie 1887, Galați — d. 27 noiembrie 1940, pădurea Snagov) a fost un<br />
economist român, sociolog, și politician de stânga, membru prominent și principal teoretician al Partidului<br />
Țărănesc și al succesorului său, Partidul Național Țărănesc (PNȚ).
126 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
already left Bucharest I received a notification on <strong>the</strong> extension of <strong>the</strong> term of application of<br />
minimal rates until 1 st September and an invitation to conclude a temporary Trade Agreement.<br />
On 20 th June in an old-fashioned royal carriage I was taken to <strong>the</strong> palace, where I was<br />
received by King Carol II. I handed him my credentials and <strong>the</strong> letter of recall of Envoy Mr. M.<br />
Nukša with a speech, <strong>the</strong> text of which I hereby attach. King’s bro<strong>the</strong>r Prince Nicolae and<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mironescu also were present at <strong>the</strong> audience. The King replied with<br />
a cordial speech, which he read out from a paper (I was not given <strong>the</strong> text of it, because, as I was<br />
told, it is not customary to do so, according to <strong>the</strong>ir etiquette). His speech contained<br />
approximately <strong>the</strong> same stream of thought as mine. Then <strong>the</strong> King and I exchanged <strong>the</strong><br />
customary phrases of courtesy. In <strong>the</strong> Palace I was presented <strong>the</strong> King’s civilian and military<br />
courts.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> Palace <strong>the</strong>re stood a guard of honour with a flag and an orchestra played <strong>the</strong> National<br />
An<strong>the</strong>m of Latvia.<br />
After that I was taken back to hotel with <strong>the</strong> same ceremonial.<br />
Through <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs I submitted also our President M. A. Kviesis’ 1<br />
statement of [my] coming to office and Envoy Mr. M. Nukša’s lettres de créance addressed to<br />
King Mihai as I was instructed to do.<br />
On 21 st June I departed for Austria.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 750, s. 169–177.<br />
44. Telegrama Legației României la Riga nr. 550 semnată de secretarul de legație<br />
Ioachim Dăianu către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />
9 septembrie 1930<br />
Presa locală letonă, rusă și germană se ocupă de primirea nepoliticoasă a aviatorilor letoni la<br />
București afirmând că au fost alungați de la aerodromul militar de către soldați. Ofițerii nu au<br />
salutat, autoritățile militare și civile nu au întâmpinat, numai Consulul General al Letoniei [a<br />
făcut oficiile de gazdă]. Colonelul Indans 2 , șeful aviației militare, a declarat presei [că]<br />
pretutindeni a fost primit foarte bine afară de București. Din această cauză, neodihniți, a doua<br />
zi dimineață [au] părăsit București. Presa socialistă se miră că reprezentantul României aici<br />
Domnul Sturdza se bucură de ospitalitatea Letoniei. Au apărut articole de presă în termeni<br />
foarte răi ca: nemaipomenită inospitalitate și primire foarte necorectă. Rog binevoiți a-mi<br />
comunica de urgență motivul întemeiat, scuza [pe care o] vom putea invoca sau binevoiți a da<br />
dezmințire.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 66<br />
1<br />
Alberts Kviesis (1881–1944), Latvian statesman. 1921–1923 Minister of Interior, 1926–1930 Deputy Chairman of <strong>the</strong><br />
Saeima (parliament), 1930–1936 President of Latvia.<br />
2<br />
Janis Indans (1895-1941) a fost un renumit general leton de aviație, participant la numeroase festivaluri aviatice. A<br />
întreprins zboruri de bunăvoință în Letonia, Lituania, Scandinavia și Europa. Atașat militar al țării sale în Lituania.<br />
În septembrie 1930 a condus un zbor al bunăvoinței în Europa. A fost arestat, deportat și executat de autoritățile<br />
sovietice la Moscova.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 127<br />
44. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Riga no. 550 signed by <strong>the</strong> Legation<br />
secretary Ioachim Dăianu to <strong>the</strong> Romanian Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />
9 th September 1930<br />
The Latvian, Russian and German local press is dealing with <strong>the</strong> discourteous welcome<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Latvian aviators in Bucharest, saying that <strong>the</strong>y were expelled by <strong>the</strong> soldiers from <strong>the</strong><br />
military aerodrome. The officers did not salute, <strong>the</strong> military and civil authorities did not<br />
welcome <strong>the</strong>m, with <strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> General Consul of Latvia. Colonel Indans 1 , <strong>the</strong><br />
head of <strong>the</strong> air force, told <strong>the</strong> press that he had been warmly welcomed everywhere except<br />
for Bucharest. That is why, in spite of being tired, <strong>the</strong>y left Bucharest <strong>the</strong> next morning.<br />
The socialist press is intrigued that <strong>the</strong> representative of Romania here, Mr. Sturdza, is<br />
enjoying Latvia’s hospitality. There are press articles that speak about: extraordinary<br />
inhospitality and improper welcoming. I kindly ask you to immediately give me a<br />
consistent reason, <strong>the</strong> excuse that we shall invoke, or be kind enough to refute <strong>the</strong><br />
accusations.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 66.<br />
45. Telegrama semnată de secretarul de stat al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine al<br />
României Grigore Gafencu 2 și de Dimitrie C. Pennescu 3 nr. 56661 adresată Legației<br />
României la Riga, 22 septembrie 1930<br />
Drept răspuns la telegrama Dvs. nr. 550 controlând împrejurările în care a avut loc vizita<br />
ofițerilor letoni la București am constatat că Consulul General leton, Dl. Orghidan, a înștiințat<br />
inspectoratul aeronauticii prin scrisoarea din 4 septembrie numărul 102 că trei avioane militare<br />
letone vor sosi la ora șaptesprezece jumătate [la] aerodromul Băneasa, aviația militară<br />
convenind să facă primire oficială la aerodromul sus-zis ales pentru aterizare; deși aerodromul<br />
era civil autoritățile militare [au] așteptat la această oră avioanele letone. Acestea [au] aterizat<br />
însă [la] aerodromul militar Pipera unde nu aștepta nimeni. De acolo au fost îndrumate la<br />
Băneasa. Aviatorii și-au exprimat mirarea că nu au fost primiți pe aerodromul militar. Faptul se<br />
datorează, după cum am spus, consulului Letoniei. Aviatorii au fost așteptați în locul pe care<br />
[ei] înșiși l-au anunțat. De altfel, aerodromul Băneasa, cel mai mare din București, [este]<br />
aerodromul [ce găzduiește] deseori recepții oficiale. Ofițerii au părăsit capitala a doua zi, deși ei<br />
fuseseră invitați în mod oficial [la] recepția aeroclubului regal în onoarea lor.<br />
Binevoiți a da aceste explicații [indescifrabil] și presei. Nimeni nu a avut intenția de a jigni<br />
reprezentanții unui stat amic. Dimpotrivă, s-au făcut pregătiri pentru primire oficială, serbare<br />
oficială în cinstea lor. Dacă nu au profitat de aceste pregătiri, [a fost] din cauza [unei]<br />
regretabile neînțelegeri. Semnat [Grigore] Gafencu.<br />
A se vedea nr. 561 la dosarul presei /IV/6)<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 68<br />
1<br />
Janis Indans (1895-1941) was a famous Latvian general of aviation, participated in numerous flight festivals. He<br />
undertook goodwill flights to Latvia, Lithuania, Scandinavia and Europe. He was his country's military attaché in<br />
Lithuania. In September 1930 he led a goodwill flight to Europe. He was arrested, deported and executed by <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet authorities in Moscow.<br />
2<br />
Grigore Gafencu (1892-1957) a fost diplomat, om politic și jurnalist român, fondator al agenției de presă Rador,<br />
Ministru al Afacerilor Străine (1938-1940), Ministru al României în U.R.S.S. (1940-1941), membru proeminent al<br />
exilului românesc și al mișcării paneuropene.<br />
3<br />
Dimitrie C. Pennescu (1874-1938) a fost diplomat român de carieră, primul ministru plenipotențiar al României<br />
pe lângă Sfântul Scaun (1920-1928), ulterior fiind desemnat în acceași calitate la Stockholm (1928-1929).
128 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
45. Telegram signed by <strong>the</strong> State Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of<br />
Romania Grigore Gafencu 1 and Dimitrie C. Pennescu 2 no. 56661 to <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
Legation in Riga, 22 nd September 1930<br />
As an answer to your telegram no. 550 controlling <strong>the</strong> circumstances in which <strong>the</strong> visit<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Latvian officers in Bucharest took place, I found that <strong>the</strong> General Consul of Latvia,<br />
Mr. Orghidan, informed <strong>the</strong> Inspectorate of Aerial Navigation through letter no. 102 of<br />
September 4 th that three Latvian military aircrafts would lend at 5 PM on Băneasa airport,<br />
<strong>the</strong> air force agreeing to give an official welcome at <strong>the</strong> above mentioned aerodrome which<br />
has been chosen for landing; although <strong>the</strong> aerodrome was civilian, <strong>the</strong> military authorities<br />
awaited <strong>the</strong> Latvian aircrafts at <strong>the</strong> mentioned hour. However, <strong>the</strong>y landed on <strong>the</strong> Pipera<br />
military aerodrome where nobody was expecting <strong>the</strong>m. From <strong>the</strong>re, <strong>the</strong>y were guided to<br />
Băneasa. The aviators seemed surprised that <strong>the</strong>y were not welcomed on <strong>the</strong> military<br />
aerodrome. This happened, as I said, because of <strong>the</strong> consul of Latvia. The aviators were<br />
awaited in <strong>the</strong> place that <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>mselves announced. Actually, <strong>the</strong> Băneasa aerodrome, <strong>the</strong><br />
biggest from Bucharest, often hosts official receptions. The officers left <strong>the</strong> capital <strong>the</strong> next<br />
day although <strong>the</strong>y had been officially invited to <strong>the</strong> reception given by <strong>the</strong> Royal Airclub in<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir honor.<br />
Please be kind enough to give <strong>the</strong>se explanations to [indecipherable] to <strong>the</strong> press too.<br />
Nobody had <strong>the</strong> intention of insulting <strong>the</strong> representatives of a friendly country. On <strong>the</strong><br />
contrary, preparations for <strong>the</strong>ir official reception have been made, with an official festivity<br />
in <strong>the</strong>ir honor. The fact that <strong>the</strong>y did not benefit from those preparations was because of a<br />
regrettable misunderstanding.<br />
Signed [Grigore] Gafencu.<br />
See no. 561 in <strong>the</strong> press record /IV/6)<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 68.<br />
46. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al României la Riga<br />
Ioachim Dăianu nr. 566 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G.<br />
Mironescu, 24 septembrie 1930<br />
Ca urmare la raportul meu nr. 561 din 18 septembrie curent am onoarea a vă face cunoscut<br />
că în lipsa titularului Ministerului Afacerilor Străine leton, m-am prezentat la Secretarul<br />
General, Domnul Albats 3 , căruia i-am dat lămuririle necesare cu privire la împrejurările în care a<br />
avut loc vizita ofițerilor aviatori letoni la București.<br />
Domnia sa ascultând cu interes explicațiile date, mi-a declarat că a fost de la început de<br />
convingerea că în jurul acestei vizite a fost numai o mică neînțelegere și că va comunica<br />
Ministrului de Război cele ce i-am împărtășit cu această ocazie.<br />
1<br />
Grigore Gafencu (1892-1957) was a Romanian diplomat, politician and journalist, founder of <strong>the</strong> news agency<br />
Rador, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938-1940), Minister of Romania in <strong>the</strong> USSR (1940-1941), prominent member<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Romanian exile and pan-European movement.<br />
2<br />
Dimitrie C. Pennescu (1874-1938) was a career diplomat Romanian, first minister plenipotentiary to <strong>the</strong> Holy See<br />
(1920-1928), eventually being nominated in same quality in Stockholm (1928-1929).<br />
3<br />
Hermanis Albats (1879-1942) a fost profesor, jurnalist și diplomat de carieră leton. Director al Departamentului<br />
Juridic (1919-1920), Secretar General al Ministerului de Externe (1923-1933), Ministru la Sfântul Scaun (1925-1940).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 129<br />
Adnotare, semnat indescifrabil: Incident foarte regretabil care desigur nu a lăsat bună<br />
amintire despre țara noastră aviatorilor letoni<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 90.<br />
46. Diplomatic report no. 566 of Ioachim Dăianu, <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania<br />
in Riga, to Gheorghe G. Mironescu, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs in Romania, 24 th<br />
September 1930<br />
As a follow up to my report no. 561 from September 18 th I have <strong>the</strong> honor to notify you that<br />
while <strong>the</strong> holder of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs was not present, I presented myself<br />
before <strong>the</strong> General Secretary, Mr. Albats 1 , to whom I offered <strong>the</strong> necessary explanations<br />
concerning <strong>the</strong> circumstances in which <strong>the</strong> visit of <strong>the</strong> Latvian airman officers took place in<br />
Bucharest.<br />
His Excellency listened with interest <strong>the</strong> explanations given, declared that he was convinced<br />
that around this visit was only a small misunderstanding and that he will communicate to <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of War <strong>the</strong> facts that I shared with this occasion.<br />
Note, signed illegible: Very regrettable incident that has not let a good impression of our<br />
country to <strong>the</strong> Latvian airmen.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 90.<br />
47. Aranjament comercial între România și Letonia semnat la București de G.G<br />
Mironescu din partea României și de O. Grosvalds din partea Letoniei, 23 octombrie<br />
1930 2<br />
MAIESTATEA SA REGELE ROMÂNIEI și PREȘEDINTELE REPUBLICII LETONIA fiind la fel<br />
de dornici de a consolida și dezvolta relațiile economice între țările lor au hotărât să încheie un<br />
acord comercial și, în acest scop, au desemnat ca plenipotențiari:<br />
MAIESTATEA SA REGELE ROMÂNIEI pe:<br />
Excelența Sa M. G.G. MIRONESCU, Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri, Ministrul<br />
Afacerilor Externe;<br />
PREȘEDINTELE REPUBLICII LETONIA pe:<br />
Excelența Sa Doctor Olgerd Grosvalds, Trimis Extraordinar și Ministru Plenipotențiar al<br />
Letonie;<br />
Care, comunicându-și deplinele lor puteri, găsite în bună și cuvenită formă, au convenit<br />
după cum urmează:<br />
Articolul I<br />
Cetățenii din oricare dintre cele două țări și întreprinderile care funcționează în mod legal<br />
pe teritoriul lor se bucură de tratamentul națiunii celei mai favorizate pe teritoriul celeilalte<br />
părți în ceea ce privește persoana și proprietățile, în toate problemele privind stabilirea și<br />
desfășurarea comerțului sau industriei, după cum, de asemenea, în toate aspectele referitoare la<br />
impozite și alte taxe.<br />
1<br />
Hermanis Albats (1879-1942) was a Latvian professor, journalist and diplomat. Director of <strong>the</strong> Legal Department<br />
(1919-1920), Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry (1923-1933), Minister to <strong>the</strong> Holy See (1925-1940).<br />
2<br />
Originalul în limba franceză.
130 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Produsele naturale și fabricate de fiecare dintre cele două țări se vor bucura, de asemenea,<br />
de tratamentul națiunii celei mai favorizate în toate chestiunile referitoare la importul, exportul,<br />
depozitarea, re-exportul, tranzitul și, în general, la toate tranzacțiile comerciale, și în mod<br />
similar, navele din fiecare țară trebuie să se bucure de tratamentul națiunii celei mai favorizate<br />
în toate aspectele privind navigația în apele și porturile din cealaltă țară.<br />
În consecință, fiecare dintre cele două Înalte Părți Contractante se angajează imediat și fără<br />
concesii echivalente să-i acorde celeilalte beneficiile oricăror favoruri, privilegii sau reduceri de<br />
taxe acordate sau care vor fi acordate în viitor oricărui terț în privințele mai sus menționate.<br />
Articolul II<br />
Tratamentul națiunii celei mai favorizate se aplică și în ceea ce privește cantitatea, garanția<br />
și perceperea taxelor de import și a altor taxe, precum și în ceea ce privește formalitățile vamale<br />
și aplicarea lor, metodele și termenii de plată a vămilor și a altor taxe, clasificarea mărfurilor,<br />
interpretarea tarifelor vamale și procesul de analiză a mărfurilor.<br />
Articolul III<br />
Înaltele Părți Contractante își acordă reciproc tratamentul națiunii celei mai favorizate în<br />
ceea ce privește sistemul de interdicții și restricții la import și export.<br />
Articolul IV<br />
Tratamentul națiunii celei mai favorizate nu se aplică la:<br />
(a) privilegii speciale acordate în prezent sau în viitor statelor vecine în scopul de a facilita<br />
traficul de frontieră;<br />
(b) aranjamente speciale în ceea ce privește importurile în scopul de a facilita plățile care<br />
decurg din războiul din 1914-1918;<br />
(c) drepturile și privilegiile prezente și viitoare acordate oricărui alt stat sau state cu scopul<br />
încheierii unei Uniuni Vamale;<br />
(d) privilegii prezente și viitoare acordate de Letonia Estoniei, Finlandei, Lituaniei sau<br />
Uniunii Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste.<br />
Articolul V<br />
Prezentul Acord va fi ratificat cât mai curând posibil și ratificarea acestuia va fi notificată de<br />
către o parte contractantă celeilalte prin intermediul unor note.<br />
Prezentul Acord va intra în vigoare la zece zile de la ultima notificare a ratificării și va<br />
rămâne în vigoare până la expirarea a trei luni de la data la care una dintre părțile contractante<br />
a notificat intenția sa ca acordul să înceteze să aibă efect.<br />
Drept pentru care, în bună credință Plenipotențiarii celor două părți contractante au semnat<br />
prezentul acord și au aplicat sigiliile lor.<br />
Întocmit în dublu exemplar la București, 23 octombrie 1930.<br />
AMAE, fond Acorduri bilaterale, Letonia 1
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 131<br />
47. Commercial Agreement between Latvia and Romania, signed at Bucharest, 23<br />
October 1930 1<br />
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROMANIA and THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF<br />
LATVIA being equally desirous of consolidating and developing economic <strong>relations</strong> between<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir countries, have resolved to conclude a commercial agreement and to this purpose have<br />
appointed as <strong>the</strong>ir Plenipotentiaries:<br />
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROMANIA:<br />
His Excellency M. G.G. MIRONESCO, Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs;<br />
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA:<br />
His Excellency Doctor OLGERD GROSVALDS, Latvian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister<br />
Plenipotentiary;<br />
Who, having communicated <strong>the</strong>ir full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as<br />
follows:<br />
Article I<br />
Nationals of ei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> two countries and undertakings, which are legally incorporated<br />
<strong>the</strong>rein shall enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment in <strong>the</strong> territory of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r in respect of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir person and property in all matters concerning <strong>the</strong> establishment and <strong>the</strong> conduct of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
trade or industry, as also in all matters concerning taxes and o<strong>the</strong>r charges.<br />
The natural and manufactured products of each of <strong>the</strong> two countries shall also enjoy mostfavoured-nation<br />
treatment in all matters concerning import, export, warehousing, re-export,<br />
transit and in general all commercial transactions; and similarly <strong>the</strong> vessels of each country<br />
shall enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters concerning navigation in <strong>the</strong> waters<br />
and ports of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r country.<br />
Consequently each of <strong>the</strong> two High Contracting Parties undertakes immediately and<br />
without equivalent concessions, to extend to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> benefit of any favours, privileges or<br />
reductions of duty now or hereafter accorded to any third Party in <strong>the</strong> connections above<br />
specified.<br />
Article II<br />
Most-favoured-nation treatment shall also be applicable in respect of <strong>the</strong> amount, guarantee<br />
and collection of import and o<strong>the</strong>r duties and in respect of Customs formalities and <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
application, <strong>the</strong> methods and terms of payment of Customs and o<strong>the</strong>r duties, <strong>the</strong> classification<br />
of goods, <strong>the</strong> interpretation of Customs tariffs and <strong>the</strong> process for analysing goods.<br />
Article III<br />
The High Contracting Parties shall grant each o<strong>the</strong>r most-favoured-nation treatment in<br />
regard to <strong>the</strong> system of import and export prohibitions and restrictions.<br />
Article IV<br />
Most-favoured-nation treatment shall not apply to:<br />
(a) Special favours now or hereafter accorded to neighbouring States for <strong>the</strong> purpose of<br />
facilitating frontier traffic;<br />
1<br />
Translated by <strong>the</strong> Secretariat of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, League of Nations – Treaty Series 1931, 35-37.
132 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
(b) Special arrangements in regard to imports for <strong>the</strong> purpose of facilitating <strong>the</strong> payments<br />
arising out of <strong>the</strong> War of 1914-1918;<br />
(c) Rights and privileges now or hereafter accorded to any o<strong>the</strong>r State or States with a view<br />
to <strong>the</strong> conclusion of a Customs Union;<br />
(d) Favours now or hereafter accorded by Latvia to Estonia, Finland, Lithuania or <strong>the</strong><br />
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<br />
Article V<br />
The present Agreement shall be ratified as soon as possible and its ratification shall be<br />
notified by one Contracting Party to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r by means of notes.<br />
The present Agreement shall enter into force ten days after <strong>the</strong> notification of <strong>the</strong> last<br />
ratification and shall remain in force until <strong>the</strong> expiration of three months from <strong>the</strong> date on<br />
which one of <strong>the</strong> Contracting Parties has notified its intention that <strong>the</strong> Agreement shall cease to<br />
have effect.<br />
In faith whereof Plenipotentiaries of <strong>the</strong> two Contracting Parties have signed <strong>the</strong> present<br />
Agreement and have <strong>the</strong>reto affixed <strong>the</strong>ir seals.<br />
Done in duplicate at Bucharest, October 23, 1930.<br />
DARMFA, f. Bilateral agreements, Latvia 1<br />
48. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 765 către Președintele Consiliului de Miniștri al României Gheorghe G.<br />
Mironescu, 9 decembrie 1930<br />
Confidențe anterioare îmi permit a reconstitui mai exact comentariile făcute colegului meu<br />
american și semnalate prin raportul meu nr. 660 din 27 octombrie relative la Tratatul de<br />
garanție român-polon. Interlocutorul colegului meu nu a pus niciun moment la îndoială faptul<br />
că țara sa s-ar alătura imediat nouă în cazul unui atac bolșevic; Domnia sa a subliniat însă că<br />
hotărârea Poloniei în această privință era mai categorică și mai precisă decât înșiși termenii<br />
tratatului – termeni asupra elasticității cărora atenția Însărcinatului cu Afaceri american fusese<br />
atrasă.<br />
Examinând acești termini pare evident că se făcuse aluzie la asocierea generală păstrată în<br />
întregul text al Tratatului între angajamentele reciproce ale celor două părți și Pactul Societății<br />
Națiunilor, precum și la faptele speciale asupra cărora articolul I lasă prin singularul<br />
întrebuințat (... integritate teritorială și independența politică PREZENTĂ) o imprecizie vădită<br />
și pare-se agravată prin situarea cuvântului „reciproc” în același articol asupra definiției<br />
geografice a integrității teritoriale, iar articolul 2 (celălalt articol fundamental al Tratatului), în<br />
întregime legat de termenii și operabilitatea greoaie a Pactului, nu corectează întru nimic<br />
această imperfecțiune.<br />
În ajunul reînnoirii Tratatului româno-polon nu este lipsit de interes a constata că textul său<br />
a putut părea susceptibil de interpretare nu numai a unor observatori obiectivi ca americanii,<br />
dar poate și celor mai interesați în chestiune.<br />
Este evident că interesele comune între Polonia și România pe granițele lor orientale sunt<br />
astăzi atât de mari încât chiar fără un angajament formal, cooperarea lor în cazul unei agresiuni<br />
ar fi asigurată în mod spontan. S-ar putea întâmpla însă ca atât altor aliați ai noștri posibili cât și<br />
inamicilor noștri să nu le pară tot atât de evident că în orișice conjunctură politică internă și
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 133<br />
externă orișice guvern polon viitor ar rezista eventualei tentații de a interpreta în favoarea<br />
necesităților momentului un tratat interpretabil. Ar fi cred de o deosebită importanță ca<br />
nedumerirea celor din urmă mai ales să fie pe deplin satisfăcută prin noul text asupra căruia se<br />
va cădea de acord la expirarea termenului actual.<br />
Într-adevăr totul pare a indica că, dacă tratatul româno-polon va fi vreodată chemat a juca 1 ,<br />
aceasta va fi tocmai în timpul noii perioade de cinci ani care va fi fixată prin reînnoirea din<br />
martie viitor. Totul indică iarăși că conjunctura (sic!) în acest răstimp a primejdiei precise pe<br />
care acest tratat are rolul [de] a [o] remedia depinde în mod covârșitor de convingerea în care<br />
trebuie întreținuți atât inamicul vizat cât și ceilalți eventuali aliați că tratatul este de perfectă,<br />
necondiționată și imediată operabilitate.<br />
În privința acestor eventuali aliați nu trebuie uitat că între cele patru puteri europene, din<br />
punct de vedere militar, vecine cu primejdia sovietică (Norvegia și Finlanda se exclud prin<br />
imposibilitatea operațiunilor ofensive pe frontul lor) există alt tratat defensiv, în afară de cel<br />
româno-polon; acesta este cel intervenit între Letonia și Estonia în noiembrie 1923. Polonia a<br />
încercat în zadar a stabili prin intermediul său o legătură contractuală indirectă între aceste<br />
două grupări defensive (acordul politic neratificat din martie 1922); activitatea ei în această<br />
privință a fost până acum ținută în eșec de repercusiunile intransigenței lituaniene asupra<br />
politicii baltice. Diplomația polonă însă se străduiește și astăzi a crea și menține atât în Estonia,<br />
unde cauza ar fi mai ușor câștigată, cât și în Letonia, mult mai timidă în reacțiile sale, o<br />
atmosferă propice unei asemenea eventualități.<br />
Stabilirea unei conexiuni formale, directe sau indirecte, între cele două pacte defensive<br />
burgheze sau cel puțin pregătirea terenului optim pentru o asemenea conexiune este o operă de<br />
o atât de mare importanță pentru siguranța frontului politic Baltica – Marea Neagră încât nu<br />
cred fără interes a alătura un moment cele două instrumente <strong>diplomatic</strong>e. Cu toată perfecta<br />
simetrie în termenii stipulațiilor reciproce, Tratatul de garanție româno-polon, tradus în<br />
domeniul faptelor, pare un pact inegal.<br />
Această inegalitate pare a juca în defavoarea noastră I - PRIN EXTENSIUNEA GEOGRAFICĂ<br />
A ANGAJAMENTELOR DE GARANȚIE RECIPROCĂ. Într-adevăr, în afară de garanția orientală<br />
a celor două țări (a cărei apărare este de un interes comun evident), tratatul garantează în<br />
favoarea Poloniei o graniță ce nu mai este garantată eficace de nici un alt angajament<br />
internațional și de nici o legătură de interese absolut permanentă, o graniță amenințată de un<br />
vecin de două ori mai numeros; în favoarea României, o graniță amenințată de inamici mult<br />
inferiori fiecare în număr, apărată de concordanțe de interese naturale și permanente, și pe<br />
porțiunea ei cea mai primejduită (Ungaria) de legământul defensiv cel mai perfect existând<br />
astăzi în Europa; II. PRIN IMPRECIZIA GENERALĂ A LITEREI TRATATULUI DE GARANȚIE.<br />
Asemenea imprecizie joacă, după cum se știe, la egalitate de împrejurări întotdeauna în<br />
favoarea puterii celei mai sigure de suficiența propriilor sale mijloace de apărare; III. PRIN<br />
ÎMPREJURAREA SPECIALĂ A INDETERMINĂRII VĂDITE ȘI PARE-SE VOITĂ A GRANIȚEI<br />
GEOGRAFICE ASTFEL GARANTATĂ. Întreaga graniță poloneză fiind precis determinată din<br />
punct de vedere internațional și în întregime recunoscută de vecinii ei, această imprecizie în<br />
ceea ce o privește nu joacă niciun rol; nu același lucru se poate spune despre granița noastră<br />
nedeterminată încă din punct de vedere internațional și nerecunoscută de vecinul respectiv<br />
TOCMAI PE PORȚIUNEA A CĂREI APĂRARE O CĂUTĂM PRIN TRATATUL DE GARANȚIE.<br />
1<br />
În sensul de a se transpune în practică.
134 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Tratatul de alianță defensivă între Letonia și Estonia este, pe de altă parte, un pact perfect<br />
egal, atât în literă cât și în efectele sale eventuale. El, în deosebire de tratatul româno-polon,<br />
este caracterizat prin evidența adversarului la care se raporta (unicul posibil), prin determinarea<br />
geografică exactă a graniței apărate (recunoscută de însuși adversarul eventual), prin<br />
peremptoriul angajamentelor (care nu sunt puse în legătură cu stipulațiile elastice și de altfel<br />
modificabile ale Pactului Societății Națiunilor).<br />
Deosebirea celor două tratate va reieși mai clar din alăturarea clauzelor lor fundamentale.<br />
Tratatul letono-estonian?<br />
Art. 3 – Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à s'aider réciproquement dans le cas où<br />
l'une d'elles serait attaquée, sans provocation de sa part, SUR SES FRONTIÈRES ACTUELLES<br />
En conséquence, au cas où l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes serait attaquée, sans<br />
provocation de sa part, L'AUTRE SE CONSIDÉRERA EN ÉTAT DE GUERRE ET LUI PRÊTERA<br />
ASSISTANCE ARMÉE.<br />
TRATATUL ROMÂNO-POLON<br />
Art. I – La Roumanie et la Pologne s`engagent à RESPECTER RÉCIPROQUEMENT et à<br />
maintenir contre toute agression extèrieur leur intégrité territoriale et l`indépendence politique<br />
PRESENTE.<br />
Art. 2 - Dans le cas où la Roumanie et la Pologne, contrairement aux engagementes imposés<br />
par les articles 12, 13 et 15 du Pacte de la S.d.N se verrait attaquées sans l`avoir provoqué, la<br />
Roumanie et réciproquement la Pologne agissant par l`appliquation de l`article 16 du Pact<br />
s`engagent à se prêter immédiatement aide et assistance..<br />
Dans le cas où le Conseil de la S.d.N statuant sur une question portée devant lui<br />
conformément aux stipulations du Pact n`aurait pu réussir à fair accépter son rapport par tous<br />
les Membres autres que les représentants des parties au différend et où la Roumanie où la<br />
Pologne se verrait attaquée sans l`avoir provoqué la Roumanie et réciproquement la Pologne,<br />
lui (se) prêterait immédiatement aide et assistance.<br />
Dans le cas où un différend prévu à l`article 17 du pact viendrait à surgir et la Roumanie où<br />
la Pologne se verrait attaquée sans l`avoir provoqué la Pologne et réciproquement la Roumanie<br />
s`engagent à se prêter immédiatement aide et assistance.<br />
Dacă deci am dori ca pentru noua sa perioadă de existență, Tratatul româno-polon să fie, pe<br />
cât împrejurările o permit, uniformizat cu celălalt pact burghez de apărare de pe frontul<br />
oriental european, dacă am dori ca prin omogenizarea legăturilor <strong>diplomatic</strong>e de pe acel front<br />
să facem un pas demonstrativ spre solidarizarea lor eventuală, nu ar fi suficient ca legământul<br />
nostru cu Polonia să fie pur și simplu prorogat înainte de expirarea lui.<br />
Dacă această tendință spre omogenizarea celor două tratate s-ar lua ca directivă a<br />
perfecționărilor ce trebuie aduse pactului româno-polon, ar părea indicate:<br />
I - următoarea nouă redactare a articolului unu:<br />
Art.1- La Roumanie et la Pologne s'engagent à respecter et à défendre réciproquement leur<br />
indépendence politique et leur frontiéres actuelles<br />
II – înlocuirea paragrafului 3 din articolul doi printr-un nou articol care ar trebui astfel<br />
redactat:<br />
Art.3- Dans le cas où l'une ou l'autre des hautes Puissances contractantes serait attaquées<br />
sans provocation par une puissance non signataire du Pacte de la S.d.N l`autre se considérera<br />
en état de guerre et lui prêtera immédiatement assistance armée.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 135<br />
O astfel de completare ar avea în plus următoarele avantaje: 1 – ar lăsa să subziste în ceea ce<br />
privește granițele occidentale angajamentul general la care desigur Polonia nu ar consimți să<br />
renunțe; 2- de astă dată legătura făcută, în această privință numai, între Tratatul de Garanție și<br />
Pactul Societății Națiunilor ar juca în favoarea noastră; 3- s-ar întări în mod special stipulațiile<br />
tratatului în ceea ce privește Basarabia, fără nicio aluzie la statutul acestei provincii.<br />
S-ar găsi, desigur, formule și mai peremptorii în termeni și mai restrânși în ceea ce privește<br />
întinderea geografică a garanției, deci mai favorabile nouă. Ceea ce țineam însă a comunica<br />
Excelenței Voastre, după observația timp de aproape doi ani a împrejurărilor atât din Rusia<br />
Sovietică cât și a celor din lumea baltică este că la niciun moment o demonstrație a solidarității<br />
burgheze pe granița Baltica – Marea Neagră nu a părut mai oportună. Reînnoirea tratatului<br />
defensiv între România și Polonia pare o ocazie minunată de a confirma această solidaritate.<br />
Ar trebui să ne folosim fără greș de acea ocazie pentru a distruge definitiv iluziile celor care<br />
se tem sau speră că evenimente extrem de grave ar putea surprinde, în timpul celor trei ani<br />
următori, Polonia sau România în flagrant delict de manevră pe teritoriul alianțelor<br />
internaționale.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 359-363.<br />
48. Diplomatic report of Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza no. 765 to President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister Gheorghe<br />
G. Mironescu, 9 th December 1930<br />
Previous confidences allow me to present <strong>the</strong> comments addressed to my American<br />
colleague and announced through my report no. 660 from October 27 th , regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian – Polish Guarantee Treaty. My colleague’s interlocutor has never doubted <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that his country would join us in case of a Bolshevik attack. He underlined that<br />
Poland’s decision in this respect was more assertive and precise than <strong>the</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong> treaty<br />
– terms whose flexibility drew <strong>the</strong> attention of <strong>the</strong> American Chargé d’Affaires.<br />
Examining <strong>the</strong>se terms, it seems clear that <strong>the</strong>y referred to <strong>the</strong> general joinder<br />
stipulated in <strong>the</strong> whole text of <strong>the</strong> Treaty, joinder between <strong>the</strong> mutual commitments of <strong>the</strong><br />
two parties and <strong>the</strong> Pact of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, as well as to <strong>the</strong> special facts, presented<br />
in <strong>the</strong> article I, which shows an obvious inaccuracy by using <strong>the</strong> word “present” (territorial<br />
integrity and present political independence) and also an aggravated inaccuracy by using<br />
<strong>the</strong> word “mutual” in <strong>the</strong> same article about <strong>the</strong> geographical definition of <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />
integrity while <strong>the</strong> second article (<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r fundamental article of <strong>the</strong> Treaty), which refers<br />
to <strong>the</strong> difficult operability of <strong>the</strong> Pact, does not fix this imperfection.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> eve of renewing <strong>the</strong> Romanian – Polish Treaty, one can easily infer that its text<br />
could be subject to an interpretation coming not only from certain objective observers like<br />
<strong>the</strong> Americans, but maybe from <strong>the</strong> more interested parties in this matter.<br />
It is obvious that <strong>the</strong> common interests between Poland and Romania on <strong>the</strong>ir eastern<br />
borders are so great nowadays, so that <strong>the</strong>ir cooperation in case of an aggression can be<br />
assured automatically, without <strong>the</strong> need of a formal arrangement. It may come to pass that<br />
both our possible allies and our enemies do not take it so clearly that any future Polish<br />
government would defy <strong>the</strong> potential temptation to interpret an interpretable treaty in<br />
favor of <strong>the</strong> necessities of <strong>the</strong> moment, within any political circumstance. It may be
136 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
essential that <strong>the</strong> perplexity of <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned to be completely eliminated through<br />
<strong>the</strong> new text that will be agreed upon when <strong>the</strong> current term expires.<br />
Indeed, everything seems to indicate that, if <strong>the</strong> Romanian – Polish Treaty is ever to be<br />
put into practice, that would happen during <strong>the</strong> new period of five years which will be<br />
established in March next year. Everything indicates again that <strong>the</strong> circumstances during<br />
this precise frightening period which is supposed to be ameliorated by this Treaty, depend<br />
entirely on <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> enemies and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r potential allies are convinced that this<br />
Treaty can be put into practice immediately and unconditionally.<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong>se potential allies, one must not forget that <strong>the</strong>re is ano<strong>the</strong>r defense<br />
military treaty, apart from <strong>the</strong> Romanian – Polish one, which has been concluded between<br />
<strong>the</strong> four European forces militarily neighboring <strong>the</strong> Soviet menace (Norway and Finland are<br />
excluded as it is impossible to carry out offensive operations on <strong>the</strong>ir fronts); this particular<br />
treaty was concluded between Latvia and Estonia in November 1923. Poland has tried in<br />
vain to establish an indirect contractual link between <strong>the</strong>se two defensive groups (<strong>the</strong><br />
unratified political agreement of March 1922); in this respect, Poland’s activity has been<br />
until now a failure, because of <strong>the</strong> repercussions of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian intransigency on <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic politics. The Polish diplomacy still tries nowadays to create and maintain a favorable<br />
atmosphere for such an occasion both in Estonia, where <strong>the</strong> cause could be more easily<br />
won, and in Latvia, which reacted in a ra<strong>the</strong>r reserved manner.<br />
The establishment of such a formal connection, whe<strong>the</strong>r direct or indirect, between <strong>the</strong><br />
two bourgeois defensive pacts or at least <strong>the</strong> preparation of <strong>the</strong> suitable ground for such a<br />
connection is a very valuable service for assuring <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea – Black Sea political front so<br />
that I do not think that combining <strong>the</strong> two <strong>diplomatic</strong> instruments is tedious. Even though<br />
it seems to be perfectly symmetric in terms of mutual stipulations, <strong>the</strong> Romanian – Polish<br />
Guarantee Treaty seems to be, in fact, an imbalanced pact.<br />
This unevenness seems to be unfavorable to us. I - BECAUSE OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL<br />
EXTENSION OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE COMMITMENTS. It is true that, apart from <strong>the</strong><br />
Eastern guarantee of <strong>the</strong>se two countries (whose defense is of an obvious common<br />
interest), <strong>the</strong> treaty guarantees for Poland a border than cannot be effectively guaranteed<br />
by any o<strong>the</strong>r international commitment and by any connection of permanent interests, a<br />
border threatened by a neighbor that can mobilize twice as many people; [instead,] in favor<br />
of Romania, a border threatened by enemies inferior in number, defended by agreements<br />
of permanent and natural interests and on its most endangered section (Hungary) by <strong>the</strong><br />
most perfect defensive agreement that exists in Europe today; II. THROUGH THE<br />
GENERAL INACCURACY OF THE GUARANTEE TREATY TEXT. As it is known, such an<br />
inaccuracy acts, in case of equal circumstances, almost every time in favor of <strong>the</strong> power<br />
which is more capable to procure <strong>the</strong>ir own means of defense; III. THROUGH THE<br />
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE OF CLEAR AND APPARENTLY WILLFUL<br />
INDETERMINATION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL BORDER. As <strong>the</strong> entire Polish boundary<br />
is clearly determined internationally and fully acknowledged by its neighbors, this<br />
inaccuracy does not matter at all; not <strong>the</strong> same thing can be said about <strong>the</strong> borderline<br />
which is not internationally determined and acknowledged by <strong>the</strong> respective neighbor.<br />
THIS APPLIES TO THE SECTION WE WANT TO DEFEND THROUGH THE GUARANTEE<br />
TREATY.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 137<br />
The defense alliance treaty between Latvia and Estonia is, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, a perfectly<br />
balanced pact, both regarding <strong>the</strong> written text and its possible effects. This treaty, unlike<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian – Polish one, is characterized by <strong>the</strong> strong presence of <strong>the</strong> enemy it takes<br />
into account (<strong>the</strong> only possible one), by <strong>the</strong> exact geographical determination of <strong>the</strong><br />
defended border (acknowledged, eventually, by <strong>the</strong> enemy), by <strong>the</strong> obviousness of<br />
commitments (which are not linked with <strong>the</strong> flexible and easy to modify stipulations of <strong>the</strong><br />
Pact made by <strong>the</strong> League of Nations).<br />
The difference between <strong>the</strong> two treaties will be more apparent when analyzing <strong>the</strong>ir key<br />
provisions.<br />
The Latvian – Estonian Treaty?<br />
Article 3: The High Contracting Parties undertake to help one ano<strong>the</strong>r if any anyone<br />
attacked ITS CURRENT BORDERS, without having provoked <strong>the</strong> assault.<br />
Therefore, if one of <strong>the</strong> High Contracting Parties was attacked, without having<br />
provoked <strong>the</strong> assault, THE OTHER WOULD CONSIDER ITSELF IN STATE OF WAR AND<br />
OFFER ARMED ASSISTANCE.<br />
The Romanian – Polish Treaty<br />
Art. I – Romania and Poland pledge to MUTUALLY RESPECT and maintain against any<br />
external aggression <strong>the</strong>ir CURRENT territorial integrity and political independence.<br />
Art. 2 – If Romania or Poland, contrary to <strong>the</strong> commitments imposed by <strong>the</strong> articles 12,<br />
13 and 15 of <strong>the</strong> Pact of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, are to be attacked without having provoked<br />
<strong>the</strong> assault, Romania and Poland, acting on <strong>the</strong> strength of article 16 of <strong>the</strong> Pact, undertake<br />
to provide immediately help and assistance.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, debating on a question brought before it<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> provisions of <strong>the</strong> Pact, does not succeed in obtaining <strong>the</strong> approval of its<br />
report by all <strong>the</strong> Members, o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>the</strong> parties in <strong>the</strong> dispute, and<br />
if Romania or Poland is attacked without having provoked <strong>the</strong> attack, Romania and Poland<br />
shall immediately offer help and assistance.<br />
If a dispute provided in article 17 of <strong>the</strong> pact appears and Romania or Poland is attacked<br />
without having provoked <strong>the</strong> attack, Poland and Romanian undertake to immediately offer<br />
help and assistance.<br />
If for its short period of existence we want <strong>the</strong> Romanian – Polish treaty harmonized<br />
with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r bourgeois defense pact on <strong>the</strong> European Eastern frontline, if we want to take<br />
a demonstrative step towards <strong>the</strong> solidification of <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> connections on that<br />
specific frontline, it is not enough to extend our relation with Poland before its expiry date.<br />
If this tendency towards homogenization of <strong>the</strong> two treaties was to be considered a<br />
directive of completion that must be added to <strong>the</strong> Romanian – Polish pact, <strong>the</strong> following<br />
would be indicated:<br />
The first article should be rewritten, as follows:<br />
Art. 1: Romania and Poland undertake to observe and to mutually defend <strong>the</strong>ir political<br />
independence and <strong>the</strong>ir current borders<br />
The third paragraph of <strong>the</strong> second article must be replaced with a new article:<br />
Art.3- If one or o<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> high contracting Powers is attacked, without having<br />
provoked <strong>the</strong> attack, by a power which has not signed <strong>the</strong> Pact of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations,
138 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r shall consider itself in <strong>the</strong> state of war and shall immediately offer armed<br />
assistance.<br />
Such replacements would yield <strong>the</strong> following advantages: 1- <strong>the</strong> general commitment<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> Western borderlines, which Poland would never give up, would still be<br />
available; 2 – this time, <strong>the</strong> link established between <strong>the</strong> Guarantee Treaty and <strong>the</strong> Pact of<br />
<strong>the</strong> League of Nations, would be in our favor; 3 – <strong>the</strong> stipulations regarding Bessarabia<br />
would be streng<strong>the</strong>n, without raising any allusion regarding <strong>the</strong> status of this province.<br />
More peremptory formulas and narrower terms more favorable for us with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />
geographic stretching of <strong>the</strong> border can be of course identified. What I really wanted to<br />
bring to Your Excellency’s attention, is that after two years of observation of <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Russia and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States’ circumstances we can say that this is <strong>the</strong> perfect time when a<br />
demonstration of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois solidarity on <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea – Black Sea should take place.<br />
The renewal of <strong>the</strong> defense treaty between Romania and Poland seems to be a perfect<br />
opportunity for us to confirm this solidarity.<br />
We should use this opportunity to definitively destroy <strong>the</strong> illusions in <strong>the</strong> minds of<br />
those who are frightened or hope that extremely serious events might surprise, in <strong>the</strong><br />
following three years, Poland or Romania reluctant to maneuver on <strong>the</strong> territory of <strong>the</strong><br />
international alliances.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 359-363.<br />
49. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 60<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 15 februarie 1931<br />
La cererea mea mi se comunică în locul competent că trimiterea Domnului Grosvalds în<br />
calitate mai mult de observator la București în loc [de] experți propriu-ziși nu are ca motiv<br />
decât imposibilitate materială de timp a pregăti pentru aceștia instrucțiunile complete necesare<br />
și că interesul Guvernului leton în chestiunile tratate a rămas același. În privința acestui interes<br />
mă refer la telegrama mea nr. 630 din 17 octombrie.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 8<br />
49. Telegram by Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza no. 60 to<br />
President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 15 th<br />
February 1931<br />
At my request, I got <strong>the</strong> information that <strong>the</strong> reason for Mr. Grosvaldis’ sending ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
as an observer to Bucharest instead of actual experts is due to <strong>the</strong> lack of time to prepare<br />
for <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> necessary complete instructions and that <strong>the</strong> interest of <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
Government concerning <strong>the</strong> discussed matters has remained <strong>the</strong> same. In respect to this<br />
interest, I make reference to my telegram no. 630 sent on October 17 th .<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 8.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 139<br />
50. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā O. Grosvalda 1931. gada 13. apr. ziņojums par Polijas ārējo<br />
politiku ārlietu ministram K. Ulmanim 1<br />
Pagodinos ziņot par politiskiem notikumiem Polijā 1931. gada pirmā ceturksnī.<br />
[..] Attiecības ar Mazo Antanti. Iet baumas, ka mazās Antantes valstis vedot sarunas par<br />
saimnieciska līguma slēgšanu, kurš izietu uz muitas ūniju. Šajās sarunās grib pievilkt arī Poliju.<br />
Vēl nekas tuvāks šai lietā nav zināms. Ar Rumāniju Polija atjaunoja 15. janvārī garantijas līgumu<br />
uz turpmākiem 5 gadiem. Jaunais līgums identisks ar 1926. gada 26. martā noslēgto līgumu<br />
(kurš savukārt tika noslēgts 1921. g. 3. marta defensīvās alianses līguma vietā). Jauns moments ir<br />
tikai tas, ka līgums tagad ir, kā izteicās M.[esjē] Mironesku, „mūžīgs”, jo arī pēc pieci gadiem tas<br />
automātiski atjaunojas, ja neviena valsts to nav uzteikusi. Polija un Rumānija pasteidzās līgumu<br />
atjaunot jau pirms termiņa, jo ap to laiku sāka cirkulēt baumas par abu valstu nesaskaņām. Arī<br />
Krievijas priekšlikums Varšavā 1930. g. decembra mēnesī, domājams, mēģināja izjaukt līguma<br />
atjaunošanu. Ja apskata garantijas līgumu pēc būtības, tad jāsaka, ka tas Rumānijai vajadzīgs<br />
daudz lielākā mērā, nekā Polijai. Polijas armija daudz lielāka un stāv arī apbruņojuma un kaujas<br />
spēju ziņā daudz augstāk, nekā Rumānijas armija. Krievijas uzbrukuma gadījumā Rumānija var<br />
ātrāk apgrūtināt Poliju, nekā tai palīdzēt, bet Rumānija pati tādā brīdī gaidīs visu glābiņu no<br />
poļu divīzijām.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 818. l., 111.–121. lp.<br />
50. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw O. Grosvalds to Minister of Foreign Policies<br />
K. Ulmanis 2 on <strong>the</strong> Foreign Affairs Policy of Poland, 13 th April, 1931<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to report to you about political events in Poland in <strong>the</strong> first quarter of<br />
1931.<br />
[...] Relations with <strong>the</strong> Little Entente. There are rumours afloat that <strong>the</strong> countries of <strong>the</strong><br />
Little Entente are negotiating an economic treaty, which would lead to a customs union. They<br />
want to pull Poland, too, into <strong>the</strong> negotiations. Nothing more is known about this matter yet.<br />
On 15 th January Poland extended <strong>the</strong> treaty of guarantee with Romania to ano<strong>the</strong>r 5 years. The<br />
new treaty is identical to <strong>the</strong> one concluded on 26 th March, 1926 (which in its turn replaced <strong>the</strong><br />
treaty of <strong>the</strong> defensive alliance of 3 rd March, 1921). The only new aspect in <strong>the</strong> present treaty is<br />
that <strong>the</strong> treaty now is, as M.[essier] Mironescu put it, “eternal” because after five years it is<br />
automatically extended again, if none of <strong>the</strong> countries gives a warning notice. Poland and<br />
Romania hurried to extend <strong>the</strong> treaty before <strong>the</strong> term had expired, because at that time<br />
rumours about discords between <strong>the</strong> two countries began to spread. Russia’s proposal made in<br />
Warsaw in December 1930 supposedly was also meant to disrupt <strong>the</strong> extension of <strong>the</strong> treaty. If<br />
we examine <strong>the</strong> treaty on its merits, it should be noted that Romania needs it much more than<br />
Poland does. The Army of Poland is much larger and also in terms of military equipment and<br />
fighting capacity it is much superior to that of Romania. In case of an attack by Russia Romania<br />
can ra<strong>the</strong>r burden Poland than help it, but on such an occasion Romania itself would entirely<br />
rely on Polish divisions to rescue it.<br />
1<br />
Kārlis Augusts Vilhelms Ulmanis (1877–1942), Latvijas valstsvīrs, 1917.–1934. g. Latviešu Zemnieku savienības<br />
priekšsēdētājs. 1918.–1921., 1925.–1926., 1931., 1934.–1940. g. Ministru prezidents, vairākkārt ārlietu, citu resoru<br />
ministrs, 1936.–1940. g. Valsts prezidents. Gājis bojā padomju ieslodzījumā.<br />
2<br />
Kārlis Augusts Vilhelms Ulmanis (1877–1942), Latvian statesman, 1917–1934 Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Farmers’<br />
Union. 1918–1921, 1925–1926, 1931, 1934–1940 Prime Minister, several times Minister of Foreign Affairs and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
departments, 1936–1940 President of Latvia. Perished in Soviet imprisonment.
140 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 818, s. 111–121.<br />
51. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza fără<br />
număr către Ministerul Afacerilor Străine al României, 14 aprilie 1931<br />
Mă refer în ultimul rând la telegrama nr. 95p.<br />
Lipsa unui curier m-a împiedicat până astăzi a dezvolta într-un raport, conform<br />
instrucțiunilor primite, telegrama mea nr. 85.<br />
Ultimele două luni au înregistrat în politica internă a celor două țări orientale baltice o<br />
schimbare importantă din punct de vedere al intereselor celorlalte puteri burgheze vecine<br />
Rusiei Sovietice.<br />
Cu domnii Kviesis și Strandman ca președinți ai republicilor letonă și estoniană, cu politica<br />
externă a acestor două țări încredințată Domnilor Celmiņš și Lattik 1 , Polonia până mai deunăzi<br />
era aici într-o poziție optimă pentru a influența în sensul intereselor sale, și ale noastre,<br />
atitudinea Letoniei și Estoniei față de Moscova. Se putea afirma în aceea vreme că nicio<br />
inițiativă nu ar fi fost luată, că nicio negociere nu ar fi fost condusă între capitalele baltice și<br />
Moscova fără ca miniștrii poloni respectivi să fie automat informați și consultați. Aceasta s-a<br />
dovedit când în ianuarie anul curent miniștrii sovietici au cerut ca Riga și Reval să se<br />
desolidarizeze cel puțin tacit de țările care reclamau beneficiul excepției vecinătății sovietice în<br />
privința obligațiilor eventuale ale dezarmării și când atât Dl. Celmiņš cât și Dl. Lattik au răspuns<br />
cu energia exactă ce le-a fost inspirată de Domnii Arciszewski și Libicki 2 . Aceasta s-a dovedit<br />
încă o dată când miniștrii poloni în Riga și Reval au comunicat guvernelor baltice propunerile<br />
sovietice relative la un pact de neagresiune și au obținut din partea Domnilor Celmiņš și Lattik<br />
cu această ocazie asigurarea formală că dacă o asemenea propunere le-ar fi făcută și lor vor<br />
refuza a negocia separat de celelalte puteri iscălitoare ale pactului zis Litvinov.<br />
Pentru a aprecia semnificația schimbărilor în politica internă letonă și estoniană survenite în<br />
ultimele luni e bine de reținut că ele sunt repercusiunile directe ale unei situații economice<br />
excepțional de grave, creată exclusiv de dumparea neîncetată pe piețele străine a lemnului și<br />
inului rusesc – produse care joacă în economia celor două state baltice un rol capital, ele fiind<br />
principalul element al prosperității particulare, garanția solidității principalelor instituții de<br />
credit și unul din principalele izvoare de venit ale statului (monopolul concesionarilor de păduri<br />
și monopolul de cumpărare a inului). Atât regimul Strandman cât și guvernul Celmiņš în<br />
Letonia au căzut în fața dificultăților economice foarte apropiate de dezastru, create de această<br />
acțiune, dificultăți cărora nimeni aici nu le vede o soluție de ordin intern.<br />
Oamenii pe care Moscova, prin presiunea ei economică calculată, a reușit astfel a-i aduce la<br />
cârma celor două țări baltice sunt dintre liderii partidelor burgheze cei mai înclinați a găsi<br />
soluția crizei de care țările lor suferă în mod atât de grav în o înțelegere directă cu Rusia<br />
sovietică: înțelegere în care avantajele așteptate de Țările Baltice nu ar putea fi desigur obținute<br />
decât în schimbul unor concesii de ordin politic.<br />
Amintesc în această privință că Dl. Ulmanis, într-o recentă conversație, asigurându-mă de<br />
interesul ce ca Președinte al Consiliului va continua a-l purta acțiunii de solidaritate a țărilor<br />
1<br />
Jaan Lattik (1878-1967) a fost scriitor, profesor, politician și diplomat estonian. Ministru al Educației (1925-1927) și<br />
Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1928-1931), Ministru al Estoniei în Lituania (1939-1940). A murit în exil în Suedia.<br />
2<br />
Konrad Libicki (1891-1980) a fost Șef al Departamentului de Presă al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Poloniei,<br />
din 1934 Ministrul Poloniei în Estonia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 141<br />
agricole, nu mi-a ascuns impresia că soluțiile posibile în această privință nu vor putea decât să<br />
țină seamă de organismul economic rusesc ca de un factor ineluctabil și permanent. Amintesc<br />
totodată că într-un acces de franchețe Domnia sa, înainte de a fi președinte al Consiliului, a<br />
manifestat colegului meu polon enervarea ce i-o cauza „tutela polonă” în întâlnirile economice<br />
internaționale, opinând că în unele chestiuni de acest ordin țara sa nu avea niciun avantaj în o<br />
acțiune comună (vezi telegramele 90p și 65p).<br />
Dimensiunea celor două țări baltice face ca, oricât de gravă ar fi criza de care ele suferă,<br />
necesitățile financiare și economice implicate să fie destul de mici pentru ca Moscova să poată,<br />
când va judeca momentul oportun, face o propunere de ajutor imediat eficace, fie sub formă de<br />
carteluri, fie sub formă de răscumpărare de stocuri, fie chiar sub formă de credite (un total de 50<br />
milioane franci aur ar fi suficient astăzi în ambele țări pentru o largă satisfacere a necesităților<br />
comerțului și a industriei). Că această propunere va fi întovărășită de exigențe de natură politică<br />
aceasta nu face nicio îndoială. Presimțiri și insistențe au avut deja în ultimele timpuri loc, ele<br />
[se] poartă asupra următoarelor lucruri: I) excepția vecinătății sovietice în chestiunile de<br />
dezarmare; II) negocierea separată a unor angajamente de neparticipare la vreo alianță<br />
îndreptată în contra uneia dintre părți; III) înglobarea într-un asemenea pact a angajamentului<br />
de a nu participa nici chiar la vreo acțiune comună economică îndreptată contra Rusiei<br />
sovietice. După cum am menționat-o aceste insistențe sunt susținute în ambele țări baltice<br />
orientale, precum și în Finlanda (după unele informații) de reprezentanții germani (vezi<br />
raportul nr. 75p.). Față de noua situație în politica internă letonă și estoniană, Varșovia dorind a<br />
salva cât mai mult posibil din principiul solidarității țărilor iscălitoare ale pactului Litvinov și în<br />
ideea că o rupere de contact în această privință cu liderii politici letoni și estonieni trebuie<br />
numaidecât evitată, pare a-și fi atenuat cu mult exigențele anterioare.<br />
Colegul meu polon mi-a comunicat într-adevăr că în recentele conversații ce a avut la<br />
Ministerul Afacerilor Străine în Riga a dat a înțelege că guvernul său nu s-ar mai opune la<br />
tratarea și încheierea 1 separat, de către puterile vecine Rusiei, a unui pact de natura celui ce a<br />
fost propus acum câteva luni Poloniei. Varșovia ar înțelege chiar, dată fiind situația specială a<br />
țărilor baltice, ca un asemenea pact să cuprindă pentru ele și angajamentul de a nu participa la<br />
vreo acțiune economică concertată îndreptată împotriva Sovietelor. Guvernul polon cere însă ca<br />
o legătură organică să fie prevăzută între diferitele pacte, ca de exemplu condiționarea intrării<br />
în vigoare de depunerea tuturor ratificărilor. În această din ultimă privință colegul meu leton<br />
m-a informat (și transmis în mod cu totul confidențial în ceea ce privește sursa) că Varșovia a și<br />
elaborat 2 un proiect pe care îl va supune în Riga noului ministru al afacerilor străine la<br />
momentul cuvenit.<br />
Date fiind tocmai recentele schimbări politice în Letonia și Estonia, părerea mea este că<br />
odată părăsit principiul negocierilor solidare nimic nu poate garanta că aceste negocieri nu vor<br />
duce în ceea ce privește aceste țări la încheieri 3 absolut independente de pacte asemănătoare<br />
între Rusia sovietică și ceilalți vecini ai săi. Cred deci că ar trebui luptat cât mai mult posibil<br />
pentru păstrarea acestui principiu.<br />
Încercările Sovietelor de a izola frontul politic baltic de cel polono-român sunt evidente, ele<br />
lucrează se pare în acest scop pe două căi și atât colegul meu polon cât și eu suntem de părere<br />
1<br />
În text, concluderea.<br />
2<br />
În text, eliberat.<br />
3<br />
În text, concluziuni.
142 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
că dacă informațiile noastre ne-ar permite a dovedi aici acest dublu joc, comunicarea acestor<br />
informații în Riga și Reval ar produce un efect extrem de salutar. Aflu în mod indirect<br />
(nemaiprimind buletinele politice de șase luni) că rapoartele legației noastre din Angora ar<br />
conține unele informații utile în această privință și rog Excelența Voastră a aprecia dacă ele miar<br />
putea fi comunicate în scopul indicat mai sus.<br />
Aceste încercări de izolare au, în afară de obiectivul îndepărtat al stabilirii unei hegemonii<br />
politice înlocuitoare a celei poloneze în Țările Baltice orientale, cele imediat următoare: I) în<br />
chestiunea coordonării rezistenței economice burgheze, de a-și asigura tăcerea a două din<br />
principalele victime al ofensivei economice sovietice; II) în chestiunea dezarmării: de a lăsa<br />
România și Polonia în situația ingrată de a fi singure invocatoare ale excepției vecinătății<br />
sovietice.<br />
Sunt informat că în chestiunea renunțării la excepția vecinătății sovietice birourile<br />
competente ale Ministerului Afacerilor Străine leton ar fi pregătit o formulă pe care o judecă în<br />
același timp și destul de conciliantă și destul de prudentă. Ea ar suna aproximativ astfel:<br />
„Letonia ar subscrie, fără a invoca nicio excepție, la acele angajamente la care Rusia sovietică ar<br />
fi subscris ÎN ACELEAȘI CONDIȚII”. Birourile civile găsesc în imprecizia acestei formule o<br />
garanție suficientă căci în momentul îndepărtat al realizărilor ea ar putea fi interpretată în<br />
sensul că calitatea (sic!) de membru al Societății Națiunilor este o condiție de similitudine<br />
esențială.<br />
Birourile Statului Major leton, pe de altă parte, se opun în limita influenței lor la renunțarea<br />
sub o formă atât de elastică la beneficiile excepției în chestiune, temându-se de consecințele ce<br />
angrenajul plin de surprize al discuțiilor internaționale le-ar putea aduce unei asemenea<br />
concesii de principiu.<br />
În lipsă de instrucțiune nu știu care este poziția guvernului român într-o chestiune în care<br />
unificarea punctului de vedere al guvernelor burgheze vecine Rusiei sovietice pare atât de<br />
dorită, dacă ea ar corespunde mai mult cu cea a Statului Major leton nu ar fi cred inutil ca să o<br />
pot expune și întemeia în conversațiile mele aici și în Reval.<br />
Nu o dată colegul meu polon mi-a atras atenția asupra avantajului ce acțiunea sa aici le-ar<br />
putea trage în anumite chestiuni din o acțiune paralelă a reprezentanților civili și militari ai<br />
României și Franței mai puțin direct interesați și mai la adăpostul învinuirii de imixtiune.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 380-<br />
384.<br />
51. Telegram by Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza to Ministry<br />
of Foreign Affairs, 14 th April 1931<br />
I am referring at last at Telegram no. 95p.<br />
Lack of courier prevented me until now developing in a report, as instructed, my telegram<br />
no. 85.<br />
The last two months have recorded in <strong>the</strong> domestic politics of <strong>the</strong> two eastern Baltic<br />
countries significant changes in terms of <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r bourgeois powers<br />
neighboring Soviet Russia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 143<br />
With Mr. Kviesis and Mr. Strandman as Latvian and Estonian presidents of republics, with<br />
<strong>the</strong> foreign policy of <strong>the</strong> two countries entrusted on Mr. Celmiņš and Mr. Lattik 1 , Poland was<br />
here until recently in an optimal position to influence according to its and our interests <strong>the</strong><br />
position of Latvia and Estonia towards Moscow. It may be said that no initiative at that time<br />
had been taken, no negotiations had been conducted in <strong>the</strong> Baltic capitals and Moscow without<br />
<strong>the</strong> Polish concerned ministers be automatically informed and consulted. This was revealed<br />
when in January this year <strong>the</strong> Soviet ministers demanded that Riga and Reval should at least<br />
tacitly distance <strong>the</strong>mselves from <strong>the</strong> countries claiming <strong>the</strong> benefit of Soviet neighborhood<br />
exemption on any disarmament obligations, and both Mr. Celmiņš and Mr. Lattik responded<br />
with <strong>the</strong> energy inspired on <strong>the</strong>m by Mr Arciszewski and Mr. Libicki 2 . This showed up once<br />
again when Polish envoys in Riga and Reval communicated to <strong>the</strong> Baltic governments <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet proposals with respect to a nonaggression pact, and <strong>the</strong>y obtained from Mr. Celmiņš and<br />
Mr. Lattik on this occasion <strong>the</strong> formal assurance that if such a proposal would be made to <strong>the</strong>m,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y will refuse to negotiate apart from o<strong>the</strong>r signatory powers of <strong>the</strong> so-called Litvinov pact.<br />
To assess <strong>the</strong> significance of changes having taken place in Latvian and Estonian domestic<br />
politics in <strong>the</strong> recent months we should keep in mind that <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> direct consequences of<br />
an exceptionally serious economic situation, created exclusively by <strong>the</strong> continuous dumping of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Russian wood and flax on <strong>the</strong> foreign markets - products that play a crucial role in <strong>the</strong><br />
economy of <strong>the</strong> two Baltic States, being <strong>the</strong> main element of <strong>the</strong> private prosperity, <strong>the</strong><br />
guarantee of <strong>the</strong> solidity of <strong>the</strong> main credit institutions and one of <strong>the</strong> main sources of state<br />
income (forest concessions monopoly and flax purchasing monopoly). Both <strong>the</strong> Strandman<br />
regime and <strong>the</strong> Celmiņš government in Latvia faced almost disastrous economic difficulties<br />
created by this action, for which anyone here does not see an internal solution.<br />
The people that Moscow, through its calculated economic pressure, has managed to bring<br />
to <strong>the</strong> helm of <strong>the</strong> two Baltic countries are recruited from among those leading bourgeois<br />
parties most likely to find a solution to <strong>the</strong> serious crisis <strong>the</strong>ir countries go through in direct<br />
understanding with Soviet Russia: in this meaning, <strong>the</strong> benefits expected by <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries<br />
could certainly be obtained only in exchange of political concessions.<br />
I would like to mention, in this matter, that Mr. Ulmanis, in a recent conversation, giving<br />
assurances that as President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers, he will continue to show interest to <strong>the</strong><br />
solidarity of <strong>the</strong> agricultural countries, has not concealed from me <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong><br />
possible solutions in this regard will surely take into consideration <strong>the</strong> Russian economy as an<br />
inevitable and permanent factor. I also remind you that, in a moment of frankness, before<br />
becoming President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers, he had expressed to my Polish colleague <strong>the</strong><br />
nuisance caused to him by ”Polish tutelage" in <strong>the</strong> international economic ga<strong>the</strong>rings, saying<br />
that in some matters of this kind, his country enjoyed no advantage from a joint action (see<br />
telegrams 90p and 65p).<br />
The size of <strong>the</strong> two Baltic countries is responsible for <strong>the</strong> fact, during any serious crisis <strong>the</strong>y<br />
would encounter, <strong>the</strong>ir financial and economic needs are small enough so that Moscow, at <strong>the</strong><br />
right moment, may offer an immediately effective help, under <strong>the</strong> form of cartels or as stock<br />
1<br />
Jaan Lattik (1878-1967) was an Estonian writer, professor, politician and diplomat. Minister of Education (1925-<br />
1927) and Foreign Minister (1928-1931), Minister of Estonia to Lithuania (1939-1940). He died in exile in Sweden.<br />
2<br />
Konrad Libicki (1891-1980) was Head of <strong>the</strong> Press Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Polish<br />
Minister in Estonia from 1934.
144 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
repurchase, even in <strong>the</strong> form of loans (a total of 50 million gold francs would suffice today in<br />
order to meet <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> trade and industry in both countries). It makes no doubt that<br />
this proposal would be accompanied by political demands. In recent times, omens and<br />
insistences have already came out on <strong>the</strong> following things: I) <strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> Soviet vicinity<br />
on disarmament issues, II) <strong>the</strong> separate negotiation of commitments of non-participation in an<br />
alliance directed against <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r concerned party, III) <strong>the</strong> incorporation into such a pact of<br />
<strong>the</strong> commitment not to participate in any economic joint action directed against Soviet Russia.<br />
As I mentioned this insistence is supported in <strong>the</strong> two Eastern Baltic countries and Finland<br />
(according to some information) by German representatives (see report no. 75p.). Confronted<br />
with <strong>the</strong> new situation in <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Estonian domestic politics, Warsaw appears to have<br />
significantly lowered previous requirements as it wanted to save as much as possible of <strong>the</strong><br />
principle of solidarity of <strong>the</strong> countries signing <strong>the</strong> Litvinov Treaty and pursues <strong>the</strong> aim at<br />
avoiding breaking off <strong>the</strong> contacts with <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Estonian political leaders.<br />
My Polish colleague told me indeed that in <strong>the</strong> recent conversations he had at <strong>the</strong> Ministry<br />
of Foreign Affairs in Riga he made it understood that his government would not oppose any<br />
longer <strong>the</strong> separate treatment and conclusion, by Russia’s neighboring powers, of a pact of <strong>the</strong><br />
kind that was proposed a few months ago to Poland. Warsaw would even agree, given <strong>the</strong><br />
peculiar situation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries, that such a pact should cover for <strong>the</strong>m also <strong>the</strong><br />
commitment of non-participation in any concerted economic action against <strong>the</strong> Soviets. The<br />
Polish Government requires, however, <strong>the</strong> provision of an organic link between <strong>the</strong> various<br />
pacts as, for example, <strong>the</strong> precondition that <strong>the</strong>ir entry into force will follow <strong>the</strong> submission of<br />
all ratifications. In this latter respect, my Latvian fellow informed me (and he was totally<br />
confidential about <strong>the</strong> source) that Warsaw has already issued a project that will be presented<br />
in Riga to <strong>the</strong> new minister of foreign affairs when appropriate.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> very recent political changes in Latvia and Estonia, my opinion is that once <strong>the</strong><br />
principle of solidary negotiations was relinquished, nothing can guarantee that such<br />
negotiations will not result, for <strong>the</strong>se countries, in <strong>the</strong> conclusion of totally independent akin<br />
pacts between Soviet Russia and some of its neighbors. Therefore, I think we should fight as<br />
much as possible to maintain this principle.<br />
The Soviet attempts to isolate <strong>the</strong> Baltic political front from <strong>the</strong> Polish-Romanian one are<br />
obvious, <strong>the</strong>y apparently work for this purpose in two ways, and both my Polish colleague and I<br />
believe that if our information allowed us to prove here this double game, <strong>the</strong> spread of this<br />
information to Riga and Reval would produce a truly salutary effect. I found out indirectly (as I<br />
have not received <strong>the</strong> political bulletin for six months) that our Angora legation’s reports may<br />
contain some useful information in this regard, and I kindly ask Your Excellency to determine<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y could be transmitted to me for <strong>the</strong> above indicated purpose.<br />
The isolation attempts, besides <strong>the</strong> distant goal of establishing <strong>the</strong> political hegemony as a<br />
replacement of <strong>the</strong> Polish one in <strong>the</strong> Eastern Baltic countries, envisage: I) with respect to <strong>the</strong><br />
coordination of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois economic resistance, to secure <strong>the</strong> silence of two of <strong>the</strong> main<br />
victims of <strong>the</strong> Soviet economic offensive; II) regarding <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> disarmament: to leave<br />
Romania and Poland in <strong>the</strong> disagreeable position of being <strong>the</strong> only countries invoking <strong>the</strong><br />
exception of <strong>the</strong> Soviet vicinity.<br />
I am informed that regarding <strong>the</strong> waiving of <strong>the</strong> exception of Soviet vicinity <strong>the</strong> competent<br />
departments of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have prepared a formula that is
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 145<br />
considered at <strong>the</strong> same time ra<strong>the</strong>r accommodating and extremely cautious. It would sound<br />
like this: "Latvia should subscribe, without demurring any exception, to those agreements that<br />
Soviet Russia would countersign UNDER SIMILAR CONDITIONS." The civil offices find in <strong>the</strong><br />
inaccuracy of this formula a sufficient guarantee because in <strong>the</strong> distant moment of execution it<br />
could be interpreted in <strong>the</strong> meaning that <strong>the</strong> quality (sic!) of a member of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations<br />
is a key condition of similitude.<br />
The General Staff offices in Latvia, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, oppose within <strong>the</strong> limit of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
influence to <strong>the</strong> waiver in such versatile form to <strong>the</strong> benefits of <strong>the</strong> exception in question,<br />
fearing <strong>the</strong> consequences that <strong>the</strong> full-of-surprises gear of international discussions could draw<br />
fr0m such principled concession.<br />
Due to <strong>the</strong> lack of instructions I do not know <strong>the</strong> Romanian government's position on an<br />
issue where <strong>the</strong> fusion of <strong>the</strong> point of view of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois governments close to Soviet Russia<br />
is needed so much; if it corresponds more to <strong>the</strong> one of <strong>the</strong> Latvian General Staff, I think it<br />
would not be ineffective if I can unfold and expound it in my conversations here and in Reval.<br />
More than once my Polish colleague drew my attention to <strong>the</strong> advantages that his activity<br />
here could drag on certain issues from a parallel action of <strong>the</strong> civilian and military<br />
representatives of Romania and France less directly concerned and more protected against <strong>the</strong><br />
accusation of interference.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 380-384.<br />
52. Telegrama Ministrului Afacerilor Străine Dimitrie I. Ghica 1 fără număr către<br />
însărcinatul cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza, 15 mai 1931<br />
Domnule Însărcinat cu Afaceri și scump prieten,<br />
Vă mulțumesc pentru ultimele Dvs. telegrame și scrisori care conțin informații și<br />
considerații foarte interesante.<br />
În privința Sovietelor, cred necesar a vă comunica, în mod confidențial și pentru stricta Dvs.<br />
știință, că în momentul de față, guvernul polon, prin reprezentantul său la București mi-a remis<br />
un proiect de pact de neagresiune care ar urma să fie dus la bun sfârșit între Polonia și U.R.S.S.,<br />
semnătura având loc concomitent cu semnarea unor pacte, nu identice ca formă dar identice ca<br />
fond, de către Statele Baltice și România. Acest proiect va fi examinat de noi – Ministerul<br />
Afacerilor Străine și Marele Stat Major – cu de amănunt, multe puncte înfățișându-se ca arme<br />
cu două tăișuri, mai cu seamă acolo unde noțiunea agresiunii ar fi lărgită, înglobând într-însa<br />
„amenințări” etc.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 385.<br />
1<br />
Dimitrie I. Ghica (1875-1967) a fost diplomat român, Ministru al Afacerilor Străine (1931-1932), Ministru al<br />
României în Grecia (1898-1900, 1901-1905), Bulgaria (1911-1913), Italia (1913-1917), membru al delegației României la<br />
Conferința de Pace de la Paris (1919), Ministru al României în Franța (1920-1922), Secretar General al Ministerului<br />
Afacerilor Străine (1926-1928), Ministru al României în Italia (1928-1931, 1932-1933), Ministru al României în Belgia<br />
și Luxemburg (1933-1936).
146 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
52. Telegram of Minister for Foreign Affairs Dimitrie I. Ghica 1 Chargé d’Affaires in<br />
Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza, 15 May 1931<br />
Mr. Chargé d'Affaires and dearest friend<br />
Thank you for your recent telegrams and letters containing very interesting information and<br />
considerations.<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong> Soviets, I want to inform you confidentially and for your confidential<br />
knowledge that, currently, <strong>the</strong> Polish Government, through its representative in Bucharest,<br />
remitted me <strong>the</strong> draft of a non-aggression pact which would be taken to completion between<br />
Poland and <strong>the</strong> USSR, <strong>the</strong> signing being scheduled concurrently with <strong>the</strong> signing of pacts,<br />
different in shape but identical in substance, by <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and Romania. This project will<br />
be examined by us – <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and <strong>the</strong> General Staff – in detail, several<br />
points appearing as double-edged weapons, especially where <strong>the</strong> concept of aggression would<br />
be enlarged, encompassing in it "threats" etc.<br />
I kindly ask you to receive, Mr. Charge d'Affaires, <strong>the</strong> assurance of my cordial and<br />
distinguished feelings of friendship.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 380-385.<br />
53. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 310<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Dimitrie I. Ghica, 17 iunie 1931<br />
Am onoarea a răspunde scrisorii Excelenței Voastre din 15 mai primită ieri prin curier din<br />
Varșovia.<br />
Uneltirile sovietice pentru a obține din partea statelor baltice consimțământul lor la pacte de<br />
neagresiune bilaterale au început într-o vreme când miniștrii poloni respectivi se opuneau la<br />
acest consimțământ cu toată influența de care dispuneau. Nu o dată acești reprezentați mi-au<br />
deslușit primejdia unei asemenea îndrumări a politicii statelor învecinate Rusiei.<br />
Am urmărit aici cu deosebită atenție schimbarea atitudinii legațiilor polone, și deoarece<br />
împrejurările vor ca să fim inevitabil influențați de această schimbare, cred că nu este lipsit de<br />
interes pentru noi de a recunoaște sentimentele care au determinat-o.<br />
Trebuie considerat, desigur, ca o simplă coincidență faptul că ea a corespuns cu înăsprirea<br />
relațiilor germano-polone, căci în asemenea caz ar trebui să presupunem „un soupçon de<br />
collusion” între Moscova și Varșovia, care nu ar fi avut în speță destulă grijă de interesele aliatei<br />
sale, încolțită astfel pe un teren și într-un moment neales de ea la elucidarea relațiilor sale<br />
speciale de vecinătate cu U.R.S.S., legitima grijă de a rămâne izolați printr-o reînscenare a<br />
Pactului Livinov, în care de astă dată nu am fi cuprinși, putându-ne sili la concesii de formă<br />
într-o chestiune care nu pare a se împăca chiar cu cea mai minusculă reticență.<br />
Polonia, prevăzând slăbirea și înfrângerea rezistenței Letoniei și a Estoniei în această<br />
materie, a vrut poate din considerații de prestigiu să depășească evoluția acestei rezistențe și să<br />
ofere ea însăși celor două State Baltice o soluție spre care păreau a tinde împotriva sugestiilor<br />
sale anterioare.<br />
1<br />
Dimitrie I. Ghica (1875-1967) was a Romanian diplomat, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1931-1932), Minister of<br />
Romania in Greece (1898-1900, 1901-1905), Bulgaria (1911-1913), Italy (1913 - 1917), member of <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
delegation to <strong>the</strong> Paris Peace Conference (1919), Minister of Romania in France (1920-1922), Secretary General of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1926-1928), Minister of Romania in Italy (1928-1931, 1932-1933), Minister of Romania<br />
in Belgium and Luxembourg (1933-1936).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 147<br />
Mi s-a părut de multe ori că în chestiunea relațiilor între statele baltice și U.R.S.S. vederile<br />
noastre puteau în unele cazuri să fie mai limpezi decât cele ale Varșoviei, puțin tulburate de<br />
grija conflictelor sale permanente cu Berlin și Kovno. Cred astfel că era prea devreme pentru a<br />
renunța de pe acum la apreciabilul câștig moral și politic [pe] care îl implică solidarizarea celor<br />
patru puteri burgheze iscălitoare ale pactului Litvinov, că Varșovia a cedat prea devreme unor<br />
tendințe incontestabil existente în cercurile dirigente baltice și că de la o atitudine uneori mult<br />
prea autoritară pentru a fi fără inconveniente, Polonia a trecut prea repede la cea a<br />
consimțămintelor 1 .<br />
Nu este regiune a Europei burgheze unde ura și teama acțiunii sovietice să fie atât de vie ca<br />
în Letonia și Estonia; la baza capitulării eventuale baltice față de presiunea rusească nu se<br />
găsește deci altceva decât o imperioasă necesitate financiaro-economică, la care se cedează cu<br />
repulsie. Date fiind pretențiile celor două state această imperioasă necesitate ar fi putut fi atât<br />
de repede satisfăcută, rezistența baltică ar fi putut asigurată pentru doi, trei ani cu sume atât de<br />
modeste, încât este greu de crezut, cu toate că [este] posibil, ca Varșovia să nu fi putut ajuta<br />
Riga și Reval, prin finanța franceză bunăoară, a găsi o soluție alta decât cea la care le silește<br />
astăzi mizeria.<br />
Este de notat că nu ar fi defel aici vorba de sacrificii analoage cu cele pe care Italia le<br />
consimte Albaniei (sumele implicate fiind de altfel de aceeași ordine de mărime). Estonia și<br />
Letonia sunt țări cu bogății naturale în plină exploatare, cu echipamente industriale importante,<br />
extrem de muncitoare și recunoscute ca bune platnice.<br />
Pe cât de paradoxal ar părea aceasta, aprioric s-ar putea spune că înlocuirea hegemoniei<br />
polone prin cea rusească în Țările Baltice este un fapt mai important pentru noi decât pentru<br />
însăși Polonia, care spre deosebire de noi este egalmente interesată de o presiune acută<br />
sovietică pe regiunea extrem nordică sau extrem sudică a frontierelor U.R.S.S.<br />
După limpezirea situației lor în Extremul Orient, limpezire care le-a permis a readuce cea<br />
mai mare parte a trupelor trimise, intră fatalmente în politica de lungă vedere a Sovietelor o<br />
sondare a situației lor prezente și eventuale în Baltica. Sondarea este pe cale a le da rezultatul<br />
optim așteptat: convingerea că în afară de orișice operațiune militară și orișice acțiune violentă,<br />
prin simpla lor situație geografică și economică Țările Baltice sunt și rămân la dispoziția<br />
Moscovei.<br />
Să se ia bine în seamă că acesta este un element nou, o carte de care Sovietele nu dispuneau<br />
încă anul trecut. La acel moment încă nicio siguranță nu exista pentru soviete în această<br />
privință. Orișice plan de agresiune sovietică trebuia la acea vreme să țină seamă de întinderea<br />
ostilităților eventuale de la Marea Neagră, inaccesibilă aproape marilor puteri și în orice caz<br />
îndepărtată de interesele lor imediate, la cea baltică unde flotele lor pot apărea atât de ușor și<br />
unde complicații de ordin general provocate de rivalitatea germano-polonă ar atrage aceste<br />
puteri chiar fără voia lor.<br />
Dacă situația câștigată astăzi de politica rusească în Țările Baltice ar fi consacrată prin<br />
sistemul pactelor de neagresiune bilaterale înlocuind pe cel al pactelor regionale, dacă mai ales<br />
ea ar fi transformată într-un protectorat economic de fapt, aceasta ar semnifica în ceea ce ne<br />
privește posibilitatea pentru U.R.S.S. de a concentra toate mijloacele lor de pregătire politică și<br />
tehnică, și în urmă toate mijloacele lor de acțiune, în direcția Basarabiei. ACESTA ESTE, DE<br />
1<br />
În document, aquiescențelor.
148 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
ALTFEL, CRED ADEVĂRATUL ȚEL AL ACTIVITĂȚII POLITICE SOVIETICE ÎN ȚĂRILE<br />
BALTICE.<br />
În aceste împrejurări mă întreb dacă nu ne-ar reveni nouă a reaminti aliatelor noastre<br />
Poloniei și Franței că nu a fost făcut totul pentru a permite Letoniei și Estoniei a se sustrage de<br />
la o hegemonie urâtă și temută de ele și de a le sugera o revizuire a politicii noastre în Țările<br />
Baltice, revizuire ce ar privi: I) chestiunea pactelor bilaterale de neagresiune; II) ajutarea<br />
promptă și eficace a celor două țări.<br />
În ceea ce privește chestiunea pactelor bilaterale, ea are desigur mai multă importanță<br />
pentru noi decât pentru orișicine.<br />
Basarabia este breșa pe care Rusia sovietică și-a rezervat-o în frontiera sa politică cu lumea<br />
burgheză, ea nu va refuza avantajele de neprețuit 1 ale acestei breșe decât în ziua când va fi<br />
renunțat la însăși distrugerea acestei lumi, când va fi dezmințit și anulat întreaga și gigantica sa<br />
sforțare de doisprezece ani, când își va fi renegat doctrina, când sovietele nu vor mai fi sovietele.<br />
Până atunci nu trebuie încetat a pune orișice întreprindere politică a Sovietelor în legătură cu<br />
acest teritoriu, a căuta înainte de toate o explicație ale acelei întreprinderi în această direcție...<br />
Ni se va spune, ni se spune deja că dacă pactul special de neagresiune româno-rus nu va fi cu<br />
totul explicit în ceea ce privește granițele noastre, aceasta nu va fi decât o chestiune de formă,<br />
un sacrificiu fără importanță făcut amorului propriu sovietic.<br />
Sovietele, care au nevoie în momentele de față de o reafirmare a intențiilor pașnice față de<br />
lumea burgheză, văd posibilitatea acestei reafirmări într-o nouă demonstrație în genul celei din<br />
Moscova din 1928. Inconvenientul pe care pactul Litvinov l-a prezentat pentru ei odinioară vor<br />
însă a-l înlătura de astă dată prin dislocarea lui și prezentarea unui text ad hoc pentru<br />
înțelegerea eventuală cu România. Acest text va fi probabil în aparență conciliant 2 , rezerva va fi<br />
poate numai tacită, reticența implicată, între teama de a fi împinși în rolul părții intransigente și<br />
combative și obligația absolută la intransigență, poziția noastră va fi cu atât mai grea.<br />
Dacă este vorba de pacte pur declarative, ce utilitate s-ar putea găsi în fragmentarea deci<br />
slăbirea celor existente deja? Dacă se simte necesitatea de a le completa prin convenții<br />
cuprinzând procedura reglementării conflictelor eventuale, de ce să se părăsească principiul<br />
solidarității regionale consacrat nu numai la Moscova în 1928, dar și la Locarno – sau pentru a<br />
nu părăsi aceste frontiere, prin tratatul de conciliere între Letonia, Estonia, Finlanda și Polonia<br />
de la 17 iunie 1925. Nu din partea celor două țări baltice ar veni vreo împotrivire în această<br />
privință, dacă ele ar fi ajutate la timp, ele ar binecuvânta împrejurările care le-ar reda odată cu<br />
independența lor economică și tovărășia reconfortantă a țărilor burgheze vecine Rusiei<br />
sovietice.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 397-<br />
401.<br />
53. Telegram of Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza no. 310 to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs Dimitrie I. Ghica, 17 th June 1931<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honor to address Your Excellency's letter of May 15 th received yesterday by courier<br />
from Warsaw.<br />
1<br />
În text, neprețuibile.<br />
2<br />
(Nota Mihail Sturdza) Să nu uităm totuși cursa în care am fost atrași odinioară la Viena unde desigur nu ne-am fi<br />
dus dacă interpușii binevoitori nu ne-ar fi ascuns faptul că numai despre Basarabia va fi vorba acolo.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 149<br />
The Soviet machinations aimed at getting <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
conclusion of bilateral non-aggression pacts started at a time when <strong>the</strong> respective Polish<br />
envoys opposed to this consent making use of all <strong>the</strong>ir influence. More than once, <strong>the</strong>se<br />
representatives unveiled to me <strong>the</strong> danger of such a policy course of <strong>the</strong> states neighboring<br />
Russia.<br />
I followed extremely closely <strong>the</strong> changing attitudes of <strong>the</strong> Polish legations, and as<br />
circumstances inevitably compel us to be influenced by this change, I think it is not<br />
without significance for us to identify <strong>the</strong> feelings that caused it.<br />
We must consider, of course, as a coincidence <strong>the</strong> fact that it corresponded to <strong>the</strong><br />
deterioration of <strong>the</strong> German-Polish <strong>relations</strong> because in that case, we would have to<br />
assume a "un soupçon de collusion" between Moscow and Warsaw, which would not have<br />
showed enough care in this case to <strong>the</strong> interests of its ally 1 , forced in a place and at a time it<br />
did not choose into <strong>the</strong> elucidation of its peculiar neighboring <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> USSR. The<br />
legitimate preoccupation not to remain isolated following a reframing of <strong>the</strong> Livinov Pact,<br />
which would not include us this time, might force us to some concessions in an issue that<br />
does not seem to reconcile even with <strong>the</strong> most infinitesimal reluctance.<br />
Foreseeing <strong>the</strong> weakening and overcoming of Latvia and Estonia’s resistance in this<br />
matter, Poland perhaps wanted, in order to maintain its prestige, to exceed <strong>the</strong> evolution in<br />
this respect and to provide <strong>the</strong> two Baltic States with a solution towards <strong>the</strong>y, however,<br />
moved in spite of its previous suggestions.<br />
I thought many times that in <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> USSR, our<br />
visions may in some instances be clearer than those of Warsaw, less troubled by <strong>the</strong><br />
preoccupation of its ongoing conflicts with Berlin and Kovno. Therefore, I think it was too<br />
early to give up on <strong>the</strong> significant moral and political benefit represented by <strong>the</strong> solidarity<br />
of <strong>the</strong> four bourgeois powers that signed <strong>the</strong> Litvinov Pact, that Warsaw gave up too early<br />
in front of <strong>the</strong> undeniably trends existing in <strong>the</strong> Baltic ruling circles, and that Poland<br />
passed too quickly from a domineering attitude to an exceedingly consensual one.<br />
In Latvia and Estonia <strong>the</strong> hatred and fear of <strong>the</strong> Soviet action is more intense than in<br />
any o<strong>the</strong>r part of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois Europe; an indispensable financial-economic necessity lies<br />
at <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> Baltic capitulation to <strong>the</strong> Russian pressure and <strong>the</strong>y give in to it with<br />
abhorrence. Given <strong>the</strong> claims of <strong>the</strong> two countries this critical need could have been<br />
satisfied so quickly, and <strong>the</strong> Baltic resistance could have been prolonged for two or three<br />
more years with modest amounts that it is hard to believe, although it [is] possible that<br />
Warsaw could not help Riga and Reval, by means of <strong>the</strong> French finance, for example, to<br />
find a solution o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> one dictated today by <strong>the</strong>ir misery.<br />
It should be noted that this is not at all about sacrifices equal to those approved by Italy<br />
for Albania (<strong>the</strong> needed amounts are, in fact, of <strong>the</strong> same magnitude). Estonia and Latvia<br />
are countries with natural resources that are currently being fully exploited, with<br />
significant industrial equipment, extremely hardworking and recognized as good payers.<br />
Paradoxical as it may seem, we might say a priori that <strong>the</strong> replacing of Poland’s<br />
hegemony by <strong>the</strong> Russian one in <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries is actually more meaningful to us than<br />
to Poland itself which, unlike us, is equally interested in a Soviet acute pressure on <strong>the</strong><br />
extreme North or extreme South region of <strong>the</strong> USSR borders.<br />
1<br />
Romania.
150 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
After clarifying <strong>the</strong>ir situation in <strong>the</strong> Far East, which allowed <strong>the</strong>m to bring back most of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir troops, <strong>the</strong> Soviet long-term view fatally includes an assessment of <strong>the</strong>ir current and<br />
prospective situation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic region. The survey is likely to give <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> best<br />
expected result: <strong>the</strong> belief that besides any military operation and any violent action, by<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir geographical and economic situation <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries are and will remain at<br />
Moscow’s disposal.<br />
It should be taken into account that this is a new element, a card that <strong>the</strong> Soviets still<br />
lacked last year. At that time, <strong>the</strong>re was still no certainty for <strong>the</strong> Soviets in this regard. Any<br />
plan of <strong>the</strong> Soviet aggression had at that time to take into account <strong>the</strong> extension of <strong>the</strong><br />
possible hostilities from <strong>the</strong> Black Sea, almost inaccessible to <strong>the</strong> great powers and in any<br />
case far from <strong>the</strong>ir immediate interests, to <strong>the</strong> Baltic region where <strong>the</strong>ir fleets can appear so<br />
easily and where general complications caused by <strong>the</strong> German-Polish rivalry would attract<br />
<strong>the</strong>se powers even against <strong>the</strong>ir will.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> position achieved today by <strong>the</strong> Russian policy in <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries would be<br />
consecrated through <strong>the</strong> bilateral non-aggression pacts system replacing that of <strong>the</strong><br />
regional pacts, especially if it would be turned into an economic de facto protectorate, this<br />
would mean for us that <strong>the</strong> USSR would have <strong>the</strong> opportunity to concentrate all <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
means of political and technical preparation, and finally all <strong>the</strong>ir means of action in <strong>the</strong><br />
direction of Bessarabia. I BELIEVE THIS IS, IN FACT, THE REAL GOAL OF THE SOVIET<br />
POLITICS IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES.<br />
In <strong>the</strong>se circumstances, I wonder if we should not remind our allies, Poland and France,<br />
that not everything was done to allow Latvia and Estonia to escape from a harmful<br />
hegemony <strong>the</strong>y hate and fear, and to suggest reviewing our policy in <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries,<br />
regarding: I) <strong>the</strong> bilateral non-aggression pacts issue; II) <strong>the</strong> promptly and effectively<br />
helping <strong>the</strong> two countries.<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> bilateral pacts, it is of course more important to us than to<br />
everyone.<br />
Bessarabia is <strong>the</strong> hole that Soviet Russia has reserved at its political boundary with <strong>the</strong><br />
bourgeois world; it will only deny <strong>the</strong> crucial advantages of this hole <strong>the</strong> day it will give up<br />
to <strong>the</strong> idea of destruction of this world, when it will deny and rescind its massive effort of<br />
twelve years, when it will negate its doctrine, when <strong>the</strong> Soviets will not be Soviets anymore.<br />
Until <strong>the</strong>n, we should not cease to connect to this territory any Soviet political action, seek<br />
above all an explanation of that action in this direction... We will be told, we are already<br />
being told that if <strong>the</strong> non-aggression Romanian-Russian special agreement is not very<br />
explicit regarding our borders, it will only be a matter of form, an unimportant sacrifice for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet egocentrism.<br />
The Soviets, which currently need a reaffirmation of <strong>the</strong>ir peaceful intentions towards<br />
<strong>the</strong> bourgeois world, see <strong>the</strong> possibility of this reassertion in a new demonstration like <strong>the</strong><br />
one in Moscow in 1928. They want to quash <strong>the</strong> inconvenience that <strong>the</strong> Litvinov Pact once<br />
caused to <strong>the</strong>m by eliminating it and presenting an ad hoc text for a possible agreement<br />
with Romania. This text will probably be apparently conciliatory 1 , <strong>the</strong> reserve can only be<br />
1<br />
(Note of Mihail Sturdza) Let us not forget however <strong>the</strong> trap prepared for us in Vienna, where we certainly would<br />
not have gone if my willing interposers had not have hidden <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> issue will be only about Bessarabia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 151<br />
tacit, and <strong>the</strong> reluctance involved; between <strong>the</strong> risk of being pushed into <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong><br />
stubborn and combating party and <strong>the</strong> absolute obligation to intransigence, our position<br />
will be much more difficult.<br />
If this is all about purely declarative pacts, what advantage could be found in <strong>the</strong><br />
fragmentation and weakening of <strong>the</strong> already existing ones? If one feels <strong>the</strong> need to combine<br />
<strong>the</strong>m with conventions including <strong>the</strong> procedure of regulation of <strong>the</strong> possible conflicts, why<br />
shall one leave <strong>the</strong> principle of <strong>the</strong> regional solidarity established not only in Moscow in<br />
1928, but also in Locarno – or in order to refer at <strong>the</strong>se borders, through <strong>the</strong> conciliation<br />
treaty between Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Poland of June 17 th , 1925? The two Baltic<br />
countries would take no objection in this respect if <strong>the</strong>y were helped in due time; <strong>the</strong>y<br />
would bless <strong>the</strong> circumstances that would give <strong>the</strong>m back, alongside <strong>the</strong>ir economic<br />
independence, <strong>the</strong> comforting companionship of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois countries neighboring <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet Russia.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 397-401.<br />
54. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 305 (înregistrat cu numărul 36594 din 22 iunie 1931) către Ministrul<br />
Afacerilor Străine al României Dimitrie I. Ghica, iunie 1931<br />
Răspuns nr. 30058. Referire nr. 88/95 și 100/p.<br />
Privitor la viitoarea conferință a dezarmării atenția guvernelor și statelor majore letone și<br />
estoniene este în principal solicitată de chestiunea excepției vecinătății sovietice.<br />
Nu ar exista nicio deosebire de vedere în această privință între cercurile răspunzătoare<br />
militare și civile dacă chestiunea ar putea fi privită din ambele părți numai din punct de vedere<br />
al siguranței naționale. Excepția vecinătății sovietice ar fi reclamată în acest caz cu aceeași<br />
insistență și aceeași precizie de birourile statelor majore și de cele ale ministerelor afacerilor<br />
străine, atât ca o necesitate tehnică față de primejdia existentă, cât și ca o prețioasă<br />
recunoaștere a acestei primejdii, implicită dar formală, din partea puterilor subscriitoare.<br />
De aproape doi ani însă raporturile dintre Rusia sovietică și vecinii săi baltici sunt dominate<br />
tot mai mult pentru acestea din urmă de considerații de ordin economic de caracter din ce în ce<br />
mai grav și imediat. Guvernele precedente în Letonia și Estonia au nădăjduit un moment [la]<br />
soluționarea unei crize care primejduiește nu o fracțiune, ci totalitatea prosperității țărilor lor în<br />
o înțelegere burgheză internațională. Nu s-a acceptat aici admiterea Rusiei pe picior de egalitate<br />
la Conferințele economice europene și excluderea deci ipso facto de la ordinea zilei a chestiunii<br />
care ar trebui să constituie baza dezbaterilor acestor conferințe, pentru a se realiza că ele nu vor<br />
duce la niciun rezultat, ora unui duel economic între Rusia sovietică și puterile orientale<br />
burgheze fiind departe de a suna, și că acestea din urmă vor fi încă un timp indefinit ocupate în<br />
căutarea ocaziilor de câștiguri politice sau materiale imediate, dar mărunte și neinteligente pe<br />
care le oferă începutul ofensivei economice rusești.<br />
Izolate deci, s-ar putea spune părăsite în fața unei primejdii pentru ele vitale, după o lungă<br />
ezitare și după schimbarea echipei oamenilor răspunzători ai destinelor lor, cele două țări s-au<br />
hotărât a căuta o ameliorare a situației într-o înțelegere momentană cu persecutorul lor. Din<br />
punct de vedere economic această înțelegerea pare a fi luat mai ales forma unor cumpărături de<br />
stocuri industriale și agricole de către Rusia Sovietică în Țările Baltice. Un pas decisiv a fost<br />
făcut în această direcție prin votarea de către parlamentul leton a legii care permite garanția
152 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
(100%) de către Stat a tratelor sovietice plătite producătorilor și vânzătorilor letoni. Fie zis în<br />
treacăt în timpul dezbaterilor parlamentare proiectul de lege s-a găsit susținut de grupurile<br />
social-democrate și comuniste unite cu partidul german care aparține extremei drepte și care<br />
primește directivele sale de la Ministrul Reichului din Riga.<br />
Această înțelegere va avea însă fără îndoială și o latură politică și nu este un mister pentru<br />
nimeni aici că discuțiile în această privință s-au purtat și [se] poartă tocmai pe chestiunea<br />
excepției vecinătății sovietice și pe cea a angajamentelor de neagresiune economică. Aceste<br />
două chestiuni au fost aici întotdeauna legate în insistențele și demersurile reprezentanților<br />
Rusiei Sovietice. În fața unei Europe orbite de ostilitățile recente și aviditățile imediate,<br />
Moscova dă aceeași importanță escamotării fondului dezbaterilor dezarmării cât și aceluia al<br />
dezbaterilor economice; fond care în ambele cazuri nu este și nu poate fi, pentru un bun pătrar<br />
de veac poate, decât: primejdia rusească sub ambele ei forme militară și economică.<br />
Formula pe care am semnalat-o în raportul meu nr. 100p este cea prin care guvernele leton și<br />
estonian cred a putea-o satisface în chestiunea dezarmării vecinul lor oriental fără a primejdui<br />
prea mult siguranța lor națională. Este puțin probabil însă ca Moscova să nu încerce a se<br />
prezenta la viitoarea conferință a dezarmării într-o situație mai avantajoasă față de Țările<br />
Baltice decât cea [pe] care o lasă restul de suspiciune cuprins în această formulă. Această<br />
situație optimă ar fi deplin câștigată până atunci dacă pacte de amiciție bilaterale excluzând<br />
cererea excepției vizate și cuprinzând clauza neagresiunii economice ar fi intervenit între cele<br />
trei țări.<br />
Urmărirea asiduă de câtva timp de către Moscova a iscălirii unor asemenea pacte bilaterale<br />
cu diverse puteri mari și mici este una din problemele interesante pe care le oferă în acest<br />
moment psihologia oamenilor reprezentați de Dl. Litvinov. Explicația acestei asiduități trebuie<br />
căutată firește în altă parte decât într-o sinceră teamă a unei agresiuni burgheze concertate.<br />
În afară de dorința vădită de a fragmenta pactele generale de neagresiune ca pactul Kellogg<br />
și pactul Litvinov și de a suprima astfel și slabele legături de solidaritate burgheză sugerate de<br />
aceste înțelegeri multilaterale, văd această explicație ÎN NECESITATEA PENTRU MOSCOVA<br />
DE A CREA MOMENTAN, CÂT DE CURÂND ȘI CÂT DE BINE, ILUZIA UNEI EUROPE<br />
CONSTITUITE DE UNITĂȚI ECONOMICE ȘI POLITICE DE CARACTER ÎNTR-ADEVĂR<br />
DEOSEBIT, COMUNIST ȘI BURGHEZ, DAR LEGATE PERMANENT ÎNTRE ELE ȘI PERFECT<br />
VIABILE.<br />
Moscova are nevoie de această iluzie:<br />
I) pentru a crea o falsă atmosferă de siguranță economică, un teren propice unor operațiuni<br />
de credit (împrumut sau garanție de stat) de care ar avea în curând neapărată nevoie, latura pur<br />
financiară a planului zis de cinci ani fiind după toate aparențele singura care ar putea aduce<br />
eventual prăbușirea lor definitivă (vezi rapoartele și memoriile mele anterioare în această<br />
privință).<br />
II) pentru a crea o falsă atmosferă de siguranță politică și a da altfel cele mai mari șanse de<br />
succes avocaților și halucinaților dezarmării, operațiune de care nu se îndoiește un moment că<br />
va fi singură a profita și de la care este hotărâtă a aștepta răbdător roadele atât cele tehnice cât și<br />
cele sociale.<br />
Referindu-se la această necesitate un fost reprezentant al unei puteri burgheze în Moscova,<br />
bun cunoscător al politicii și metodelor Kremlinului, îmi spunea că dacă am socoti în avantajul
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 153<br />
nostru a forța o elucidare a echivocului relațiilor noastre cu Rusia sovietică, momentul ar fi<br />
destul de propice.<br />
Raportând cu o oarecare repulsie această opinie, nu mă pot împiedica a gândi că tocmai<br />
această necesitate în care se găsește astăzi Moscova de a masca cât mai bine semnificația<br />
incontestabilă a unui plan economico-militar al cărui scop nu este decât distrugerea mai întâi<br />
economică și socială, pe urmă politică și militară a lumii burgheze, că tocmai această necesitate<br />
constituie principalul argument contra unei schimbări provizorii, unei ameliorări aparente a<br />
relațiilor noastre cu U.R.S.S.<br />
Primejdiosul echivoc care stă la baza nesiguranței europene, nesiguranței mondiale, nu este<br />
în aceste relații, ci tocmai în cele ale tuturor celorlalte puteri burgheze cu Rusia comunistă.<br />
Acesta este cel pe care reprezentanții noștri trebuie cred neîncetat să încerce a-l disipa.<br />
Nu ar fi oare o greșeală din partea noastră dacă am permite Rusiei să se prezinte în fața<br />
viitoarei conferințe a dezarmării proaspăt spălată prin însăși iscălitura tuturor vecinilor săi de<br />
orișice acuzație de conspirație și ostilitate contra lumii burgheze?<br />
Ne putem noi îndoi de valoarea primejdioasă a argumentului pe care l-am da astfel nu<br />
numai avocaților inteligenți ai dezarmării ca Germania, Ungaria, Rusia, dar și reprezentanților<br />
acelor țări burgheze insulare sau transoceanice care nedeosebind în această acțiune decât faptul<br />
îmbucurător că în cazul cel mai rău nu ele vor fi păgubașii imediați și principali, sunt deja atât<br />
de înclinate față de primejdia rusească spre o politică de struț.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1918-1944, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, filele 136-139.<br />
54. Diplomatic report no 305 (registered with number 36594 from June 22 nd 1931) of<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza, <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania to Dimitrie I. Ghica, minister of<br />
foreign affairs, June 1931<br />
Reply no. 30058. Ref. no. 88/95 and 100/p.<br />
Concerning <strong>the</strong> future conference on disarmament, <strong>the</strong> attention of Latvian and<br />
Estonian Governments and General Staffs is mainly drawn to <strong>the</strong> matter of <strong>the</strong> exception of<br />
Soviet vicinity.<br />
There would never be any difference on this matter between <strong>the</strong> military and <strong>the</strong> civil<br />
supervising circles if <strong>the</strong> matter could be viewed by both sides only from national safety<br />
standpoint. The exception of Soviet vicinity would be claimed in this case with <strong>the</strong> same<br />
insistence and <strong>the</strong> same precision by <strong>the</strong> general staffs offices and by <strong>the</strong> offices of <strong>the</strong><br />
ministries of foreign affairs, both as technical necessity against <strong>the</strong> existing danger, as well<br />
as a precious recognition of this danger, which is implicit but formal, from <strong>the</strong><br />
underwritten powers.<br />
Yet, for almost two years, <strong>relations</strong> between Soviet Russia and its Baltic neighbours have<br />
been increasingly dominated by considerations of economic nature, with a more serious<br />
and immediate character. The previous Latvian and Estonian Governments hoped for a<br />
moment to solve a crisis that endangered not a fraction but <strong>the</strong> whole prosperity of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
country in an international bourgeois understanding. The attendance of Russia, with equal<br />
powers, to European economic conferences was not accepted and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> matter that<br />
should be <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> debates of <strong>the</strong>se conferences, in order to realize that <strong>the</strong>y would<br />
not lead to any result, was excluded ipso facto from <strong>the</strong> order of <strong>the</strong> day, <strong>the</strong> time of an<br />
economic duel between Soviet Russia and <strong>the</strong> Eastern bourgeoisie powers being still far
154 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
away, and that <strong>the</strong>y would still be concerned, for an indefinite period, with <strong>the</strong> search for<br />
opportunities for immediate, but small and unintelligent political and material gains that<br />
are offered by <strong>the</strong> start of Russian economical offensive.<br />
Isolated in this manner, one may even say abandoned, when facing a vital danger, after a<br />
long period of hesitation and after replacing people responsible for <strong>the</strong>ir fates, <strong>the</strong> two<br />
countries decided to look for an improvement of <strong>the</strong> situation in a momentary understanding<br />
with <strong>the</strong>ir persecutor. From an economical standpoint, this understanding seems to have<br />
taken <strong>the</strong> shape of purchase of industrial and agricultural supplies, by <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia, from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries. A decisive step was made in this direction by Latvian Parliament’s<br />
approval of <strong>the</strong> law that allows State warranty (100%) of <strong>the</strong> Soviet bills of exchange paid to<br />
Latvian producers and vendors. Barely mentioned during debates, <strong>the</strong> draft law was<br />
supported by Social – Democrat and Communist groups united with <strong>the</strong> extreme right<br />
German party which received its directives from <strong>the</strong> Minister of <strong>the</strong> Reich in Riga.<br />
This understanding will have, undoubtedly, a political side and it is anybody’s doubt<br />
that discussions on this matter were held and are being held concerning <strong>the</strong> exception of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet vicinity and also concerning <strong>the</strong> economic non-aggression pact. These two<br />
matters were always linked in Soviet Russia’s claims and approaches. Being faced with an<br />
Europe blinded by recent hostilities and immediate avidity, Moscow gives <strong>the</strong> same<br />
importance to <strong>the</strong> circumvention of disarming debates content as well as to <strong>the</strong> economical<br />
debate; content which in both cases is not and it cannot be, possibly for a good quarter<br />
century, anything o<strong>the</strong>r than Russian danger under its both forms: military and economic.<br />
The formula that I’ve shown in my report no. 100p is <strong>the</strong> one that Latvian and Estonian<br />
Governments think that <strong>the</strong>y could rely on when disarming <strong>the</strong>ir Eastern neighbour<br />
without endangering <strong>the</strong>ir national safety to a significant extent. Yet Moscow is unlikely to<br />
refrain from attending <strong>the</strong> future disarmament conference in a more advantageous<br />
situation towards <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries, different from that displayed by <strong>the</strong> remaining<br />
suspicion included in this formula. This optimal situation would be fully won by <strong>the</strong>n if<br />
bilateral friendship pacts, excluding <strong>the</strong> respective exception claim and covering <strong>the</strong><br />
economic non-aggression clause had been concluded between <strong>the</strong> three countries.<br />
The assiduous Moscow’s pursuit for <strong>the</strong> signing of such bilateral pacts with various<br />
small and great powers is one of <strong>the</strong> most interesting issues that psychology of <strong>the</strong> men<br />
represented by Mr. Litvinov display at this moment. The grounds for this assiduity is to be<br />
found somewhere else, ra<strong>the</strong>r than in an honest sincere fear of a concentrated bourgeois<br />
aggression.<br />
Apart from <strong>the</strong> desire to divide <strong>the</strong> general non-aggression pacts like <strong>the</strong> Kellogg pact<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Litvinov pact and to suppress <strong>the</strong> weak bourgeoisie solidarity bounds suggested by<br />
<strong>the</strong>se multilateral understandings, I see this explanation in MOSCOW’S NECESSITY TO<br />
CREATE, MOMENTARILY, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AS FAIRLY AS POSSIBLE, THE<br />
ILLUSION OF A EUROPE CONSTITUTED FROM ECONOMIC AND POLITIC UNITIES OF<br />
A REALLY SPECIAL CHARACTER, BOTH COMMUNIST AND BOURGEOIS, BUT WITH<br />
PERMANENT TIES BETWEEN THEM AND PERFECTLY VALID.<br />
Moscow needs this illusion:<br />
I) in order to create a false economical safety, an appropriate environment for certain<br />
credit operations (state loan and warranty) which <strong>the</strong>y will soon need, <strong>the</strong> pure financial
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 155<br />
side of <strong>the</strong> five-years plan being, according to all appearances, <strong>the</strong> only thing that could<br />
eventually lead to <strong>the</strong>ir final fall (see my previous reports and memories concerning this<br />
matter).<br />
II) in order to create a false political safety and thus to provide <strong>the</strong> best chances of<br />
success to lawyers and disarmament fanatics, operation which it will undoubtedly be <strong>the</strong><br />
exclusive beneficiary of, and from which <strong>the</strong>y eagerly expect results, both technical as well<br />
as social.<br />
Concerning this need, a former representative of a bourgeois power in Moscow, a good<br />
connoisseur of Kremlin’s policy and methods, told me that if we thought about forcing an<br />
elucidation of our equivocal <strong>relations</strong>hips with Soviet Russia to our advantage, <strong>the</strong> moment<br />
would be just right.<br />
Reporting with some kind of repulsion towards this opinion, I cannot stop thinking<br />
that especially this necessity that Moscow has today, to mask as well as possible <strong>the</strong><br />
incontestable significance of an economical – military plan whose purpose is firstly <strong>the</strong><br />
economic and social destruction and <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> political and military destruction of <strong>the</strong><br />
bourgeois world, that this particular need is <strong>the</strong> main argument against a temporary<br />
change, against an apparent improvement of our <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> U.S.S.R.<br />
The dangerous ambiguity that is <strong>the</strong> underlying foundation of European uncertainty,<br />
worldwide uncertainty, does not lie in <strong>the</strong>se <strong>relations</strong>, but in <strong>the</strong> ones of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
bourgeois powers with Communist Russia. This, I think, is <strong>the</strong> one that our representatives<br />
want to eliminate.<br />
Would we not be committing a mistake if we allowed Russia to attend <strong>the</strong> next<br />
disarmament conference freshly exonerated, through <strong>the</strong> signature of all its neighbours,<br />
from any kind of accusation of conspiracy and hostility against <strong>the</strong> bourgeois world?<br />
Could we doubt <strong>the</strong> dangerous value of <strong>the</strong> argument we would <strong>the</strong>refore provide not<br />
only to intelligent disarmament pursuers like: Germany, Hungary, Russia but also to <strong>the</strong><br />
representatives of those insular bourgeois countries or transoceanic countries which can<br />
only see in this action <strong>the</strong> beneficial fact that in <strong>the</strong> worst case <strong>the</strong>y will not be immediate<br />
and main losers, <strong>the</strong>y are already bowing to <strong>the</strong> Russian danger, like in an ostrich policy.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940, USSR, vol. 9, s. 136-139.<br />
55. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr.<br />
340p către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Dimitrie I. Ghica, iulie 1931<br />
Referire raport nr. 100p și instrucțiuni ministeriale 30058. Șeful Statului Major leton mi-a<br />
comunicat ieri hotărârea luată de Guvernul leton de a rămâne în chestiunea excepției<br />
vecinătății sovietice la formula adoptată la Geneva de țările vecine Rusiei de a se opune la<br />
orișice slăbire a ei. Secretarul Ministerului Afacerilor Străine solicitat astăzi de colegul meu<br />
polon i-a făcut aceeași declarație.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 20<br />
55. Telegram of Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza no. 310 to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs Dimitrie I. Ghica, 17 th June 1931<br />
With reference to report no. 100p and ministerial instructions no. 30058. The Latvian<br />
Chief of General Staff told me yesterday about <strong>the</strong> Latvian government's decision -
156 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> Soviet vicinity - of maintaining <strong>the</strong> formula of<br />
opposing any weakening attempt, adopted in Geneva by <strong>the</strong> countries neighboring Russia,<br />
When asked today by my Polish colleague, <strong>the</strong> Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs reissued <strong>the</strong> same declaration.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 20.<br />
56. Telegrama Ministerului Afacerilor Străine nr. 57450 către Legația României la<br />
Riga, 6 octombrie 1931<br />
De acord cu guvernul german am luat înțelegere de pune în vigoare la 15 noiembrie tratatul<br />
de comerț româno-german din 27 iunie 1931. Acest tratat conținând clauza de preferință pentru<br />
import în Germania a porumbului și a orzului furaj românesc, trebuie obținut agrementul<br />
guvernului pe lângă care sunteți acreditat în ceea ce privește preferința ce ni s-a acordat. În<br />
acest scop luați contact cu reprezentantul Germaniei de urgență, care a primit instrucțiuni în<br />
acest sens. Reprezentantul Germaniei va vorbi mai întâi cu Ministrul Afacerilor Străine și va lăsa<br />
notă verbală având anexe copie după tratatul de comerț, partea preferenței. După întrevederea<br />
reprezentantului Germaniei vorbiți Domnia voastră cu Ministrul Afacerilor Străine lăsând o<br />
notă verbală al cărei text expediez prin poștă. La această notă anexați copie tratat de preferință.<br />
Copia veți lua de la reprezentantul Germaniei care a primit instrucțiuni să vă remită.<br />
Demersurile acestea trebuie a avea loc între 7 și 12 octombrie. Pentru știința Domniei voastre<br />
expediez prin poștă memoriul referitor la clauza de preferință cu Germania precum și istoricul<br />
tratamentului de preferință. În acest memoriu găsiți argumentarea pentru susținerea preferinței<br />
în cursul conversației Domniei voastre cu Ministrul Afacerilor Străine. Pentru știința Domniei<br />
Voastre adaug că unele guverne nu vor da adeziunea [spațiu gol] tratatului de preferință.<br />
Eventual ne-am mulțumi cu o lipsă [a] opoziției.<br />
Binevoiți a mă informa de contact cu reprezentantul Germaniei și despre demersurile<br />
Domniei voastre precum și rezultatul. Pe lângă guvernul Estoniei demersul va fi făcut numai de<br />
Ministrul Germaniei la Tallinn.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 22<br />
56. Telegram of Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 57450 to Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza, 6 th October 1931<br />
In agreement with <strong>the</strong> German government, we agreed to put into force on November 15 th<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade treaty of June 27 th , 1931. As this treaty contains <strong>the</strong> clause<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> import preference for <strong>the</strong> Romanian fodder maize and barley to Germany, we<br />
must receive <strong>the</strong> approval of <strong>the</strong> government to which you are accredited regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
preference that was granted to us. To this end, please contact <strong>the</strong> German representative who<br />
was instructed in this respect as a matter of urgency. The German representative will talk first<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs and leave a note verbale with a copy of <strong>the</strong> preference part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> trade treaty. After <strong>the</strong> meeting of <strong>the</strong> representative of Germany, please talk to <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and leave a note verbale with <strong>the</strong> content that I will send to you<br />
by post. Please enclose a copy of <strong>the</strong> preference treaty to <strong>the</strong> note. You will take <strong>the</strong> copy<br />
from <strong>the</strong> representative of Germany who was instructed to deliver it. These steps must be<br />
taken between October 7 th and 12 th . For your information, I will send to you by post <strong>the</strong><br />
memorandum on <strong>the</strong> preference clause with Germany as well as <strong>the</strong> history of <strong>the</strong>
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 157<br />
preferential treatment. You will find in this memorandum arguments to support <strong>the</strong><br />
preference in your discussion with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs. For your information, I add<br />
that some governments will not adhere [blank] to <strong>the</strong> preference treaty. In this case, we will<br />
be content with <strong>the</strong> lack [of] opposition.<br />
Please inform me about <strong>the</strong> contact with <strong>the</strong> German representative and about your<br />
actions and outcome. The action will be taken to <strong>the</strong> government of Estonia only by <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of Germany in Tallinn.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 22.<br />
57. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Theodor Scortzescu 1 nr.<br />
460 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Dimitrie I. Ghica, 12 octombrie 1931<br />
Până acum nu am primit nici unul din documentele menționate în telegrama Nr. 57450.<br />
Rog pe Excelența Voastră să-mi comunice de urgență dacă pot eventual adopta textul notei<br />
verbale trimisă din Berlin Legației germane din Riga. Pe baza acestui text care menționează<br />
avizul favorabil obținut de clauza de preferințe în chestiune din partea Comitetului<br />
competent la Geneva, Ministrul Germaniei crede că demersul nostru ar trebui să aibă sensul<br />
unei simple comunicări, iar nu al unei cereri de agrement. Legația Germaniei mă roagă de a<br />
trimite notă verbală de asemenea Ministrului Afacerilor Străine din Tallinn pentru a completa<br />
demersul Ministrului Germaniei de acolo.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 23<br />
57. Telegram of Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Latvia Theodor Scortzescu 2 no. 460<br />
to Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrie I. Ghica, 12 th October 1931<br />
So far, I have not received any of <strong>the</strong> <strong>documents</strong> mentioned in telegram no. 57450. I<br />
kindly ask Your Excellency to urgently inform me if I could possibly adopt <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> note<br />
verbale sent to <strong>the</strong> German Legation in Riga from Berlin. Based on this text, which mentions<br />
<strong>the</strong> approval of <strong>the</strong> preference clause in question by <strong>the</strong> competent Committee in Geneva, <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of Germany believes that our approach should have <strong>the</strong> character of a simple<br />
communication, not a request for approval. The German Legation asked me to send a note<br />
verbale to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs in Tallinn also, in order for him to complete <strong>the</strong><br />
action of <strong>the</strong> Minister of Germany <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 23.<br />
1<br />
Theodor Scortzescu (1893-?) și-a început cariera <strong>diplomatic</strong>ă la 1 octombrie 1921. A fost trimis în exterior la Ankara şi<br />
Helsinki, înainte de a fi numit ca secretar (15 decembrie 1930), apoi consilier de legaţie (15 aprilie 1934) la Riga, unde a<br />
rămas până în aprilie 1937. Secretar pentru România în cadrul Secretariatului Permanent al Micii Înțelegeri (1937-<br />
1938), Director Adjunct la Direcția Afaceri Consulare (1939), consilier la legațiile din Berna și Vatican.<br />
2<br />
Theodor Scortzescu (1893-?) began his <strong>diplomatic</strong> career on October 1, 1921. He was sent out in Ankara and<br />
Helsinki before being appointed as Secretary (15 December 1930), <strong>the</strong>n counselor of legation (15 April 1934) to<br />
Riga, where he remained until April 1937. Secretary for Romania at <strong>the</strong> Little Entente’s Permanent Secretariat<br />
(1937-1938), Deputy Director at <strong>the</strong> Department of Consular Affairs (1939), counselor at <strong>the</strong> legations in Bern and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Vatican.
158 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
58. Telegrama lui Gheorghe Filality de la Ministerul Afacerilor Străine al României<br />
nr. 58790 către însărcinatul cu afaceri al României la Riga Theodor Scortzescu, fără<br />
dată, probabil 12 octombrie 1931<br />
Răspuns 460. De acord, adoptați textul Legației germane care este același cu al nostru,<br />
referindu-vă evident numai la tratatul româno-german și nu și la cel german (?). De acord ca<br />
demersul să aibă sensul unei simple comunicări. La Reval ne-am înțeles cu delegatul<br />
Germaniei la Geneva ca demersul să fie făcut de Ministrul Germaniei.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 23<br />
58. Telegram of Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 58790 to Chargé d’Affaires ad<br />
interim in Latvia Theodor Scortzescu, not dated, probably 12 th October 1931<br />
Answer 460. I agree, you should adopt <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> German Legation, which is <strong>the</strong> same<br />
as ours, but obviously referring only to <strong>the</strong> Romanian-German treaty and not to <strong>the</strong> German<br />
one (?). I agree that <strong>the</strong> approach should have <strong>the</strong> character of a simple communication. We<br />
agreed with <strong>the</strong> German delegate in Geneva that in Reval <strong>the</strong> action be undertaken by <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of Germany.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 23.<br />
59. Telegrama Legației României la Riga nr. 480 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine<br />
al României Dimitrie I. Ghica, octombrie 1931<br />
Referindu-mă la telegrama nr. 57450.<br />
Am primit documentele. Ministrul Afacerilor Străine fiind în imposibilitate de a acorda<br />
astăzi audiențe, am fost primit de Dl. Albats, Secretarul General, care mi-a spus că va examina<br />
chestiunea și că crede că guvernul său nu va face obiecții împotriva clauzei preferențiale. Dl.<br />
Albats nu a ridicat de asemenea nicio obiecție în cursul întrevederii sale de azi cu Ministrul<br />
Germaniei.<br />
Legația Germaniei din Reval nu are cunoștință de instrucțiuni asemănătoare cu cele<br />
menționate în sfârșitul telegramei nr. 58690, primind din Berlin numai instrucțiunea de a<br />
face demersul împreună cu Legația României. În urma insistențelor Legației Germaniei din<br />
Riga, cât și a celei din Tallinn, și dată fiind lipsa de timp pentru clarificarea neînțelegerii, miam<br />
permis de a trimite notă verbală de asemeni la Tallinn.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 21<br />
59. Telegram of Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza no. 480 to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs Dimitrie I. Ghica, October 1931<br />
Referring to telegram no. 57 450.<br />
I received <strong>the</strong> <strong>documents</strong>. Due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs is<br />
unavailable for audiences today, I was received by Mr. Albats, <strong>the</strong> Secretary General, who said<br />
he would examine <strong>the</strong> issue and that he believed that his government would have no<br />
objections to <strong>the</strong> preferential clause. Also, Mr. Albats did not raise any objections during his<br />
meeting today with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Germany.<br />
The German Legation in Reval is not aware of instructions similar to those mentioned at<br />
<strong>the</strong> end of Telegram no. 58690; <strong>the</strong>y received from Berlin only <strong>the</strong> instruction of performing<br />
this toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation. Following <strong>the</strong> insistence of <strong>the</strong> German Legation
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 159<br />
in Riga and of <strong>the</strong> one in Tallinn, and given <strong>the</strong> lack of time to clarify <strong>the</strong> misunderstanding, I<br />
took <strong>the</strong> liberty of sending a verbal note to Tallinn, too.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 20.<br />
60. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr.<br />
425 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Dimitrie I. Ghica, 16 decembrie 1931<br />
Domnul Zariņš, noul Ministru al Afacerilor Străine leton, cu care am evitat până acum<br />
orișice conversație pe tema pactelor de neagresiune, mi-a trimis astăzi pe ministrul Franței<br />
pentru a-mi face cunoscut că dacă guvernul român ar alege Riga ca loc al negocierilor cu<br />
Rusia Sovietică, negocieri despre care a fost informat pare-se prin Reval, guvernul leton ar fi<br />
extrem de fericit și s-ar pune cu totul la dispoziția noastră. Este impresia mea și a colegului<br />
meu francez că Guvernul leton, pe lângă satisfacția de amor propriu, crede că în asemenea<br />
împrejurări ar putea menține mai ușor și sediul negocierilor letone în acest oraș, unde, pe de<br />
altă parte, date fiind mai ales actualele relații cu Polonia, s-ar simți, prin noi, mai puțin izolat<br />
în cursul tratativelor. În privința acestor relații adaug că noul guvern pare hotărât a le reda cât<br />
mai degrabă un curs normal.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 34.<br />
60. Telegram of Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza no. 425 to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs Dimitrie I. Ghica, 16 th December 1931<br />
Today, Mr. Zariņš, <strong>the</strong> new Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom I have avoided<br />
any discussion on non-aggression pacts so far sent <strong>the</strong> French envoy to me to let me know<br />
that if <strong>the</strong> Romanian government chose Riga as a place for negotiations with Soviet Russia, of<br />
which he was apparently informed through Reval, <strong>the</strong> Latvian government would be<br />
extremely happy and would be entirely at our disposal. It is my impression, and that of my<br />
French colleague that <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government, besides <strong>the</strong> satisfaction of <strong>the</strong>ir self-esteem,<br />
believes that under such circumstances, it could also maintain more easily <strong>the</strong> headquarters<br />
of Latvian negotiations in this city, where, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, especially given <strong>the</strong> current<br />
<strong>relations</strong> with Poland, it would feel less isolated during negotiations due to our presence.<br />
With regard to <strong>the</strong>se <strong>relations</strong>hips, I add that <strong>the</strong> new government seems determined to<br />
resume <strong>the</strong>m in a natural manner as soon as possible.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 34.<br />
61. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 45<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Dimitrie I. Ghica, 8 ianuarie 1932<br />
Strict confidențial<br />
Domnul Zariņš, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine leton, m-a convocat azi pentru a-mi<br />
comunica îngrijorarea cauzată Guvernelor estonian și leton de părăsirea eventuală [a] clauzei<br />
de interdependență. Domnia sa m-a întrebat în mod confidențial dacă Guvernul român era<br />
gata în ceea ce-l privește ca împreună cu Polonia, Estonia, Letonia și Finlanda să găsim modul<br />
de a obține efectul căutat prin altă cale eventuală.<br />
Am răspuns domnului Zariņš că Excelența Voastră ar primi cu satisfacție această<br />
propunere.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, fila 156.
160 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
61. Telegram no. 45 of Mihail R. Sturdza, <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania, to<br />
Dimitrie I. Ghica, <strong>the</strong> minister of foreign affairs of Romania, 8 th January 1932<br />
Strictly confidential<br />
Mister Zariņš, <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, summoned me today in order to<br />
communicate me <strong>the</strong> concern of <strong>the</strong> Estonian and Latvian governments regarding an<br />
eventual abandonment of <strong>the</strong> clause of interdependency. His Excellency asked me if <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian Government was ready along with Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Finland<br />
counterparts to find a way to obtain <strong>the</strong> desired effect by ano<strong>the</strong>r means.<br />
I answered to Mister Zariņš that Your Excellency would gladly receive this proposition.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940. USSR, vol. 9, s. 156.<br />
62. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 63 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Dimitrie I. Ghica, 16<br />
ianuarie 1932<br />
Documentul aici alăturat arată că în ziua de 21 decembrie deja Dl. Patek 1 acceptase un text<br />
din care clauza interdependenței intrării în vigoare a diferitelor pacte era absolut exclusă. În<br />
urma exemplului dat, proiectul finlandez exclude, de asemenea, această clauză. Celelalte<br />
două puteri baltice s-au resemnat și ele cu tot atâta tristețe la această eventualitate, și dacă<br />
mențin încă în proiectele lor această clauză, aceasta este numai pentru a-și menaja încă un<br />
element de schimb.<br />
Colegul meu polon mă informează într-adevăr astăzi că Polonia ar putea reveni (?) la<br />
această propunere, însă aceasta ca o simplă manevră pentru a para introducerea articolului 3<br />
al proiectului sovietic în forma lui originală, concesiunile făcute, unele proprio moto 2 pare-se,<br />
de Dl. Patek, nemaipermițând discuția decât asupra acestui din urmă punct.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, fila 45.<br />
62. The <strong>diplomatic</strong> report no. 63 of Mihail R. Sturdza, <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of<br />
Romania, to Dimitrie I. Ghica, <strong>the</strong> minister of foreign affairs of Romania, 16 th January<br />
1932<br />
The documentation appended here shows that already on December 21 st Mr. Patek had<br />
accepted a text from which <strong>the</strong> interdependence clause of <strong>the</strong> entry into force of different<br />
pacts was categorically excluded. Following this pattern, <strong>the</strong> Finnish project also excludes this<br />
clause. The o<strong>the</strong>r two Baltic powers sadly resigned in front of this situation, and <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y still keep this clause in <strong>the</strong>ir project is only to allow <strong>the</strong>m to maintain an exchange coin.<br />
My Polish colleague indeed notifies me today that Poland could return (?) to this<br />
proposition, but as a simple maneuver in order to prevent <strong>the</strong> introduction of article 3 of <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet project in its original form; <strong>the</strong> concessions, some of <strong>the</strong>m made proprio moto 3 by Mr.<br />
Patek, allow a discussion only in relation to this last point.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 45.<br />
1<br />
Stanisław Patek (1866-1944) a fost un avocat și diplomat polonez, membru al Comitetului Național Polonez de la<br />
Paris, Ministru al Afacerilor Străine (1919-1920), Ministru al Poloniei în Japonia (1921-1926), în U.R.S.S. (1926-1932),<br />
Ambasador în S.U.A. (1933-1936), senator al Poloniei (1936-1939).<br />
2<br />
Expresie latină, din proprie inițiativă.<br />
3<br />
Latin expression, of one’s own initiative.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 161<br />
63. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 75 către președintele Consiliului de Miniștri și Ministrul Afacerilor Străine<br />
al României Nicolae Iorga 1 , 30 ianuarie 1932<br />
Interviul domnului Litvinov constituie, cred, epilogul și în tot cazul morala negocierilor<br />
româno-sovietice din Riga. Ele au dovedit, într-adevăr, încă o dată cât de greșită era opinia<br />
celor care, în cancelariile străine sau în țară, credeau că Basarabia nu constituie pentru Rusia<br />
Sovietică „în definitiv” decât o chestiune de prestigiu, că din moment ce s-ar găsi formula care<br />
să cruțe îndeajuns amorul propriu al marii noastre vecine, trecerea peste această dificultate ar<br />
fi ușoară și că sincera dorință a Moscovei de a trăi în pace declarată cu toate țările învecinate<br />
ar putea fi realizată.<br />
Cea mai elementară perspicacitate, cel mai puțin ascuțit simț politic ar dovedi orișicărui<br />
român în contact direct cu reprezentanții autorizați ai ideii sovietice că Basarabia nu este<br />
pentru U.R.S.S. nici o chestiune de prestigiu, nici o minimă chestiune teritorială. Basarabia a<br />
rămas până astăzi pentru Soviete unul dintre cele mai importante accesorii, principala<br />
rezervă, a dramei ce o pregătesc cu amănunțire. Basarabia este breșa politică prezervată cu<br />
îngrijire în frontiera lumii burgheze, germenul breșei militare a planului lor de distrugere a<br />
acestei lumi. „Sovietele nu vor renunța la avantajele neprețuibile ale acestei breșe decât când<br />
sovietele nu vor mai fi sovietele, când vor fi renunțat la această distrugere, sau cel puțin când<br />
VOR ÎNCEPE A EVOLUA REALMENTE ÎN ACEST SENS.<br />
Principalul avantaj, cred, al negocierilor de astăzi a fost tocmai de a ne permite nu numai<br />
nouă de a ne convinge încă o dată despre acest adevăr, dar de a da ocazia lumii burgheze, în<br />
special aliaților noștri, de a-și corecta impresia primejdios optimistă în ceea ce privește<br />
„revendicările de simplu prestigiu ale U.R.S.S. față de numai unul din vecinii săi”, de a repune<br />
aceste revendicări pe planul la care ele aparțin: a antagonismului iremediabil între lumea<br />
burgheză și cea comunistă.<br />
În această privință coincidența dezbaterilor pentru dezarmare și a negocierilor românoruse<br />
este o întâmplare fericită despre care nu trebuie cred să ne lipsim a ne folosi în<br />
întregime. Pentru ca aceasta să fie posibil o condiție indispensabilă, după părerea mea, este ca<br />
rezistența și fermitatea noastră pe pozițiile pe care suntem să țină mai mult decât timpul<br />
șederii domnului Stomoniakov 2 în Riga.<br />
Declarațiile energice ale guvernului polon, noua atitudine a Franței, ralierea Finlandei la<br />
frontul vecinilor burghezi ai Rusiei Sovietice, acțiunea energică și în urmă încoronată cu<br />
succes a reprezentanților polon, român, estonian, finlandez în Riga pentru a obține garanția<br />
că Letonia, la un moment dat șovăielnică, nu îl va părăsi, ne pun în posibilitatea de a aștepta<br />
cu sânge rece desfășurarea evenimentelor.<br />
Prin formula adoptată după acord prealabil între negociatorii polon, român, estonian,<br />
finlandez și astăzi leton, pentru clauza de ratificare a celor cinci pacte, suntem asigurați că<br />
1<br />
Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940) a fost una dintre figurile cele mai importante ale istoriografiei românești și europene,<br />
membru al Academiei Române, fondator al Partidului Naționalist Democrat și apoi Partidul Naționalist al<br />
Poporului. A fost Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (1931-1932).<br />
2<br />
Boris Spiridonovici Stomoniakov (1882-1941) a fost un inginer născut în Bulgaria care ulterior s-a alăturat mișcării<br />
bolșevice. A fost reprezentatul comercial sovietic în Germania (1921-1924), membru al Colegiului Comisariatului<br />
Poporului pentru Afaceri Externe.
162 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
niciunul dintre aceste pacte nu va fi perfectat înainte de rezultatul negocierilor româno-ruse,<br />
cel puțin atâta timp cât Polonia se va ține fermă alături de noi.<br />
Sunt convins și cred de datoria mea a spune că am comite o greșeală dacă dintr-un spirit<br />
de conciliere, care nu găsește în adversarul nostru, pot să o asigur, nici un ecou, am părăsi<br />
poziția noastră actuală alunecând din formulă în formulă până la una care ar putea satisface<br />
toate rezervele și răzgândirile Rusiei Sovietice, menajându-i pentru viitor toate posibilitățile<br />
de utilizare a pretextului basarabean, adormind din nou vigilența lumii burgheze un moment<br />
trezită.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, fila 95-97.<br />
63. The <strong>diplomatic</strong> report no. 75 of Mihail R. Sturdza, <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of<br />
Romania, to Nicolae Iorga 1 , <strong>the</strong> President of The Council of Ministers and <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, 30 th January 1932<br />
Mr. Litvinov’s interview is, I think, <strong>the</strong> epilogue and in any case <strong>the</strong> lesson to be learnt<br />
from Romanian – Soviet negotiations in Riga. They proved once more how wrong was <strong>the</strong><br />
opinion of those who, in foreign offices or in <strong>the</strong> country, thought that Bessarabia did not<br />
represent for Russia “in a definite way” a matter of prestige, that once <strong>the</strong> formula that would<br />
spare <strong>the</strong> ego of our great neighbour country had been found, settlement of this issue would<br />
be easy and <strong>the</strong> sincere desire of Moscow to live in a declared peace with all its neighbouring<br />
countries could be accomplished.<br />
The most basic perspicacity, <strong>the</strong> lesser sharpened political sense would prove to any<br />
Romanian folk in direct contact with authorized representatives of Soviet idea, that<br />
Bessarabia is not for U.S.S.R. a matter of prestige, or even a minimal territorial matter.<br />
Bessarabia is, up to <strong>the</strong> present day, for <strong>the</strong> Soviets, one of <strong>the</strong> most important assets, <strong>the</strong><br />
main reserve of drama that <strong>the</strong>y are carefully planning. Bessarabia is <strong>the</strong> political breach<br />
preserved with care in <strong>the</strong> frontier of bourgeois world, <strong>the</strong> germ of <strong>the</strong> military breach in<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir plan to destruct this world. “The Soviets would give up <strong>the</strong> untraceable advantages of<br />
this breach only when <strong>the</strong>y shall no longer be Soviets, when <strong>the</strong>y shall give up this<br />
destruction” or at least WHEN THEY START TO MAKE ACTUAL PROGRESS.<br />
The main benefit of today’s’ negotiations was to allow o<strong>the</strong>rs, not only us, to convince<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves once more about this truth, but to give <strong>the</strong> chance to <strong>the</strong> bourgeois world,<br />
especially to our allies, to correct <strong>the</strong>ir dangerously optimistic impression in what “<strong>the</strong> claim<br />
of simple prestige of <strong>the</strong> USSR towards one of its neighbours” is concerned, to reset <strong>the</strong>se<br />
claims where <strong>the</strong>y belong: in <strong>the</strong> irremediable antagonism between <strong>the</strong> Bourgeois world and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Communist one.<br />
Therefore <strong>the</strong> coincidence of disarmament debates and <strong>the</strong> Romanian –Russian debates is<br />
a fortunate occurs that we need to make <strong>the</strong> most possible use of. For this, an indispensable<br />
condition, in my opinion, is for our resistance and firm position to be held also after Mr.<br />
Stomoniakov 2 ’s stay in Riga ends.<br />
1<br />
Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940) was one of <strong>the</strong> most important figures of Romanian and European historiography,<br />
member of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Academy and founder of <strong>the</strong> Democratic Nationalist Party and <strong>the</strong>n of Nationalist<br />
People's Party. President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1931-1932).<br />
2<br />
Boris Spiridonovich Stomoniakov (1882-1941) was an engineer born in Bulgaria who later joined <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik<br />
movement. He was <strong>the</strong> Soviet trade representative in Germany (1921-1924) and a member of <strong>the</strong> People's<br />
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs College.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 163<br />
The dynamic declarations of <strong>the</strong> Polish Government, <strong>the</strong> changed attitude of France, <strong>the</strong><br />
joining of Finland in <strong>the</strong> front of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois neighbours of Soviet Russia, <strong>the</strong> dynamic and<br />
successful action of <strong>the</strong> Polish, Romanian, Estonian, Finnish representatives in Riga in order<br />
to obtain <strong>the</strong> warranty that Latvia, hesitating at certain moments, would not abandon it, give<br />
us <strong>the</strong> opportunity to expect in cold blood <strong>the</strong> development of events.<br />
Based on <strong>the</strong> formula adopted after <strong>the</strong> previous agreement between <strong>the</strong> Polish,<br />
Romanian, Estonian, Finnish and today Latvian negotiators, for <strong>the</strong> clause of ratification of<br />
<strong>the</strong> five pacts, we are assured that none of <strong>the</strong>se pacts can be executed before Romanian –<br />
Russian negotiations reach a result, at least as long as Poland keeps its firm position on our<br />
side.<br />
I am convinced and I think that it is my duty to say that we would commit a mistake if,<br />
out of a reconciliatory sense, which cannot find in our opponent, I may say it for sure, any<br />
echo, we leave our current position shifting from one formula to ano<strong>the</strong>r up to one that could<br />
satisfy all reluctances and changing of hearts of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia, sparing it in <strong>the</strong> future of<br />
all possibilities of using <strong>the</strong> Bessarabia pretext, putting once again to sleep <strong>the</strong> briefly awaked<br />
vigilance of bourgeois world.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 95-97.<br />
64. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 81<br />
către președintele Consiliului de Miniștri al României Nicolae Iorga, 4 februarie 1932<br />
Sub presiunea opoziției socialiste, guvernul leton fusese pe cale, deja săptămâna trecută,<br />
de a admite unele modificări relativ la pactul de neagresiune, cerute de Soviete, care ar fi<br />
desolidarizat Letonia și poate chiar [ar fi] izolat-o în mod definitiv prin pactul de neagresiune<br />
de celelalte țări vecine. Împreună cu colegii mei polon, estonian și finlandez am intervenit<br />
energic împiedicând semnarea pactului în ultimul moment și obținând atât din partea<br />
Președintelui Republicii cât și din partea Președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri asigurările<br />
cuvenite. Acțiunea Rusiei intensificându-se între timp, am regăsit azi după mai multe ședințe<br />
aceeași situație.<br />
În aceste împrejurări și dată fiind importanța chestiunii ne-am hotărât la un demers<br />
colectiv al celor patru reprezentanți sus-numiți pe care l-am făcut azi dimineață pe lângă<br />
Președintele Consiliului de Miniștri în numele și din ordinul guvernelor noastre respective.<br />
Am atras atenția cu toții în mod serios domnului Skujenieks 1 asupra răspunderii ce și-o ia față<br />
de propria lui țară determinând de acum izolarea ei în unele eventualități care sunt departe<br />
de a fi excluse. Am reamintit Președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri făgăduința ce mi-a făcut-o<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine leton în ziua de 8 ianuarie.<br />
Reprezentantul Estoniei a declarat în mod categoric că alianța celor două țări este<br />
amenințată. Am obținut în fine noi asigurări Cu toți avem impresia că dacă Ministrul francez<br />
s-ar alătura insistențelor noastre, guvernul leton ar putea mai ușor înfrânge manevrele<br />
opoziției și intrigile Legației Sovietice. O sugestie urgentă la Paris în acest sens ar fi poate<br />
salutară.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, filele 157-158.<br />
1<br />
Marģers Skujenieks (1886-1941) a fost politician leton, Prim Ministru (1926-1928, 1931-1933). A fost arestat,<br />
deportat și executat în U.R.S.S.
164 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
64. Telegram no. 81 of Mihail R. Sturdza, <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania, to<br />
Nicolae Iorga, <strong>the</strong> president of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers and <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs, 4 th February 1932<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> pressure of <strong>the</strong> Socialist opposition, <strong>the</strong> Latvian government was last week on<br />
<strong>the</strong> verge of allowing some modifications regarding <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact that were<br />
demanded by <strong>the</strong> Soviets, which might have had <strong>the</strong> effect of dissociating Latvia and maybe<br />
even definitively isolating it through <strong>the</strong> pact of no-aggression from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r neighboring<br />
countries. Toge<strong>the</strong>r with my Polish, Estonian and Finnish colleagues I energetically<br />
intervened, obstructed <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> pact at <strong>the</strong> last minute and obtained both from <strong>the</strong><br />
President of <strong>the</strong> Republic as well as from <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers <strong>the</strong><br />
positive assurance. As <strong>the</strong> action of Russia was intensifying, meanwhile we found again, after<br />
several meetings, in <strong>the</strong> same situation.<br />
In <strong>the</strong>se circumstances and given <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> matter, we decided to make a<br />
joint action of <strong>the</strong> four above-mentioned representatives that we undertook this morning at<br />
<strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers in <strong>the</strong> name and by <strong>the</strong> order of our governments.<br />
We seriously drew <strong>the</strong> attention of Mr. Skujenieks 1 on <strong>the</strong> liability that he assumed towards<br />
his own country, determining its isolation in some events that are far from being excluded. I<br />
reminded <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers of <strong>the</strong> promise that <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister<br />
of Foreign Affairs made me on January 8 th .<br />
The representative of Estonia declared that <strong>the</strong> alliance of <strong>the</strong> two countries was<br />
threatened. I was again reassured; we all have <strong>the</strong> impression that if <strong>the</strong> French Minister<br />
joined our association, <strong>the</strong> Latvian governs could easily defeat <strong>the</strong> maneuvers of <strong>the</strong><br />
opposition and <strong>the</strong> intrigues of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Legation. Any urgent advice from Paris concerning<br />
this issue would be appropriate.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940. USSR, vol. 9, s. 157-158.<br />
65. Telegrama circumară a Președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri al României<br />
Nicolae Iorga nr. 6396 către legațiile României de la Paris și Geneva, 5 februarie 1932<br />
Cu toate intervențiile prealabile ale Însărcinatului nostru cu Afaceri la Riga, guvernul<br />
leton, fiind pe cale, sub presiunea opoziției socialiste și a Moscovei, a admite în Pactul de<br />
Neagresiune cu Sovietele unele modificări, care ar fi desolidarizat-o și poate chiar izolat-o<br />
definitiv de țările vecine, Dl. Sturdza a făcut la 4 februarie împreună cu colegii săi polon,<br />
estonian și finlandez un demers colectiv pe lângă guvernul leton în numele și din ordinul<br />
guvernelor respective. Dânșii au atras în mod serios atenția Președintelui Consiliului de<br />
Miniștri asupra răspunderii [pe] care și-o ia față de țara lui determinând izolarea ei în unele<br />
eventualități ce nu sunt excluse.<br />
Reprezentantul Estoniei a declarat cu acest prilej în mod categoric că alianța celor două<br />
țări este amenințată. Reprezentanții celor patru puteri au obținut în fine noi asigurări. Dânșii<br />
au totuși impresia că dacă Ministrul francez s-ar alătura insistențelor lor, guvernul leton ar<br />
putea mai ușor înfrânge manevrele opoziției și intrigile Legației Sovietice. 1) Veți binevoi a<br />
1<br />
Marģers Skujenieks (1886-1941) was a Latvian politician, Prime Minister (1926-1928, 1931-1933). He was arrested,<br />
deported and executed in <strong>the</strong> USSR.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 165<br />
face de urgență o sugestie în acest sens pe lângă guvernul francez. 2) Am dat instrucțiuni<br />
Domnului Cesianu 1 să facă de urgență o sugestie în acest sens pe lângă guvernul francez.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, fila 159.<br />
65. Telegram no. 6396 of Nicolae Iorga, <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers of<br />
Romania, to <strong>the</strong> legations of Romania in Paris and Geneva, 5 th February 1932<br />
Despite all <strong>the</strong> previous interventions of our Chargé d'affaires in Riga, and as <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
government was on <strong>the</strong> verge of allowing some modifications in <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviets under <strong>the</strong> pressure of <strong>the</strong> Socialist opposition and Moscow, which could have<br />
dissociated it and even definitively isolated it from its neighboring countries, Mr. Sturdza<br />
made on February 4 th toge<strong>the</strong>r with his Polish, Estonian and Finnish colleagues a joint<br />
demarche at <strong>the</strong> Latvian government in <strong>the</strong> name of and by <strong>the</strong> order of those respective<br />
governments. They seriously drew <strong>the</strong> attention of <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers<br />
on <strong>the</strong> liability that it would assume in what his country was concerned, determining its<br />
isolation in certain events that are not to be excluded.<br />
The representative of Estonia declared on account of this event that <strong>the</strong> alliance of <strong>the</strong><br />
two countries was threatened. The representatives of <strong>the</strong> four powers obtained new<br />
reassurances. However, <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> impression that if <strong>the</strong> French Minister joined <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
cause, <strong>the</strong> Latvian government could easily exceed <strong>the</strong> maneuvers of <strong>the</strong> opposition and <strong>the</strong><br />
intrigues of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Legation. 1) I ask you to urgently make a suggestion in this sense to <strong>the</strong><br />
French government. 2) I have instructed Mr. Cesianu 2 to make an emergency suggestion in<br />
this sense at <strong>the</strong> French government.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940. USSR, vol. 9, s. 159.<br />
66. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr.<br />
101 către președintele Consiliului de Miniștri al României Nicolae Iorga, 7 februarie<br />
1932<br />
Pactul de neagresiune între Letonia și Soviete a fost iscălit ieri în Riga. Într-o declarație<br />
verbală făcută în momentul iscăliturii și repetată presei, Președintele Consiliului de Miniștri<br />
leton a precizat că ratificarea pactului iscălit de către Letonia va depinde de iscălitura pactului<br />
estonian și este în cea mai strânsă legătură cu iscălitura unor pacte de neagresiune<br />
asemănătoare de toate țările vecine Sovietelor.<br />
Formula președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri leton este ceva mai puțin categorică decât<br />
cea a Ministrului Afacerilor Străine finlandez, aceasta din considerații de politică internă.<br />
Intenția este totuși aceeași și actualul guvern sau alt guvern burghez din Letonia va rămâne<br />
după toate probabilitățile credincios acestor declarații. De altfel, a fost solemn promis<br />
Estoniei că ratificările ambelor țări nu vor avea loc decât împreună, și Estonia va fi, credem,<br />
mai ușor reținută de la o ratificare separată de guvernele polon, român și finlandez.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, fila 160.<br />
1<br />
Constantin (Dinu) Cesianu (1887-1983) a fost diplomat român, Ministru al României în Franța (1930-1938).<br />
2<br />
Constantin (Dinu) Cesianu (1887-1983) was a Romanian diplomat, Minister of Romania in France (1930-1938).
166 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
66. Telegram no. 101 of Mihail R. Sturdza, <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania, to<br />
Nicolae Iorga, <strong>the</strong> president of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers and <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs, 7 th February 1932<br />
The non-aggression pact between Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Soviets was signed yesterday in Riga. In a<br />
verbal declaration made at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> signing and repeated <strong>the</strong>n to <strong>the</strong> press, <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers mentioned that <strong>the</strong> ratification of <strong>the</strong> pact signed by<br />
Latvia would depend on <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> Estonian pact and that it was in <strong>the</strong> closest<br />
relation with <strong>the</strong> signing of similar non-aggression pacts by all <strong>the</strong> neighbor countries of <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviets.<br />
The formula of <strong>the</strong> Latvian President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers is less categorical than<br />
<strong>the</strong> one of <strong>the</strong> Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, owing to considerations of domestic policy.<br />
The intention is still <strong>the</strong> same and <strong>the</strong> current government or o<strong>the</strong>r bourgeois government in<br />
Latvia would remain after all faithful to <strong>the</strong>se declarations. Also, promises were made to<br />
Estonia that <strong>the</strong> ratifications of both countries would only take place simultaneously, and we<br />
believe that Estonia would be easier averted from a ratification separate from <strong>the</strong> Polish,<br />
Romanian and Finnish governments.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940. USSR, vol. 9, s. 160.<br />
67. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 108 către președintele Consiliului de Miniștri Nicolae Iorga, 12 februarie<br />
1932<br />
Partea a doua.<br />
Confidențială.<br />
Am onoarea [de] a completa prin acest raport [pe] cel trimis deja prin poștă relativ la<br />
îndeplinirea misiunii ce mi-a fost încredințată. El va răspunde totodată la informațiile<br />
confidențiale cu același subiect cerute prin scrisoarea Excelenței Voastre nr. 6118/32.<br />
În negocierile conduse de mine în Riga cu domnul Stomoniakov, relative la un pact de<br />
neagresiune româno-sovietic, am considerat ca egal esențiale următoarele două directive,<br />
ambele corespunzând cu instrucțiunile primite: 1) a nu admite sub niciun cuvânt ca vreo<br />
rezervă sovietică orișicare asupra Basarabiei să fie introdusă în textele adoptate sau chiar în<br />
partea consemnată a dezbaterilor noastre. 2) A evita cu aceeași grijă ca o rupere a negocierilor<br />
să poată fi atribuită de aliații noștri, în special de Polonia, relei noastre voințe, intransigenței<br />
noastre exagerate sau chiar vreunei hotărâri prealabile.<br />
Am considerat tot astfel ca necesar a ține un contact cât mai strâns cu negocierile ce erau<br />
duse în același timp de către Letonia și Estonia cu U.R.S.S..<br />
Pare evident că din punctul de vedere exclusiv al raporturilor noastre cu Sovietele și<br />
plecând de la principiul că nu am fi admis a intra pentru a doua oară în negocieri dacă nu am<br />
fi fost asigurați de astă dată, în mod formal, că chestiunea Basarabiei va fi lăsată deoparte, ar<br />
fi trebuit să întrerup conversațiile chiar de la prezentarea proiectului sovietic, adică de la<br />
prima mea întrevedere cu domnul Stomoniakov.<br />
Asigurări repetate îmi erau însă continuu transmise de Ministrul Poloniei că încercarea<br />
Sovietelor de a introduce chestiunea prohibită chiar de la primele alineate ale preambulului<br />
acelui proiect nu constituia decât un bluf, că rezistența domnului Stomoniakov nu era decât<br />
tactică și că prin suplețea și răbdarea cuvenită voi reuși a obține redactarea normală a unui
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 167<br />
asemenea instrument, redactare la care eram în drept a ne aștepta în urma asigurărilor ce ne<br />
fuseseră transmise înainte de începerea negocierilor.<br />
Mă grăbesc să menționez că domnul Arciszewski, colegul meu polon, mi-a acordat în tot<br />
timpul negocierilor colaborarea cea mai loială, mergând chiar până la a-mi comunica unele<br />
informații mai mult dăunătoare rolului ce-i fusese atribuit pe lângă mine. Domnia sa nu a<br />
încetat a mă asigura că Polonia nu ar admite un singur moment ca U.R.S.S să condiționeze<br />
contractarea unui angajament de neagresiune față de noi de redeschiderea chestiunii<br />
Basarabiei. Guvernul său era însă convins că această redeschidere nu era decât o manevră<br />
trecătoare și mă ruga insistent să țin cont de lunga experiență pe care Domnul Patek o avea<br />
despre metodele de negociere ale Sovietelor, în general, și ale Domnului Stomoniakov, în<br />
particular.<br />
Pentru a da deci dovada completă a sincerității noastre în negocierile întreprinse, m-am<br />
hotărât a ocoli obstacolul ce se prezenta chiar de la prima ședință, propunând delegatului<br />
sovietic a considera deocamdată proiectele respective ca lipsite de preambul și de a intra în<br />
discuția articolelor. Doream astfel a încerca până la extrema limită după sfaturile aliaților<br />
noștri și pentru propria mea convingere ipoteza blufului sovietic.<br />
Știam că acceptarea propunerii mele de către domnul Stomoniakov nu constituia după<br />
toate probabilitățile din partea Domniei sale decât o manevră pentru a muta conflictul de pe<br />
terenul intransigenței sale în chestiunea preambulului proiectului său pe cel al intransigenței<br />
noastre în chestiunea articolului întâi al proiectului nostru. Căpătasem, însă, între timp<br />
convingerea că prima atitudine adoptată de mine, cea a unui simplu contact prealabil<br />
negocierilor propriu-zise, era de natură a slăbi la Varșovia (tocmai în momentul când Dl.<br />
Patek se găsea în fața alternativei de a iscăli sau de a parafa) simțămintele de solidaritate și de<br />
răspundere ale aliaților noștri, simțăminte pe care era scopul meu a le dezvolta și întreține cât<br />
mai mult.<br />
Desfășurarea evenimentelor arată cred că metoda adoptată nu a fost greșită.<br />
Refuzând a consemna orișice aluzie chiar la rezerva sovietică, discuțiile ce au urmat în<br />
cele ale mele șase întâlniri cu Dl. Stomoniakov nu au alterat întru nimic poziția noastră de<br />
intransigență absolută în chestiunea teritorială.<br />
Răbdarea noastră, pe de altă parte, ne-a dat prilejul de a dovedi aliaților noștri și<br />
sinceritatea absolută a intențiilor noastre și concepția ce Sovietele o aveau despre un pact de<br />
neagresiune cu România: retrezirea litigiului teritorial, hotărârea lor de a nu ne acorda nici<br />
asigurarea inviolabilității granițelor noastre, nici vreo procedură de reglementare a<br />
conflictelor, nici vreun angajament orișicare relativ la provocarea peste granițele noastre a<br />
mișcărilor subversive.<br />
Totodată, prin prelungirea prezenței mele în dezbaterile ce se țineau în acest timp în Riga<br />
între Soviete și puterile burgheze am putut contribui la menținerea în linie a negociatorilor<br />
letoni care în diferite rânduri au părut a voi a se eschiva îndatoririlor comune.<br />
Cred că răspunsul la întrebările ce Excelența Voastră mi le făcea prin scrisoarea sus<br />
menționată va completa în mod util acest raport.<br />
În momentul luării primului meu contact cu Ministrul sovietic în Riga, adică la începutul<br />
lunii decembrie, dl. Arciszewski mi-a citit procesul verbal stenografiat și certificat atât de dl.<br />
Patek cât și de dl. Litvinov a uneia dintre ședințele negocierilor polono-sovietice în curs, cea<br />
din 14 noiembrie, mi se pare. În dialogul urmat, dl. Patek întreba la un moment dat pe dl.
168 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Litvinov dacă se angaja a lăsa la o parte chestiunea Basarabiei între eventuale negocieri între<br />
România și Rusia sovietică; după unele ezitări Dl. Litvinov răspundea afirmativ.<br />
Puțin timp după aceea dl. Arciszewski mi-a povestit următoarele în legătură cu procesul<br />
verbal în chestiune. Ambasada polonă din Paris a fost la un moment dat întrebată de Quai<br />
d`Orsay dacă într-adevăr dl. Patek se angajase la Moscova față de dl. Litvinov în numele<br />
României ca această țară să înceapă cu U.R.S.S. negocieri în vederea unui pact de neagresiune<br />
„cu condiția ca chestiunea Basarabiei să fie lăsată deschisă”. Ministerul Afacerilor Străine<br />
francez producea în același timp o copie a procesului verbal din 14 noiembrie, copie ce-i<br />
fusese remisă de ambasada sovietică, în care cuvintele de „lăsată la o parte” erau înlocuite<br />
prin cele de „lăsată deschisă”. Urmarea, după spusele colegului meu polon, a fost o energică<br />
protestare a domnului Patek pe lângă dl. Litvinov, care ar fi recunoscut eroarea de stenografie<br />
și ar fi dispus ca rectificarea erorii textului să fie comunicată pe aceeași cale Ministerului<br />
Afacerilor Străine francez.<br />
Dl. Arciszewski nu a lipsit a-mi aminti atunci, ca și de repetate ori în urmă, că acest proces<br />
verbal era punctul de plecare al cererii ce ne fusese făcută de Varșovia de a intra în negocieri<br />
cu Moscova. La rândul meu am considerat întotdeauna față de Domnia sa că această<br />
făgăduință fusese formal și precis dată domnului Patek și că deschiderea bruscă a chestiunii<br />
Basarabiei chiar de la începutul negocierilor nu a putut fi datorată decât exclusiv relei<br />
credințe și intenției de mistificare a domnului Litvinov, care încercase chiar a pregăti lovitura<br />
prin substituirea de cuvinte sus-menționată. Am luat în acest sens precauția de a nu strecura<br />
în presă comunicatul la care se referea telegrama mea nr. 47 și instrucțiunile Excelenței<br />
Voastre nr. 81 și unde făgăduielile formale făcute de Soviete erau reamintite, înainte de a<br />
consulta pe dl. Arciszewski care nu a avut nimic de obiectat conținutului său.<br />
Astăzi, însă, după ultima întrevedere cu dl. Stomoniakov, și după deslușirile ce domnia sa<br />
mi-a dat relative la acele făgăduieli (deslușiri, bineînțeles, luate cum grano salis 1 ) sunt mai<br />
puțin convins ca oricând despre faptul că promisiunea de a nu atinge chestiunea Basarabiei a<br />
fost dată în modul clar și categoric pe care Dl. Patek a crezut a-l auzi. Dacă ar trebui să rezum<br />
în puține cuvinte impresiile mele aș zice CĂ DIN PARTEA DL. LITVINOV A FOST O<br />
VĂDITĂ INTENȚIE DE MISTIFICARE, CĂ DIN PARTEA DOMNULUI PATEK A FOST O<br />
VĂDITĂ COMPLEZENȚĂ ÎN A SE LĂSA MISTIFICAT ȘI POATE DIN PARTEA<br />
GUVERNULUI POLON A FOST O TENDINȚĂ DE A DESCOPERI MISTIFICAREA CÂT MAI<br />
TÂRZIU POSIBIL.<br />
Cred încă util a semnala altă influență ce a avut-o asupra negocierilor optimismul exagerat<br />
al domnului Patek.<br />
Se știe că după părăsirea planului inițial al negocierilor simultane între țările burgheze și<br />
Rusia sovietică, guvernul polon adoptase ideea introducerii unei clauze de interdependență a<br />
intrărilor în vigoare a pactelor, ce urmau a fi negociate bilateral. Despre Țările Baltice în tot<br />
cazul se poate spune că ele nu ar fi urmat sugestia guvernului polon dacă nu ar fi crezut că<br />
Polonia făcea din acceptarea de către Moscova a acestei clauze o condiție sine qua non.<br />
Spre marea mea mirare aflam prin Ministrul Poloniei (telegrama mea nr. 405 din 13<br />
decembrie) că încă de la aceea dată dl. Patek, care negociase deja aproape întregul pactul cu<br />
dl. Litvinov, nu pusese încă în discuție clauza care trebuia să servească de punct de raliere<br />
1<br />
Latină: cu un grăunte de sare. Expresie ce este folosită de Pliniu cel Bătrân și trebuie înțeleasă în context în sensul<br />
că deslușirile nu trebuie luate în serios.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 169<br />
puterilor burgheze asociate. Constatând în urmă eu însumi efectul de exasperare și de<br />
indignare, oarecum legitimă, pe care propunerea unei asemenea clauze a făcut-o din capul<br />
locului asupra negociatorilor sovietici, atât în Riga, cât și în Helsingfors și față de Estonia,<br />
sunt SILIT A CONCLUZIONA CĂ DL PATEK A COMIS O CURIOASĂ IMPRUDENȚĂ ȘI A<br />
ARĂTAT O IMPRUDENȚĂ LIPSITĂ DE CURIOZITATE NEPROVOCÂND DIN CAPUL<br />
LOCULUI O REACȚIE PRECISĂ A SOVIETELOR PE ACEASTĂ CHESTIUNE SAU<br />
NECOMUNICÂND GUVERNULUI SĂU DECÂT LA SFÂRȘITUL APROAPE AL<br />
NEGOCIERILOR NON POSSUMUS 1 -UL CATEGORIC OPUS DE SOVIETE.<br />
Consternarea a fost mare în capitalele baltice când s-a aflat fără nicio prevestire că Polonia<br />
renunțase subit la aceea clauză al cărei inițiator și campion elocvent fusese atâtea luni de zile<br />
și de care părea astfel a se fi servit numai pentru a atrage celelalte puteri burgheze în<br />
negocieri pe care ele nu le-ar fi acceptat altfel. Dacă ar trebui să cred pe colegul meu polon,<br />
consternarea a fost aproape tot atât de mare, pentru unele persoane cel puțin, la Varșovia,<br />
când s-a aflat că „Patek avait tout lâché”.<br />
Admițând că nu ar fi prea târziu pentru a trage o lecție utilă din aceste evenimente, s-ar<br />
putea semnala cât de avantajoasă ar fi astăzi poziția țărilor burgheze dacă în fața refuzului<br />
ușor de prevăzut și de explicat al Moscovei de a primi clauza de interdependență exclusiv<br />
îndreptată împotriva ei, Polonia, consecventă cu ideea protocolului din Moscova, s-ar fi întors<br />
la concepția unui pact multiplu. Trebuia, printr-o redactare adecvată dată acestui pact,<br />
[redat] caracterul strict și complet al unui pact de neagresiune, excluzând orișice confuzie cu<br />
un pact de garanție sau cu un Locarno Oriental; el trebuia negociat între toate puterile<br />
iscălitoare ale protocolului din Moscova, invitând și Finlanda (pactul de neagresiune francosovietic<br />
dovedește că distanța geografică nu este o piedică logică la contractarea a astfel de<br />
obligații) și diferitele adeziuni trebuiau culese de puterile inițiatoare pe măsură ce erau<br />
negociate și obținute. Alianțele existente între România și Polonia sau Letonia și Estonia nu<br />
ar fi dat loc decât la unele dificultăți de redactare ușor de înlăturat. Rusia sovietică ar fi găsit<br />
cu greu vreun motiv legitim pentru a refuza adeziunea sa și în tot cazul acest refuz ar fi<br />
descoperit-o pe ea fără nicio ambiguitate față de opinia publică și nu pe vreuna din puterile<br />
burgheze.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 108-113.<br />
67. Diplomatic Report no. 108 of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Cabinet Office and <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs Nicolae Iorga, 12 th February 1932<br />
Part two.<br />
Confidential<br />
It is my honour to supplement my prior report, sent by mail, with this one, regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
accomplishment of <strong>the</strong> mission assigned to me. It will also provide an answer to confidential<br />
information requested in Letter no. 611/32 by Your Excellency, on <strong>the</strong> same matter.<br />
In my negotiations held with Mr. Stomoniakov in Riga, with regard to a Romanian-Soviet<br />
non-aggression pact, we considered <strong>the</strong> following two directives to be equally essential, as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y both correspond to <strong>the</strong> received directions: 1) Not to allow under any circumstance that<br />
1<br />
„Nu putem”: expresie latină intrată în vocabularul <strong>diplomatic</strong> ce înseamnă o opoziție principială, categorică,<br />
nenegociabilă dată unei propuneri.
170 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
any Soviet reserve over Bessarabia is introduced in <strong>the</strong> adopted texts or even in <strong>the</strong> minutes<br />
of our argument. 2) To carefully prevent our allies, especially Poland, from claiming that<br />
disruption of negotiations was due to our bad faith, to our intransigence or even to a previous<br />
decision to this end.<br />
Also, we considered necessary to keep a very close contact with negotiations led at <strong>the</strong><br />
same time by Latvia and Estonia with <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />
It seems obvious that from <strong>the</strong> exclusive point of view of our <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Soviets<br />
and starting from <strong>the</strong> fact that this time we would not have accepted to return to<br />
negotiations if we had not been officially assured that <strong>the</strong> question of Bessarabia was not to<br />
be approached, I would have been forced to interrupt discussions even from <strong>the</strong> presentation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Soviet project, namely from my first meeting with Mr. Stomoniakov.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> Minister of Poland was constantly assuring me that Soviets’ attempt to enter <strong>the</strong><br />
question that was prohibited even from <strong>the</strong> first paragraphs of <strong>the</strong> project preamble was<br />
nothing but a bluff, that <strong>the</strong> resistance of Mr. Stomoniakov was nothing but a strategy and<br />
that with <strong>the</strong> appropriate patience and flexibility, I would have <strong>the</strong> ability to obtain <strong>the</strong><br />
normal drafting of such instrument, a draft we were entitled to expect, following supportive<br />
statements we received before <strong>the</strong> beginning of negotiations.<br />
I must mention that during <strong>the</strong> entire negotiations period, Mr. Arciszewski, my Polish<br />
colleague, gave me his most loyal collaboration, up to <strong>the</strong> point when he communicated me<br />
certain information that could represent a risk for <strong>the</strong> role he had been assigned to. He<br />
insisted in assuring me that Poland, under any circumstance, would not allow <strong>the</strong> USSR to<br />
condition <strong>the</strong> contracting of a non-aggression agreement with us on reopening of <strong>the</strong><br />
Bessarabia question. Its Government however was sure that this reopening was nothing but a<br />
temporary manoeuvre and <strong>the</strong>y persistently asked me to defer to <strong>the</strong> vast experience that Mr.<br />
Patek had in relation to <strong>the</strong> negotiation methods of <strong>the</strong> Soviets in general and of Mr.<br />
Stomoniakov in particular.<br />
In order to provide full proof of our honesty during negations, I decided to avoid <strong>the</strong><br />
obstacle that occurred even from <strong>the</strong> first meeting, proposing to <strong>the</strong> Soviet delegate to<br />
consider those projects without preambles and to begin discussions on articles. This way,<br />
based on <strong>the</strong> advice of our allies and for my own beliefs I wanted to test <strong>the</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>sis of <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet bluff to <strong>the</strong> limit.<br />
I knew that <strong>the</strong> acceptance of my proposal by Mr. Stomoniakov only represented a<br />
manoeuvre intended to shift <strong>the</strong> conflict away from his intransigency regarding <strong>the</strong> question<br />
of <strong>the</strong> project preamble towards our intransigency concerning <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> first article of<br />
our project. Meanwhile I got to believe that my first attitude, namely a simple contact prior to<br />
actual negotiations, was meant to weaken <strong>the</strong> feelings of solidarity and responsibility of our<br />
allies in Warsaw (right when Mr. Patek had to choose whe<strong>the</strong>r to sign / seal <strong>the</strong> pact of not),<br />
feelings that I had to develop and maintain as much as possible.<br />
I believe that <strong>the</strong> development of events shows that I adopted <strong>the</strong> right method.<br />
By refusing to record any allusion to <strong>the</strong> Soviet reluctance, <strong>the</strong> discussions that followed<br />
during my six meetings with Mr. Stomoniakov did not alter in any way our position of<br />
absolute intransigency regarding <strong>the</strong> territorial question.<br />
Our patience, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, also gave us <strong>the</strong> opportunity to prove to our allies <strong>the</strong><br />
absolute honesty of our intentions and <strong>the</strong> Soviets’ conception on a non-aggression pact with
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 171<br />
Romania: <strong>the</strong> reiteration of territorial litigation, <strong>the</strong>ir decision to grant us nei<strong>the</strong>r assurance<br />
of our frontiers inviolability, nor any conflict regulating procedure, nor any engagement<br />
regarding <strong>the</strong> instigation to subversive movements beyond our borders.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time, by extending my presence in Riga debates - held between <strong>the</strong> Soviets<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Bourgeois powers – I was able to make a contribution to maintaining <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
negotiators afloat, who repeatedly seemed to want to weasel out of <strong>the</strong> common duties.<br />
I believe that <strong>the</strong> answer to Your Excellency’s questions in <strong>the</strong> above mentioned letter will<br />
complete this report in a serviceable manner.<br />
When I first met <strong>the</strong> Soviet Minister in Riga, more precisely at <strong>the</strong> beginning of<br />
December, Mr. Arciszewski read to me <strong>the</strong> Minute – written in shorthand and certified by<br />
both Mr. Patek and Mr. Litvinov – of one of <strong>the</strong> ongoing Polish-Soviet negotiation meetings,<br />
namely <strong>the</strong> meeting of November 14 th , as I recall. In a certain moment of <strong>the</strong> following<br />
dialogue Mr. Patek asked Mr. Litvinov if he was willing to let <strong>the</strong> Bessarabia question aside, in<br />
case of possible negotiations between Romania and Soviet Russia; after certain hesitation Mr.<br />
Litvinov gave a positive answer.<br />
Shortly after that, Mr. Arciszewski told me <strong>the</strong> following things regarding <strong>the</strong> said Minute.<br />
The Polish Embassy in Paris was questioned by Quai d`Orsay if it was true that in Moscow<br />
Mr. Patek took commitment, in front of Mr. Litvinov, on Romania’s behalf, that this country<br />
shall start negotiations with U.S.S.R. regarding a non-aggression pact “subject that <strong>the</strong><br />
Bessarabia question was to be left opened”. At <strong>the</strong> same moment, <strong>the</strong> French Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs was producing a copy of <strong>the</strong> Minute of November 14 th , a copy that had been<br />
delivered to him by <strong>the</strong> Soviet Embassy and where <strong>the</strong> idiom “let <strong>the</strong> Bessarabia question<br />
outside” was replaced by “let <strong>the</strong> Bessarabia question opened”. The result – as my Polish<br />
colleague related – was a strenuous protest from Mr. Patek against Mr. Litvinov, who seemed<br />
to have admitted <strong>the</strong> stenography error and ordered to communicate <strong>the</strong> error rectification<br />
to <strong>the</strong> French Minister of Foreign Affairs.<br />
Then, Mr. Arciszewski did not miss <strong>the</strong> opportunity to remind me – as he had reminded<br />
me several times in <strong>the</strong> past – that this Minute represented <strong>the</strong> starting point for <strong>the</strong> demand<br />
made to us by Warsaw, namely to start negotiations with Moscow. In turn, I always<br />
considered in front of His Excellency that this promise had been formally and clearly made to<br />
Mr. Patek and that <strong>the</strong> sudden opening of <strong>the</strong> Bessarabia question, even upon <strong>the</strong> start of<br />
negotiations could only be due to bad faith and to Mr. Litvinov’s intention of mystification, as<br />
he had already tried to prepare this blow by making <strong>the</strong> abovementioned change of words.<br />
Thus, we decided not to publish <strong>the</strong> press release mentioned in my Telegram no. 47 and Your<br />
Excellency’s directions no. 81, where formal promises made by <strong>the</strong> Soviets were reminded,<br />
before consulting with Mr. Arciszewski, who had no objection to make with regard to its<br />
content.<br />
But today, after my last encounter with Mr. Stomoniakov, and after his explanations<br />
concerning those promises (explanations taken cum grano salis 1 ) I tend to be convinced, now<br />
more than ever, that <strong>the</strong> promise to avoid <strong>the</strong> Bessarabia issue was made in a clear and<br />
categorical manner as Mr. Patek considered it. If I were to express my feelings shortly, I<br />
would say THAT MR. LITVINOV’S INTENTION WAS CLEARLY ONE OF MYSTIFICATION,<br />
1<br />
Latin: with a grain of salt. An idiom of Pliny <strong>the</strong> Elder, used in this context to suggest that <strong>the</strong> explanations do<br />
not have to be taken seriously.
172 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
THAT MR. PATEK SHOWED AN OBVIOUS COMPLAISANCE OF LETTING HIMSELF<br />
MYSTIFIED AND THAT, MAYBE, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TENDED TO DISCOVER<br />
THIS MYSTIFICATION AT THE LATEST POSSIBLE TIME.<br />
I believe that it is still useful to highlight ano<strong>the</strong>r influence that Mr. Patek’s exaggerated<br />
optimism had over <strong>the</strong> negotiations.<br />
It is well known that after leaving <strong>the</strong> initial plan concerning simultaneous negotiations<br />
between <strong>the</strong> bourgeois states and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia, <strong>the</strong> Polish Government adopted <strong>the</strong> idea<br />
of introducing an interdependence clause of coming into force of <strong>the</strong> pacts, that were to be<br />
negotiated bilaterally. Regarding <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, one can say that <strong>the</strong>y would not have taken<br />
into account <strong>the</strong> Polish Government’s suggestion if <strong>the</strong>y had not thought that Poland turned<br />
<strong>the</strong> acceptance of this clause by Moscow into a sine qua non condition.<br />
To my great surprise <strong>the</strong> Minister of Poland informed me (my Telegram no. 405 of<br />
December 13 th ) that even on that date Mr. Patek – who had already negotiated almost <strong>the</strong><br />
entire pact with Mr. Litvinov – had not yet discussed <strong>the</strong> clause meant to serve as an<br />
adherence point for <strong>the</strong> associated bourgeois powers. Looking back and noting <strong>the</strong> quite<br />
legitimate indignation and exasperation effect produced even from <strong>the</strong> start by <strong>the</strong> proposal<br />
of such a clause on <strong>the</strong> Soviet negotiators, as well as on Estonia, both in Riga and in<br />
Helsingfors, I SEE MYSELF FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT MR. PATEK COMMITTED A<br />
STRANGE IMPRUDENCE AND SHOWED AN UNINQUISITIVE IMPRUDENCE, BY<br />
FAILING TO CLAIM FROM THE VERY START A CLEAR REACTION OF THE SOVIETS<br />
REGARDING THIS QUESTION OR BY NOTIFYING ITS GOVERNMENT ON THE<br />
CATEGORICAL POSSUMUS 1 OPPOSED BY THE SOVIETS ONLY NEAR THE END OF<br />
NEGOTIATIONS.<br />
A great consternation was caused in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States when, without notice, <strong>the</strong>y found<br />
out that Poland had suddenly gave up <strong>the</strong> clause whose initiator and eloquent champion it<br />
had been for so many months and which it seemed to have used only to attract o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
bourgeois powers and convince <strong>the</strong>m to attend <strong>the</strong> negotiations <strong>the</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>rwise would not<br />
have accepted. If I am to trust my Polish colleague, <strong>the</strong> consternation was almost equally<br />
great for certain persons, at least in Warsaw, when <strong>the</strong>y found out that “Patek has given up<br />
everything”.<br />
Admitting that time could still be right to learn a useful lesson from <strong>the</strong>se events, one<br />
could show how advantageous <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois States is today if when faced<br />
with Moscow’s easily predictable and explainable refusal to receive <strong>the</strong> interdependence<br />
clause aimed exclusively against itself, Poland, consistent with <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> Moscow<br />
protocol, had gone back to <strong>the</strong> idea of a multiple pact. By an appropriate elaboration of this<br />
pact, one had to render <strong>the</strong> strict and complete character of a non-aggression pact, excluding<br />
any confusion with a guarantee pact or with an Oriental Locarno; it had to be negotiated by<br />
all parties signatory of <strong>the</strong> Moscow Protocol, also inviting Finland (<strong>the</strong> French-Soviet nonaggression<br />
pact proves that geographical separation is not a logical obstacle in contracting of<br />
such obligations) and <strong>the</strong> various adhesions had to be ga<strong>the</strong>red by initiating powers as <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were negotiated and obtained. The already existing alliances between Romania and Poland or<br />
Latvia and Estonia would only have produced certain elaboration difficulties easy to remove.<br />
1<br />
“We cannot”: Latin idiom in <strong>diplomatic</strong> terminology, having <strong>the</strong> meaning of main, categorical, nonnegotiable<br />
opposition given to a proposal.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 173<br />
The Soviet Russia would have hardly found a legitimate reason to refuse its adhesion, and this<br />
refusal would have left Russia – and not any of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois powers – uncovered in front of<br />
<strong>the</strong> public opinion.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 108-113.<br />
68. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā O. Grosvalda 1932. g. 11. apr. konfidenciālais ziņojums<br />
ārlietu ministram K. Zariņam<br />
Pagodinos ziņot par politiskiem notikumiem Polijā 1932. g. pirmajā ceturksnī.<br />
[...] Ārējā politika. Attiecības ar Rumāniju. 1932. gada sākumā uz Varšavu atbrauca<br />
viesoties Rumānijas ārlietu ministrs princis Gika (no 8. līdz 10. janvārim). Kā viņš pats izteicās<br />
presei, viņa brauciens, bez parastās draudzības un sadarbības apliecinājuma, stāvēja sakarā ar<br />
toreizējām Rumānijas–Krievijas sarunām par neuzbrukšanas paktu. Tas bija tai laikā, kad<br />
Francijas valdība dzīvi interesējās par šo paktu noslēgšanu un kad Francijas sūtniecības<br />
Krievijas robežu valstīs šai virzienā attīstīja lielu aktivitāti. Kaut gan arī no Polijas puses<br />
toreiz, bez šaubām, rumāņus mēģināja pierunāt atrast kādu zolūciju [risinājumu], kā<br />
parakstīt paktu ar Krieviju, neaiztiekot Besarābijas jautājumu, tad tomēr prinča Gikas<br />
toreizējais pesimistiskais noskaņojums, par kuru savā laikā ziņoju, bijis pareizs. Stiprā<br />
opozīcija Rumānijā pret līgumu no Karaļa un armijas puses, kā arī krievu stūrgalvība<br />
Besarābijas jautājumā nav ļāvušas avansēt sarunām un šajā brīdī, kur arī Parīzē Tardjē 1<br />
valdība daudz mazāk interesējas par šiem līgumiem, nav nekādas lielās izredzes uz<br />
Rumānijas–Krievijas vienošanos. Pēdējie incidenti uz abu valstu robežām (Dņestra) vēl vairāk<br />
attālina šo iespējamību.<br />
Līdz ar princi Giku atbrauca rumāņu Galvenā štāba pārstāvji, kuri apspriedās ar saviem<br />
poļu kolēģiem par darbības saskaņošanu Atbruņošanās konferencē. Abu armiju starpā pastāv<br />
vispārīgi ļoti ciešs kontakts, kas izpaužās biežos apciemojumos.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 872. l, 78.–79. lp.<br />
68. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw O. Grosvalds to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs K Zariņš, 11 th April, 1932<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to report to you about political events in Poland in <strong>the</strong> first quarter of<br />
1932.<br />
[...] Foreign policy. Relations with Romania. In <strong>the</strong> beginning of 1931 Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs of Romania Prince Ghica came to Warsaw for a visit (8 th –10 th January). As he himself<br />
told <strong>the</strong> press, apart from <strong>the</strong> traditional affirmation of friendship and co-operation, his trip<br />
was related to <strong>the</strong> ongoing Romania-Russia negotiations on a non-aggression pact. It<br />
happened at <strong>the</strong> time when <strong>the</strong> government of France showed lively interest in <strong>the</strong><br />
conclusion of this pact and legations of France in <strong>the</strong> countries that border with Russia<br />
launched great activities in that direction. Although from Poland’s part efforts, no doubt,<br />
were launched at that time to persuade <strong>the</strong> Romanians to find a solution, which would allow<br />
it signing <strong>the</strong> pact with Russia without touching <strong>the</strong> issue of Bessarabia, <strong>the</strong>re was a good<br />
reason for Prince Ghica‘s pessimistic attitude that I reported about at that time. The strong<br />
opposition against <strong>the</strong> treaty in Romania from <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> King and <strong>the</strong> Army as well as<br />
1<br />
Andrē Pjērs Gabriels Tardjē (Tardieu; 1876–1945), Francijas valstsvīrs. 1929.–1930. g., 1930. g. un 1932. g.<br />
premjerministrs, vairākkārt dažādu nozaru ministrs.
174 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
<strong>the</strong> Russian’s obstinacy on <strong>the</strong> issue of Bessarabia had not allowed <strong>the</strong> negotiations to<br />
advance and at <strong>the</strong> present moment <strong>the</strong>re is not much chance for Romania and Russia to<br />
reach an agreement and Tardieu’s 1 government in Paris also shows much less interest in <strong>the</strong>se<br />
treaties. The recent incidents on <strong>the</strong> border between <strong>the</strong> two countries (Dniester) move <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility even fur<strong>the</strong>r away.<br />
Prince Ghica was accompanied by representatives of <strong>the</strong> Romanian General Staff who had<br />
a discussion with <strong>the</strong>ir Polish colleagues on co-ordination of <strong>the</strong>ir activities at <strong>the</strong><br />
Disarmament Conference. Between <strong>the</strong> two armies <strong>the</strong>re in general are very close contacts<br />
that take expression in frequent exchange of visits.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 872, s. 78–79.<br />
69. Telegrama Ministrului Afacerilor Străine Dimitrie I. Ghica nr. 20807 adresată<br />
însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza, 15(?) aprilie 1932<br />
Mareșalul Piłsudski a avut azi 2 la Președinția Consiliului o întâlnire cu domnul Iorga și cu<br />
mine, ministrul Poloniei fiind prezent, cu scopul anunțat de mai înainte de a discuta pactul<br />
de neagresiune. Cu o supărare inspirată probabil din grija ca Polonia să nu fie bănuită de<br />
[neclar] și neeleganță față de România, mareșalul a făcut oareșicum procesul oamenilor<br />
politici francezi care duc o politică schimbătoare și îndreptată de unii contra altora. Azi<br />
Tardieu părăsește linia lui Briand 3 față de Soviete. Este cert că Polonia nu s-a angajat pe calea<br />
proiectului decât în urma îndemnului Franței. Politica Poloniei care a parafat cu Sovietele<br />
este comandată față de România de interese comune și față de statele baltice de a legitima<br />
sfera de influență. După ultimele informații din Varșovia, Estonia a reluat negocierile cu<br />
Sovietele care se arată doritoare a isprăvi admițând unele concesii până acum respinse, așa<br />
încât în curând Finlanda, Estonia și Letonia vor avea pactele semnate. În asemenea condiții<br />
mareșalul ne-a declarat că dacă se va adeveri o atare situație în Baltica, Polonia va semna și<br />
dânsa indiferent dacă România rămâne în starea negativă de astăzi în privința pactului.<br />
Luând act am obiectat că România nu poate lua inițiativa reluării negocierilor. Dacă<br />
Polonia sau Franța aduc un nou contact, acest contact nu va fi urmat de alte tratative decât<br />
după ce Sovietele vor părăsi atitudinea lor în privința Basarabiei și vor anula în mod precis tot<br />
ce s-a petrecut la Riga în convorbirile Sturdza – Stomoniakov cu retragerea formulei<br />
documentului scris relativ la existența litigiului basarabean. După cum vedeți demersul<br />
Mareșalului Piłsudski indică că într-un interval de timp corespunzând cu succesul<br />
negocierilor estoniano-ruse Polonia va semna definitiv pactul său, părăsind solidaritatea cu<br />
România față de care va rămâne regimul alianței și al protocolului Litvinov de punere în<br />
aplicare a Pactului Kellogg. Mă întreb dacă Polonia a vrut să facă o simplă presiune spre a ne<br />
împinge mai iute spre un nou dialog cu Moscova sau dacă în adevăr hotărârea sa este deja<br />
fixată în sensul arătat. În această ultimă ipoteză este de mirare că guvernul polon nu-și dă<br />
seama că pentru ochii lumii alianța noastră va fi slăbită și scopul Sovietelor de a provoca o<br />
crăpătură în zidul polono-român va avea un început de realizare. La noi atitudinea Poloniei<br />
1<br />
André Pierre Gabriel Tardieu (1876–1945), French statesman. 1929–1930, 1930 and 1932 Prime Minister, several<br />
times Minister of different branches.<br />
2<br />
Mareșalul Józef Piłsudski a efectuat patru vizite în România în perioada interbelică: 14 – 15 septembrie 1922, 19<br />
august – 3 octombrie 1928, 11 – 28 octombrie 1931, 13 aprilie – 20 aprilie 1932.<br />
3<br />
Aristide Briand (1862-1932) a fost un politician și diplomat francez cu vederi de centru-stânga, Prim Ministru al<br />
Franței de 11 ori (1909-1929), figură centrală a Societății Națiunilor și a diplomației interbelice. În 1926 i s-a<br />
decernat Premiul Nobel pentru Pace.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 175<br />
va fi adânc resimțită cu consecințe penibile. Adaug că informațiile noastre concordante nu<br />
arată mersul negocierilor în Moscova atât de înaintat, ci din contră din partea Estoniei o mare<br />
neplăcere […] a Sovietelor și de reînceperea tratativelor.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 140-141<br />
69. Telegram no. 20807 of <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrie I. Ghica to <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza, 15 th (?) April 1932<br />
Today 1 – at <strong>the</strong> Presidency of <strong>the</strong> Council – Marshal Piłsudski had a meeting with Mr.<br />
Iorga and me, with <strong>the</strong> participation of <strong>the</strong> Minister of Poland, <strong>the</strong> announced object being a<br />
discussion on <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact. Displaying an anger springing perhaps from his<br />
concern for Poland not to be suspected of [indecipherable] and discourtesy with respect to<br />
Romania, <strong>the</strong> Marshal condemned <strong>the</strong> French politicians of conducting a di<strong>the</strong>ring and<br />
conflictual policy. Today Tardieu leaves Briand 2 ’s approach towards <strong>the</strong> Soviets. It is obvious<br />
that Poland only engaged in <strong>the</strong> project because France encouraged it. The politics of Poland,<br />
which sealed <strong>the</strong> deal with <strong>the</strong> Soviets, is guided towards Romania of common interests and<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> Baltic States of <strong>the</strong> desire to legitimate its sphere of influence. According to <strong>the</strong><br />
latest news from Warsaw, Estonia resumed <strong>the</strong> negotiations with <strong>the</strong> Soviets which are<br />
willing to concede certain concessions denied hi<strong>the</strong>rto, so that soon Finland, Estonia and<br />
Latvia are going to sign <strong>the</strong> pacts. In such circumstances, <strong>the</strong> Marshal stated that if such a<br />
situation is to be accomplished in <strong>the</strong> Baltic area, Poland will also sign [<strong>the</strong> treaty], no matter<br />
if Romania maintains or not its current negative stand regarding <strong>the</strong> pact.<br />
Acknowledging this, I remonstrated since Romania cannot take <strong>the</strong> initiative of resuming<br />
<strong>the</strong> negotiations. If Poland or France establish a new contact, this contact will be followed by<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r negotiations only when <strong>the</strong> Soviets will give up <strong>the</strong>ir stance regarding Bessarabia and<br />
clearly rescind everything that happened in Riga in <strong>the</strong> Sturdza-Stomoniakov discussions,<br />
withdrawing <strong>the</strong> written document reference to <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong> Bessarabia litigation. As<br />
you can see, <strong>the</strong> demarche of Marshal Piłsudski indicates that in a period of time<br />
corresponding to <strong>the</strong> success of <strong>the</strong> Estonian - Russian negotiations, Poland will definitively<br />
sign its pact, leaving aside <strong>the</strong> solidarity with Romania to which will continue to be bounded<br />
through <strong>the</strong> alliance and <strong>the</strong> Litvinov protocol regarding <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> Kellogg Pact. I<br />
wonder if Poland simply wanted to make pressure in order to push us more rapidly to a new<br />
dialogue with Moscow or if its decision is truly adopted in this respect. Taking into account<br />
this latter hypo<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>the</strong>re is no wonder that <strong>the</strong> Polish Government does not realize that in<br />
<strong>the</strong> eyes of <strong>the</strong> world our alliance would be weakened and <strong>the</strong> purpose of <strong>the</strong> Soviets to<br />
provoke a crack in <strong>the</strong> Polish – Romanian wall would begin to bear fruits. Here Poland’s<br />
attitude will be deeply felt, with painful consequences. I may also add that our reliable<br />
information does not show <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> negotiations from Moscow to be so advanced,<br />
but on <strong>the</strong> contrary, a significant Estonian nuisance [indecipherable] of <strong>the</strong> Soviets and <strong>the</strong><br />
recommencement of <strong>the</strong> negotiations.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 140-141.<br />
1<br />
Mareșalul Józef Piłsudski made four visits to Romania in <strong>the</strong> interwar period: September 14 to 15, 1922, August 19-<br />
October 3, 1928, October 11 to 28, 1931, April 13 to 20, 1932.<br />
2<br />
Aristide Briand (1862-1932) was a French politician and diplomat with center-left views, Prime Minister of France<br />
eleven times (1909-1929), central figure of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and <strong>the</strong> inter-war diplomacy. In 1926 he was<br />
awarded <strong>the</strong> Nobel Peace Prize.
176 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
70. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al României la Riga<br />
Theodor Scortzescu nr. 285 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Dimitrie I. Ghica, 3<br />
mai 1932<br />
Am onoarea a aduce la cunoștința Excelenței Voastre că politica din ultimul timp a celor<br />
trei state baltice de la nord față de Soviete marchează o destrămare din ce în ce mai<br />
accelerată a frontului burghez.<br />
Se știe că în urma insistențelor sovietice guvernul finlandez a semnat la 22 aprilie trecut<br />
Convenția – al cărei text îl trimit aici alăturat în traducere franceză – relativă la procedura de<br />
conciliere prevăzută în pactul de neagresiune dintre cele două state. La 28 aprilie guvernul<br />
finlandez a ratificat (cu un singur vot contra, acela al reprezentantului partidului suedez)<br />
pactul de neagresiune cu U.R.S.S. Ministrul Afacerilor Străine Koskinen 1 a declarat cu această<br />
ocazie că Președintele Republicii nu va desăvârși ratificarea prin semnătura sa decât după ce<br />
pacte similare vor fi încheiate între U.R.S.S. și statele limitrofe.<br />
Atitudinea guvernului finlandez a fost determinată de presiunea cercurilor industriale și<br />
mai ales aceea a puternicului partid agrar. Este drept că situația agricultorilor finlandezi,<br />
covârșiți de datorii și lipsiți de piețe de desfacere, este extrem de grea. Parlamentul urmând a<br />
lua în curând vacanță, Moscova, în vederea obținerii succesului său politic, a oferit marilor<br />
cooperative finlandeze aprovizionarea Leningradului. Astfel că țăranii finlandezi vor avea<br />
deocamdată pentru produsele lor agricole un debușeu cu atât mai important cu cât fuseseră<br />
grav dăunați în ultimul timp de pierderea pieței germane. Se vorbește totodată de unele<br />
avantaje pe care Sovietele le vor acorda industriei finlandeze a lemnului.<br />
Conform legilor finlandeze aprobarea Pactului de Neagresiune de către Parlament devine<br />
nulă dacă în cele trei luni următoare nu va fi ratificat de către semnătura Președintelui<br />
Republicii. Se pot deci ușor prevedea sforțările pe care în acest răstimp le vor depune<br />
Sovietele în vederea obținerii semnăturii prezidențiale. Cert este că domnul Svinhufvud 2 ,<br />
Președintele Republicii finlandeze, vechi campion al independenței finlandeze, nu poate fi<br />
bănuit de simpatii proruse. Nu este mai puțin adevărat că primul pas al ratificării – aprobarea<br />
Seimului – fiind deja împlinit, presiunea Sovietelor se va exercita de acum înainte asupra unui<br />
singur om care nu se va putea folosi de arma eventualei rezistențe parlamentare.<br />
Ratificarea parlamentului finlandez a provocat o impresie penibilă în Estonia, singurul stat<br />
baltic care rezistase până acum cu fermitate presiunilor sovietice. Guvernul din Tallinn se<br />
găsește astăzi asaltat de recriminările cercurilor industriale și agricole estoniene, geloase de<br />
avantajele economice acordate de U.R.S.S. în Finlanda și Letonia, mai ales că aprovizionarea<br />
Leningradului fusese mai întâi oferită – fără succes – de către Soviete Estoniei în scopul de a-i<br />
înfrânge rezistența. Se pare că făgăduieli au fost făcute de Moscova relativ la modificarea – în<br />
folosul Estoniei – a Tratatului de Comerț dintre cele două țări.<br />
Dintr-o convorbire avută cu Însărcinatul cu Afaceri al Estoniei am înțeles că guvernului<br />
său îi este teamă de o posibilă defecțiune a aliatei sale Letonia, care ar fi capabilă să urmeze<br />
exemplul dat de Finlanda: ratificarea parlamentară a pactului de neagresiune însoțită sau nu<br />
de o declarație similară privitoare la punerea sa în vigoare. Pentru evitarea unei politici de<br />
1<br />
Aarno Armas Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen (1885-1951) a fost politician și diplomat finlandez. Ministru al Afacerilor<br />
Externe al Finlandei (1931-1932), Ministru al Finlandei în U.R.S.S. (1931-1940) și Turcia (1940-1951).<br />
2<br />
Pehr Evind Svinhufvud af Qvalstad (1861-1944) a fost un om politic finlandez cu vederi conservatoare. A fost cel<br />
dintâi șef de stat al Finlandei independente (1918), Prim Ministru (1930-1931), Președinte al republicii (1931-1937).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 177<br />
izolare este de așteptat ca Estonia să semneze curând, la rândul ei, un pact de neagresiune.<br />
Doritoare de a ajunge mai repede la un acord, Sovietele au renunțat a cere Estoniei – precum<br />
făcuseră până acum – să accepte un pact copiat după pactul leton; pactul estonian va fi<br />
probabil un tip intermediar între pacul leton și polonez.<br />
Domnul Sviderski 1 , Ministrul sovietic în Riga, negociază cu Ministrul leton de Externe<br />
semnarea Convenției relative la procedura de conciliere prevăzută în pactul de neagresiune<br />
dintre cele două state. Nu este îndoială că odată această convenție semnată, Sovietele vor face<br />
sforțări pentru obținerea ratificării Pactului de Neagresiune de către Parlamentul leton, fără a<br />
se mai aștepta ca un pact similar să fie semnat și ratificat de Estonia. Diverse indicii arată că<br />
presiunile Sovietelor au început să dea roade; Dl. Cielēns, lider social-democrat, fost Ministru<br />
de Externe, a ținut alaltăieri un discurs în Saeima, atacând politica externă a guvernului care<br />
s-ar găsi prea mult sub influența dăunătoare a Estoniei, și recomandând încheierea unei<br />
alianțe cu Lituania. Dar arma cea mai puternică de care uzează în acest moment Sovietele<br />
față de guvernul leton constă în făgăduielile unor modificări – în favoarea Letoniei – a<br />
Tratatului de Comerț dintre cele două țări. Tratatul de comerț – încheiat în 1927 pentru o<br />
durată de cinci ani – poate fi denunțat de ambele părți în perioada de 6 luni mai-noiembrie<br />
1932. Tratatul – considerat la încheierea sa ca o binefacere pentru Letonia – s-a dovedit ca un<br />
primejdios instrument politic în mâinile Moscovei. Pe baza angajamentelor Sovietelor de a<br />
cumpăra anual în Letonia pentru 40 milioane lats, în general produse industriale metalurgice,<br />
letonii au consacrat sume imense construirii, refacerii și utilării mai multor mari uzine.<br />
Sovietele prin varierea expresă a obiectelor comandate – ceea ce necesita o frecventă și<br />
costisitoare schimbare de utilaj a uzinelor letone –, cât și încetarea temporară a acestor<br />
comenzi sub diverse pretexte, au reușit să dezorganizeze uzinele și să arunce pe drumuri o<br />
armată considerabilă de șomeri. Guvernul leton speră să înlăture de astă dată neajunsurile<br />
tratatului obținând importante modificări (o nomenclatură detaliată a obiectelor ce urmează<br />
să fie comandate de Soviete etc.). Bineînțeles că Sovietele – pentru care denunțarea sau<br />
prelungirea tratatului prezintă din punct de vedere economic un interes minim – nu vor<br />
acorda aceste modificări decât în schimbul unor concesii politice (ratificarea un moment mai<br />
degrabă a pactului de neagresiune). E probabil că Moscova va începe prin a denunța tratatul<br />
de comerț în scopul de a impresiona guvernul din Riga și a-l expune atacurilor opoziției și<br />
presiunilor cercurilor interesate.<br />
Nu este exclus ca guvernul leton să cedeze și de astă dată – în speranța unei îmbunătățiri<br />
chiar momentane a situației economice. Un demnitar baltic, comentând cu scepticism<br />
valoarea pactului de neagresiune, s-a exprimat față de mine în termenii următori: „A tout<br />
prendre, 10.000 cochons (exportés) valent mieux qu`un morceau de paper.” Privită în această<br />
lumină suavă, politica Letoniei poate fi explicată, dacă nu justificată. Ruinată de dumpingul<br />
rus, cu mijloace financiare sleite, neobținând nici un ajutor important de nicăieri, Letonia<br />
încearcă să traverseze criza folosindu-se de orice avantaj imediat. Iar Sovietele, prin jocul lor<br />
abil de oferte și retrageri de beneficii economice, reușește să reducă treptat rezistența politică<br />
a Statelor Baltice.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, filele 166-169.<br />
1<br />
Alexei Sviderski (1878-1933) a fost Ministru al U.R.S.S. în Letonia (1929-1933).
178 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
70. Diplomatic Report no. 285 of <strong>the</strong> Romanian ad interim Chargé d’Affaires in Riga<br />
Theodor Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrie I. Ghica, 3 rd May 1932<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to inform Your Excellency that, recently, <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> three nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
Baltic States towards <strong>the</strong> Soviets shows an increasing dissolution of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois front.<br />
It is known that following Soviet insistences, on April 22 nd last year <strong>the</strong> Finnish<br />
Government signed <strong>the</strong> Convention – whose text I hereby annex translated into French –<br />
regarding conciliation stipulated in <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact between <strong>the</strong> two states. On April<br />
28 th <strong>the</strong> Finnish Government approved (with only one vote against, namely that of <strong>the</strong><br />
Swedish Party’s representative) <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact with <strong>the</strong> U.S.S.R. On this occasion<br />
<strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs, Koskinen 1 , stated that <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic will<br />
accomplish <strong>the</strong> approval with his signature only after <strong>the</strong> signing of similar pacts between <strong>the</strong><br />
USSR and its neighbouring states.<br />
The Finnish Government’s position was determined by <strong>the</strong> pressure of industrial circles<br />
and especially by <strong>the</strong> pressure of <strong>the</strong> strong Agrarian Party. It is true that <strong>the</strong> situation of<br />
Finnish agriculturists – covered in debts and lacking in sale markets – is extremely difficult.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> Parliament is soon to go on holiday leave, and in order to obtain a political success,<br />
Moscow offered to <strong>the</strong> great Finnish cooperatives <strong>the</strong> opportunity to supply Leningrad.<br />
Therefore, <strong>the</strong> Finnish peasants still have an outlet for <strong>the</strong>ir agricultural products, which is<br />
even more important bearing in mind that <strong>the</strong>y had been affected by <strong>the</strong> loss of <strong>the</strong> German<br />
market. At <strong>the</strong> same time, some advantages <strong>the</strong> Soviets will grant to Finnish wood industry<br />
are also brought into discussion.<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> Finnish law, <strong>the</strong> Parliament’s passing of <strong>the</strong> Non-Aggression Pact<br />
becomes void if it is not ratified by <strong>the</strong> signature of <strong>the</strong> Republic’s President in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
three months. Thus, <strong>the</strong> Soviets efforts during this period, in order to obtain presidential<br />
signature, are easily predictable. Of course, Mr. Svinhufvud 2 , President of <strong>the</strong> Finnish<br />
Republic and old champion of Finnish independence, cannot be suspected of pro-Russian<br />
sympathies. It is also true that once <strong>the</strong> first step of ratification – <strong>the</strong> approval of <strong>the</strong><br />
Parliament – is complete, <strong>the</strong> pressure of <strong>the</strong> Soviets will be exerted on a single man who will<br />
not be able to make use of <strong>the</strong> weapon of possible parliamentary resistance.<br />
The approval of <strong>the</strong> Finnish Parliament made an embarrassing impression in Estonia, <strong>the</strong><br />
only Baltic state that still firmly resisted <strong>the</strong> Soviet pressures. The Tallinn Government is now<br />
assaulted by <strong>the</strong> recriminations of Estonian industrial and agricultural circles, jealous with<br />
<strong>the</strong> economical advantages granted by <strong>the</strong> USSR to Finland and Latvia, especially since <strong>the</strong><br />
Leningrad supply was <strong>the</strong> first of all unsuccessful offers awarded by <strong>the</strong> Soviets to Estonia in<br />
order to defeat its resistance. It seems that Moscow also made promises – for Estonia’s benefit<br />
– regarding <strong>the</strong> modification of <strong>the</strong> Trade Agreement signed by <strong>the</strong> two states.<br />
Based on a discussion held with <strong>the</strong> Estonian Chargé d’Affaires I understood that <strong>the</strong><br />
Government is afraid of a potential fault of its ally, Latvia, which would be capable to follow<br />
Finland’s example: <strong>the</strong> Parliament’s approval of <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact, accompanied or not<br />
by a similar statement regarding its entry into force. In order to avoid an isolation politics,<br />
1<br />
Aarno Armas Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen (1885-1951) was a Finnish politician and diplomat. Minister for Foreign Affairs<br />
of Finland (1931-1932), Minister of Finland to <strong>the</strong> USSR (1931-1940) and Turkey (1940-1951).<br />
2<br />
Pehr Evind Svinhufvud af Qvalstad (1861-1944) was a Finnish politician with conservative views. He was <strong>the</strong> first<br />
Head of State of independent Finland (1918), Prime Minister (1930-1931), President of <strong>the</strong> Republic (1931-1937).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 179<br />
one may also expect Estonia to sign a non-aggression pact soon. Willing to reach an<br />
agreement as soon as possible, <strong>the</strong> Soviets gave up on asking Estonia – as <strong>the</strong>y previously did<br />
– to accept a pact that was identical with <strong>the</strong> Latvian one; <strong>the</strong> Estonian pact will probably<br />
represent an intermediate model between <strong>the</strong> Latvian and <strong>the</strong> Polish pact.<br />
Mr. Sviderski 1 , <strong>the</strong> Soviet Minister in Riga, negotiates with <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> Convention regarding <strong>the</strong> conciliation procedure stipulated by <strong>the</strong><br />
non-aggression pact of <strong>the</strong> two states. There is no doubt that once this convention is signed<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviets will make real efforts to obtain <strong>the</strong> approval of <strong>the</strong> Non-Aggression Pact by <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian Parliament, without waiting for a similar pact to be signed and approved by Estonia.<br />
Different hints show that Soviet pressures start showing results; <strong>the</strong> day before yesterday Mr.<br />
Cielēns, social-democratic leader, ex Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave a speech in Saeima,<br />
attacking <strong>the</strong> external politics of <strong>the</strong> Government, which was strongly affected by Estonia’s<br />
harmful influence and recommending <strong>the</strong> signing of an alliance with Lithuania. But <strong>the</strong><br />
strongest weapon currently used by <strong>the</strong> Soviets against <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government is<br />
represented by <strong>the</strong> promises to modify – in Estonia’s benefit – <strong>the</strong> Trade Agreement between<br />
<strong>the</strong> two states. The Trade Agreement – signed in 1927 for a five-year period – can be<br />
denounced by both parties within 6 months, namely May – November 1932. The Agreement –<br />
whose signing was considered to represent a benefit for Latvia – proved to be a dangerous<br />
political instrument in Moscow’s hands. Based on <strong>the</strong> Soviets’ arrangements to buy from<br />
Latvia, each year, metallurgical industrial products of over 40 millions lats, <strong>the</strong> Latvians<br />
allotted enormous amounts for <strong>the</strong> building, rehabilitation and supplying of several large<br />
plants. By <strong>the</strong> express variation of <strong>the</strong> ordered items – which called for a frequent and<br />
expensive change of equipment in Latvian plants – and by <strong>the</strong> temporary cessation of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
orders based on different excuses, <strong>the</strong> Soviets managed to disorganize <strong>the</strong> plants and<br />
generated an entire army of unemployed personnel. This time <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government hopes<br />
to purge <strong>the</strong> deficiencies off <strong>the</strong> agreement obtaining important modifications (a detailed<br />
nomenclature of objects that are to be ordered by <strong>the</strong> Soviets etc.). Naturally, <strong>the</strong> Soviets – for<br />
which denunciation or <strong>the</strong> extension of <strong>the</strong> agreement are of minimum economical interest –<br />
will only agree to <strong>the</strong>se modifications in exchange of certain political concessions (earlier<br />
approval of <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact). Probably Moscow will start by denouncing <strong>the</strong> trade<br />
agreement in order to impress <strong>the</strong> Riga Government and expose it to attacks from <strong>the</strong><br />
opposition and to pressures from <strong>the</strong> interested circles.<br />
It is not excluded for <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government to once again give in this time – hoping for<br />
an improvement of <strong>the</strong> economical situation, even temporary. A Baltic dignitary, sceptically<br />
commenting <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact, spoke to me as follows: “All in all, 10,000<br />
(exported) swine are better than a piece of paper.” Seen in this “suave” light, <strong>the</strong> Latvia<br />
politics can at least be explained, if not justified. Ruined by <strong>the</strong> Russian dumping, with<br />
exhausted financial means, unable to obtain any important help from anywhere, Latvia tries<br />
to surpass <strong>the</strong> crisis by using any immediate advantage. With <strong>the</strong>ir ingenious game of<br />
offering and withdrawing economical benefits <strong>the</strong> Soviets manage to gradually reduce <strong>the</strong><br />
political resistance of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940, USSR, vol. 9, s. 166-169.<br />
1<br />
Aleksey Sviderski (1878-1933) was Minister of <strong>the</strong> USSR in Latvia (1929-1933).
180 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
71. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 352<br />
către Președintele Consiliului de Miniștri și Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României<br />
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod 1 , 16 iunie 1932<br />
Prevăzusem în februarie 1931 că imprudenta acceptare de către Polonia a discutării<br />
pactelor de neagresiune bilaterale cu Sovietele, în momentul cel mai acut al crizei economice<br />
în Țările Baltice, fără ca Varșovia să se fi hotărât de mai înainte la un număr suficient de<br />
sacrificii materiale pentru a înfrunta supralicitația masivă a Sovietelor, trebuia să conducă la<br />
un important succes <strong>diplomatic</strong> al acestora.<br />
Semnalam în primăvara aceluiași an, ca un corolar inevitabil al acestui succes eventual,<br />
„încolțirea României pe un teren și într-un moment neales de ea la elucidarea relațiilor sale<br />
speciale de vecinătate cu U.R.S.S.” și izolarea noastră prin fragmentarea pactului Litvinov și<br />
înlocuirea acestui instrument al solidarității burgheze prin o nouă formulă juridică din care<br />
de astă dată am fi excluși.<br />
Dacă situația câștigată deja de U.R.S.S. în Țările Baltice, ziceam la aceea epocă, ar fi<br />
consacrată prin sistemul pactelor de neagresiune bilaterale înlocuind pe cel al pactului<br />
regional, dacă ea ar fi fost completată printr-un protectorat economic de fapt, aceasta ar<br />
semnifica în ceea ce ne privește posibilitatea pentru U.R.S.S. de a concentra toate mijloacele<br />
lor de pregătire, politică și tehnică mai întâi, și în urmă toate mijloacele lor de acțiune în<br />
direcția Basarabiei. ACESTA ERA DE ALTFEL, adăugam atunci, ADEVĂRATUL ȚEL AL<br />
ACTIVITĂȚILOR POLITICE SOVIETICE ÎN ȚĂRILE BALTICE.<br />
Consacrarea în chestiune trebuind considerată astăzi ca un fapt împlinit (ratificarea letonă<br />
și estoniană va urma automat semnătura pactelor de neagresiune respective) mi-am permis a<br />
reaminti aceste prevederi cu scopul numai de a întemeia mai bine unele aprehensiuni ale<br />
mele actuale, aprehensiuni formate pe același stoc de informații și observații. Îmi propun a le<br />
expune, semnalând că experiența excepțională a lungii și fertilei conversații cu unul din<br />
reprezentanții cei mai tipici ai mentalității politice sovietice nu a făcut decât să mă confirme<br />
în temerile mele.<br />
Aliații noștri poloni au explicat insistențele Moscovei pentru a obține pacte de<br />
neagresiune cu vecinii săi burghezi prin dorința de a se asigura pe frontul occidental în ajunul<br />
unor grave evenimente posibile în Extremul Orient. Pentru mine această explicație este mai<br />
mult decât insuficientă.<br />
Moscova nu are nici o temere adevărată privitor la granițele sale occidentale, ea știe foarte<br />
bine că nu va fi atacată de nici unul dintre vecinii săi europeni și de nici una din Puterile<br />
occidentale. Panica simulată și încontinuu declarată de oamenii politici sovietici nu<br />
constituie decât o sfruntată manevră de politică internă pentru legitimarea, față de o<br />
populație istovită și înfometată, a unor sforțări de organizare și de înarmare care corespund<br />
într-adevăr cu cele ale unei cetăți asediate. Cei care au observat unele exhibiții moscovite din<br />
ultimii ani, ca procesele de pretinse comploturi și afacerile simulate de spionaj și sabotaj, șiau<br />
putut da seama că Sovietele nici nu aveau pretenția de a înșela opinia publică mondială în<br />
această privință, ci numai pe a lor.<br />
1<br />
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (1872-1950) a fost om politic și publicist, unul dintre liderii marcanți ai Partidului<br />
Național Român din Transilvania, apoi ai Partidului Național Țărănesc.Pe măsură ce concepțiile sale politice au<br />
evoluat spre dreapta, a fondat Frontul Românesc (1935) și a fost președinte al Frontului Renașterii Naționale<br />
(1940). A contribuit la unificarea Transilvaniei cu România. Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (1919-1920, 1932,<br />
1933).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 181<br />
Legătura între evenimentele din Extremul Orient și dorința Moscovei de a semna pacte de<br />
neagresiune cu unii din vecinii săi trebuie făcută, cred, cu totul altfel.<br />
Cheia acestei legături este în simplul fapt că Moscova nu a manifestat o voință clară și<br />
indubitabilă de a iscăli asemenea tratate decât cu Finlanda, Estonia, Letonia și Polonia, iar nu<br />
cu România. Moscova nu a propus și nu va propune României decât texte care nu le poate<br />
primi sau care dacă ar fi primite ar consfinți „starea de agresiune permanentă” în care U.R.S.S.<br />
pretinde că România se găsește față de ea – care îi vor prezerva și mai departe, cu alte cuvinte,<br />
acel prețios pretext de irupțiune peste singurele granițe vecine burgheze pe care nu le-a<br />
recunoscut niciodată în fața lumii și a opiniei publice rusești.<br />
Păstrarea acestui pretext a constituit și constituie, nu trebuie să ne înșelăm, una din<br />
principalele griji ale politicii externe sovietice. Negocierile din Riga 1 au dovedit încă o dată, nu<br />
numai negociatorului român sper, că Basarabia nu este pentru U.R.S.S. nici o simplă<br />
chestiune de prestigiu, nici o minimă chestiune teritorială, ci că reprezintă acea breșă, astăzi<br />
politică mâine militară, în frontiera lumii burgheze pe care imperialismul social sovietic o<br />
socotește indispensabilă politicii sale de lungă vedere.<br />
Rusia sovietică, hotărâtă a nu reînvia nici eșecul militar din fața Varșoviei, nici pe cel<br />
social din Budapesta, condiționa până acum utilizarea deliberată a acelei breșe de unele<br />
împrejurări de descompunere economică și socială a lumii burgheze încă departe de a fi ajuns<br />
la maturitate. Moscova își dă însă astăzi seama că o agresiune militară subită victorioasă și<br />
întinsă a Japoniei ar putea-o sili să părăsească sau hotărârea sa de răbdare și pregătire<br />
integrală sau însăși nădejdea de a executa vreodată planurile sale.<br />
O adâncă grijă pare a o fi cuprins în această privință și ea simte cred astăzi nevoia de a nu<br />
se asigura pe frontul occidental, ci de a-și asigura pe acest front posibilitatea compensației<br />
politice și militare, a revanșei de prestigiu, de care existența regimului sovietic din Rusia și<br />
întregul viitor al comunismului în lume ar putea subit depinde.<br />
Nimic nu dovedește până astăzi că Japonia este hotărâtă a ataca U.R.S.S. în posesiunile<br />
sale din Extremul Orient. Informațiile cele mai demne de crezare confirmă în fiecare zi, pe de<br />
altă parte, că Moscova este hotărâtă a răbda aproape toate provocările, a suferi aproape toate<br />
umilințele din partea vecinei sale asiatice. La această răbdare și prudență este însă o limită pe<br />
care Sovietele nu ar putea-o întrece. Ele nu ar putea, de pildă, tolera o înaintare victorioasă a<br />
trupelor nipone până în regiunea Baikalului sau constituirea eventuală cu ajutorul japonez a<br />
unui guvern rus alb în provinciile maritime. Asemenea înfrângeri morale și militare s-ar<br />
traduce imediat printr-o zdruncinare fatală a prestigiului interior al regimului.<br />
Sovietele știu prea bine că o mobilizare generală în Rusia (sau acele măsuri care în<br />
concepția Statului Major sovietic corespund cu mobilizarea generală) este o operațiune pe<br />
care regimul lor nu va avea ocazia a o efectua de două ori, vor face deci totul pentru a o evita<br />
înainte de împlinirea vremurilor. Dar tocmai din cauza acestei perfecte cunoștințe a<br />
posibilităților lor [neclar], în ziua când vor fi siliți a lua armele în mână nu le vor mai depune<br />
înainte de a fi încercat toate șansele, cele mai șubrede chiar [neclar].<br />
Să presupunem acea încercare, să presupunem Rusia silită să facă apel la arme. Problema<br />
în fața căreia va fi pus Statul Major din Moscova va fi următoarea: a câștiga cât mai degrabă și<br />
1<br />
Negocierile eșuate din ianuarie 1932 dintre România (Mihail R. Sturdza) și U.R.S.S. (Boris Stomoniakov) pentru<br />
un pact de neagresiune.
182 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
cât mai manifest prestigiul pierdut, a utiliza cât mai eficace pentru cauza comunistă forțele ce<br />
s-au putut mobiliza.<br />
Tema comportă două soluții: una orientală, alta occidentală. Nu este temerar a crede că<br />
cei mai mulți dintre factorii determinanți militari și civili în Moscova sunt convinși că cea<br />
orientală nu are nicio probabilitate de succes, dar cu cea occidentală ar putea cu O SINGURĂ<br />
CONDIȚIE împlini satisfăcător obiectivele dorite. Ea s-ar încadra astfel, spre deosebire de cea<br />
orientală, în planul general, ulterior executabil, al sovietizării Europei burgheze. Această<br />
condiție este izolarea prealabilă a României.<br />
La lumina acestor considerații este natural a presupune că începând campania pactelor de<br />
neagresiune bilaterale, Moscova își propunea două obiective: unul minimal, spargerea<br />
frontului politic burghez înjghebat la Moscova prin despărțirea blocului baltic și [a] celui<br />
româno-polon, altul maximal, despărțirea blocului polono-baltic de România.<br />
Anticipând asupra ratificărilor finlandeze, estoniene și letone a pactelor de neagresiune, se<br />
poate spune că primul din aceste obiective este astăzi realizat. De astăzi înainte planul unei<br />
eventuale agresiuni sovietice nu mai are să țină seamă de întinderea inevitabilă a ostilităților<br />
de la Marea Neagră, inaccesibilă probabil marilor puteri și în tot cazul îndepărtată de<br />
interesele lor primordiale, până la cea baltică unde flotele lor pot apărea atât de ușor și unde<br />
complicații de ordin general ar atrage aceste puteri chiar fără voia lor. De astăzi înainte<br />
punctul de interogație atât de salutar pentru armatele româno-polone ce îl constituiau cele<br />
două sute de mii de baionete ale armatelor baltice nu mai există probabil în calculele Statului<br />
Major din Moscova.<br />
Totul s-ar schimba bineînțeles din nou, și această primă victorie <strong>diplomatic</strong>ă rusească ar fi<br />
anulată, dacă prin încheierea de pacte analoage de către România și Polonia frontul burghez<br />
s-ar realinia în ordinea obținută la Moscova.<br />
În ceea ce privește obiectivul maximal este evident că el nu ar fi pe deplin atins prin o<br />
semnătură polonă solidară față de semnăturile baltice și necondiționată de încheierea<br />
pactului de neagresiune româno-sovietic. Trebuie considerat însă că ceea ce va determina la<br />
momentul cuvenit hotărârea unei Moscove încolțite și înnebunite va fi nu atât izolarea<br />
noastră propriu-zisă, cât ideea ce Sovietele își vor face la acest moment despre a noastră<br />
izolare. Oricât de solidă ar rămâne deci de fapt alianța româno-polonă ea nu și-ar realiza în<br />
asemenea împrejurări scopul său principal, cel preventiv, dacă am lasă să se creeze împrejurul<br />
acestei alianțe atmosfera de ambiguitate în care ar lăsa-o încheierea pe granița occidentală<br />
rusească nu a șase, ci numai a cinci pacte de neagresiune.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 165-170.<br />
71. Diplomatic Report no. 352 of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers and to <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs Alexandru Vaida-Voevod 1 , 16 th June 1932<br />
In February 1931 I had foreseen that Poland’s imprudent agreement to discuss on bilateral<br />
non-aggression pacts with <strong>the</strong> Soviets in <strong>the</strong> most acute moment of <strong>the</strong> economical crisis in<br />
1<br />
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (1872-1950) was a Romanian politician and journalist, one of <strong>the</strong> prominent leaders of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian National Party of Transylvania, <strong>the</strong>n of <strong>the</strong> Farmers National Part. As his political views have<br />
evolved to <strong>the</strong> right, he founded <strong>the</strong> Romanian Front (1935 ) and became president of <strong>the</strong> National Renaissance<br />
Front (1940). He contributed to <strong>the</strong> unification of Transylvania with Romania. Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of<br />
Ministers (1919-1920, 1932, 1933).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 183<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic States, without Warsaw having yet decided to make a sufficient number of material<br />
sacrifices destined to provide support in <strong>the</strong> confrontation against <strong>the</strong> massive overbid of <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviets, was supposed to bring <strong>the</strong> latter an important <strong>diplomatic</strong> success.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> spring of <strong>the</strong> same year, like an inevitable corollary of this possible success, I was<br />
signalling “Romania’s snookering on a field and in a moment not selected by itself, meant to<br />
lead to <strong>the</strong> elucidation of its special neighbouring <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> USSR” and our isolation<br />
caused by <strong>the</strong> fragmentation of <strong>the</strong> Litvinov pact and <strong>the</strong> replacement of this instrument of<br />
bourgeois solidarity with a new juridical formula that would exclude us this time.<br />
I used to say at that time that if <strong>the</strong> position already gained by <strong>the</strong> USSR in <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States had been streng<strong>the</strong>ned by <strong>the</strong> system of bilateral non-aggression pacts, replacing <strong>the</strong><br />
system of <strong>the</strong> regional pact, if this situation had been supplemented by an economical<br />
protectorate, for us this would mean USSR’s possibility to first concentrate all <strong>the</strong>ir political<br />
and technical preparation means and <strong>the</strong>n all <strong>the</strong>ir action means towards Bessarabia. IN<br />
FACT, I used to add <strong>the</strong>n, THIS WAS THE REAL GOAL OF SOVIET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES<br />
IN THE BALTIC STATES.<br />
Today <strong>the</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning we refer to must be regarded as an accomplished fact (<strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian and Estonian approval will automatically follow <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> respective nonaggression<br />
pacts); I dare to recall <strong>the</strong>se predictions only to better establish certain present<br />
apprehensions of mine, which are founded on <strong>the</strong> same set of information and observations.<br />
My point is to display <strong>the</strong>m, underlining <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> exceptional experience of a long<br />
and productive discussion held with one of <strong>the</strong> most typical representatives of <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
political mentality did nothing else but confirm my concerns.<br />
Our Polish allies explained Moscow’s urgency to conclude non-aggression pacts with its<br />
bourgeois neighbours based on its goal to have a secured Western front on <strong>the</strong> eve of some<br />
possible serious events in <strong>the</strong> Far East. For me, this explanation is anything but sufficient.<br />
Moscow has no real concern regarding its Western borders, being well aware that it will<br />
not be attacked by any of its European neighbours, or by <strong>the</strong> Western Powers. The<br />
continuously declared and simulated panic of Soviet political figures only represents an<br />
egregious manoeuvre of internal politics meant to show to an exhausted and starving<br />
population certain organization and arming efforts actually consistent with those of an<br />
embattled fortress. Those who noticed certain Muscovite displays over <strong>the</strong> last years, like <strong>the</strong><br />
suits for pretended conspiracies and <strong>the</strong> simulated affairs of espionage and sabotage, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were able to realize that <strong>the</strong> Soviets could not attempt to mislead <strong>the</strong> worldwide public<br />
opinion, but only its domestic public.<br />
I believe <strong>the</strong> connection between events in <strong>the</strong> Far East Moscow’s desire to sign nonaggression<br />
pacts with some of its neighbours must be seen in a completely different manner.<br />
The key to this connection is represented by <strong>the</strong> simple fact that Moscow showed a clear<br />
and indubitable intention to sign such agreements only with Finland, Estonia, Latvia and<br />
Poland, not with Romania. Moscow did not propose, and it will only propose to Romania,<br />
texts that <strong>the</strong> latter cannot accept or that, if accepted, would legalize “<strong>the</strong> state of permanent<br />
aggression” that <strong>the</strong> USSR say Romania is displaying – which, in o<strong>the</strong>r words, will keep<br />
preserving that precious pretext to irrupt over <strong>the</strong> only bourgeois neighbouring borders it<br />
never recognized in front of <strong>the</strong> world and in front of <strong>the</strong> Russian public opinion.
184 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
It’s obvious that <strong>the</strong> preservation of this pretext constituted and constitutes one of <strong>the</strong><br />
main concerns of <strong>the</strong> Soviet politics. Once more <strong>the</strong> negotiations of Riga 1 proved – not only to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian negotiator, I hope – that Bessarabia did not represent a simple question of<br />
prestige for <strong>the</strong> USSR, nor a minimum territorial question, but that breach, political today,<br />
military tomorrow, at <strong>the</strong> frontier of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois world that <strong>the</strong> Soviet social imperialism<br />
considers to be indispensable to its long term politics.<br />
Determined not to revive <strong>the</strong> military defeat with Warsaw or <strong>the</strong> social defeat of<br />
Budapest, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia has been conditioning until today <strong>the</strong> deliberate use of that<br />
breach, in certain circumstances of social and economical dissolution of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois world<br />
that was far from reaching its maturity. But today Moscow realizes that a sudden victorious<br />
and extended military aggression of Japan could force it to give up ei<strong>the</strong>r its decision to be<br />
patient and completely prepared or <strong>the</strong> hope to ever execute its plans.<br />
A deep concern seems to be hovering over Moscow and I believe that today it feels <strong>the</strong><br />
need not to secure its Western front, but to secure its possibility of political and military<br />
compensation on this front, <strong>the</strong> prestige revenge on which <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong> Soviet regime<br />
from Russia and <strong>the</strong> entire future of <strong>the</strong> communism in <strong>the</strong> world could suddenly depend on.<br />
Until today nothing proves that Japan is decided to attack <strong>the</strong> USSR on its assets in <strong>the</strong><br />
Far East. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> most credible information confirms every day that Moscow<br />
is decided to support almost all challenges, to suffer almost all humiliations coming from its<br />
Asian neighbour. But this patience and this prudence have a threshold that <strong>the</strong> Soviets could<br />
not overpass. For example, <strong>the</strong> Soviets could not tolerate a victorious advance of <strong>the</strong> Nippon<br />
troops up to <strong>the</strong> Baikal region or a possible constitution of a white Russian Government in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Maritime Provinces, with Japan support. Such moral and military defeats would be<br />
immediately taken as a fatal shock for <strong>the</strong> domestic prestige of <strong>the</strong> regime.<br />
The Soviets knew very well that a general mobilization in Russia (or those actions that,<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> Soviet General Staff, correspond to <strong>the</strong> general mobilization) represents an<br />
operation that <strong>the</strong>ir regime could not perform twice, and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong>y will do anything to<br />
avoid it before <strong>the</strong> proper time has come. But precisely because <strong>the</strong>y are perfectly aware of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir possibilities [unclear], <strong>the</strong> day <strong>the</strong>y will be forced to take guns in <strong>the</strong>ir hands <strong>the</strong>y will<br />
not surrender until taking all chances, even <strong>the</strong> most slim ones [unclear].<br />
Let us imagine that attempt, let us suppose that Russia is forced to turn to arms. The issue<br />
that General Staff of Moscow will have to deal with is <strong>the</strong> following: to win <strong>the</strong> lost prestige as<br />
soon as possible and as undeniably as possible, to use <strong>the</strong> mobilized forces in an efficient<br />
manner for <strong>the</strong> communist cause.<br />
The given <strong>the</strong>me has two solutions: an Eastern solution and a Western solution. It is not<br />
wild to believe that most military and civil decision factors in Moscow are convinced that <strong>the</strong><br />
Eastern solution has no chances of success, but <strong>the</strong> Western solution could be successful<br />
WITH ONE CONDITION, accomplishing <strong>the</strong> desired objectives in a satisfying manner. This<br />
way – as opposed to <strong>the</strong> Eastern solution – it could be enclosed in <strong>the</strong> subsequently eligible<br />
general plan of Sovietisation of <strong>the</strong> Bourgeois Europe. This condition is <strong>the</strong> preliminary<br />
isolation of Romania.<br />
1<br />
The unsuccessful negotiations in January 1932 between Romania (Mihail R. Sturdza) and <strong>the</strong> USSR (Boris<br />
Stomoniakov) for a non-aggression pact.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 185<br />
Based on <strong>the</strong>se considerations we naturally suppose that by starting <strong>the</strong> campaign of<br />
bilateral non-aggression pacts Moscow is committed to accomplish two objectives: a minimal<br />
objective, namely <strong>the</strong> breaching of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois front organized in Moscow through <strong>the</strong><br />
separation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic block and of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish block, and a maximal objective,<br />
namely <strong>the</strong> separation of <strong>the</strong> Polish-Baltic from Romania.<br />
Anticipating on <strong>the</strong> Finnish, Estonian and Latvian approvals of <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts,<br />
one can say that today <strong>the</strong> first of <strong>the</strong>se objectives is accomplished. From now on, <strong>the</strong> plan of<br />
a possible Soviet aggression shall not take into account <strong>the</strong> unavoidable expansion of<br />
hostilities from <strong>the</strong> Black Sea, probably inaccessible to <strong>the</strong> great powers and far from <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
primordial interests, up to <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea where <strong>the</strong>ir fleets can travel so easily and where<br />
general complications would attract <strong>the</strong>se powers even involuntarily. From now on <strong>the</strong><br />
interrogation point –which is so salutary for <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish armies – constituted by <strong>the</strong><br />
two hundred thousands bayonets of <strong>the</strong> Baltic armies are probably no longer taken into<br />
account in <strong>the</strong> calculation of <strong>the</strong> General Staff of Moscow.<br />
Everything would clearly change again and this first Russian <strong>diplomatic</strong> victory would be<br />
cancelled, if <strong>the</strong> Bourgeois front realigns according to <strong>the</strong> Moscow order, by <strong>the</strong> signing of<br />
analogue pacts between Romania and Poland.<br />
With regard to <strong>the</strong> maximal objective, it is obvious that this would not be completely<br />
reached with a Polish signature in solidarity with <strong>the</strong> Baltic signatures and unconditioned on<br />
<strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Soviet non-aggression pact. We must consider that not our<br />
proper isolation but <strong>the</strong> Soviets’ opinion on this isolation at this moment will determine <strong>the</strong><br />
decision of a cornered and frenzied Moscow. As solid as <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish alliance<br />
remains in fact, in such circumstances it would not achieve its main goal, <strong>the</strong> preventive goal,<br />
if we allow it to create an atmosphere of ambiguity around this alliance, an atmosphere<br />
provoked by <strong>the</strong> signing of only five, instead of six, non-aggression pacts on <strong>the</strong> Russian<br />
Western border.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 165-170.<br />
72. Telegrama ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr.<br />
637 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu 1 , 31 decembrie<br />
1932<br />
Strict Confidențial<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine leton mi-a mărturisit astăzi, în toată confidența, îngrijorarea<br />
ce i-o cauzează atitudinea prezentă a Rusiei, în chestiunea reînnoirii convenției comerciale cu<br />
Letonia.<br />
„Nu înțeleg ce vrea Moscova, mi-a spus Domnia Sa, când ne cere concesii politice și mai<br />
grave decât cele la care am fost deja siliți să consimțim.<br />
Un pas mai mult dacă am face în aceea direcție și conștiința independenței sale ar fi<br />
zdruncinată în poporul leton.”<br />
1<br />
Nicolae Titulescu (1882-1941) a fost un om politic cu vederi democratice și diplomat român. Președinte al<br />
Adunării Generale a Societății Națiunilor (1930, 1931), Ministru al Afacerilor Străine al României (1927-1928, 1932-<br />
1936), delegat al României la Conferința de Pace de la Paris (1920), delegat permanent al României la Societatea<br />
Națiunilor (din 1924).
186 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Asupra acestor condiții de „atmosferă politică”, cum le denumește Moscova, domnul<br />
Zariņš mi-a spus că ar echivala cu întinderea controlului G.P.U. 1 -lui asupra opiniei publice<br />
letone și că domnul Stomoniakov, șeful delegației sovietice, i-a trimis „sfatul personal” de a<br />
ceda înainte ca să fie prea târziu, căci Letonia ar putea-o regreta amarnic.<br />
Privitor la schimburile economice, Moscova propune comenzi în Letonia de 12 milioane<br />
plătite în lats în schimbul monopolului petrolului și zahărului și aproape total al cerealelor<br />
plătite în valută străină.<br />
Lucru demn de atenție, în ceea ce privește tranzitul spre porturile letone, Moscova refuză<br />
orice angajament. Pretextul este „reîntoarcerea Rusiei la politica economică a lui Witte 2 ” de a<br />
se mulțumi cu porturile care îi aparțin.<br />
Semnalez că unele cercuri interpretează deja „atitudinea Moscovei” ca un simplu mijloc<br />
de presiune pentru a obține liberă dispoziție a portului Windau 3 sau a unei zone în acel port.<br />
Date fiind proporțiile politice și geografice, o asemenea concesie ar avea cu totul altă<br />
semnificație pentru Letonia decât aceea făcută de Grecia la Salonic.<br />
Chiar făcând parte din bluf-ul sovietic înțeleg îngrijorarea domnului Zariņš.<br />
Aș înțelege mai puțin indiferența [pe] care după prima mea impresie ar afecta-o Polonia în<br />
această chestiune.<br />
Indiferența, dacă s-ar confirma, ar prezenta destul interes pentru noi prin deducțiile ce s-<br />
ar impune, pentru a merita un control al Legației noastre din Varșovia.<br />
Lipsa unui reprezentant al Poloniei aici nu permite acest control.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, filele 230-232.<br />
72. Telegram no. 637 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu 4 , 31 st<br />
December 1932<br />
Strictly Confidential<br />
The Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs has confessed me today, with full confidence, his<br />
concern which is caused by <strong>the</strong> current stance of Russia regarding <strong>the</strong> renewal of <strong>the</strong><br />
commercial convention with Latvia.<br />
“I do not understand what Moscow wants, he said, when it requires political concessions<br />
which are even more serious than those we had already been constrained to yield to.<br />
If we took ano<strong>the</strong>r step in this direction <strong>the</strong> consciousness of independence would be<br />
shaken within <strong>the</strong> Latvian people”.<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong>se conditions of “political atmosphere”, as Moscow calls <strong>the</strong>m, Mr. Zariņš<br />
told me that it would be equivalent to <strong>the</strong> extension of GPU 5 ’s control on <strong>the</strong> Latvian public<br />
opinion and that Mr. Stomoniakov, <strong>the</strong> chief of <strong>the</strong> Soviet delegation, had sent “his personal<br />
advice” of giving up before it was too late, because Latvia might o<strong>the</strong>rwise bitterly regret it.<br />
1<br />
Directoratul Politic de Stat, organ de informație și poliție secretă al U.R.S.S.<br />
2<br />
Contele Serghei Witte (1849-1915) a fost om politic și de finanțe rus, Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (1905-<br />
1906).<br />
3<br />
În letonă, Ventspils.<br />
4<br />
Nicolae Titulescu (1882-1941) was a Romanian politician with democratic views and diplomat. President of <strong>the</strong><br />
General Assembly of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations (1930, 1931), Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania (1927-1928, 1932-<br />
1936), Romania's representative to <strong>the</strong> Paris Peace Conference (1920), Permanent Delegate of Romania to <strong>the</strong><br />
League of Nations (from 1924).<br />
5<br />
State Political Directorate, <strong>the</strong> Soviet intelligence agency and secret police.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 187<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong> economic changes, Moscow proposes in Latvia orders of 12 million paid in<br />
lats in exchange of <strong>the</strong> monopoly of oil and sugar and almost complete monopoly of cereals<br />
paid in foreign currency.<br />
It is apparent that, regarding <strong>the</strong> transit towards <strong>the</strong> Latvian harbours, Moscow refuses<br />
any commitment. The pretext is “<strong>the</strong> return of Russia to <strong>the</strong> Witte 1 ’s economic policy” to be<br />
pleased with <strong>the</strong> harbours it possesses.<br />
I point out that certain circles already interpret “Moscow’s attitude” as a simple means of<br />
pressure in order to obtain free disposal of Windau 2 harbour or of an area in that harbour.<br />
Due to <strong>the</strong> political and geographical proportions, such a concession would have an entire<br />
new meaning in Latvia than <strong>the</strong> one made by Greece in Thessaloniki.<br />
Even if it is a part of <strong>the</strong> Soviet bluff, I understand Mr. Zariņš’s concern.<br />
I would less understand <strong>the</strong> indifference that Poland, after my first impression, displays<br />
in this matter.<br />
The indifference, if it were confirmed, would present enough interest to us from <strong>the</strong><br />
deductions which would be entailed, in order to worth a control of our Legation in Warsaw.<br />
The lack of a representative of Poland here does not allow this control.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940, USSR, vol. 9, s. 230-232.<br />
73. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 71 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 10<br />
februarie 1933<br />
Strict confidențial<br />
Instrucțiunile Departamentului Excelenței Voastre indicaseră la timp acestei Legații<br />
importanța atribuită de România menținerii de către guvernele baltice a excepției zisă „a<br />
vecinătății sovietice”, excepție ce aceste guverne o opuseseră de la 1928 încoace în chestiune<br />
de dezarmare, solidar cu România și Polonia.<br />
Cred că un mijloc atât de precis și eficace de a ne sustrage orișicărui angajament general<br />
nesocotit și de a denunța încă o dată poziția specială ocupată de Rusia perturbatoare în<br />
mijlocul celorlalte națiuni AR FI ASTĂZI MAI NECESAR DECÂT ORICÂND.<br />
Într-adevăr:<br />
- de la 1928 până astăzi organismul sovietic și-a dovedit vitalitatea care la aceea vreme<br />
putea încă fi contestată.<br />
- oricum ar fi apreciate rezultatele economice și sociale obținute prin aplicarea planului de<br />
cinci ani, el a avut în tot cazul ca consecință punerea la punct a unuia dintre cele mai<br />
puternice instrumente de distrugere, prin desăvârșirea dotării tehnice și organice a armatei<br />
roșii și a detașamentelor sale, ca [neclar] 3 care grupează 12.000.000 de oameni.<br />
- pe când luciditatea puterilor occidentale față de primejdia militară sovietică era întreagă<br />
în 1928, astfel cum o dovedesc toate declarațiile reprezentanților lor în Comisia Preparatorie,<br />
astăzi sub influența preocupărilor anacronice cauzate de restabilirea puterii militare a<br />
Reichului, acea luciditate a dispărut, toate criteriile dezarmării și securității sunt inspirate de<br />
această sterilă psihoză, NICI UNUL NU ȚINE SEAMĂ DE IMPOSIBILITATEA ABSOLUTĂ A<br />
1<br />
Count Sergei Witte (1849-1915) was a Russian politician and finacier, Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1905-<br />
1906).<br />
2<br />
In Latvian, Ventspils.<br />
3<br />
(Notă Mihail Sturdza) [Neclar] grupează 12.000.000 de oameni în sute de societăți locale, toate cu bugetul lor<br />
particular, nici un control nu poate fi imaginat în asemenea condiții în URSS.
188 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
UNUI CONTROL ÎN U.R.S.S. ȘI DE VOINȚA DE ÎNȘELĂCIUNE ȘI DISTRUGERE,<br />
INVARIABILĂ ȘI VEȘNIC MĂRTURISITĂ, CARE ESTE ÎNSĂȘI DEFINIȚIA REGIMULUI<br />
SOVIETIC.<br />
- evenimentele ultimului an în Reich au determinat între aliații noștri îndepărtați sau<br />
apropiați și Moscova destinderi, raporturi și legăminte care ar putea provoca în spiritul<br />
conducătorilor sovietici, privitor la izolarea noastră, primejdioase iluzii; curentele<br />
sectarismului de stânga francez ar putea în curând dezvolta aceste legături în mod<br />
inconfortabil pentru noi.<br />
- acești conducători au câștigat, astăzi deja, certitudinea că legăturile de solidaritate<br />
spontană între Țările Baltice și România, legături ce formau pentru Statul Major sovietic un<br />
important punct de interogație, sunt pentru moment desfăcute,<br />
- pe când în 1928 ne găseam în chestiunea dezarmării în mijlocul unor discuții pur<br />
academice la concluderea cărora probabil nimeni cu credea, mecanismul incontrolabil al<br />
conferințelor ne-a adus astăzi în preajma celor mai grave și neașteptate abdicări.<br />
Tocmai în aceste împrejurări trebuie să constatăm că tovărășia Țărilor Baltice, și desigur<br />
cea a Poloniei, ne va lipsi în chestiunea menținerii „excepției vecinătății sovietice”.<br />
În cunoștință, inevitabil limitată, de cauză – dându-mi deci seama că elementele de<br />
informație ce îmi lipsesc ar putea milita categoric împotriva părerii ce exprim –, dar<br />
determinat de convingerile și experiența ce mi le-am putut forma în acest post de observație,<br />
îmi permit a insista din nou asupra necesității fie de a menține chiar izolați această excepție,<br />
fie de a o înlocui cu una echivalentă.<br />
Alternativele pe care ni le oferă conferința dezarmării, în noua situație creată prin<br />
nesocotirea de toți afară de noi a primejdiei sovietice, nu sunt, cred, numeroase.<br />
Ori un acord fiind atins asupra punctelor actualmente în litigiu, un rezultat practic este<br />
obținut și acest rezultat nu poate fi decât în dauna intereselor noastre, deoarece PRINCIPIILE<br />
în chestiune de siguranță nu vor ține niciun cont de caracterele specifice primejdiei bolșevice<br />
(nimeni nu mai denunță astăzi ca Lord Cushendun 1 în 1928 că sunt două soiuri de războaie și<br />
două moduri de a le pregăti) iar APLICAȚIILE în chestiunea de dezarmare vor fi față de Rusia<br />
Sovietică perpetuu inoperante.<br />
Ori despărțirea se face fără ca vreun acord să fie atins și singurul beneficiar în acest caz al<br />
inimicițiilor redeschise între puterile burgheze va fi tocmai vecinul nostru oriental. El va ști să<br />
găsească în straniile iluzii franco-polone un câmp de speculație cu consecințe incalculabile<br />
pentru noi și inestimabile pentru el, într-un moment când prăbușirea sau subzistența<br />
regimului sovietic atârnă poate în întregime de reîmprospătarea izvoarelor sale de credit –<br />
moral și financiar.<br />
În 1928 toate puterile erau conștiente de primejdia militară sovietică, astăzi noi singuri<br />
vedem clar în această direcție. Din cauza aceasta și fiindcă suntem primii interesați ar fi<br />
natural ca rolul să ne revină nouă de a reconcentra atenția celor care în Europa și America<br />
pretind a organiza securitatea și dezarmarea, asupra celei mai mari primejdii de război<br />
existentă, asupra războiului care e declarat deja.<br />
Văd în expunerea și menținerea curajoasă a „excepției românești” în materie de dezarmare<br />
și [a] „definiției românești” în materie de siguranță, bazate fie pe considerentele pe care le<br />
adoptasem solidar cu Polonia și Țările Baltice, fie pe altele sugerate în rapoartele mele nr. 401<br />
1<br />
Ronald John McNeill, Primul Baron Cushendun PC (1861 –1934) a fost un politician conservator britanic.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 189<br />
și 637/32, cea mai bună ocazie de a îndeplini misiunea pe care ne-o dă astăzi simțul<br />
conservării noastre.<br />
Acea expunere ar putea fi pregătită sau chiar înlocuită la Geneva prin cererea atât de<br />
naturală de a alcătui o comisie specială însărcinată cu redactarea unui raport asupra:<br />
„Organizării forțelor de sedițiune în țările străine și încercările de mobilizare a acestor forțe<br />
ca important element de pregătire a războiului și ca principal element al insecurității în<br />
lume”. Acest raport ar putea fi suficient de edificator chiar dacă nu s-ar baza decât pe<br />
documentația oficială și oficioasă sovietică.<br />
Înțeleg sentimentul de pudoare care ne-ar reține în momentul [de față] de a azvârli<br />
această bombă în mijlocul conferinței, atât de agitată deja, a dezarmării, dar mi-e frică că vom<br />
regreta poate odată ocazia ce ne este încă lăsată de a rechema țările burgheze, atât cele aliate<br />
cât și celelalte, la simțul gravei realități.<br />
Nu văd în tot cazul inconvenientul pentru noi al unei asemenea proceduri.<br />
Cumințenia și moderația noastră în această privință joacă cred în întregime în avantajul<br />
Sovietelor. Într-adevăr, nu mai este vorba de a dezvălui inconvenientele pentru România a<br />
unor anumite relații de vecinătate, aceste inconveniente fiind astăzi prea bine cunoscute de<br />
toți, este vorba de a dovedi că primejdia militară rusească privește nu România sau nu chiar<br />
numai o provincie română, ci Europa și în definitiv lumea întreagă.<br />
Șansele de a reuși sunt minime? Se poate, dar știm că dacă nu încercăm noi nimeni nu va<br />
încerca să disipeze în Europa și Statele Unite aceea fascinație colectivă la adăpostul căreia<br />
lumea roșie își pregătește astăzi în liniște agresiunea – ba chiar cu concursul nostru al tuturor.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 243-246.<br />
73. Diplomatic Report no. 71 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 10 th<br />
February 1933<br />
Strictly confidential<br />
Instructions from Your Excellency’s Department had indicated in due time to this<br />
Legation <strong>the</strong> importance Romania gives to <strong>the</strong> maintenance, by <strong>the</strong> Baltic Governments, of<br />
<strong>the</strong> so-called “soviet proximity” exception, an exception which <strong>the</strong>se Governments have been<br />
opposing against since 1928 until now, regarding disarmament, in solidarity with Romania<br />
and Poland.<br />
I think that such accurate and efficient measure of refraining from any general injudicious<br />
commitment and of denouncing once more <strong>the</strong> special position held by <strong>the</strong> disturbing Russia<br />
among <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r nations WOULD BE MORE NECESSARY THAN EVER.<br />
Indeed:<br />
- since 1928 until today <strong>the</strong> Soviet body has proven its vitality which at that time could still<br />
be contested<br />
- regardless of <strong>the</strong> way in which economic and social results achieved through <strong>the</strong><br />
application of <strong>the</strong> five-year plan would be considered, its aim has always been <strong>the</strong> perfection<br />
of one of <strong>the</strong> most powerful instruments of destruction, based on <strong>the</strong> finalization of technical
190 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
and personnel equipping of <strong>the</strong> red army and its detachments, as [unclear] 1 which ga<strong>the</strong>rs<br />
12,000,000 people.<br />
- while <strong>the</strong> Occidental powers’ awareness of military Soviet danger was clear in 1928, as it<br />
was proved by all declarations of <strong>the</strong>ir representatives to <strong>the</strong> Preparatory Commission, today,<br />
under <strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> anachronistic concerns caused by <strong>the</strong> reestablishment of <strong>the</strong><br />
Reich’s military power, that awareness has dissipated, all criteria of disarmament and safety<br />
are inspired by this sterile psychosis, NO ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE ABSOLUTE<br />
IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTROL ON THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND<br />
THE INTENTIONS OF FRAUD AND DESTRUCTION, WHICH ARE INVARIABLY AND<br />
ALWAYS ACKNOWLEDGED AND WHICH ARE THE ACTUAL DEFINITION OF THE<br />
SOVIET REGIME.<br />
- <strong>the</strong> events that occurred in <strong>the</strong> Reich over <strong>the</strong> last year have determined, between our<br />
distant and close allies and Moscow, some tension reliefs, reports and pledges that might<br />
create dangerous illusions regarding our isolation, in <strong>the</strong> minds of Soviet leaders; <strong>the</strong> currents<br />
of French left-wing sectarianism might soon develop <strong>the</strong>se connections in an uncomfortable<br />
manner for us.<br />
- <strong>the</strong>se leaders have already won today assuredness that connections of spontaneous<br />
solidarity between <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and Romania, which once represented for <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
General Staff an important question mark, are loosened for <strong>the</strong> moment,<br />
- while in 1928, <strong>the</strong> disarmament issue was <strong>the</strong> subject of several purely-academic<br />
discussions in whose conclusion nobody believed, <strong>the</strong> uncontrollable mechanism of<br />
conferences has brought us today near <strong>the</strong> most serious and unexpected abdications.<br />
Right in <strong>the</strong>se circumstances we have to notice that we will not benefit of <strong>the</strong> support of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic States, and of course, that of Poland in maintaining <strong>the</strong> “exception of Soviet<br />
proximity”.<br />
Being aware of this, however not completely – finding that pieces of information that I<br />
miss could definitely militate against <strong>the</strong> opinion I express – but determined by <strong>the</strong> beliefs<br />
and <strong>the</strong> experience I acquired in this observation post, I take <strong>the</strong> liberty to insist again on <strong>the</strong><br />
necessity of ei<strong>the</strong>r maintaining this exception even in isolation or replacing it with a<br />
corresponding one.<br />
I believe that <strong>the</strong> alternatives provided by <strong>the</strong> disarmament conference are not many, in<br />
<strong>the</strong> newly-created situation through <strong>the</strong> ignorance of <strong>the</strong> Soviet danger by everyone, except<br />
us.<br />
But, having reached an agreement on <strong>the</strong> current litigation points, a practical result is<br />
obtained and this result can only damage our interests, as <strong>the</strong> safety PRINCIPLES will not<br />
take into account <strong>the</strong> properties specific to Bolshevik danger (nobody denounces today, as<br />
Lord Cushendun 2 did in 1928, that <strong>the</strong>re are two types of wars and two methods of preparing<br />
for <strong>the</strong>m) and <strong>the</strong> APPLICATIONS in <strong>the</strong> disarmament issue shall perpetually be inoperative<br />
in relation to Soviet Russia.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> separation is made without reaching an agreement and <strong>the</strong> sole beneficiary in this<br />
case of re-opened enmities between bourgeois powers shall be our Eastern neighbour. It<br />
1<br />
(Note Mihail Sturdza) [unclear] ga<strong>the</strong>rs 12,000,000 people from hundreds of local companies, all with <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
private budget, no control can be imagined in such conditions in URSS.<br />
2<br />
Ronald John McNeill, 1st Baron Cushendun PC (1861 –1934) was a British Conservative politician.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 191<br />
would know how to find, in <strong>the</strong> strange French-Polish illusions, a field of speculation with<br />
incalculable consequences for us and inestimable for itself, in a moment when collapse or<br />
subsistence of <strong>the</strong> Soviet regime depends almost entirely on refreshing its sources of moral<br />
and financial credit.<br />
In 1928 all powers were aware of <strong>the</strong> military Soviet danger; today only we can clearly see<br />
this direction. Due to this fact and because we are <strong>the</strong> first interested party, it would be fair<br />
that we are assigned <strong>the</strong> role of shifting <strong>the</strong> attention of those who pretend to organize safety<br />
and disarmament in Europe and America towards <strong>the</strong> greatest existing war threat, to <strong>the</strong> war<br />
which has already been declared.<br />
I see, in <strong>the</strong> presentation and brave preservation of <strong>the</strong> “Romanian exception” related to<br />
disarmament and [of] <strong>the</strong> “Romanian definition” on safety, which are based ei<strong>the</strong>r on <strong>the</strong><br />
reasons we adopted in solidarity with Poland and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, or on o<strong>the</strong>r reasons<br />
suggested in my reports no. 401 and 637/32, <strong>the</strong> best opportunity to accomplish <strong>the</strong> mission<br />
which we are assigned today by <strong>the</strong> instinct of our conservation.<br />
This exposure might be prepared or even replaced in Geneva by <strong>the</strong> natural request of<br />
constituting a special commission in charge with <strong>the</strong> elaboration of a report on: “The<br />
organisation of sedition forces in <strong>the</strong> foreign countries and <strong>the</strong> attempt of mobilization of<br />
those forces as an important element in <strong>the</strong> preparation of <strong>the</strong> war and as <strong>the</strong> main element<br />
of world insecurity”. This report might be sufficiently probative if it were not based only on<br />
official and unofficial Soviet documentation.<br />
I understand <strong>the</strong> sense of shame that might hinder us from dropping this bomb of<br />
disarmament in <strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong> conference, which is already agitated, but I am afraid that<br />
we will regret <strong>the</strong> opportunity, which is still available, of recalling <strong>the</strong> feeling of serious reality<br />
in <strong>the</strong> bourgeois countries, both allies and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
In any case, I cannot see <strong>the</strong> inconvenient for us in such procedure.<br />
I think that our reasonableness in this question is entirely in <strong>the</strong> advantage of <strong>the</strong> Soviets.<br />
Indeed, this is no longer about revealing <strong>the</strong> inconveniences for Romania of certain proximity<br />
<strong>relations</strong>, <strong>the</strong>se inconveniences being well-known by everyone, but about proving that<br />
military Russian danger concerns not only Romania or a Romanian province, but also Europe<br />
and eventually <strong>the</strong> entire world.<br />
Are <strong>the</strong> chances to succeed minimal? Maybe, but if we do not try, no one will try to<br />
disseminate in Europe and <strong>the</strong> United States that collective fascination under <strong>the</strong> shelter of<br />
which <strong>the</strong> red world quietly prepares its aggression today – even with <strong>the</strong> help of us all.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 243-246.<br />
74. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 128 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 20<br />
martie 1933<br />
Repercusiunile succesului lui Hitler în Letonia<br />
Am onoarea de a aduce la cunoștință Excelenței Voastre că luarea puterii în Germania de<br />
către Hitler nu a lipsit de a produce îngrijorări și tulburări în statele baltice.<br />
În ajunul alegerilor parlamentare din Germania un grup de 330 supuși germani din<br />
Letonia care plecau la Tilsit pentru a vota – se crede – în favoarea lui Hitler, au fost maltratați
192 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
pe cheiul gării din Riga de către comuniștii și social-democrații letoni. În urma intervenției<br />
Ministrului Germaniei de aici, agresorii au primit pedepse de mică importanță.<br />
Reprezentanții partidului social-democrat au semnalat în Seim primejdia propagandei<br />
„hitleriste” în Letonia, susținând că unele grupări letone de dreapta ar proiecta, modelându-și<br />
activitatea după aceea a „Führer-ului”, să impună prin forță Letoniei un regim dictatorial;<br />
înșiși supușii germani precum și numeroși letoni de origine germană ar alimenta această<br />
propagandă în speranța de a provoca zguduirea și compromiterea independenței letone.<br />
Partidul Social Democrat a reușit prin ralierea grupurilor democratice să obțină majoritatea<br />
de voci în Seim pentru aprobarea acestor două „rezoluții”:<br />
1) vor fi expulzați din Letonia toți supușii străini-fasciști dăunători Republicii;<br />
2) vor fi desființate toate organizațiile și ziarele (fasciste) dăunătoare Republicii.<br />
Aceste rezoluții nu au forță de lege, ci au numai semnificația unei demonstrații a<br />
democrației letone. Ele vor îngreuna situația guvernului actual, demisionar dar continuând a<br />
gera afacerile până la formarea unui nou Cabinet și fără mijloace de a controla și domina<br />
manifestațiile unei puternice opoziții.<br />
Rezoluțiile Seimului din Riga, al căror conținut drastic și aspect insolit se datorează în<br />
parte inexperienței politicienilor letoni, au fost determinate de mai mulți factori. Partidele de<br />
stânga letone și în special social-democrații și comuniștii au vrut să își arate solidaritatea lor<br />
cu oropsita „stângă” germană. Pe lângă aceasta ascensiunea lui Hitler în fruntea treburilor<br />
germane a provocat îngrijorare în toate statele baltice. Sunt cunoscute părerile lui Hitler<br />
asupra nevoii Germaniei de a-și căuta drumul spre Răsărit (Drang nach Osten), astfel că azi în<br />
Letonia, Estonia și Lituania există teama ca unele conflicte internaționale să nu se lichideze în<br />
paguba acestor mici țări ce ar putea servi Germaniei drept pământ de colonizare.<br />
Trebuie de asemenea adăugat că partidelor de stânga letone le este teamă că organizațiile<br />
fasciste letone, profitând de nemulțumirea generală a unei populații lovită de criză, să nu<br />
încerce o lovitură care să le aducă în fruntea statului. Este de remarcat însă că pe când<br />
democrația letonă reclamă măsuri de prigoană împotriva embrionarelor organizații fasciste,<br />
propaganda comunistă își continuă aici cursul netulburată.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 261-263.<br />
74. Diplomatic Report no. 128 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 20 th<br />
March 1933<br />
Repercussions of Hitler’s success in Latvia<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to inform Your Excellency that <strong>the</strong> takeover of power in Germany by<br />
Hitler did produce concerns and disturbance in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> eve of parliamentary elections in Germany a group of 330 German subjects from<br />
Latvia who were leaving for Tilsit in order to vote – it is believed – in favour of Hitler, have<br />
been abused on <strong>the</strong> platform of <strong>the</strong> railway station in Riga by Latvian communists and socialdemocrats.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> intervention of <strong>the</strong> local Minister of Germany, <strong>the</strong> aggressors have<br />
received punishments of minor importance.<br />
The representatives of <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party have pointed out in Saeima to <strong>the</strong><br />
danger of <strong>the</strong> “Hitlerite” propaganda in Latvia, arguing that certain Latvian right-wing groups<br />
would like to impose by force in Latvia a dictatorial regime, by modelling <strong>the</strong>ir activity<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> one of <strong>the</strong> „Führer”; even <strong>the</strong> German subjects and many Latvian people of
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 193<br />
German origin would inflame this propaganda hoping to provoke <strong>the</strong> convulsion and <strong>the</strong><br />
discredit of <strong>the</strong> Latvian independence. The Social Democrat Party has succeeded, through <strong>the</strong><br />
adhesion of <strong>the</strong> democratic groups, to obtain <strong>the</strong> majority of voices in Saeima for <strong>the</strong><br />
approval of <strong>the</strong>se two “resolutions”:<br />
1) all <strong>the</strong> foreign fascist subjects which are harmful for <strong>the</strong> Republic will be banished from<br />
Latvia;<br />
2) all (fascist) organizations and newspapers which are harmful for <strong>the</strong> Republic will be<br />
dissolved.<br />
These resolutions do not have <strong>the</strong> force of law, but only <strong>the</strong> meaning of a demonstration<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Latvian democracy. These shall hinder <strong>the</strong> situation of <strong>the</strong> current government, which<br />
is outgoing but continues to manage <strong>the</strong> affairs until <strong>the</strong> constitution of a new Parliament<br />
and without <strong>the</strong> means of controlling and dominating <strong>the</strong> manifestations of a strong<br />
opposition.<br />
The resolutions of <strong>the</strong> Saeima from Riga, whose radical content and unusual appearance is<br />
partly due to <strong>the</strong> lack of experience of <strong>the</strong> Latvian politicians, have been influenced by many<br />
factors. The Latvian left-wing parties and especially <strong>the</strong> social-democrats and <strong>the</strong><br />
communists wanted to prove <strong>the</strong>ir solidarity with <strong>the</strong> German forlorn “left”. Besides this fact,<br />
Hitler’s ascension at <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> German affairs has provoked concerns in all <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States. Hitler’s opinions on <strong>the</strong> Germany’s necessity to seek its way to <strong>the</strong> East (Drang nach<br />
Osten) are well-known so that today in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania <strong>the</strong>re is a fear that<br />
certain international conflicts might be liquidated to <strong>the</strong> prejudice of <strong>the</strong>se small countries<br />
that might serve to Germany as colonization field.<br />
It should also be added that <strong>the</strong> Latvian leftist parties are afraid that <strong>the</strong> Latvian fascist<br />
organizations, by taking advantage of <strong>the</strong> general discontent of a population affected by<br />
crisis, might attempt a coup that would bring <strong>the</strong>m at <strong>the</strong> head of state. But it should also be<br />
noticed that if <strong>the</strong> Latvian democracy claims measures of persecution against <strong>the</strong> infant<br />
fascist organizations, <strong>the</strong> communist propaganda will continue its course here unperturbed.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 261-263.<br />
75. Telegrama ministrului României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 142 către<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, aprilie 1933<br />
După evenimentele din Reich, desfășurarea situațiilor la Geneva și Roma și discursul<br />
Domnului MacDonald au determinat crescândă neliniște în cercurile politice baltice și au<br />
retrezit în același timp în mod acut simțământul necesității, și în aceste regiuni, a unei alte<br />
garanții organice de stabilitate decât aceea oferită de Liga Națiunilor.<br />
Am găsit ecoul acestor simțăminte atât la noul Președinte al Consiliului, cât și la noul<br />
Ministru al Afacerilor Străine leton. Domniile lor mi-au arătat cu această ocazie viu interes și<br />
curiozitate față de noua organizație Mica Înțelegere 1 , precum și mai ales [a] raporturilor sale<br />
cu Polonia.<br />
Am explicat că în fața clubului țărilor care cred în frontiere și tratate dirijate, România,<br />
Iugoslavia și Cehoslovacia au crezut indispensabil a forma fără întârziere clubul celor care<br />
cred în imuabilitatea lor. Nu am atins decât în măsura ce o permitea lipsa de directive<br />
exprese, perspectivele deschise de ultimele linii ale preambulului noului pact al Micii<br />
Înțelegeri, perspective care păreau a interesa în special pe interlocutorii mei.<br />
1<br />
Prin Pactul de Organizare a Micii Înțelegeri (16 februarie 1933).
194 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Iritația contra Guvernului din Kowno, care cu toată via opoziție a opiniei publice chiar în<br />
Lituania, continuă a condiționa aderarea sa la un bloc baltic de o luare de poziție unanimă în<br />
chestiunea Wilnei, a câștigat toate cercurile politice în Letonia și Estonia, chiar [și pe] cele<br />
mai ostile până acum Poloniei.<br />
Această unanimitate de opinie creează Varșoviei neașteptate posibilități privitoare la<br />
formarea sub egida sa a unei Uniuni Baltice și alinierea eventuală a acestei Uniuni cu Mica<br />
Înțelegere în fața întreprinderilor dictatoriale ale Marilor Puteri.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 151.<br />
75. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza no. 142 to Foreign<br />
Minister Nicolae Titulescu, April 1933<br />
After <strong>the</strong> events in Reich, <strong>the</strong> evolution of situations in Geneva and Rome and Mr.<br />
MacDonald’s speech caused increasing concern in <strong>the</strong> Baltic political circles and at <strong>the</strong> same<br />
time reawakened acutely <strong>the</strong> sense of necessity, in <strong>the</strong>se regions as well, of an organic<br />
guarantee of safety o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> one offered by <strong>the</strong> League of Nations.<br />
I found an echo of <strong>the</strong>se feelings both in <strong>the</strong> new President of <strong>the</strong> Council and <strong>the</strong> new<br />
Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs. On this occasion, <strong>the</strong>y showed lively interest and curiosity<br />
for <strong>the</strong> new organization 1 , <strong>the</strong> Little Entente, and especially [for] its <strong>relations</strong> with Poland.<br />
I explained that, given <strong>the</strong> club of countries that believe in borders and controlled treaties,<br />
Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia thought it essential to establish without delay <strong>the</strong><br />
club of those who believed in <strong>the</strong>ir immutability. Due to <strong>the</strong> absence of clear directives, I only<br />
touched on <strong>the</strong> prospects opened by <strong>the</strong> last lines of <strong>the</strong> preamble of <strong>the</strong> new Pact of <strong>the</strong><br />
Little Entente, prospects in which my interlocutors seemed particularly interested.<br />
The irritation against <strong>the</strong> Government of Kowno, which, despite <strong>the</strong> lively opposition of<br />
<strong>the</strong> public opinion even in Lithuania, continues to make its adherence to a Baltic block<br />
contingent upon unanimous position-taking in relation to <strong>the</strong> issue of Wilna, embraced all<br />
<strong>the</strong> political circles in Latvia and Estonia, even those most hostile to Poland until now.<br />
This unanimity of opinion creates unexpected possibilities for Warsaw in relation to <strong>the</strong><br />
formation of a Baltic Union under its auspices and <strong>the</strong> possible alignment of this Union to <strong>the</strong><br />
Little Entente against <strong>the</strong> dictatorial undertakings of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 151.<br />
76. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail<br />
R. Sturdza nr. 160 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României ad interim Gheorghe<br />
G. Mironescu, 3 aprilie 1933<br />
Pe când relațiile germano-lituaniene par a intra într-o fază de perfectă cordialitate, cele<br />
dintre Berlin și Riga se înăspresc sensibil. Ministrul Germaniei în Riga 2 a depus pe biroul<br />
Ministrului Afacerilor Străine leton o notă foarte energică în chestiunea atacurilor din presă, din<br />
stradă și din parlament împotriva actualului regim în Germania. Domnia sa a plecat în aceeași<br />
zi la Berlin și întoarcerea sa pare condiționată de satisfacția ce va fi acordată Reichului.<br />
Simțământul de izolare și îngrijorare în Letonia și Estonia nu încetează a crește, pe când<br />
posibilitățile formării unui bloc pur baltic (Letonia, Estonia, Lituania) par definitiv îndepărtate.<br />
1<br />
The Pact of Organisation of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente signed at Geneva on 16 February 1933.<br />
2<br />
Georg Martius (1884-1951), Ministru al Germaniei la Riga (1933-1934).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 195<br />
Nu este de mirare că în asemenea împrejurări ideea formarii unui Bloc Baltic cu<br />
participarea Poloniei să înceapă a fi considerată chiar de grupuri odinioară antipolone.<br />
Cred a observa că repulsia oamenilor de stat baltici față de această în urmă eventualitate s-<br />
ar diminua sensibil în cazul apropierii Poloniei, în un mod sau în altul, de Blocul Micii<br />
Înțelegeri, de o formațiune politică deci care nu este vizibil constituită - ca alianța românopolonă-<br />
împotriva Rusiei Sovietice.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, fila 287.<br />
76. Diplomatic Report no. 160 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania ad interim Gheorghe<br />
G. Mironescu, 3 rd April 1933<br />
While <strong>the</strong> German-Lithuanian <strong>relations</strong> seem to reach a stage of perfect cordiality, <strong>the</strong><br />
ones between Berlin and Riga are noticeably hardening. The Minister of Germany in Riga 1 has<br />
submitted to <strong>the</strong> office of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs an unusually aggressive note<br />
on <strong>the</strong> matter of <strong>the</strong> attacks from <strong>the</strong> press, <strong>the</strong> street and <strong>the</strong> parliament against <strong>the</strong> current<br />
regime in Germany. His Excellency has left <strong>the</strong> same day to Berlin, and his return seems to be<br />
conditioned by <strong>the</strong> satisfaction that will be granted to <strong>the</strong> Reich.<br />
The feeling of isolation and concern in Latvia and Estonia does not cease to grow while<br />
<strong>the</strong> possibilities to establish an entirely Baltic block (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) seem to<br />
be determinately remote.<br />
It is no wonder that in such circumstances, <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> creation of a Baltic block with<br />
<strong>the</strong> participation of Poland began to be taken into consideration even by groups that were<br />
once utterly anti-Polish.<br />
I believe that <strong>the</strong> Baltic statesmen’s aversion to this latter possibility would seriously<br />
weaken in <strong>the</strong> case of Poland’s rapprochement, in one way or ano<strong>the</strong>r, to <strong>the</strong> block of Little<br />
Entente, thus to a political group, which is not visibly constituted– as in <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Polish alliance - against <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 287.<br />
77. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 179 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României ad interim Gheorghe G.<br />
Mironescu, 15 aprilie 1933<br />
Neutralizarea Statelor Baltice<br />
Am onoarea a răspunde adresei ministeriale nr. 4223 din 30 ianuarie 1933 (parvenită la<br />
acest oficiu la 2 aprilie curent).<br />
Ideea neutralizării Țărilor Baltice a preocupat pe oamenii politici din Estonia, Letonia și<br />
Lituania încă de la începutul existenței acestor state. Lipsa unor mijloace serioase de apărare<br />
militară, micimea numerică a armatelor baltice i-au făcut să se gândească la soluția cea mai<br />
comodă de salvgardare: neutralizarea țărilor lor prin garanția Marilor Puteri. Această idee se<br />
găsește deja exprimată în Tratatele de Pace încheiate de cele trei state cu U.R.S.S. într-un<br />
articol prin care Sovietele se angajează de a susține sforțările Guvernelor Baltice pentru<br />
dobândirea neutralității.<br />
1<br />
Georg Martius (1884-1951), Minister of Germany in Riga (1933-1934).
196 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Atitudinea favorabilă a Moscovei se explică prin teama (exprimată în 1920 în cursul<br />
negocierilor ruso-estoniene de către delegatul rus Joffe 1 ) ca Statele Baltice să nu înlesnească<br />
eventual operațiunile militare ale Marilor Puteri împotriva Rusiei. Sovietele se temeau - și se<br />
tem încă – mai ales de avantajele pe care le-ar fi putut oferi flotei engleze litoralul estonian de<br />
unde cu ușurință s-ar putea proceda la închiderea Golfului Finlandei.<br />
Proiectul scump mai ales unor oameni de stat estonieni reapare în discuțiile cercurilor<br />
politice din Tallinn de câte ori situația internațională pare a conține un motiv de îngrijorare<br />
pentru Statele Baltice. De pildă, izbucnirea evenimentelor din Manciuria, pe lângă faptul că a<br />
pus în lumină lipsurile Societății Națiunilor, a inspirat teama dezmințită ulterior de<br />
evenimente că un eventual acord ruso-japonez [avea] să îngăduie Sovietelor o libertate de<br />
acțiune pe frontul occidental.<br />
Dl. Tõnisson 2 , pe atunci Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Estoniei, a făcut diverse sforțări,<br />
sondaje, propagandă prin presă, în vederea realizării vechiului proiect. Demersuri au fost<br />
făcute pe lângă reprezentanții Marilor Puteri. Ministrul Sovietic în Estonia a răspuns<br />
Domnului Tõnisson că U.R.S.S. ar putea susține la Geneva proiectul neutralizării Estoniei în<br />
cazul numai când guvernul din Tallinn ar renunța să ceară la Conferința Dezarmării<br />
menținerea „excepției vecinătății sovietice”.<br />
Este de presupus că celelalte Puteri s-au ferit și ele de a încuraja acțiunea Domnului<br />
Tõnisson. Nici Anglia, nici Polonia nu țin, desigur, a renunța la unele avantaje pe care le-ar<br />
putea eventual oferi Statele Baltice, în cazul unei conflagrații, cu privire la organizarea unui<br />
blocus sau alte acțiuni navale sau la transportul munițiilor. Fără a mai adăuga că astăzi cu<br />
greu s-ar mai găsi un stat dispus să garanteze neutralitatea unor țărișoare mici și atât de<br />
amenințate ca Statele Baltice.<br />
Evenimentele din Germania, cu repercusiunile cunoscute în Statele Baltice, au dezgropat<br />
iarăși, pentru scurt timp, proiectul în chestiune. Conștienți de zădărnicia acestei încercări,<br />
unii oameni politici baltici i-au opus ideea mai realistă a unei uniuni baltice, care a reușit<br />
astăzi să ralieze aprobările aproape ale tuturor politicienilor letoni și estonieni, nu însă și pe<br />
ale lituanienilor (vezi rapoartele anterioare).<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 288-290.<br />
77. Diplomatic Report no. 179 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania ad interim Gheorghe<br />
G. Mironescu, 15 th April 1933<br />
Neutralization of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to answer to your ministerial request no. 4223 from January 30 th 1933<br />
(which arrived at this office on <strong>the</strong> April 2 nd of <strong>the</strong> current year).<br />
The idea of neutralization of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States has concerned <strong>the</strong> politicians from Estonia,<br />
Latvia and Lithuania since <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong>se states. The lack of serious<br />
means of military defence, <strong>the</strong> numerical littleness of <strong>the</strong> Baltic armies made <strong>the</strong>m think at<br />
<strong>the</strong> most convenient safeguard solution: <strong>the</strong> neutralization of <strong>the</strong>ir countries through <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Adolph Abramovich Joffe (1883-1927) a fost un politician și diplomat comunist, membru al Comitetului Central al<br />
partidului. A condus delegația sovietică în cadrul negocierilor de la Brest-Litovsk și a semnat tratatele de pace cu<br />
Polonia, Estonia, Letonia și Lituania în anii 1920-1921. Trimis al U.R.S.S. în China (1922-1923) și Austria (1924-1926).<br />
2<br />
Jaan Tõnisson (1868-1941?) a fost un jurnalist și politician democrat estonian, șef al statului estonian (1927-1928,<br />
1933), Prim Ministru (1919-1920), Ministru de Externe (1931-1932). Executat de autoritățile sovietice de ocupație.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 197<br />
guarantee of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers. This idea had already been expressed in <strong>the</strong> Peace Treaties<br />
concluded by <strong>the</strong> three states with <strong>the</strong> USSR in an article through which <strong>the</strong> Soviets<br />
committed to support <strong>the</strong> endeavors of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Governments for obtaining <strong>the</strong> neutrality.<br />
The favourable attitude of Moscow is explained through <strong>the</strong> fear (expressed in 1920 during<br />
<strong>the</strong> Russian-Estonian negotiations by <strong>the</strong> Russian delegate Joffe 1 ) that <strong>the</strong> Baltic States might<br />
facilitate <strong>the</strong> military operations of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers against Russia. The Soviets were afraid –<br />
and are still afraid – of <strong>the</strong> advantages that can be offered to <strong>the</strong> English fleet by <strong>the</strong> Estonian<br />
shores, from where <strong>the</strong>y could easily proceed to <strong>the</strong> closing off of <strong>the</strong> Gulf of Finland.<br />
The project which was very important, especially for certain Estonian statesmen,<br />
reappears in <strong>the</strong> discussion of <strong>the</strong> political circles in Tallinn whenever <strong>the</strong> international<br />
situation seems to contain a reason for concern for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. For example, <strong>the</strong> burst of<br />
<strong>the</strong> events in Manchuria, besides <strong>the</strong> fact that it brings light on <strong>the</strong> deficiencies of <strong>the</strong> League<br />
of Nations, has inspired a fear, which was subsequently repulsed, of a possible Russian –<br />
Japanese agreement that would allow <strong>the</strong> Soviets a freedom of action on <strong>the</strong> western front.<br />
Mr Tõnisson 2 , who was at that time <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, has made<br />
various efforts, surveys, propaganda in <strong>the</strong> press in order to accomplish <strong>the</strong> old project. Certain<br />
demarches have been made towards <strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers. The Soviet<br />
Minister of Estonia has answered to Mr. Tõnisson that <strong>the</strong> USSR might support in Geneva <strong>the</strong><br />
project of neutralization of Estonia only if <strong>the</strong> government from Tallinn ceased to ask at <strong>the</strong><br />
Disarmament Conference <strong>the</strong> maintenance of “<strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> Soviet proximity”.<br />
It can be assumed that <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Powers also kept away from encouraging <strong>the</strong> action of<br />
Mr. Tõnisson. Nei<strong>the</strong>r England nor Poland wants to give up certain advantages which could<br />
be offered by <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, in <strong>the</strong> case of a conflagration, related to <strong>the</strong> organization of a<br />
blockade or of o<strong>the</strong>r naval actions or <strong>the</strong> ammunition transport. Without adding that today<br />
one could hardly find a state willing to guarantee <strong>the</strong> neutrality of such small and menaced<br />
countries as <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
The events from Germany with <strong>the</strong> known repercussions in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States have dug up<br />
again, for a short time, <strong>the</strong> project in question. Being aware of <strong>the</strong> futility of this attempt,<br />
certain Baltic political people have opposed <strong>the</strong> more realist idea of a Baltic union, which has<br />
succeeded today to rally <strong>the</strong> approvals of almost all Latvian and Estonian politicians, but not<br />
those of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanians (see <strong>the</strong> previous reports).<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 288-290.<br />
78. Telegrama ministrului României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 255 către<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 4 iunie 1933<br />
Strict confidențial.<br />
Semnalez Excelenței Voastre personalitatea noului ministru leton de pe lângă Guvernul<br />
francez: Dl Cielēns, fost Ministru al Afacerilor Străine, liderul partidului socialist și până ieri<br />
președinte [al] comisiei afacerilor străine în Parlament.<br />
1<br />
Adolph Abramovich Joffe (1883-1927) was a communist politician and diplomat, a member of <strong>the</strong> Central<br />
Committee of <strong>the</strong> party. He led <strong>the</strong> Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk negotiations and signed peace treaties with<br />
Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in <strong>the</strong> years 1920-1921. The USSR envoy to China (1922-1923) and Austria<br />
(1924-1926).<br />
2<br />
Jaan Tõnisson (1868-1941?) was a journalist and democrat politician, Estonian Head of State (1927-1928, 1933),<br />
Prime Minister (1919-1920), Foreign Minister (1931-1932). Murdered by <strong>the</strong> Soviet occupation authorities.
198 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Domnia sa va reprezenta în primul rând la Paris importanta grijă comună a guvernului<br />
său și a celui sovietic: aprehensiunea unei apropieri franco-germane și a unei înțelegeri<br />
posibile între Polonia și Germania. Va fi însă și un avocat inteligent al intereselor Moscovei în<br />
general.<br />
Domnia sa era până mai deunăzi partizanul unei uniuni baltice cuprinzând Rusia și<br />
Germania și excluzând Polonia. Astăzi Domnia sa este partizanul unei apropieri, mergând<br />
până la o acțiune comună împotriva Germaniei, între Rusia, Țările Baltice, Polonia și Franța.<br />
Această apropiere ar cuprinde și Mica Înțelegere cu condiția, îmi spunea Domnia sa, „ca<br />
România să fie mai puțin intransigentă(!) în chestiunea Basarabiei.”<br />
Importanța Domnului Cielēns în Internaționala a Doua îi va deschide probabil din capul<br />
locului în Paris multe uși și multe urechi.<br />
Adaug că în ceea ce privește relațiile personale, care între noi au fost excelente, Dl. Cielēns<br />
prezintă toate avantajele unei firi foarte vorbărețe și chiar indiscrete.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 174.<br />
78. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza no. 255 to Foreign<br />
Minister Nicolae Titulescu, 4 th June 1933<br />
Top secret.<br />
I apprise Your Excellency of <strong>the</strong> personality of <strong>the</strong> new Latvian envoy to <strong>the</strong> French<br />
Government: Mr. Cielēns, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, leader of <strong>the</strong> Socialist party, and<br />
until yesterday President [of] <strong>the</strong> Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament. He will represent<br />
in Paris first of all <strong>the</strong> fundamental mutual concern of his and <strong>the</strong> Soviet governments: <strong>the</strong><br />
apprehension of a Franco-German rapprochments and a possible agreement between Poland<br />
and Germany. He will also be a shrewd advocate of <strong>the</strong> interests of Moscow in general.<br />
He was until recently <strong>the</strong> champion of a Baltic union including Russia and Germany and<br />
excluding Poland. Today, he is <strong>the</strong> apostle of an approach, going so far as to undertake joint<br />
action against Germany, between Russia, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, Poland and France. This approach<br />
would also include <strong>the</strong> Little Entente provided that, he told me, "Romania will be less<br />
intransigent (!) in <strong>the</strong> matter of Bessarabia."<br />
The importance of Mr. Cielēns in <strong>the</strong> Second International will probably open many doors<br />
and stir many interests in Paris from <strong>the</strong> beginning.<br />
We related excellently, Mr. Cielēns has all <strong>the</strong> advantages of a highly talkative and even of<br />
an indiscreet character.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 174.<br />
79. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail<br />
R. Sturdza nr. 355 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 26<br />
iulie 1933<br />
Ziarul „Riga am Sonntag” din 23 iulie curent publicând următorul articol:<br />
„Un Congres al Dezertorilor”<br />
„Epoca de după război ne-a arătat numeroase congrese și întreprinderi internaționale în<br />
Europa care nu au dat niciun rezultat, dar se pare că niciunul dintre ele nu a fost atât de<br />
absurd ca: Congresul foștilor dezertori din monarhia danubiană care va avea loc la 15 august<br />
la Cluj (România). Este vorba de un congres internațional al soldaților cehi (ruteni) și croați
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 199<br />
care pe vremea războiului mondial au fugit din armata austro-ungară. După cum se știe erau<br />
numeroși aceia care dezertau îndată ce se prezenta ocazia. Foștii soldați ruteni sunt<br />
organizatorii acestei ciudate reuniuni. Se prevăd mari serbări. Participanții congresului vor fi<br />
sărbătoriți ca eroi. Un marș triumfal spre Sinaia și Constanța va încununa festivitățile și se va<br />
prețui precum merită între ruteni, cehi și iugoslavi faptul de a arunca armele. Toți transfugii<br />
se vor îmbrățișa, și după cum spune cu dispreț un ziar ungur „își vor aminti cu entuziasm<br />
marele act militar ce le-a fost hărăzit de a dezerta în fața inamicului părăsind steagurile<br />
cărora [le] juraseră credință până la moarte.”<br />
Colegul meu, Dl. Lipa 1 , Însărcinatul cu Afaceri al Cehoslovaciei, și cu mine am găsit necesar<br />
a nu-l lăsa fără răspuns. Am trimis în consecință ziarelor principale din Riga „Jaunākās Ziņas”<br />
(leton) „Segodnia” (rusesc) și „Rigasche Rundschau” (german) următoarea scrisoare:<br />
„Domnule Director,<br />
Legionarii români, cehoslovaci și iugoslavi care în timpul Marelui Război au luptat cu curaj<br />
ca voluntari împotriva unei tiranii seculare și execrate, alături de soldații țărilor lor sau ai Statelor<br />
aliate vor ține peste câteva zile un congres la Cluj, în România. Un ziar din Riga consacra<br />
acestui eveniment un ciudat articol în prima pagină intitulat: „Un Congres al Dezertorilor”.<br />
Nu știm cărei țări aparțin redactorii sau corespondenții zisului ziar, dar suntem convinși<br />
că nu există un leton care ar putea admite ca să fie tratați drept dezertori tovarășii de arme<br />
care în Carpați, în Alpi și pe Tisa au îndeplinit tocmai ceea ce eroicele legiuni letone au<br />
îndeplinit pe Duna 2 , pe Lielupe și pe Gauja în luptele lor memorabile și victorioase pentru<br />
independența Patriei și libertatea fiilor ei.<br />
În consecință, Domnule Director, ca foști organizatori și soldați noi înșine ai vrednicelor<br />
legiuni naționale recurgem cu toată încrederea la ospitalitatea amicală a coloanelor<br />
Dumneavoastră pentru a protesta cu uimire și indignare împotriva unui asemenea procedeu.<br />
Mulțumindu-vă de înainte, Domnule Director, vă rog să binevoiți a primi asigurarea<br />
înaltei noastre considerații.”<br />
ss. Michel R.Sturdza<br />
Yaroslav Lipa<br />
Scrisoarea a fost publicată de „Jaunākās Ziņas” din 25 iulie sub următorul titlu: „O urâtă<br />
lipsă de tact” cu următorul comentariu:<br />
„Ziarul împotriva căruia este îndreptată protestarea de mai sus a Miniștrilor României și<br />
Cehoslovaciei este ziarul hitlerist „Riga am Sonntag” care s-a specializat deja în asemenea<br />
lipse de tact. Societatea letonă judecă cu asprime astfel de acțiuni ale hitleriștilor.”<br />
Ziarul „Segodnia” (principalul ziar în limba rusă din Statele Baltice) a publicat de asemenea<br />
succinta noastră scrisoare, ziarul „Rigasche Rundschau” (în limba germană) s-a abținut.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 318-319.<br />
79. Diplomatic Report no. 355 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 26 th<br />
July 1933<br />
The paper „Riga am Sonntag” from July 23 rd of <strong>the</strong> current year published <strong>the</strong> following<br />
article:<br />
1<br />
Yaroslav Lipa (1866-1966) era Ministrul Cehoslovaciei la Riga (până în 1938).<br />
2<br />
Fluviul Daugava.
200 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
„A Congress of Deserters”<br />
„The post-war days has brought in Europe many international congresses and enterprises<br />
which had no result, but it seems that none of <strong>the</strong>m is as absurd as: <strong>the</strong> Congress of former<br />
deserters from <strong>the</strong> Danubian monarchy that will take place on August 15 th in Cluj (Romania).<br />
It is an international congress of Czech (Ru<strong>the</strong>nians) and Croatian soldiers who have<br />
deserted from <strong>the</strong> Austro-Hungarian army during <strong>the</strong> world war. As it is known, <strong>the</strong>re were<br />
many soldiers who deserted as soon as <strong>the</strong>y had <strong>the</strong> opportunity. The former Ru<strong>the</strong>nian<br />
soldiers are <strong>the</strong> organisers of this strange reunion. Great celebrations shall take place <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
The participants to <strong>the</strong> congress shall be celebrated as heroes. A triumphal march to Sinaia<br />
and Constanța shall crown <strong>the</strong> festivities and <strong>the</strong> throwing of weapons shall be celebrated, as<br />
it deserves, among Ru<strong>the</strong>nians, Czechs and Yugoslavs. All runaways shall embrace and, as it<br />
contemptuously states a Hungarian paper “<strong>the</strong>y will remember with enthusiasm <strong>the</strong> great<br />
military act which was intended for <strong>the</strong>m, to desert in front of <strong>the</strong> enemy by leaving <strong>the</strong><br />
colours for which <strong>the</strong>y have taken <strong>the</strong> oath until death.”<br />
My colleague, Mr. Lipa 1 , <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Czechoslovakia, and I have considered<br />
that it is necessary to give an answer to this. As a result, we have sent to <strong>the</strong> main papers in<br />
Riga „Jaunākās Ziņas” (Latvian) „ Segodnia” (Russian) and „Rigasche Rundschau” (German)<br />
<strong>the</strong> following letter:<br />
„Dear Director,<br />
The Romanian, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs legionaries who have courageously fought<br />
as volunteers during <strong>the</strong> Great War against a centennial and loa<strong>the</strong>d tyranny, toge<strong>the</strong>r with<br />
<strong>the</strong> soldiers of <strong>the</strong>ir countries and of <strong>the</strong> Allied states shall hold a congress in Cluj, Romania<br />
in a few days. A paper in Riga has dedicated to this event a strange article on <strong>the</strong> first page<br />
which was entitled: „A Congress of Deserters”.<br />
We do not know to which country <strong>the</strong> editors and <strong>the</strong> correspondents of <strong>the</strong> paper in<br />
question belong, but we are sure that <strong>the</strong>re is no Latvian who might admit for his bro<strong>the</strong>rsin-arms<br />
to be considered deserters, <strong>the</strong> ones who have accomplished in <strong>the</strong> Carpathians, in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Alps and on Tisza what <strong>the</strong> heroic Latvian legions have accomplished on Duna 2 , on<br />
Lielupe and on Gauja in <strong>the</strong>ir memorable and victorious fights for <strong>the</strong> independence of <strong>the</strong><br />
Country and <strong>the</strong> liberty of its sons.<br />
As a consequence, Mr. Director, as former organisers and soldiers of <strong>the</strong> reputable<br />
national legions ourselves, we apply with all trust to <strong>the</strong> friendly hospitality of your columns<br />
in order to protest with amazement and indignation against such a procedure.<br />
Thanking you in advance, Mister Director, please accept <strong>the</strong> assurance of our highest<br />
consideration”.<br />
ss. Michel R.Sturdza<br />
Yaroslav Lipa<br />
The letter was published by „Jaunākās Ziņas” on July 25 th under <strong>the</strong> following title: „A<br />
disorderly clumsiness” with <strong>the</strong> following commentary:<br />
„The paper against which is directed <strong>the</strong> above protest of <strong>the</strong> Ministers of Romania and<br />
Czechoslovakia is <strong>the</strong> Hitlerite paper „Riga am Sonntag” which has already specialized in<br />
such clumsiness. The Latvian society judges with severity such actions of <strong>the</strong> Hitlerites”.<br />
The paper „ Segodnia” (<strong>the</strong> main paper in Russian language from <strong>the</strong> Baltic States) also<br />
published our short letter, <strong>the</strong> paper „Rigasche Rundschau” (in German language) has<br />
refrained from doing so.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 318-319.<br />
1<br />
Yaroslav Lipa (1866-1966) was Minister of Czechoslovakia in Riga (until 1938).<br />
2<br />
Daugava river.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 201<br />
80. Raportul lunar (septembrie 1933) al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la<br />
Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 491 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 2 octombrie 1933<br />
Am onoarea a rezuma mai jos pentru luna septembrie 1933 situația și faptele relative la<br />
politica internă și externă a Letoniei:<br />
a. Politica internă<br />
Se știe că spre sfârșitul lunii august partidul social-democrat obținuse – grație concursului<br />
deputaților comuniști – numărul de semnături parlamentare necesare pentru convocarea unei<br />
sesiuni extraordinare a Seimei. Parlamentul leton – astfel convocat – a respins totuși cererea<br />
socialiștilor de a se lua măsuri severe împotriva organizațiilor extremei drepte. Imprudenta<br />
campanie a stângii împotriva acestor organizații a dat prilej guvernului de a închide clubul SSS,<br />
vasta organizație sportivă a Partidul social-democrat destinată – se pare – a da tineretului<br />
muncitoresc cunoștințele tactice necesare unui bun revoluționar. În schimb, societatea așa-zisă<br />
fascistă „Pērkonkrusts”, acuzată de a avea o activitate secretă antidemocratică și pe care<br />
guvernul în urma presiunilor stângii o închisese în mod provizoriu, a primit peste puțin timp,<br />
din partea tribunalului, autorizația de a funcționa.<br />
Eșecul partidului social-democrat se explică; alianța sa recentă cu comuniștii a provocat<br />
alarma opiniei publice și solidarizarea partidelor burgheze, în afară de grupul Centruluidemocratic<br />
(centru stânga), al cărui patrimoniu electoral fiind ațâțarea simțămintelor antigermane<br />
ale populației, se găsește momentan în alianță cu socialiștii.<br />
Este de observat că în ședința sus menționată a Seimului au votat, alături de comuniști și socialiști,<br />
deputații polonezi, fără îndoială în urma sfatului Varșoviei. Aceasta se explică prin<br />
teama Poloniei că instalarea eventuală a unui guvern de extremă dreaptă în Riga ar putea atrage<br />
nu atât o apropiere germano-letonă cât noi dificultăți în ceea ce privește o apropiere rusobaltică.<br />
În urma înfrângerii parlamentare partidul social-democrat a organizat în diverse orașe<br />
miting-uri de protest, urmate pe alocuri de mișcări de stradă care au fost reprimate imediat<br />
de poliție. Încercarea de a camufla o reînființare a clubului SSS, strecurând membrii săi în<br />
secțiunile unei alte societăți sportive socialiste (Muncă și Sport), a fost de asemenea<br />
împiedicată de către guvern.<br />
Atitudinea neașteptat de energică a guvernului din Riga se explică în parte prin faptul că a<br />
simțit că simpatiile populare încep din ce în ce mai mult în aceste țări să încline spre o<br />
politică de autoritate, [iar] el nu dorește a fi întrecut de acest nou și puternic curent de<br />
opinie; partidele burgheze – în marea lor majoritate – nu pot, de altfel, constata decât cu<br />
plăcere slăbirea partidului social-democrat a cărui presiune constantă a apăsat greu asupra<br />
tuturor guvernelor de la înființarea statului leton.<br />
Coeziunea acestui partid – atât de perfectă până acum – pare a fi amenințată de o sciziune<br />
internă; într-adevăr, aripa [de] extremă-stânga s-a întărit în ultimul timp în detrimentul<br />
elementelor moderate. Lider-ul ei, Dl Menders 1 , exercită în partid o activitate demagogică<br />
inspirată în mod vizibil de Moscova. Vechii șefi social-democrați, Dl. Cielēns (actualul Ministru<br />
al Letoniei la Paris), Dl. Kalniņš 2 (Președintele Seimei) etc. cărora, cu toate convingerile lor<br />
1<br />
Fricis Menders (1885 - 1971) a fost un politician cu vederi de stânga, devenit ulterior disident antisovietic.<br />
2<br />
Pauls Kalniņš (1872-1945) a fost un leton medic și politician cu vederi de stânga, Președinte al Saeima (1925-1934).
202 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
teoretice, nu li s-ar putea contesta un anumit patriotism, privesc cu neplăcere noua îndrumare<br />
pe care extremiștii vor să o imprime partidului social-democrat. Ecourile disensiunilor interne<br />
au ajuns în public, ceea ce a contribuit nu puțin la slăbirea prestigiului partidului.<br />
Campania împotriva Germaniei face subiectul principal al ziarelor socialiste. În ultimul<br />
timp ziarul „Socialdemokrats” a atacat cu vigoare chiar pe Dl. Martius, Ministrul Germaniei în<br />
Riga, acuzându-l de a sprijini financiar organizațiile fasciste din Letonia. Acuzația socialiștilor<br />
nu se bazează pe nici un fapt concret. Organizațiile „fasciste” sunt în Letonia prin definiție<br />
ultra-naționaliste, iar în profesiunea lor de credință liderii lor au manifestat față de populația<br />
minoritară germană simțăminte atât de ostile încât nu par defel compatibile cu presupusele<br />
stipendii ale legației Reichului.<br />
b. Situația economică și financiară internă.<br />
În cursul lunii septembrie a avut loc în Riga o conferință economică a Statelor baltice<br />
(Letonia, Estonia, Lituania). Această conferință a pus în discuție măsurile de combatere a<br />
crizei economice, precum și coordonarea politicii economice a celor trei state baltice. Urări<br />
au fost făcute și de astă dată de către toți delegații în favoarea uniunii vamale baltice, proiect<br />
care revine de ani de zile în dezbaterile economice din aceste ținuturi, fără însă a se apropia<br />
în mod serios de realizare.<br />
Rezoluțiile următoare au fost votate cu unanimitate:<br />
1) Numirea unei comisii însărcinate de a studia mijloacele înfăptuirii uniunii vamale;<br />
2) „Clauza baltică” urmează să fie introdusă în toate Tratatele de comerț încheiate de<br />
Statele Baltice cu alte țări;<br />
Conferința a exprimat, de asemenea, dorința de a vedea în viitor intervenția statului în<br />
economia privată redusă la minimum posibil.<br />
La 25 septembrie au început negocierile în vederea unui tratat de comerț lituaniano-leton.<br />
Se anunță fără multă convingere că delegații ambelor state vor duce negocierile în spiritul<br />
Conferinței economice sus-menționată.<br />
Partidul agrar cere cu insistență ca guvernul să nu suprime măsurile restrictive privitoare<br />
la comerțul cu devize; după părerea sa cursul actual al lat-ului trebuie susținut cu orice preț.<br />
Această atitudine excepțională pentru agricultori se explică prin faptul că statul leton este<br />
prin legile în vigoare principalul cumpărător al produselor pământului.<br />
Guvernul leton declară cu orice ocazie, precum a făcut și la Conferința economică de la<br />
Londra, că alături de statele agrare va căuta să obțină o îmbunătățire a regimului general al<br />
contingentărilor și prohibițiilor. Așteptând această îmbunătățire se poate constata că politica<br />
economică a Letoniei este în întregime bazată tocmai pe sus-menționatele restricții.<br />
c. Chestiuni speciale<br />
Raporturile economice cu U.R.S.S. au fost determinate prin Tratatul de comerț letonosovietic<br />
încheiat în 1927. Prin acest tratat se prevedea: dezvoltarea crescândă a schimburilor<br />
economice dintre cele două țări; acordarea mutuală de taxe vamale foarte scăzute; Sovietele<br />
urmau să importe mărfuri din Letonia pentru suma de 40 milioane de Lat. Un paragraf<br />
special prevedea că mărfurile care treceau în tranzit pe teritoriul celor două țări trebuiau să<br />
fie scutite de taxe de import, export și tranzit. Se înțelege că această stipulație era favorabilă<br />
Sovietelor care își trimitea o parte din mărfuri prin Libau. Acest tratat nu a fost executat cu<br />
sinceritate de către Soviete decât în primul an; în anii următori comenzile sovietice în Letonia<br />
au scăzut progresiv, până când anul trecut U.R.S.S. a denunțat zisul tratat.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 203<br />
Tabloul de mai jos precizează relațiile comerciale dintre Letonia și U.R.S.S.:<br />
Import Export Balanța<br />
Anii 1000<br />
Lat<br />
% din întregul<br />
import<br />
1000<br />
Lat<br />
% din întregul<br />
export<br />
1000<br />
Lat<br />
1927 18319 7,33 3783 1,70 - 14536<br />
1928 17522 5,70 23598 8,90 + 6076<br />
1929 17022 4,70 40079 14,03 + 23057<br />
1930 17601 3,94 35118 14,17 + 17517<br />
1931 16539 9,34 33101 20,21 + 16562<br />
1932 8506 10,06 14222 14,73 + 5716<br />
1933<br />
Prima<br />
jumătate<br />
2118 5,42 631 1,70 - 1487<br />
U.R.S.S. exportă în Letonia grâu, zahăr, naft, petrol, benzină, fructe, bumbac și tabac,<br />
Letonia exportă în U.R.S.S. vagoane de drum de fier, blănuri și piei, mașini agricole, țesături<br />
de bumbac și lână, hârtie etc. În 1932 78% din exportul leton în U.R.S.S. consista în vagoane.<br />
În ultimii ani Moscova concentrându-și sforțările în scopul realizării planului de cinci ani, a<br />
renunțat să importe mărfuri letone în cantități importante. Această neexecutare a tratatului a<br />
produs grave perturbări în economia letonă.<br />
Pentru a încuraja exportul în U.R.S.S., guvernul leton în 1931 a redactat o lege a<br />
„garanțiilor” statului. Prin această lege ministerul de finanțe leton avea dreptul de a da<br />
garanții caselor de comerț care exportau în U.R.S.S. Scopul acestor garanții era de a ușura<br />
scontarea tratelor sovietice. Prin mărfuri letone se considerau acelea în a căror producție au<br />
intrat 30% materii prime și muncă letonă. Suma totală a acestor garanții nu trebuia să<br />
depășească, la un moment dat, totalul de 10 milioane Lat. Garanția trebuia acordată pe un<br />
termen de maximum 12 luni. Statul lua 2% 1 din suma garantată. Dacă trata sovietică de export<br />
garantată se întâmpla să fie protestată și neachitată în cursul lunii următoare protestului,<br />
Ministerul de Finanțe achita suma în chestiune din fondul pentru asigurarea garanțiilor; în<br />
cazul când acest fond nu era suficient, garanția putea să fie provizoriu achitată din fondurile<br />
de rezervă ale Statului.<br />
4. Politica externă<br />
Se știe că acum câteva luni social-democrația letonă, din spirit de solidaritate cu stânga<br />
germană, reușise să provoace o înăsprire a relațiilor germano-letone. Se pare că guvernul din<br />
Riga, care s-a liberat treptat de presiunea socialismului leton, tinde actualmente spre<br />
normalizarea acestor relații.<br />
Vizita Domnului Herriot în Riga nu pare a fi avut în această privință efectul scontat de<br />
inițiatorii săi. Entuziasmul său prefăcut pentru rezultatele obținute de regimul comunist a<br />
fost primit aici cu o politicoasă ironie și nu a produs nicio impresie asupra unor cercuri lung<br />
și amănunțit informate deja. Oricare ar fi argumentația întrebuințată colaborarea cu Sovietele<br />
nu poate surâde unei țări care a avut deja ocazia de a vedea armata roșie pe teritoriul său.<br />
1<br />
Posibil, neclar.
204 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Socialismul leton interpretând călătoria Domnului Herriot în U.R.S.S. și vizita sa în Riga<br />
ca preliminariile ralierii Letoniei unei cruciade antihitleriste, guvernul leton a ținut să<br />
dezmintă cu precizie zvonurile despre „colaborarea Letoniei cu vreun grup politic îndreptat<br />
împotriva altor state”.<br />
Chestiunea revizuirii.<br />
Primejdia ce ar prezenta deschiderea acestei chestiuni este viu și unanim simțită în<br />
Letonia. Sentimentul general în Țările Baltice este că odată principiul revizuirii admis, din<br />
toate granițele actualmente contestate, cea germano-poloneză ar fi cea mai amenințată și că<br />
orice modificare consimțită sau nu a acestor granițe ar avea consecințe extrem de grave<br />
pentru integritatea teritoriului acestor țări și chiar pentru independența lor națională.<br />
Chestiunea dezarmării.<br />
Este ocazia de a reaminti că încheierea pactelor de neagresiune cu U.R.S.S. a schimbat cu<br />
totul atitudinea țărilor baltice în această chestiune. Nu mai este vorba și nu mai poate fi vorba<br />
de excepția vecinătății sovietice.<br />
Atât cercurile politice cât și cele militare letone privesc cu neîncredere opera dezarmării în<br />
care văd în fond o ocazie de slăbire a puterilor asiguratoare a păcii. „Nu credem în dezarmare,<br />
dar nu nouă ne revine a o spune” îmi preciza acum câteva luni un factor esențial al politicii<br />
externe letone.<br />
Chestiunea datoriilor de război.<br />
Letonia plătise rata sa din datorie către Statele Unite în luna decembrie, în speranța de a<br />
putea contracta un împrumut pe piața americană. Tratative în acest sens erau începute de un<br />
an de zile. Gestul ei nereușind a convinge cercurile financiare americane să plaseze capitaluri<br />
într-o țară puțin cunoscută, cu ocazia celei din urmă rate, guvernul leton s-a mărginit să facă<br />
o plată nominală, în aceeași proporție pe care Anglia a făcut-o pe a sa.<br />
În privința următoarei rate, Letonia așteptă decizia celorlalte state.<br />
Chestiunea minorităților.<br />
Fostul Ministru al Instrucției din Riga pedepsise disciplinar pe directorii școlilor germane<br />
din Letonia pentru că sărbătoriseră în școli aniversarea zilei în care legiunile balte alături de<br />
trupele letone recuceriseră Riga din mâinile bolșevicilor. Directorii școlilor au făcut apel la<br />
Senat (Tribunalul suprem în Letonia) împotriva acestor măsuri și nu este exclus, după<br />
recentele reacții ale opiniei publice, ca pedepsele distribuite de Dl Ķeniņš 1 , înainte de plecarea<br />
sa, să fie raportate sau atenuate.<br />
Chestiunile în legătură cu Societatea Națiunilor<br />
Dl. Salnais, Ministrul leton al Afacerilor Străine, intervievat cu ocazia plecării sale la<br />
Geneva a declarat că „experiențele trecute au arătat că reuniunile Societății Națiunilor n-au<br />
întotdeauna un deosebit succes, dar totuși statele mai mici mai ales sunt datoare să participe<br />
la aceste conferințe și să nu se încreadă numai în propriile lor puteri. Nu trebuie uitat că fără<br />
opinia mondială, fără solidaritatea internațională a micilor state, acestea ar avea mult de<br />
suferit din cauza neînțelegerilor dintre marile puteri. Din acest punct de vedere Letonia<br />
trebuie cu toate forțele ei să apere prestigiul Societății Națiunilor.”<br />
Cu aceeași ocazie, Dl Salnais a declarat că va căuta să obțină ca să se acorde statelor<br />
baltice un loc în Consiliul Societății Națiunilor la următoarele alegeri. Cred a ști că vreo<br />
1<br />
Atis Ķeniņš (1874-1961) a fost avocat, profesor și politician leton. A fost Ministru al Educației și al Justiției. A<br />
desfășurat o curajoasă acțiune de opoziție față de ocupația sovietică a țării sale, fiind arestat în mai multe rânduri.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 205<br />
înțelegere în această privință nu a intervenit decât între Letonia și Estonia. Este îndoielnic ca<br />
Finlanda să accepte vreodată a participa la un rulement 1 stabilit între Țările Baltice numai.<br />
Chestiuni în legătură cu întrunirile internaționale<br />
Conferința de la Sinaia, ca și toate manifestările Micii Înțelegeri au fost urmărite aici cu<br />
cea mai mare atenție și simpatie. Spiritele cumpătate și în general toți factorii răspunzători<br />
actuali ar prefera dilemei ce le este actualmente oferită – violarea relativă sau alăturarea 2<br />
manifestă unei grupări franco-ruso-polonă, apropierea între grupul Țărilor Baltice, constituit<br />
pe modelul Micii Antante, și acest organism internațional. Trăsătura de uniune între aceste<br />
două grupuri nu poate fi decât Polonia.<br />
e. Raporturi cu România<br />
Letonia exportă în România în principal încălțăminte de cauciuc (galoși, snow-boots etc.),<br />
a exportat de asemenea în mici cantități materii colorante (ultramarin).<br />
Exportul României în Letonia consistă aproape exclusiv în petrol.<br />
În anul 1932 Letonia a importat mărfuri românești pentru suma totală de Lats 243 257. Cea<br />
mai mare parte din import este constituită din petrol (137 440 Lats), benzină (72 246 Lats),<br />
blănuri de miel (11 899 Lats). În același an exportul leton în România a atins suma de Lats 1<br />
286 068. Cea mai mare parte din acest export este constituită de încălțăminte în cauciuc (Lats<br />
1 089 200) și materii colorante, în special albastru ultramarin (Lats 85 424).<br />
Situația raporturilor economice dintre Letonia și România pe lunile iulie și august este<br />
următoarea:<br />
1.Importul din România în Letonia<br />
Numele mărfurilor Iulie Lats August lats<br />
Materii prime și semi-fabricate, din care: 137 115 36 470<br />
Blănuri, din care: 2550 7412<br />
Miel 2550 -<br />
Caracul - 7412<br />
Sămânță floarea soarelui 1821 -<br />
Semințe diverse 16 -<br />
Petrol 132 327 -<br />
Benzină 399 29 058<br />
Totalul importului 137 113 36 470<br />
2. Exportul Letoniei în România<br />
Numele mărfurilor Iulie Lats August Lats<br />
Produse fabricate<br />
8001 175 310<br />
din care:<br />
Galoși 7259 71 596<br />
Încălțăminte în cauciuc 737 103 711<br />
Colete poștale 5 3<br />
Total exportului 8001 175 310<br />
1<br />
Termen folosit în sensul de înțelegere.<br />
2<br />
În text, participarea.
206 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
În acest moment firma letonă „Quadrat” depune mari insistențe pentru a ajunge la o<br />
înțelegere cu Ministerul Industriei din București, pe baza căreia va putea exporta în România<br />
încălțăminte de cauciuc pentru suma de 25 milioane lei, în schimbul unui import de petrol<br />
pentru o sumă echivalentă. Dat fiind regimul actual de restricții și prohibiții din Letonia<br />
schimbul pe bază de compensație pare singurul apt de a înviora raporturile economice între<br />
cele două țări.<br />
Regimul actual al schimburilor ruso-letone (lipsa unei convenții comerciale, aplicarea<br />
tarifului maximal) creează pentru plasamentul petrolului român o situație extrem de<br />
favorabilă, trecătoare probabil, de care ar trebui neapărat profitat. Cucerirea acestui nou<br />
debușeu ar merita poate chiar unele sacrificii momentane.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 362-369.<br />
80. Monthly Report no. 491 (September 1933) of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of<br />
Romania in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania<br />
Nicolae Titulescu, 2 nd October 1933<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to summarize below, for September 1933, <strong>the</strong> situation and facts<br />
concerning Latvia’s domestic and foreign policy.<br />
a. Domestic policy<br />
It is known that towards <strong>the</strong> end of August <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party acquired – with<br />
<strong>the</strong> help of Communist deputies – <strong>the</strong> number of parliamentary signatures necessary for <strong>the</strong><br />
summoning of an extraordinary session of Saeima. The Latvian Parliament – summoned as<br />
described – has still rejected <strong>the</strong> socialists’ request to take severe measures against <strong>the</strong><br />
organisations of <strong>the</strong> far right. The injudicious campaign of <strong>the</strong> left wing against <strong>the</strong>se<br />
organisations has provided <strong>the</strong> Government with <strong>the</strong> opportunity to close <strong>the</strong> SSS club, a<br />
large sports organisation of <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party – apparently - intended to offer to<br />
young workers <strong>the</strong> tactical knowledge necessary to a good revolutionaryy. In exchange, <strong>the</strong><br />
so-called fascist society “Pērkonkrusts”, which was accused of having a secret anti-democratic<br />
activity and which was temporarily closed by <strong>the</strong> Government as a result of left wing’s<br />
pressures, received after a short time, from <strong>the</strong> court, <strong>the</strong> license for operation.<br />
The failure of <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party is justified; its recent alliance with <strong>the</strong><br />
communists has triggered <strong>the</strong> alarm of public opinion and <strong>the</strong> harmonization of bourgeois<br />
parties, except for <strong>the</strong> group of Democratic centre (left-wing centre), whose elective<br />
patrimony represented by <strong>the</strong> encouragement of <strong>the</strong> anti-German feelings of <strong>the</strong> population,<br />
is currently in alliance with <strong>the</strong> socialists.<br />
It can be noticed that in <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned session of <strong>the</strong> Saeima, <strong>the</strong> Polish deputies<br />
have undoubtedly voted at Warsaw’s advice, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> communists and socialists.<br />
This fact can be explained by Poland’s fear that a possible installation of a far right<br />
Government in Riga might entail not only <strong>the</strong> German-Latvian reconciliation, but also more<br />
difficulties regarding <strong>the</strong> Russian-Baltic reconciliation.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> parliamentary defeat, <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party organized in various cities<br />
protest meetings, sometimes followed by street movements which were immediately<br />
repressed by <strong>the</strong> police. The attempt to camouflage a re-foundation of <strong>the</strong> SSS club, by<br />
infiltrating its members in <strong>the</strong> groups of ano<strong>the</strong>r socialist sports society (Labour and Sports)<br />
had also been prevented by <strong>the</strong> Government.
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The unexpectedly dynamic attitude of Riga Government is partly explained by <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
it felt that popular sympathies in <strong>the</strong>se countries are increasingly swayed towards an<br />
authoritarian policy, it does not want to be outrun by this new and strong tide; <strong>the</strong> bourgeois<br />
parties – most of <strong>the</strong>m – are happy to notice <strong>the</strong> weakening of <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party<br />
whose constant pressure has been exerted on all Governments since foundation of <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
State.<br />
The cohesion of this party – perfect until now – seems to be threatened by an internal<br />
split; indeed, <strong>the</strong> far left wing has been lately consolidating to <strong>the</strong> detriment of moderate<br />
elements. Its leader, Mr. Menders 1 , exercises a demagogical activity within <strong>the</strong> party, which is<br />
visibly inspired by Moscow. The former social-democratic leaders, Mr. Cielēns (<strong>the</strong> current<br />
Minister of Latvia in Paris), Mr. Kalniņš 2 (President of Saeima) etc. who, despite all <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
<strong>the</strong>oretical beliefs, have a certain patriotism which cannot be contested, reluctantly noticed<br />
<strong>the</strong> new guidelines that extremists attempt to spread in <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party. The<br />
echoes of internal dissensions have reached <strong>the</strong> public, a fact which greatly contributed to <strong>the</strong><br />
weakening of <strong>the</strong> party’s prestige.<br />
The campaign against Germany represents <strong>the</strong> main subject of socialist newspapers.<br />
Lately, <strong>the</strong> paper ”Socialdemokrats” has even frantically attacked Mr. Martius, <strong>the</strong> Minister of<br />
Germany in Riga, accusing him of financially supporting fascist organisations from Latvia.<br />
The socialists’ claims are not based on any actual fact. The “fascist” organisations in Latvia are<br />
by definition ultra-nationalist and, in <strong>the</strong>ir exercising <strong>the</strong>ir faith, <strong>the</strong> leaders have manifested<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> German minority population such hostile feelings that <strong>the</strong>y seem incompatible<br />
with <strong>the</strong> alleged support to <strong>the</strong> Reich’s legation.<br />
b. The domestic economic and financial situation.<br />
An economic conference of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) took place in Riga<br />
in September. This conference brought into discussion measures for controlling <strong>the</strong><br />
economic crisis as well as <strong>the</strong> coordination of economic policy of <strong>the</strong> three Baltic States. All<br />
delegates formulated statements in favour of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Customs Union, a project which has<br />
recurred for years in economic debates of <strong>the</strong>se lands, without seriously approaching its<br />
realisation.<br />
The following resolutions were voted unanimously:<br />
1) The assignment of a commission in charge for <strong>the</strong> survey of means for <strong>the</strong> realisation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Customs union;<br />
2) “The Baltic clause” shall be introduced in all Trade Treaties concluded by <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States with o<strong>the</strong>r countries.<br />
The conference also expressed <strong>the</strong> wish to see in <strong>the</strong> future <strong>the</strong> state’s intervention in <strong>the</strong><br />
private economy reduced to a minimum.<br />
The negotiations for a Lithuanian-Latvian Trade Treaty started on September 25 th . An<br />
announcement was made, without much persuasion, that delegates of both states would lead<br />
<strong>the</strong> negotiations in <strong>the</strong> spirit of <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned economic Conference.<br />
The agrarian party insistently demands that <strong>the</strong> Government does not suppress <strong>the</strong><br />
restrictive measures regarding foreign trade; in <strong>the</strong>ir opinion, <strong>the</strong> current exchange rate of <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Fricis Menders (1885 - 1971) was a Latvian left-wing politician who later became anti-Soviet dissident.<br />
2<br />
Pauls Kalniņš (1872-1945) was a Latvian doctor and left-wing politician, Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Saeima (1925-1934).
208 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
lat must be supported at any cost. This exceptional attitude of farmers is explained by <strong>the</strong> fact<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Latvian state is <strong>the</strong> main purchaser of agricultural products, based on current laws.<br />
The Latvian Government declares upon every occasion, as it did at <strong>the</strong> Economic<br />
Conference in London, that toge<strong>the</strong>r with agrarian states <strong>the</strong>y will try to achieve an<br />
improvement in <strong>the</strong> general regime of contingencies and prohibitions. While expecting this<br />
improvement, we can note that <strong>the</strong> economic policy of Latvia is entirely based precisely on<br />
<strong>the</strong> abovementioned restrictions.<br />
c. Special issues<br />
The economic <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> USSR were determined in <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Soviet Trade<br />
Treaty of concluded in 1927. This treaty stipulated: increasing development of economic<br />
exchanges between <strong>the</strong> two countries; mutual award of very low customs duties; <strong>the</strong> Soviets<br />
were to import goods from Latvia in <strong>the</strong> amount of Lat 40 millions. A special section<br />
stipulated that goods that transited territories of <strong>the</strong> two countries should be exempted of<br />
import, export and transit charges. It is obvious that this provision was favourable for <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviets which used to ship a part of <strong>the</strong>ir goods via Libau. This treaty was carried out in good<br />
faith by <strong>the</strong> Soviets only in <strong>the</strong> first year; during <strong>the</strong> following years <strong>the</strong> Soviet orders in Latvia<br />
had progressively decreased until last year when <strong>the</strong> Union of Soviet Socialist Republics<br />
denounced <strong>the</strong> treaty in question.<br />
The table below specifies <strong>the</strong> commercial <strong>relations</strong> between Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Union of<br />
Soviet Socialist Republics:<br />
Imports Exports Balance<br />
Years 1000 Lat % of all imports 1000 Lat % of all exports 1000 Lat<br />
1927 18319 7,33 3783 1,70 - 14536<br />
1928 17522 5,70 23598 8,90 + 6076<br />
1929 17022 4,70 40079 14,03 + 23057<br />
1930 17601 3,94 35118 14,17 + 17517<br />
1931 16539 9,34 33101 20,21 + 16562<br />
1932 8506 10,06 14222 14,73 + 5716<br />
1933<br />
First half<br />
2118 5,42 631 1,70 - 1487<br />
The USSR exports to Latvia wheat, sugar, gasoline, oil, gas, fruits, cotton and tobacco, and<br />
Latvia exports to <strong>the</strong> Union of Soviet Socialist Republics railway wagons, fur and lea<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
agricultural machines, cotton and wool fabrics, paper, etc. In 1932 78% of <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
products exported to <strong>the</strong> USSR were wagons. Given that over <strong>the</strong> last years Moscow has<br />
focused its efforts on <strong>the</strong> achievement of <strong>the</strong> five-year plan, it has given up imports of Latvian<br />
goods in large quantities. This breach of <strong>the</strong> treaty has entailed serious disturbances in<br />
Latvian economy.<br />
In order to encourage exports to <strong>the</strong> USSR, in 1931 <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government drafted a law<br />
of state “guarantees”. Based on this law, <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Finances had <strong>the</strong> right to<br />
grant guarantees to <strong>the</strong> trade houses which supplied exports to <strong>the</strong> USSR. The purpose of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se guarantees was to facilitate <strong>the</strong> discount of Soviet treaties. Latvian goods were<br />
considered those goods for whose production 30% Latvian raw materials and workforce were<br />
used. The total amount of <strong>the</strong>se guarantees should not exceed, at a certain point, <strong>the</strong> total of
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 209<br />
Lat 10 million. The guarantee was to be granted for a period of 12 months at <strong>the</strong> most. The<br />
state took 2% 1 of <strong>the</strong> amount guaranteed. If <strong>the</strong> guaranteed Soviet export policy was<br />
contested and not paid during <strong>the</strong> month following contestation, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Finance<br />
paid <strong>the</strong> amount in question from <strong>the</strong> guarantee insurance fund; if this fund was insufficient,<br />
<strong>the</strong> guarantee could be temporarily paid from <strong>the</strong> State’s reserve funds.<br />
4. External policy<br />
It is known that a few months ago <strong>the</strong> Latvian social-democracy, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong><br />
German left-wing, succeeded in causing turbulences in German-Latvian <strong>relations</strong>. It seems<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Riga Government, that has gradually escaped from <strong>the</strong> pressure of <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
socialism, currently pursues a normalization of <strong>the</strong>se <strong>relations</strong>.<br />
Mr. Herriot’s visit to Riga does not seem to have had <strong>the</strong> effect expected by its initiators.<br />
His artificial enthusiasm for <strong>the</strong> results obtained by <strong>the</strong> communist regime was received here<br />
with polite irony and it did not cause any impression on certain circles which had already<br />
been informed in detail. Whatever <strong>the</strong> justification, cooperation with <strong>the</strong> Soviets is not<br />
attractive to a country that had already seen <strong>the</strong> red army on its territory.<br />
The Latvian socialism has interpreted Mr. Herriot’s journey to <strong>the</strong> USSR and his visit to<br />
Riga as <strong>the</strong> premises of Latvia’s rally to an anti-Hitlerite crusade, and <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government<br />
wanted to strongly deny rumours about “Latvia’s cooperation with any political group<br />
directed against o<strong>the</strong>r states”<br />
The issue of revision.<br />
The danger incurred by <strong>the</strong> debate of this issue is intensively and unanimously felt in<br />
Latvia. The general feeling in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States is that once <strong>the</strong> principle of revision is<br />
approved, among all currently contested borders, <strong>the</strong> German-Polish border would be <strong>the</strong><br />
most threatened and that any change, accepted or not, to <strong>the</strong>se borders would have<br />
extremely serious consequences for <strong>the</strong> integrity of <strong>the</strong>se countries’ territory and even for<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir national independence.<br />
The issue of disarmament.<br />
Now is <strong>the</strong> time to remind you that conclusion of non-aggression pacts with <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />
has entirely changed <strong>the</strong> Baltic States’ position on this issue. The exception of Soviet<br />
proximity is and will be out of <strong>the</strong> question.<br />
The Latvian political circles, as well as <strong>the</strong> military bodies, receive with a grain of salt <strong>the</strong><br />
disarmament activities which <strong>the</strong>y ultimately consider to be an opportunity for weakening<br />
<strong>the</strong> powers that provide <strong>the</strong> peace. “We do not believe in disarmament, it’s not up to us” an<br />
essential factor in <strong>the</strong> Latvian external policy told me a few months ago.<br />
The issue of war debts.<br />
Latvia had paid its instalment from <strong>the</strong> debt to <strong>the</strong> United States in December, hoping to<br />
contract a loan on <strong>the</strong> American market. The treaties for this purpose had been entered into<br />
force for one year. Due to <strong>the</strong> fact that its action did not persuade American financial circles<br />
to vest capitals in a little-known country, upon payment of last instalment <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
Government was confined to a nominal payment, in <strong>the</strong> same proportion as England has<br />
made its own.<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong> following instalment, Latvia awaits <strong>the</strong> decision of o<strong>the</strong>r states.<br />
The issue of minorities.<br />
1<br />
Possible, unclear.
210 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
The former Ministry of Training in Riga had taken disciplinary actions against directors of<br />
German schools in Latvia as <strong>the</strong>y celebrated, in schools, <strong>the</strong> anniversary of <strong>the</strong> day when <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic legions toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Latvian troops retook Riga from Bolshevik domination. The<br />
school directors have appealed to <strong>the</strong> Senate (The Supreme Court in Latvia) against <strong>the</strong>se<br />
measures and it is not excluded that, after <strong>the</strong> recent reactions of public opinion, <strong>the</strong><br />
punishments decided by Mr. Ķeniņš 1 before his departure shall be reported or mitigated.<br />
Issues regarding <strong>the</strong> League of Nations<br />
Interviewed upon his departure to Geneva, Mr. Salnais, <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs, declared that “past experiences showed that reunions of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations were<br />
not always successful, but <strong>the</strong> small states are still particularly forced to attend <strong>the</strong>se<br />
conferences and prevented from taking powers in <strong>the</strong>ir own hands. We should not forget that<br />
without worldwide opinion, without international solidarity of <strong>the</strong> small states, such states<br />
would have to suffer due to misunderstandings between <strong>the</strong> great powers. From this point of<br />
view, Latvia must defend <strong>the</strong> prestige of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations with all forces”.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> same occasion, Mr. Salnais declared that he would try to obtain, for <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States, a seat in <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations during <strong>the</strong> next elections. I believe that<br />
he knows about an agreement in this respect which has occurred only between Latvia and<br />
Estonia. It is questionable if Finland is ever going to accept to participate in a ruling 2<br />
established only between <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
Issues regarding international meetings<br />
The Conference in Sinaia, as well as all o<strong>the</strong>r actions of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente were monitored<br />
with great attention and sympathy. The moderate spirits and, in general, all factors currently<br />
responsible would prefer <strong>the</strong> reconciliation of <strong>the</strong> group of Baltic States, based on <strong>the</strong> Little<br />
Entente model and this international body over <strong>the</strong> dilemma which is seen at present – <strong>the</strong><br />
relative breach or obvious juxtaposition 3 of French-Russian-Polish group. The common<br />
feature of <strong>the</strong>se two groups cannot be o<strong>the</strong>r than Poland.<br />
e. Relations with Romania<br />
Latvia exports to Romania mainly rubber footwear (galoshes, snow-boots etc.), and it has<br />
also exported (ultramarine) dies in small quantities.<br />
Romanian exports to Latvia are represented almost exclusively by oil.<br />
In 1932 Latvia imported Romanian goods in a total amount of Lats 243 257. The most part<br />
of such imports was represented by oil (Lats 137 440), gas (Lats 72 246), lamb furs (Lats 11<br />
899). In <strong>the</strong> same year <strong>the</strong> Latvian exports to Romania reached <strong>the</strong> amount of Lats 1 286 068.<br />
The most part of such exports was represented by rubber footwear (Lats 1 089 200) and dies,<br />
especially blue ultramarine (Lats 85 424).<br />
The situation of economic <strong>relations</strong> between Latvia and Romania in July and August is <strong>the</strong><br />
following:<br />
1<br />
Atis Ķeniņš (1874-1961) was a Latvian lawyer, professor and politician. A former Minister of Education and Justice.<br />
He held a courageous act of opposition to <strong>the</strong> Soviet occupation of his country, was arrested on several occasions.<br />
2<br />
Term used with <strong>the</strong> meaning of agreement.<br />
3<br />
In <strong>the</strong> text, participation.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 211<br />
1. Romanian imports to Latvia<br />
Goods July Lats August lats<br />
Raw materials and semi-made products, of which: 137 115 36 470<br />
Furs, of which: 2550 7412<br />
Lamb 2550 -<br />
Karakul - 7412<br />
Sunflower seeds 1821 -<br />
Various seeds 16 -<br />
Oil 132 327 -<br />
Gasoline 399 29 058<br />
Total imports 137 113 36 470<br />
2. Latvian exports to Romania<br />
Goods<br />
July<br />
Lats<br />
August<br />
Lats<br />
Ready-made products<br />
8001 175 310<br />
of which:<br />
Galoshes 7259 71 596<br />
Rubber footwear 737 103 711<br />
Mail parcels 5 3<br />
Total exports 8001 175 310<br />
At present, <strong>the</strong> Latvian company “Quadrat” attempts to reach an agreement with <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Industry in Bucharest, based on which it could export rubber footwear in<br />
Romania for <strong>the</strong> amount of lei 25 million in exchange of an oil import for a corresponding<br />
amount. Due to <strong>the</strong> current regime of restrictions and prohibitions in Latvia, <strong>the</strong> exchange<br />
based on compensation seems to be <strong>the</strong> only appropriate trade in order to revive economic<br />
<strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two countries.<br />
The current regime of <strong>the</strong> Russian-Latvian exchanges (<strong>the</strong> lack of a trade convention, <strong>the</strong><br />
application of maximum tax) creates for <strong>the</strong> Romanian oil market an extremely favourable,<br />
and probably temporary, situation, which should be necessarily capitalized on. The conquest<br />
of a new market would justify even certain momentary sacrifices.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 362-369.<br />
81. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al României la Riga<br />
Th. Scortzescu nr. 541 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 30 octombrie 1933<br />
Un nou ministru al U.R.S.S. în Riga<br />
Interviu acordat de domnia sa presei letone.<br />
Drept urmare la telegrama mea nr. 537.<br />
Am onoarea a aduce la cunoștința Excelenței Voastre sosirea în Riga a noului Ministru al<br />
Sovietelor în Letonia, Domnul Brodovski. Domnia sa este de mult timp în serviciul<br />
Comisariatului Afacerilor Străine. A funcționat mai mulți ani în gradul de Consilier pe lângă<br />
ambasada sovietică din Berlin, iar în ultimul timp se găsea la Harkov ca reprezentant al<br />
guvernului din Moscova.
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Abia sosit din Moscova, Dl. Brodovski a convocat pe reprezentanții presei din Riga, cărora<br />
le-a acordat un interviu, pe care îl trimit aici alăturat în traducere după ziarele „Latvis” și<br />
„Riga am Sonntag”.<br />
Cele dintâi întrebări ale ziariștilor se referă la posibilitatea încheierii unui tratat de comerț<br />
letono-sovietic.<br />
Se știe că în urma semnării pactului de neagresiune cu Letonia, Moscova nu mai acordă<br />
acestui mic stat baltic un interes politic suficient pentru a-i acorda avantajele economice pe<br />
care guvernul din Riga spera să le obțină prin încheierea unui nou tratat de comerț. Letonia<br />
se plânge mai ales că Sovietele au încetat de un an să utilizeze porturile letone pentru<br />
exportul mărfurilor rusești, lipsind-o astfel – în favoarea Lituaniei – de beneficii importante.<br />
Astăzi, când recenta mișcare politică spre dreapta din statele baltice începe să neliniștească<br />
Moscova, reprezentantul Sovietelor lasă să se întrevadă posibilitatea unei încheieri apropiate<br />
a unui tratat de comerț între cele două țări.<br />
Ziariștii letoni au întrebat apoi pe Ministrul Sovietelor dacă crede că existența ziarului<br />
„Lupta comunistă”, publicat în Moscova de către comuniștii letoni, poate contribui la<br />
îmbunătățirea relațiilor letono-sovietice. Ministrul U.R.S.S a reproșat, la rândul său, presei<br />
letone publicarea știrilor răuvoitoare Sovietelor, știri fabricate – pretinde Domnia sa – în Riga<br />
pentru uzul presei mondiale. Reproșul Domnului Brodovski era îndreptat în special împotriva<br />
ziarului „Segodnia” care se bucură de prețioase izvoare de informații privitoare la U.R.S.S și al<br />
cărui reprezentant nu a fost invitat de Domnia sa cu ocazia acestui interviu.<br />
Vorbind despre relațiile germano-sovietice, Domnul Brodovski nu a negat răceala actuală<br />
dintre Moscova și Berlin, arătând că ea ar fi datorită „tendințelor anexioniste ale Germaniei față<br />
de Europa Orientală și de U.R.S.S”. Se poate ghici că Dl. Brodovski va căuta să convingă<br />
guvernul din Riga că pentru Statele baltice și pentru Soviete există un singur dușman:<br />
Germania.<br />
Comentând reluarea relațiilor dintre Statele Unite și U.R.S.S., Domnia sa a spus că acest<br />
fapt va diminua tendințele războinice ale Japoniei.<br />
Vorbind despre politica externă pacifică a U.R.S.S., Domnia sa a dat drept exemplu<br />
îmbunătățirea relațiilor româno-sovietice, adăugând că „deși Sovietele nu recunosc<br />
pretențiile României asupra Basarabiei, totuși s-a ajuns la încheierea unui acord.”<br />
Domnia sa a spus apoi că Sovietele nu doresc să atace Japonia (fapt care, fie zis în treacăt,<br />
ziariștii nu-l puneau în îndoială), citând totodată însă cuvintele lui Stalin: „Noi nu vrem un<br />
centimetru de pământ străin, dar nici nu vom ceda nimănui un centimetru din pământul<br />
nostru.”<br />
Domnul Brodovski a vorbit apoi despre progresele industriei și despre prosperitatea<br />
agriculturii în U.R.S.S., plângându-se totuși că belșugul de grâu complică chestiunea<br />
transporturilor. După ce a trebuit să suporte unele chestiuni ironice ale ziariștilor privitoare<br />
la această abundență de cereale, Domnia sa a vorbit despre Komintern. „Kominternul, a<br />
afirmat Domnia sa, nu are nici un fel de legătură cu guvernul Sovietelor”, afirmație care nu a<br />
surprins pe nimeni, atitudinea oficială a Moscovei în această chestiune fiind de mult timp<br />
cunoscută.<br />
Răspunzând ultimei chestiuni, Dl. Brodovski s-a pronunțat împotriva unui eventual bloc al<br />
Statelor Baltice, care – crede Domnia sa – nu ar putea fi îndreptat decât împotriva Sovietelor,<br />
sugerând totuși că U.R.S.S. ar accepta această formațiune politică dacă ar participa la ea.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 213<br />
Este evident că formarea unui bloc baltic – fie chiar sub egida Poloniei – nu ar putea<br />
conveni Sovietelor care preferă a avea în vecinătatea lor în aceste ținuturi un șirag de state<br />
mărunte și lipsite de rezistență. De la înființarea acestor state politica Sovietelor a consistat în<br />
tendința – uneori încoronată de succes – de a le diviza, făgăduindu-le și acordându-le pe rând<br />
diverse avantaje economice, care în practică s-au dovedit adesea iluzorii. Ușurința de a le<br />
manevra ar scădea prin reunirea acestor țărișoare într-o confederație trainică. Bineînțeles că<br />
participarea eventuală a Sovietelor la o asemenea confederație – astfel precum o urează Dl.<br />
Brodovski în interviul său – ar însemna prin gravele ei consecințe economice și politice,<br />
redobândirea pentru U.R.S.S a unui acces la Marea Baltică, acces la care ea nu a renunțat<br />
decât în mod temporar.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, filele 234-237.<br />
81. Diplomatic Report no. 541 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Romania in<br />
Riga Th. Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu,<br />
30 th October 1933<br />
A new USSR Minister to Riga<br />
Interview taken by Latvian press to His Excellency<br />
Following my telegram no. 537.<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> hour to inform Your Excellency about <strong>the</strong> arrival in Riga of <strong>the</strong> new Minister of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviets to Latvia, Mr. Brodovski. His Excellency has been for a long time in <strong>the</strong> service of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Foreign Affairs Commissariat. He has been for many years Counsellor attached to <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet Embassy in Berlin, and lately he has been assigned to Kharkov as representative of <strong>the</strong><br />
Moscow Government.<br />
As soon as he arrived from Moscow, Mr. Brodovski summoned <strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>the</strong><br />
Riga press to give an interview, which I shall annex in translation as taken from <strong>the</strong> papers<br />
“Latvis” and “Riga am Sonntag”.<br />
The first questions of <strong>the</strong> journalists referred to <strong>the</strong> possibility of concluding a Latvian-<br />
Soviet trade treaty.<br />
It is known that after signing <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact with Latvia, Moscow does not give<br />
enough political interest to this small Baltic state, in order to award <strong>the</strong> economic advantages<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Riga Government hoped to obtain based on <strong>the</strong> conclusion of a new trade treaty.<br />
Latvia especially complains that <strong>the</strong> Soviets have ceased for one year to use Latvian harbours<br />
for <strong>the</strong> export of Russian goods, thus taking away important benefits – in Lithuania’s favour.<br />
Nowadays, when <strong>the</strong> recent political movement in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States towards <strong>the</strong> right wing<br />
has begun to alarm Moscow, <strong>the</strong> Soviets’ representative can see, in <strong>the</strong> near future, <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility to conclude a trade treaty between <strong>the</strong> two countries.<br />
The Latvian journalists <strong>the</strong>n asked <strong>the</strong> Minister of <strong>the</strong> Soviets if he thinks that <strong>the</strong><br />
existence of <strong>the</strong> newspaper “The Communist Struggle”, published in Moscow by Latvian<br />
communists, may contribute to an improvement of <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Soviet <strong>relations</strong>. In turn, <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of <strong>the</strong> Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has reproached to <strong>the</strong> Latvian press <strong>the</strong><br />
publishing of certain malevolent news against <strong>the</strong> Soviets, fabrications – claims His<br />
Excellency – made in Riga for <strong>the</strong> use of worldwide press. Mr. Brodovski’s reproach was<br />
directed especially against “Segodnia”, which has precious information sources regarding <strong>the</strong>
214 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
USSR and whose representative had not been invited by His Excellency on <strong>the</strong> occasion of<br />
this interview.<br />
While talking about <strong>the</strong> German-Soviet <strong>relations</strong>, Mr. Brodovski did not deny <strong>the</strong> current<br />
coldness between Moscow and Berlin, showing that it was due to “Germany’s tendencies of<br />
annexation against Eastern Europe and <strong>the</strong> USSR.” It can be supposed that Mr. Brodovski<br />
shall try to convince <strong>the</strong> Riga Government that both <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> Soviets have<br />
only one common enemy: Germany.<br />
Commenting on <strong>the</strong> revival of <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> United States and <strong>the</strong> U.S.S.R., His<br />
Excellency said that this would mitigate <strong>the</strong> Japan’s war tendencies.<br />
While talking on <strong>the</strong> pacifistic external policy of <strong>the</strong> USSR, His Excellency gave as example<br />
<strong>the</strong> improvement of Romanian-Soviet <strong>relations</strong>, adding that “although <strong>the</strong> Soviets do not<br />
recognize Romania’s claims on Bessarabia, <strong>the</strong> conclusion of <strong>the</strong> agreement has still been<br />
reached.”<br />
His Excellency <strong>the</strong>n mentioned that <strong>the</strong> Soviets do not wish to attack Japan (a fact that<br />
journalists had not doubt about), but quoting at <strong>the</strong> same time Stalin’s words: “We do not<br />
want a single foot of foreign territory; but of our territory we shall not surrender a single inch<br />
to anyone”.<br />
Mr. Brodovski <strong>the</strong>n talked about <strong>the</strong> progresses of industry and <strong>the</strong> prosperity of<br />
agriculture in <strong>the</strong> USSR, complaining that <strong>the</strong> abundance of wheat troubles transportations.<br />
After having to bear certain ironic remarks from <strong>the</strong> journalists regarding this abundance of<br />
cereals, His Excellency spoke about Komintern. “The Komintern, His Excellency stated, has<br />
no connections with <strong>the</strong> Soviets Government”, a statement that surprised no one, <strong>the</strong> official<br />
position of Moscow on this matter being well-known for a long time.<br />
Answering to <strong>the</strong> last question, Mr. Brodovski said he was against an eventual block of <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States which – His Excellency believed - could only be opposed to <strong>the</strong> Soviets, also<br />
suggesting that <strong>the</strong> U.S.S.R would accept this political group if it were a part of it.<br />
It is obvious that foundation of a Baltic block – even under <strong>the</strong> aegis of Poland – would<br />
not serve <strong>the</strong> Soviets’ purpose, as it would ra<strong>the</strong>r have in <strong>the</strong>ir proximity a series of small<br />
states lacking in strength. Since <strong>the</strong> foundation of <strong>the</strong>se states, <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> Soviets was<br />
characterized by – sometimes successful – attempts to divide <strong>the</strong>m, promising and granting<br />
<strong>the</strong>m various economic advantages in turns, which often proved misleading in practice. The<br />
ease of such manipulation would be reduced based on <strong>the</strong> reunion of such small countries in<br />
a durable confederation. Of course, a possible participation of <strong>the</strong> Soviets to such<br />
confederation – as desired by Mr. Brodovski in his interview – would allow, given its serious<br />
economic and political consequences, reclamation by <strong>the</strong> USSR of access to <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, an<br />
access which it gave up only temporarily.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940, USSR, vol. 9, s. 234-237.<br />
82. Raportul lunar (octombrie 1933) al însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al<br />
României la Riga Th. Scortzescu nr. 539 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României<br />
Nicolae Titulescu, 1 noiembrie 1933<br />
Am onoarea a rezuma mai jos pentru luna octombrie 1933 situația și faptele relative la<br />
politica internă și externă a Letoniei:
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 215<br />
a. Politica internă<br />
Izbânda obținută în Estonia de gruparea Foștilor Combatanți cu ocazia plebiscitului privitor<br />
la modificarea constituției nu a lipsit de a da un nou impuls mișcării „fasciste” letone. Grupul<br />
naționalist „Pērkonkrusts” câștigă din ce în ce mai multe simpatii. Însăși coaliția<br />
guvernamentală din Riga, în dorința de a nu se lăsa depășită de mișcarea populară, și-a<br />
manifestat, în ultimul timp în repetate rânduri, voința de a impune o politică de autoritate.<br />
Începând cu unele măsuri de ordine (interzicerea miting-urilor socialiste, interzicerea pentru<br />
grupările politice de a purta uniforme, cenzura manifestelor etc.) primite cu simpatie de opinia<br />
publică, Guvernul se simte astăzi în măsură de a cere îndepărtarea deputaților comuniști din<br />
Saeima. Menționez că deși existența unui partid comunist este interzisă prin lege, de fapt acest<br />
partid a continuat să existe sub denumirea de: „Partidul țăranilor și al micilor lucrători”.<br />
Toleranța pe care guvernele succesive din Riga au arătat-o ani de zile față de acest partid se<br />
explică mai ales printr-o manevră de politică internă a partidelor burgheze. Interzicerea<br />
partidului comunist adusese partidului social-democrat – în alegerile parlamentare – un<br />
important câștig de mandate grație voturilor comuniștilor. Astfel că numeroși deputați social<br />
democrați puteau cu ușurință, printr-o alianță momentană cu un grup burghez nemulțumit, să<br />
obțină majoritatea necesară pentru a răsturna guvernul. Teama ca jocul parlamentar să aducă<br />
încă o dată la cârma statului un guvern social-democrat (ca în 1927) a decis partidele burgheze<br />
să tolereze și chiar să protejeze reînvierea camuflată a partidului comunist. De la înființarea așazisului<br />
partid al „Țăranilor și al micilor lucrători” – care a absorbit o parte din aripa extremă<br />
stângă a partidului social-democrat – numărul deputaților social-democrați a scăzut mereu.<br />
Astăzi când partidul social-democrat pierde pe zi ce trece din popularitate, formarea unui<br />
guvern socialist nu mai apare partidelor burgheze ca o primejdie iminentă. Suprimarea de fapt a<br />
partidului comunist nu va mai aduce partidului social-democrat – crede guvernul – un succes<br />
important în viitoarele alegeri. Guvernul a cerut Saeimei să se pronunțe asupra ridicării<br />
imunității parlamentare a deputaților comuniști care urmează să fie dați în judecată pentru<br />
crimă de înaltă trădare (instigare la rebeliune în armată) pedepsită în Letonia cu muncă silnică.<br />
În cazul probabil când Saeima va aproba ridicarea imunității parlamentare, nu este exclus ca<br />
zișii deputați să fugă în Rusia – fără a fi împiedicați de guvern – astfel precum au mai făcut acum<br />
câțiva ani, în cazuri similare, doi deputați comuniști.<br />
Domnul Ulmanis, șeful partidului agrar, a prezentat Saeimei un proiect de modificare a<br />
constituției, care reproduce în liniile sale generale modificările aduse constituției estoniene prin<br />
recentul plebiscit. Prin proiectul Domnului Ulmanis președintele urmează să fie ales pe timp de<br />
cinci ani, prin sufragiu direct de către popor. El este împuternicit cu întinse prerogative: dreptul<br />
de a dizolva Parlamentul, de a emite decrete, de a refuza punerea în vigoare a legilor votate de<br />
parlament etc. Numărul deputaților va fi redus la cincizeci. Domnul Ulmanis, fost Președinte al<br />
Consiliului de Miniștri, este șeful unui puternic partid burghez care face parte din actuala<br />
coaliție guvernamentală. Vechi partizan al unei politici de autoritate, Domnia sa pare a fi ales<br />
un moment oportun pentru a cere adeziunea opiniei publice, care urmărește cu interes, și în<br />
parte cu simpatie, mișcarea așa-zisă fascistă din Estonia.<br />
Domnul Bļodnieks 1 , actual Prim-ministru și șeful partidului țăranilor împroprietăriți și-a<br />
manifestat poziția de a susține proiectul Domnului Ulmanis. De asemenea, o mare parte din<br />
grupările politice, fie din opportunism, fie din convingere s-au declarat favorabile zisei<br />
1<br />
Ādolfs Bļodnieks (1889-1962) a fost un politician leton cu vederi agrariene, Prim Ministru al Letoniei (1933-1934).
216 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
modificări a constituției. Dacă totuși în urma opoziției deputaților social-democrați, evrei etc.<br />
proiectul în chestiune nu va reuni în Saeima cele 2/3 de voturi necesare pentru a fi luat în<br />
considerație, el urmează a fi supus aprecierii poporului care se va pronunța pe cale de plebiscit.<br />
b. Situația economică și financiară internă<br />
Guvernul leton a luat măsuri severe pentru a evita introducerea prin contrabandă a<br />
cerealelor în Letonia. Această contrabandă se dezvoltase considerabil în ultimul timp din<br />
cauză că în Letonia, unde prin legile în vigoare statul este principalul cumpărător al<br />
produselor agricole, prețurile cerealelor sunt mai ridicate ca în alte țări.<br />
Presa letonă înregistrează cu amărăciune tărăgănarea negocierilor începute între Letonia<br />
și Lituania în vederea semnării unui Tratat de comerț. Cercurile industriale letone sunt în<br />
special decepționate de refuzul Lituaniei de a acorda o scădere a taxelor vamale pentru<br />
încălțămintea de cauciuc și produsele metalurgice letone.<br />
c. Chestiuni speciale<br />
Partidul social-democrat a redactat un proiect de lege privitor la „asigurarea bătrâneții,<br />
invalidității și șomajului” pe care vrea să-l supună unui plebiscit. Partidele burgheze, deși nu<br />
sunt potrivnice în principiu unui asemenea proiect, susțin că social-democrații i-au dat un<br />
caracter demagogic, introducând unele dispoziții cu totul inaplicabile. Pentru a putea fi supus<br />
plebiscitului, zisul proiect urmează a obține mai întâi semnăturile unei zecimi din numărul<br />
întreg al persoanelor care au dreptul de vot în Letonia.<br />
d. Politică externă<br />
Activitatea naționalistă a grupului „Pērkonkrusts” a stârnit oarecare nemulțumire la<br />
Moscova. Presa sovietică acuză actualul cabinet de a încuraja mișcarea fascistă letonă care ar<br />
fi organizată și subvenționată de către agenți secreți germani. Faptul că grupul<br />
„Pērkonkrusts” atacă – cu o pasiune șovină chiar – minoritatea germană din Letonia arată<br />
lipsa de temei a învinuirilor presei sovietice.<br />
Evenimentele politice din Letonia par a fi hotărât guvernul de la Moscova să trimită un<br />
moment mai degrabă un Ministru în Riga pentru a înlocui pe fostul Ministru Sviderski,<br />
decedat în iunie trecut. Abia sosit în Riga noul ministru sovietic, Dl. Brodovski, a dat a<br />
înțelege guvernului leton că Moscova este dispusă a încheia un nou Tratat de Comerț cu<br />
Letonia. Se știe că denunțarea de către U.R.S.S. a tratatului de comerț sovieto-leton – în 1932 –<br />
a lipsit o parte din uzinele letone de debușeul principal în vederea căruia fuseseră înzestrate.<br />
De altfel, modul în care Sovietele înțelegeau să execute stipulațiile zisului tratat devenise un<br />
mijloc de presiune constantă politică în mâinile Moscovei și izbutise doar să dezorganizeze<br />
industria letonă. De astă dată guvernul sovietic, neliniștit fără îndoială de mișcarea „fascistă”<br />
din Statele Baltice, încearcă să-și recâștige influența, lăsând să se întrezărească posibilitatea<br />
încheierii unui nou tratat de comerț cu Letonia.<br />
Chestiunea revizuirii.<br />
Lumea politică letonă continuă de a urmări cu atenție atitudinea străinătății față de<br />
curentul revizionist, înregistrând cu satisfacție toate actele <strong>diplomatic</strong>e destinate a întări<br />
poziția ordinii stabilite.<br />
Chestiunea dezarmării.<br />
Nimic nou nu a intervenit în atitudinea Letoniei, exprimată în buletinul lunar anterior.<br />
Chestiunea datoriilor de război.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 217<br />
Letonia, care cu ocazia ultimei rate făcuse o plată nominală imitând gestul Angliei, așteptă<br />
– în privința ratei viitoare – decizia celorlalte state.<br />
Chestiunea minorităților.<br />
Grupul „Pērkonkrusts” duce o campanie energică în favoarea introducerii dispoziției<br />
„Numerus Clausus” în Universitatea letonă. Această cerere pare a fi îndreptată în special împotriva<br />
studenților evrei al căror număr în unele facultăți depășește pe cel al studenților letoni.<br />
„Pērkonkrusts” cere, de asemenea, ca toate cursurile universitare să fie predate în limba<br />
letonă.<br />
Se știe că directorii școlilor germane din Letonia făcuseră apel la Senat (Tribunalul suprem<br />
în Letonia) împotriva pedepselor disciplinare la care fuseseră condamnați pentru că<br />
sărbătoriseră în școli aniversarea alungării bolșevicilor din Riga de către legiunile balte. Prin<br />
sentința sa Senatul a anulat toate aceste pedepse.<br />
Chestiuni în legătură cu Societatea Națiunilor<br />
La Ministerul Afacerilor Străine mi s-a spus că speranțele guvernului leton de a obține un<br />
loc în Consiliul Ligii Națiunilor pentru Statele Baltice – pe cale de rulement – nu au găsit la<br />
Geneva încurajarea dorită.<br />
Cu ocazia părăsirii Societății Națiunilor de către Germania, presa social-democrată letonă,<br />
făcându-se ecoul presei sovietice, interpretează gestul lui Hitler ca întâiul pas către realizarea<br />
unei politici imperialiste. Încercând a slăbi prestigiul Societății Națiunilor, Germania ar căuta<br />
să mărească importanța pactului celor patru Mari Puteri, lipsind micile state de sprijinul pe<br />
care-l puteau găsi la Geneva. Intențiile pacifiste pe care Hitler le arată Franței ar avea ca scop<br />
obținerea unei libertăți de acțiune în Orient. Statele baltice ar oferi, prin lipsa lor de<br />
rezistență, terenul cel mai propice expansiunii germane.<br />
Guvernul leton nu pare însă a crede în posibilitatea unei acțiuni militare din partea<br />
Germanei, izolată și acaparată de preocupări de ordin intern pentru mult timp. La întoarcerea<br />
sa din Geneva, Domnul Salnais, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine, a declarat de altfel presei că<br />
relațiile germano-letone s-au îmbunătățit în ultimul timp.<br />
Chestiuni în legătură cu întrunirile internaționale etc<br />
Întrevederea dintre Majestățile Lor Regele României și Regele Bulgariei 1 , activitatea<br />
pacificatoare a României în Orient sunt urmărite de lumea politică letonă cu interesul și<br />
simpatia pe care ea le acordă oricărei acțiuni <strong>diplomatic</strong>e destinate a diminua posibilitățile<br />
unei conflagrații viitoare. Letonia este convinsă că un eventual război în Europa ar fi greu de<br />
localizat actualmente și ar putea avea grave repercusiuni pentru independența Statelor<br />
Baltice.<br />
e. Raporturile cu România<br />
Situația raporturilor economice dintre Letonia și România pe luna septembrie este<br />
următoarea:<br />
1.Importul din România în Letonia<br />
Numele mărfurilor Kg lats<br />
Materii prime și semi-fabricate<br />
1 129 659 80 830<br />
din care:<br />
Blănuri (astrahan) 75 5796<br />
1<br />
Întâlnirea de pe Dunăre a celor doi suverani (30 octombrie 1933).
218 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Petrol 812 968 35 825<br />
Benzină 316 616 39 209<br />
Fabricate 9 50<br />
Cărți în limbi străine 9 50<br />
Total importului 1 129 668 80 880<br />
2. Exportul Letoniei în România<br />
Numele mărfurilor Kg Lats<br />
Produse fabricate<br />
44 423 206 583<br />
din care:<br />
Galoși 29 708 123 718<br />
Încălțăminte de cauciuc 14 682 82 708<br />
Colete poștale 33 157<br />
Total exportului 44 423 206 583<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 403-407.<br />
82. Monthly Report no. 539 (October 1933) of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of<br />
Romania in Riga Th. Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 1 st November 1933<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to summarize below, for September 1933, <strong>the</strong> situation and facts<br />
concerning Latvia’s domestic and foreign policy.<br />
a. Domestic policy<br />
The success achieved in Estonia by <strong>the</strong> group of Former Veterans on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong><br />
plebiscite regarding <strong>the</strong> amendment of <strong>the</strong> constitution provided a new incentive to <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian “fascist” movement. The nationalist group “Pērkonkrusts” has won an increasing<br />
sympathy. Even <strong>the</strong> Riga Government Coalition, trying to prevent being overcome by <strong>the</strong><br />
popular movement, has manifested, lately on repeated occasions, <strong>the</strong> will to enforce an<br />
authoritarian policy. Starting with several measures of order (prohibition of socialist<br />
meetings, prohibition for political groups to wear uniforms, censure of manifests, etc.) which<br />
were received positively by <strong>the</strong> public opinion, <strong>the</strong> Government is now feeling entitled to<br />
demand resignation of communist deputies from Saeima. I mention that, although existence<br />
of a communist party is prohibited by law, in fact this party has been existing under <strong>the</strong> name<br />
of “The party of peasants and small workers”. The tolerance shown for years by successive<br />
Riga Governments towards this party is explained through a manoeuvre of domestic policy of<br />
<strong>the</strong> bourgeois parties. The prohibition of <strong>the</strong> communist party has gained for <strong>the</strong> Social-<br />
Democratic Party – in parliamentary elections – an important number of seats due to <strong>the</strong><br />
votes of communists. Therefore, many social-democratic deputies could easily achieve <strong>the</strong><br />
majority needed to replace <strong>the</strong> Government, through a provisional alliance with a discontent<br />
bourgeois group. The fear that parliamentary games would bring once more a socialdemocratic<br />
Government in <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> state (as it did in 1927) has caused bourgeois<br />
parties to tolerate and even protect <strong>the</strong> camouflaged revival of <strong>the</strong> communist party. Since<br />
<strong>the</strong> foundation of <strong>the</strong> so-called party of “Peasants and small workers” – which absorbed a part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> far left wing of <strong>the</strong> social-democratic party – <strong>the</strong> number of social-democratic deputies<br />
has progressively decreased. Nowadays, when <strong>the</strong> social-democratic party loses popularity<br />
every day, <strong>the</strong> foundation of a socialist Government does not seem an imminent danger to
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 219<br />
<strong>the</strong> bourgeois parties. The de facto suppression of <strong>the</strong> communist party shall not bring once<br />
more to <strong>the</strong> social-democratic party – <strong>the</strong> Government believes – an important success in <strong>the</strong><br />
next elections. The Government has asked Saeima to state its opinion on waiver of<br />
parliamentary immunity of <strong>the</strong> communist deputies, who are to be put to trial for <strong>the</strong> crime<br />
of high treason (instigation to rebellion in <strong>the</strong> army) which is punished in Latvia with forced<br />
labour. If Saeima approves <strong>the</strong> waiver of <strong>the</strong> parliamentary immunity, <strong>the</strong> deputies in<br />
question may flee to Russia – without being stopped by <strong>the</strong> Government – just like two<br />
communist deputies did years ago, in similar cases.<br />
Mr. Ulmanis, <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> Agrarian Party, presented to Saeima a project for <strong>the</strong><br />
amendment of constitution, which reproduced, largely, <strong>the</strong> amendments brought to <strong>the</strong><br />
Estonian constitution by <strong>the</strong> recent plebiscite. According to Mr. Ulmanis’ project <strong>the</strong><br />
president shall be elected for a period of five years, by direct suffrage, by <strong>the</strong> people. He is<br />
empowered with high prerogatives: <strong>the</strong> right to dissolve <strong>the</strong> Parliament, to issue decrees, to<br />
reject enforcement of laws voted by <strong>the</strong> parliament etc. The number of deputies shall be<br />
reduced to fifty. Mr. Ulmanis, former President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers, is <strong>the</strong> head of a<br />
powerful bourgeois party which is part of <strong>the</strong> current Government coalition. An old partisan<br />
of an authoritarian policy, His Excellency seems to have chosen <strong>the</strong> right moment to ask<br />
adhesion of <strong>the</strong> public opinion, which monitors with great interest, and partly with<br />
sympathy, <strong>the</strong> so-called fascist movement in Estonia.<br />
Mr. Bļodnieks 1 , <strong>the</strong> current Prime-Minister and <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> party of peasants that were<br />
given lands, has manifested his intention to support Mr. Ulmanis’ project. In <strong>the</strong> same time, a<br />
large part of political groups, ei<strong>the</strong>r out of opportunism or conviction, declared that <strong>the</strong>y<br />
were in favour of <strong>the</strong> amendment of <strong>the</strong> constitution in question. If as a result of <strong>the</strong><br />
opposition of <strong>the</strong> social-democratic deputies, of <strong>the</strong> Jews, etc, <strong>the</strong> project in question does not<br />
reunite in Saeima <strong>the</strong> 2/3 quorum needed to be taken into consideration, it shall be<br />
submitted to people’s attention, who shall take a decision by means of plebiscite.<br />
b. Domestic economic and financial situation<br />
The Latvian Government has taken measures to avoid smuggling of cereals in Latvia. Such<br />
smuggling activities have been developing considerably over <strong>the</strong> recent period as in Latvia,<br />
where by means of <strong>the</strong> laws in force <strong>the</strong> state is <strong>the</strong> main buyer of agricultural products, <strong>the</strong><br />
prices of cereals are higher than in o<strong>the</strong>r countries.<br />
The Latvian press disappointedly records <strong>the</strong> slowness of negotiations started between<br />
Latvia and Lithuania for signing a trade Treaty. The Latvian industrial circles are<br />
disappointed especially due to Latvia’s refusal to approve a decrease in customs duties for<br />
rubber footwear and Latvian metallurgic products.<br />
c. Special issues<br />
The Social-Democratic Party has drafted a law regarding <strong>the</strong> “insurance of old age,<br />
invalidity and unemployment” and wants to submit it to a plebiscite. The bourgeois parties,<br />
although <strong>the</strong>y are not virtually against such a project, state that social-democrats gave a<br />
demagogic nature to such law, introducing certain provisions which are entirely inapplicable.<br />
In order to be submitted to a plebiscite, <strong>the</strong> project in question has to obtain at first <strong>the</strong><br />
signatures of a tenth of <strong>the</strong> total number of persons with voting rights in Latvia.<br />
1<br />
Ādolfs Bļodnieks (1889-1962) was a Latvian politician with agrarian views, Prime Minister of Latvia (1933-1934).
220 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
d. External policy<br />
The nationalist activity of <strong>the</strong> “Pērkonkrusts” group has caused certain discontents in<br />
Moscow. The Soviet press accuses <strong>the</strong> current cabinet of encouraging <strong>the</strong> Latvian fascist<br />
movement thought to be organised and funded by <strong>the</strong> German secret agents. The fact that<br />
<strong>the</strong> “Pērkonkrusts” group attacks – even with a Chauvinistic passion – <strong>the</strong> German minority<br />
in Latvia shows <strong>the</strong> inaccuracy of accusations in <strong>the</strong> Soviet press.<br />
The political events in Latvia seem to have determined <strong>the</strong> Moscow Government to<br />
immediately send a Minister to Riga to replace <strong>the</strong> former Minister Sviderski, deceased last<br />
June. As soon as he arrived in Riga, <strong>the</strong> new Soviet minister, Mr. Brodovski, suggested to <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian Government that Moscow was willing to conclude a new Trade Treaty with Latvia. It<br />
is known that denunciation by <strong>the</strong> USSR of <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Latvian trade treaty in 1932 affected<br />
part of <strong>the</strong> Latvian factories from <strong>the</strong> main market for which <strong>the</strong>y have been equipped. As a<br />
matter of fact, <strong>the</strong> manner in which <strong>the</strong> Soviets understood to accomplish <strong>the</strong> provisions of<br />
<strong>the</strong> treaty in question became a means of constant political pressure in Moscow’s hands and<br />
it only managed to disorganize <strong>the</strong> Latvian industry. This time, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Government,<br />
which was undoubtedly alarmed by <strong>the</strong> “fascist” movement in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, tries to<br />
reclaim its influence, by suggesting <strong>the</strong> possibility of concluding a new trade treaty with<br />
Latvia.<br />
The issue of revision.<br />
The Latvian political world continues to closely monitor <strong>the</strong> position of foreign countries<br />
on <strong>the</strong> revision trend, recording with satisfaction all <strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>documents</strong> intended to<br />
streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>the</strong> established order.<br />
The issue of disarmament.<br />
Nothing new has occurred in Latvia’s position, as shown in <strong>the</strong> previous monthly report.<br />
The issue of war debts.<br />
Latvia, which on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> last instalment had made a nominal payment<br />
imitating England’s action, awaits <strong>the</strong> decision of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r states regarding <strong>the</strong> next<br />
instalment.<br />
The issue of minorities.<br />
The “Pērkonkrusts” group led an aggressive campaign for <strong>the</strong> introduction of <strong>the</strong><br />
“Numerus Clausus” provision in <strong>the</strong> Latvian University. This request seems to be directed<br />
especially against Jewish students whose number exceeds <strong>the</strong> one of Latvians in certain<br />
faculties.<br />
“Pērkonkrusts” also requests that all university courses are taught in Latvian.<br />
It is also known <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> German schools in Latvia have appealed to <strong>the</strong> Senate<br />
(The Supreme Court in Latvia) against disciplinary actions taken because <strong>the</strong>y had<br />
celebrated, in schools, <strong>the</strong> anniversary of <strong>the</strong> Bolsheviks’ expelling from Riga by <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
legions. In a sentence, <strong>the</strong> Senate cancelled all <strong>the</strong>se measures.<br />
Issues regarding <strong>the</strong> League of Nations<br />
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me that Latvian Government’s hopes to obtain a seat<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States – based on an agreement – have<br />
not received <strong>the</strong> expected support in Geneva.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> occasion of Germany’s leaving from <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, <strong>the</strong> Latvian socialdemocratic<br />
press, becoming <strong>the</strong> echo of <strong>the</strong> Soviet press, interprets Hitler’s gesture as <strong>the</strong>
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 221<br />
first step towards enforcement of an imperialistic policy. Attempting to reduce <strong>the</strong> prestige of<br />
<strong>the</strong> League of Nations, Germany seeks to extend <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> pact of <strong>the</strong> four Great<br />
Powers, taking away from <strong>the</strong> small states <strong>the</strong> support <strong>the</strong>y could find in Geneva. Hitler’s<br />
pacifistic intentions shown to France are intended for achieving freedom of action in <strong>the</strong> East.<br />
The Baltic States would offer, through <strong>the</strong>ir lack of strength, <strong>the</strong> best field for German<br />
expansion.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government does not seem to believe <strong>the</strong> possibility of military<br />
action from Germany , which is isolated and concerned with domestic interests for a long<br />
period of time. On his return from Geneva, Mister Salnais, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs,<br />
declared to <strong>the</strong> press that German-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> have improved lately.<br />
Issues regarding international meetings etc<br />
The meeting between Their Majesties <strong>the</strong> King of Romania and <strong>the</strong> King of Bulgaria and<br />
Romania’s pacifying activities in <strong>the</strong> East are followed by <strong>the</strong> Latvian political world with <strong>the</strong><br />
same interest and sympathy <strong>the</strong>y give to any <strong>diplomatic</strong> action intended to mitigate<br />
possibilities of a future conflagration. Latvia is sure that a possible war in Europe would be<br />
hardly contained at present and could have serious repercussions on <strong>the</strong> independence of <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States.<br />
e. Relations with Romania<br />
Situation of trading <strong>relations</strong> between Latvia and Romania in September is as follows:<br />
1. Latvian imports from Romania<br />
Goods Kg lats<br />
Raw materials and semi-made products<br />
1 129 659 80 830<br />
Of which:<br />
Furs (astrakhan) 75 5796<br />
Oil 812 968 35 825<br />
Gasoline 316 616 39 209<br />
Ready-made products 9 50<br />
Books in foreign languages 9 50<br />
Total imports 1 129 668 80 80<br />
2. Latvian imports to Romania<br />
Goods Kg Lats<br />
Ready-made products<br />
44 423 206 583<br />
Of which:<br />
Galoshes 29 708 123 718<br />
Rubber footwear 14 682 82 708<br />
Mail parcels 33 157<br />
Total exports 44 423 206 583<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 403-407.
222 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
83. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā O. Grosvalda 1933. gada 21. novembra ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Salnajam 1<br />
Pagodinos ziņot par savu komandējuma braucienu uz Rumāniju.<br />
Bukarestē iebraucu 22. oktobrī un paliku tur līdz 10. novembrim. Mani pieņēma ārlietu<br />
ministrs N. Titulesku 6. novembrī, kad tas bija atgriezies no sava ceļojuma uz Balkānu valstīm<br />
un Turciju. Bez tam apmeklēju visus Ārlietu ministrijas augstākos ierēdņus un apmainījos<br />
vizītēm ar visiem Bukarestē akreditētiem ārvalstu pārstāvjiem. Runāju arī ar finanšu ministru<br />
V. Madgearu, kuru pazīstu no agrākiem laikiem, un iepazinos ar daudziem rumāņu<br />
politiskiem un saimnieciskiem darbiniekiem.<br />
Rumānija, kā zināms, patlaban ir ļoti aktīva ārējās politikas laukā. Tas attiecas uz diviem<br />
jautājumu kompleksiem: a) Rumānijas un Mazās Antantes attiecības ar Krieviju, b) Rumānijas<br />
attiecības ar Balkānu valstīm un Turciju. Sarunas, kuras man bija ar N. Titulesku un ar pārējām<br />
politiskām personībām, tad nu arī grozījās galvenā kārtā ap šiem diviem jautājumiem.<br />
1. Rumānijas un Mazās Antantes attiecības ar Krieviju. Rumānijas valdošo sfēru uzskatos<br />
šai laikā, kā zināms, šinī vasarā, Londonas saimnieciskās konferences laikā, notika lūzums. Ir<br />
gan taisnība, ka M.[esjē] Kadere, Rumānijas sūtnis Varšavā, iepriekšējās sarunās ar Ļitvinovu 2<br />
jau agrāk šo jautājumu bija tik tālu pakustinājis uz priekšu, ka saprašanās bija palikusi<br />
iespējama. Bet M.[esjē] Titulesku līdz šī gada vasarai bija noteikti pretojies izlīgšanai ar<br />
Krieviju un tā kā viņam Rumānijas noteicošās sfēras (pie karaļa, parlamentā un sabiedrībā) ir<br />
ārkārtīgi stiprs iespaids un gandrīz ārējās politikas diktatora stāvoklis, tad viņa viedoklis<br />
paturēja virsroku. Kaderem bija jāpārtrauc sarunas un labi vēl, ka viņš (pateicoties savai<br />
veiklai manevrēšanai) paturēja savu vietu, nekrītot par upuri politiskai greizsirdībai, jo<br />
Titulesku tagad visur ieliek diplomātiskās vietās savus cilvēkus (pie kuriem Kadere nepieder).<br />
Zem dažu lielās politikas notikuma iespaida (Hitlera 3 nākšanas pie varas, Krievijas<br />
orientācijas maiņas, kara draudi no Japānas) krievu nepiekāpīgais viedoklis Besarābijas<br />
jautājumā mīkstinājās un nu Titulesku šinī vasarā varēja pievienoties, kopā ar Krieviju,<br />
uzbrucēja definīcijas konvencijai. Viņa domas šai gadījumā būs bijušas: „Tā būs mana<br />
konvencija ar Krieviju un ne kādas citas personas!” Jo tagadējais Rumānijas ārlietu ministrs ir<br />
ārkārtīgi godkārīga persona, ar stipri pasvītrotu pašlepnumu. Krievija, piekrītot tā saucamai<br />
politiskai formulai (par teritorijām, kas atrodas patlaban zem attiecīgās valsts politiskās<br />
suverenitātes), izrādījusi, pēc manām domām, lielu piekāpību. Atceros vēl, ka apmēram pirms<br />
gada Krievijas sūtnis Varšavā Antonovs-Avsejenko 4 man teica: „Mēs nekad neiesim uz<br />
koncesijām Besarābijas jautājumā. Karu mēs viņas dēļ nevedīsim (?), bet mēs gribam plebiscītu.<br />
Lai tas manis pēc notiek zem Tautu Savienības kontroles (kuru Krievija citādi nekad neatzīst),<br />
bet bez plebiscīta šis jautājums nav atrisināms.” Bet ko tad īsti Krievijas piekāpšanās nozīmē un<br />
kā rumāņi to novērtē, kad viņi runā zem četrām acīm? M. Titulesku man teica, ka viņš vēl<br />
nekādā ziņā nelolo domas, ka Krievija formāli atzinusi Besarābijas piederību pie Rumānijas.<br />
Krievi 3. jūlijā Londonā esot tikai atsacījušies no iespējamības grozīt varas līdzekļiem status<br />
1<br />
Voldemārs Salnais (1886–1948), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1933.–1934. g. ārlietu ministrs. No 1937. g. sūtnis<br />
Zviedrijā, Dānijā un Norvēģijā ar sēdekli Stokholmā. Miris Zviedrijā.<br />
2<br />
Maksims Ļitvinovs (īst. uzv. Vallahs; 1876–1951), Padomju Savienības diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1921.–1930., 1941.–1946.<br />
g. ārlietu tautas komisāra vietnieks, 1930.–1939. g. ārlietu tautas komisārs.<br />
3<br />
Ādolfs Hitlers (Hitler; 1889–1945), Vācijas valstsvīrs. 1933.–1945. g. kanclers.<br />
4<br />
Vladimirs Antonovs-Avsejenko (1883–1938), Padomju Savienības valstsvīrs, diplomāts. 1930.–1934. g. sūtnis Polijā.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 223<br />
quo 1 , t. i. atņemt Rumānijai Besarābiju ar karu. Esot jāpanāk tomēr vēl kāda skaidrāka un<br />
noteiktāka deklarācija no krievu puses. Es prasīju, viņam ir izredzes atrast tādu solūciju un vai<br />
šāda deklarācija būtu priekšnoteikums Krievijas atzīšanai un diplomātisko sakaru atjaunošanai.<br />
Uz to Titulesku atbildēja pozitīvi un teica: „Je pense que je trouverai une formule.” 2 Sīkāk par šīs<br />
formulas veidu viņš vēl negribēja izteikties. Viņam ir nodoms izšķirt šo jautājumu personīgās<br />
sarunās ar Ļitvinovu, pie nākošās izdevības. To vajag izšķirt tiešās sarunās, teica Titulesku; tādus<br />
jautājumus nevarot nokārtot ar sarakstīšanos vai caur diplomātiskiem aģentiem. No tā varētu<br />
slēgt, ka Rumānija neatzīs Krieviju de iure, kamēr Titulesku nebūs personīgi saticies ar<br />
Ļitvinovu. Zināmu lomu spēlē, protams, arī precedents ar Ameriku, kas var iespaidot Rumānijas<br />
un visas Mazās Antantes sarunas ar Krieviju šādā vai tādā virzienā. Uz manu jautājumu, vai<br />
Rumānija eventuāli atzīs viena pati Krieviju vai tam jānotiek no visām Mazās Antantes valstīm<br />
vienā reizē, Titulesku man atbildēja (kā arī izteicās visi pārējie rumāņu politiķi), ka par šo<br />
jautājumu vispirms jāpanāk kopējs Mazās Antantes lēmums. Tomēr to var arī iztulkot, ņemot<br />
vērā Mazās Antantes pēdējo nolīgumu attiecīgo pantu, tādā veidā, ka visu triju valstu ārlietu<br />
ministri eventuāli varētu savā starpā pieņemt tādu lēmumu, ka viena vai otra no šīm trim<br />
valstīm var šo atzīšanu izdarīt agrāk par pārējām. No cita avota dabūju zināt, ka Mazās Antantes<br />
valstis norunājušas savā starpā atstāt katrai valstij brīvas rokas ārpolitikā attiecībā uz tiešiem<br />
kaimiņiem: Rumānijai – attiecībā uz Krieviju, Čehoslovākijai – attiecībā uz Austriju un<br />
Dienvidslāvijai – attiecībā uz Itāliju. No visām 3 valstīm visvairāk „sagatavota” Krievijas formālai<br />
atzīšanai, bez šaubām, ir Čehoslovākija un Prāgā varbūt visā drīzumā tiks sperts pirmais<br />
atzīšanas solis. Dienvidslāvija ir tā valsts, kuru attiecības ar Padomju Krieviju vismazāk interesē<br />
un kur atzīšanai pretojas vēsturiski sentimentāli motīvi, kā arī daudzo krievu emigrantu<br />
retardējošais iespaids. Arī Rumānijā daudzas aprindas, kā skaidri manīju, ir ļoti naidīgi<br />
noskaņotas pret Padomju Krieviju. Sevišķi tas jāsaka par armijas štābu. Atzīšanas gadījumā<br />
komunistu iespaids nebūtu sevišķi bīstams plašās rumāņu zemnieku masās, kuri pēc ļoti<br />
radikāli izvestās agrārreformas ir dabūjuši zemi; visstiprāk komunistu propaganda varētu<br />
iedarboties Besarābijā. Bet, kad Bukarestē apmetīsies plaša Padomju Krievijas pārstāvniecība ar<br />
milzu personālu un bagātīgiem dispozīcijas fondiem, tad gan var sagaidīt militārās spiegošanas<br />
jaunu izstarojumu; jau līdz šim nodevība armijas virsnieku starpā, pateicoties šai zemē plaši<br />
izplatītai „bakšišs” 3 kārei, bija bieži novērota lieta.<br />
Kā man Titulesku teica, paralēli atzīšanas aktam Rumānijai būs jāved ar Krieviju sarunas par<br />
dažiem nenokārtotiem jautājumiem. Vispirms kristu svarā jautājums par lielo Rumānijas valsts<br />
zelta fondu, kas pasaules kara laikā tika no Bukarestes evakuēts uz Krieviju; tomēr, cik manīju,<br />
uz tā atpakaļdabūšanu pašiem rumāņiem vairs nav nekādas nopietnas cerības. Tālāk jāmin<br />
aizvesto arhīvu un mākslas priekšmetu atpakaļ iegūšana, kas būtu vieglāk izdarāma. Pēdīgi vēl<br />
jāvienojas par robežsatiksmes veidu. Šajās sarunās, kā Arciševskis 4 man teica, Polijas valdība cer<br />
spēlēt svarīgu starpniecību un jau piedāvājusi savus pakalpojumus.<br />
1<br />
Status quo (latīņu val.) – stāvoklis kurā; plaši lietots kā apzīmējums aktuālajam lietu stāvoklim.<br />
2<br />
Je pense que je trouverai une formule (franču val.) – Es domāju, ka es atradīšu formulu [risinājumu].<br />
3<br />
Bakšišs – dzēriena veids islāma tradīcijās jeb pienākums dalīties ienākumos ar trūcīgajiem, pateicības forma par<br />
pakalpojumu jeb laipnību. 20. gadsimtā ar šo vārdu apzīmēts arī vienkāršs „kukulis”, kas domāts arī šajā gadījumā.<br />
4<br />
Miroslavs Arciševskis (Arciszewski; 1892–1963), Polijas diplomāts. 1929.–1932. g. sūtnis Latvijā, 1932.–1938. g.<br />
Rumānijā.
224 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Sakarā ar „Latvja” 1 ziņu par sūtņa Brodovska 2 interviju Rīgā, aiztelegrafēju mūsu<br />
ministrijai un dabūju tūlīt atbildi no ģenerālsekretāra V. Muntera kunga. Titulesku par to ļoti<br />
interesējās un teica, ka viņam pilnīgi pietiekot ar ziņu, ka Brodovskis oficiālā intervijā par<br />
Besarābiju neko neesot teicis. Ka no Krievijas sūtņa nevarot prasīt, lai viņš šo ziņu vēl pat<br />
atsauc – tas taču esot gluži skaidrs.<br />
2. Balkānu valstu lietas. Kad Titulesku uzsāka savu Balkānu ceļojumu, par viņa nodomiem<br />
cirkulēja visādas baumas, kuras vēlāk izrādījušās par pārspīlētām. Viņa īsto nolūku varētu<br />
definēt tā: „Uzpurināt” politisko dzīvi Balkānu valstīs, iedvest viņu savstarpējiem sakariem<br />
vairāk dzīvības un aktivitātes un izlietot izdevīgo politisko konjunktūru (galvenā kārtā –<br />
Krievijas pārorientēšanos), lai redzētu, kas no Balkānu valstu pakta idejas var iznākt.<br />
Rumānijai šai ziņā ir labi negociatora 3 priekšnoteikumi, jo tai ar visām Balkānu valstīm un<br />
Turciju ir labi sakari, bez kādām nopietnām pretenzijām no Rumānijas puses. Jo vienmēr<br />
jāpadomā, ka Rumānijas nacionālās aspirācijas pēc pasaules kara ir tādā mērā apmierinātas,<br />
kā nevienai citai valstij. „Rumāņi pēc kara tā sarijušies”, saka ienaidnieki, „ka diezin kā būs ar<br />
sagremošanu”.<br />
Titulesku akciju jau bija sagatavojušas dažādas sanāksmes karaļu un valstsvīru starpā<br />
Sinaijā un citur, kas notika šinī vasarā un rudenī, kā arī daudzie bilaterālie pakti, kurus<br />
Balkānu valstis pēdējā laikā savā starpā noslēgušas.<br />
[..]<br />
Ko Titulesku bija panācis, kad tas atgriezās uz Bukaresti? Viņš man izteicās sekojošā veidā:<br />
Acumirklīgās iespējamības Balkānu valstu kopdarbībai ir noskaidrotas. Četru valstu<br />
(Rumānijas, Dienvidslāvijas, Grieķijas un Turcijas) paktu es varu noslēgt kuru katru brīdi. Bet<br />
es gribu 5 valstu paktu (ar Bulgāriju) ar savstarpējām robežu garantijām, un tas patlaban ir<br />
izrādījies par neiespējamu. Ja mēs noslēgtu tagad 4 valstu paktu, tad tas būtu tieši pret<br />
Bulgāriju vērsts akts, kas viņai sevišķi sāpīgi liktu sajust viņas izolāciju; no tā es gribu<br />
atturēties un likt vēl laikam strādāt, lai pamazām varbūt izlīdzinātos pretišķības, kas pastāv<br />
starp Bulgāriju un pārējām Balkānu valstīm.<br />
Šīs domstarpības Bulgārijai ir ar Rumāniju, Grieķiju un Dienvidslāviju. Visvieglāk būtu<br />
izšķirama pirmā grupa. Rumānija ir gatava uzlabot bulgāru minoritātes režīmu Dobrudžā,<br />
pret tamlīdzīgu ekvivalentu Vidinas rajonā, kur dzīvo rumāņi. Principā arī piekrišana dota<br />
Donavas tiltam, kaut gan Titulesku man teica, ka rumāņu galvenais štābs stipri pretojas tilta<br />
būvei, kamēr Bulgārija nav garantējusi robežas. Un to, kā augstāk teikts, no viņas nevar<br />
panākt [..].<br />
Rumānijas iekšpolitiskie notikumi. Kad atstāju Bukaresti, karalis bij uzdevis liberālās<br />
partijas vadonim M.[esjē] Duka sastādīt valdību. Tā ir ievērojama maiņa Rumānijas iekšējā<br />
dzīvē, jo visus pēdējos gadus (ar īsu pārtraukumu) tur valdījusi nacionāl-caranistu<br />
(zemnieku) partija. Šī partija, kurai ir bez šaubām visplašākais atbalsts tautas masās, visu<br />
laiku bija atbalstījusi karali – kā pretstats liberāļu partijai, kuras vadonis Duka pat bij nonācis<br />
asā personīgā konfliktā ar karali. Karalis, kura autoritāte visādu personīgu dēku dēļ bij stipri<br />
apdraudēta, pēdējā laikā ļoti pūlējās to atkal stiprināt ar visādiem ceļojumiem provincē,<br />
baznīcu, universitāšu atklāšanu u. t. t., ar runām un personīgiem žestiem. Viens no šiem<br />
1<br />
„Latvis” – 1921.–1934. g. labējs, nacionāls dienas laikraksts Rīgā.<br />
2<br />
Stepans Brodovskis (1880–1937), Padomju Savienības diplomāts. 1933.–1937. g. sūtnis Latvijā.<br />
3<br />
Domāts – sarunu vedējs (angļu val. negotiate – vest sarunas).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 225<br />
žestiem tagad atkal ir Dukas, viņa personīgā ienaidnieka, saukšana pie valdības stūres. Karalis<br />
savukārt paliks nepopulārs pie nacionāl-caranistiem, tas ir skaidrs.<br />
[..]<br />
Laipni lūdzu ar šo ziņojumu iepazīstināt Valsts Prezidenta A. Kvieša kungu.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2785. l., 45.–52. lp.<br />
83. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw O. Grosvalds to Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
V. Salnais 1 , 21 st November, 1933<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to report to you about my business trip to Romania.<br />
I arrived in Bucharest on 22 nd October and stayed <strong>the</strong>re till 10 th November. I was received<br />
by Minister of Foreign Affairs N. Titulescu on 6 th November when he had returned from his<br />
trip to <strong>the</strong> Balkan states and Turkey. Apart from that I also visited all <strong>the</strong> highest-ranking civil<br />
servants in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and exchanged visits with all representatives of<br />
foreign countries accredited in Bucharest. I also talked to Minister of Finance V. Madgearu,<br />
whom I knew from <strong>the</strong> earlier times, and made acquaintance with many Romanian political<br />
and economic figures.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> present moment Romania, as we know, is very active in <strong>the</strong> field of foreign policy.<br />
It refers to two sets of issues: a) <strong>relations</strong> of Romania and <strong>the</strong> Little Entente with Russia; b)<br />
Romania’s <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Balkan states and Turkey. Discussions that I had with N.<br />
Titulescu and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r political figures mostly focused on <strong>the</strong>se two issues.<br />
1. Relations of Romania and <strong>the</strong> Little Entente with Russia. As we know, this summer,<br />
during <strong>the</strong> economic conference in London a turn took place in <strong>the</strong> position of Romania’s<br />
ruling circles. It is indeed true that in previous discussions with Litvinov 2 Mr. Cădere 3 ,<br />
Romania’s Envoy in Warsaw had moved this issue so far ahead that understanding had<br />
already become possible. N. Titulescu, in his turn, until this summer had firmly resisted<br />
reconciliation with Russia and since he has a very strong influence in Romania’s ruling circles<br />
(over <strong>the</strong> King, in Parliament and society) and in <strong>the</strong> field of foreign policy he enjoys almost<br />
dictator like status, his position prevailed. Cădere had to interrupt <strong>the</strong> negotiations and he<br />
was lucky (thanks to his shrewd manoeuvring) to keep his job and not to fall victim to<br />
political jealousy, because Titulescu now places his own people (and Cădere is not one of<br />
<strong>the</strong>m) in all <strong>diplomatic</strong> positions.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong> impact of some events in <strong>the</strong> large politics (Hitler’s 4 coming to power, military<br />
threats from <strong>the</strong> part of Japan) <strong>the</strong> Russians’ obstinate position on <strong>the</strong> issue of Bessarabia<br />
softened and this summer Titulescu toge<strong>the</strong>r with Russia could join <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong><br />
Definition of Aggressor. He held <strong>the</strong> following position on this issue: „It will be mine and<br />
nobody else’s convention with Russia!“ because <strong>the</strong> acting Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
is an extremely ambitious person, with strongly emphasised dignity. I think that by accepting<br />
1<br />
Voldemārs Salnais (1886–1948), Latvian statesman. 1933–1934 Minister of Foreign Affairs. From 1937 Envoy to<br />
Sweden, Denmark and Norway with seat in Stockholm. Died in Sweden.<br />
2<br />
Maxim Litvinov (real surname Wallah; 1876–1951), Soviet diplomat and statesman, 1921–1930, 1941–1946 deputy<br />
People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 1930–1939 People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs.<br />
3<br />
Victor Cădere (1891-1980) was a Romanian jurist, politician and diplomat. He was member of <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
delegation to <strong>the</strong> Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 and head ot <strong>the</strong> Romanian Military Mission in <strong>the</strong> Far East<br />
designed to rescue <strong>the</strong> Romanian POWs (1920-1921). Minister plenipotentiary of Romania in Poland, Yugoslavia<br />
and Portugal. Imprisoned by <strong>the</strong> Communist regime, he spent his old age in France.<br />
4<br />
Adolf Hitler (1889–1945), German statesman. 1933–1945 Chancellor.
226 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
<strong>the</strong>-so-called political formula (on territories, which at <strong>the</strong> present moment are under <strong>the</strong><br />
political sovereignty of <strong>the</strong> respective country) Russia has demonstrated great pliancy. I<br />
remember that approximately a year ago Envoy of Russia in Warsaw Antonov-Ovseyenko 1 told<br />
me: „We will never make concessions on <strong>the</strong> issue of Bessarabia. We will not wage war for it (?),<br />
but we want a plebiscite. I would not mind if it took place under <strong>the</strong> control of <strong>the</strong> League of<br />
Nations (which Russia o<strong>the</strong>rwise never recognises), but without a plebiscite this issue cannot be<br />
resolved.“ But what Russia’s concession really means and how <strong>the</strong> Romanians evaluate it when<br />
<strong>the</strong>y talk in private? N. Titulescu told me that he did not yet cherish <strong>the</strong> hope that Russia had<br />
formally recognised Bessarabia as part of Romania. [He thinks that] in London on 3 rd July<br />
Russians had only given up <strong>the</strong> possibility of changing <strong>the</strong> status quo 2 by force, i.e. of taking<br />
Bessarabia from Romania by military means. [He believes that] a clearer and more committed<br />
declaration from <strong>the</strong> Russian side yet has to be achieved. I asked him whe<strong>the</strong>r he saw a<br />
possibility of finding such a solution and would such a declaration be a precondition for <strong>the</strong><br />
recognition of Russia and restoration of <strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>relations</strong>. Titulescu answered in <strong>the</strong><br />
affirmative and said: „Je pense que je trouverai une formule.” 3 He did not want to disclose any<br />
details about <strong>the</strong> type of such formula yet. He has an intention to solve this issue in a personal<br />
discussion with Litvinov on <strong>the</strong> next opportune occasion. It had to be resolved in direct talks,<br />
Titulescu said; such issues could not be settled through correspondence or <strong>diplomatic</strong> agents.<br />
From that it could be deduced that Romania will not recognize Russia de jure before Titulescu<br />
has a personal meeting with Litvinov. Certainly <strong>the</strong> precedent of America also plays a certain<br />
role and may in that or o<strong>the</strong>r direction influence Romania’s and <strong>the</strong> entire Little Entente’s talks<br />
with Russia. To my question whe<strong>the</strong>r Romania will eventually recognize Russia alone or it has<br />
to be done by all of <strong>the</strong> countries of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente at <strong>the</strong> same time, Titulescu replied (and<br />
all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Romanian politicians said <strong>the</strong> same thing) that first a joint decision by <strong>the</strong> Little<br />
Entente on this issue had to be achieved. Yet, based on <strong>the</strong> respective clause of <strong>the</strong> newest<br />
agreement of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente, it may be interpreted in such a way that <strong>the</strong> Ministers of<br />
Foreign Affairs of <strong>the</strong> three countries could make a decision among <strong>the</strong>mselves that one of <strong>the</strong><br />
three countries may come out with <strong>the</strong> recognition before <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. From a different source I<br />
heard that <strong>the</strong> countries of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente had agreed to give to each of its member countries<br />
free hands in foreign policy with regard to its direct neighbours: to Romania – with regard to<br />
Russia, to Czechoslovakia – with regard to Austria and to Yugoslavia – with regard to Italy.<br />
Among <strong>the</strong> three countries best „prepared“ for a formal recognition of Russia, no doubt, is<br />
Czechoslovakia and perhaps in Prague <strong>the</strong> first step towards <strong>the</strong> recognition will be made soon.<br />
Yugoslavia is <strong>the</strong> country least interested in <strong>relations</strong> with Soviet Russia and resisting <strong>the</strong><br />
recognition for historically sentimental reasons and because of <strong>the</strong> retarding influence of <strong>the</strong><br />
numerous Russian émigrés. In Romania, too, as I clearly noticed, many circles are very hostile<br />
towards Soviet Russia. It particularly refers to <strong>the</strong> army’s staff. In case of recognition, <strong>the</strong><br />
Communists‘ influence in <strong>the</strong> broad mass of Romanian farmers, who have received land as a<br />
result of <strong>the</strong> very radical agrarian reform, would not be very dangerous; it is in Bessarabia that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Communist propaganda could leave <strong>the</strong> strongest impact. But when Soviet Russia opens in<br />
1<br />
Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko (1883–1938), Soviet diplomat and statesman. 1930–1934 Envoy to Poland.<br />
2<br />
Status quo (Latin) – literally “<strong>the</strong> state in which”; a broadly used phrase to denote <strong>the</strong> current or existing state of<br />
affairs.<br />
3<br />
Je pense que je trouverai une formule (French) – I think that I will find a formula [solution].
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 227<br />
Bucharest a large mission with a huge staff and lavish funds at its disposal – <strong>the</strong>n indeed a new<br />
emission of military spying can be expected; treason among army officers, thanks to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
craving for „bakshish“ 1 , which is broadly spread in this country, is a very frequent occurrence.<br />
As Titulescu told me, along with <strong>the</strong> act of recognition, Romania would have to negotiate<br />
several o<strong>the</strong>r pending issues with Russia. The weightiest of <strong>the</strong>se would be <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong><br />
large fund of state gold of Romania that had been evacuated from Bucharest to Russia during<br />
<strong>the</strong> world war; however, as much as I noticed, <strong>the</strong> Romanians no longer cherish any serious<br />
hope to get it back. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, one should mention <strong>the</strong> recovery of <strong>the</strong> deported archives and<br />
pieces of art, which would be an easier task. Finally, <strong>the</strong> type of border traffic should be<br />
agreed on. In <strong>the</strong>se negotiations, as Arcizewski 2 told me, <strong>the</strong> government of Poland hoped to<br />
act as an important mediator and had already offered its services.<br />
Owing to information published in „Latvis“ 3 about an interview that Envoy Brodovski 4 has<br />
given in Riga I sent a telegram to our ministry and right away received a reply from Secretary<br />
General Mr. V. Munters. Titulescu showed great interest in it and said that it fully sufficed<br />
him to know that in an official interview Brodovski had said nothing about Bessarabia. It was<br />
completely clear that one could not ask an Envoy of Russia to go as far as recall his message.<br />
2. The issues of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states. When Titulescu began his trip through <strong>the</strong> Balkans,<br />
various rumours were afloat about his intentions that eventually turned out to be<br />
exaggerated. His actual intention could be formulated as follows: „to shake up“ <strong>the</strong> political<br />
life in <strong>the</strong> Balkan states, to infuse more life and activity into <strong>the</strong>ir mutual contacts and to use<br />
<strong>the</strong> advantageous political conjuncture (first and foremost – <strong>the</strong> re-orientation of Russia), in<br />
order to see what can come of <strong>the</strong> idea of a pact of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states. In this regard Romania<br />
as a negotiator has good advantages, because it has good contacts with all <strong>the</strong> Balkan states<br />
and with Turkey and <strong>the</strong>re are no serious claims from Romania’s part. Because one always<br />
has to consider that after <strong>the</strong> world war Romania’s national aspirations were satisfied to an<br />
extent greater that those of any o<strong>the</strong>r country. „The Romanians filled <strong>the</strong>ir bellies so much<br />
after <strong>the</strong> war,“ <strong>the</strong> enemies say, „that <strong>the</strong> digesting is to be doubted“.<br />
Titulescu’s campaign had been prepared by different meetings among <strong>the</strong> kings and<br />
statesmen in Sinai and elsewhere this summer and autumn as well as by <strong>the</strong> numerous<br />
bilateral pacts that <strong>the</strong> Balkan states have concluded among <strong>the</strong>mselves lately.<br />
[..]<br />
What Titulescu had achieved when he returned to Bucharest? He put it in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
way: The immediate possibilities for <strong>the</strong> co-operation of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states have been clarified.<br />
I can conclude <strong>the</strong> pact of <strong>the</strong> four countries (Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey) any<br />
moment. But I want a pact of 5 countries (with Bulgaria, too) with mutual guarantees of<br />
borders and it has turned out to be impossible at <strong>the</strong> moment. If we concluded <strong>the</strong> pact of 4<br />
countries now, it would be an act directly targeted against Bulgaria and would make this<br />
country very painfully aware of its isolation; I would like to abstain from it and to make <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Bakshish – a type of drink in Islamic tradition or a duty to share one’s income with <strong>the</strong> poor, also a way to thank<br />
for a service or kindness. In 20 th century this word became used also simply to denote a bribe, which is <strong>the</strong> case<br />
also in <strong>the</strong> present context.<br />
2<br />
Mirosław Arciszewski (1892–1963), Polish diplomat. 1929–1932 Envoy to Latvia, 1932–1938 Envoy to Romania.<br />
3<br />
„Latvis” – 1921–1934 a right-wing nationalist daily newspaper issued in Riga.<br />
4<br />
Stepan Brodovski (1880–1937), Soviet diplomat. 1933–1937 Envoy to Latvia.
228 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
time still to work for it, in order for <strong>the</strong> contradictions, which exist between Bulgaria and <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r Balkan states, to smooth out.<br />
Bulgaria has such disagreements with Romania, Greece and Yugoslavia. The first group is<br />
<strong>the</strong> easiest to solve. Romania is ready to improve <strong>the</strong> regime of <strong>the</strong> ethnic Bulgarian minority<br />
in Dobruja in exchange for an equivalent [step taken] in Vidvina district where Romanians<br />
live. A principal consent for <strong>the</strong> Danube bridge has also been given although Titulescu told<br />
me that <strong>the</strong> Romanian General Staff was strongly opposed to <strong>the</strong> construction of <strong>the</strong> bridge<br />
until Bulgaria guarantees <strong>the</strong> borders. And as was mentioned above, this is what cannot be<br />
achieved from it. [..]<br />
Events in Romania’s domestic policy. As I was leaving Bucharest, <strong>the</strong> King had nominated<br />
head of <strong>the</strong> Liberal Party Mr. Duca to form <strong>the</strong> government. It is a noteworthy change in<br />
Romania’s domestic life because all through <strong>the</strong> recent years (with a brief intermission) <strong>the</strong><br />
Național-Țărănist (Farmers‘) Party had been at power <strong>the</strong>re. This party, which, no doubt,<br />
enjoys <strong>the</strong> greatest popular support, had supported <strong>the</strong> King all <strong>the</strong> time – in contrast to <strong>the</strong><br />
Liberal Party, whose leader Duca had even come into a harsh personal conflict with <strong>the</strong> King.<br />
The King, whose authority had been badly threatened due to miscellaneous personal affairs,<br />
lately has tried very hard to streng<strong>the</strong>n it again through various trips to <strong>the</strong> province,<br />
unveiling of churches and universities, etc., with speeches and personal gestures. One of such<br />
gestures is <strong>the</strong> summoning of Duca, his personal enemy, again at <strong>the</strong> helm of <strong>the</strong> state. Under<br />
<strong>the</strong> Național-Țărănist <strong>the</strong> King in his turn will remain unpopular, that much is clear.<br />
[…]<br />
I ask you kindly to acquaint President Mr. A. Kviesis with this report.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2785, s. 45–52.<br />
84. Raportul lunar (noiembrie 1933) al însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al<br />
României la Riga Th. Scortzescu nr. 598 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României<br />
Nicolae Titulescu, 2 decembrie 1933<br />
Am onoarea a rezuma mai jos pentru luna noiembrie 1933 situația și faptele relative la<br />
politica internă și externă a Letoniei:<br />
a. Politica internă<br />
Se știe că progresele mișcării grupărilor de dreapta au inspirat partidului agrar – cel mai<br />
important partid burghez leton – hotărârea de a cere o modificare a constituției actuale în<br />
sensul unei diminuări a rolului Saeimei și a unei centralizări a puterii executive. Această atitudine<br />
a partidului agrar i-a atras simpatiile nu numai ale clasei burgheze orășenești care înclină<br />
vădit către o politică de autoritate, dar și a păturilor țărănești. Singură clasa uvrieră rămâne – în<br />
parte – fidelă partidului social-democrat, care se opune oricărei modificări a constituției.<br />
Saeima a aprobat, cu o majoritate importantă, trimiterea spre examinare a zisului proiect<br />
Comisiei Juridice parlamentare. Atât guvernul cât și cea mai mare parte din partidele<br />
burgheze susțin proiectul – al cărui adversari principali sunt social-democrații și partidul<br />
centrului democratic.<br />
După arestarea deputaților comuniști - acuzați de crimă de înaltă trădare - partidul social<br />
democrat a început o violentă campanie împotriva politicii „inchizitoriale” a guvernului.<br />
Campania pare a fi dusă mai ales în scopuri electorale. Departe de a se lăsa emoționat,<br />
Guvernul a procedat la arestarea a numeroase grupuri comuniste.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 229<br />
Toate aceste manifestări ale unei politici de dreapta sunt în general primite cu simpatie de<br />
populație.<br />
b. Situația economică și financiară internă<br />
Din ce în ce mai mult circulă zvonul că guvernul ar avea intenția să provoace o<br />
devalorizare a latului imitând în aceasta politica financiară estoniană.<br />
După lungi negocieri s-a ajuns la parafarea unui Tratat de Comerț letono-lituanian.<br />
Tratatul conține două liste de mărfuri care vor beneficia de tarif preferențial, una<br />
concentrând produsele industriale letone, iar cealaltă produsele agricole ale Lituaniei. Grație<br />
„clauzei baltice” aceste taxe de favoare nu urmează a fi aplicate altor țări pe baza „clauzei<br />
națiunii celei mai favorizate”. Se crede că aplicarea noului tratat de comerț va reuși să<br />
intensifice relațiile economice letono-lituaniene care lânceziseră în ultimii ani.<br />
Faptul că industria mare în Letonia se găsește în mare parte în mâinile minorităților<br />
(evrei, germani, ruși) stârnește în mod periodic violente campanii de presă și formează<br />
principala platformă electorală a Partidului Centrului. Direcția acestui partid cere cu<br />
insistență crearea unui „Consiliu Economic” destinat de a fixa liniile unei politici economice<br />
naționale. De fapt, industria mare letonă trece printr-o gravă criză din cauza lipsei de<br />
debușeuri și o parte din ea este susținută în mod artificial printr-un regim vamal extrem de<br />
protecționist. Grupările naționaliste pretind statului de a ajuta în primul rând industria mică<br />
și agricultura care reprezintă mijloacele de existență ale țăranilor letoni. Problema conservării<br />
unei industrii mari în Letonia formează una dintre principalele preocupări ale guvernului.<br />
c. Chestiuni speciale<br />
Fracțiunea social-democrată a Consiliului Municipal din Riga a cerut ca Spitalul German<br />
„Georgenhospital”, precum și edificiile Guilde-lor germane din Riga să devină proprietatea<br />
statului leton. Un precedent similar a avut loc acum doi ani, când statul leton a luat în<br />
stăpânire Domul care aparținea minorității germane. Cererea social-democraților destinată a<br />
place populației letone pune în încurcătură guvernul într-un moment când relațiile germanoletone<br />
sunt în curs de ameliorare.<br />
Partidul social-democrat cere reformarea actualului aparat judiciar, care s-ar fi dovedit a fi<br />
părtinitor, apărând exclusiv interesele clasei burgheze. Unele din acuzațiile aduse justiției de<br />
către membrii zisului partid dovedindu-se a fi false, ei au fost condamnați la închisoare.<br />
d. Politica Externă<br />
Unele asigurări liniștitoare primite din Berlin par a fi calmat în ultimul timp<br />
aprehensiunile inspirate guvernului leton de către presupusele intenții ale regimului hitlerist.<br />
Domnul Ulmanis, liderul partidului agrar și inițiatorul proiectului de modificare a Constituției,<br />
și-a manifestat în mod public simpatia pentru unele aspecte ale național-socialismului<br />
german. Menționez că partidul agrar face parte din actuala coaliție guvernamentală.<br />
Guvernul sovietic a organizat la Moscova o întrunire de protest a comuniștilor letoni<br />
refugiați împotriva arestării deputaților comuniști în Letonia. Evoluția raporturilor sovietoletone<br />
depinde însă în mare parte de rezultatul negocierilor întreprinse între aceste două țări<br />
în vederea încheierii unui nou tratat de comerț. Letonia ține să redobândească măcar o parte<br />
din piața rusească pierdută și să beneficieze de traficul sovietic spre Occident.
230 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Vizita Domnului Päts 1 , Șeful Statului estonian, la Riga, este considerată ca o manifestație a<br />
trăiniciei alianței estono-letone.<br />
La 8 decembrie va sosi în Riga Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Finlandei. Anunțarea acestei<br />
vizite a fost primită cu bucurie de guvernul leton, întrucât sunt ani de zile de când Finlanda<br />
nu a mai făcut un asemenea gest amical față de Letonia. Este posibil ca politica „scandinavă” a<br />
Finlandei să nu mai apară la Helsingfors ca răspunzând necesităților vremurilor actuale.<br />
Emoția provocată în Lituania de destinderea germano-poloneză trezește noi speranțe la<br />
Riga printre partizanii proiectului „Uniunii Baltice”, proiect zădărnicit până acum de politica<br />
externă unilaterală a Lituaniei, obsedată de ideea redobândirii Vilnei.<br />
Chestiunea revizuirii<br />
…<br />
Chestiunea dezarmării<br />
…<br />
Chestiunea datoriilor de război<br />
Guvernul leton nu a luat încă o decizie în privința plății ratei din decembrie către Statele<br />
Unite, dar se crede că va urma și de astă dată exemplul Angliei, făcând o plată nominală.<br />
Chestiunea minorităților<br />
Autoritățile au făcut o percheziție la sediul asociației „Baltische Brüderschaft” din Riga, al<br />
cărei scop pare ar fi crearea unui curent național-socialist germanofil în Letonia. Zisa<br />
asociație găsise un număr mic de aderenți în Riga.<br />
Chestiunile în legătură cu Societatea Națiunilor<br />
Zvonul că Italia ar avea intenția de a părăsi și ea Societatea Națiunilor a fost primit cu<br />
oarecare îngrijorare de lumea politică letonă, care crede că existența instituției din Geneva nu<br />
poate fi, în general, decât favorabilă statelor mici.<br />
Chestiuni în legătură cu întrunirile internaționale etc<br />
…<br />
e. Raporturile cu România<br />
Din punct de vedere politic România continuă să intereseze Letonia (precum și Estonia)<br />
ca vecină a Sovietelor, ca aliată a Poloniei, ca partizană a unei politici de respectare a<br />
tratatelor.<br />
Situația raporturilor economice dintre Letonia și România pe luna octombrie 1933 este<br />
următoarea:<br />
1.Importul din România în Letonia<br />
Numele mărfurilor Kg lats<br />
Materii prime și semi-fabricate<br />
Blănuri 178 12 308<br />
Blănuri (astrahan) 178 12 308<br />
Benzină 28 905 3653<br />
Total 29 083 15 961<br />
Fabricate<br />
1<br />
Konstantin Päts (1874-1956) a fost cel mai influent politician estonian din prima jumătate a sec. al XX-lea, șef al<br />
statului democratic estonian (1921-1922, 1923-1924, 1931-1932, 1932-1933, 1933-1934), Prim Ministru al Estoniei (1918-<br />
1919) și șef al regimului autoritar din această țară (așa-numita „epocă a tăcerii, 1934-1940). Fondator al Estoniei<br />
independente. Arestat și deportat, a murit în Uniunea Sovietică.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 231<br />
Trestie împletită 120 309<br />
Carton și hârtie desenată x/ 200<br />
Totalul importului 29 203 16 470<br />
2. Exportul Letoniei în România<br />
Numele mărfurilor Kg Lats<br />
Produse fabricate 26 317 105 090<br />
In 979 1318<br />
Galoși 4991 14 582<br />
Încălțăminte de cauciuc 20 344 89 160<br />
Colete poștale 3 30<br />
Totalul exportului 26 317 105 090<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 420-425.<br />
84. Monthly Report no. 598 (November 1933) of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of<br />
Romania in Riga Th. Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 2 nd December 1933<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to summarize below <strong>the</strong> situation and <strong>the</strong> facts related to <strong>the</strong> internal<br />
and external policy of Latvia for November 1933:<br />
a. Internal policy<br />
It is known that <strong>the</strong> progresses of <strong>the</strong> movement of <strong>the</strong> left-wing groups have inspired <strong>the</strong><br />
agrarian party – <strong>the</strong> most important Latvian party –to decide amending <strong>the</strong> current<br />
constitution in <strong>the</strong> sense of a diminution of <strong>the</strong> Saeima’s role and a centralisation of <strong>the</strong><br />
executive power. This attitude of <strong>the</strong> agrarian party has attracted <strong>the</strong> sympathies not only of<br />
<strong>the</strong> urban bourgeois class which clearly bends towards an authoritarian policy, but also of <strong>the</strong><br />
peasant strata. The only working class – partly – remains faithful to <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic<br />
Party which opposes any amendment of <strong>the</strong> constitution.<br />
The Saeima has approved, with an important majority, to send <strong>the</strong> project in question to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Law Commission of <strong>the</strong> Parliament for examination. The government as well as most part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois parties support <strong>the</strong> project –whose main opponents are <strong>the</strong> social-democrats<br />
and <strong>the</strong> party of <strong>the</strong> democratic centre.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> arrest of <strong>the</strong> communist deputies – accused of <strong>the</strong> crime of high treason – <strong>the</strong><br />
Social-Democratic Party started a violent campaign against <strong>the</strong> “inquisitorial” policy of <strong>the</strong><br />
government. The campaign seems to be made especially for elective purposes. Far from being<br />
moved, <strong>the</strong> Government has proceeded to <strong>the</strong> arrest of numerous communist groups.<br />
All <strong>the</strong>se manifestations of a right-wing policy are generally received with sympathy by<br />
<strong>the</strong> population.<br />
b. Internal economic and financial situation<br />
There are increasing rumours that <strong>the</strong> government has <strong>the</strong> intention to provoke a<br />
depreciation of <strong>the</strong> lat by imitating <strong>the</strong> Estonian financial policy.<br />
After long negotiations an initialling of a Latvian-Lithuanian Treaty of Commerce was<br />
reached. The treaty contains two lists of goods that will benefit of preferential tariff, one<br />
concentrating <strong>the</strong> Latvian industrial products and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian agricultural<br />
products. Due to <strong>the</strong> “Baltic clause”, <strong>the</strong>se privileged taxes shall not be applied to o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
countries based on <strong>the</strong> “”clause of <strong>the</strong> most favoured nation”. It is believed that <strong>the</strong>
232 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
application of a new Treaty of Commerce shall succeed to intensify <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Lithuanian<br />
economic <strong>relations</strong> that were slackening in <strong>the</strong> last years.<br />
The fact that <strong>the</strong> great industry in Latvia lies mostly in <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> minorities (Jews,<br />
Germans, Russian) has periodically caused violent press campaigns and has formed <strong>the</strong> main<br />
electoral platform of <strong>the</strong> party of <strong>the</strong> Centre. The direction of this party insistently demands<br />
<strong>the</strong> creation of an “Economic Council” intended to establish <strong>the</strong> lines of a national economic<br />
policy. In fact, <strong>the</strong> great Latvian industry passes through a serious crisis due to <strong>the</strong> lack of<br />
markets and a part of <strong>the</strong> industry is artificially supported through a very protectionist<br />
customs regime. The nationalist groups ask <strong>the</strong> state to first of all help <strong>the</strong> little industry and<br />
<strong>the</strong> agriculture which represent <strong>the</strong> means of existence of <strong>the</strong> Latvian peasants. The problem<br />
of conservation of a great industry in Latvia represents one of <strong>the</strong> main concerns of <strong>the</strong><br />
government.<br />
c. Special issues<br />
The social-democrat group of <strong>the</strong> Municipal Council in Riga has asked for <strong>the</strong> German<br />
Hospital „Georgenhospital” as well as <strong>the</strong> constructions of <strong>the</strong> German Guilds in Riga to<br />
become <strong>the</strong> property of <strong>the</strong> Latvian state. A similar precedent occurred two years ago, when<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian state took over <strong>the</strong> Dome which belonged to <strong>the</strong> German minority. The request of<br />
<strong>the</strong> social-democrats, which was intended to please <strong>the</strong> Latvian population, puzzles <strong>the</strong><br />
government in a moment when <strong>the</strong> German-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> are improving.<br />
The Social-Democratic Party asks for <strong>the</strong> reformation of <strong>the</strong> current judicial apparatus,<br />
which proved to be subjective, by defending exclusively <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois class.<br />
As some of <strong>the</strong> accusations brought to justice by <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> party in question were<br />
false, <strong>the</strong>y were sentenced to prison.<br />
d. Foreign Policy<br />
Certain comfortable assurances received from Berlin seem to have lately calmed <strong>the</strong><br />
apprehensions inspired to <strong>the</strong> Latvian government by <strong>the</strong> supposed intentions of <strong>the</strong> Hitlerite<br />
regime.<br />
Mr. Ulmanis, <strong>the</strong> leader of <strong>the</strong> agrarian party and <strong>the</strong> initiator of <strong>the</strong> project of<br />
amendment of <strong>the</strong> Constitution, publicly manifested his sympathy for certain aspects of <strong>the</strong><br />
German National-Socialism. I mention that <strong>the</strong> agrarian party is part of <strong>the</strong> current<br />
governmental coalition.<br />
The Soviet government organised in Moscow a protest reunion of <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
communists, who were refugees against <strong>the</strong> arrest of <strong>the</strong> communist deputies in Latvia.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> depends to a great extent on <strong>the</strong> result<br />
of <strong>the</strong> negotiations undertaken between <strong>the</strong>se two countries for <strong>the</strong> conclusion of a new<br />
treaty of commerce. Latvia wants to recover at least a part of <strong>the</strong> lost Russian market and to<br />
benefit from <strong>the</strong> Soviet traffic towards <strong>the</strong> Occident.<br />
The visit of Mr. Päts 1 , Chief of <strong>the</strong> Estonian state, in Riga, is considered a manifestation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> stability of <strong>the</strong> Estonian-Latvian alliance.<br />
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland will arrive in Riga on December 8 th . The<br />
announcing of this visit was gladly received by <strong>the</strong> Latvian government, because <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
many years since Finland has not made such a friendly gesture towards Latvia. It is possible<br />
that <strong>the</strong> “Scandinavian” policy of Finland does not appear in Helsingfors too appropriate for<br />
<strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> current age.<br />
1<br />
Konstantin Päts (1874-1956) was <strong>the</strong> most influential Estonian politician in <strong>the</strong> first half of <strong>the</strong> 20th century.<br />
Democratic Head of State (1921-1922, 1923-1924, 1931-1932, 1932-1933, 1933-1934), Prime Minister (1918-1919) and<br />
head of <strong>the</strong> country's authoritarian regime (during so-called „period of silence” 1934-1940). Founder of<br />
independent Estonia. Arrested and deported, he died in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 233<br />
The emotion provoked in Latvia by <strong>the</strong> German-Polish detente, awakes new hopes in Riga<br />
among <strong>the</strong> supporters of <strong>the</strong> project of <strong>the</strong> “Baltic Union”, a project which has been made futile<br />
until now by <strong>the</strong> external unilateral policy of Latvia, obsessed with <strong>the</strong> idea of recovering Vilna.<br />
The issue of revision<br />
…<br />
The issue of disarmament<br />
…<br />
The issue of war debts<br />
The Latvian government has not yet taken a decision regarding <strong>the</strong> payment of <strong>the</strong><br />
instalment from December to <strong>the</strong> United States, but it is believed that it will follow once<br />
more <strong>the</strong> example of England, by making a nominal payment.<br />
The issue of minorities<br />
The authorities have searched <strong>the</strong> headquarters of <strong>the</strong> association „Baltische<br />
Brüderschaft” in Riga, whose purpose is <strong>the</strong> creation of a national-socialist Teutophile trend<br />
in Latvia. The association in question found a small number of supporters in Riga.<br />
Issues regarding <strong>the</strong> League of Nations<br />
The rumour that Italy would also have <strong>the</strong> intention to leave <strong>the</strong> League of Nations was<br />
received with a certain concern by <strong>the</strong> Latvian political establishment, which believes that <strong>the</strong><br />
existence of <strong>the</strong> institution in Geneva can be favourable, in general, only to small states.<br />
Issues regarding international meeting etc<br />
…<br />
e. Relations with Romania<br />
From a political point of view, Romania continues to be interested in Latvia (as well as<br />
Estonia) as neighbour of <strong>the</strong> Soviets, as ally of Poland, as supporter of a policy of observance<br />
of <strong>the</strong> treaties.<br />
The situation of <strong>the</strong> economic <strong>relations</strong> between Latvia and Romania in October 1933 is<br />
<strong>the</strong> following:<br />
1. Import from Romania to Latvia<br />
Name of goods Kg lats<br />
Raw materials and semi-products<br />
Furs 178 12 308<br />
Furs (astrakhan) 178 12 308<br />
Gas 28 905 3653<br />
Total 29 083 15 961<br />
Manufactured products<br />
Woven cane 120 309<br />
Paperboard and drawn paper x/ 200<br />
Total import 29 203 16 470<br />
2. Export from Latvia to Romania<br />
Name of goods Kg Lats<br />
Manufactured products 26 317 105 090<br />
Flax 979 1318<br />
Galoshes 4991 14 582<br />
Rubber footwear 20 344 89 160<br />
Postal parcels 3 30<br />
Total export 26 317 105 090<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 420-425.
234 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
85. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 35 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 18<br />
ianuarie 1934<br />
După un moment de surpriză sau ezitare guvernele din Reval și Riga și-au dat seama că<br />
propunerea sovieto-polonă tindea mai mult la o limitare a suveranității lor decât la întărirea<br />
acestei suveranități și că excluderea vizibil intenționată a Germaniei dintre puterile garante –<br />
a unei Germanii care nu fusese solicitată – nu putea avea decât un singur scop, crearea unui<br />
surplus, plin de făgăduință, de ațâțare și de suspiciune între cele două câmpuri ale puterilor<br />
burgheze atât de învrăjbite deja.<br />
În afară de foile stipendiate de Moscova, întreaga presă, chiar ziarele cele mai antigermane,<br />
au sfârșit prin a pricepe distincția: o garanție generală cuprinzând și Germania, da,<br />
tutela, nu. Domnul Salnais exprima deci sentimentul general când declara în recentul său<br />
discurs: „Letonia nu se va lăsa antrenată în jocul nici uneia, nici alteia dintre cele două<br />
grupări rivale, pentru a nu deveni obiectul unor simple manevre tactice.<br />
O dată intențiile Rusiei sovietice bine definite, rămâne a desluși mobilele Varșoviei.<br />
Neputând gândi că o diplomație atât de realistă ca cea actuală a Poloniei poate crede în<br />
rentabilitatea operațiunii zisă a încercuirii sau chiar a amenințărilor în acest sens, risc<br />
următoarea explicație.<br />
Guvernele baltice au primit cu neliniște în decembrie trecut conversațiile și destinderea<br />
între Berlin și Varșovia. Zvonuri că între aceste două capitale se căuta, pe spatele țărilor<br />
baltice, o soluție satisfăcătoare a problemei coridoarelor au circulat aici cu insistență.<br />
Încrederea Statelor Baltice în Varșovia ar fi fost grav zdruncinată dacă acestor zvonuri [li] s-ar<br />
fi adăugat astăzi informația precisă că Rusia sovietică, propunând Poloniei de a garanta<br />
solidar independența lor, această țară ar fi refuzat să o facă.<br />
Cred deci că inițiativa propunerii aparține Rusiei sovietice și că Polonia nu s-a putut<br />
abține a o urma. Moscova, pe lângă avantajele de alt ordin, a găsit în această manevră și<br />
ocazia de a constata dacă într-adevăr în conversațiile germano-polone problema coridorului<br />
fusese abordată în spirit atât de radical.<br />
Polonia a cedat cred și complexului său de putere medie, ce se manifestă la Varșovia de<br />
câte ori e vorba de a juca rolul de protector. Și în această privință, între altele, n-avem cred a<br />
regreta eșecul demersului sovieto-polon.<br />
Într-adevăr, în cercurile politice ale Țărilor Baltice, în Letonia mai ales, există o<br />
necontestabilă tendință de a nu mai vedea în proiectul de modificare a statutului Societății<br />
Națiunilor o afacere baltică din moment ce independența și integritatea acestor țări ar fi [în]<br />
prealabil garantate, de a se desolidariza deci eventual de celelalte puteri mijlocii sau mici în<br />
lupta lor contra introducerii Tutelei în dreptul internațional.<br />
Pe de altă parte, Polonia ar fi mult mai jenată, cred, prin legăturile sale de solidaritate cu<br />
Țările Baltice decât prin altele, dacă ocazia s-ar prezenta pentru ea, a trece cu arme și bagaje<br />
la Geneva în câmpul tutorilor. Aceste legături de solidaritate s-ar fi putut considera ca deplin<br />
satisfăcute, și Polonia dezlegată cu atât în chestiunea modificării organizării Ligii, dacă Țările<br />
Baltice ar fi primit garanția ce li se oferea.<br />
Cred că astăzi interesul nostru este ca sentimentul de insecuritate în aceste părți să ducă<br />
la o uniune scandinavo-baltică, pe care am putea-o aduce dacă necesitatea s-ar face simțită,
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 235<br />
într-un bloc intransigent al statelor mijlocii și mici, iar nu la o grupare pur baltică, sub egida a<br />
două sau mai multe Mari Puteri, care ar scoate Letoniei, Estoniei și Lituaniei orișice spirit de<br />
combativitate față de imaginațiile italiene la Geneva.<br />
Chiar o garanție specială în cadrul Societății Națiunilor, în afară de un pact de garanție<br />
universal, garanție care pare a fi visul actual al oamenilor de stat baltici, nu-mi pare a<br />
corespunde cu interesele noastre. Ce ar însemna împărțirea Europei în puteri garante (din<br />
care U.R.S.S. ar face parte!) și puteri garantate dacă nu cea, detestată de noi, în puteri cu<br />
răspundere generală și limitată? Iar distincția între garanție și garantate sau negarantate nu<br />
poate conveni decât amicelor revizuirii.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 452-455.<br />
85. Diplomatic Report no. 35 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 18 th<br />
January 1934<br />
After a moment of surprise or hesitation, <strong>the</strong> Reval and Riga Governments realized that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet-Polish proposal pursued a limitation of <strong>the</strong>ir sovereignty ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong><br />
streng<strong>the</strong>ning of this sovereignty, and that <strong>the</strong> visibly intended exclusion of Germany from<br />
guaranteed powers – a Germany that was not requested – could only have a single purpose,<br />
<strong>the</strong> generation of a surplus, full of promises, of instigation and suspicion between <strong>the</strong> two<br />
fields of bourgeois powers, already divided.<br />
Except for <strong>the</strong> papers subsidized by Moscow, <strong>the</strong> whole press, even <strong>the</strong> most anti-German<br />
newspapers, eventually perceived <strong>the</strong> distinction: a general guarantee including Germany,<br />
but not <strong>the</strong> guardianship. Mr. Salnais thus expressed <strong>the</strong> general feeling when he declared <strong>the</strong><br />
following in his recent discourse: “Latvia shall not be part of any game of ei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> two<br />
rival groups, to avoid becoming just <strong>the</strong> object of tactical manoeuvres”.<br />
Once <strong>the</strong> intentions of Soviet Russia are clear, Warsaw’s motives are yet to be disclosed.<br />
As I cannot think that a realistic diplomacy like Poland’s can believe in <strong>the</strong> profitability of <strong>the</strong><br />
so-called encircling operation or even of threats in this sense, I’ll take my chances with <strong>the</strong><br />
following explanation.<br />
Last December, <strong>the</strong> Baltic Governments received with anxiety <strong>the</strong> discussions and relief of<br />
tensions between Berlin and Warsaw. Rumours that <strong>the</strong> two capitals were searching, behind<br />
Baltic States’ back, for a satisfactory settlement to <strong>the</strong> corridors issue, had circulated here<br />
intensely. The Baltic States’ confidence in Warsaw would have been seriously shaken if <strong>the</strong>se<br />
rumours were added <strong>the</strong> clear information that Soviet Russia, suggesting to Poland to jointly<br />
guarantee <strong>the</strong>ir independence, <strong>the</strong> latter would have refused to do it.<br />
Hence I do believe that <strong>the</strong> initiative of proposal belongs to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia and that<br />
Poland could not have refrained from following it. Besides advantages of ano<strong>the</strong>r nature,<br />
Moscow has also found in this manoeuvre an opportunity to find out whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> corridor<br />
issue was truly approached in such a radical manner in <strong>the</strong> German – Polish discussions.<br />
I think that Poland has also yielded to its “average power” complex, which is manifested in<br />
Warsaw each time it needs to play <strong>the</strong> protector’s role. In this respect, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, we<br />
must not regret <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Polish intercession.<br />
Actually, in <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries’ political circles, especially in Latvia, <strong>the</strong>re is an<br />
undeniable tendency to stop considering <strong>the</strong> project of modification of <strong>the</strong> statute of <strong>the</strong><br />
League of Nations as a Baltic business, since independence and integrity of <strong>the</strong>se countries
236 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
would be previously guaranteed, to possibly separate from o<strong>the</strong>r average or small powers in<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir fight against <strong>the</strong> introduction of Guardianship in <strong>the</strong> international law.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, I think Poland would feel much more embarrassed due to its<br />
sympa<strong>the</strong>tic <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries ra<strong>the</strong>r than with o<strong>the</strong>rs, if it had <strong>the</strong> chance<br />
to cross over, “with guns and baggage” to <strong>the</strong> side of guardians, in Geneva. These <strong>relations</strong> of<br />
sympathy could have been considered fully satisfied and Poland would have been released<br />
with <strong>the</strong> issue of changing <strong>the</strong> organization of <strong>the</strong> League, if Baltic countries had received <strong>the</strong><br />
guarantee that was offered to <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
I think today it is in our interest that <strong>the</strong> feeling of insecurity from <strong>the</strong>se territories lead to<br />
a Scandinavian – Baltic union, that we could achieve, if necessity requires, in an intransigent<br />
block of average and small states, ra<strong>the</strong>r than in a purely Baltic group, under <strong>the</strong> aegis of two<br />
or several Great Powers, which would determine Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to repress any<br />
fighting spirit in relation to Italian imaginations in Geneva.<br />
Even a special guarantee within <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, except for an universal guarantee<br />
pact, which seems to be <strong>the</strong> current dream of Baltic people, does not seem to me to be<br />
consistent with our interests. What would <strong>the</strong> separation of Europe in guarantor powers<br />
(where Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a part!) and guaranteed powers mean, if not one<br />
in powers with general and limited responsibility, which we detest? And <strong>the</strong> distinction<br />
between guarantee and guaranteed or non-guaranteed can only be convenient to supporters<br />
of revision.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 452-455.<br />
86. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail<br />
R. Sturdza nr. 64 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 29<br />
ianuarie 1934<br />
Pactul germano-polon și Țările Baltice<br />
Mă refer la raportul meu nr. 36 din 18 ianuarie.<br />
Vestea neașteptată a încheierii pactului germano-polon, urmând din scurt propunerile de<br />
garanție cu caracter anti-german făcute Țărilor baltice de Rusia Sovietică și Polonia, au<br />
surprins neplăcut aici lagărul socialist în plină campanie de răsturnare a actualului Ministru<br />
al Afacerilor Străine, acuzat de a fi cauza avortării proiectului sovietic.<br />
În Moscova presa s-a abținut până astăzi de la orice comentarii; pactul germano-polon<br />
este totuși prezentat ca un important succes al diplomației germane.<br />
Evenimentul va întări după toate probabilitățile poziția cabinetului Domnului Bļodnieks,<br />
ce părea ferm hotărât a se solidariza până la urmă cu politica de rezervă a Domnului Salnais.<br />
Se observă aici, post festum 1 , că indiciile nu lipseau pentru a arăta că Varșovia nu urmase<br />
decât fără entuziasm și pentru motive pur tactice o inițiativă care aparținea în întregime<br />
Moscovei. Astfel, intervențiile legațiilor polone în capitalele baltice nu urmaseră decât cu o<br />
sensibilă întârziere celor ale legațiilor sovietice; revenirea la șarjă nu se produsese decât în<br />
Kovno, unde singură Legația Sovietică avea ocazia a se pronunța; campania de opinie și<br />
atacurile în Parlament contra Ministrului Afacerilor Străine erau exclusiv conduse de ziarele<br />
și cercurile politice influențate de Moscova sau de Paris, pe când cele influențate de Polonia<br />
nu încetaseră a-l trata cu menajament. Astfel, încă, se remarcă calmul arătat de Reich și de<br />
1<br />
Expresie latină: după ce s-a terminat ceremonia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 237<br />
legațiile sale în momentul propunerilor sovieto-polone, calm ce pare astăzi a indica că<br />
explicații prealabile fuseseră schimbate între Berlin și Varșovia.<br />
ÎN CERCURILE DE DREAPTA SE SEMNALEAZĂ AVANTAJELE ARĂTATE ÎNCĂ O DATĂ<br />
DE ATITUDINEA ADOPTATĂ DE VARȘOVIA, COMPARATIV CU CEA A PUTERILOR<br />
ÎMPIETRITE FAȚĂ DE NOUL REICH DE UN CONSEMN STERIL, NU POLITIC CI DE<br />
DOCTRINĂ. CONSEMN CE A PROVOCAT DEJA IEȘIREA GERMANEI DIN SOCIETATEA<br />
NAȚIUNILOR, DÂND ACESTEI INSTITUȚII, PRINCIPALA GARANȚIE PENTRU MICILE<br />
PUTERI, CEA MAI GRAVĂ LOVITURĂ PE CARE A PRIMIT-O PÂNĂ ACUM.<br />
Cercurile Ministerului Afacerilor Străine par destul de îngrijorate și dezorientate. Solidaritatea<br />
franceză și polonă în materie germană, un moment compromisă la sfârșitul anului<br />
trecut, părea astăzi incontestabilă; chiar căldura cu care guvernul francez susținuse prin<br />
intermediul Domnului Cielēns propunerile sovieto-polone, confirmase recent aici această<br />
impresie.<br />
Ziarele socialiste, „Pēdējais Brīdis”, ziarul Legației sovietice între altele, găsesc că în urma<br />
pactului din Berlin nu rămâne Puterilor Baltice decât a se pune sub ocrotirea Moscovei.<br />
Situația creată prin succesiunea celor două evenimente (propunerile de garanție sovietopolone,<br />
pactul polono-german) inspiră oarecare reflecții. Rusia sovietică descoperită prin zisele<br />
propuneri, Germania angajată prin noul pact, Țările Baltice tulburate și de propunerile<br />
unora și de pactul celorlalți... niciodată climatul nord-estic nu a fost mai propice pentru un<br />
pact regional întins, Locarno oriental sau altul.<br />
Aceste împrejurări prielnice crea-vor evenimentul sau nu?<br />
Se poate spune în tot cazul că el este astăzi la discreția și la inițiativa Varșoviei și că în<br />
bună logică lunile ce vor urma ne vor arăta dacă Polonia, sau Polonia și Germania doresc a da<br />
ființă în aceste părți unui legământ atât de întins și de important.<br />
În legătură cu această întrebare aflu, tot din izvorul de informație menționat în telegrama<br />
mea nr. 50, că Ministrul sovietic în Berlin ar fi comunicat atât informatorului în chestiune, cât<br />
și Ambasadorului francez că, la cunoștința guvernului său, active negocieri au urmat între<br />
Berlin, Tokio și Varșovia și sunt pe cale a duce la un acord.<br />
Informatorul, adresându-se la Wilhelmstrasse cu o francă întrebare în privința<br />
presupusului acord germano-polon, răspunsul l-a lăsat nedumerit. „Încă o indiscreție a lui<br />
Rosenberg” i s-ar fi spus în locul competent.<br />
Pentru informatorul citat în sus-menționata mea telegramă, singura deosebire între<br />
politica domnului Rosenberg și a elementelor zburdalnice ale nazismului, pe de o parte, și<br />
Hitler și Wilhelmstrasse, pe de alta, în materie estică, ar fi numai o chestiune de calendar. Pe<br />
terenul exterior Hitler nu este deloc grăbit.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 462-465<br />
86. Diplomatic Report no. 64 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 29 th<br />
January 1934<br />
The German – Polish pact and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />
Ref. to my report no. 36 dated January 18 th .<br />
The unexpected news of <strong>the</strong> conclusion of <strong>the</strong> German-Polish pact, thoroughly consistent<br />
with proposals of guarantee with anti-German character made to <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries by <strong>the</strong>
238 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Soviet Russia and Poland, have unpleasantly surprised <strong>the</strong> socialist society, in full campaign<br />
of subversion of <strong>the</strong> current Minister of Foreign Affairs, accused of having aborted <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
project.<br />
In Moscow, <strong>the</strong> press has refrained from any comments until now, <strong>the</strong> German-Polish<br />
pact is still presented as an important success of <strong>the</strong> German diplomacy.<br />
According to all probabilities, <strong>the</strong> event shall streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> position of Mr. Bļodnieks’s<br />
cabinet, who seemed very determined to finally join Mr. Salnais’ reserved policy.<br />
Post festum 11 , it is noticed here that we had hints to show that Warsaw had followed, only<br />
without enthusiasm and for purely tactical reasons, an initiative which fully belonged to<br />
Moscow. Therefore, interventions of Polish legations in <strong>the</strong> Baltic capitals had followed those<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Soviet legations only with a substantial delay; <strong>the</strong> resuming of <strong>the</strong> charge had only<br />
occurred in Kovno, where <strong>the</strong> Soviet Legation had <strong>the</strong> occasion to decide by itself; <strong>the</strong><br />
opinion campaign and <strong>the</strong> parliamentary attacks against <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs were<br />
lead exclusively by newspapers and political circles influenced by Moscow or Paris, while<br />
those influenced by Poland did not cease to treat it sympa<strong>the</strong>tically. Therefore, one can still<br />
notice <strong>the</strong> calm shown by <strong>the</strong> Reich and by its legations on <strong>the</strong> moment of <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Polish<br />
proposals, a calm which today seems to show that previous explanations had been exchanged<br />
between Berlin and Warsaw.<br />
THE RIGHT-WING CIRCLES DISPLAY THE ADVANTAGES SHOWN ONE MORE TIME<br />
BY THE POSITION ADOPTED BY WARSAW, COMPARED TO THE ONE OF THE POWERS<br />
PARALYZED, WHEN FACED WITH THE NEW REICH, BY A STERILE AGREEMENT, OF<br />
DOCTRINE, NOT POLITICS. AGREEMENT THAT HAS ALREADY CAUSED GERMANY TO<br />
LEAVE THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GIVING THIS INSTITUTION – WHICH IS THE MAIN<br />
GUARANTEE FOR THE SMALL POWERS - THE HEAVIEST BLOW EVER.<br />
The circles of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs seem quite anxious and puzzled. The French<br />
and Polish sympathies towards Germany, compromised briefly at <strong>the</strong> end of last year, seemed<br />
incontestable today; even <strong>the</strong> warmth with which <strong>the</strong> French Government supported <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet-Polish proposals through Mister Cielēns has recently confirmed here this feeling.<br />
The socialist newspapers, “Pēdējais Brīdis”, <strong>the</strong> newspaper of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Legation among<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rs, consider that after <strong>the</strong> pact in Berlin, <strong>the</strong> Baltic Powers have no o<strong>the</strong>r choice but to<br />
put <strong>the</strong>mselves under Moscow’s protection.<br />
The situation created by <strong>the</strong> succession of <strong>the</strong> two events (<strong>the</strong> proposals of Soviet-Polish<br />
guarantee, <strong>the</strong> Polish-German pact) trigger certain reflections. The Soviet Russia discovered<br />
by means of <strong>the</strong> proposals, Germany involved in <strong>the</strong> new pact, <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries also<br />
disturbed by <strong>the</strong> proposals of some and by <strong>the</strong> pact of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs… <strong>the</strong> north-eastern climate<br />
has never been more favourable for an extended regional pact, oriental Locarno or ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Will <strong>the</strong>se favourable circumstances give birth to <strong>the</strong> event or not?<br />
In all cases, we can say that today such event is at Warsaw’s discretion and initiative, and<br />
that logically, <strong>the</strong> following months shall show us if Poland, or Poland and Germany, wish to<br />
give birth to such widely-spread and important agreement in <strong>the</strong>se part of Europe.<br />
Related to this question I find out, from <strong>the</strong> source of information mentioned also in my<br />
telegram no. 50, that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Minister in Berlin might have notified to <strong>the</strong> informer in<br />
question, as well as to <strong>the</strong> French Ambassador that, as its Government is aware, active<br />
1<br />
Latin expression: after <strong>the</strong> ceremony ended.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 239<br />
negotiations between Berlin, Tokyo and Warsaw followed and that <strong>the</strong>y are about to reach an<br />
agreement.<br />
The informer, addressing to Wilhelmstrasse with a transparent question concerning <strong>the</strong><br />
alleged German-Polish agreement, was perplexed by <strong>the</strong> answer. “One more of Rosenberg’s<br />
indiscretions” seems to have been <strong>the</strong> answer received.<br />
For <strong>the</strong> informer quoted in my above-mentioned telegram, <strong>the</strong> only distinction between<br />
<strong>the</strong> policy of Mr. Rosenberg and of <strong>the</strong> frisky element of <strong>the</strong> Nazism, on <strong>the</strong> one hand, and<br />
Hitler and Wilhelmstrasse, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, aes<strong>the</strong>tically speaking, would be only a matter<br />
of scheduling. In exterior, Hitler is not at all in a hurry.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 462-465.<br />
87. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 113 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 20<br />
februarie 1934<br />
Prelungirea Convenției de alianță letono-estoniană<br />
În timpul vizitei la Riga a Domnului Seljamaa 1 , Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Estoniei,în<br />
afară de diferite convenții de importanță secundară (convenție școlară, convenție veterinară,<br />
asistență judiciară) s-a semnat o Convenție de Organizare a alianței existente între cele două<br />
state.<br />
Noua convenție nu a lipsit a se inspira din unele importante recente acte <strong>diplomatic</strong>e. Ea<br />
nu schimbă totuși mult starea de fapt existentă, colaborarea în materie de politică externă<br />
între Letonia și Estonia fiind și până acum completă.<br />
Convenția prevede consultări regulate între cei doi miniștri ai afacerilor străine, crearea<br />
unui Consiliu permanent al Alianței, comunitatea de acțiune în toate conferințele internaționale,<br />
posibilitatea de a trimite delegații comune, posibilitatea pentru delegația unui stat<br />
(realizată deja la Conferința Agrară de la București 2 ) de a reprezenta interesele celuilalt,<br />
contactul și colaborarea între reprezentanțele <strong>diplomatic</strong>e și consulare ale celor două state.<br />
Cu prilejul încheierii convenției nu s-a înregistrat nici un progres privitor la constituirea<br />
Uniunii Vamale între Estonia și Letonia.<br />
Tot astfel niciun pas mai mult nu s-a făcut deunăzi în Riga spre constituirea unui Bloc al<br />
tuturor Țărilor Baltice. Speranțele [pe] care le trezise revirimentul în opinia lituaniană<br />
provocat de iscălirea pactului polono-german au rămas înșelate.<br />
Convenția exprimă totuși dorința și organizează posibilitatea aderării altor State Baltice.<br />
Dată fiind gravitatea avertismentelor date Țărilor Baltice de evenimentele ultimului an,<br />
trebuie recunoscut că expresia acestui simplu desideratum constituie un progres cam succint<br />
pe calea raționalizării raporturilor, și în această parte a lumii, între țările care doresc<br />
menținerea păcii și ordinii teritoriale existente.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 484-485.<br />
1<br />
Julius Seljamaa (1883-1936) a fost un politician și diplomat estonian. Ministru de Externe (1933-1936),<br />
reprezentant al țării sale în Rusia Sovietică (1919-1920), Ministru al Estoniei în Letonia (1922-1928), Lituania (1925-<br />
1926), U.R.S.S. (1928-1933).<br />
2<br />
Conferințele agrare au reunit în perioada crizei economice reprezentanți ai statelor agrare din Europa Centrală și<br />
de Est care au încercat să impună statelor industrializate o „clauză europeană” prin care exportatorii agricoli<br />
europeni ar fi fost favorizați în ceea ce privește pătrunderea pe piețele vest-europene în fața competitorilor<br />
extraeuropeni. Una dintre aceste conferințe s-a deschis la București la 18 octombrie 1930.
240 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
87. Diplomatic Report no. 113 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 20 th<br />
February 1934<br />
Prolongation of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian-Estonian Convention of alliance.<br />
During <strong>the</strong> visit to Riga of Mr. Seljamaa, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, besides<br />
different conventions of secondary importance (school convention, veterinary convention,<br />
legal assistance), Convention of Organization of <strong>the</strong> existing alliance between <strong>the</strong> two states<br />
was signed.<br />
The new convention did not miss <strong>the</strong> opportunity to get inspired from some fundamental<br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>documents</strong>. It still does not alter much <strong>the</strong> existing state of affairs, <strong>the</strong> collaboration<br />
in terms of foreign policy between Latvia and Estonia being complete up to now.<br />
The convention provides regular consultations between <strong>the</strong> two ministers of <strong>the</strong> foreign<br />
affairs, <strong>the</strong> creation of a permanent Council of <strong>the</strong> Alliance, <strong>the</strong> community of action in all<br />
<strong>the</strong> international conferences, <strong>the</strong> possibility to send joint delegations, <strong>the</strong> possibility for <strong>the</strong><br />
delegation of a country (already realized at <strong>the</strong> Agrarian Conference of Bucharest 1 ) to<br />
represent <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s interests, <strong>the</strong> contact and collaboration between <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> and<br />
consular offices of <strong>the</strong> two states.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> conclusion of <strong>the</strong> convention, no progress regarding <strong>the</strong> formation<br />
of a customs union between Estonia and Latvia was registered.<br />
Similarly, no step forward was achieved recently in Riga regarding <strong>the</strong> shaping of a block<br />
of all <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries. The hopes arisen from <strong>the</strong> revival in <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian attitude<br />
following <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> Polish-German pact were shuttered.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> convention expresses <strong>the</strong> will and organizes <strong>the</strong> possibility of adherence of<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic states. Given <strong>the</strong> magnitude of warnings <strong>the</strong> previous year’s events<br />
transmitted to <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries, it must be assumed that <strong>the</strong> expression of this simple<br />
desideratum represents a relatively little progress on <strong>the</strong> line of rationalization of <strong>the</strong> bonds<br />
in this part of <strong>the</strong> world as well between <strong>the</strong> countries that wish to maintain <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
peace and territorial order.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 484-485.<br />
88. Raportul lunar (februarie 1934) al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la<br />
Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 148 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 3 martie 1934<br />
Am onoarea a rezuma mai jos pentru luna Februarie 1934 situația și faptele relative la<br />
politica internă și externă a Letoniei:<br />
a. Politica internă<br />
Evenimentele din Austria au produs în rândurile social-democrației letone o vie agitație<br />
care a fost mai lesne înțeleasă când s-a descoperit că doi din principalii ei lideri – Domnii<br />
Brūno Kalniņš 2 , fiul președintelui Saeimei și Domnul Menders, șeful partidului social-<br />
1<br />
The agricultural conferences brought toge<strong>the</strong>r during <strong>the</strong> Great Depression representatives of <strong>the</strong> agrarian<br />
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and tried to impose a „European clause” by which <strong>the</strong> European<br />
agricultural exporters would have been favored in terms of market penetration in Western Europe in front of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
non-European competitors. One of <strong>the</strong>se conferences was opened in Bucharest on October 18, 1930.<br />
2<br />
Brūno (Bruno) Haralds Kalniņš (1899-1990) a fost un istoric și politician de stânga, membru al Parlamentului<br />
leton. Exilat în Suedia în timpul regimului autoritar al lui Konstantin Päts, a revenit în țara sa slujind obiectivele<br />
ocupanților sovietici (1940-1941). Închis de ocupanții germani (1941-1944), acesta se va stabili ulterior în exil și va<br />
critica regimul sovietic din Letonia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 241<br />
democrat – fuseseră la Viena în ajunul revoluției. Partea mai mult sau mai puțin activă pe<br />
care aceștia au avut-o în conciliabulele pregătitoare tulburărilor austriece, rămâne pentru<br />
moment obscură, se poate însă deduce că, în urma prăbușirii partidelor de stânga în<br />
Germania, social-democrația letonă a stabilit un contact mai strâns cu colegii lor din Austria.<br />
Manifestațiile de simpatie ale social-democraților letoni pentru revoluționarii austrieci au<br />
fost numeroase și zgomotoase. Astfel, de pildă, cu ocazia sosirii în Letonia, în ziua chiar a<br />
izbucnirii insurecției în Viena, a unui grup de 12 membri ai unei asociații „sportive” socialiste<br />
austriece, Domnul B. Kalniņš a mobilizat o numeroasă mulțime pe peronul gării și pe străzi,<br />
capii delegației sportive austriece au fost plimbați pe străzile orașului în automobilele<br />
Saeimei, al cărui președinte este tatăl Domnului Kalniņš. Cu două zile mai târziu Comitetul<br />
Central al Partidului Social-Democrat a invitat toată muncitorimea letonă de a face o grevă<br />
demonstrativă de cinci minute. Greva, de fapt, nu a fost executată decât de un număr restrâns<br />
de lucrători.<br />
Atât prin articolele ziarelor lor cât și prin discursuri, șefii social-democrați îndeamnă<br />
neîncetat clasa uvrieră din Letonia de a fi gata, în orice clipă, de o acțiune revoluționară<br />
asemănătoare cu cea din Austria.<br />
Se pare că această invitație ostentativă nu constituie un simplu „bluf”, și dacă trebuie<br />
crezute organele de dreapta, organizațiile așa-zise sportive social-democrate și diversele „case<br />
uvriere” posedă deja un suficient material tehnic pentru a tenta 1 un „putch” în genul celui din<br />
Viena. Presa burgheză atacă în fiece zi pe Domnul Mīlbergs 2 , Ministru de Interne, pentru<br />
atitudinea sa pasivă față de amenințările stângii. I se reproșează mai ales de a fi îngăduit<br />
intrarea în Letonia a numeroșilor refugiați suspecți din Germania și Austria și de a nu<br />
îndrăzni să ordone perchezițiile necesare în unele localuri ale social-democraților.<br />
Îndrăzni-vor social-democrații letoni să pună rodomontadele lor în execuție, să încerce o<br />
mișcare revoluționară înainte ca soarta lor să fie pecetluită printr-o eventuală înfrângere în<br />
alegeri? Totul depinde, cred, nu de posibilitățile de succes ce o asemenea mișcare le-ar putea<br />
avea, ci de instrucțiunile pe care socialismul leton le-ar putea primi de la Moscova,<br />
instrucțiuni ce vor fi urmate orbește.<br />
Deocamdată se poate observa un proces de apropiere între grupările socialiste și cele<br />
comuniste.<br />
Scăderea exportului, deficitul bugetar, menținerea artificială a valorii Latului, pun<br />
guvernul Bļodnieks în fața unor grave dificultăți interne. Situația sa mai este îngreunată de<br />
faptul că, în urma unor divergențe de vederi în materie economică, nu mai poate conta pe<br />
sprijinul partidului agrar, partidul Domnului Ulmanis.<br />
b. Situația economică și financiară internă.<br />
Negocierile economice anglo-letone începute la Londra în vederea încheierii unui Tratat<br />
de Comerț între cele două țări au fost întrerupte fără a da niciun rezultat.<br />
Anglia dorește să plaseze în Letonia, pe baza unor taxe vamale favorabile și a unui sistem<br />
de contingente, următoarele mărfuri: textile, cărbune și hering. Anglia ar dori mai ales să<br />
redevină principala furnizoare de cărbune, așa precum fusese înainte de anul 1925, când<br />
acoperea 93% din nevoile de cărbune ale Letoniei. Cererea Angliei se lovește însă de<br />
1<br />
În sensul de a încerca.<br />
2<br />
Gotfrīds Mīlbergs (1887-1942) a fost un scriitor și politician leton, Ministru de Interne (1933-1934). Deportat și<br />
executat în Uniunea Sovietică.
242 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
angajamentele contractate de Letonia cu alte state producătoare de cărbune (Belgia, Polonia<br />
etc.). Letonia dorește să-și mărească exportul său de unt și bacon în Anglia. Ambele state însă<br />
nu au putut cădea până acum de acord asupra fixării contingentelor.<br />
Fără îndoială însă că obstacolul principal întâmpinat de delegația letonă a fost chestiunea<br />
datoriei contractate de orașul Riga pe piața engleză, înainte și în timpul războiului, datorie<br />
ale cărei procente nu au fost achitate de ani de zile. Deținătorii obligațiunilor împrumutului<br />
au reușit, se pare, să creeze la Londra o atmosferă cu totul defavorabilă delegației letone.<br />
Negocierile s-au amânat sine die.<br />
În scopul de a atrage tranzitul sovietic pe teritoriul leton, guvernul din Riga a procedat la<br />
mărirea taxelor pentru tranzitul de mărfuri pe porțiunea de cale ferată Indra-Eglaine, distanța<br />
pe care mărfurile sovietice exportate spre Lituania sunt silite să o parcurgă pe teritoriul leton.<br />
În urma protestelor administrațiilor căilor ferate din Germania, Lituania și U.R.S.S. împotriva<br />
măsurilor luate de Letonia, o conferința va avea loc între reprezentanții acestor patru state la<br />
Riga. Anumite măsuri de represalii sunt privite la Kovno.<br />
c. Chestiuni speciale<br />
Guvernul va prezenta un proiect de lege privitor la luarea măsurilor de apărare împotriva<br />
eventualelor atacuri aeriene. Se vor organiza posturi de alarmă, distribuirea măștilor,<br />
construirea refugiilor, îngrijirea răniților etc.<br />
Pe lângă Ministerul de Război s-a înființat o Comisie însărcinată cu strângerea și<br />
administrarea unui fond destinat aviației militare. Fondul va fi alimentat prin loterii, colecte,<br />
reprezentații. Încercarea este lăudabilă, dar destinată să rămână stearpă. O sforțare pe terenul<br />
înarmărilor aeriene, organizată și concertată între Țările Baltice și eventual cele scandinave,<br />
ar constitui probabil prima de asigurare cea mai ieftină pe care aceste țări ar putea-o plăti<br />
contra anumitor primejdii ce le privesc în mod solidar. Colecta organizată de guvernul leton,<br />
împreună cu unele credite minuscule votate sau propuse în Estonia sau Finlanda, corespund<br />
acestui sentiment.<br />
Partidul Social-Democrat a supus unui plebiscit proiectul său privitor la asigurarea<br />
bătrâneții etc. Este demn de remarcat că cu tot caracterul demagogic al proiectului – a cărui<br />
realizare ar costa statul 60 de milioane de Lați pe an sub formă de pensii, subsidii etc, sumă<br />
ce depășește jumătatea bugetului actual – el nu a recoltat numărul de voturi necesare.<br />
Partidul social-democrat nu a renunțat totuși la acest proiect, care rămâne una din<br />
principalele sale arme electorale.<br />
d. Politica externă.<br />
Guvernul din Riga este astăzi convins că Varșovia, pe când făcea guvernelor baltice, alături<br />
de Soviete, cunoscuta propunere de „garanție a independenței” începuse deja, în secret, cu<br />
Germania negocierile care au dus la declarațiile de neagresiune din ianuarie trecut. Acest<br />
dublu joc al guvernului din Varșovia a avut ca rezultat [faptul] că statele baltice s-au fixat<br />
pentru moment, după unele ezitări, în o atitudine de neîncredere față de Polonia. Faptul că<br />
cu ocazia întrevederii Beck-Litvinov proiectul de garanție cu privire la 1 Țările Baltice nu a fost<br />
reluat în considerație pe o bază mai largă, autorizată pare-se de negocierile din Berlin, și că<br />
Varșovia le-a părăsit pur și simplu, alimentează neîncrederea Letoniei și grijile Lituaniei.<br />
*<br />
1<br />
În original, concernând.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 243<br />
Cu ocazia vizitei Ministrului Estonian al Afacerilor Străine la Riga s-a semnat o convenție<br />
de organizare a alianței existente între cele două state. Convenția prevede unele dispoziții<br />
care tind la strângerea colaborării dintre cele două state: crearea unui Consiliu Permanent al<br />
alianței, posibilitatea de a trimite delegații comune etc. Nu se poate însă constata niciun<br />
progres în direcția Uniunii Vamale estono-letone, nici în aceea a constituirii unui bloc baltic.<br />
O clauză specială îngăduie totuși aderarea celorlalte state baltice la convenție, ceea ce este<br />
bineînțeles o invitație adresată Lituaniei.<br />
Cu ocazia sărbătorii naționale lituaniene, Domnul Bļodnieks, Președintele Consiliului de<br />
Miniștri al Letoniei, a reînnoit invitația; după ce a evocat colaborarea din trecut dintre cele<br />
două popoare, a făcut urarea ca în momentele critice de astăzi, Lituania să se alăture<br />
celorlalte state baltice. Lituania a rămas și va rămâne probabil surdă. Avizul Moscovei va<br />
determina cred mult timp încă hotărârea Guvernului din Kovno în această chestiune.<br />
Chestiunea revizuirii: mă refer la raportul precedent.<br />
Chestiunea dezarmării …<br />
Chestiunea datoriilor de război…<br />
Chestiunea minorităților …<br />
Chestiunile în legătură cu Societatea Națiunilor: mă refer la raportul precedent.<br />
Chestiuni în legătură cu întrunirile internaționale<br />
Pactul balcanic a fost aici examinat cu deosebită atenție. El interesează guvernele baltice<br />
în principal în două privințe: 1) în ce măsură s-au cerut României, și indirect Poloniei,<br />
angajamente de natură a slăbi la un moment dat poziția sa militară pe frontiera rusească; 2)<br />
în ce măsură alianța turco-rusă a fost sau ar putea fi influențată de încheierea acestui pact sau<br />
de consecințele lui.<br />
Solicitat a-mi da părerea asupra primului punct, am explicat că pactul balcanic, care în<br />
definitiv era un pact consultativ, nu putea avea drept consecință, în caz de conflict, decât<br />
liberarea forțelor noastre de pe alte fronturi decât cel al Nistrului și deocamdată ușurarea<br />
grijilor noastre politice pe fronturile meridionale, că deci acest pact nu poate decât să ne<br />
permită o și mai eficientă concentrare a atenției noastre asupra altor chestiuni ale vieții<br />
politice europene.<br />
În ceea ce privește alianța turco-rusă, părerea aici este că ea este indisolubilă.<br />
e. Raporturile cu România.<br />
În urma încheierii tratatului de comerț dintre Letonia și U.R.S.S. se observă o încercare a<br />
Moscovei de a recâștiga piața letonă pentru exportul petrolului rusesc. Locul câștigat în ultima<br />
vreme de petrolul român pe această piață riscă astfel să fie pierdut, dacă exportatorii români nu<br />
ar aviza la timp. Casa „Quadrat” din Riga, care exportă în România încălțăminte din cauciuc și<br />
importă de acolo, pe cale de compensație, petrol, se plânge că întâmpină dificultăți din partea<br />
Băncii Naționale Române pentru importarea benzinei în Letonia. Cred că în acest moment,<br />
pentru motivele indicate, toate facilitățile ar trebui acordate, în marginea posibilului, păstrării și<br />
dezvoltării pieței de desfacere baltice pentru produsele noastre petrolifere.<br />
Am onoarea a ruga pe Excelența Voastră să binevoiască a primi asigurarea celei mai înalte<br />
mele considerații.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 486-494.
244 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
88. Monthly Report (February 1934) no. 148 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of<br />
Romania in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania<br />
Nicolae Titulescu, 3 rd March 1934<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to summarize below, for February 1934, <strong>the</strong> situation and facts<br />
concerning Latvia’s domestic and foreign policy.<br />
a. Domestic policy<br />
The events in Austria have caused, in <strong>the</strong> Latvian social-democratic society, a lively<br />
agitation which has been easily understood when discovery was made that two of its main<br />
leaders – Mr. Brūno Kalniņš 1 , <strong>the</strong> son of <strong>the</strong> President of Saeima and Mr. Menders, <strong>the</strong> head<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party – were in Vienna in <strong>the</strong> eve of revolution. The more or less<br />
active part that <strong>the</strong>y played in <strong>the</strong> preparatory reconcilements of Austrian disorders, remains<br />
obscure for <strong>the</strong> moment, but we can deduce that after <strong>the</strong> break-down of <strong>the</strong> left-wing parties<br />
in Germany, <strong>the</strong> Latvian social-democracy has established a stronger contact with <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
colleagues in Austria.<br />
The manifestations of sympathy of Latvian social-democrats for <strong>the</strong> Austrian<br />
revolutionaries have been numerous and loud. Therefore, for instance, on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong><br />
arrival in Latvia, right on <strong>the</strong> outburst of insurrection in Vienna, of a group of 12 members of<br />
an Austrian socialist “sports” association, Mr. B. Kalniņš mobilized a huge crowd on <strong>the</strong><br />
railway platform and on <strong>the</strong> streets, <strong>the</strong> heads of <strong>the</strong> Austrian sports delegation were driven<br />
on city’s streets in vehicles of Saeima, whose president is Mr. Kalniņš’ fa<strong>the</strong>r. Two days later,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Central Committee of <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party invited all Latvian labour force to<br />
undertake a five-minutes demonstrative strike. In fact, <strong>the</strong> strike was performed only by a<br />
restricted number of workers.<br />
Both in newspaper articles and in discourses, <strong>the</strong> social-democratic heads permanently<br />
advise workers from Latvia to be ready, at any moment, for a revolutionary action similar to<br />
<strong>the</strong> one in Austria.<br />
It seems that this outright invitation is not just a simple “bluff” and if we were to believe<br />
<strong>the</strong> right-wing parties, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> so-called social-democratic sports organizations and <strong>the</strong><br />
different “workers” already possess sufficient technical material to attempt 2 a “putsch” similar<br />
to <strong>the</strong> one in Vienna. The bourgeois press attacks Mr. Mīlbergs 3 , Minister of Internal Affairs<br />
every day for his passive position on <strong>the</strong> threats of <strong>the</strong> left-wing party. He is especially<br />
reproached for having allowed <strong>the</strong> access to Latvia of numerous suspect refugees from<br />
Germany and Austria, and for not having dared to order <strong>the</strong> necessary house searches in<br />
some offices of social-democrats.<br />
Will <strong>the</strong> Latvian social-democrats put in execution <strong>the</strong>ir fanfaronades, will <strong>the</strong>y try a<br />
revolutionary movement before <strong>the</strong>ir fate is doomed by a possible defeat in elections? I think<br />
that everything depends not on <strong>the</strong> chances of success that such movement could have, but<br />
1<br />
Brūno (Bruno) Haralds Kalniņš (1899-1990) was a historian and leftist politician, member of <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
Parliament. Exiled in Sweden during <strong>the</strong> authoritarian regime of Konstantin Pats, he returned to his country<br />
serving <strong>the</strong> goals of Soviet occupiers (1940-1941). Deported to a camp by German occupiers (1941-1944), he will set<br />
later into exile and criticize <strong>the</strong> Soviet regime of Latvia.<br />
2<br />
In <strong>the</strong> sense of trying.<br />
3<br />
Gotfrīds Mīlbergs (1887-1942) was a Latvian writer and politician, Minister of <strong>the</strong> Interior (1933-1934). Deported<br />
and executed in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 245<br />
on instructions that Latvian socialism could receive from Moscow, instructions that are to be<br />
followed blindly.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> meantime, one can notice a process of closeness between socialist and communist<br />
groups.<br />
The reduction in exports, <strong>the</strong> budgetary deficit, <strong>the</strong> artificial support of <strong>the</strong> Lat, confronts<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bļodnieks Government with severe domestic difficulties. Its situation is also aggravated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> fact that after some divergences of opinion regarding certain economic issues, <strong>the</strong><br />
support of <strong>the</strong> agrarian party, Mr. Ulmanis’ party, cannot be relied upon any longer.<br />
b. Domestic economic and financial situation<br />
The English-Latvian economic negotiations that started in London with <strong>the</strong> purpose to<br />
conclude a Trade Treaty between <strong>the</strong> two countries have been interrupted with no result.<br />
England wishes to place <strong>the</strong> following goods on Latvian markets, based on some<br />
favourable customs taxes and on a system of contingences: textiles, coal and herring. England<br />
would ra<strong>the</strong>r become once again <strong>the</strong> main coal supplier, as it was before 1925, when it<br />
covered 93% of Latvia’s coal demand. However, England’s request is inconsistent with<br />
commitments contracted by Latvia with o<strong>the</strong>r coal-producing states (Belgium, Poland, etc.).<br />
Latvia wishes to increase its exports of butter and bacon to England. However, both states<br />
have failed in agreeing on <strong>the</strong> setting of contingences.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong>re is no doubt that <strong>the</strong> main impediment encountered by <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
delegation was <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> debt contracted by Riga on <strong>the</strong> English market, before and<br />
during <strong>the</strong> war, a debt whose percentages have not been paid for years. It seems that <strong>the</strong><br />
holders of debentures of <strong>the</strong> loan have succeeded to create in London an atmosphere which is<br />
completely unfavourable to <strong>the</strong> Latvian delegation. Negotiations have been delayed sine die.<br />
With <strong>the</strong> purpose of attracting Soviet transit on <strong>the</strong> Latvian territory, <strong>the</strong> Riga<br />
Government has proceeded to increase taxes for <strong>the</strong> transit of goods on <strong>the</strong> railway section<br />
Indra-Eglaine, <strong>the</strong> path that Soviet goods exported to Lithuania are required to travel through<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian territory. Following <strong>the</strong> protests of <strong>the</strong> railways administrations in Germany,<br />
Lithuania and <strong>the</strong> USSR against measures taken by Latvia, a meeting shall take place between<br />
representatives of <strong>the</strong>se four states in Riga. Certain measures of reprisals are taken into<br />
account at Kovno.<br />
c. Special issues<br />
The Government shall present a draft law concerning defence measures against <strong>the</strong><br />
eventual air attacks. Alarm posts, distribution of gas masks, construction of shelters, patient<br />
care, etc. shall be organized.<br />
Besides <strong>the</strong> Ministry of War, a Commission charged with <strong>the</strong> collection and<br />
administration of a fund destined to military aviation was also settled. The fund shall be<br />
financed by lotteries, collections, representations. The attempt is creditable, but destined to<br />
remain unprolific. An effort in <strong>the</strong> field of air arming organized and concerted between <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic Countries and possibly <strong>the</strong> Scandinavian ones, would probably represent <strong>the</strong> cheapest<br />
insurance premium <strong>the</strong>se countries could pay against some dangers that concern <strong>the</strong>m<br />
separately. The collection organized by <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government, toge<strong>the</strong>r with some small<br />
credits voted for or intended in Estonia or Finland, are consistent with this view.<br />
The Social-Democratic Party subjected its project regarding <strong>the</strong> insurance of <strong>the</strong> old age to a<br />
referendum, etc. We must note that despite <strong>the</strong> demagogical nature of <strong>the</strong> project – whose
246 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
achievement would cost <strong>the</strong> State Lats 60 millions per year as pensions, subsidies, etc, amount<br />
which exceeds half of <strong>the</strong> current budget – it has not raised <strong>the</strong> number of necessary votes.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party did not give up to this project, which remains one<br />
of its electoral weapons.<br />
d. External policy.<br />
The Riga Government is nowadays convinced that Warsaw, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
countries, while making <strong>the</strong> known proposal of “guarantee of independence” to <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
Governments, has already started secret negotiations with Germany, which have lead to <strong>the</strong><br />
statements of non-aggression from last January. This double-sided game of <strong>the</strong> Warsaw<br />
Government has resulted in [<strong>the</strong> fact] that <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries, after some hesitations,<br />
developed a position of mistrust towards Poland. The fact that on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> Beck-<br />
Litvinov meeting, <strong>the</strong> project of guarantee with regard to 1 <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries was not taken<br />
into consideration again based on an extended basis, reportedly <strong>the</strong> negotiations from Berlin,<br />
and that Warsaw has simply abandoned <strong>the</strong>m, feeds Latvia’s mistrust and Lithuania’s concerns.<br />
*<br />
On <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> visit of <strong>the</strong> Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Riga, a<br />
convention of organization of <strong>the</strong> existing alliance between <strong>the</strong> two states was signed. The<br />
convention provides some dispositions that tend to tighten <strong>the</strong> collaboration between <strong>the</strong><br />
two states: <strong>the</strong> creation of a Permanent Council of <strong>the</strong> alliance, <strong>the</strong> possibility to send<br />
common delegations, etc. However, any progress was made nei<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> line of <strong>the</strong><br />
Estonian-Latvian Customs Union, nor in <strong>the</strong> one of establishing a Baltic block. A special<br />
provision still allows <strong>the</strong> adherence of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic countries to <strong>the</strong> convention, a fact<br />
which is an invitation addressed to Lithuania, of course.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian national holiday, Mr. Bļodnieks, <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong><br />
Council of Ministers of Latvia, has renewed <strong>the</strong> invitation; after having evoked <strong>the</strong><br />
collaboration of <strong>the</strong> two nations in <strong>the</strong> past, he has expressed <strong>the</strong> wish that in <strong>the</strong> current<br />
critical moments, Lithuania should join <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States. Lithuania has remained and<br />
shall probably remain numb. I think Moscow’s notice shall still determine <strong>the</strong> decision of <strong>the</strong><br />
Government from Kovno on this issue for a long time.<br />
The issue of revision: See <strong>the</strong> previous report.<br />
The issue of disarmament …<br />
The issue of war debts…<br />
The issue of minorities …<br />
Issues related to <strong>the</strong> League of Nations: See <strong>the</strong> previous report.<br />
Issues related to <strong>the</strong> international meetings.<br />
The Balkan Pact was examined here with a special attention. It is of interest for <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
Governments mainly in two directions: 1) to what extent Romania, and indirectly Poland,<br />
were requested commitments intended to weaken at a given moment <strong>the</strong>ir military position<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Russian border; 2) to what extent <strong>the</strong> Turkish-Russian alliance was influenced or could<br />
be influenced by <strong>the</strong> conclusion of this pact or by its consequences.<br />
Being required to say my opinion on <strong>the</strong> first point, I have explained that <strong>the</strong> Balkan Pact,<br />
which after all was a consultative pact, could not have ano<strong>the</strong>r consequence, in <strong>the</strong> event of a<br />
conflict, than <strong>the</strong> liberation of our forces from o<strong>the</strong>r fronts than that of <strong>the</strong> Dniester and for<br />
1<br />
In original, concerning.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 247<br />
<strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong> relief of our political concerns on <strong>the</strong> meridional fronts, consequently this<br />
pact can only allow a more efficient concentration of our attention on o<strong>the</strong>r issues of <strong>the</strong><br />
European political life.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> Turkish-Russian alliance is concerned, in my opinion, it is indissoluble.<br />
e. Relations with Romania.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> conclusion of <strong>the</strong> Trade Treaty between Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Union of Soviet Socialist<br />
Republics one can notice Moscow’s attempt to gain <strong>the</strong> Latvian market for <strong>the</strong> export of<br />
Russian oil again. The place recently gained by <strong>the</strong> Romanian oil on this market risks<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore to be lost, if Romanian exporters do not take note in due time. The “Quadrat” house<br />
in Riga, which exports in Romania rubber footwear and imports oil from <strong>the</strong>re as<br />
compensation, complains that it encounters difficulties on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> Romanian National<br />
Bank for importing gas in Latvia. I think that at this moment, for <strong>the</strong> above mentioned<br />
reasons, all <strong>the</strong> facilities should be granted, within possibilities, for preserving and developing<br />
<strong>the</strong> Balkan market for our oil products.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 486-494.<br />
89. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail<br />
R. Sturdza nr. 212 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 6<br />
aprilie 1934<br />
Prelungirea pactelor de neagresiune ruso-baltice<br />
Urmare telegramei mele nr. 200.<br />
Protocolul de prelungire a pactelor de neagresiune între U.R.S.S. și Țările Baltice a fost,<br />
după cum se anunțase, semnat în ziua de 4 aprilie la Moscova. Legămintele în chestiune sunt<br />
astfel prelungite până la 31 decembrie 1945.<br />
În mica cuvântare ținută cu acest prilej, Dl. Litvinov s-a felicitat de repeziciunea cu care<br />
Țările Baltice au răspuns apelului Domniei sale, repeziciune ce ar dovedi „creșterea încrederii<br />
reciproce”. Comisarul poporului nu a lipsit a sublinia faptul că menținerea independenței<br />
Țărilor Baltice este un factor important al politicii externe a Sovietelor. După versiunea<br />
primită deocamdată în Riga, Domnia sa a declarat că „RUSIA SOVIETICĂ NU CUNOAȘTE<br />
DIFERENDE DE ORDIN TERITORIAL și de aceea nu cere nici revizuirea tratatelor.”<br />
După Dl. Litvinov sunt prea multe țări care nu văd în primejdia unui război decât un<br />
motiv pentru a completa înarmările lor. Prezentul protocol, afirmă Domnia sa, „dovedește că<br />
mai sunt state care văd în întărirea păcii principala datorie a politicii lor externe”. Astfel se<br />
exprimă Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al țării care posedă astăzi probabil cel mai formidabil<br />
instrument militar pe care lumea l-a putut admira vreodată, construit cu sforțări uriașe în<br />
ultimii 12 ani.<br />
Moscova și-a dat tot atâta osteneală astăzi pentru a împreuna iscăliturile celor trei puteri<br />
burgheze pe protocoale de prelungire identice pe cât se străduia acum câțiva ani a despărți<br />
negocierile și încheierile pactelor de neagresiune înseși. Tendința României, Poloniei și a<br />
Puterilor Baltice de a solidariza negocierile lor părea Moscovei, pe atunci încă pradă maniei<br />
persecuției, un complot contra siguranței și demnității sale. Distinsele relații câștigate între<br />
timp de Moscova în Paris, Washington și Varșovia au debarasat-o aproape cu totul de acest<br />
sentiment de inferioritate.
248 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Neașteptata propunere a Moscovei a fost explicată aici: 1) prin dorința de a disipa impresia<br />
eșecului său <strong>diplomatic</strong> din decembrie trecut (propunerile de garanție); 2) ca o încercare de a<br />
corecta oarecum acest eșec, semnarea protocolului în chestiune oferind Domnului Litvinov<br />
prilejul de a plasa cupletul asupra independenței Țărilor Baltice; 3) ca un număr mai mult din<br />
dumpingul pacifist cu care Rusia sovietică ne-a obișnuit de câțiva ani.<br />
Finlanda nu a luat niciodată acest program în serios, preferând în această materie a nu<br />
ține cont de vorbe sau texte ci de fapte, adică: puterea militară sovietică sub cele două forme<br />
ale ei, armata sovietică, pregătirile înfăptuite și în curs în vederea insurecțiilor locale și<br />
revoluției mondiale. Ea, pe de altă parte, întotdeauna bucuroasă a marca distanțele între ea și<br />
celelalte țări baltice, s-a grăbit deci a nu da Domnului Litvinov satisfacția unei mise-en-scène<br />
complete micului sketch improvizat deunăzi în Moscova.<br />
Răspunsul întârziat al guvernului din Helsingfors va fi totuși afirmativ, și după toate<br />
probabilitățile un protocol de prelungire asemănător dacă nu identic va fi iscălit în curând de<br />
Ministrul Finlandei în Moscova.<br />
Nu voi lipsi a transmite Excelenței Voastre textele autentice îndată ce vor fi în posesia mea.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 519-521.<br />
89. Diplomatic Report no. 212 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 6 th<br />
April 1934<br />
Extension of Russian-Baltic non-aggression pacts<br />
Following my telegram no. 200.<br />
The protocol of extension of <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts between <strong>the</strong> Union of Soviet<br />
Socialist Republics and <strong>the</strong> Balkan Countries was signed on April 4 th in Moscow, as<br />
announced. The agreements in question are <strong>the</strong>refore extended until December 31 st , 1945.<br />
In a small discourse held on this occasion, Mr. Litvinov congratulated himself for <strong>the</strong><br />
promptness with which <strong>the</strong> Balkan Countries answered <strong>the</strong> appeal of His Excellency,<br />
promptness that proves “an improvement of mutual trust”. The people’s commissary did not<br />
forget to point out that maintaining <strong>the</strong> independence of <strong>the</strong> Balkan Countries is an important<br />
factor of Soviets’ external policy. According to <strong>the</strong> version received so far from Riga, His<br />
Excellency declared that “THE SOVIET RUSSIA DOES NOT EXPERIENCE DIFFERENCES OF<br />
TERRITORIAL ORDER” and that is why it does not ask <strong>the</strong> revision of treaties.”<br />
According to Mr. Litvinov, <strong>the</strong>re are too many countries that see in <strong>the</strong> menace of a war<br />
only a reason to complete <strong>the</strong>ir arming efforts. His Excellency asserts that <strong>the</strong> present<br />
protocol “proves that <strong>the</strong>re are o<strong>the</strong>r states that see <strong>the</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning of peace as <strong>the</strong> main<br />
duty of <strong>the</strong>ir external policy”. These are <strong>the</strong> words of <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of <strong>the</strong><br />
country who possesses today probably <strong>the</strong> most formidable military instrument that <strong>the</strong><br />
world could ever admire, established with high efforts in <strong>the</strong> last 12 years.<br />
Nowadays, Moscow itself has tried hardly to reunite <strong>the</strong> signatures of three bourgeois<br />
powers on identical protocols of extension, as it strived a few years ago to separate<br />
negotiations and conclusions of <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts. The tendency of Romania, Poland<br />
and of <strong>the</strong> Balkan Powers to combine <strong>the</strong>ir negotiations seemed to Moscow, still governed by<br />
<strong>the</strong> persecution mania at that time, a plot against its safety and dignity. The distinguished
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 249<br />
<strong>relations</strong> gained in time by Moscow in Paris, Washington and Warsaw have almost totally<br />
disembarrassed it of this feeling of inferiority.<br />
The unexpected proposal from Moscow has been explained here: 1) from <strong>the</strong> desire to<br />
dissipate <strong>the</strong> impression of its <strong>diplomatic</strong> failure from last December (proposals of<br />
guarantee); 2) as an attempt to correct somehow this failure, <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> protocol in<br />
question offered Mister Litvinov <strong>the</strong> opportunity to give <strong>the</strong> last word to <strong>the</strong> independence of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Balkan Countries; 3) as ano<strong>the</strong>r number of <strong>the</strong> pacifist dumping which <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia<br />
has accustomed us with for several years.<br />
Finland has never taken this program seriously, preferring in this respect not to take into<br />
account words and texts, but facts, namely: <strong>the</strong> Soviet military power under its two forms, <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet army, previous preparations and those in course of execution for local insurrections<br />
and worldwide revolution. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, always happy to highlight distances between it<br />
and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Balkan countries, it has hurried in not giving Mr. Litvinov <strong>the</strong> satisfaction of a<br />
complete staging of <strong>the</strong> small sketch improvised <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r day in Moscow.<br />
The delayed response of <strong>the</strong> Helsingfors Government shall still be positive, and after all<br />
probabilities, a protocol for extension, similar if not identical, shall be signed soon by <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister of Finland in Moscow.<br />
I will not forget to send Your Excellency <strong>the</strong> au<strong>the</strong>ntic texts as soon as <strong>the</strong>y shall be in my<br />
possession.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 519-521.<br />
90. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail<br />
R. Sturdza nr. 299 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 18<br />
mai 1934<br />
Lovitură de Stat în Letonia<br />
Urmare telegramei nr. 298.<br />
Soarta Parlamentului leton – și probabil a vieții parlamentare în Letonia –, de mult pusă în<br />
chestiune de majoritatea opiniei publice, a fost pecetluită de performanțele Saeimei în ultimele<br />
zile ale recentei sesiuni.<br />
Incapabilă de a înțelege primejdia ce o amenință sau neputincioasă în fața acestei primejdii,<br />
Saeima refuzase guvernului Domnului Ulmanis deplinele puteri economice și financiare cerute<br />
imperativ de împrejurări și despuiase articol cu articol de orice semnificație proiectul de<br />
reformă constituțională care răspundea setei generale de autoritate și eficacitate. În plus, prin<br />
trei voturi succesive, emise pe aceeași chestiune, Saeima, în ilaritatea generală, se contrazisese<br />
de trei ori în timp de 48 de ore, de fiecare dată cu o majoritate covârșitoare, după fluctuațiile<br />
târguielilor în culoare.<br />
Executarea hotărârii, de mult timp scumpă Domnului Ulmanis, de a suspenda pe o perioadă<br />
nelimitată viața parlamentară, nu mai putea întârzia.<br />
Pentru a legitima data exactă aleasă, în manifestul lor către popor, Domnul Ulmanis și<br />
Generalul Balodis invocă două comploturi: unul de stânga, altul de dreapta a căror existență ar<br />
fi fost în ultimele zile descoperită de guvern.<br />
Observatorii fără competență în asemenea materie se mărginesc a constata: 1) că lovitura de<br />
stat era, după numeroase indicii, pregătită deja de săptămâni de zile; 2) că o întârziere de 48 de<br />
ore în executarea ei ar fi îngreunat-o sensibil din punct de vedere tehnic. Într-adevăr, plecarea
250 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
membrilor Saeimei în concediu nu ar fi permis arestarea și reducerea la neputință în spațiu de o<br />
oră a celor 22 de deputați socialiști.<br />
Redusă la adevărata sa expresie lovitura de stat a Domnului Ulmanis și Generalului Balodis,<br />
provocată în general de paraplegia Parlamentului, este dirijată în special împotriva stângii.<br />
În afară de arestarea șefilor așa-zișilor „legionari”, o organizație 1 suspectă de altfel de legături<br />
cu comunismul și ai căror cei doi principali șefi au servit pe vremuri în armata sovietică, toate<br />
personalitățile arestate aparțin partidului social-democrat, organizărilor sindicaliste,<br />
organizărilor evreiești și grupurilor de emigranți. Ziarele suprimate sunt:<br />
14 (patrusprezece) ziare evreiești 2 ; „Europa-Ost”, ziarul emigranților germani.<br />
35 ziare social-democrate și socialiste. 3<br />
În schimb, ziarul german de dreapta, „Rigasche Rundschau”, care a adoptat de mult de altfel<br />
o atitudine cu totul favorabilă guvernului Ulmanis, nu a fost atins. Niciunul din șefii sau din<br />
membrii organizației „Pērkonkrusts”, organizație fascistă binecunoscută pentru toate<br />
scandalurile provocate în ultimii doi ani, nu a fost până acum tulburat. Aceasta pare a confirma<br />
zvonurile persistente relative la tratativele între această organizație și Generalul Balodis,<br />
zvonuri care au circulat cu persistență acum câteva săptămâni.<br />
După cum era de prevăzut, Domnul Ulmanis și-a remaniat Cabinetul său din momentul ce<br />
și-a căpătat mâinile libere; noii colaboratori ai Domnului Ulmanis și ai Generalului Balodis au<br />
fost aleși în principal din afara vieții politice. Singură alegerea domnului Skujenieks, șeful<br />
partidului progresist, ca Vicepreședinte al Cabinetului ar putea fi considerată ca un sacrificiu<br />
din dorința de a-și concilia colaborarea unui alt partid politic. Domnul Skujenieks este însă un<br />
amic personal al Domnului Ulmanis.<br />
Intențiile Domnului Ulmanis în materie de politică internă sunt destul de clar explicate în<br />
manifestul său. Confidențele unuia din colaboratorii săi intimi confirmă proiectul Domniei sale<br />
de a înlocui sistemul de reprezentanță parlamentară tradițional prin cel corporativ și<br />
profesional.<br />
În ceea ce privește politica externă, se poate presupune că Domnul Ulmanis nu și-a<br />
schimbat cunoscutele convingeri: 1) nu există, cel puțin astăzi, în mod practic, primejdie<br />
germană pentru Letonia și Estonia; 2) politica letonă față de Berlin trebuie să țină cont înainte<br />
de toate de necesitățile economice. Un indiciu demn de interes par perchezițiile și arestările la<br />
sediul organizării Boicotului Antigerman, ce au urmat imediat instaurării noului regim.<br />
Ministrul Franței în localitate a crezut necesar să ceară cu insistență să vadă pe Domnul<br />
Pauls Kalniņš, președintele Saeimei, îndată după arestarea lui.<br />
Franța, cred, își rezervă importante și inutile decepții dacă va continua să considere, atât în<br />
aceste țări cât și în altele, partidele și personalitățile de stânga și chiar extrema stângă, ca<br />
singurele apte a-i servi politica și interesele generale europene.<br />
P.S. Cauza arestării Domnului Pauls Kalniņš, președintele Saeimei, a fost găsirea unui întreg<br />
lagăr de arme și muniții în locuința Domniei sale. Aceasta după ce dăduse cuvântul său de<br />
onoare că nicio armă nu exista în casa sa. Informația era îndeobște cunoscută când Ministrul<br />
Franței a încercat să pătrundă la domiciliul Președintelui Saeimei și i-a depus cărțile de vizită.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 537-541.<br />
1<br />
În document, organizare.<br />
2<br />
Enumerarea respectivă nu este cuprinsă în acest volum.<br />
3<br />
Enumerarea respectivă nu este cuprinsă în acest volum.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 251<br />
90. Diplomatic Report no. 299 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 18 th<br />
May 1934<br />
Coup D’état in Latvia<br />
Following my telegram no. 298.<br />
The destiny of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Parliament – and probably of <strong>the</strong> parliamentary life in Latvia –<br />
questioned for a long time by <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> public opinion, was sealed by Saeima’s<br />
performances in <strong>the</strong> last days of <strong>the</strong> recent session.<br />
Unable to understand <strong>the</strong> danger that threatens it or unable to cope with this danger,<br />
Saeima refused Mr. Ulmanis’ Government <strong>the</strong> full economic and financial powers<br />
imperatively required by circumstances and has taken out any substance from every article of<br />
<strong>the</strong> constitutional reform project that answered to <strong>the</strong> general need of authority and<br />
efficiency. Moreover, by three successive votes, cast on <strong>the</strong> same matter, Saeima, in general<br />
amusement, contradicted itself three times in 48 hours, every time with an overwhelming<br />
majority, according to <strong>the</strong> fluctuations of <strong>the</strong> various agreements made on hallways.<br />
Execution of <strong>the</strong> decision to suspend for an unlimited period <strong>the</strong> parliamentary life, so<br />
important for Mr. Ulmanis, could not have been delayed any longer.<br />
In order to legitimate <strong>the</strong> selected date, in <strong>the</strong>ir manifest to <strong>the</strong> nation, Mr. Ulmanis and<br />
General Balodis invoked two plots: a left-wing one and a right-wing one, whose existence was<br />
allegedly discovered by <strong>the</strong> Government in <strong>the</strong> last days.<br />
Observers with no competence in such issues limit <strong>the</strong>mselves in stating <strong>the</strong> following: 1)<br />
that after numerous hints, <strong>the</strong> coup d’état has been prepared for several weeks; 2) that a delay<br />
of 48 hours in its execution would have sensibly aggravated it from a technical point of view.<br />
Actually, <strong>the</strong> holidays of <strong>the</strong> members of Saeima would not have allowed <strong>the</strong> arrest and relief<br />
from duties of 22 socialist deputies within one hour.<br />
Reduced to its real expression, <strong>the</strong> coup d’état of Mister Ulmanis and of General Balodis,<br />
generally produced by <strong>the</strong> Parliament’s numbness, is specially directed against <strong>the</strong> left-wing<br />
party.<br />
Besides <strong>the</strong> arrest of <strong>the</strong> heads of <strong>the</strong> so-called “legionaries”, an organization suspected to<br />
have of <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> communism and whose main two heads formerly served <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
army, all personalities arrested belong to <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party, to unionist<br />
organizations, to Jewish organizations and to <strong>the</strong> groups of emigrants. The newspapers<br />
suppressed are:<br />
14 (fourteen) Jewish newspapers 1 ; “Europa-Ost”, <strong>the</strong> newspaper of German emigrants.<br />
35 social-democratic and socialist newspapers. 2<br />
Instead, <strong>the</strong> German right-wing newspaper “Rigasche Rundschau”, which has adopted a<br />
position completely favourable to <strong>the</strong> Ulmanis Government, was not affected. None of <strong>the</strong><br />
heads or members of <strong>the</strong> organization “Pērkonkrusts”, a fascist organization well-known for all<br />
<strong>the</strong> scandals produced in <strong>the</strong> last two years, have been taken measures against until now. This<br />
seems to confirm <strong>the</strong> persistent rumours concerning negotiations between this organization<br />
and General Balodis, rumours which circulated with persistence a few weeks ago.<br />
1<br />
The respective enumeration is not comprised in this volume.<br />
2<br />
The respective enumeration is not comprised in this volume.
252 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
As foreseen, Mr. Ulmanis has reshuffled his Cabinet since he was set free; <strong>the</strong> new<br />
collaborators of Mr. Ulmanis and General Balodis have been chosen mainly from outside <strong>the</strong><br />
political life. It is solely <strong>the</strong> decision of Mister Skujenieks, <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> Progressive Party, as<br />
Vice-President of <strong>the</strong> Cabinet, that could be considered as a sacrifice for <strong>the</strong> wish to<br />
conciliate <strong>the</strong> collaboration of ano<strong>the</strong>r political party. However, Mr. Skujenieks is a personal<br />
friend of Mr. Ulmanis.<br />
The intentions of Mr. Ulmanis in terms of domestic policy are clearly enough explained in<br />
his manifest. The confidences of one of its intimate collaborators confirm <strong>the</strong> project of His<br />
Excellency to replace <strong>the</strong> traditional system of parliamentary representations with <strong>the</strong><br />
corporative and professional one.<br />
In terms of external policy, it can be assumed that Mr.Ulmanis has not changed his<br />
known beliefs: 1) practically, <strong>the</strong>re is no German danger for Latvia and Estonia, at least at<br />
present time; 2) first of all, <strong>the</strong> Latvian policy towards Berlin must take into account<br />
economic needs. A hint worthy to be mentioned seems to be <strong>the</strong> house searches and arrests<br />
made at <strong>the</strong> headquarters of <strong>the</strong> Organization of <strong>the</strong> Anti-German Boycott, which followed<br />
immediately after <strong>the</strong> instauration of <strong>the</strong> new regime.<br />
The local Ministry of France considered that it was necessary to ask insistently to see Mr.<br />
Pauls Kalniņš, <strong>the</strong> President of Saeima, immediately after his arrest.<br />
I think that France reserves itself important and futile deceptions if it continues to<br />
consider, both in <strong>the</strong>se countries as in o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong> left-wing and radical left-wing parties and<br />
personalities as <strong>the</strong> only ones capable to serve <strong>the</strong> policy and <strong>the</strong> general European interests.<br />
P.S. The reason for Mister Pauls Kalniņš’ arrest, who is <strong>the</strong> President of Saeima, was <strong>the</strong><br />
finding of an entire storeroom of arms and munitions in His Excellency’s home, after he had<br />
given his word of honour that <strong>the</strong>re were no guns in his house. This information was<br />
generally known when <strong>the</strong> Minister of France tried to enter <strong>the</strong> residence of <strong>the</strong> President of<br />
Saeima and left his visiting cards.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 537-541.<br />
91. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 331 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 4<br />
iunie 1934<br />
Noul regim în Letonia<br />
Ziarele „Pravda” și „Le Temps” și în general presa franceză și sovietică au luat în ultimele<br />
zile hotărârea de a se felicita de directivele imprimate politicii interne și externe letone de<br />
guvernul Ulmanis. Temerile de a vedea noul Guvern transformându-se într-un regim fascist și<br />
căzând sub influența organizațiilor de extremă dreaptă care ar fi primejduit independența<br />
Letoniei în beneficiul Reichului s-ar fi arătat nefondate.<br />
Organizații letone de extrema dreaptă favorabile Reichului nu există, după cum o știe<br />
foarte bine informația 1 și presa sovietică. Organizațiile de extrema dreaptă sunt în Letonia<br />
extrem de naționaliste, opuse prin definiție atât influenței Reichului, cât și a celei interne și<br />
externe a Rusiei Sovietice și în general oricărei influențe străine. Oareșicare rezervă ar trebui<br />
făcută poate în ceea ce privește influența polonă. În această privință un rol important este<br />
jucat de legăturile existente între aceste organizații și cercurile militare, câștigate convingerii<br />
1<br />
În sensul de organele de informații.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 253<br />
că orișice operațiune eventuală de apărare a teritoriului nu s-ar putea face decât cu ajutorul<br />
forțelor polone.<br />
În ceea ce privește natura internă a regimului Ulmanis-Balodis, nu poate rămânea nicio<br />
îndoială că el este un regim de extrema dreaptă în sensul postbelic al cuvântului. Anexez aici<br />
alăturat în traducere un discurs extrem de edificator în această privință al Domnului Kviesis,<br />
Președintele Republicii letone.<br />
Organizația Pērkonkrustului, organizație curat fascistă, nu numai că a fost lăsată în pace de<br />
noul regim, dar formează indirect una din bazele sale. Într-adevăr, din primele ceasuri ale<br />
loviturii de stat și până astăzi Domnii Ulmanis și Balodis au arătat o încredere ilimitată în Garda<br />
Națională (Aizsargi), mobilizând-o în întregime pe întreg teritoriul și servindu-se de ea ca<br />
instrument de instaurare a noii ordini. Este binecunoscut că [membrii] Aizsargi sunt în<br />
majoritatea lor câștigați Pērkonkrustului.<br />
Dacă cea mai mică nedumerire ar putea subzista asupra caracterului mișcării Ulmanis-<br />
Balodis, ea ar fi imediat ridicată la vederea frumoasei fotografii care stă de două zile pe biroul<br />
colegului meu italian. În această fotografie Domnia sa este reprezentat alături de Președintele<br />
Consiliului de Miniștri leton pe scările Ministerului Afacerilor Străine cu dedicația următoare<br />
scrisă și iscălită de mâna însăși a Domnului Ulmanis: „Noi suntem cei care arătăm calea.”<br />
Este drept că printre primele arestări operate au fost 16 așa-ziși „legionari”, care reprezentau<br />
șefii și trupa unei organizații de caracter dubios și de origine se zice polițienească, fără nicio<br />
importanță numerică, contra căreia guvernul precedent luase măsuri riguroase și ostentative<br />
pentru a legitima astfel de măsuri de distrugere luate contra organizațiilor comuniste.<br />
Domnul Ulmanis și Generalul Balodis, hotărâți de a distruge de astă dată în Letonia și<br />
socialismul, nu au lipsit a repeta manevra. Încolo toate arestările, toate interdicțiile de ziare<br />
locale și străine, toate măsurile au fost îndreptate contra persoanelor partidelor și organizațiilor<br />
de stânga și contra celor evreiești. Măsurile luate contra acestora din urmă au fost dictate nu<br />
din considerații de rasă, ci din considerații pur politice.<br />
Este cred necesar a reține aceste fapte pentru a avea o vedere exactă a adevăratelor<br />
sentimente ale Moscovei față de noile regimuri din Țările Baltice.<br />
*<br />
Incidentul pe care îl raportez mai jos poate servi ca element de apreciere a influențelor<br />
exercitate în momentul de față asupra noului regim și a rezultatelor lor.<br />
Ministrul Italiei 1 întrebând zâmbind, în fața mea, pe Secretarul General al Ministerului<br />
Afacerilor Străine, Dl. Munters – brațul drept al Domnului Ulmanis: „Fără indiscreție, cât timp<br />
aveți de gând să țineți pe fostul Președinte al Saeimei în umbră?!!”, răspunsul răspicat a fost:<br />
„Cel puțin atâta timp cât Ministrul Franței va continua a se interesa de el”. Domnul Tripier 2 ,<br />
colegul meu francez, era la doi pași de noi în acest moment și după toate probabilitățile acustice<br />
și întrebarea, și răspunsul au ajuns la cunoștința Domniei sale.<br />
Am onoarea a pune aici alăturat sub ochii Excelenței Voastre o proclamație a șefilor<br />
minorității germane în Letonia. Proclamația constituie, după părerea tuturor, demonstrația de<br />
lealitate cea mai hotărâtă pe care minoritatea germană să fi găsit cu cale de lungi ani de zile a o<br />
manifesta.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 547- 550.<br />
1<br />
Giorgio Francesco Mameli, Ministru al Italiei în Letonia în perioada 1933-1936.<br />
2<br />
Jean Tripier (1878-1969), Ministru al Franței în Letonia în perioada 1930-1939.
254 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
91. Diplomatic Report no. 331 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 4 th<br />
June 1934<br />
The new Latvian regime<br />
The newspapers “Pravda” and “Le Temps” and generally <strong>the</strong> French and <strong>the</strong> Soviet press<br />
have taken in <strong>the</strong> last days <strong>the</strong> decision to compliment <strong>the</strong>mselves for <strong>the</strong> directives imposed<br />
to Latvian domestic and external policies by <strong>the</strong> Ulmanis Government. The fears of seeing <strong>the</strong><br />
new Government shifting to a fascist regime and falling under <strong>the</strong> influence of radical rightwing<br />
organizations which would have endangered Latvia’s independence in <strong>the</strong> benefit of <strong>the</strong><br />
Reich have proved to be unfounded.<br />
There are no Latvian radical right-wing organizations favourable to <strong>the</strong> Reich, as <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet information 1 and press know very well. The radical right-wing organizations are<br />
extremely nationalist in Latvia, contrary by definition both to <strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> Reich and<br />
to <strong>the</strong> internal and external influences of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia, and generally to any foreign<br />
influence. Some reserve should be taken as <strong>the</strong> Polish influence is concerned. In this respect,<br />
an important role is played by <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong>se organizations and <strong>the</strong> military<br />
circles, gained upon <strong>the</strong> conviction that any eventual operation of territorial defence could<br />
have been executed only with <strong>the</strong> aid of <strong>the</strong> Polish forces.<br />
In respect of <strong>the</strong> domestic nature of Ulmanis-Balodis regime, <strong>the</strong>re was no doubt that it is<br />
a radical right-wing regime, in <strong>the</strong> post-war meaning of this word. I attach hereto in<br />
translation a discourse of Mr. Kviesis, President of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Republic, extremely probative<br />
in this regard.<br />
The Pērkonkrust organization, a pure fascist organization, has been left untouched by <strong>the</strong><br />
new regime, but, moreover, it indirectly forms one of its bases. Actually, from <strong>the</strong> first hours<br />
after <strong>the</strong> coup d’état and until today, Misters Ulmanis and Balodis have shown an unlimited<br />
trust in <strong>the</strong> National Guard (Aizsargi), fully mobilizing it on <strong>the</strong> entire territory and using it<br />
as an instrument of enforcement of a new order. It is well known that <strong>the</strong> [members] of<br />
Aizsargi are in <strong>the</strong>ir majority devoted to Pērkonkrust.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> smallest doubt could be raised in relation to <strong>the</strong> character of <strong>the</strong> Ulmanis-Balodis<br />
movement, it would be immediately forgotten after visualizing <strong>the</strong> beautiful photography<br />
which has been sitting for two days on <strong>the</strong> desk of my Italian colleague 2 . In this photography,<br />
His Excellency appears near <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Latvian Ministers on <strong>the</strong> stairs of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs with <strong>the</strong> following dedication written and signed by Mister<br />
Ulmanis’s himself: “We are <strong>the</strong> ones to show <strong>the</strong> way”.<br />
It is true that among <strong>the</strong> first operated arrests <strong>the</strong>re were 16 so-called “legionaries”, who<br />
represented <strong>the</strong> heads and <strong>the</strong> troops of an organization with uncertain character and of<br />
allegedly constabulary origin, with no numerical importance, against which <strong>the</strong> previous<br />
Government has taken serious and outright measures in order to legitimate such measures of<br />
destruction against communist organizations.<br />
Mr. Ulmanis and General Balodis, convinced that <strong>the</strong>y have to annihilate <strong>the</strong> socialism in<br />
Latvia this time, repeated <strong>the</strong> manoeuvre. Despite all arrests, all interdictions of local and<br />
foreign newspapers, all measures have been directed against left-wing persons, parties and<br />
1<br />
In <strong>the</strong> sense of information bodies.<br />
2<br />
Giorgio Francesco Mameli, Italian Minister of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> period 1933-1936.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 255<br />
organizations and against <strong>the</strong> Jewish ones. The measures taken against <strong>the</strong> latter have been<br />
dictated not out of racial considerations, but based on purely political considerations.<br />
I think it is necessary to note <strong>the</strong>se facts in order to have an accurate view on <strong>the</strong> true<br />
feelings of Moscow concerning <strong>the</strong> new regimes in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries.<br />
*<br />
The incident that I shall report below can serve as element of appreciation for influences<br />
exercised at <strong>the</strong> present moment on <strong>the</strong> new regime and on <strong>the</strong>ir results.<br />
Before me, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Italy asked <strong>the</strong> General Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs, Mr. Munters – Mr. Ulmanis’ right hand - smiling: “With no indiscretion, how long do<br />
you intend to keep <strong>the</strong> ex-President of Saeima in <strong>the</strong> shadow?!!”, his unequivocal answer was<br />
<strong>the</strong> following: „At least as long <strong>the</strong> Minister of France 1 shall continue to ask for him”. Mister<br />
Tripier, my French colleague, was very close to us in this moment and according to all <strong>the</strong><br />
acoustic probabilities <strong>the</strong> question, as well as <strong>the</strong> answer, were heard by His Excellency.<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to mention hereto, under <strong>the</strong> sight of Your Excellency, a proclamation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> heads of <strong>the</strong> German minority in Latvia. The proclamation represents, in everyone’s<br />
opinion, <strong>the</strong> most decisive demonstration of loyalty that <strong>the</strong> German minority has manifested,<br />
after many years of trying it.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 547- 550.<br />
92. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 403 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 13 iulie<br />
1934<br />
Guvernele Baltice și negocierea relativă la pactele de asistență mutuală<br />
Desfășurarea negocierii relative la un pact nord-estic de asistență mutuală în care Franța ar<br />
intra eventual ca garantă, zvonurile relative la completarea pactului renan prin asocierea sub o<br />
formă sau alta a Rusiei Sovietice și a Armatei Roșii sunt urmărite aici în primul caz cu cea mai<br />
mare atenție, în al doilea cu vădită neliniște chiar.<br />
Până în momentul de față și fără prejudiciul efectului pe care l-ar putea produce o precizare<br />
a atitudinii Marii Britanii sau o schimbare radicală a celei italiene, punctul de vedere al<br />
guvernelor din Riga și Reval rămâne cel raportat precedent. Un pact nord-estic de asistență<br />
mutuală nu ar fi altceva decât un tratat de alianță în cazul când toate puterile interesate nu ar fi<br />
din capul locului participante sau în cazul când agresiunea unei puteri neparticipante ar<br />
constitui un casus foederis 2 . Hotărârea germană pare pentru guvernele din Riga și Reval legată<br />
în mod deocamdată imprecise, dar totuși operant de hotărârea Varșoviei. În consecință, ochii<br />
factorilor răspunzători în Letonia și Estonia sunt fixați asupra Varșoviei și este puțin probabil ca<br />
o hotărâre în această privință să le poată fi sugerată în contrazicere cu sfaturile guvernului<br />
polon.<br />
În ceea ce privește asocierea Rusiei Sovietice pactului renan, asociere despre care Domnul<br />
Brodovski, Ministrul sovietic în localitate, a evocat-o cu diferite împrejurări, solidaritatea<br />
polono-baltică pare și mai inevitabilă. Nici un kilometru de graniță comună nu există între<br />
Rusia Sovietică și Germania. Obligația de a interveni în cazul unei agresiuni germane pe Rin nu<br />
1<br />
Jean Tripier (1878-1969), Minister of France in Latvia during 1930-1939.<br />
2<br />
Expresie latină: caz de alianță, clauză stipulată în tratatele de alianță prin care un stat este obligat să intre în<br />
război alături de aliatul său, atunci când acesta este atacat de o altă putere.
256 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
se poate închipui decât cu colaborarea militară a puterilor geografic interpuse, Polonia și Statele<br />
Baltice, sau poate peste voința și teritoriul lor.<br />
Îngrijorările suscitate de ambele aceste chestiuni au provocat astfel două curente în opinia<br />
baltică: unul de apropiere între cele trei mici țări surori (Letonia, Estonia, Lituania), altul de<br />
apropiere mai intimă încă între Estonia, Letonia și Polonia. Se poate spune că aceste două<br />
curente operează pentru moment paralel. Ele nu vor coincide decât în cazul unei destinderi<br />
polono-lituaniene, destindere la care se lucrează în momentul de față foarte activ.<br />
În Kovno toată influența guvernelor din Riga și Reval se exercită în sensul apropierii polonolituaniene.<br />
Alte influențe contrare nu lipsesc, unele incontestabile, altele numai bănuite. De<br />
triumful unora sau altora depinde cred astăzi în întregime atitudinea finală a guvernelor din<br />
Riga și Reval în chestiunile la ordinea zilei.<br />
Fără a risca niciun pronostic, menționez că pentru unele opinii competente și bine<br />
informate apariția, în negocierile în curs, a unui Bloc Baltic mai întâi, și a unui Bloc polonobaltic<br />
mai pe urmă, cu toată greutatea geografică și politică pe care un asemenea bloc ar<br />
reprezentau-o, nu este exclusă.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 557-559.<br />
92. Diplomatic Report no. 403 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 13 th<br />
July 1934<br />
The Baltic Governments and <strong>the</strong> negotiation concerning mutual assistance pacts.<br />
The development of <strong>the</strong> negotiation related to a north-eastern pact of mutual assistance<br />
where France could eventually enter as guarantor, <strong>the</strong> rumours related to completion of <strong>the</strong><br />
Rhineland pact by association under one form or ano<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia and of <strong>the</strong> Red<br />
Army are followed here with <strong>the</strong> greatest attention in <strong>the</strong> first case, and in <strong>the</strong> second case even<br />
with obvious unease.<br />
Until <strong>the</strong> present moment and without <strong>the</strong> prejudice of <strong>the</strong> effect that a clarification of <strong>the</strong><br />
attitude of <strong>the</strong> Great Britain or a radical change of <strong>the</strong> Italian position could produce, <strong>the</strong> point<br />
of view of <strong>the</strong> Riga and Reval Governments remains as previously reported. A north-eastern<br />
pact of mutual assistance would not be something else than a treaty of alliance if none of <strong>the</strong><br />
interested powers were signatories in <strong>the</strong> first place or if <strong>the</strong> aggression of a non-signatory<br />
power represented a casus foederis 1 . The German decision for <strong>the</strong> Governments from Riga and<br />
Reval seems imprecisely, but still operatively related, for <strong>the</strong> moment, to <strong>the</strong> decision of<br />
Warsaw. As a consequence, <strong>the</strong> eyes of <strong>the</strong> responsible factors in Latvia and Estonia are on<br />
Warsaw and it is less probable that a decision in this regard shall be suggested to <strong>the</strong>m against<br />
<strong>the</strong> advices of <strong>the</strong> Polish Government.<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong> association of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia to <strong>the</strong> Rheinland pact, an association which<br />
was evoked on different occasions by Mr. Brodovski, <strong>the</strong> local Soviet Minister, <strong>the</strong> Polish-Baltic<br />
solidarity seems even more inevitable. There is less than a kilometre of common border<br />
between <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia and Germany. The obligation to intervene in <strong>the</strong> case of a German<br />
aggression on <strong>the</strong> Rhine can be imagined only with <strong>the</strong> military collaboration of <strong>the</strong> powers<br />
interposed geographically, Poland and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, or even over <strong>the</strong>ir will and territory.<br />
1<br />
Latin expression: case of alliance, provision stipulated in <strong>the</strong> treaties of alliance through which a state is obliged<br />
to enter <strong>the</strong> war toge<strong>the</strong>r with its ally, when it is attacked by ano<strong>the</strong>r power.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 257<br />
The concerns produced by both <strong>the</strong>se issues have produced <strong>the</strong>refore two trends in <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic opinion: one of closeness between <strong>the</strong> three small sister countries (Latvia, Estonia,<br />
Lithuania), and ano<strong>the</strong>r one of more intimate closeness between Estonia, Latvia and Poland. It<br />
can be said that <strong>the</strong>se trends operate in parallel for <strong>the</strong> moment. They shall coincide only in <strong>the</strong><br />
event of a Polish-Lithuanian relief, on which is being worked on very actively at <strong>the</strong> present<br />
moment.<br />
In Kovno, all influence of Riga and Reval Governments are exercised in <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong><br />
Polish-Lithuanian closeness. O<strong>the</strong>r contrary influences are not absent, some of <strong>the</strong>m<br />
incontestable, o<strong>the</strong>rs only alleged. I think that <strong>the</strong> final position of Riga and Reval Governments<br />
regarding today’s matters depends on <strong>the</strong> triumph of <strong>the</strong> one or ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Without risking any prognosis, I mention that for some competent and well informed<br />
opinions, in <strong>the</strong> current negotiations, <strong>the</strong> occurrence of a Baltic Block first and of a Polish-Baltic<br />
Block secondly, with all geographical and political influence that such a block would incur, is<br />
not excluded.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 557-559.<br />
93. Raportul lunar (iulie 1934) al însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al României la<br />
Riga Th. Scortzescu nr. 429 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 5 august 1934<br />
Am onoarea a rezuma mai jos pentru luna Iulie 1934 situația și faptele relative la politica<br />
internă și externă a Letoniei:<br />
a. Politica internă<br />
Desfășurarea procesului împotriva deputaților comuniști a dus la constatarea că dânșii se<br />
făcuseră vinovați de acte grave împotriva siguranței statului: instigare la rebeliune în armată,<br />
propagandă comunistă în fabricile de muniții etc. S-a dovedit, de asemenea, că acuzații erau în<br />
strânsă legătură cu Moscova. Din cei 6 deputați inculpați 4 au fost condamnați la 8 ani muncă<br />
silnică, iar ceilalți doi la 6 și 3 ani închisoare. Acești deputați ar fi putut fugi în noiembrie trecut<br />
în U.R.S.S., dar se pare că guvernul sovietic îi sfătuise atunci a rămâne în Letonia pentru a nu da<br />
maselor muncitorești impresia că conducătorii comuniști sunt lipsiți de demnitate și curaj.<br />
Un alt proces va avea loc în curând împotriva unui important grup de comuniști descoperit<br />
la Libau 1 , compus în cea mai mare parte din evrei.<br />
În ceea ce privește partidul social-democrat, campania sa împotriva guvernului continuă în<br />
clasa uvrieră, dar în mod timid și, până acum, fără succes. O mare parte din foștii deputații<br />
social-democrați se găsesc în vilegiatură forțată într-un „câmp de concentrație” pe malul mării,<br />
lângă Libau. Fostul președinte al Saeimei, Pauls Kalniņš, precum și fiul său, nu au părăsit încă<br />
închisoarea.<br />
Gruparea naționalistă de extrema dreaptă, „Pērkonkrusts”, a aderat în mare parte la opera<br />
constructivă a guvernului, în afară de un număr de recalcitranți.<br />
Sforțările guvernului de a rezolva problema șomajului au obținut rezultate apreciabile. În<br />
ceea ce privește însă înviorarea vieții economice, urmărită de guvern, dificultățile rămân<br />
serioase. Susținerea artificială a Lat-ului la un curs ridicat continuă de a apăsa asupra<br />
exportului.<br />
1<br />
Forma germană a denumirii orașului leton Liepāja.
258 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Unul dintre numeroasele partide politice desființate, încearcă de a exploata printr-o<br />
campanie surdă, împotriva guvernului, dificultățile economice actuale.<br />
b. Situația economică.<br />
Negocieri au început în vederea încheierii unui Tratat de Comerț între Letonia și Italia.<br />
c. Chestiuni speciale.<br />
O comisie a fost numită cu misiunea de a reforma actualul Cod Civil.<br />
d. Politică externă.<br />
Reuniunea delegaților Estoniei, Letoniei și Lituaniei la Kovno, pentru a discuta proiectul<br />
colaborării baltice, nu a obținut un rezultat apreciabil. Dificultatea principală a unei asemenea<br />
colaborări rezidă în dorința – mai mult sau mai puțin mascată – a Lituaniei de a obține o<br />
solidarizare între cele trei state cu privire la propriile sale dificultăți externe. Declarația Lituaniei<br />
că s-ar mulțumi numai cu un concurs „negativ” din partea celorlalte state care s-ar obliga de a<br />
nu întreprinde nicio acțiune dăunătoare politicii externe a Lituaniei este extrem de elastică.<br />
Orice acțiune amicală a Estoniei sau Letoniei către Polonia sau Germania ar putea fi<br />
interpretată, din punct de vedere lituanian, drept „dăunătoare”. Varșovia continuă de a<br />
zădărnici, grație influenței sale la Tallinn, încercările Lituaniei în această direcție.<br />
Vizita Domnului Beck în capitala Letoniei arată cât de mult ține Polonia a atrage Statele<br />
Baltice în sfera sa politică. Declarațiile făcute cu această ocazie arată că s-a obținut o comunitate<br />
de vederi între Riga și Varșovia cu privire la proiectul pactului de asistență mutuală nord-estic.<br />
Guvernul leton crede că pactul nu poate fi util intereselor păcii europene decât dacă se va<br />
obține participarea tuturor statelor prevăzute în proiect. Atâta timp cât Varșovia și Berlinul<br />
rămân în expectativă este puțin probabil ca Letonia să cedeze demersurilor sovietice făcute în<br />
favoarea pactului.<br />
Declarațiile făcute de către Ministrul Letoniei la Moscova în această chestiune nu aduc<br />
niciun element nou. Deși Sovietele ar dori să le interpreteze ca o aderare a Letoniei la pact, este<br />
sigur că Riga își păstrează atitudinea sa cunoscută.<br />
O participare eventuală a Letoniei la pact nu va avea însă în orice caz loc decât în urma unor<br />
clarificări ale diverselor condiții tehnice privitoare la executarea „asistenței mutuale”, condiții<br />
care interesează în mod special aceste mici state situate între U.R.S.S. și Germania.<br />
Chestiunea revizuirii: mă refer la raportul precedent.<br />
Chestiunea dezarmării…<br />
Chestiunea datoriilor de război…<br />
Chestiunea minorităților…<br />
Chestiunile în legătură cu Societatea Națiunilor…<br />
e. Raporturile cu România.<br />
Birourile statistice din Riga nepublicând până acum darea de seamă a schimburilor<br />
comerciale cu România pe ultima lună, nu voi lipsi de a o transmite imediat ce îmi va parveni.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 575-578.<br />
93. Monthly Report no. 429 (July 1934) of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Romania<br />
in Riga Th. Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu,<br />
5 th August 1934<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour to summarize below, for July 1934, <strong>the</strong> situation and facts related to <strong>the</strong><br />
internal and external policy of Latvia:
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 259<br />
a. Domestic policy<br />
The development of <strong>the</strong> law suits against communist deputies led to <strong>the</strong> ascertainment that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y had been guilty of serious actions against national security: instigation to rebellion in <strong>the</strong><br />
army, communist propaganda in ammunition factories, etc. It has been also proved that<br />
accused persons had close <strong>relations</strong> with Moscow. From 6 defendant deputies, 4 were convicted<br />
to 8 years of forced labour, and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two to 3 years of prison. These deputies had a chance<br />
to flee to <strong>the</strong> USSR last November, but it seems that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Government advised <strong>the</strong>m to<br />
stay in Latvia in order not to give <strong>the</strong> labour masses <strong>the</strong> impression that communist leaders<br />
were lacking in dignity and courage.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r law suit shall take place soon against an important group of communists<br />
discovered in Libau 1 , including Jewish for <strong>the</strong> most part.<br />
Regarding <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party, its campaign against <strong>the</strong> Government continues in<br />
<strong>the</strong> labour class, but vaguely and unsuccessfully until now. A great part of ex-deputies<br />
belonging to <strong>the</strong> Social-Democratic Party are in forced detention in a “concentration camp” on<br />
<strong>the</strong> sea shore, near Libau. The ex-president of Saeima, Pauls Kalniņš, as well as his son, has not<br />
left <strong>the</strong> prison yet.<br />
The radical right-wing nationalist group, „Pērkonkrusts”, has greatly adhered to <strong>the</strong><br />
constructive work of <strong>the</strong> Government, except for a number of recalcitrant people.<br />
Government’s efforts in solving <strong>the</strong> unemployment problem have lead to significant results.<br />
But, as far as <strong>the</strong> economic boom pursued by <strong>the</strong> Government is concerned, difficulties remain<br />
serious.<br />
The artificial support of <strong>the</strong> Lat to a high exchange rate continues to inflict pressures on<br />
exports.<br />
One of <strong>the</strong> numerous political parties dissolved tries to exploit <strong>the</strong> current economic<br />
difficulties by a strong campaign against <strong>the</strong> Government.<br />
b. Economic situation.<br />
Negotiations have started for <strong>the</strong> conclusion of a Trade Treaty between Latvia and Italy.<br />
c. Special issues.<br />
A commission assigned to reform <strong>the</strong> current Civil Code has been appointed.<br />
d. External policy.<br />
The reunion of <strong>the</strong> representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to Kovno to discuss <strong>the</strong><br />
project of Baltic collaboration did not achieve any significant result. The main difficulty of such<br />
collaboration consists in <strong>the</strong> Lithuania’s desire – more or less concealed – to obtain unification<br />
of <strong>the</strong> three states on <strong>the</strong> issue of its own external difficulties. Lithuania’s statement that it<br />
would be satisfied only with a “negative” competition on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r states which<br />
would only undertake not to carry on any action harmful to <strong>the</strong> external policy of Lithuania is<br />
extremely flexible. Any amicable action of Estonia or Latvia towards Poland or Germany could<br />
be interpreted as “harmful”, from a Lithuanian point of view. Warsaw continues to baffle <strong>the</strong><br />
Lithuanian attempt in this direction, thanks to its influence on Tallinn.<br />
Mr. Beck’s visit in <strong>the</strong> capital of Latvia shows how much Poland intends to attract <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
Countries in its political sphere. The statements made on this occasion show that an agreement<br />
between Riga and Warsaw was obtained with regard to <strong>the</strong> project of <strong>the</strong> pact of north-eastern<br />
mutual assistance. The Latvian Government believes that <strong>the</strong> pact cannot be useful to <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
German form of <strong>the</strong> denomination of <strong>the</strong> Latvian town Liepāja.
260 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
interests of European peace unless <strong>the</strong> participation of all <strong>the</strong> countries set forth in <strong>the</strong> project<br />
is obtained. As long as Warsaw and Berlin remain in expectation, Latvia is less probable to give<br />
in to Soviet intercessions made in <strong>the</strong> favour of <strong>the</strong> pact.<br />
Statements made by <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Moscow related to this issue do not bring any<br />
new element. Although <strong>the</strong> Soviets would like to interpret <strong>the</strong>m as an adherence of Latvia to<br />
<strong>the</strong> pact, it is certain that Riga preserves its known position.<br />
However, a possible participation of Latvia to <strong>the</strong> pact shall take place only as a follow up of<br />
some clarifications of different technical conditions referring to <strong>the</strong> execution of <strong>the</strong> “mutual<br />
assistance”, conditions that are of special interest for <strong>the</strong>se small states situated between <strong>the</strong><br />
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany.<br />
The issue of revision: See <strong>the</strong> previous report.<br />
The issue of disarmament …<br />
The issue of war debts…<br />
The issue of minorities …<br />
Issues related to <strong>the</strong> League of Nations: …<br />
e. Reports with Romania.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> statistical offices from Riga have not yet published <strong>the</strong> report on commercial<br />
exchanges with Romania in <strong>the</strong> last month, I shall certainly remit it as soon as it get a hold of it.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 575-578.<br />
94. Telegrama ministrului României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 439 către Ministrul<br />
Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 14 august 1934<br />
Referire nr. 435.<br />
Dl. Munters mi-a confirmat astăzi că față de precizările aduse de memorandul remis de Dl<br />
Barthou 1 Guvernului Britanic (al cărui text în forma în care a ajuns la Ministerul Afacerilor<br />
Străine leton îl trimit astăzi prin poștă), poziția Guvernului leton (vezi telegrama mea nr. 354)<br />
nu a făcut decât a se confirma.<br />
Prin eventualitățile incalculabile și incontrolabile pentru noi ce le cuprinde proiectul de<br />
agrement franco-rus, mi-a spus Domnia sa, el primează complet [asupra] proiectului de pact<br />
regional. Agrementul între Rusia și Franța, care nu implică niciun element de siguranță acordat<br />
de Franța Statelor Baltice, dă totuși Franței prin punctul C rolul de arbitru în pactul regional din<br />
care ea nu face parte. „Mă tem, a spus Dl. Munters, că va reveni puterilor baltice de a semnala<br />
inadmisibilitatea unei asemenea situații, Cehoslovacia și Polonia fiind compensate în prealabil<br />
de rolul concedat Franței, prin tratatele de alianță existente.”<br />
Examinând textul mai departe Dl. Munters mi-a semnalat că contrazicerea între paragraful a<br />
și b al părții 2 a proiectului de asistență nu se explică decât prin prevederea eventualității<br />
absenței Germaniei din pact. „Asemenea eventualitate, mi-a declarat Dl. Munters, este pentru<br />
noi inadmisibilă. Nu putem concepe pactul regional fără cooperarea Germaniei.<br />
Cu textele imprecise ce ni se prezintă nu știm încă despre ce este vorba, continuă Dl.<br />
Munters; noi cerem ca partida să se joace cu toate cărțile pe masă. Un lucru este singur că nu<br />
vom admite niciodată texte care permit altora să hotărască dacă teritoriul nostru este în<br />
1<br />
Louis Barthou (1862-1934) a fost un om politic conservator francez, Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (1913),<br />
Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1934). Asasinat alături de regele Alexandru al Iugoslaviei (9 octombrie 1934).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 261<br />
primejdia sau nu ca acest teritoriu să servească de trecere armatelor străine în conflicte care nu<br />
ne interesează sau asupra cărora nu avem niciun control.”<br />
Dl. Munters e de părere că Rusia Sovietică va eschiva până la urma urmei și încheierea<br />
agrementului franco-rus și intrarea în Liga Națiunilor. Redau această părere, pe care o cred<br />
greșită, ca fiind poate bazată pe informații speciale.<br />
Se poate deci constata încă o dată că cu toate veștile fanteziste apărute, poziția Estoniei și<br />
Letoniei în chestiunea pactului și agrementului a rămas aceeași și în acord cu cea de până acum<br />
a Poloniei. Cercurile Ministerului Afacerilor Străine leton nu mi-au părut a regreta că iluziile<br />
presei franceze și ale celei rusești permit Țărilor Baltice a-și păstra și poziția adoptată și simpatia<br />
opiniilor publice respective.<br />
Trimit prin poștă textul unor declarații ale Domnului Ulmanis în materie politică externă<br />
care se acordă cu cele ale Domnului Seljamaa la Moscova și cu prezentele lămuriri.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, filele 96-97.<br />
94. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza no. 439 to Foreign<br />
Minister Nicolae Titulescu, 14 th August 1933<br />
Reference to no. 435.<br />
Today, Mr. Munters confirmed to me that as regards <strong>the</strong> clarifications brought about by <strong>the</strong><br />
memorandum delivered by Mr. Barthou 1 to <strong>the</strong> British Government (which I will send by mail<br />
today exactly as it was received by <strong>the</strong> Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian Government (see my telegram no. 354) did anything but confirmed itself.<br />
Due to <strong>the</strong> contingencies incalculable and uncontrollable to us, contained by <strong>the</strong> draft<br />
Franco-Russian agreement, - he told me - it absolutely prevails over <strong>the</strong> proposed regional pact.<br />
The agreement between Russia and France, which does not involve any element of safety<br />
provided by France to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, yet confers to France, according to section C, <strong>the</strong> role of<br />
arbitrator in <strong>the</strong> regional pact, which it is not part of. "I am afraid, said Mr. Munters, that <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic powers may have <strong>the</strong> responsibility to signal <strong>the</strong> inadmissibility of such a situation, as<br />
Czechoslovakia and Poland are indemnified in advance by <strong>the</strong> role conceded to France by<br />
means of <strong>the</strong> existing alliance treaties."<br />
Examining <strong>the</strong> text fur<strong>the</strong>r on, Mr. Munters pointed out that <strong>the</strong> contradiction between<br />
paragraphs a and b of part 2 of <strong>the</strong> assistance project is explained only by <strong>the</strong> anticipation of <strong>the</strong><br />
potential absence of Germany from <strong>the</strong> pact. "Such possibility, Mr. Munters told me, is<br />
unacceptable to us. We cannot imagine <strong>the</strong> regional pact without <strong>the</strong> cooperation of Germany”.<br />
"Given <strong>the</strong> inaccurate texts that are presented to us, we do not know what it is about yet,<br />
Mr. Munters continues; we ask that <strong>the</strong> game be played with all <strong>the</strong> cards on <strong>the</strong> table.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, we are certain that we will never accept texts which allow o<strong>the</strong>rs to decide<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r our territory is in danger of serving as a passage for <strong>the</strong> foreign armies in conflicts<br />
which are not our concern or over which we have no control.”<br />
Mr. Munters thinks that, as a matter of fact, Soviet Russia will also avoid <strong>the</strong> conclusion of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Franco-Russian agreement and <strong>the</strong> inclusion in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations. I render this opinion,<br />
which I consider to be wrong, as being probably based on special information.<br />
1<br />
Louis Barthou (1862-1934) was a French conservative politician, President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1913),<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1934). Assassinated toge<strong>the</strong>r with King Alexander of Yugoslavia (9 October 1934).
262 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
It can <strong>the</strong>refore be noted again that with all <strong>the</strong> unreal news that emerged, Estonia and<br />
Latvia's position on <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> pact and of <strong>the</strong> agreement remained <strong>the</strong> same and in<br />
accordance with that of Poland up to <strong>the</strong> present. The circles of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs did not seem to regret that <strong>the</strong> illusions of <strong>the</strong> French and <strong>the</strong> Russian press allow <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States to maintain <strong>the</strong>ir adopted position and <strong>the</strong> sympathy of <strong>the</strong>ir respective public<br />
opinions.<br />
I will send by mail <strong>the</strong> text of some Mr. Ulmanis’ statements on <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> external<br />
policy, which are in accordance with Mr. Seljamaa’s in Moscow and <strong>the</strong> present explanations.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 96-97.<br />
95. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 403 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 27<br />
august 1934<br />
Strict confidențial<br />
Atitudinea Letoniei și Estoniei față de chestiunile politice la ordinea zilei<br />
Următoarele elemente de apreciere sunt cred utile pentru a prevedea reacțiile celor două<br />
țări baltice, Letonia și Estonia, față de situațiile politice actuale și de evenimentele ce se<br />
pregătesc.<br />
1) Politicile externe ale acestor două țări sunt INDISOLUBIL LEGATE și nicio hotărâre nu va<br />
fi luată de una fără de cealaltă.<br />
2) Oricâtă dorință ar avea guvernele din Riga și Reval de a-și mări prestigiul în Geneva și<br />
influența lor politică în general prin constituirea unui Bloc Baltic integral (cuprinzând și<br />
Lituania), ele NU VOR SUBSCRIE [UNOR] TEXTE CARE AR CONTRACARA ÎN MOD<br />
PATENT POLITICA POLONĂ ÎN BALTICA. În această privință politica de întărâtare a Franței<br />
în Kovno, ce s-a dezvoltat în ultimele timpuri alături de cea sovietică, a nemulțumit adânc<br />
aceste guverne. Aceasta nu înseamnă că negocierile ce se pregătesc între cele trei Țări Baltice nu<br />
ar putea duce la semi-concluzii care nu ar satisface în întregime Varșovia.<br />
3) Întreaga chestiune a Pactului de Asistență Mutuală Oriental, astfel cum a fost pusă de<br />
Rusia Sovietică și reluată de Franța, este profund neplăcută guvernelor din Riga și Reval, și în<br />
această privință nimic mai fericit nu s-ar putea întâmpla, în opinia acestor guverne, decât<br />
DISPARIȚIA CHESTIUNII PE UN CÂT MAI LUNG TIMP DE PE TAPETUL DISCUȚIILOR<br />
INTERNAȚIONALE.<br />
4) Riga și Revalul consideră că lipsa Germaniei dintr-un asemenea Pact l-ar transforma întro<br />
alianță caracteristică, alianță în care Rusia Sovietică ar juca mai mult rolul principal ȘI ÎN<br />
CARE STATELE MICI SAU MEDII, GEOGRAFIC INTERPUSE, AR FI DE MAI ÎNAINTE<br />
COMPLET SACRIFICATE.<br />
5) În Riga și Reval nu se știe încă dacă participarea Franței la manevra Litvinov<br />
CORESPUNDE CU DORINȚA FUNDAMENTALĂ, CU VISUL ABSURD ȘI MORTAL, de a<br />
întrebuința efectiv la un moment dat armata roșie – armata revoluției mondiale și a răsturnării<br />
tuturor granițelor – la păstrarea ordinii stabilite și la apărarea fruntariei Rinului sau dacă această<br />
participare nu constituie decât o simplă manevră tactică ... presiune asupra Londrei sau<br />
presiune asupra Berlinului. Când Domnul Munters îmi spunea „nu consimțim a începe partida
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 263<br />
fără ca toate cărțile să fie pe masă” și Domnii Seljamaa și Laretei 1 aproape același lucru, ei se<br />
refereau la acest dubiu.<br />
6) NICI O ÎNCREDERE nu există aici în intențiile adânci ale Sovietelor. Iluziile Franței în<br />
această privință – dacă ele există – nu sunt împărtășite cred de nici o personalitate<br />
răspunzătoare în politică sau armată.<br />
7) Eventualitatea trecerii armatei roșii prin teritoriile baltice – în orișice împrejurare –<br />
echivalează pentru guvernele din Riga și Reval cu DISPARIȚIA PUR ȘI SIMPLĂ a țărilor lor de<br />
pe harta Europei.<br />
8) Din toate rezervele și subînțelesurile pe care le-am observat în conversațiile mele cu<br />
personalitățile cele mai autorizate în Riga și Reval, și câteodată din declarațiile lor explicite, cred<br />
că aproape toate au convingerea că – cu toate demonstrațiile pacifice ale tovarășului Litvinov –<br />
POSIBILITĂȚILE UNUI CONFLICT EUROPEAN VOR FI PRIMEJDIOS ÎNMULȚITE din<br />
momentul în care Rusia Sovietică s-ar instala cu arme și bagaje în câmpul politicii burgheze.<br />
9) Ca și cu pactul de asistență mutuală atât Riga, [cât] și Revelul ar fi preferat ca chestiunea<br />
intrării Rusiei Sovietice în Societatea Națiunilor să nu fie niciodată pusă. Atitudinea lor în<br />
această chestiune va corespunde cu dorință de a evita orice provocare față de Moscova și orice<br />
contracarare a intențiilor Marilor Puteri. TOT CE SE VA PUTEA FACE ÎNSĂ, FĂRĂ<br />
INCONVENIENT, PENTRU A ÎNTÂRZIA SAU EVITA DEZLEGAREA ACESTOR CHESTIUNI,<br />
VA FI SUSȚINUT DE CELE DOUĂ GUVERNE BALTICE.<br />
10) Opinia culeasă de mine, la timpul său, pe lângă cei doi foști șefi de Stat Major din Riga și<br />
Reval și pe lângă Mareșalul Mannerheim 2 în Helsingfors este că ARMATA ROȘIE NU ESTE<br />
FĂCUTĂ PENTRU EXTREMUL ORIENT și că nu va fi niciodată – în afară de elemente relativ<br />
reduse - trimisă în această direcție. Nu cred că opinia cercurilor militare baltice competente să<br />
fie astăzi schimbată.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 585-588.<br />
95. Diplomatic Report no. 403 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 27 th<br />
August 1934<br />
Strictly confidential<br />
The attitude of Latvia and Estonia with regard to <strong>the</strong> political issues of <strong>the</strong> daily agenda.<br />
I think that <strong>the</strong> following elements of appreciation are useful in forecasting <strong>the</strong> reactions of<br />
<strong>the</strong> two Baltic countries, Latvia and Estonia, with regard to <strong>the</strong> current political situations and<br />
to <strong>the</strong> events that are currently being prepared.<br />
1) The external policies of <strong>the</strong>se two countries are INDISSOLUBLY RELATED and decisions<br />
are not to be taken separately.<br />
2) No matter how much <strong>the</strong> Governments from Riga and Reval would want to increase <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
prestige in Geneva and generally <strong>the</strong>ir political influence by <strong>the</strong> settlement of a integral Baltic<br />
Block (also comprising Lithuania), <strong>the</strong>y SHALL NOT SUBSCRIBE TEXTS THAT WOULD<br />
OBVIOUSLY COUNTERACT THE POLISH POLICY IN THE BALTIC SEA. In this aspect, <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Heinrich Laretei (1892-1973) a fost un politician și diplomat estonian. Ministru al Estoniei în U.R.S.S. (1926–1928),<br />
Lituania (1928–1931) și Suedia (1936–1940). Stabilit în Suedia după ocupația sovietică a țării sale.<br />
2<br />
Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (1867-1951) a fost un militar și politician finlandez, singurul mareșal al<br />
Finlandei, Comandant-Șef al forțelor militare finlandeze în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, regent (1918-<br />
1919) și președinte al acestei țări (1944-1946).
264 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
policy of streng<strong>the</strong>ning of France in Kovno, which has developed in recent times along with <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet one, has deeply displeased <strong>the</strong>se Governments. This does not mean that <strong>the</strong> negotiations<br />
which are prepared between <strong>the</strong> three Baltic Countries could not lead to preliminary<br />
conclusions which would not fully satisfy Warsaw.<br />
3) The whole issue of <strong>the</strong> oriental Pact of Mutual Assistance, as it was expressed by <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet Russia and resumed by France, is profoundly unpleasant to <strong>the</strong> Governments from Riga<br />
and Reval, and in this respect nothing better than <strong>the</strong> DISAPPEARANCE OF THE ISSUE FROM<br />
THE AGENDA OF THE INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS, FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE could<br />
happen in <strong>the</strong> opinion of <strong>the</strong>se Governments.<br />
4) Riga and Reval consider that <strong>the</strong> absence of Germany from such a Pact would transform it<br />
in a typical alliance, alliance where <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia would play <strong>the</strong> main role AND WHERE<br />
THE GEOGRAPHICALLY INTERPOSED SMALL OR AVERAGE STATES WOULD BE<br />
COMPLETELY SACRIFICED.<br />
5) In Riga and Reval it is not known yet if <strong>the</strong> participation of France to <strong>the</strong> Litvinov<br />
maneuver CORRESPONDS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL WISH, TO THE ABSURD AND<br />
MORTAL DREAM of effectively using <strong>the</strong> red army – <strong>the</strong> army of <strong>the</strong> worldwide revolution and<br />
of <strong>the</strong> overturn of all borders – in order to preserve <strong>the</strong> established orders and to defend of <strong>the</strong><br />
border of <strong>the</strong> Rhine or if this participation represents a simple tactic maneuver … pressure on<br />
London or pressure on Berlin. When Mr. Munters told me “we do not consent to start <strong>the</strong> party<br />
without having all <strong>the</strong> cards on <strong>the</strong> table” and when Misters Seljamaa and Laretei 1 said almost<br />
<strong>the</strong> same thing, <strong>the</strong>y referred to this incertitude.<br />
6) There is NO TRUST in <strong>the</strong> deep intentions of <strong>the</strong> SOVIETS. The illusions of France in this<br />
respect – if <strong>the</strong>y exist – are not shared by any responsible personality from politics or army.<br />
7) The eventuality of <strong>the</strong> red armies passing through <strong>the</strong> Baltic territories – in any<br />
circumstances – means for <strong>the</strong> Governments from Riga and Reval <strong>the</strong> PURE AND SIMPLE<br />
DISAPPEARANCE of <strong>the</strong>ir countries on <strong>the</strong> map of Europe.<br />
8) From all reserves and implications that I have noticed in my conversations with <strong>the</strong> most<br />
authorized personalities from Riga and Reval, and sometimes from <strong>the</strong>ir explicit statements, I<br />
think that almost all of <strong>the</strong>m have <strong>the</strong> conviction that –due to all <strong>the</strong> pacific demonstrations of<br />
<strong>the</strong> comrade Litvinof – THE POSSIBILITIES OF A EUROPEAN CONFLICT SHALL BE<br />
DANGEROUSLY MULTIPLIED from <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia would install with guns and<br />
baggage in <strong>the</strong> field of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois policy.<br />
9) As with <strong>the</strong> pact of mutual assistance, both Riga and Revel would have preferred that <strong>the</strong><br />
issue of <strong>the</strong> entry of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations is never applied. Their attitude<br />
on this issue shall correspond to <strong>the</strong> will of avoiding any challenge related to Moscow and any<br />
counteraction of <strong>the</strong> intentions of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers. HOWEVER, EVERYTHING THAT<br />
COULD BE DONE WITH NO INCONVENIENCE FOR DELAYING OR AVOIDING THE<br />
SETTLEMENT OF THESE ISSUES SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY THE TWO BALTIC<br />
GOVERNMENTS.<br />
1<br />
Heinrich Laretei (1892-1973) was an Estonian politician and diplomat. Minister of Estonia in <strong>the</strong> USSR (1926-<br />
1928), Lithuania (1928-1931) and Sweden (1936-1940). Established in Sweden after <strong>the</strong> Soviet occupation of his<br />
country.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 265<br />
10) The opinion collected by me, at its time, from <strong>the</strong> two ex-chiefs of <strong>the</strong> General Staff of<br />
Riga and Reval and Marshal Mannerheim 1 in Helsingfors is that <strong>the</strong> RED ARMY IS NOT MADE<br />
FOR THE FAR EAST and will never be– except for <strong>the</strong> relatively reduced elements – sent in this<br />
direction. I do not think that <strong>the</strong> opinion of <strong>the</strong> competent Baltic military circles has changed<br />
nowadays.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 585-588.<br />
96. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 469 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 3<br />
septembrie 1934<br />
Pactul de Înțelegere și Colaborare Baltică și relațiile polono-baltice<br />
Urmare telegramei mele nr. 467.<br />
Un Tratat de Înțelegere și Colaborare a fost parafat în ziua de 29 august în Riga între<br />
reprezentanții Letoniei, Estoniei și Lituaniei.<br />
Am putut asculta o rapidă citire a textului ce va fi ținut confidențial până la ratificare. El<br />
constă într-o versiune cu atenuări și schimbări esențiale a Tratatului de Reglementare a Alianței<br />
intervenit între Letonia și Estonia la 17 februarie anul curent, tratat [pe] care îl anexez aici<br />
alăturat spre referire.<br />
Nicio aluzie nu este făcută la vreo alianță militară sau la posibilitatea ei. Un articol de<br />
importanță capitală constată [în] „imposibilitatea de a coordona activitatea politică a celor trei<br />
țări pe unele chestiuni de caracter special” și prevede că aceste chestiuni sunt excluse din<br />
cazurile de aplicare a principiilor de coordonare și consultare stabilite de tratat.<br />
Ultimele propoziții lituaniene, la care se referă telegrama mea nr. 454, cereau menționarea<br />
expresă că Vilna face parte din chestiunile de interes special. 2 Tratatul parafat acum trei zile și<br />
textul ce va fi supus semnăturii și ratificării nu conține această mențiune care ar fi displăcut în<br />
înalt grad Varșoviei. Această concesie a Lituaniei pare ar fi hotărât rezultatul favorabil al<br />
negocierilor.<br />
Aflu însă din sursă demnă de toată încrederea că o notă comună, care nu va fi dată<br />
publicității, a fost iscălită de reprezentanții celor trei puteri baltice, prin care Letonia și Estonia<br />
declară de partea lor a nu rezerva nicio chestiune de caracter particular, iar Lituania că singura<br />
chestiune de această natură este pentru ea Vilna.<br />
Tratatul propriu-zis 1) cuprinde un început substanțial de organizare a blocului baltic prin<br />
consultări periodice și ocazionale prevăzute; 2) desolidarizează complet Letonia și Estonia de<br />
Lituania în chestiune Vilnei; 3) prevede posibilitatea de adeziune ulterioară pentru alte puteri.<br />
Primul punct corespunde cu dorințele politicii polone de până acum un an, este însă în<br />
contradicție cu punctul de vedere recent adoptat de Varșovia. Al doilea îi dă o incontestabilă<br />
satisfacție. Al treilea (introdus mi se spune asupra 3 insistențelor Estoniei) îi lasă deschise toate<br />
posibilitățile. În total textul este deci de natură a permite Varșoviei alegerea între o atitudine de<br />
părintească satisfacție sau de nemulțumire. Este probabil că va alege pe cea dintâi.<br />
1<br />
Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (1867-1951) was a Finnish soldier and politician, <strong>the</strong> only Marshal of Finland,<br />
Commander-in-Chief of <strong>the</strong> Finnish military forces during <strong>the</strong> Second World War, regent (1918-1919) and<br />
President of this country (1944-1946).<br />
2<br />
(Mihail R. Sturdza) Iar nu Vilna și Memel după cum mă informaseră greșit confidențele ce-mi fuseseră făcute.<br />
Confidențe ce s-au adeverit exacte pentru rest (telegrama nr. 454).<br />
3<br />
Probabil folosit în sensul de „ca urmare a”.
266 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Este noul tratat de natură a favoriza acțiunea sovieto-franceză în Baltica? Răspunsul la<br />
această chestiune îl dă în parte istoricul ultimelor negocieri. Este indiscutabil că factorul care a<br />
determinat în principal concesiile reciproce ale guvernelor baltice și a permis acordul între ele a<br />
fost dorința de a mări importanța, influența și INDEPENDENȚA LOR față de chestiunile vitale<br />
puse actualmente de politica generală și în special în Europa nord-estică.<br />
În chestiunea pactului de asistență mutuală, de exemplu, nu trebuie uitat că, în ciuda<br />
aparențelor, declarațiile oficioase și oficiale lituaniene au fost tot atât de descurajatoare ca cele<br />
estoniene și letone. Dacă Riga și Reval nu admit un pact de asistență mutuală fără de Germania<br />
și de Polonia și fără ca garanția să fie le fie dată că în nici o împrejurare nu se vor trezi pe<br />
teritoriul național cu o armată roșie „asistentă” (ce ar mai rămânea din proiectul sau intențiile<br />
sovieto-franceze?), Kovno declară că refuză a iscăli un text care ar consacra prin tăcere spoliația<br />
unei părți a teritoriului lituanian (cum ar putea Polonia iscăli un text care ar evoca-o?). Cred<br />
deci că o înțelegere pe această chestiune între cele trei țări baltice a devenit probabilă și că ea se<br />
va face – în afară de cazul unui nou proiect de pact estic foarte diferit de cel inițial –<br />
ÎMPREJURUL IDEII UNEI CÂT MAI LUNGI TEMPORIZĂRI, a remiterii cât mai îndepărtată a<br />
dezlegării problemei impusă de acțiunea sovieto-franceză.<br />
În acest sens vor lucra două considerații: 1) din partea Letoniei și Estoniei în principal (și din<br />
partea Lituaniei în oarecare măsură) impresia că recentul dumping de proiecte de garanție, de<br />
asistență etc corespunde mult mai puțin cu o sinceră îngrijorare privitoare la independența<br />
Țărilor Baltice decât cu jocul unor forțe și unor interese pentru care aceste țări ar fi simple<br />
obiecte; 2) din partea celor trei puteri baltice: dorința de a nu fi chemate a se pronunța în<br />
chestiuni pentru ele de interes vital înainte de a fi tras toate beneficiile de influență și de<br />
prestigiu derivând din noua lor asociere ... culminarea acestor beneficii fiind obținerea mult<br />
visatului sediu 1 baltic, sau balto-scandinav în Consiliul Societății Națiunilor.<br />
Chestiunea Memel, spre deosebire de cea a Vilnei, nu a fost menționată de textul notei<br />
comune. Interpretarea cercurilor competente lituaniene este că această chestiune nu există<br />
pentru guvernul din Kovno și că prin nemenționarea ei cele din Reval și Riga s-au asociat<br />
acestui punct de vedere.<br />
La Ministerul Afacerilor Străine leton această latură a noului acord este atinsă cu o vădită<br />
rezervă și se subliniază în treacăt următoarele. Redactarea notei comune arată în mod clar că<br />
reprezentanții fiecărei țări ÎN PARTE precizează care sunt pentru ei chestiunile de caracter<br />
special, celelalte două părți înregistrând pur și simplu această precizare. Aceasta ar însemna că<br />
nici prin „comisiune” în chestiunea Vilnei, nici prin „omisiune” în chestiunea Memelului,<br />
Letonia și Estonia nu și-au luat vreo răspundere și vreun angajament. Se observă mai departe că<br />
Tratatul de Înțelegere și Colaborare nu are nicio asemănare cu Tratatul de Alianță Militară și<br />
Politică letono-estonian și că el nu expune obligatoriu aceste două țări la nicio complicație<br />
primejdioasă în afaceri teritoriale străine.<br />
Nu este mai puțin adevărat, cred, că omisiunea în chestiune constituie un succes pentru<br />
politica guvernului din Kovno și că dacă o capitală va fi în imposibilitatea de a se declara<br />
satisfăcută de acordul din Riga, aceasta va fi Berlinul.<br />
În ceea ce privește Moscova, nu-i va fi greu a descoperi în acest început de constituire a unui<br />
bloc politic baltic un rezultat al acțiunii sale și de a se felicita. Probabilitatea este însă că noul<br />
tratat nu va face decât să mărească spiritul de independență al Țărilor Baltice și că politica în<br />
1<br />
În sensul de loc nepermanent.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 267<br />
aceste părți ale Europei se va complica – în afară de cazul unei împăcări polono-lituaniene – atât<br />
pentru alții, cât și pentru Soviete cu întărirea acestui nou factor. Chiar dacă noul bloc baltic ar<br />
trebui să se transforme într-un simplu instrument, ar rămâne de văzut în mâinile cui acest<br />
instrument va cădea definitiv.<br />
Este greu a prevedea influența ce noul acord și mai ales dezvoltările sale eventuale o vor<br />
avea asupra relațiilor polono-lituaniene. Lituania va găsi, pe de o parte, în perfecționarea<br />
situației sale internaționale noi imbolduri la rezistență. Pe de altă parte, cei doi asociați ai ei<br />
VOR CĂUTA FĂRĂ NICIO ÎNDOIALĂ A O HOTĂRÎ LA O POLITICĂ DE CONCILIERE FAȚĂ<br />
DE VARȘOVIA.<br />
Interesul ce îl au Letonia și Estonia la o împăcare polono-lituaniană este dublu și evident.<br />
Atâta timp cât Varșovia și Kovno nu și-ar fi strâns mâna, atâta timp cât un aranjament<br />
pacifist nu va fi redat Baltica cursului politic și economic natural întrerupt de aventura<br />
Želigovskį, posibilitatea unei înțelegeri germano-polone pe spatele Lituaniei rămâne deschisă.<br />
Letonia și Estonia cunosc foarte bine primejdia ce ar reprezenta-o pentru ele repercusiunile<br />
violente posibile ale unei asemenea înțelegeri. Una dintre personalitățile cele mai influente în<br />
politica letonă îmi spunea acum câtva timp în această privință: „Pauvre Lituanie qui se figure<br />
que c'est de Vilna qu`il s`agit.”<br />
O împăcare polono-lituaniană, care ar atrage automat înjghebarea unui adevărat Bloc Baltic<br />
în frunte cu Polonia, ar fi pentru Riga și Reval garanția cea mai stabilă și mai operantă față de<br />
ambele primejdii posibile pentru Statele nou-născute ale Europei nord-estice, față de cea<br />
germană și față de cea sovietică.<br />
Franța nu pare a fi apreciat cum trebuie atitudinea obligatorie a Letoniei și Estoniei față de<br />
diferendul lituaniano-polon. Prin expedițiile efectuate sau anunțate ale oamenilor săi de stat,<br />
prin activitatea reprezentanților săi ea pare hotărâtă a contracara astăzi alături de Rusia<br />
sovietică acțiunea de împăcare ce de câtva timp, cu mai multă sau mai puțină intensitate, s-a<br />
desfășurat între Varșovia și Kovno, intensificând rezistența Lituaniei și iritația Poloniei,<br />
ÎNTREȚINÂND ASTFEL PRINCIPALUL MOTIV POATE DE ÎNȚELEGERE ÎNTRE VARȘOVIA<br />
ȘI BERLIN.<br />
În Riga și Reval unde s-ar pricepe, la nevoie, tendințele Franței de a reduce întreaga<br />
problemă europeană la primejdia pe Rin, nu se înțelege activitatea ei în chestiunea raporturilor<br />
polono-lituaniene. Această activitate corespunzând ce este drept minuțios cu interesele Rusiei<br />
Sovietice pare în opoziție absolută cu înseși interesele franceze.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 590-597.<br />
96. Diplomatic Report no. 469 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 3 rd<br />
September 1934<br />
Baltic Understanding and Collaboration Pact, and Polish – Baltic <strong>relations</strong><br />
Following my telegram no. 467.<br />
A Treaty of Understanding and Collaboration has been sealed on August 29 th in Riga<br />
between <strong>the</strong> representatives of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.<br />
I was able to listen to a quick reading of <strong>the</strong> text that shall be kept confidential until<br />
ratification. It consists in a version with essential attenuations and changes of <strong>the</strong> Treaty for <strong>the</strong>
268 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Regulation of <strong>the</strong> Alliance, intervened between Latvia and Estonia on February 17 th this year,<br />
treaty that I attach hereto as a reference.<br />
No allusion to any military alliance or to its eventuality is made. An article of capital<br />
importance notices “<strong>the</strong> impossibility to coordinate <strong>the</strong> political activity of <strong>the</strong> three countries<br />
on some issues of special character” and provides that <strong>the</strong>se questions are excluded from <strong>the</strong><br />
cases when <strong>the</strong> principles of coordination and consultancy established in <strong>the</strong> treaty are applied.<br />
The last Lithuanian statements which my telegram no. 454 refer to, asked for <strong>the</strong> express<br />
mention that Vilna is included in <strong>the</strong> issues of special interest. 1 The treaty sealed three days ago<br />
and <strong>the</strong> text which shall be signed and ratified do not contain this mention which Warsaw<br />
would highly dislike. This concession of Lithuania seems to have decided <strong>the</strong> favourable result<br />
of negotiations.<br />
However, I found out from a highly reliable source that a common note, which shall not be<br />
published, has been signed by <strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>the</strong> three Baltic powers, based on which<br />
Latvia and Estonia declare on <strong>the</strong>ir own that <strong>the</strong>y are not to reserve any issue of particular<br />
character, and that Lithuania declares that Vilna is <strong>the</strong> only issue of this nature.<br />
The actual treaty 1) comprises a substantial start of organization of <strong>the</strong> Baltic block by<br />
setting forth periodical and occasional examinations; 2) completely separates Latvia and Estonia<br />
from Lithuania with respect to Vilna; 3) provides <strong>the</strong> possibility of subsequent adhesion for<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r powers.<br />
The first point is consistent with <strong>the</strong> goals of Polish policy of one year ago, still in<br />
contradiction to <strong>the</strong> point of view recently adopted by Warsaw. The second point gives Warsaw<br />
an incontestable satisfaction. The third point (introduced at 2 Estonia’s express request, as I was<br />
told) left all possibilities open. As a whole, <strong>the</strong> text has such a nature to allow Warsaw <strong>the</strong><br />
choice between an attitude of parental satisfaction or of discontent. It will probably choose <strong>the</strong><br />
first one.<br />
Is <strong>the</strong> new treaty able to favour <strong>the</strong> Soviet-French action in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea? The answer to<br />
this issue is partly given by <strong>the</strong> history of <strong>the</strong> last negotiations. It is unquestionable that <strong>the</strong><br />
factor that has mainly determined reciprocal concessions between Baltic Governments was <strong>the</strong><br />
desire to increase <strong>the</strong>ir importance, influence and INDEPENDENCE related to <strong>the</strong> vital issues<br />
actually expressed by <strong>the</strong> general policy, especially in <strong>the</strong> north-eastern Europe.<br />
For example, regarding <strong>the</strong> issue of mutual assistance pact, it must not be forgotten that<br />
despite appearances, officious and official Lithuanian statements were as discouraging as <strong>the</strong><br />
Estonian and Latvian ones. If Riga and Reval do not admit a pact of mutual assistance without<br />
Germany and Poland and without being given to <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> guarantee that under no<br />
circumstance <strong>the</strong>y shall be in <strong>the</strong> situation of seeing on <strong>the</strong> national territory an “assistant” red<br />
army (what would remain from <strong>the</strong> Soviet-French project or intentions?), Kovno declares that it<br />
refuses to sign a text that would silently endorse <strong>the</strong> spoliation of a part of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian<br />
territory (how could Poland sign a text that would evoke it?). Therefore I do believe that an<br />
understanding on this issue between <strong>the</strong> three Baltic countries has become probable and that is<br />
shall be realized – except for <strong>the</strong> case of a new project of eastern pact very different aes<strong>the</strong>tically<br />
from <strong>the</strong> initial one – AROUND THE IDEA OF A DELAY FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, of<br />
1<br />
And not Vilna and Memel, as wrongly informed me <strong>the</strong> confidences that were made to me. The confidences have<br />
proven accurate for <strong>the</strong> rest of it (telegram no. 454).<br />
2<br />
Probably used in <strong>the</strong> sense of „as a follow up of”.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 269<br />
transferring as far as possible <strong>the</strong> settlement of <strong>the</strong> problem imposed by <strong>the</strong> Soviet-French<br />
action.<br />
In this sense two considerations are applicable: 1) mainly on <strong>the</strong> part of Latvia and Estonia<br />
(and on <strong>the</strong> part of Lithuania to a certain extent) <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> recent dumping of<br />
projects of guarantee, of assistance corresponds more or less to a sincere unease regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
independence of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries ra<strong>the</strong>r than with <strong>the</strong> play of forces and some interests for<br />
which <strong>the</strong>se countries would be simple pawns; 2) on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> three Baltic powers: <strong>the</strong><br />
desire of not being asked to pronounce on issues of vital interest for <strong>the</strong>m before having<br />
received all <strong>the</strong> benefits of influence and prestige deriving from <strong>the</strong>ir new association … <strong>the</strong><br />
climax of <strong>the</strong>se benefits being <strong>the</strong> procurement of <strong>the</strong> long dreamt Baltic or Baltic-Scandinavian<br />
seat 1 in <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations.<br />
The Memel issue, unlike <strong>the</strong> one of Vilna, has not been mentioned in <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong><br />
common note. The interpretation of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian competent circles is that this issue does not<br />
exist for <strong>the</strong> Kovno Government and because it was not mentioned, <strong>the</strong> circles in Reval and<br />
Riga have also adopted this point of view.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this side of <strong>the</strong> new agreement is reached with an<br />
obvious reserve and <strong>the</strong> following are emphasized on <strong>the</strong> whole. The drafting of <strong>the</strong> common<br />
note clearly shows that representatives of EVERY country claim issues that have a special<br />
character for <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>the</strong> two o<strong>the</strong>r parties simply registering this determination. This would<br />
mean that nei<strong>the</strong>r by “commission” in <strong>the</strong> issue of Vilna, nor by “omission” in <strong>the</strong> issue of<br />
Memel, Latvia and Estonia assumed any responsibility or commitment. It is fur<strong>the</strong>r noticed that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Treaty of Understanding and Collaboration does not resemble <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Military<br />
Alliance and Latvian-Estonian Policy and that it does not mandatory expose <strong>the</strong>se two<br />
countries to any dangerous complication in o<strong>the</strong>r foreign territorial businesses.<br />
I think it is not less true that <strong>the</strong> current omission represents a success for <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong><br />
Kovno Government and if <strong>the</strong>re is any capital which finds itself in impossibility to declare<br />
satisfaction concerning <strong>the</strong> Riga agreement, this one shall be Berlin.<br />
As Moscow is concerned, it should not find difficult to discover in this beginning of<br />
establishment of a Baltic political block a result of its action and to congratulate itself for that.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> probability is that <strong>the</strong> new treaty will only develop <strong>the</strong> independence spirit in <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic Countries and that <strong>the</strong> policy in <strong>the</strong>se areas of Europe shall become complicated – except<br />
for <strong>the</strong> case of a Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation – both for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs and for <strong>the</strong> Soviets, along<br />
with <strong>the</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning of <strong>the</strong> new factor. Even if <strong>the</strong> new Baltic block transforms in a simple<br />
instrument, it remains to be seen in whose hands this instrument shall finally rest.<br />
It is difficult to forecast <strong>the</strong> influence that <strong>the</strong> new agreement, and especially its possible<br />
developments shall have on <strong>the</strong> Polish-Lithuanian <strong>relations</strong>. On one hand, Lithuania shall find<br />
new incentives in <strong>the</strong> improvement of its international situation. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, its two<br />
associates WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO ADOPT A POLICY OF CONCILIATION<br />
TOWARDS WARSAW.<br />
The interest of Latvia and Estonia for <strong>the</strong> Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation is double-faced<br />
and obvious.<br />
As long as Warsaw and Kovno do not shake hands, as long as a pacifist arrangement does<br />
not render <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea to its natural economic and politic course interrupted by <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
In <strong>the</strong> sense of termporary place.
270 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Želigovskį adventure, <strong>the</strong> possibility of a German-Polish understanding behind Lithuania’s back<br />
remains open. Latvia and Estonia know very well <strong>the</strong> danger that possible violent repercussions<br />
of such an understanding would represent for <strong>the</strong>m. One of <strong>the</strong> most influential personalities in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Latvian policy told me some time ago on this issue: “Poor Latvia, it imagines that it relates<br />
to Vilna”.<br />
A Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation, which would automatically cause <strong>the</strong> formation of a real<br />
Baltic Block starting with Poland, would be for Riga and Reval <strong>the</strong> most stable and most<br />
operative guarantee for both possible dangers faced by <strong>the</strong> new-born States of <strong>the</strong> north-eastern<br />
Europe, <strong>the</strong> German danger and <strong>the</strong> Soviet danger.<br />
France does not seem to have appreciated properly <strong>the</strong> compulsory attitude of Latvia and<br />
Estonia towards <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian-Polish difference. Through expeditions, realized or announced<br />
by its State representatives, through activities of its representatives, it seems to be determined<br />
to counteract toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia <strong>the</strong> action of reconciliation that, with more or less<br />
intensity, has been developing between Warsaw and Kovno for some time, intensifying<br />
Lithuania’s strength and Poland’s irritation, THEREFORE MAINTAINING PERHAPS THE<br />
MAIN GROUNDS OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN WARSAW AND BERLIN.<br />
In Riga and Reval where, <strong>the</strong> tendencies of France to reduce <strong>the</strong> entire European issue to <strong>the</strong><br />
danger on <strong>the</strong> Rhine would be useful, its activity in <strong>the</strong> issue of Polish-Lithuanian reports is not<br />
understood. This activity corresponding closely to <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia seems to be<br />
in absolute opposition with <strong>the</strong> very French interests.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 590-597.<br />
97. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 491 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 18<br />
septembrie 1934<br />
Pactul de Înțelegere și Colaborare Baltică<br />
Am onoarea a pune aici alăturat sub ochii Excelenței Voastre textul Tratatului de Înțelegere<br />
și Colaborare semnat la Geneva între Letonia, Lituania și Estonia. 1<br />
Comparându-l cu cel al Tratatului de Reglementare a Alianței letono-estonian din 17<br />
februarie a.c., se constată că acesta din urmă a inspirat pe redactorii noii convenții în ceea ce<br />
privește reglementarea consultărilor 2 și, în general, a aparatului de colaborare, după cum, la<br />
rândul său, tratatul din 17 februarie fusese inspirat de Pactul de Reglementare al Micii<br />
Înțelegeri.<br />
Spre deosebire de tratatul din 17 februarie, noua convenție își are terenul de aplicare limitat<br />
esențial. Articolul 3 prevede: „Les Hautes Parties Contractantes reconnaissent l'existence des<br />
problèmes spécifiques qui pourraient rendre difficile une attitude concertée à leur égard. Elles<br />
conviennent que ces problèmes constituent l'exception aux engagements stipulés dans l'Article<br />
Premier du présent Traité.”<br />
Deosebire esențială încă, Tratatul letono-estonian se reazemă pe o alianță militară de care<br />
este organic legat prin stipulația referitoare la durata sa.<br />
1<br />
Textul pactului nu este cuprins în acest volum. Acesta poate fi lecturat în limba franceză la adresa de internet:<br />
http://www.letton.ch/lventent.htm (accesat la 11.10.2012).<br />
2<br />
În original, consultațiilor.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 271<br />
Ultimul alineat al articolul doi al prezentului tratat prevede că conferințele periodice ale<br />
miniștrilor afacerilor străine ai Letoniei și Estoniei, prevăzute de art. 1 și 2 ale tratatului din 17<br />
februarie, vor fi înlocuite prin noile întâlniri în trei. Este greu a crede însă că consultările<br />
bilaterale continue între cancelariile din Riga și Reval, consultări care derivă și din alte<br />
necesități și obligații decât cele create prin tratatul din 17 februarie și care erau de tradiție cu<br />
mult înainte de încheierea sa, vor fi curmate prin această stipulație.<br />
Articolul 7 al tratatului iscălit la Geneva prevede adeziunea terțelor puteri, cu acordul<br />
unanim al celor trei țări semnatare. Tratatul din 17 februarie prevedea, la rândul său, adeziuni<br />
ulterioare cu consimțământul celor două părți contractante. Dl. Urbšys 1 , negociatorul lituanian,<br />
și-a dat imediat seama de perspectivele neplăcute pentru țara sa pe care le deschidea<br />
coexistența acestor două stipulații. În consecință, Domnia sa a cerut cu insistență ca noul tratat<br />
să prevadă dreptul pentru Lituania de a se opune la adeziunea unei terțe puteri la tratatul din<br />
februarie. Această clauză, care ar fi fost dirijată contra Poloniei, nu a fost însă admisă de<br />
reprezentanții polon și estonian.<br />
Prin declarații oficioase și comentariile presei, guvernul din Kovno a încercat imediat după<br />
parafarea Tratatului de Înțelegere și Colaborare să creeze impresia că articolul 7 nu se poate<br />
referi decât la o singură posibilitate: cea a adeziunii Finlandei. Presa din Kovno a părăsit însă<br />
această atitudine și nu mai ezită astăzi a menționa Polonia și Finlanda ca fiind cele două puteri<br />
a căror adeziune ar putea intra în considerare.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 598-600.<br />
97. Diplomatic Report no. 491 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 18 th<br />
September 1934<br />
Pact of Baltic Agreement and Collaboration<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour of attaching for Your Excellency <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Agreement and<br />
Collaboration signed in Geneva by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. 2<br />
By comparing it to <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> Treaty for <strong>the</strong> Regulation of <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Estonian Alliance<br />
from February 17 th current year, it turns out that <strong>the</strong> latter has inspired <strong>the</strong> editors of <strong>the</strong> new<br />
convention as regards <strong>the</strong> regulation of consultations and of <strong>the</strong> collaboration system in<br />
general, as <strong>the</strong> treaty from February 17 th had been inspired in turn by <strong>the</strong> Pact for <strong>the</strong><br />
Organization of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente.<br />
Unlike <strong>the</strong> treaty from February 17 th , <strong>the</strong> new convention applies to an essentially limited<br />
sphere. Article 3 stipulates: “The High Contracting Parties acknowledge <strong>the</strong> existence of specific<br />
problems that might make difficult a concerted attitude with respect to <strong>the</strong>m. They agree that<br />
<strong>the</strong>se problems represent <strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> commitments provided in <strong>the</strong> First Article of this<br />
Treaty.”<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r essential difference is that <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Estonian Treaty is based on a military<br />
alliance to which it is organically connected through <strong>the</strong> stipulation regarding its duration.<br />
The last paragraph of article two of <strong>the</strong> current treaty specifies that <strong>the</strong> periodical<br />
conferences of <strong>the</strong> ministers of foreign affairs of Latvia and Estonia, stipulated by articles 1 and 2<br />
of <strong>the</strong> treaty of February 17 th , will be replaced by <strong>the</strong> new threesome reunions. Never<strong>the</strong>less, it is<br />
hard to believe that <strong>the</strong> continuous bilateral conferences between <strong>the</strong> chancelleries from Riga<br />
1<br />
Juozas Urbšys (1896-1991) a fost Ministrul Lituaniei la Riga (1932-1934), Director al Departamentului Politic al<br />
Ministerului de Externe leton, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1938-1940).<br />
2<br />
The text of <strong>the</strong> pact is not included in this volume.
272 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
and Reval, which also derive from o<strong>the</strong>r necessities and obligations than <strong>the</strong> ones created by <strong>the</strong><br />
treaty of February 17 th and which were traditional long before it was signed, will be brought to<br />
an end by this stipulation.<br />
Article 7 of <strong>the</strong> treaty signed in Geneva stipulates <strong>the</strong> adherence of <strong>the</strong> third powers, with<br />
<strong>the</strong> unanimous approval of <strong>the</strong> three signing countries. The treaty from February 17 th stipulated<br />
in turn subsequent adherences, based on <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> two contracting parties. Mr. Urbšys<br />
– <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian negotiator – immediately realized <strong>the</strong> unpleasant perspectives for his country<br />
that <strong>the</strong> coexistence of <strong>the</strong>se two stipulations generated. Consequently, His Excellency insisted<br />
that <strong>the</strong> new treaty should include <strong>the</strong> right for Lithuania to oppose <strong>the</strong> adherence of a third<br />
power to <strong>the</strong> February treaty. None<strong>the</strong>less, this clause, which would have been directed against<br />
Poland, was not admitted by <strong>the</strong> Polish and Estonian representatives.<br />
Through officious statements and <strong>the</strong> press comments, immediately after <strong>the</strong> sealing of <strong>the</strong><br />
Treaty of Agreement and Collaboration, <strong>the</strong> government from Kovno tried to give <strong>the</strong><br />
impression that article 7 could only refer to one possibility: <strong>the</strong> adherence of Finland. But <strong>the</strong><br />
press from Kovno abandoned this attitude and nowadays <strong>the</strong>y do not hesitate to mention<br />
Poland and Finland as <strong>the</strong> two powers whose adherence could be considered.<br />
The Pact of Baltic Agreement and Collaboration<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour of attaching for Your Excellency <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Agreement and<br />
Collaboration signed in Geneva by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. 1<br />
By comparing it to <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> Treaty for <strong>the</strong> Regulation of <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Estonian Alliance<br />
from February 17 th current year, it turns out that <strong>the</strong> latter has inspired <strong>the</strong> editors of <strong>the</strong> new<br />
convention as regards <strong>the</strong> regulation of consultations and of <strong>the</strong> collaboration system in<br />
general, as <strong>the</strong> treaty from February 17 th had been inspired in turn by <strong>the</strong> Pact for <strong>the</strong> Regulation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente.<br />
Unlike <strong>the</strong> treaty from February 17 th , <strong>the</strong> new convention applies to an essentially limited<br />
sphere. Article 3 stipulates: “The High Contracting Parties acknowledge <strong>the</strong> existence of specific<br />
problems that might make difficult a concerted attitude with respect to <strong>the</strong>m. They agree that<br />
<strong>the</strong>se problems represent <strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> commitments provided in <strong>the</strong> First Article of this<br />
Treaty.”<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r essential difference is that <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Estonian Treaty is based on a military<br />
alliance to which it is organically connected through <strong>the</strong> stipulation regarding its duration.<br />
The last paragraph of article two of <strong>the</strong> current treaty specifies that <strong>the</strong> periodical<br />
conferences of <strong>the</strong> ministers of foreign affairs of Latvia and Estonia, stipulated by art. 1 and 2 of<br />
<strong>the</strong> treaty from February 17 th , will be replaced by <strong>the</strong> new threesome reunions. Never<strong>the</strong>less, it<br />
is hard to believe that <strong>the</strong> continuous bilateral conferences between <strong>the</strong> chancelleries from Riga<br />
and Reval, which also derive from o<strong>the</strong>r necessities and obligations than <strong>the</strong> ones created by <strong>the</strong><br />
treaty from February 17 th and which were traditional long before it was signed, will be brought<br />
to an end by this stipulation.<br />
Article 7 of <strong>the</strong> treaty signed in Geneva stipulates <strong>the</strong> adherence of <strong>the</strong> third powers, with<br />
<strong>the</strong> unanimous approval of <strong>the</strong> three signing countries. The treaty from February 17 th stipulated<br />
in turn subsequent adherences, based on <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> two contracting parties. Mr.<br />
Urbšys 2 – <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian negotiator – immediately realized <strong>the</strong> unpleasant perspectives for his<br />
country that <strong>the</strong> coexistence of <strong>the</strong>se two stipulations generated. Consequently, His Excellency<br />
insisted that <strong>the</strong> new treaty should include <strong>the</strong> right for Lithuania to oppose <strong>the</strong> adherence of a<br />
1<br />
The text of <strong>the</strong> pact is not included in this volume.<br />
2<br />
Juozas Urbšys (1896-1991) was Lithuania’s envoy to Riga at <strong>the</strong> time (1932-1934), after having served as a diplomat<br />
in Berlin and Paris. In 1934 he was appointed Director of <strong>the</strong> Political Department of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian Foreign<br />
Ministry and in 1938 he became his country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 273<br />
third power to <strong>the</strong> treaty from February. None<strong>the</strong>less, this clause, which would have been<br />
directed against Poland, was not admitted by <strong>the</strong> Polish and Estonian representatives.<br />
Through officious statements and <strong>the</strong> press comments, immediately after <strong>the</strong> sealing of <strong>the</strong><br />
Treaty of Agreement and Collaboration, <strong>the</strong> government from Kovno tried to give <strong>the</strong><br />
impression that article 7 could only refer to one possibility: <strong>the</strong> adherence of Finland. But <strong>the</strong><br />
press from Kovno abandoned this attitude and nowadays <strong>the</strong>y do not hesitate to mention<br />
Poland and Finland as <strong>the</strong> two powers whose adherence could be considered.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 598-600.<br />
98. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 500 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 25<br />
septembrie 1934<br />
Ultraconfidențial<br />
Ca urmare la telegrama mea nr. 293.<br />
Dl Miķelis Valters, care este astăzi în vârstă de 60 de ani, fusese în Rusia sovietică membru al<br />
partidului social-revoluționar. În 1905, Domnia sa fusese condamnat la o perioadă de exil în<br />
Siberia, reușise însă a fugi înainte de aplicarea pedepsei.<br />
Studiile lui de doctor în drept și le-a făcut în Elveția, este înfățișat ca un om de cultură<br />
întinsă, inteligent, dar puțin activ.<br />
Domnia sa este prieten intim al D-lui Ulmanis cu care a colaborat în timpul luptelor pentru<br />
independență și făcând parte ca Ministru de Interne din Guvernul din Libau.<br />
Domnia sa a fost trimis în urmă ca Ministru mai întâi la Roma pe urmă la Paris.<br />
În timpul unui guvern social-democrat, Dl Cielēns, pe atunci Ministru al Afacerilor Străine,<br />
ar fi ordonat o anchetă privitor la contabilitatea acestei legații și rechemat în același timp<br />
telegrafic pe dl. Valters. Explicația acestei acțiuni este pe cât mi se spune dublă: Dl. Cielēns<br />
răzbuna astfel în același timp și partidul socialist pe care Dl. Valters îl părăsiseră și pe o vară a<br />
Domniei sale, Doamna X, care pentru motive inutil de cercetat pălmuise în public la timpul său<br />
pe Dl. Valters.<br />
Oricum ar fi Dl. Valters a refuzat categoric a-și părăsi postul înainte ca ancheta ordonată să<br />
aibă loc. Rezultatul acestei anchete ar fi fost în întregime favorabil Domnului Valters, Dl.<br />
Cielēns nu a renunțat totuși la ideea pe care o urmărea și a transferat pe Dl. Valters ca Consul<br />
(sic!) la Königsberg cu speranța că acesta va prefera a demisiona. Ceea ce n-a fost cazul.<br />
Numind pe Dl. Valters într-un post atât de important cum este Varșovia-București, Dl.<br />
Ulmanis, pe lângă că răspunde unor sentimente de amiciție bine cunoscute, recompensează, mi<br />
se spune, pe primul intelectual leton care pe vremea Rusiei țariste proclamase cu riscul libertății<br />
sale ideea independenței letone.<br />
Cu toate acest trecut onorabil aflu la legația Poloniei că Guvernul de la Varșovia nu a găsit<br />
alegerea Domnului Valters ca absolut satisfăcătoare. Agrementul totuși va fi probabil acordat<br />
fără discuție.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 611-613.<br />
98. Diplomatic Report no. 500 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 25 th<br />
September 1934<br />
Top secret.
274 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
As a response to my telegram no. 293.<br />
Mr. Miķelis Valters, who is today 60 years old, had been a member of <strong>the</strong> Social-<br />
Revolutionary Party in Soviet Russia. In 1905, he was sentenced to exile in Siberia, but had<br />
managed to escape before <strong>the</strong> enforcement of <strong>the</strong> punishment.<br />
He attended his doctoral studies of law in Switzerland, he is seen as a highly educated man,<br />
intelligent, but not very active.<br />
He is an intimate friend of Mr. Ulmanis, with whom he collaborated during <strong>the</strong> fights for<br />
independence and partaking as a Minister of <strong>the</strong> Interior in <strong>the</strong> Government in Liepāja (Libau).<br />
He was sent as a Minister first to Rome and <strong>the</strong>n to Paris.<br />
During a social-democratic government, Mr. Cielēns, who was <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs, is assumed to have ordered an investigation regarding <strong>the</strong> accountability of this legation<br />
and to have called Mr. Valters back by wire. The explanation for this action is – as far as I am<br />
informed – double: Mr. Cielēns, thus, avenged at <strong>the</strong> same time both <strong>the</strong> socialist party that Mr.<br />
Valters had left, and a cousin of his, Mrs. X, who had slapped Mr. Valters in public for reasons<br />
useless to investigate.<br />
Anyway, Mr. Valters firmly refused to leave his position before <strong>the</strong> actual ordered<br />
investigation. It seems that <strong>the</strong> result of this investigation was entirely in favour of Mr. Valters,<br />
but Mr. Cielēns did not give up his purpose and transferred Mr. Valters as a Consul to<br />
Königsberg, hoping that he would prefer to resign. Still, it was not <strong>the</strong> case.<br />
By appointing Mr. Valters in such an important position as Warsaw-Bucharest, besides<br />
responding to well-known feelings of friendship, Mr. Ulmanis also rewards – as I am told – <strong>the</strong><br />
first Latvian intellectual that had proclaimed <strong>the</strong> idea of Latvian independence, though running<br />
<strong>the</strong> risk of being imprisoned during czarist Russia.<br />
Despite this honourable past, I found out at <strong>the</strong> Polish legation that <strong>the</strong> Government in<br />
Warsaw did not find Mr. Valters’s choice absolutely satisfying. Never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>the</strong> approval will be<br />
probably granted without discussion.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s.<br />
99. Telegrama ministrului României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 516 către Ministrul<br />
Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 9 octombrie 1934<br />
Dl. Munters, Secretarul General al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine, reîntors din Geneva unde<br />
a reprezentat țara sa, îmi comunică unele confidențe ce i-au fost făcute de Dl. Beck pe timpul<br />
călătoriei lor spre casă.<br />
Polonia, care este dispusă să întrețină cele mai bune relații de vecinătate cu Rusia Sovietică,<br />
consideră orișice încercare de a introduce U.R.S.S. în politica generală europeană pe un picior<br />
de egalitate cu celelalte Mari Puteri ca îndreptată contra intereselor sale cele mai vitale și se va<br />
opune constant unor asemenea încercări ori de unde vor pleca ele. Dl. Beck pare hotărât a nu<br />
devia de la această linie de conduită.<br />
Conținutul „rezumatului conversațiilor” prezentat D-lui Barthou de Dl Beck reprezintă,<br />
după spusele acestuia, atitudinea definitivă a Poloniei, atitudine care, observă Dl. Munters cu o<br />
vădită satisfacție, îngroapă proiectul pactului de asistență mutuală oriental.<br />
Întrebând pe Dl. Munters dacă nu crede că prin această îngropare se pregătește terenul unei<br />
alianțe franco-ruse, combinație poate mai primejdioasă pentru Polonia și Țările Baltice decât<br />
zisul proiect, Domnia sa mi-a răspuns că o asemenea alianță nu ar avea nici o semnificație<br />
practică.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 275<br />
Într-adevăr, îmi spune Domnia sa, Rusia Sovietică contrar Rusiei Țariste nu este limitrofă<br />
Germaniei, o nouă alianță ruso-franceză nu ar putea prezenta astăzi deci decât expresia unei<br />
tendințe. Dacă însă Franța ar încerca să îi dea o valoare echivalentă cu cea a alianței antebelice,<br />
ea ar provoca cu timpul o grupare contrară a tuturor puterilor geografic interpuse egal<br />
amenințate. Un bloc germano-polon s-ar forma probabil imediat, el ar reprezenta cea mai<br />
puternică combinație militară imaginabilă în Europa.<br />
La Geneva, îmi spune Dl. Munters, alianța franco-rusă este considerată ca foarte probabilă,<br />
el totuși personal nu-și poate închipui ca Franța să se hotărască finalmente a renunța la o<br />
alianță atât de eficace ca aceea cu Polonia pentru a o înlocui cu un enorm necunoscut. Domnia<br />
sa crede încă că acest proiect de alianță nu este pentru Franța decât un element tactic de<br />
presiune asupra Germaniei și de sondaj a apropierii germano-polone.<br />
Abordând același subiect cu un coleg al meu, reprezentant al unei mari puteri, Dl Munters i-<br />
a exprimat și lui speranța că până la urmă Franța va renunța la ideea alianței rusești. Parisul, i-a<br />
spus Dl Munters, caută un element de siguranță, mai mult o asemenea alianță ar distruge<br />
dimpotrivă [pe] cele pe care le posedă și ar provoca în plus noi coaliții.<br />
Adaug că opinia generală în Țările Baltice crede, dimpotrivă, în posibilitatea încheierii<br />
alianței în chestiune și că această credință pare a provoca în momentul de față o dezvoltare a<br />
simțului de solidaritate baltic și scandinavo-baltic.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, filele 114-116.<br />
99. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza no. 516 to Foreign<br />
Minister Nicolae Titulescu, 9 th October 1934<br />
Mr. Munters, Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who returned from<br />
Geneva, where he represented his country, informs me about confidences made by Mr. Beck on<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir journey home. Poland, who is willing to maintain <strong>the</strong> best neighbourly <strong>relations</strong> with<br />
Soviet Russia, considers that any attempt of including <strong>the</strong> USSR in <strong>the</strong> general European policy<br />
on equal footing with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Great Powers as being directed against its most vital interests<br />
and will oppose constantly such attempts, whichever <strong>the</strong>ir origin. Mr. Beck seems determined<br />
not to deviate from this line of conduct.<br />
The content of <strong>the</strong> "summary of conversations" presented by Mr. Beck to Mr. Barthou<br />
represents, according to him, <strong>the</strong> final attitude of Poland, which Mr. Munters notices with<br />
obvious satisfaction that buries <strong>the</strong> draft of <strong>the</strong> oriental pact of mutual assistance.<br />
I asked Mr. Munters if he thought that by this burial <strong>the</strong> ground for a Franco-Russian<br />
alliance was being prepared, which was a combination possibly more dangerous for Poland and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic states than <strong>the</strong> said draft, and he said that such an alliance would have no practical<br />
significance.<br />
He tells me that, indeed, Soviet Russia unlike Tsarist Russia is not bordering Germany, thus<br />
a new Russo-French alliance would be but <strong>the</strong> expression of a trend today. But if France tried to<br />
consider it as important as <strong>the</strong> pre-war alliance, in time it would determine <strong>the</strong> creation of an<br />
opposed group of all <strong>the</strong> geographically interposed powers, equally threatened. Probably a<br />
German-Polish block would immediately form and it would represent <strong>the</strong> strongest military<br />
combination imaginable in Europe.<br />
Mr. Munters says that in Geneva, <strong>the</strong> Franco-Russian alliance is considered highly probable,<br />
but that he still cannot imagine that France could finally decide to give up an alliance as
276 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
effective as that with Poland in order to replace it with an unknown factor. He still believes that<br />
this alliance project is to France but a tactical element of pressure on Germany and of survey of<br />
<strong>the</strong> German-Polish approach.<br />
In a discussion on <strong>the</strong> same subject with a colleague of mine, a representative of a great<br />
power, Mr. Munters also expressed his hope that France would eventually abandon <strong>the</strong> idea of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Russian alliance. Mr. Munters believed that Paris was seeking for a safety element, and what<br />
is more such an alliance would ra<strong>the</strong>r destroy <strong>the</strong> ones it already had and moreover, would<br />
determine new coalitions.<br />
I also mention that <strong>the</strong> general opinion in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States conversely believes in <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility of concluding <strong>the</strong> alliance in question and that this belief seems to cause at present<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> sense of Baltic and Scandinavian-Baltic solidarity.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 114-116.<br />
100. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 601 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu,<br />
decembrie 1934<br />
Țările baltice față de Pactul de Asistență Orientală sau de o eventuală alianță sovietofranceză<br />
Referire la nr. 598.<br />
Se știe că pactul de colaborare a celor trei țări baltice: Estonia, Letonia și Lituania, iscălit la<br />
Geneva în octombrie trecut, prevedea obligația unei acțiuni politice solidare numai în<br />
chestiunile desemnate în prealabil ca fiind de interes comun.<br />
Comunicatul oficial prin care s-a încheiat recenta Conferință din Reval între Miniștrii<br />
Afacerilor Străine ai celor trei țări declară că ele sunt favorabile ideii Pactului oriental de<br />
Asistență Mutuală și că această chestiune face parte tocmai din categoria celor supuse unui<br />
examen și unei hotărâri în trei.<br />
Informațiile pe care le culeg din izvorul cel mai competent arată însă că înțelegerea<br />
Guvernelor baltice este în această privință departe de a fi atât de completă pe cât s-ar părea<br />
după comunicatul oficial.<br />
Punctul de vedere al guvernelor din Riga și Reval rămâne că un pact oriental de asistență<br />
mutuală nu se poate încheia în lipsa Germaniei sau Poloniei fără a lua imediat caracterul unei<br />
alianțe îndreptată împotriva acestor țări. Revalul și Riga sunt ferm hotărâte a nu se lăsa<br />
niciodată târâte în asemenea combinații politice. Guvernul din Kovno, pe de altă parte, pare a fi<br />
considerat, împreună cu U.R.S.S., soluția șchioapă a problemei siguranței orientale, cea fără<br />
Germania, ca mai favorabilă intereselor sale.<br />
O înțelegere între cele trei puteri baltice pe această chestiune nu s-a putut realiza în<br />
consecință în octombrie la Geneva decât pe terenul temporizării. În Reval pozițiile însă au fost<br />
mai precis definite.<br />
Chestiunea pactului oriental a fost declarată ca rămânând printre cele de interes comun<br />
numai atâta timp cât este înțeles că Germania și Polonia fac parte dintre puterile semnatare. În<br />
aceste împrejurări precise numai s-a hotărât că textele vor fi studiate, obiecțiile făcute,<br />
adeziunea cu rezervele eventuale dată de comun acord.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 277<br />
Reprezentanții leton și estonian au precizat însă că în cazul când un text oarecare s-ar<br />
discuta sau iscăli fără participarea Germaniei sau a Poloniei, Guvernele lor își vor relua deplina<br />
libertate de acțiune, chestiunea reintrând atunci în categoria celor de interes special.<br />
S-a hotărât, de asemenea, că cele trei puteri baltice se vor mulțumi, până la noi ordine, cu<br />
aprobarea de principiu a ideii proiectului și vor evita orișice manifestație pozitivă în această<br />
chestiune până la limpezirea situației internaționale.<br />
Această ultimă hotărâre a fost luată împotriva sugestiilor Domnului Lozoraitis 1 , Ministrul<br />
Afacerilor Străine lituanian. Ea pare paralelă cu cea a Poloniei și corespunde cu simțămintele pe<br />
care Guvernele din Riga și Reval și le-au format de la început asupra propunerii Litvinov-<br />
Barthou, întărite prin cele ce le inspiră acestor guverne unele noi elemente în evoluția situației<br />
internaționale.<br />
Toată activitatea <strong>diplomatic</strong>ă a Domnului Litvinov, atât de bine înlănțuită de la punctul de<br />
plecare al declarației din Londra, care singură a făcut posibilă recunoașterea Sovietelor de către<br />
Mica Înțelegere, care singură, la rândul ei, a făcut posibilă intrarea Rusiei Sovietice în Liga<br />
Națiunilor, intrare fără de care alianța franco-sovietică ar fi astăzi un lucru irealizabil – nu a<br />
încetat să fie privită aici cu extremă suspiciune. Partea, importantă de altfel, pe care guvernele<br />
din Riga și Reval au avut-o în succesul întreprinderilor din ultimii ani ale Comisarului sovietic,<br />
nu a fost consimțită de ele decât „la mort dans l'âme”, din oportunitate sau timiditate politică și<br />
din convingerea că nu opunerea acestor două mici țări ar fi putut împiedica evenimente ca, de<br />
pildă, intrarea Rusiei Sovietice în Societatea Națiunilor. Această intrare despre care un Ministru<br />
al Afacerilor Străine leton, invocând articolul 16 al Conventului, îmi spunea că mai târziu sau<br />
mai devreme va primejdui siguranța sau chiar existența țării sale.<br />
Interesul Rusiei Sovietice în izbucnirea unui conflict între puterile burgheze pare aici atât de<br />
indubitabil, și de altfel a fost atât de des proclamat de mai toți corifeii Kremlinului, încât în<br />
orișice manevră a Comisarului Sovietic se întrezărește încă o mașinațiune pentru o pregătire cât<br />
mai propice a terenului în vederea tocmai a izbucnirii acestui conflict. Fapte ca decepția<br />
exprimată fără jenă de Radek în „Izvestia” față de spiritul de toleranță arătat la Roma față de<br />
Franța în chestiunea Saar-ului sau ca oferta celor 11 milioane de baionete [făcută] Națiunii<br />
Iugoslave pentru a răzbuna moartea Monarhului său, nu fac desigur decât să confirme aceste<br />
simțăminte.<br />
După cum Domnul Ulmanis mi-a declarat-o în timp, nu se crede aici în sinceritatea grijii<br />
inspirate Moscovei de către pretinsele planuri de agresiune ale Germaniei. Se crede însă în<br />
teroarea pe care o inspiră lumii sovietice posibilitatea unei reconcilieri între puterile burgheze<br />
occidentale, astăzi încă despărțite în cele două tabere ale marelui război. Presupunând, deci,<br />
chiar că nici o intenție agresivă propriu-zisă nu s-ar ascunde sub actuala politică externă a<br />
Moscovei, se atribuie în tot cazul acestei politici intenția de a împiedica cu orișice preț o<br />
asemenea reconciliere și se constată, de altfel, că tensiunea extraordinară din ultimele luni este<br />
(în afară de cea neașteptată cauzată de atentatul din Marseille) în întregime datorată sistemului<br />
de cărări inextricabile în care spiritul inventiv al Domnului Litvinov a atras puțin cu puțin<br />
lumea burgheză, manoperă care a reușit să zdruncine deja alianțe atât de sincere și naturale ca<br />
cea franco-polonă, precum și, în gândul opiniei publice baltice, [pe] cea româno-polonă.<br />
1<br />
Stasys Lozoraitis (1898-1983) a fost diplomat lituanian, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1934-1938) și șef al<br />
diplomației lituaniene în exil (1940-1983).
278 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
În această privință, notez că noul ministru al Letoniei în București, pentru a-mi explica<br />
schimbarea de atribuție intervenită, îmi spunea: „maintenant que l'alliance roumaine-polonaise<br />
n`existe pour ainsi dire plus...”<br />
Până la ultima schimbare de guvern în Franța era intima convingere a oamenilor politici din<br />
Riga și Reval, că atât Pactul Oriental de Asistență Mutuală, dacă s-ar fi încheiat cu pripa care<br />
prezida negocierilor la acea vreme din partea Moscovei și a Parisului, adică fără participarea<br />
Germaniei, cât și alianța franco-rusă, ar fi avut ca rezultat, și aveau probabil ca scop, de a<br />
permite Franței inițierea unei acțiuni energice în chestiunea Saar-ului sau în cea a dezarmării,<br />
probabil înainte de data plebiscitului. Această acțiune ar fi putut fi pusă în perfectă concordanță<br />
cu stipulațiile tratatelor în vigoare (art. 16, 42, 43, 44, 213 ale Conventului, art. 2 și 4 Locarno),<br />
dar totuși ar fi dus, după toate probabilitățile, la un conflict general.<br />
Nu se crede un moment că Franța ar fi dorit un asemenea conflict. Se presupune însă că ea<br />
se hotărâse prin proiectele Litvinov-Barthou a organiza împrejurul Germanei o situație politică<br />
și militară atât de clară și de amenințătoare încât însuși guvernul național-socialist ar fi fost silit<br />
să tolereze chiar o nouă instalare a aliaților la Wiesbaden mai degrabă decât a risca o rezistență<br />
fatală. Rusia sovietică nu se preta la manevra de stil mare a Parisului decât în speranța tocmai că<br />
ea totuși ar fi degenerat în conflictul atât de dorit între puterile burgheze.<br />
Astăzi, de la luarea direcției afacerilor străine franceze de către Dl. Laval 1 , de la veștile<br />
liniștitoare ce veneau de la Roma privitor la discuțiile Comitetului de Trei, de la declarațiile<br />
grave dar împăciuitoare ale Domnului Baldwin 2 în parlamentul englez, de la noile conversații<br />
începute între Varșovia și Paris, acest sentiment s-a atenuat în mod sensibil.<br />
Până în ziua însă în care procesul de destindere între țările burgheze occidentale va fi un<br />
fapt aproape împlinit, Guvernele din Riga și Reval vor continua mi se pare a crede că adeziunea<br />
lor necondiționată la proiectele sovieto-franceze ar contribui mai mult la o împiedicare a<br />
acestui proces decât la accelerarea lui. Ori opinia în aceste două țări este unanimă în a<br />
considera că nu există o mai bună garanție în general de securitate în Orient și în special de<br />
existență pentru ele decât apropierea și reconcilierea definitivă între Țările Occidentale astăzi<br />
învrăjbite.<br />
În ultimele vremuri un alt simțământ – cel al instabilității lucrurilor în Rusia sovietică – a<br />
venit să confirme încă odată oportunitatea, pentru statele vecine acestei țări, unei rezerve<br />
absolute în ceea ce privește chestiunea pactului de asistență mutuală și a relațiilor franco-ruse.<br />
Acest simțământ bazat pe unele vești certe, pe altele dubioase, ce vin dincolo de granița<br />
roșie, se poate analiza astfel.<br />
De succesul politicii interne a Domnului Litvinov este legată nu numai soarta acestui<br />
personaj, dar și situația internă în Rusia, unde în ultimele vremuri o tensiune fără precedent s-a<br />
manifestat incontestabil. Această tensiune influențează la rândul său puternic politica<br />
Comisarului sovietic. În scurt, nu se crede că Dl. Litvinov, că politica sa, că echilibrul actual în<br />
Kremlin vor rezista unei destinderi adânci și evident durabile în raporturile franco-germane.<br />
1<br />
Pierre Laval (1883-1945) a fost un om politic francez cu vederi de dreapta. Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri<br />
(1931-1932, 1935-1936, 1940, 1942-1944). A fost una dintre personalitățile proeminente ale regimului de la Vichy și a<br />
acceptat deportarea evreilor străini din Franța. Condamnat la moarte pentru înaltă trădare și executat în 1945.<br />
2<br />
Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947) a fost un politician conservator britanic, de trei ori premier al Marii Britanii între<br />
1923 și 1937.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 279<br />
Un asemenea eveniment ar fi considerat în Moscova ca un eșec complet al politicii<br />
Domnului Litvinov. Toate „jertfele” de principiu la care Domnia sa ar fi consimțit până în ziua<br />
de astăzi la Geneva și în altă parte îi vor fi reproșate cu violență.<br />
Nu se crede că în o asemenea ipoteză situația lui Stalin va fi [ea] însăși compromisă. Se<br />
presupune mai degrabă că sub pretextul tulburărilor interne actuale va consemna în mâna<br />
militarilor pentru un oarecare timp conducerea afacerilor. Se vorbește în acest sens de<br />
chemarea lui Blücher 1 la Moscova. Se crede însă că într-o asemenea conjunctură activitatea<br />
externă a Rusiei Sovietice va suferi o eclipsă și că astfel s-ar putea ca, în definitiv, chestiunea<br />
Pactului Oriental de Asistență Mutuală să nu se mai pună defel sau să nu se mai pună decât în<br />
împrejurări care nu vor mai avea nimic de a face cu cele de astăzi.<br />
Posibilitatea unui nou și covârșitor succes al Domnului Litvinov în cariera sa de „medium”<br />
politic european, posibilitatea adică a unei alianțe militare sovieto-franceze, nu este exclusă nici<br />
ea pentru Ministrul Afacerilor Străine leton.<br />
La o asemenea eventualitate, la care personal Domnia sa nu crede, se referea Domnul<br />
Munters când îmi pronostica că Franța ar risca izolarea completă.<br />
Nu am avut impresia că amenințarea cu alianța sovieto-franceză să fi avut aici ca efect de a<br />
aduce cele două guverne baltice la simțământul mai puțin intransigent față de pactul oriental.<br />
Dimpotrivă, cred că acest proiect de alianță, că zvonurile relative la o colaborare militară, de<br />
fapt existentă deja între Statele Majore francez și sovietic, au alarmat și mai mult opinia publică<br />
baltică față de orișice combinație în care Rusia Sovietică ar juca alături de Franța rolul principal.<br />
Dacă o asemenea alianță ar trebui să se împlinească, nu ezit a crede că, pentru Statele<br />
Baltice și Polonia cel puțin, Domnul Munters vedea just când îmi pronostica că față de blocul<br />
sovieto-francez un bloc al țărilor intermediare s-ar constitui automat, oricare ar fi antipatiile și<br />
divergențele politice existente.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 632-640.<br />
100. Diplomatic Report no. 601 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu,<br />
December 1934<br />
The Baltic Countries faced with <strong>the</strong> Pact for Oriental Assistance or a potential Soviet-French<br />
alliance<br />
Reference no. 598.<br />
It is a known fact that <strong>the</strong> collaboration pact of <strong>the</strong> three Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia<br />
and Lithuania, signed in Geneva in October of last year, stipulated <strong>the</strong> obligation of a joint<br />
political action only regarding <strong>the</strong> issues pre-determined as being of common interest.<br />
The official release based on which <strong>the</strong> recent Conference of Reval was signed by <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of <strong>the</strong> three countries states that <strong>the</strong>y are in favour of <strong>the</strong> idea of an<br />
Oriental Pact of Mutual Assistance and that this issue belongs precisely to <strong>the</strong> category of issues<br />
subject to a three-party examination and decision.<br />
The information I collect from <strong>the</strong> most competent source never<strong>the</strong>less shows that <strong>the</strong><br />
agreement of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Governments is in this regards far from being as complete as it seems<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> official release.<br />
1<br />
Vasili Konstantinovici Blücher (1889-1938) a fost un lider militar sovietic, comandant al forțelor sovietice din<br />
Ucraina și din Extremul Orient. A căzut victimă epurării armatei de către Stalin.
280 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
The point of view of <strong>the</strong> Riga and Reval Governments remains that an oriental pact of<br />
mutual assistance cannot be signed in default of Germany or Poland, without having <strong>the</strong><br />
immediate character of an alliance against <strong>the</strong>se countries. Reval and Riga are decided not to let<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves dragged into such political combinations ever. The Kovno Government, on <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r hand, seems to have considered – toge<strong>the</strong>r with USSR – <strong>the</strong> “lump” solution to <strong>the</strong><br />
problem of oriental safety, <strong>the</strong> one without Germany, which is more favourable for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
interests.<br />
Consequently, an agreement between <strong>the</strong> three Baltic powers on this issue could be signed<br />
in October in Geneva only as regards <strong>the</strong> delay. In Reval, <strong>the</strong> positions were better defined,<br />
though.<br />
The issue of <strong>the</strong> oriental pact was declared as remaining of common interest only as long as<br />
Germany and Poland are understood as part of <strong>the</strong> signing powers. Only in <strong>the</strong>se certain<br />
circumstances <strong>the</strong> texts will be studied, objections will be made, <strong>the</strong> adherence with <strong>the</strong><br />
potential reserves will be conjunctly agreed.<br />
None<strong>the</strong>less <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Estonian representatives mentioned that if any text is<br />
discussed or signed without <strong>the</strong> participation of Germany or Poland, <strong>the</strong>ir Governments will<br />
resume <strong>the</strong>ir complete freedom of action, case in which <strong>the</strong> concerning issue is re-included in<br />
<strong>the</strong> category of special interest issues.<br />
It has also been decided that <strong>the</strong> three Baltic powers will settle – until fur<strong>the</strong>r notice – for<br />
<strong>the</strong> overall approval of <strong>the</strong> project draft and will avoid any positive public opposition in this<br />
matter until <strong>the</strong> clarification of <strong>the</strong> international situation.<br />
This latter decision was taken against <strong>the</strong> suggestions of Mr. Lozoraitis 1 , Lithuanian Minister<br />
of Foreign Affairs. It seems parallel to Poland’s decision and consistent with opinions expressed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Riga and Reval Governments from <strong>the</strong> beginning on <strong>the</strong> Litvinov-Barthou proposal,<br />
consolidated by what <strong>the</strong> new elements of <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> international situation suggest<br />
to <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Mr. Litvinov’s entire <strong>diplomatic</strong> activity, uninterrupted from <strong>the</strong> starting point of <strong>the</strong><br />
declaration in London, which allowed by itself <strong>the</strong> inclusion of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russian in <strong>the</strong> League<br />
of Nations, without which <strong>the</strong> French-Soviet alliance would be today unaccomplishable, is<br />
regarded as extremely suspicious. The role – ra<strong>the</strong>r important – that <strong>the</strong> Riga and Reval<br />
Governments played in <strong>the</strong> success of Soviet Commissary’s actions from <strong>the</strong> past years was only<br />
consented by <strong>the</strong>m as “la mort dans l’âme”, out of political opportunity or shyness and out of<br />
<strong>the</strong> conviction that it was not <strong>the</strong> opposition of <strong>the</strong>se two small countries that could prevent<br />
events such as <strong>the</strong> inclusion of Soviet Russia in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations. Based on article 16 of <strong>the</strong><br />
Assembly a Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs told me that sooner or later this inclusion will<br />
endanger <strong>the</strong> safety or even <strong>the</strong> very existence of his country.<br />
The Soviet Russia’s interest in <strong>the</strong> outburst of a conflict between <strong>the</strong> bourgeois powers<br />
seems here so indubitable and moreover so often proclaimed by almost all <strong>the</strong> Kremlin<br />
coryphaei that any manoeuvre of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Commissary suggests ano<strong>the</strong>r intrigue for an<br />
appropriate preparation of <strong>the</strong> ground for <strong>the</strong> very outburst of this conflict. Facts such as <strong>the</strong><br />
deception expressed remorselessly by Radek in “Izvestia” related to <strong>the</strong> tolerance shown by<br />
Rome to France in <strong>the</strong> matter of <strong>the</strong> Saar or such as <strong>the</strong> offer of <strong>the</strong> 11 million bayonets [made]<br />
1<br />
Stasys Lozoraitis (1898-1983) was a Lithuanian diplomat, Foreign Minister (1934-1938) and head of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian<br />
diplomacy in exile (1940-1983).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 281<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Yugoslavian Nation to avenge <strong>the</strong> death of <strong>the</strong>ir Monarch, can only confirm <strong>the</strong>se<br />
opinions.<br />
As Mr. Ulmanis told me in time, <strong>the</strong> sincerity of <strong>the</strong> concern shown by Moscow as regards<br />
Germany’s aggression plans is being questioned. Never<strong>the</strong>less it is believed that <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
world is terrified by <strong>the</strong> possibility of <strong>the</strong> reconciliation of <strong>the</strong> occidental bourgeois powers that<br />
are still separated in <strong>the</strong> two sides of <strong>the</strong> Great War. Hence, even assuming that no actual<br />
aggressive intention is hidden under <strong>the</strong> current external politics of Moscow, this politics is<br />
attributed <strong>the</strong> intention of preventing at all costs such reconciliation and it is ascertained that<br />
<strong>the</strong> extraordinary tension from <strong>the</strong> past months is (besides <strong>the</strong> unexpected one caused by <strong>the</strong><br />
attempt in Marseille) entirely due to <strong>the</strong> inextricable path system in which <strong>the</strong> inventive spirit<br />
of Mr. Litvinov attracted <strong>the</strong> bourgeoisie step by step, which already managed to shake honest<br />
and natural alliances such as <strong>the</strong> French-Polish as well as – in <strong>the</strong> public Baltic opinion – <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian-Polish one.<br />
In this regard, I note that while explaining to me <strong>the</strong> change in assignment, <strong>the</strong> new Latvian<br />
Minister to Bucharest told me: “maintenant que l'alliance roumaine-polonaise n`existe pour<br />
ainsi dire plus...”<br />
Until <strong>the</strong> last change of Government in France, politicians in Riga and Reval were highly<br />
convinced that both <strong>the</strong> Oriental Pact of Mutual Assistance – which if it had been signed in <strong>the</strong><br />
rush that governed negotiations at that time by Moscow and Paris, without <strong>the</strong> participation of<br />
Germany – as well as <strong>the</strong> French-Russian alliance, would have resulted in, and probably had <strong>the</strong><br />
purpose of allowing France to initiate an energetic action in <strong>the</strong> Saar issue or in <strong>the</strong><br />
disarmament matter, probably before <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong> plebiscite. This action could have been set<br />
in perfect accordance with <strong>the</strong> stipulations of <strong>the</strong> treaties in force (art. 16, 42, 43, 44, 213 of <strong>the</strong><br />
Assembly, art. 2 and 4 Locarno), but still it would have led – according to all probabilities – to a<br />
general conflict.<br />
Not for a moment does anyone believe that France wanted such conflict. Never<strong>the</strong>less it is<br />
assumed that by means of <strong>the</strong> Litvinov-Barthou projects it had decided to organize around<br />
Germany such clear and threatening political and military situation that <strong>the</strong> national-socialist<br />
Government itself would have been forced to tolerate even a new settlement of <strong>the</strong> allies at<br />
Wiesbaden ra<strong>the</strong>r than risking a fatal resistance. Soviet Russia did not make an appeal to <strong>the</strong><br />
grand manoeuvre of Paris, unless hoping that it could have degenerated to <strong>the</strong> conflict between<br />
<strong>the</strong> bourgeois powers so badly wanted.<br />
Today, due to Mr. Laval 1 ’s taking over of <strong>the</strong> foreign affairs reign, due to <strong>the</strong> comforting<br />
news coming from Rome regarding <strong>the</strong> discussions of <strong>the</strong> Threesome Committee, from Mr.<br />
Baldwin 2 ’s serious but reconciling declarations in <strong>the</strong> English Parliament, due to <strong>the</strong> new<br />
conversations initiated between Warsaw and Paris, this feeling has faded considerably.<br />
None<strong>the</strong>less, until <strong>the</strong> day when <strong>the</strong> tension-relief process between occidental bourgeois<br />
countries is almost accomplished, it seems that Riga and Reval Governments will continue to<br />
believe that <strong>the</strong>ir unconditioned adhesion to <strong>the</strong> Soviet-French projects would contribute more<br />
to <strong>the</strong> prevention of this process than to its forwarding. But <strong>the</strong> opinion in <strong>the</strong>se two countries<br />
1<br />
Pierre Laval (1883-1945) was a French right-wing politician. Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1931-1932, 1935-<br />
1936, 1940, 1942-1944). He was one of <strong>the</strong> prominent personalities of Vichy and accepted <strong>the</strong> deportation of foreign<br />
Jews from France. Sentenced to death for high treason and executed in 1945.<br />
2<br />
Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947) was a British Conservative politician, three times Prime Minister of Great Britain<br />
between 1923 and 1937.
282 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
is unanimous in considering that <strong>the</strong>re is no better guarantee of safety in <strong>the</strong> East in general<br />
and of existence in particular for <strong>the</strong>m than <strong>the</strong> toge<strong>the</strong>rness and final reconciliation of <strong>the</strong><br />
Occidental Countries that are today embittered.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r feeling – of instability in Soviet Russia – has lately come to still confirm <strong>the</strong><br />
opportunity for absolute reserve of <strong>the</strong> neighbouring countries as regards <strong>the</strong> matter of <strong>the</strong> pact<br />
of mutual assistance and of <strong>the</strong> French-Russian <strong>relations</strong>.<br />
This feeling based on certain indubitable news and on o<strong>the</strong>r arguable ones coming from<br />
beyond <strong>the</strong> red border can be analyzed this way.<br />
The success of Mr. Litvinov’s domestic politics is connected not only to <strong>the</strong> fate of this<br />
character, but even to <strong>the</strong> internal situation of Russia, where an unprecedented tension has<br />
manifested incontestably lately. This tension strongly influences in turn <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Commissary. In brief, it is not believed that Mr. Litvinov, that his policy, that <strong>the</strong> current<br />
balance in Kremlin can allow a deep and obviously durable relief of tensions from French-<br />
German <strong>relations</strong>.<br />
Such event would be considered in Moscow a complete failure of Mr. Litvinov’s policy. All<br />
<strong>the</strong> principled “sacrifices” that he consented until today in Geneva and elsewhere will be<br />
reproached to him violently.<br />
In such hypo<strong>the</strong>sis, Stalin’s situation is not believed to be compromised. Assumption is<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r made that, upon justification of current domestic disorders, business management shall<br />
be temporarily entrusted to military. To this end, Blücher 1 is believed to be soon called to<br />
Moscow. Yet, in such circumstances, <strong>the</strong> external activity of Soviet Russia is believed to be<br />
shadowed and thus, <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> Oriental Pact for Mutual Assistance may never be raised or<br />
may be raised only in certain circumstances, completely different from <strong>the</strong> current conditions.<br />
The possibility of a new and overwhelming success of Mr. Litvinov in his carrier as an<br />
European political “medium”, respectively <strong>the</strong> possibility of a Soviet-French military alliance is<br />
not excluded by <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs.<br />
This possibility, which His Excellency does not personally believe in, was referred to by Mr.<br />
Munters when foreseeing that France might risk complete isolation.<br />
I didn’t feel that <strong>the</strong> Soviet-French alliance threat caused <strong>the</strong> two Baltic Governments to be<br />
less intransigent towards <strong>the</strong> oriental pact. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, I believe that <strong>the</strong> project of this<br />
alliance, that rumours concerning a military collaboration, which actually already exists<br />
between <strong>the</strong> Soviet and French General Staffs, have raised Baltic public opinion’s awareness on<br />
any situation where Soviet Russia may play <strong>the</strong> main part toge<strong>the</strong>r with France.<br />
If such alliance is to be established, I unhesitatingly believe that, at least for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />
and Poland, Mr. Munters was right when foreseeing that, in opposition to <strong>the</strong> Soviet-French<br />
block, a block of intermediate countries would be established automatically, disregarding all<br />
and any current political divergences and antipathies.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 632-640.<br />
1<br />
Vasili Konstantinovici Blücher (1889-1938) was a Soviet military leader, commander of Soviet armies in Ukraine<br />
and Far East. He was a victim of changes made by Stalin within army leaders.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 283<br />
101. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />
Sturdza nr. 30 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 23<br />
ianuarie 1935<br />
Triumful german în Saar și Puterile Baltice<br />
Îndată după Sărbători procesul intentat de guvernul lituanian partidelor politice germane a<br />
fost suspendat sub cuvântul că unul sau doi din cei 160 de acuzați ar fi fost indispuși. Nimeni nu<br />
s-a înșelat asupra motivelor adevărate ale acestei măsuri: guvernul și judecătorii din Kovno<br />
preferau să aștepte rezultatul plebiscitului, dorind să își dea seama de posibilitățile lăsate sau<br />
create de noua situație internațională a Germaniei.<br />
Acțiunea angajată de guvernul din Kovno în chestiunea Memelului, acțiune care fusese<br />
permanent dezaprobată de Estonia și Letonia, nu se putea dezvolta chiar în visurile cele mai<br />
îndrăznețe ale oamenilor de stat lituanieni decât într-o conjunctură precisă: ostracismul<br />
Germaniei, absența sa continuă din concernul politic european.<br />
Triumful Germanei în Saar, perspectivele ce acest eveniment le deschide, constituie pentru<br />
mica Lituanie o dureroasă dezamăgire. Sfaturile de moderație ce-i vin se pare astăzi chiar din<br />
sursa franceză îi indică destul de clar că momentul a venit, sub riscurile cele mai grave, de a-și<br />
renega de fapt întreaga acțiune și de a părăsi calea îndrăzneață adoptată în urma încurajărilor<br />
celor care caută a o opri astăzi.<br />
În cercurile competente în Riga găsesc, în urma plebiscitului, față de Lituania, precizarea și<br />
intensificarea reproșurilor de lipsă de măsură și de simț politic ce până acum îi erau făcute<br />
numai cu o relativă moderație.<br />
„La Lituanie n'a que ce qu'elle mérite, pourquoi n'at-elle pas écouté nos conseils. Nous lui<br />
disions bien qu'elle n`était qu`un poin dans les mains des grands et qu`on la lâcherait pour un<br />
autre dès que les intérêts de ces Grands le demanderaient.” Astfel se exprima deunăzi față de<br />
mine directorul celui mai important ziar local, campion al blocului baltic și al apropierii de<br />
Franța.<br />
Tot astfel domnul Munters, Secretarul General al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine leton, îmi<br />
semnalează cu iritație că față de imposibilitatea de a termina onorabil acțiunea întreprinsă în<br />
Memel, pe terenul pe care criza se desfășoară astăzi, Guvernul din Kovno a crezut necesar a<br />
provoca o diversiune răspândind informațiile cele mai alarmante și fanteziste totodată, asupra<br />
unor pregătiri militare și o iminentă lovitură de forță a Germaniei.<br />
O asemenea învinuire, îmi spunea Dl. Munters, este copilărească. Prima grijă a politicii<br />
germane – și aici este punctul unde ea se întâlnește cu politica polonă – este, astăzi, de a ține<br />
Rusia Sovietică îndepărtată de jocul puterilor occidentale.<br />
Cine ar putea crede că într-o chestiune care izolată este atât de minimă pentru ea și unde<br />
nicio grabă nu se impune Germaniei, ea ar recurge la un gest de disperare, gest care ar aduce<br />
obligatoriu Marile Puteri occidentale la o colaborare politică cu U.R.S.S.<br />
Nu credem în aceste „Tatarennachrichten” 1 îmi spune Secretarul General al Ministerului<br />
Afacerilor Străine, și nu ne vom lăsa influențați de ele. Vestea lansată de Moscova că noi sau<br />
Estonia am fi fost atât de impresionați de amenințările Germaniei că am fi primit principiul<br />
trecerii armatelor roșii pe teritoriul nostru pentru a alerga în ajutorul Lituaniei este o pură<br />
invenție. Poziția noastră față de o asemenea eventualitate se cunoaște și nu o vom schimba.<br />
1<br />
Expresie germană folosită în sensul de știri alarmiste.
284 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Această poziție este cea de care am dat cont în rapoartele mele anterioare, ea se poate cred<br />
rezuma astfel: „ADMITEREA ASTĂZI A PRINCIPIULUI TRECERII ARMATELOR ROȘII PE<br />
TERITORIUL NAȚIONAL SUB ORIȘICE PRETEXT ȘI ÎN ORIȘICE CONDIȚII ESTE TOT ATÂT<br />
DE PRIMEJDIOASĂ CA ADMITEREA EVENTUALĂ A FAPTULUI ACESTEI TRECERI. ÎN<br />
ACEST DIN URMĂ CAZ AR FI VORBA DE FAPTUL DISPARIȚIEI ȚĂRILOR BALTICE DE PE<br />
HARTA EUROPEI, ÎN CEL DINTÂI DE PRINCIPIUL ACESTEI DIPARIȚII; DE LA PRINCIPIU<br />
PÂNĂ LA FAPT RIGA ȘI REVAL CRED CĂ DISTANȚA S-AR PUTEA DOVEDI INFIMĂ.<br />
Observ că niciodată de la instalarea regimului național-socialist în Germania, și mai ales de<br />
la începutul încercărilor franco-ruse de a atrage puterile baltice într-o formațiune politică estică,<br />
opiniile nu s-au exprimat aici atât de liber privitor la necesitatea de a nu provoca întru nimica<br />
Reichul. Paralel cu acest sentiment se poate constata, cred, întărirea unui altuia, întărire ce mi-a<br />
fost afirmată astfel deunăzi de Atașatul militar polon: „Niciodată contactul nostru cu Statele<br />
Majore letone și estoniene nu a fost mai intim”. Pentru a intra în detalii voi spune că satisfacția<br />
atașatului militar polon se referea în special la atitudinea statului major (și guvernului) leton<br />
care niciodată nu au fost mai aproape de aliații lor estonieni în simțământul că reazemul politic<br />
și militar polon este indispensabil existenței puterilor baltice.<br />
De câtva timp s-a ajuns aici la convingerea că procesul de restabilire politică a Reichului va fi<br />
înfăptuit, „Programm-mässig” și că succesului plebiscitului în Saar îi va succeda într-o ordine<br />
oarecare reintrarea Germaniei în Liga Națiunilor, câștigarea unei „Gleichberechtigung 1 ” de fapt<br />
limitată la pretențiile actuale ale Reichului și la o destindere reală în relațiile franco-germane.<br />
Se crede, de asemenea, că o dată reinstalată în Saar, adeziunea Germaniei la un pact estic,<br />
revăzut după modelul proiectelor din Roma, va servi Germaniei de monedă de schimb și va<br />
oferi Franței ocazia onorabilă de concesie așteptată în chestiunea armamentului.<br />
În asemenea împrejurări utilitatea atitudinii de expectativă adoptată până acum în<br />
chestiunea pactului estic este recunoscută mai mult decât oricând. Va fi cred menținută cu atât<br />
mai mult cu cât convingerea a existat întotdeauna aici că Rusia Sovietică nu va rezista unei<br />
apropieri reale franco-germane și că în asemenea împrejurare domnul Litvinov sau persoana<br />
care-i va fi succedat la Comisariatul Afacerilor Străine își va azvârli masca și repune cuțitul între<br />
dinți.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 670-674.<br />
101. Diplomatic Report no. 30 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Mihail R. Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 23 rd<br />
January 1935<br />
The German triumph in Saar and <strong>the</strong> Baltic Powers<br />
Immediately after <strong>the</strong> Holidays <strong>the</strong> trial initiated by <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian government to <strong>the</strong><br />
German political parties was suspended under <strong>the</strong> pretext that one or two of <strong>the</strong> 160 culprits<br />
were indisposed. Everyone knew <strong>the</strong> real reasons of this measure: <strong>the</strong> government and judges<br />
from Kovno preferred to wait for <strong>the</strong> result of <strong>the</strong> plebiscite, wishing to see <strong>the</strong> possibilities left<br />
or created by <strong>the</strong> new international situation of Germany.<br />
The action undertaken by <strong>the</strong> government in Kovno in <strong>the</strong> Memel issue, which had been<br />
permanently disapproved by Estonia and Latvia, could not be achieved even in <strong>the</strong> most daring<br />
dream of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian politicians, unless in a certain circumstance: Germany’s ostracism, its<br />
continuous absence from <strong>the</strong> European political concern.<br />
1<br />
În context, egalitate în materie de drepturi de înarmare.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 285<br />
Germany’s triumph in Saar, <strong>the</strong> perspectives opened by this event constitute a painful<br />
disappointment to small Lithuania. The moderation advice given to it even by France makes it<br />
clear that <strong>the</strong> moment has come – even with <strong>the</strong> most serious of risks – for it to actually<br />
renegade from <strong>the</strong> entire action and to leave <strong>the</strong> bold path adopted as a consequence of <strong>the</strong><br />
enticements of <strong>the</strong> ones that today are trying to stop it.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> competent circles in Riga I find, as a result of <strong>the</strong> plebiscite, <strong>the</strong> mention and<br />
intensification of <strong>the</strong> reproaches of lack of measure and political sense to Lithuania that were<br />
only given in relative moderation before.<br />
“Lithuania has only what it deserves, why has she not taken our advice? We have told her<br />
that she is nothing but a pawn in <strong>the</strong> hand of <strong>the</strong> Greats and that we would abandon her for<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r one as soon as <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> Greats would request it.” This is what I was told by<br />
<strong>the</strong> manager of <strong>the</strong> most important local newspaper, a champion of <strong>the</strong> Baltic block and of <strong>the</strong><br />
closeness to France.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> same way Mr. Munters, General Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,<br />
announces me irritated that as regards <strong>the</strong> impossibility of finishing honourably <strong>the</strong> action<br />
undertaken in Memel, on <strong>the</strong> ground where <strong>the</strong> crisis is taking place today, <strong>the</strong> Government<br />
from Kovno thought it necessary to make a diversion by disseminating <strong>the</strong> most alarming and<br />
at <strong>the</strong> same time imaginative information on Germany’s military preparations and imminent<br />
force blow.<br />
Such an accusation, Mr. Munters said, is childish. The first concern nowadays of <strong>the</strong> German<br />
policy – and this is where it crosses <strong>the</strong> Polish policy – is to keep Soviet Russia away from <strong>the</strong><br />
game of <strong>the</strong> occidental powers.<br />
Who could believe that in a matter which, if isolated, is minimum to Germany and in which<br />
no pressure is put on it, she would resort to a desperate gesture, which would definitely lead <strong>the</strong><br />
Great Occidental Powers to a political collaboration with <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />
We do not believe in <strong>the</strong>se „Tatarennachrichten” 1 , I am told by <strong>the</strong> General Secretary of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and we will not let ourselves be influenced by <strong>the</strong>m. The news<br />
launched by Moscow according to which we or Estonia were so impressed by Germany’s threats<br />
that we received <strong>the</strong> principle of <strong>the</strong> crossing of <strong>the</strong> red army on our territory in order to help<br />
Lithuania is pure invention. Our position as regards such event is well known and it will not<br />
change.<br />
This position is <strong>the</strong> one I mentioned in my previous reports, it can be summarized as<br />
follows: “THE ADMISSION TODAY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RED ARMY CROSSING<br />
OUR NATIONAL TERRITORY UNDER ANY PRETEXT AND UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES<br />
IS AS DANGEROUS AS THE POTENTIAL ADMISSION OF THE ACTUAL CROSSING. THE<br />
LATTER EVENT IMPLIES THE ACTUAL DISAPPEARANCE OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES<br />
FROM THE MAP OF EUROPE, THE FORMER IMPLIES THE PRINCIPLE OF THIS<br />
DISAPPEARANCE; RIGA AND REVAL BELIEVE THAT THE DISTANCE FROM PRINCIPLE TO<br />
FACT COULD PROVE TO BE INSIGNIFICANT.<br />
I notice that never from <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> national-socialist regime in Germany and<br />
especially from <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> French-Russian attempts of attracting <strong>the</strong> Baltic powers in<br />
an Eastern political formation, have opinions been expressed so freely here regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
necessity of avoiding to provoke <strong>the</strong> Reich in any way. Parallel to this feeling, I think we may<br />
assert <strong>the</strong> consolidation of ano<strong>the</strong>r, which was confirmed to me as such by <strong>the</strong> Polish Military<br />
Attaché <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r day: “Never has our contact with <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Estonian General Staffs<br />
been more intimate”. Going into detail I will say that <strong>the</strong> satisfaction of <strong>the</strong> Polish military<br />
attaché referred especially to <strong>the</strong> attitude of <strong>the</strong> Latvian General Staff (and <strong>the</strong> government),<br />
1<br />
German phrase used with <strong>the</strong> meaning of alerting news.
286 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
which have never been closer to <strong>the</strong>ir Estonian allies as regards <strong>the</strong>ir opinion that <strong>the</strong> Polish<br />
political and military support is indispensable to <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong> Baltic powers.<br />
For a while now people here have been convinced that <strong>the</strong> process of political recovery of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Reich will be accomplished “Programm-mässig”, and that <strong>the</strong> success of <strong>the</strong> plebiscite in<br />
Saar will give way to <strong>the</strong> re-inclusion of Germany in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, <strong>the</strong> gaining of a<br />
“Gleichberechtigung 1 ” actually limited to <strong>the</strong> current demands of <strong>the</strong> Reich and to a real detent<br />
in <strong>the</strong> French-German <strong>relations</strong>, not necessarily in this order.<br />
It is also believed that once recovered in Saar, Germany’s adherence to an Eastern pact,<br />
reviewed according to <strong>the</strong> model of projects in Rome, will serve Germany as an exchange<br />
currency and will offer France <strong>the</strong> expected honourable concession opportunity in <strong>the</strong><br />
armament matter.<br />
In such circumstances <strong>the</strong> usefulness of <strong>the</strong> expectative attitude adopted until now in <strong>the</strong><br />
matter of <strong>the</strong> eastern pact is admitted more than ever. I believe it will be maintained all <strong>the</strong><br />
more so as <strong>the</strong>re has always been a conviction that Soviet Russia will not endure a real French-<br />
German closeness and that in such circumstance Mr. Litvinov or his successor to <strong>the</strong><br />
Commissary of Foreign Affairs will take off his mask and get ready for <strong>the</strong> fight.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 670-674.<br />
102. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 2 1935. gada 2. aprīļa ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram K. Ulmanim<br />
Mani šodien apmeklēja Rumānijas sūtnis Kadere, kurš vēlējās saņemt kādas tuvākas ziņas<br />
par Klaipēdas apgabalu un dažām baumām, kas stāv sakarā ar to. Viņu sevišķi interesēja, vai<br />
taisnība, ka Austrumprūsijā izbūvēti plaši nocietinājumi un sapulcētas lielākas karaspēka masas.<br />
Vai Vācija nedomā uzbrukt Klaipēdai? Savos paskaidrojumos varēju tikai aprādīt apstākļus<br />
Klaipēdas iedzīvotāju struktūrā, saimnieciskā dzīvē, politiskās tieksmēs. Izrādījās, ka sūtnis<br />
nemaz nezināja par patiesām Klaipēdas apgabala īpatnībām. Te Varšavā valdot dažādi uzskati:<br />
vieni sakot, ka Vācija nekavēsies iebrukt Klaipēdas apgabalā, kamēr citi atkal negribot tam ticēt,<br />
jo Vācija nejūtoties vēl pietiekoši sagatavota konfliktam, kurš varētu izcelties. Pēc Rumānijas<br />
sūtņa ieskatiem nevarot cerēt tomēr, ka rietumvalstis iejauksies, ja Vācija iebruks. Tik tālu vēl<br />
neesot ar kopējo rietumvalstu fronti. Ko varētu paredzēt tagad sakarā ar Saimona 3 paziņojumu<br />
Anglijas apakšnamā par soļiem Kauņā? Lietuva jutīšoties piespiesta piegriezt vērību prasībai, lai<br />
Klaipēdas apgabalā nodibinas atkal konstitucionāla kārtība, kāda tā paredzēta statūtā. Pie kā tas<br />
novedīs? Droši vien, ka tādā gadījumā vācu spēki Klaipēdas apgabalā jutīsies vēl drošāki savos<br />
pasākumos. Lietuva esot novēlojusi savā politikā. Tai bijis vajadzīgs jau pašā sākumā ar<br />
uzmanīgu rīcību vācus izspiest no pārvaldības, vājināt vācu spēkus, kamēr tagad liekoties jau<br />
par vēlu esam. Tā Vācija atgūstot vienu pozīciju pēc otras. Pēc Klaipēdas droši vien nākšot vēl<br />
citi mēģinājumi. Vācijas politiku sajutīšot Čehoslovākija un citas zemes. No Klaipēdas saruna<br />
pārgāja uz plašākiem jautājumiem, sevišķi arī Īdena 4 vizīti Varšavā. Rumānijas sūtnis izteicās<br />
1<br />
In this context, equality on rights of weaponisation.<br />
2<br />
Miķelis Valters (1874–1968), Latvijas valstsvīrs, diplomāts. 1918.–1919. g. iekšlietu ministrs, 1919.–1921. g.<br />
diplomātiskais pārstāvis Itālijā, no 1921. g. sūtnis Itālijā, Spānijā un Portugālē ar sēdekli Romā, 1924.–1925. g. –<br />
Francijā un Spānijā ar sēdekli Parīzē, 1934.–1938. g. Polijā un Ungārijā ar sēdekli Varšavā, 1938.–1940. g. Beļģijā un<br />
Luksemburgā ar sēdekli Briselē. Miris Francijā.<br />
3<br />
Džons Olbrūks Saimons (Simon; 1873–1954), Lielbritānijas valstsvīrs. 1931.–1935. g. ārlietu, 1935.–1937. g. iekšlietu,<br />
1937.–1940. g. finanšu sekretārs, 1940.–1945. g. lords sekretārs.<br />
4<br />
Entonijs Īdens (Eden; 1897–1977), Lielbritānijas valstsvīrs. 1935.–1938., 1940.–1945., 1951.–1955. g. ārlietu ministrs,<br />
1955.–1957. g. premjerministrs.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 287<br />
sekojoši: Neesot nekādu šaubu, ka Padomju Krievija miermīlīga un, ka par to pārliecināšoties<br />
angļi. Varšavā turpretim lietas nostādot citādi un sakot, ka Krievijai esot kaut kādi agresīvi<br />
nolūki. Par Polijas politiku esot jau pilnīga skaidrība. Vai tajā kas mainīsies sakarā ar tagadējo<br />
Anglijas politiku, grūti teikt, bet sūtnis domā, ka pie zināmas uzmanīgas izturēšanās pret Poliju<br />
būtu iespējams to piedabūt pie austrumu nodrošināšanas sistēmas. Starp citu, būtu no svara, ja<br />
drošības iekārtai austrumos rietumvalstis dotu savu garantiju. Polija gribot, lai tai būtu drošība,<br />
ka neviens neaiztiek viņas robežas. Viņa nevēloties uz savas teritorijas ne krievu, ne vācu<br />
karaspēkus. Kā tas būtu iespējams noorganizēt, lai šī prasība tiktu ievērota, tas vēl jautājums. Ja<br />
Anglija uzņemtos kādas plašākas garantijas austrumu lietās, tad droši vien Polija pavirzītos nost<br />
no sava tagadējā viedokļa un būtu ar mieru ieiet kādā kopējā nodrošināšanas iekārtā. Bet par<br />
tādu Anglijas garantiju neesot nekas dzirdams. No svara būtu, ja Polija varētu kaut kā tuvāk<br />
pienākt Mazai Antantei, neteiksim Čehoslovākijai, tā piemetināja sūtnis. Būtu ļoti liels spēks, ja<br />
Polija sanāktu reģionālā paktā kopā ar Rumāniju, Dienvidslāviju, Čehoslovākiju. Šī kopība<br />
varētu atbalstīties arī uz Balkānu pakta. Tāds kopējs spēks būtu ļoti ievērojams faktors un Polija<br />
tad justos mazāk atkarīga no Vācijas. Vienu laiku, tā piebilda sūtnis, mēs bijām jau diezgan tuvu<br />
šādam mērķim, bet tad uzreiz viss izjuka. Tādas pēkšņas lietas nāk te Varšavā šad tad priekšā.<br />
Žēl, ka Beks 1 nevar saprasties ar Benešu. 2 Cik varēju novērot, tad vēl tagad sūtnis interesējās<br />
savas valdības uzdevumā par izteiktām idejām un to piepildīšanos. Kas vēl zīmējas uz citu<br />
valstu politiku pret Poliju, tad sūtnis domā esam novērojis, ka visvairāk kaitētu, ja Polija<br />
mēģinātu spiest izšķirties jo drīz par kādu ceļu, negriežot uz tās politisko viedokli uzmanīgi<br />
vērību. No visiem sūtņa izteicieniem palika kopiespaids, ka pēc viņa novērojumiem Varšavā<br />
vajadzīga ļoti pacietīga iespaidu politika, lai Polija vēl vairāk nenoslietos uz to pusi, pie kuras tā<br />
pieturas. Anglijas iespaidiem te būtu liela nozīme. Nedraudzība pret Franciju neesot dziļa un to<br />
varot, uzmanīgi rīkojoties, izklīdināt. Pārāk liela Vācijas nostiprināšanās vai pat pavirzīšanās uz<br />
priekšu austrumos, it īpaši gar Baltijas jūras piekrasti, neesot Polijas interesēs.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 1687. l., 257.–258. lp.<br />
102. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters 3 to Minister of Foreign Affairs K.<br />
Ulmanis, 2 nd April, 1935<br />
Today I was visited by Envoy of Romania Cădere, who wanted to learn more details about<br />
Klaipeda district and some rumours related to it. He was particularly eager to learn whe<strong>the</strong>r it<br />
was true that in Eastern Prussia large-scale fortifications had been erected and a large number<br />
of troops had been assembled. Does Germany intend to attack Klaipeda? By way of explanation<br />
I could only describe to him <strong>the</strong> population structure, economic life and political aspirations of<br />
Klaipeda. It turned out that <strong>the</strong> Envoy was not informed about <strong>the</strong> actual specifics of Klaipeda<br />
district. They say that different views are dominating here in Warsaw: some say that Germany<br />
will not hesitate to invade Klaipeda district, while o<strong>the</strong>rs do not want to believe in it,<br />
considering that Germany does not feel sufficiently prepared yet for a conflict that may break<br />
1<br />
Juzefs Beks (Beck; 1894–1944), Polijas armijas pulkvedis, valstsvīrs. 1932.–1939. g. ārlietu ministrs.<br />
2<br />
Edvards Benešs (Beneš; 1884–1948), Čehoslovākijas valstsvīrs. 1918.–1935. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1935.–1938. g. Valsts<br />
prezidents.<br />
3<br />
Miķelis Valters (1874–1968), Latvian statesman, diplomat 1918–1919 Minister of Interior, 1919–1921 <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />
representative in Italy, from 1921 Envoy to Italy, Spain and Portugal with seat in Rome, 1924–1925 Envoy to France<br />
and Spain with seat in Paris, 1934–1938 Envoy to Poland and Hungary with seat in Warsaw, 1938–1940 Envoy to<br />
Belgium and Luxemburg with seat in Brussels. Died in France.
288 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
out. In <strong>the</strong> opinion of Romania’s Envoy <strong>the</strong>re is no hope for intervention from <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong><br />
Western countries in case Germany attacks. The joint front of <strong>the</strong> Western countries has not<br />
progressed that far. What could be expected in <strong>the</strong> connection with Simon’s 1 statement in <strong>the</strong><br />
House of Commons of England about measures in Kaunas? [The Envoy thinks that] Lithuania<br />
will feel forced to pay attention to <strong>the</strong> requirement for a constitutional order to be restored in<br />
Klaipeda district <strong>the</strong> way it is stipulated in <strong>the</strong> statute. What will come out of it? It is most likely<br />
that in such a case <strong>the</strong> German forces will feel even more confident in <strong>the</strong>ir activities in<br />
Klaipeda district. Lithuania is behind its time in terms of its policies [<strong>the</strong> Envoy believes]. It<br />
should have by careful measures pushed <strong>the</strong> Germans out of administration and weakened <strong>the</strong><br />
German forces at <strong>the</strong> very beginning while now it seems to be too late for it. Now Germany<br />
recovers one position after ano<strong>the</strong>r. Most likely after Klaipeda o<strong>the</strong>r attempts will follow.<br />
Czechoslovakia and o<strong>the</strong>r countries will feel [<strong>the</strong> effects of] Germany’s policy [<strong>the</strong> Envoy<br />
believes]. From Klaipeda <strong>the</strong> discussion turned to broader issues, particularly focusing on<br />
Eden’s 2 visit in Warsaw. The Envoy of Romania spoke as follows: There is no doubt whatsoever<br />
that Soviet Russia is peace-loving and that <strong>the</strong> English will soon come to realize it. In Warsaw in<br />
turn things are positioned in a different way and <strong>the</strong>y say here that Russia has some kind of<br />
aggressive intentions. About Poland’s policy everything is already absolutely clear. Will<br />
something change in it owing to <strong>the</strong> current policy of England, it is difficult to say, but <strong>the</strong><br />
Envoy thinks that through careful treatment Poland could be persuaded to take part in <strong>the</strong><br />
system for <strong>the</strong> securing of <strong>the</strong> East. By <strong>the</strong> way, it would be important that <strong>the</strong> Western<br />
countries should give <strong>the</strong>ir guarantee for <strong>the</strong> security system in <strong>the</strong> East. [The Envoy of<br />
Romania thinks that] Poland wants to enjoy security and nobody to encroach on its borders. It<br />
does not want ei<strong>the</strong>r Russian or German troops in its territory. How things could be organised<br />
so that this requirement is met, remains an open question. If England assumed some kind of<br />
more extensive guarantees with regard to <strong>the</strong> eastern matters, Poland would most likely step<br />
back from its current position and agree to join some kind of a common security system. But<br />
nothing is heard of such guarantees from England’s part. It would be important to have Poland<br />
somehow approaching closer <strong>the</strong> Little Entente, not to say Czechoslovakia, <strong>the</strong> Envoy added. It<br />
would be a great force if Poland joined a regional pact toge<strong>the</strong>r with Romania, Yugoslavia and<br />
Czechoslovakia. This community could build also on <strong>the</strong> Balkan pact. Such common force<br />
would be a significant factor and in such a case Poland would feel less dependent on Germany.<br />
For some time, <strong>the</strong> Envoy added, we were already ra<strong>the</strong>r close to this goal, but <strong>the</strong>n suddenly<br />
everything crumbled. Such sudden turns happen here in Warsaw now and <strong>the</strong>n. It is a pity that<br />
Beck 3 cannot get on well with Beneš. 4 As much as I could observe, on his government’s<br />
instructions <strong>the</strong> Envoy still makes inquiries about <strong>the</strong> expressed ideas and <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
implementation. As concerns <strong>the</strong> polices of o<strong>the</strong>r countries towards Poland, <strong>the</strong> Envoy believes<br />
to have observed that <strong>the</strong> greatest harm would be done by pressing Poland to choose a way<br />
soon, without its political views being carefully considered. Everything that <strong>the</strong> Envoy said<br />
1<br />
John Allsebrook Simon (1873–1954), Statesman of Great Britain. 1931–1935 Foreign Secretary, 1935–1937 Home<br />
Secretary, 1937–1940 Finances Secretary, 1940–1945 Lord Secretary.<br />
2<br />
Anthony Eden (1897–1977), British statesman. 1935–1938, 1940–1945, 1951–1955 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1955–<br />
1957 Prime Minister.<br />
3<br />
Józef Beck (1894–1944), Colonel of <strong>the</strong> Army of Poland, statesman. 1932–1939 Minister of Foreign Affairs.<br />
4<br />
Edvard Beneš (1884–1948), Czechoslovak statesman. 1918–1935 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1935–1938 President of<br />
Czechoslovakia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 289<br />
summed toge<strong>the</strong>r left an impression that according to his observations a very patient policy of<br />
influencing Warsaw is required to prevent Poland from inclining even more towards <strong>the</strong> side<br />
that it already clings to. England’s influence would be of great importance here. Unfriendliness<br />
towards France is not deep and, by acting carefully, it can be dissipated. It would not serve<br />
Poland’s interests if Germany streng<strong>the</strong>ned its positions too much here or even advanced<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r into east, especially along <strong>the</strong> coast of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea [<strong>the</strong> Envoy thinks].<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 1687, s. 257–258.<br />
103. Telegrama ministrului României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 274 către<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 4 iulie 1935<br />
Ca urmare nr. 257.<br />
Dl. Munters mi-a dat astăzi următoarele deslușiri asupra recentelor evoluții ale atitudinii<br />
guvernului leton în chestiunile de politică generală.<br />
Ceea ce a determinat guvernul leton a crede că o inițiativă în sensul apropierii către grupul<br />
franco-ceho-sovietic este necesară, au fost următoarele două considerații:<br />
1) faptul că Germania părea să fi revenit asupra făgăduințelor făcute la Stresa 1 de a participa<br />
la o înțelegere colectivă;<br />
2) faptul că în lipsa prelungită a unei asemenea înțelegeri, alianțele militare între Soviete,<br />
Franța și Cehoslovacia nu mai rămâneau un mijloc de presiune și deveneau instrumentul unui<br />
conflict oricând posibil.<br />
În niciun caz, mi-a spus Dl. Munters, adeziunea Țărilor Baltice nu ar fi mers până la<br />
asistență mutuală. Formula ce s-ar fi găsit ar fi fost cea indicată de punctul 3 al Protocolului de<br />
semnătură. Tendința, îmi comenta Dl. Munters, fără să-l pot prea bine înțelege, ar fi fost tot<br />
crearea unei zone inviolabile în favoarea Țărilor Baltice.<br />
Astăzi, îmi spune Dl Munters, informațiile pe care le-a primit guvernul leton l-au convins că<br />
asemenea inițiativă ar fi încă prematură căci Germania pare a adopta o atitudine mai<br />
conciliantă și negocierile în curs între Paris, Londra și Berlin ar putea da în curând rezultatul<br />
dorit de noi: înțelegere colectivă pe baza punctului 3 al Protocolului de semnătură francosovietic,<br />
înțelegere ce nu ar cuprinde asistența mutuală pentru care noi suntem prea mici.<br />
Cred deci că a fost și este vorba numai de un mijloc de presiune asupra Germaniei și<br />
Poloniei. Aflu, pe de altă parte, că Estonia ar fi intervenit energic pe lângă aliata sa pentru ca<br />
această presiune să nu meargă până la împliniri primejdioase.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia. Telegrams Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 228.<br />
103. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza no. 274 to Foreign<br />
Minister Nicolae Titulescu, 4 th July 1935<br />
Follow-up to no. 257.<br />
Today, Mr. Munters provided me with <strong>the</strong> following clarifications on <strong>the</strong> recent evolution of<br />
<strong>the</strong> attitude of <strong>the</strong> Latvian government with regard to matters of general policy.<br />
What led <strong>the</strong> Latvian government to believe that an initiative of approaching <strong>the</strong> French-<br />
Czech-Soviet group was necessary was <strong>the</strong> following two considerations:<br />
1<br />
Acordul de la Stresa dintre Franța, Marea Britanie și Italia (11 aprilie 1935), survenit ca reacție la reintroducerea<br />
serviciului militar obligatoriu în Germania. Acesta exprima fidelitatea față de Pactul de la Locarno (1925) și<br />
protesta la adresa denunțării unilaterale a tratatelor.
290 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
1) <strong>the</strong> fact that Germany seemed to have reconsidered its promises from Stresa 1 of<br />
participating in a collective agreement;<br />
2) <strong>the</strong> fact that in default of such an agreement, <strong>the</strong> military alliances between <strong>the</strong> Soviets,<br />
France and Czechoslovakia no longer remained a means of pressure and became <strong>the</strong><br />
instrument of an imminent conflict.<br />
Mr. Munters said that in any case, <strong>the</strong> adherence of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States would not have gone as<br />
far as <strong>the</strong> mutual assistance. The best formula would have been <strong>the</strong> one indicated in section 3 of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Protocol of signature. The tendency, Mr. Munters commented, would have been <strong>the</strong><br />
creation of an inviolable area in favour of <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries, which was beyond my<br />
understanding.<br />
Mr. Munters tells me that <strong>the</strong> information received by <strong>the</strong> Latvian government persuaded<br />
him today that such an initiative would still be premature, for Germany seems to adopt a more<br />
conciliatory attitude and <strong>the</strong> ongoing negotiations between Paris, London and Berlin could lead<br />
to <strong>the</strong> outcome desired by us: a collective agreement under paragraph 3 of <strong>the</strong> Franco-Soviet<br />
Protocol of signature, which is an agreement that would not include <strong>the</strong> mutual assistance for<br />
which we are insignificant.<br />
I <strong>the</strong>refore believe that this was and is about only a means of pressure on Germany and<br />
Poland. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, I find out that Estonia would have interceded energetically to its<br />
ally so that this pressure should not lead to dangerous accomplishments.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 228.<br />
104. Latvijas Tirdzniecības un rūpniecības ministrijas 1935. g. 24. jūl. raksts Ārlietu<br />
ministrijas Rietumu nodaļai<br />
Š. g. jūnijā Rumānijā ievesta 44% liela nodeva no importējamo preču vērtības, izņemot tikai<br />
Austrijas, Ungārijas un Polijas preces. Cik zināms, dažas valstis (piem., Vācija), kurām ar<br />
Rumāniju tirdzniecības sakari, atbildējušas ar līdzīgiem pretsoļiem attiecībā pret Rumānijas<br />
eksporta precēm. Lūdzam sniegt mums sīkāku informāciju par šiem soļiem, kādus ārvalstis<br />
spērušas pret Rumānijas jauno importa preču aplikšanas režīmu. Lai gan mūsu eksports uz<br />
Rumāniju patreiz nav liels, tomēr rodas jautājums, vai arī Latvijai nevajadzētu ko tamlīdzīgi<br />
darīt eventuālu zaudējumu novēršanai uz precēm, kuras eksportē uz Rumāniju.<br />
Pie mums griezusies firma „Dr. C. Leverkus un dēli A[kciju]/S[biedrība]” (ultramarīna 2<br />
fabrika) ar lūgumu palīdzēt viņai iekasēt no Rumānijas pienākošos maksājumu par uz turieni<br />
eksportētiem 4.450 kg ultramarīna. Rumānijas valsts banka neļaujot šo summu pārvest uz<br />
Latviju. Firma savā rakstā min, ka varbūt Igenberga 3 kungs varētu še ko darīt. Lietas<br />
nokārtošanai pietiekošs varētu būt arguments, ka Latvijai tirdzniecības bilance ar Rumāniju<br />
šogad (un tāpat arī 1934. gadā) galīgi pasīva: š. g. pirmajos 5 mēnešos imports no turienes bijis<br />
267.000 ls, bet mūsu eksports uz Rumāniju – tikai 17.000 ls.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 1599. l., 6. lp.<br />
1<br />
The Stresa Agreement between France, Britain and Italy (11 April 1935), occurred in response to <strong>the</strong><br />
reintroduction of conscription in Germany. It expressed fidelity to <strong>the</strong> Locarno Pact (1925) and protested against<br />
unilateral termination of treaties.<br />
2<br />
Ultramarīns – spilgti zila krāsviela.<br />
3<br />
Ēriks Pauls Arvīds Igenbergs (1906–1984), Latvijas diplomāts. 1933.–1935. g. atašejs, pēc tam II šķiras sekretārs<br />
sūtniecībā Čehoslovākijā, vēlāk – I šķiras sekretārs sūtniecībā Vācijā. Miris Vācijā.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 291<br />
104. Note by <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Western<br />
Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 th July, 1935<br />
In June this year a tax of 44% of <strong>the</strong> value of imported goods has been enforced in Romania,<br />
except on goods from Austria, Hungary and Poland. As much as it is known, some countries<br />
(Germany, for example), which have trade contacts with Romania, have reacted with similar<br />
counter-measures with regard to Romania’s export commodities. We ask you to provide us with<br />
more detailed information about <strong>the</strong>se measures, which foreign countries have taken against<br />
Romania’s new regime of taxation of import commodities. Although at present our export to<br />
Romania is not large, a question arises whe<strong>the</strong>r Latvia should do something similar to prevent<br />
eventual losses from export of goods to Romania.<br />
Company „Dr. C. Leverkus un dēli A[kciju]/S[biedrība]” (ultramarine 1 factory) has turned to<br />
us with a request to help <strong>the</strong>m to collect <strong>the</strong> payment due from Romania for <strong>the</strong> 4,450 kg of<br />
ultramarine exported <strong>the</strong>re. The State Bank of Romania is said to have prohibited <strong>the</strong> transfer of<br />
this amount of money to Latvia. In its note <strong>the</strong> company mentions that probably Mr. Igenbergs 2<br />
could do something in this regard. To settle <strong>the</strong> issue, <strong>the</strong> argument could suffice that Latvia’s<br />
trade balance with Romania has been very passive this year (same as in 1934): in <strong>the</strong> first 5<br />
months of this year import from <strong>the</strong>re had constituted 267,000 LVL, while our export to<br />
Romania – only 17,000 LVL.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 1599, s. 6.<br />
105. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al României la Riga Th.<br />
Scortzescu nr. 318 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 15<br />
august 1935<br />
Într-o conversație avută cu Dl. Munters, Secretarul General al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine<br />
leton, Domnia sa mi-a exprimat neliniștea cauzată guvernului său de faptul că Hitler nu pare<br />
destul de dispus să dea vreun început de realizare a declarațiilor făcute de Germania cu ocazia<br />
Conferinței de la Stresa.<br />
Domnia sa mi-a spus că prelungirea acestei situații ar putea împinge guvernul leton spre<br />
încheierea unui instrument <strong>diplomatic</strong> cu U.R.S.S..<br />
„Nu este vorba de un pact de asistență mutuală, mi-a spus Domnia sa, ci de un pact de<br />
consultare care ne-ar îngădui să ne spunem din primul moment părerea în cazul unei eventuale<br />
aplicări a pactului franco-sovietic. Ne este teamă de tărăgănările procedurii Societății Națiunilor<br />
și ne dorim a evita ca o aplicare a zisului pact să aibă loc peste capetele noastre.”<br />
Domnia sa a adăugat că guvernul său ar considera inutil încheierea vreunui acord separat<br />
letono-sovietic, în cazul când Germania ar reveni la propunerile făcute la Stresa.<br />
Atitudinea Guvernului leton este interpretată de cercurile <strong>diplomatic</strong>e de aici ca o încercare<br />
de a provoca Berlinul să-și precizeze politica față de Statele Baltice.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, filele 280-281.<br />
1<br />
Ultramarine – brightly blue pigment.<br />
2<br />
Ēriks Pauls Arvīds Igenbergs (1906–1984), Latvian diplomat. 1933–1935 attaché, later – Second secretary of <strong>the</strong><br />
Legation in Czechoslovakia, <strong>the</strong>n – First Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Legation in Germany. Died in Germany.
292 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
105. Telegram no. 318 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Romania in Riga Th.<br />
Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 15 th August<br />
1935<br />
In a conversation with Mr. Munters, of to his government regarding <strong>the</strong> fact that Hitler did<br />
not seem willing enough to start doing what he declared in Germany, during <strong>the</strong> Conference in<br />
Stresa.<br />
He told me that <strong>the</strong> prolongation of this situation could determine <strong>the</strong> Latvian government<br />
to sign a <strong>diplomatic</strong> document with <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />
“It is not a pact of mutual assistance, he said, but a consultation pact that would allow us to<br />
express our opinion from <strong>the</strong> very first moment in <strong>the</strong> event <strong>the</strong> French-Soviet pact is applied.<br />
We are afraid of <strong>the</strong> slowness of <strong>the</strong> procedure of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and we want to prevent<br />
<strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> pact without us as part of it.”<br />
He added that his government would consider useless <strong>the</strong> signing of any separate Latvian-<br />
Soviet agreement, in case Germany resumes <strong>the</strong> promises made in Stresa.<br />
The attitude of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government is interpreted by <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> circles here as an<br />
attempt of challenging Berlin to specify <strong>the</strong>ir policy as regards <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940, USSR, vol. 9, s. 280-281.<br />
106. Telegrama ministrului României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 331 către Ministrul<br />
Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 30 august 1935<br />
Înainte de plecarea sa spre Geneva, ca șef al delegației letone, Dl. Munters mi-a dat<br />
următoarele deslușiri asupra atitudinii ce vor adopta eventual Țările Baltice în chestiunea<br />
Abisiniei.<br />
Dacă acțiunea Italiei s-ar desfășura declarat împotriva dispozițiilor Convenantului și în<br />
sfidarea autorității Societății Națiunilor, Țările Baltice se vor alătura fără ezitare Marii Britanii,<br />
apărătoarea acestei instituții.<br />
Dacă, dimpotrivă, Italia va cere, după cât pare cel mai probabil, formarea unei comisii<br />
pentru a hotărî asupra expulzării Abisinei din Societatea Națiunilor, Țările Baltice, consecvente<br />
cu ele însele, nu ar putea decât să susțină această cerere.<br />
Dl. Munters mi-a amintit că, într-adevăr, fostul Ministru al Afacerilor Străine leton, Dl.<br />
Meierovics, președinte al comisiei însărcinată cu examenul cererii de admitere a Abisiniei, s-a<br />
arătat înverșunat opus acestei admiteri ca și ceilalți colegi baltici și scandinavi ai săi.<br />
Înființarea unei comisii de anchetă ar avea avantajul de a câștiga timpul necesar cercetărilor<br />
corespunzătoare. Timp în care, îmi spune Dl Munters, dată fiind noua situație creată, o acțiune<br />
de forță italiană ar îmbrăca forme ce nu ar pune această țară în obligația de a părăsi Societatea<br />
Națiunilor – părăsire ce ar însemna probabil ruina acestei instituții.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 232.<br />
106. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Riga Mihail R. Sturdza no. 331 to Foreign<br />
Minister Nicolae Titulescu, 30 th August 1935<br />
Before his departure to Geneva as head of <strong>the</strong> Latvian delegation, Mr. Munters provided me<br />
with <strong>the</strong> following clarifications on <strong>the</strong> attitude that <strong>the</strong> Baltic States will eventually adopt<br />
concerning <strong>the</strong> matter of Abyssinia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 293<br />
If Italy's action took place declaredly against <strong>the</strong> dispositions of <strong>the</strong> Assembly and in<br />
defiance of <strong>the</strong> authority of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States will join without hesitation<br />
<strong>the</strong> UK, <strong>the</strong> defender of this institution.<br />
If, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, Italy requests, as it seems most likely, <strong>the</strong> formation of a commission to<br />
decide on <strong>the</strong> expulsion of Abyssinia from <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States - consistent<br />
with <strong>the</strong>mselves - could but support this claim.<br />
Mr. Munters reminded me that, indeed, Mr. Meierovics, former Latvian Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs, chairman of <strong>the</strong> commission responsible for <strong>the</strong> examination of <strong>the</strong> application for <strong>the</strong><br />
admission of Abyssinia, proved to be bitterly opposed to this admission like <strong>the</strong> rest of our<br />
Baltic and Scandinavian fellows.<br />
The establishment of a commission of inquiry would have <strong>the</strong> advantage of gaining <strong>the</strong><br />
necessary time for appropriate research. In <strong>the</strong> meantime, Mr. Munters says that, given <strong>the</strong><br />
newly emerged situation, an Italian force action would take such shapes that would not force<br />
this country to leave <strong>the</strong> League of Nations – which would probably mean <strong>the</strong> crash of this<br />
institution.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 232.<br />
107. Raportul lunar (septembrie 1935) al însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al<br />
României la Riga Th. Scortzescu nr. 364 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României<br />
Nicolae Titulescu, 5 octombrie 1935<br />
Am onoarea a rezuma mai jos pentru luna Septembrie 1935 situația și faptele relative la<br />
politica internă și externă a Letoniei:<br />
Politica internă<br />
Aniversarea de 15 ani de la aplicarea reformei agrare a fost sărbătorită de guvernul leton.<br />
Această reformă a jucat un rol predominant în viața poporului leton, repercusiunile ei<br />
răsfrângându-se atât pe terenul economic cât și politic. Ea a scos clasa țărănească letonă din<br />
starea lamentabilă în care se găsea înainte de război. Modul de aplicare a reformei agrare –<br />
adeseori brutar și arbitrar – a stârnit deseori critici justificate.<br />
Politica externă<br />
Cu ocazia împlinirii unui an de la încheierea convenției „Înțelegerii Baltice” felicitări<br />
călduroase au fost schimbate între cele trei guverne. Unele ziare letone și mai ales estoniene șiau<br />
permis totuși, chiar cu această ocazie, a exprima urări semnificative pentru o mai apropiată<br />
lichidare a diferendelor Lituaniei cu Polonia și Germania.<br />
Interviurile date de Dl. Munters la începutul lunii septembrie marchează revenirea<br />
guvernului său la poziția sa anterioară față de proiectul pactului oriental: participarea Letoniei<br />
este condiționată de aceea a Poloniei și a Germaniei. Domnul Munters continuă însă să<br />
deplângă refuzul Germaniei de a îndeplini propunerile făcute de dânsa la Stresa. Se știe că acest<br />
refuz determinase pe Dl. Munters la un moment dat să considere proiectul încheierii unui pact<br />
consultativ cu U.R.S.S.<br />
Evenimentele din Lituania au fost urmărite cu interes și grijă de guvernul leton. Tulburările<br />
țărănești exploatate de comuniști își au de fapt originea în ruina economică a clasei rurale.<br />
Guvernul din Kovno – combătut aprig de toate partidele opoziției – și-a pierdut se pare chiar și<br />
încrederea armatei. Importante grupări politice doresc o destindere cu Polonia; încercările
294 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
guvernului lituanian îndreptate în acest sens continuă. Rămâne de văzut dacă Varșovia nu ar<br />
prefera să negocieze cu un guvern lituanian mai stabil decât cel actual.<br />
Menționez zvonul că în armată s-ar desena un curent favorabil lui Voldemaras, actualmente<br />
în închisoare în urma putchului său neizbutit. Voldemaras este considerat ca omul „împăcării<br />
cu Germania”.<br />
Alegerile din Memel au avut loc într-o ordine relativă, grație demersurilor stăruitoare ale<br />
Puterilor Garante. Rezultatul lor nu va pune însă în niciun caz capăt greutăților suscitate<br />
Lituaniei de guvernarea acestui ținut.<br />
Chestiunea Minorităților<br />
Cinci germani, supuși letoni, au fost condamnați pentru propagandă național-socialistă, la<br />
pedepse variind între 8 luni și un an. Se știe că orice activitate politică este interzisă<br />
actualmente în Letonia.<br />
Chestiuni în legătură cu Societatea Națiunilor<br />
Guvernul leton speră să obțină anul viitor un loc în Consiliu pentru Statele Baltice.<br />
În discursul său ținut în fața Adunării Societății Națiunilor, Domnul Munters a reproșat<br />
acestei instituții de a fi neglijat uneori principiul pactului în favoarea politicii. Domnia sa este<br />
favorabil unei întăriri a principiilor și a autorității Societății Națiunilor. Atâta timp cât Abisinia<br />
rămâne membră a Societății Națiunilor, conflictul italo-abisinian trebuie reglementat, crede<br />
guvernul leton, conform spiritului și literei Covenantului.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Rapoarte Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, filele 743-745.<br />
107. Monthly Report (September 1935) no. 364 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of<br />
Romania in Riga Th. Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 5 th October 1935<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour of summarizing below <strong>the</strong> situation and facts related to <strong>the</strong> internal and<br />
external policy of Latvia for September 1935:<br />
Internal policy<br />
The Latvian government celebrated 15 years from <strong>the</strong> application of <strong>the</strong> agrarian reform.<br />
This reform played a dominating role in <strong>the</strong> life of <strong>the</strong> Latvian people, as its repercussions<br />
influenced both <strong>the</strong> economic and <strong>the</strong> political fields. It drew <strong>the</strong> Latvian peasant class out of<br />
<strong>the</strong> miserable state <strong>the</strong>y were before <strong>the</strong> war. The manner of application of <strong>the</strong> agrarian reform<br />
– often brutal and random – often generated justified critiques.<br />
Foreign policy<br />
Upon <strong>the</strong> one-year anniversary from <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> “Baltic Agreement” convention, <strong>the</strong><br />
three governments exchanged warm congratulations. Some Latvian and especially Estonian<br />
newspapers dared even on this occasion express significant greetings for a closer liquidation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> difference of opinions between Lithuania, Poland and Germany.<br />
The interviews given by Mr. Munters at <strong>the</strong> beginning of September mark <strong>the</strong> resumption of<br />
his government to its previous position as regards <strong>the</strong> oriental pact project: Latvia’s<br />
participation is conditioned by Poland and Germany’s. Never<strong>the</strong>less Mr. Munters keeps<br />
deploring Germany’s refusal of fulfilling its proposals made in Stresa. It is known that this<br />
refusal had determined Mr. Munters at a certain point to consider <strong>the</strong> project of a consultative<br />
pact with <strong>the</strong> USSR.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 295<br />
The events in Lithuania were watched interestedly and carefully by <strong>the</strong> Latvian government.<br />
The peasant riots exploited by <strong>the</strong> communists actually have <strong>the</strong>ir origin in <strong>the</strong> economic ruin<br />
of <strong>the</strong> rural class. The government in Kovno – fought against by all <strong>the</strong> opposition parties –<br />
apparently lost even <strong>the</strong> army’s trust. Important political groups want a détente with Poland;<br />
<strong>the</strong> attempts of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian government on this line go on. We will see if Warsaw prefers to<br />
negotiate with a Lithuanian government more stable than <strong>the</strong> current one.<br />
I mention <strong>the</strong> rumour that <strong>the</strong> army develops a trend favourable to Voldemaras, who is<br />
currently in prison as a consequence of his unsuccessful putch. Voldemaras is considered <strong>the</strong><br />
man “for <strong>the</strong> reconciliation with Germany”.<br />
The elections in Memel took place in a relative order, thanks to <strong>the</strong> insistent intercessions of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Guarantor Powers. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>ir outcome will not end <strong>the</strong> difficulties caused to<br />
Lithuania by <strong>the</strong> government of this land.<br />
The Minorities Matter<br />
Five Germans, Latvian subjects, have been sentenced for national-socialist propaganda to<br />
punishments between 8 months and one year of prison. It is known that any political activity is<br />
currently forbidden in Latvia<br />
Matters related to <strong>the</strong> League of Nations<br />
The Latvian government hopes to obtain a place in <strong>the</strong> Council [of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations]<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States next year.<br />
In his speech held before <strong>the</strong> Assembly of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, Mr. Munters reproached<br />
this institution <strong>the</strong> fact that it sometimes neglected <strong>the</strong> pact principles in favour of politics. He<br />
supports a consolidation of <strong>the</strong> principles and of <strong>the</strong> authority of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations. The<br />
Latvian government believes that as long as Abyssinia remains a member of <strong>the</strong> League of<br />
Nations, <strong>the</strong> Italian-Abyssinian conflict must be regulated, according to <strong>the</strong> spirit and letter of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Assembly.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Reports Riga 1932-1935, vol. 3, s. 743-745.<br />
108. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al României la Riga Th.<br />
Scortzescu nr. 379 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 14<br />
octombrie 1935<br />
Întrebând pe Dl. Munters dacă proiectul unui pact consultativ letono-sovietic este încă în<br />
vederile guvernului, domnia sa mi-a spus că ultimele evenimente internaționale au îndepărtat<br />
această chestiune de la ordinea zilei.<br />
Letonia așteaptă desfășurarea conflictului italo-abisinian 1 și eventualele sale grupări de<br />
puteri, pe care el le-a putea provoca în Europa.<br />
Cu privire la acest conflict, domnul Munters, întors din Geneva și Londra, mi-a spus că<br />
soluția imperfectă a excluderii Italiei din Societatea Națiunilor părea să câștige teren în unele<br />
cercuri internaționale.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, filele 282.<br />
1<br />
Italia începuse agresiunea împotriva Abisiniei la 3 octombrie 1935, Italia fiind ulterior supusă regimului<br />
sancțiunilor prevăzute de Pactul Societății Națiunilor.
296 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
108. Telegram no. 379 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Romania in Riga Th.<br />
Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 14 th October<br />
1935<br />
In response to my question whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> project of a Latvian-Soviet consultative pact is still<br />
considered by <strong>the</strong> government, Mr. Munters said that <strong>the</strong> latest international events removed<br />
this matter from <strong>the</strong> agenda.<br />
Latvia is expecting <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> Italian-Abyssinian 1 conflict and <strong>the</strong> potential groups<br />
of powers that it could generate in Europe.<br />
As regards this conflict, Mr. Munters, who returned from Geneva and London, told me that<br />
<strong>the</strong> imperfect solution of <strong>the</strong> exclusion of Italy from <strong>the</strong> League of Nations seemed to be gaining<br />
ground in some international circles.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940, USSR, vol. 9, s. 282.<br />
109. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera konfidenciālais 1935. g. 21. okt. ziņojums<br />
Ārlietu ministrijas ģenerālsekretāram V. Munteram 2<br />
No manevriem Rumānijā atgriezies militāratašejs Klūges 3 kungs man ziņoja par saviem<br />
novērojumiem. Militāratašejam bijušas dažādas sarunas, no kurām pats svarīgākais liekas esam<br />
sekojošais: Ļoti uzkrītot, ka poļi šogad nav sūtījuši speciālu militāru misiju uz manevriem, ko<br />
uzskata Rumānijā par nelaipnības zīmi. Rumāņi esot pret poļiem stipri vēsi un vērojot, kādā<br />
mērā Polijas Vācijai draudzīgā politika nesaskan ar Rumānijas politiskām interesēm. Bet esot arī<br />
dažādi noskaņojumi, vieni pesimistiskāki, otri ne tādā mērā, pie kam sakot, ka Polijas militārās<br />
aprindās neesot ministra Beka politikai daudz draugu. Vispār ministra Beka stāvoklis liekoties<br />
esam pavājinājies. Citās sarunās militāratašejs dzirdējis, ka Vācija attīstot rosīgu politiku<br />
Bulgārijā un Dienvidslāvijā. Starp citu, Vācija slepeni apbruņojot Bulgāriju, esot tai devusi kādus<br />
40 jaunus tankus u. t. t. Varot redzēt, ka Bulgāriju cenšas izlietot kā vienu no Mazās Antantes<br />
pretspēkiem [..]. Vācijas politika izejot uz Mazās Antantes sašķelšanu [..]. Manevru temats bijis<br />
diezgan nozīmīgs eventuālos politiskos paredzējumos: Bijis apcerēts stāvoklis, kāds varētu<br />
rasties priekš Rumānijas, ja Vācija ietu caur Čehoslovākiju un mēģinātu ielauzties Rumānijā. Šis<br />
temats esot stipri nodarbinājis rumāņu prātus visu pēdējo laiku un notikušie manevri it kā<br />
noslēguši dažādās militārpraktiskās pārdomas.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 1687. l., 51. lp.<br />
109. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Secretary General<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs V. Munters 4 , 21 st October 1935<br />
Military Attaché Mr. Klūge 5 , having returned from manoeuvres in Romania, informed me<br />
about his observations. The Military Attaché has had various discussions, <strong>the</strong> most important<br />
1<br />
Italy had begun aggression against Abyssinia on 3 October 1935, being subsequently subjected to sanctions<br />
regime under <strong>the</strong> League of Nations Covenant.<br />
2<br />
Vilhelms Munters (1898–1967), Latvijas valstsvīrs. No 1933. g. Ārlietu ministrijas ģenerālsekretārs, 1936.–1940. g.<br />
ārlietu ministrs. 1940.–1959. g. padomju ieslodzījumā un izsūtījumā.<br />
3<br />
Eduards Klūge (1893–1942), Latvijas armijas pulkvedis-leitnants. 1934.–1939. g. kara aģents (militārais atašejs)<br />
Polijā un Rumānijā ar sēdekli Varšavā. Nogalināts padomju apcietinājumā.<br />
4<br />
Vilhelms Munters (1898–1967), Latvian statesman. From 1933 Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs,<br />
1936–1940 Minister of Foreign Affairs 1940–1959 in Soviet imprisonment and deportation.<br />
5<br />
Eduards Klūge (1893–1942), Colonel-Lieutenant of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia. 1934–1939 war agent [military attaché] in<br />
Poland and Romania with seat in Warsaw. Executed in Soviet imprisonment.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 297<br />
aspects in which seem to be <strong>the</strong> following: It is very striking that this year <strong>the</strong> Poles did not send<br />
a special military mission to <strong>the</strong> manoeuvres, which fact is regarded in Romania as a sign of<br />
discourtesy. The Romanians have assumed a very cool attitude towards <strong>the</strong> Poles and observe<br />
<strong>the</strong> extent to which Poland’s policy, which is friendly towards Germany, clashes with <strong>the</strong><br />
political interest of Romania. But opinions differ, some are more pessimistic, some –less so,<br />
besides <strong>the</strong>y say that in Poland’s military circles <strong>the</strong>re are not many friends for Minister Beck’s<br />
policy. In general, Minister Beck’s position seems to have weakened. In some o<strong>the</strong>r discussions<br />
<strong>the</strong> Military Attaché learned that Germany pursues active policy in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. By<br />
<strong>the</strong> way, Germany is said to be secretly equipping Bulgaria with arms and to have given it some<br />
40 new tanks etc. They say that efforts of using Bulgaria as one of <strong>the</strong> counter-forces against <strong>the</strong><br />
Little Entente are obvious [..] Germany’s policy is targeted at dividing <strong>the</strong> Little Entente [..] The<br />
topic of <strong>the</strong> manoeuvres had been ra<strong>the</strong>r significant in terms of <strong>the</strong> prognosis of eventual<br />
political developments: <strong>the</strong>re had been reviewed a situation that Romania could face if<br />
Germany advanced through Czechoslovakia and tried to invade Romania. This topic has been<br />
very much on <strong>the</strong> Romanians’ minds lately and <strong>the</strong> manoeuvres have as if finalized various<br />
military-practical reflections.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 1687, s. 51.<br />
110. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga<br />
Constantin Văllimărescu 1 nr. 450 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 25 noiembrie 1935<br />
Am fost astăzi în audiență la Domnul Ulmanis, Președintele Consiliului de Miniștri și<br />
Ministru al Afacerilor Străine. Domnia sa mi-a urat bună sosire în termeni călduroși și mi-a<br />
exprimat bucuria că între Letonia și România există cele mai bune relații.<br />
„Țările noastre, mi-a spus Dl. Ulmanis, se găsesc pe același front al păcii.”<br />
L-am asigurat că în ceea ce mă privește nu voi neglija nimic pentru a contribui la strângerea<br />
legăturilor dintre cele două țări.<br />
Audiența mea a fost precedată de o scurtă vizită de curtoazie la Domnul Munters, Secretarul<br />
General al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine. Am profitat de prilej pentru a cere opinia Domniei<br />
sale cu privire la desfășurarea crizei din teritoriul Memel, chestiune care preocupă actualmente<br />
cercurile politice letone. Domnia sa crede că în câteva zile Directoratul va fi constituit sub<br />
președinția unui german. În cazul când Directoratul va fi compus din 5 membri, va intra<br />
probabil în compoziția sa și un lituanian.<br />
Ocupându-se de crearea legației noastre la Tallinn și relevând cu plăcere importanța ce<br />
România atribuie relațiilor cu Statele Baltice, Secretarul General al Ministerului Afacerilor<br />
Străine mi-a vorbit și despre utilitatea creării unei legații române și la Kovno, măcar sub forma<br />
acreditării reprezentantului nostru în Letonia. O asemenea dispoziție ar procura României o<br />
sursă directă de prețioase de informații. Domnia sa a adăugat în treacăt că în același timp<br />
lituanienii s-ar simți astfel sprijiniți.<br />
La despărțire Domnul Munters m-a rugat să reamintesc Excelenței Voastre că ați făgăduit o<br />
vizită la Riga și-a exprimat speranța că nu ați renunțat la acest proiect.<br />
Mâine voi fi primit de Președintele Republicii pentru a prezenta scrisorile de acreditare.<br />
1<br />
Constantin Văllimărescu (1896-1972) a fost Ministrul României în Țările Baltice (1935-1936). În 1939 a fost numit<br />
ca Ministru al țării sale în Argentina.
298 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 97-98.<br />
110. Diplomatic Report no. 450 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Constantin Văllimărescu 1 to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 25 th November 1935<br />
Today I have been received by Mr. Ulmanis, President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers and<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs. His Excellency welcomed me most warmly and expressed his<br />
delight that Latvia and Romania enjoyed <strong>the</strong> best of <strong>relations</strong>.<br />
“Our countries, Mr. Ulmanis told me, are on <strong>the</strong> same peace front.”<br />
I assured him that as far as I was concerned, I would do my best to contribute to tightening<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two countries.<br />
My hearing was preceded by a short visit of Mr. Munters, Secretary General of Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs. I took advantage of <strong>the</strong> opportunity to ask for his opinion as regards <strong>the</strong> crisis in<br />
<strong>the</strong> land of Memel, which is a matter currently concerning <strong>the</strong> Latvian political circles. He<br />
believes that in a few days <strong>the</strong> Directorate will be constituted under a German Chairman. In<br />
case <strong>the</strong> directorate is made of 5 members, a Lithuanian may also be one of <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
Handling <strong>the</strong> creation of our legation in Tallinn and revealing with pleasure <strong>the</strong> importance<br />
assigned by Romania to its <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, <strong>the</strong> General Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Ministry<br />
of Foreign Affairs told me about <strong>the</strong> usefulness of creating a Romanian legation in Kovno as<br />
well, at least by accrediting our representative in Latvia. Such a disposition would grant<br />
Romania a direct source of precious information. He touched upon <strong>the</strong> fact that at <strong>the</strong> same<br />
time <strong>the</strong> Lithuanians would thus feel supported.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> end, Mr. Munters asked me to remind Your Excellency that you promised a visit to<br />
Riga and that he hoped you did not abandon this plan.<br />
Tomorrow I will be received by <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic, in order to present <strong>the</strong> letters<br />
of accreditation.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 97-98.<br />
111. Latvijas sūtņa Prāgā M. Nukšas 1935. g. 4. dec. ziņojums no Bukarestes Ārlietu<br />
ministrijai<br />
Kā jau ziņoju, jaunais Rumānijas ārējās tirdzniecības režīms ir stājies spēkā š. g. 1. decembrī<br />
[..]. Salīdzinot ar bijušo režīmu (no 10.VI 1935) [..] jaunajā režīmā ir atrodamas dažas svarīgas<br />
pārmaiņas: 1) atcelta ir līdzšinējā importa nodeva 44% apmērā [..].<br />
No savas puses varu piezīmēt, ka jaunais ārējās tirdzniecības režīms ienes apjukumu<br />
tirgotāju aprindās. No visām pusēm dzirdamas asas kritikas un labi apstākļu pazinēji izsakās, ka<br />
resoru starpā nav vienprātības par jauno noteikumu piemērotību dzīvei. Pareģo jaunam<br />
režīmam tikpat drīzu galu, kā daudzajiem iepriekšējiem. No otras puses, pastāv arī cerība, ka<br />
jaunais režīms, varbūt, netiks pārāk rigorozi piemērots visos gadījumos. Bet uz šiem<br />
apgalvojumiem nevar nebūt palaisties.<br />
Ja jaunais režīms patiešām paliktu spēkā ilgāku laiku, tad mēs to sajustu kā vēl lielāku<br />
apgrūtinājumu mūsu tirdzniecībā ar Rumāniju. Kompensācijas darījumu aizlieguma dēļ. Bet<br />
ārējās tirdzniecības režīms Rumānijā mainās tik bieži, ka gribētos piekrist tiem, kas pareģo pēc<br />
1<br />
Constantin Văllimărescu (1896-1972) was Minister of Romania in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States (1935-1936). In 1939 he was<br />
appointed as Minister of his country in Argentina.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 299<br />
pāris nedēļām jaunas pārmaiņas. Vai ar tām preču apmaiņa tiks atvieglota, tas ir cits jautājums:<br />
līdz šim visi jauninājumi ienesa tikai jaunus apgrūtinājumus, un nolīgumi starp firmām, kas bija<br />
slēgti zem iepriekšējā režīma, zaudēja spēku. Par to visi sūdzas.<br />
Bet ja tas ir tā, ja firmu līgumi netiek respektēti, tad varētu sev uzstādīt jautājumu, vai ir<br />
lietderīgi, ka šādus līgumus, kā mūsu firmu iepriekšējos kompensācijas līgumus, kuru<br />
izpildīšanas laiks ir paredzams diezgan garš, konkrētos gadījumos slēdz tikai mūsu firmas ar<br />
Rumānijas firmām un iestādēm, un vai nebūtu lietderīgāk, ka notiktu arī zināma vienošanās<br />
oficiālā veidā starp valsts iestādēm par zināmas preču grupas apmaiņas principiālo bāzi,<br />
termiņu un norēķināšanās veidu, kuru tagad daudz vairāk nosaka valdības iestādes, nekā<br />
privātie tirgotāji, darījumu izpildītāji? Tādā veidā pēdējā laikā esot šeit rīkojusies Somija. Man<br />
nav zināms, kādā veidā un ko īsti Somija izdarījusi, bet pēc 5 mēnešu garām sarunām, ar<br />
grūtībām un pārtraukumiem, Somija beidzot esot panākusi kaut kādu rakstisku vienošanos: uz<br />
mutiskiem solījumiem palaisties būtu neprātība. Protams, Somijai, ņemot vērā viņas brīvo tirgu,<br />
ir vieglāk uzstādīt prasības, nekā mums.<br />
Man bija saruna arī ar mūsu firmu „Kvadrāts” 1 un „Kontinents” 2 pārstāvjiem. Viņi par jaunu<br />
apgalvoja tos pašus datus, kurus ministrija bija man atsūtījusi uz Prāgu. No diviem noslēgtiem<br />
kompensācijas darījumiem, pirmais ir izsmelts pilnā mērā, kamēr no otrā 50 milj. leju lielā<br />
darījuma apmaiņa ir notikusi tikai par 6,5 milj. lejām. Bet tā kā šī kontrakta realizēšanas laikā<br />
Rumānijā notika ārējās tirdzniecības režīma maiņa, tad nolīguma, pēc kura vēl būtu izdarāma<br />
kompensācija par 43,5 milj. leju, tagad faktiski vairs nav spēkā. No šī vecā līguma tomēr izgāju<br />
savās pirmās sarunās ar Rumānijas iestādēm, prasīdams atļaut vispirms novest līdz galam jau<br />
iesākto realizēt kompensācijas nolīgumu uz tur paredzētiem noteikumiem, lai firmām nebūtu<br />
jācieš pārāk lieli zaudējumi. (Kompensācias darījumi gan, kā jau sākumā minēju, tagad ir<br />
aizliegti). Kādi būs panākumi, to nevar paredzēt. Šis jautājums komplicējas vēl vairāk tādēļ, ka<br />
mūsu gumijas rūpnieki nevēlas tūliņ dabūt iesāktā kompensācijas nolīguma atjaunošanu. Viņi<br />
paskaidro, ka tagadējā režīmā jau ir par vēlu, bet nākošam gadam par agru. Vislabāk būtu, ja<br />
vienošanos varētu panākt pēc 4 vai 5 mēnešiem, aiz tā vienkāršā aprēķina, ka prece jāiesūta bez<br />
kavēšanās, tiklīdz kā atļauja dabūta, jo citādi var atkal notikt tirdzniecības režīma maiņa, un tur<br />
viss tiek apgāzts. Kolēģi man apgalvo, ka pēdējos 2 gados Rumānija 25 reizes izdarījusi<br />
pārmaiņas savā ārējās tirdzniecības režīmā.<br />
Tirgus šeit Rumānijā var uzņemt vairāk preču, nekā ir ievests. Mūsu gumijas izstrādājumiem<br />
ir laba slava vēl no iepriekšējiem gadiem, sevišķi Besarābijā. 3 Bez tam, kā redzu, tiklab<br />
„Kvadrāta” kā „Kontinenta” tirdznieciskais aparāts šeit ir labi nostādīts. Mūsu firmu konkurents<br />
ir zviedru „Tretorn”; turpretim somi un čehu „Bat’a” ražo vieglāku preci, kura pieder jau pie<br />
citas šķirnes.<br />
Man palika iespaids, ka Latvijas gumijas rūpnieki tiešām vēlas saņemt iesalušās summas. Pie<br />
tagadējā tirdzniecības režīma viņi ar Rumānijas leju pat Rumānijā neko nevar iesākt. Var izdarīt<br />
vienīgi investīciju ēkās un izdarīt algu izmaksas. Jēlvielu iegādei un mašīnu pirkšanai vajadzētu<br />
1<br />
1924. g. izveidotā rūpnīca „Kvadrāts” Rīgā – lielākais gumijas izstrādājumu ražotājs Latvijā līdz 1940. g. Pēc<br />
aneksijas Padomju Savienībā – „Sarkanais Kvadrāts”.<br />
2<br />
1923. g. izveidotā akciju sabiedrība „Rīgas gumijas manufaktūra Kontinents” ražoja galvenokārt gumijas apavus.<br />
1928. g. uzņēmumā 1200 strādnieku, 1938. g. pārdēvēts par fabriku „Meteors”.<br />
3<br />
Latvijā ražoto gumijas izstrādājumu popularitāte Besarābijā izskaidrojama arī ar apstākli, ka Rīgā esošās gumijas<br />
izstrādājumu fabrikas „Provodņik” produkcija pirms Pirmā pasaules kara tika izplatīta un bija populāra visā<br />
Krievijas impērijas teritorijā, arī Besarābijā.
300 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
devīzes, 1 bet tās Rumānijas Nacionālbankai pašai nav. Tomēr nedrīkstam aizmirst, ka tas tā ir<br />
tikai patlaban un tad, ja nostājas uz stingra likumības viedokļa; bet, ņemot vērā biežo<br />
tirdzniecības režīma maiņu Rumānijā un dažādos sānu ceļus, pa kuriem daudzi mēdz iet,<br />
firmām var būt arī citādi aprēķini. Pēc mana ieskata, uzmanība no mūsu iestāžu puses ir vietā,<br />
lai nenotiktu kapitāla aizpludināšana.<br />
Mūsu ģenerālkonsulam Orgidana kungam, kuram, blakus pieminot, Bukarestē ir izcils<br />
stāvoklis un labi sakari, paskaidroju, ka līgumi slēdzami tāpat, kā līdz šim starp Latvijas un<br />
Rumānijas firmām, bet, ka mans un viņa uzdevums ir: izpētīt vispārējās tirgus iespējamības,<br />
radīt līgumu oficiālo bāzi un veicināt līgumu noslēgšanu zināmās, mums pieņemamās robežās.<br />
Aizrādīju arī, ka vajadzīga iepriekšēja līguma teksta akceptācija no attiecīgo Latvijas iestāžu<br />
puses. To darīju zināmu arī mūsu firmu pārstāvjiem.<br />
Patlaban atkal biju Ārlietu ministrijas Ekonomiskajā departamentā un pie Eksporta institūta<br />
ģenerālsekretāra. Sarunu rezultāts ir šāds:<br />
1) Gumijas ražojumi. Rumānijas iestādes noskaidro vēl dažus blakus apstākļus, piemēram,<br />
cik skaitās izstāvošu parādu Latvijas gumijas rūpniekiem Rumānijā. Rumānijas banka uzdod 3<br />
milj. leju, kamēr mēs uzdodam 25 milj. leju (740.000 latu).<br />
2) Pret ultramarīna importu no Latvijas Rumānijas iestādes lielus iebildumus necelšot, tāda<br />
esot bijusi noskaņa viņu pēdējās pārrunās par šo lietu un tādā garā arī esot sūtniecībai uz Prāgu<br />
atbildēts. Bet jautājums ir, ar kādām pretvērtībām, un kādās proporcijās izdarīt samaksu. Tas<br />
vēl jānoskaidro nākošās sarunās.<br />
3) Par krāsu un laku novietošanas iespējamību ievadīta izziņa, bet drīza atbilde nav gaidāma.<br />
Jautājums iet caur Tirdzniecības kameru.<br />
4) Linu diegi un diedziņi varētu tikt novietoti Rumānijā diezgan prāvos apmēros un<br />
periodiski. Tie domāti Kara ministrijas vajadzībām. Tā kā es ne tik vien Latvijas linus, bet arī<br />
linu izstrādājumus uzdevu par valūtas preci, tāpat kā rumāņi petroleju un naftas derivātus, tad<br />
Rumānijas iestādes būtu ar mieru atļaut kompensācijas darījumus ar linu diegiem un<br />
diedziņiem no mūsu puses un ar petroleju, benzīnu no Rumānijas puses. Ierosinājums nāca no<br />
rumāņiem. Es viņus lūdzu man dot sīkākas ziņas par to, kādi diegi un diedziņi, kādā daudzumā<br />
ir vajadzīgi, lai varētu pieprasīt no Rīgas tuvāku informāciju. Man liekas, ka Latvijas iestādēm šī<br />
operācija būtu mazāk izdevīga, nekā kompensācijas darījums ar gumijas izstrādājumiem, mazāk<br />
izdevīgs pat tādā gadījumā, ja apmaiņa notiktu ar mazāku valūtas piemaksu vai pat bez valūtas<br />
piemaksas. Man liekas, petroleju un benzīnu mēs pērkam Rumānijā tikai ar to aprēķinu, lai<br />
varētu tur novietot gumijas ražojumus, kuriem citādi ir ļoti grūti atrast tirgu.<br />
Cik līdz šim zinu, tad vajadzīgie diegi un diedziņi būs Nr. 30 un Nr. 40. Pircēja Rumānijā<br />
būtu Aizsardzības ministrija. Tuvākas ziņas nosūtīšu, tiklīdz tās saņemšu, tomēr jau tagad<br />
sliecos Jūs par šo ierosinājumu informēt, lai nekavējoši varētu dabūt zināt Latvijas iestāžu<br />
viedokli [..].<br />
Mana adrese ir: Hotel Athénée Palace [..].<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 1599. l., 3.–5. lp.<br />
1<br />
Domāta – valūta (franču val. devise).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 301<br />
111. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Prague M. Nukša to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
from Bucharest, 4 th December 1935<br />
As I already reported, Romania’s new regime of external trade came into force on 1 st<br />
December, this year [..] The new regime contains several important changes compared to <strong>the</strong><br />
previous regime (from 10.06.1935) [..]: 1) <strong>the</strong> existing import duty of 44% has been lifted [..]<br />
I can remark from my own part that <strong>the</strong> new regime of external trade causes confusion<br />
among dealers. Sharp criticism can be heard from all parts and those who know <strong>the</strong> situation<br />
well say that <strong>the</strong>re is no consensus among <strong>the</strong> departments on <strong>the</strong> adequacy of <strong>the</strong> new<br />
regulations for real life. The new regime is predicted as short a life as <strong>the</strong> numerous previous<br />
ones have had. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong>re is hope that <strong>the</strong> new regime will probably not be too<br />
rigorously applied in all cases. But one should not rely on such statements at all.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> new regime indeed remained in force for a longer period, we would feel it as an even<br />
greater burden on our trade with Romania. Due to <strong>the</strong> prohibition of compensation deals. But<br />
in Romania <strong>the</strong> regimes of external trade change so often that I would like to agree with those<br />
who predict new changes to take place in a couple of weeks. Will <strong>the</strong>y make <strong>the</strong> exchange of<br />
goods easier, that is a different question: so far all <strong>the</strong> innovations have brought only burdens<br />
and contracts concluded between companies under <strong>the</strong> previous regime become invalid.<br />
Everybody complains about it.<br />
But if it is so that contracts between companies are not respected, a question can be asked<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r in concrete cases it is expedient to conclude such contracts, like <strong>the</strong> previous<br />
compensation contracts of our companies with a ra<strong>the</strong>r long term of <strong>the</strong> fulfilment of<br />
contractual duties, only between our companies and Romanian companies and institutions and<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r it would not be preferable in an official way to achieve a kind of agreement between<br />
state institutions on <strong>the</strong> principal base of exchange of a concrete group of commodities and on<br />
<strong>the</strong> term and form of payment, which at present to a larger extent is dictated by government<br />
institutions ra<strong>the</strong>r than by private dealers and executors of <strong>the</strong> deals? Finland is said to have<br />
acted in this way here lately. I do not know exactly what and in what way Finland has done, but<br />
after 5 months long negotiations, with difficulties and pauses, Finland has finally achieved some<br />
kind of a written agreement: it would be madness to rely on oral promises. Of course, for<br />
Finland, considering its free market, it is easier to put forward demands than it is for us.<br />
We had a discussion with representatives of our companies „Kvadrāts” 1 and „Kontinents” 2 .<br />
They reiterated <strong>the</strong> same data, which <strong>the</strong> Ministry had sent to me to Prague. Of <strong>the</strong> two<br />
concluded compensation deals <strong>the</strong> first one has been fully exhausted, while in <strong>the</strong> framework of<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r deal, which is worth 50 million lei, exchange only for <strong>the</strong> value of 6.5 million lei has taken<br />
place. But since a change occurred in Romania’s regime of foreign trade during <strong>the</strong> period of <strong>the</strong><br />
implementation of this contract, <strong>the</strong> contract, according to which a compensation for 43.5<br />
million lei has to take place yet, now in fact has become invalid. However, in my first discussion<br />
with Romania’s authorities I built on <strong>the</strong> old contract, requiring to permit first of all on <strong>the</strong><br />
stipulated conditions to finalize <strong>the</strong> compensation contract, <strong>the</strong> implementation of which had<br />
already started, in order for <strong>the</strong> companies not to suffer exceedingly great losses.<br />
1<br />
Company „ Kvadrāts”, founded in Riga in 1924, was <strong>the</strong> largest manufacturer of rubber products in Latvia until<br />
1940. After <strong>the</strong> annexation by <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union <strong>the</strong> factory was renamed „Sarkanais Kvadrāts”.<br />
2<br />
Joint stock company „Rīgas gumijas manufaktūra Kontinents”, founded in 1923, manufactured mostly rubber<br />
footwear. In 1928 <strong>the</strong> company employed 1200 workers, in 1938 <strong>the</strong> factory was renamed „Meteors”.
302 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
(Compensation deals, however, as I mentioned at <strong>the</strong> beginning, are prohibited now). What<br />
will be <strong>the</strong> result, it cannot be predicted. This issue is made even more complicated by <strong>the</strong> fact<br />
that our rubber manufacturers do not want immediate extension of <strong>the</strong> compensation<br />
contracts, which <strong>the</strong>y have began to implement. They explain that [under] <strong>the</strong> existing regime<br />
[it] is already too late, but for <strong>the</strong> next year – too early. It would be best if it was possible to<br />
achieve agreement in 4 or 5 months, for <strong>the</strong> simple reason that <strong>the</strong> commodity has to be<br />
shipped without delay as soon as a permit is received lest a change of trade regime occurs again<br />
and everything crumbles <strong>the</strong>re. My colleagues assert that in <strong>the</strong> last 2 years Romania has 25<br />
times made amendments in its regime of external trade.<br />
The market here in Romania can absorb more commodities than is actually imported. Our<br />
rubber products have good reputation from <strong>the</strong> previous years, particularly in Bessarabia. 1<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, as I see, <strong>the</strong> trade machinery of both “Kvadrāts” and “Kontinents” is well<br />
organized here. The competitor of our companies is Swedish “Tretorn”, while <strong>the</strong> Finns and<br />
Czech “Bat’s” manufacture a lighter commodity which belongs to a different category.<br />
I got an impression that Latvia’s rubber manufacturers truly want to receive <strong>the</strong> frozen<br />
amounts [of money]. Under <strong>the</strong> existing trade regime <strong>the</strong>y cannot do anything with Romanian<br />
lei even in Romania. They can only invest in buildings and pay wages. For <strong>the</strong> purchase of raw<br />
materials and equipment devises 2 are required but Romania’s National Bank does not have any<br />
itself. Yet, we must not forget that it is like <strong>the</strong> way it is only at <strong>the</strong> present moment and if one<br />
firmly pursues <strong>the</strong> lawful road; but considering <strong>the</strong> frequent change of trade regimes in<br />
Romania and <strong>the</strong> various side-ways that are used, companies may have different considerations.<br />
In my opinion attention from <strong>the</strong> part of our institutions is in place in order to prevent <strong>the</strong><br />
outflow of capital.<br />
I explained to our General Consul Mr. Orghidan, who, by <strong>the</strong> way, is in an outstanding<br />
position in Bucharest and has good contacts, that contracts between <strong>the</strong> companies of Latvia<br />
and Romania had to be concluded in <strong>the</strong> same way as before but that he and me had <strong>the</strong><br />
following task: to explore <strong>the</strong> general potential of <strong>the</strong> market, to create an official contractual<br />
basis and to stimulate conclusion of contracts in a certain framework, which is acceptable to us.<br />
I also remarked that a preliminary approval of <strong>the</strong> contract’s text by <strong>the</strong> relevant Latvian<br />
authorities was required. I made it known also to representatives of our companies.<br />
Recently I visited again <strong>the</strong> Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and <strong>the</strong><br />
Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Exports Institute. The result of <strong>the</strong> discussions is following:<br />
1) Rubber products. Romania’s institutions are still clarifying some additional circumstances,<br />
for example <strong>the</strong> amount of pending debt to Latvian rubber manufacturers in Romania. The<br />
Bank of Romania mentions 3 million lei while we calculate it at 25 million lei (740,000 lats).<br />
2) Romania’s authorities are not expected to raise objections against <strong>the</strong> import of<br />
ultramarine – such has been <strong>the</strong>ir attitude in <strong>the</strong>ir latest discussions and <strong>the</strong> Legation in Prague<br />
has also received a reply in this spirit. But <strong>the</strong> question is, by what kind of equivalent and in<br />
what proportion <strong>the</strong> payment is to be made. It must be clarified yet in fur<strong>the</strong>r negotiations.<br />
1<br />
The popularity of Latvia-made rubber products in Bessarabia is also due to <strong>the</strong> fact that before <strong>the</strong> war <strong>the</strong><br />
products of rubber processing factory „Provodnik”, which was located in Riga, were broadly spread and popular all<br />
over <strong>the</strong> Russian Empire, Bessarabia included.<br />
2<br />
Currency is meant here (French – devise).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 303<br />
3) About <strong>the</strong> possibility of placement [export] of paints and varnishes inquiry has been<br />
made, but no quick answer is expected. The issue goes through <strong>the</strong> Chamber of Commerce.<br />
4) Flax yarn and thread could be placed in [exported to] Romania in ra<strong>the</strong>r large amounts<br />
and on regular basis. They are meant for <strong>the</strong> needs of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of War. Since I presented not<br />
only Latvian flax but also linen products as a currency commodity, same as <strong>the</strong> Romanians did<br />
with kerosene and oil products, Romania’s authorities would be willing to permit compensation<br />
deals with flaxen yarn and thread from our part and with kerosene and petrol from Romania’s<br />
part. The proposal came from Romania’s part. I asked <strong>the</strong>m to specify <strong>the</strong> type and amount of<br />
yarn and thread that <strong>the</strong>y need in order to be able to require more details from Riga. It seems to<br />
me that for <strong>the</strong> Latvian authorities this operation would be less advantageous than <strong>the</strong><br />
compensation deal with rubber products, less advantageous even in case <strong>the</strong> exchange involves<br />
a lesser additional payment in currency or even no additional payment in currency at all. It<br />
seems to me that we buy kerosene and petrol in Romania only in order to be able to place<br />
[export] <strong>the</strong>re rubber products, for which o<strong>the</strong>rwise it is very difficult to find a market.<br />
As far as I know, <strong>the</strong> required yarn and thread will be Nos. 30 and 40. The purchaser in<br />
Romania would be <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Defence. I will send more details as soon as I get <strong>the</strong>m,<br />
however already now I felt inclined to inform you about this proposal in order to learn <strong>the</strong><br />
position of Latvia’s authorities as soon as possible [..]<br />
My address is:<br />
Hotel Athénée Palace [..].<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 1599, s. 3–5.<br />
112. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga<br />
Constantin Văllimărescu nr. 459 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 7 decembrie 1935<br />
În ziua de 26 noiembrie am fost primit de Dl. Kviesis, Președintele Republicii letone, pentru<br />
prezentarea scrisorilor mele de acreditare.<br />
La ora 11, Șeful de Protocol, însoțit de o escortă de cavalerie sub comanda unui ofițer, a venit<br />
să mă ia de la legație cu un automobil al Președintelui Republicii. Dl. Scortzescu, consilierul<br />
legației, ne-a urmat într-un alt automobil.<br />
În curtea palatului prezidențial o companie de onoare cu drapel mi-a dat onorurile. Însoțit<br />
de Colonelul Comandant al gărzii am trecut trupa în revistă. În momentul intrării mele în palat,<br />
orchestra a intonat imnul regal.<br />
După o scurtă așteptare într-un salon unde m-a întâmpinat Dl. Munters, Secretarul General<br />
al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine, am trecut, însoțit de acesta din urmă, de șeful Protocolului și<br />
de Dl. Scortzescu, în sala de audiență în care se afla Președintele Republicii, înconjurat de Dl.<br />
Ulmanis, Prim Ministru și Ministru al Afacerilor Străine, directorii administrativ și politic din<br />
Ministerul Afacerilor Străine, secretarul și aghiotantul Președintelui Republicii.<br />
Am înaintat până în mijlocul sălii și am pronunțat discursul meu. Dl. Kviesis a pronunțat<br />
apoi discursul său de răspuns.<br />
Au urmat prezentările persoanelor prezente după care președintele m-a rugat să-l însoțesc<br />
în cabinetul său de lucru unde ne-am întreținut timp de 20 de minute, fiind și Dl. Ulmanis de<br />
față.
304 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Convorbirea a avut loc în limba germană deoarece Dl. Ulmanis, Președintele Consiliului, nu<br />
cunoaște limba franceză.<br />
Dl. Kviesis mi-a exprimat sentimentele sale de înaltă stimă pentru Majestatea Sa Regele<br />
Carol II și mi-a vorbit apoi cu multă simpatie de România și de București, unde a petrecut<br />
câteva zile cu prilejul unui congres de penaliști. Și Domnia Sa, ca și Dl. Ulmanis au relevat<br />
asemănarea între politicile urmate de România și Letonia, ambele deopotrivă devotate păcii.<br />
Ca mai toți guvernanții letoni pe care i-am cunoscut până în prezent, Dl. Kviesis s-a arătat<br />
foarte interesat de chestiunile economice.<br />
Vorbind despre conflictul italo-etiopian și-a exprimat îngrijorarea cu privire la consecințele<br />
ce le-ar putea avea.<br />
După terminarea întrevederii am fost recondus la legație cu același ceremonial ca la sosire<br />
O oră mai târziu m-am dus la cimitirul combatanților căzuți în război unde am depus o<br />
coroană. Am fost primit acolo de Șeful protocolului și de reprezentanții autorităților.<br />
Trimit aici alăturat textul discursului meu și al răspunsului D-lui Kviesis 1 .<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 102-103.<br />
112. Diplomatic Report no. 459 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Constantin Văllimărescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 7 th December 1935<br />
On November 26 th I was received by Mr. Kviesis, President of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Republic, in order<br />
to present my letters of accreditation.<br />
At 11 o’clock, <strong>the</strong> Chief of Protocol, accompanied by a cavalry escort under <strong>the</strong> orders of an<br />
officer, came to take me from <strong>the</strong> legation with a motor car of <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic. Mr.<br />
Scortzescu, <strong>the</strong> legation counsellor, followed us in ano<strong>the</strong>r motor car.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> presidential palace courtyard, an honorary campaign with <strong>the</strong> colours gave me <strong>the</strong><br />
shout out. Accompanied by Guard Commander Colonel, I reviewed <strong>the</strong> troop. When I entered<br />
<strong>the</strong> palace, <strong>the</strong> orchestra played <strong>the</strong> royal hymn.<br />
After a brief expectation in a room where Mr. Munters, General Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs welcomed me, I was accompanied by him, <strong>the</strong> Chief of Protocol and Mr.<br />
Scortzescu to <strong>the</strong> hearing room, where <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic was surrounded by Mr.<br />
Ulmanis, Prime-Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, <strong>the</strong> Administrative and Political<br />
Managers of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <strong>the</strong> secretary and <strong>the</strong> Adjutant of <strong>the</strong> President of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Republic.<br />
I advanced to <strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong> room and I held my speech. Then Mr. Kviesis held his<br />
response speech.<br />
The persons present were introduced, after which <strong>the</strong> president asked me to accompany<br />
him in his cabinet, where we talked for 20 minutes, Mr. Ulmanis was also present.<br />
We spoke German, as Mr. Ulmanis, Council Chairman, does not speak French.<br />
Mr. Kviesis expressed his feelings of high esteem for his Majesty King Carol II and spoke<br />
with sympathy of Romania and Bucharest, where he spent a few days for a criminal law<br />
congress. His Excellency and Mr. Ulmanis revealed <strong>the</strong> similarity between <strong>the</strong> policies of<br />
Romania and Latvia, both devoted to peace.<br />
1<br />
Textele discursurilor oficiale nu au fost incluse în acest volum.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 305<br />
Like almost all Latvian government politicians I have met until now, Mr. Kviesis showed<br />
himself very interested in <strong>the</strong> economic matters.<br />
Speaking about <strong>the</strong> Italian-Ethiopian conflict, he expressed his concern regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
consequences it may have.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> meeting, I was driven back to <strong>the</strong> legation with <strong>the</strong> same ceremonial from<br />
my arrival.<br />
An hour later I went to <strong>the</strong> cemetery of <strong>the</strong> fighters fallen in war, where I laid a wreath.<br />
There I was received by <strong>the</strong> Chief of Protocol and <strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>the</strong> authorities.<br />
I attach hereto <strong>the</strong> text of my speech and <strong>the</strong> text of Mr. Kviesis’ response 1 .<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 102-103.<br />
113. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga<br />
Constantin Văllimărescu nr. 463 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 7 decembrie 1935<br />
Am onoarea a pune aici alăturat Excelenței Voastre textul unei declarații ce am făcut<br />
reprezentanților presei din Riga, astfel cum a apărut în ziarul „Rigasche Rundschau”.<br />
Declarațiile D-lui Ministru Văllimărescu astfel cum au apărut în „Rigasche Rundschau”<br />
(traducerea)<br />
România și Letonia. Un interviu cu Ministrul României<br />
Ministrul României, Domnul Văllimărescu, s-a exprimat astfel într-o conversație cu<br />
reprezentantul ziarului nostru:<br />
„Sunt foarte fericit că am fost însărcinat de Suveranul meu să reprezint țara în Letonia, întrun<br />
stat care se bucură de considerație la noi și care oferă lumii un frumos exemplu de energie,<br />
ordine și muncă. Primirea care mi-a fost făcută la Riga a fost foarte prietenoasă și sunt convins<br />
că îndeplinirea misiunii mele va fi ușoară și plăcută, ca orice muncă care este întreprinsă cu<br />
bucurie și într-o atmosferă de cordialitate.<br />
România și Letonia sunt deja prietene vechi. Legăturile care există între cele două popoare,<br />
legături caracterizate printr-un trecut asemănător, plin de lupte duse împotriva celor mai<br />
puternici și de sforțări continue spre a-și dobândi neatârnarea, au facilitat stabilirea raporturilor<br />
prietenești între cele două popoare. Colaborarea noastră la Geneva, sediul familiei popoarelor, a<br />
contribuit și mai mult la dezvoltarea acestei prieteni.<br />
Politica României, ale cărei linii de conduită sunt respectul tratatelor, fidelitate față de aliați,<br />
bune relații cu vecinii, prietenie față de toate statele, precum și o rodnică colaborare în cadrul<br />
cooperării unirii popoarelor, apare netedă și lămurită.<br />
Această politică este în întregime în slujba păcii, care pentru noi înseamnă țelul cel mai înalt<br />
către care tindem.<br />
Poporul român, unit în jurul iubitului său rege, care conduce destinele țării sale cu mână<br />
tare și încercată, el fiind primul exemplu al strădaniei pentru binele general, poporul român –<br />
zic – nu dorește altceva decât să poată lucra în liniște pentru propășirea sa, pentru ordine și<br />
pace.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 99-101.<br />
1<br />
The texts of <strong>the</strong> official speeches have not been included in this volume
306 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
113. Diplomatic Report no. 463 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Constantin Văllimărescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae<br />
Titulescu, 7 th December 1935<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour of attaching hereto for Your Excellency <strong>the</strong> text of a declaration I gave to<br />
<strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>the</strong> press in Riga, as it was published in <strong>the</strong> “Rigasche Rundschau”<br />
newspaper.<br />
Minister Văllimărescu’s declarations as <strong>the</strong>y were published in “Rigasche Rundschau”<br />
(translation)<br />
Romania and Latvia. An interview with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania<br />
In a conversation with <strong>the</strong> representative of our newspaper, Mr. Văllimărescu, Minister of<br />
Romania, said:<br />
“I am very happy that I have been charged by <strong>the</strong> Sovereign to represent my country in<br />
Latvia, in a state that enjoys consideration in our country and that offers to <strong>the</strong> world a good<br />
example of energy, order and hard work. I was welcomed very friendly in Riga and I am<br />
convinced that my mission will be easy and nice to fulfil, like any work carried out with joy and<br />
in a cordial atmosphere.<br />
Romania and Latvia are already old friends. The connections existing between <strong>the</strong> two<br />
peoples, characterized by resembling pasts, full of struggles against more powerful nations and<br />
of continuous efforts to acquire <strong>the</strong>ir freedom, facilitated <strong>the</strong> establishment of friendship<br />
<strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two peoples. Our collaboration in Geneva, <strong>the</strong> headquarters of <strong>the</strong> family<br />
of peoples, contributed even more to <strong>the</strong> development of this friendship.<br />
The policy of Romania, whose conduct lines are <strong>the</strong> observance of treaties, loyalty to its<br />
allies, good <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> neighbours, friendship to all states as well as a fruitful<br />
collaboration within <strong>the</strong> cooperation for <strong>the</strong> unity of peoples, is smooth and clear.<br />
This policy is entirely in <strong>the</strong> service of peace, which is to us <strong>the</strong> highest purpose we aim at.<br />
The Romanian people – united around its beloved king, who leads his country’s destiny with<br />
a firm hand, being <strong>the</strong> first example of effort for <strong>the</strong> general wellbeing – only wishes to be able<br />
to work in peace for <strong>the</strong>ir prosperity, for order and peace.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 99-101.<br />
114. Latvijas sūtņa M. Valtera 1936. g. 21. febr. ziņojums Ārlietu ministrijas<br />
ģenerālsekretāram V. Munteram par sarunu ar Rumānijas sūtni K. Visoianu<br />
Man šodien bija garāka saruna ar jauno Rumānijas sūtni Varšavā Konstantinu Visoianu<br />
kungu, kurš te tagad jau paguvis taisīt dažus novērojumus. Jaunais sūtnis daudz atklātāks, nekā<br />
agrākais, kādu iespaidu dabūjuši visi, kas ar viņu runājuši. Viņš skaitās par vienu no tuvākiem<br />
līdzstrādniekiem Rumānijas ārlietu ministram Titulesku. Mūsu sarunā uznācām tūliņ uz<br />
Gēringa 1 vizīti Varšavā un līdz ar to uz vispārējo jautājumu par Polijas politiku sakarā ar Vāciju.<br />
Pēc sūtņa izteicieniem, Gēringa apciemojumam nedrīkstētu piegriezt atsevišķu vērību tai ziņā,<br />
ka varētu sagaidīt no šī apciemojuma kādus praktiskus rezultātus vai politiskus soļus. Polija<br />
turpina savu līdzšinējo manevrēšanas politiku, kāda tā bijusi visus pēdējos gadus, bet jājautājot,<br />
vai šī politika var dot labus panākumus priekš pašas Polijas. „Es esmu tagad runājis, tā teica<br />
1<br />
Hermanis Vilhelms Gērings (Göring; 1893–1946), Vācijas reihsmaršals (1940), valstsvīrs. No 1932. g. Reihstāga<br />
priekšsēdētājs, no 1933. g. reihsministrs bez portfeļa, Prūsijas Ministru prezidents, no 1933. g. aviācijas<br />
reihsministrs, no 1935. g. gaisa spēku virspavēlnieks.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 307<br />
sūtnis, ar visiem kolēģiem šejienes diplomātiskā korpusā, ar vienu pēc otra, un mani iespaidi ir<br />
tagad sabiezējušies diezgan noteikti. No visiem esmu saņēmis iespaidu, ka uzskati par Polijas<br />
politiku pilnīgi vienādi. Polija grib, lai viņu uzskata tās ārējā politikā par pilnīgi patstāvīgu, bet<br />
līdzekļi, kādiem tā to grib panākt, liekas neesam paši pareizākie. Tagadējā Polijas ārējā politika<br />
neizliekas nevienam atklāta, saprotama, tā ir misterioza. 1 Dažas dienas atpakaļ es biju medībās<br />
kopā ar vairākiem poļu ģenerāļiem. Uznāca runas par Polijas ārlietu politiku, pie kam ģenerāļi<br />
izteica brīnīšanos, ka Polijas politiku apspriežot tik dažādi. Es atbildēju – tā taču pašas Polijas<br />
vēlēšanās, ka viņas politiku dažādi ievērtētu un sagaidītu no tās dažādus virzienus. Jūs gribat, lai<br />
visi no Polijas kaut ko sagaidītu un tagad Jūs brīnaties, ka spriedumos tas izklausās dažādi.<br />
Polija taču grib būt misterioza un rezultāts, ka neviens nav par viņu skaidrībā. Neviens uz Poliju<br />
īsti nepalaižas.” Šos pēdējos vārdus sakarā ar poļu ģenerāļu izteicieniem, viņš, protams, nav<br />
sacījis tieši, bet tie uzskatāmi kā refleksija mūsu sarunā. Drīz vien sūtnis no jauna atgriezās pie<br />
šī paša temata. „Ja Jūs jautātu šodien kādam francūzim, vai viņš var palaisties uz Poliju, viņš<br />
atbildēs ar nē. To pašu jautājumu Jūs varat uzstādīt mums, rumāņiem vai angļiem – Jūs vienmēr<br />
dzirdēsiet to pašu atbildi, ka palaisties nevar. Nesen es runāju ar šejienes Anglijas vēstnieku. 2<br />
Viņa atbilde ne ar ko neatšķīrās no citām, viņš tikai izplēta rokas un piemetināja, ka neviens<br />
Polijas politiku nesaprotot. Mums kā Polijas militārsabiedrotajiem tāds jautājums no sevišķa<br />
svara un mums vajadzētu skaidri zināt, kādas ir īstās poļu–vācu attiecības. Mēs to nezinām.<br />
Tāpat to nezin Francija. Ar savu tagadējo politiku Polija ved spēli, tā grib būt laba šodien pret<br />
vāciem, rīt pret frančiem un tā bez gala. Ar šādu savu politiku Polija panāk tikai to, ka valda<br />
neuzticība un, ka apstākļos, sevišķi Eiropas austrumos, nenonāk pie pilnīga miera un<br />
nostiprināšanās.” Tāds bija galvenais saturs jaunā Rumānijas sūtņa izteicienos. Viņš interesējās<br />
par mūsu attiecībām ar Padomju Krieviju, kuras pēc viņa ziņām neesot sliktas un to pašu viņš<br />
varot konstatēt tagadējos sakaros starp Rumāniju un Krieviju. Īsi pēc šīs sarunas ar Rumānijas<br />
sūtni man bija gadījums pie tiem pašiem jautājumiem atgriezties kādā citā sarunā, kurai tuva<br />
pieskare pie Francijas vēstniecības. Par Gēringa vizīti vispārējais spriedums, ka tas ir gabals no<br />
parastās poļu taktikas. Ka tai pašā laikā notikuši lielāki aresti vācu starpā Augšsilēzijā, ir tikai<br />
atkal izbalansēšanas spēle. Te grib rādīt, ka sakari ar Vāciju tomēr neierobežo poļu valdību tās<br />
stāvoklī, zīmējoties uz politisko izturēšanos pašu zemē. Augšsilēzijā atklātā vācu slepenā<br />
organizācija bijusi plašāka, nekā to sākumā domājuši. Biedru skaits tajā sasniedzis 4000. Pēdējās<br />
dienās parādījušās baumas, ka ministrs Beks pēc brauciena uz Briseli braukšot arī uz Belgradi,<br />
bet ministru prezidents Koscjaklovskis 3 atdošot vizīti Budapeštā [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 1900. l., 49.–51. lp.<br />
114. Report by Latvia’s Envoy M. Valters to Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs V. Munters about a discussion with Romania’s Envoy C. Vişoianu, 21 st<br />
February, 1936<br />
Today I had a lengthy discussion with Romania’s new Envoy in Warsaw Mr. Constantin<br />
Vişoianu, who has already managed to make a few observations here. The new Envoy is much<br />
more open than <strong>the</strong> previous one and everybody who has talked to him has got <strong>the</strong> same<br />
1<br />
Domāta noslēpumaina, neskaidra (angļu val. misterious – noslēpumains).<br />
2<br />
Lielbritānijas vēstnieks Polijā Hovards Viljams Kenards (Kennard; 1878–1955).<br />
3<br />
Marians Koscjalkovskis-Zindrams (Kościałkowski-Zyndram; 1892–1946), Polijas un Viduslietuvas armijas<br />
apakšpulkvedis, valstsvīrs. 1934.–1935. g. iekšlietu ministrs, 1935.–1936. g. premjerministrs, 1936.–1939. g.<br />
sabiedriskās aprūpes ministrs.
308 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
impression. He counts as one of <strong>the</strong> closest collaborators of Romania’s Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs Titulescu. In our discussion we turned right away to Gӧring’s 1 visit to Warsaw and<br />
through that came to <strong>the</strong> general issue of Poland’s policy vis-à-vis Germany. According to <strong>the</strong><br />
Envoy, Gӧring’s visit should not be attributed special attention in <strong>the</strong> sense of expecting from<br />
this visit any practical result or political measures. Poland continues <strong>the</strong> policy of manoeuvring<br />
that it had pursued over <strong>the</strong> recent years, but [<strong>the</strong> Envoy thinks] a question should be asked<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r such policy can give any good result for Poland itself. “I have now talked,” so <strong>the</strong> Envoy<br />
said, “to all <strong>the</strong> colleagues in <strong>the</strong> local <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps, one after <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, and I have now<br />
condensed [developed] a ra<strong>the</strong>r concrete impression. I have got <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong>y all are<br />
of completely <strong>the</strong> same opinion about Poland’s policy. Poland wants to be regarded as being<br />
absolutely independent in its foreign policy, but <strong>the</strong> means by which it wants to achieve it do<br />
not seem to be <strong>the</strong> most correct ones. Poland’s current foreign policy does not seem transparent<br />
and understandable to anyone, it is mysterious 2 . A few days ago I went hunting with several<br />
Polish generals. We began talking about Poland’s foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> generals expressed<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir amazement that Poland’s policy was being discussed in so different ways. I replied: “But it<br />
had been Poland’s desire to have its policy evaluated in different ways and different directions<br />
to be expected from it. You all want everybody to expect something from Poland and now you<br />
are surprised that in different judgments it sounds different. But Poland wants to be mysterious<br />
and <strong>the</strong> result is that nobody can figure it out. Nobody really relies on Poland.” Of course, he<br />
did not exactly utter <strong>the</strong> latter phrases to <strong>the</strong> Polish generals; <strong>the</strong>y are to be considered as a<br />
reflexion [of <strong>the</strong>ir discussion] in our talk. Soon <strong>the</strong> Envoy returned to <strong>the</strong> same topic. “If today<br />
you asked a French person if he can rely on Poland, he would say no. You can ask <strong>the</strong> same<br />
question to us, <strong>the</strong> Romanians, or to <strong>the</strong> English – you will always get <strong>the</strong> same reply that it<br />
cannot be relied on. Recently I talked to England’s Ambassador to this country. 3 His reply did<br />
not differ from that of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs at all, he just made a helpless gesture and added and nobody<br />
understood Poland’s policy. For us, Poland’s military allies, such question is particularly<br />
important and we need to know exactly what <strong>the</strong> actual Polish–German <strong>relations</strong> are like. We<br />
do not know it. Nei<strong>the</strong>r does France. By its current policy Poland is playing a game, today it<br />
wants to be good to <strong>the</strong> Germans, tomorrow – to <strong>the</strong> French and so on and so forth. The only<br />
thing that Poland achieves by such policy is distrust and failure to come to complete peace and<br />
consolidation, particularly in <strong>the</strong> east of Europe.” Such was <strong>the</strong> substance of <strong>the</strong> statements of<br />
<strong>the</strong> new Envoy of Romania. He showed interest in our <strong>relations</strong> with Soviet Russia, that<br />
according to information at his disposal were not bad and he stated that <strong>the</strong> same could be said<br />
about <strong>the</strong> current contacts between Romania and Russia. Shortly after <strong>the</strong> discussion with<br />
Romania’s Envoy I had a chance to return to <strong>the</strong> same issues in a different discussion, which<br />
was closely associated with <strong>the</strong> Embassy of France. The general judgment on Gӧring’s visit is<br />
that it is a piece of <strong>the</strong> usual Polish tactics. That at <strong>the</strong> same time large-scale arrest of ethnic<br />
Germans had taken place in Upper Silesia, it is again only a game of balance. They here want to<br />
demonstrate that contacts with Germany do not put restrictions on <strong>the</strong> Polish government’s<br />
position with regard to political behaviour in <strong>the</strong>ir own country. The secret German<br />
1<br />
Hermann Wilhelm Göring (1893–1946), Reichsmarschall of Germany (1940), statesman. From 1932 Chairman of<br />
Reichstag, from 1933 Reich Minister without a post, Prime Minister of Prussia, from 1933 Reich Minister of<br />
Aviation, from 1935 commander-in-chief of <strong>the</strong> Luftwaffe (air-force).<br />
2<br />
This word is of <strong>the</strong> Envoy’s own choosing and was placed by him in <strong>the</strong> Latvian text (translator’s note).<br />
3<br />
Ambassador of Great Britain to Poland Howard William Kennard (1878–1955).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 309<br />
organisation, which was disclosed in Upper Silesia, is said to have been larger that expected. Its<br />
membership is said to have amounted to 4000. In <strong>the</strong> last few days rumours have spread that<br />
after his trip to Brussels Minister Beck will go to Belgrade, but Prime Minister Kościałkowski 1<br />
will pay a return visit to Budapest [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 1900, s. 49–51.<br />
115. Telegrama ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Constantin<br />
Văllimărescu nr. 295 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Titulescu, 10<br />
iunie 1936<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine ad-interim mi-a afirmat adânca simpatie pe care Letonia o are<br />
pentru Mica Înțelegere al cărei exemplu l-au urmat Statele Baltice întemeind Uniunea Baltică,<br />
adăugând că Letonia nu se îndoiește de vigoarea și coeziunea Micii Înțelegeri în care vede<br />
nucleul unui bloc grupând statele mici și mijlocii din Europa, animate de dorința menținerii<br />
păcii și a statu-quoului european.<br />
Mi-a repetat apoi sugestia ce mi-a comunicat-o Dl. Munters și pe care am transmis-o prin<br />
telegrama mea nr. 242, cu privire la o manifestație de solidaritate a statelor mici și mijlocii din<br />
Europa printr-o întrunire ce ar putea avea loc la Geneva cu prilejul viitoarei reuniuni a Adunării<br />
Societății Națiunilor.<br />
S-ar pune în evidență prin această manifestație că statele în chestiune sunt conștiente de<br />
drepturile lor câștigate, nu se poate decide nimic cu privire la ele fără avizul lor și că reprezintă<br />
laolaltă o forță morală care nu poate fi neglijată.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 120-121.<br />
115. Telegram no. 295 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga Constantin<br />
Văllimărescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu, 10 th June<br />
1936<br />
The Minister of Foreign Affairs ad-interim assured me of <strong>the</strong> deep sympathy of Latvia for <strong>the</strong><br />
Little Entente, which is an example followed by <strong>the</strong> Baltic States which founded <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
Union, adding that Latvia does not doubt <strong>the</strong> vigour and <strong>the</strong> cohesion of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente, in<br />
which it sees <strong>the</strong> nucleus of a block grouping small and medium states from Europe, animated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> wish of maintaining peace and <strong>the</strong> European statu-quo.<br />
Then he reiterated <strong>the</strong> suggestion made by Mr. Munters, which I communicated in my<br />
telegram no. 242 regarding a solidarily manifestation of <strong>the</strong> small and medium states in Europe<br />
through a reunion that could take place in Geneva on <strong>the</strong> future reunion of <strong>the</strong> Assembly of <strong>the</strong><br />
League of Nations.<br />
This manifestation would point out that <strong>the</strong> concerning states are aware of <strong>the</strong>ir earned<br />
rights, nothing can be decided regarding <strong>the</strong>m without <strong>the</strong>ir approval, and that <strong>the</strong>y represent a<br />
moral force that cannot be neglected.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 120-121.<br />
1<br />
Marian Kościałkowski-Zyndram (1892–1946), Colonel-Lieutenant of <strong>the</strong> Army of Poland and Central Lithuania,<br />
statesman. 1934–1935 Minister of Interior, 1935–1936 Prime Minister, 1936–1939 Minister of Social Welfare.
310 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
116. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1936. gada 22. okt. ziņojums ārlietu ministram<br />
V. Munteram<br />
Šodien bija pie manis atvadīšanās vizītē līdzšinējais Rumānijas sūtnis Varšavā Visoianu. Šī<br />
vizīte bija diezgan pēkšņas dabas, jo pēc tam, kad bija notikušas pārmaiņas Rumānijas ārlietu<br />
vadībā, gan runāja par dažu Rumānijas sūtņu demisiju, pie kam minēja arī šejienes sūtni, tomēr<br />
likās viss nokārtojamies. Tagad pēkšņi sūtnis dabūjis paziņojumu, ka viņa demisiju, kuru tas<br />
iesniedzis jau agrāk, pieņem. Sūtnis ved to sakarā ar jaunā Rumānijas ārlietu ministra<br />
Antonesku braucienu uz Varšavu, kas nodomāts pašā tuvākā laikā. Vai tik ātri, kā tas ticis teikts,<br />
tas gan apšaubāms, bet katrā ziņā pārmaiņu grib te pasteidzināt, lai jaunais sūtnis būtu jau te<br />
ierīkojies, kad ieradīsies Antonesku. Sūtnis Visoianu bija viens no tuvākiem līdzstrādniekiem<br />
Titulesku un Titulesku pats viņu uzrakstīja par savu draugu. Nupat vēl Visoianu bijis Sankt-<br />
Moricā pie Tilulesku, kurš tikai pamazām atkopjoties. Tikai tagad viņš sācis staigāt. Sarunās ar<br />
Titulesku Visoianu guvis pārliecību, ka tagadējais stāvoklis Rumānijas ārlietu politikas vadībā<br />
nebūšot paliekošs, lai gan nevarot teikt, kad Titulesku atgriezīsies atklātā darbībā, vai nu kā<br />
ārlietu ministrs, vai arī varbūt kā valdības vadītājs. Kādas bijušas intrigas, kas panākušas, ka<br />
Titulesku palicis ārpus valdības, par to vēl neesot pilna skaidrība. Tiktāl gan zinot, ka tagadējais<br />
Ministru prezidents Tataresku bijis pret Titulesku ieiešanu kabinetā, uzsvērdams, ka viņam esot<br />
bijušas vienmēr grūtības ar Titulesku iebildumiem un ierunām Rumānijas iekšējā politikā.<br />
Karalis no savas puses licis Titulesku paskaidrot, ka viņš vienmēr bijis apmierināts ar Titulesku<br />
politiku un, ka no viņa puses neesot nekas ticis darīts, lai Titulesku paliktu ārpus kabineta.<br />
Sūtnis Visoianu izteicās, ka tiklab Tataresku, kā karalis, abi spēlējuši drusku neatklāti un, ka<br />
katrs no viņiem tagad it kā taisnojas, apzinoties, ka Titulesku autoritāte liela un, ka agrāk vai<br />
vēlāk būs nepieciešams pie tā atgriezties. Karaļa nodoms esot panākt, ka valdība novirzās vairāk<br />
uz galējo pusi, bet viņš zinot, ka Titulesku, kad tas atradīsies kabinetā, būs tam pretim. Ka<br />
Rumānija varētu mainīt savu ārpolitisko līniju, tas neesot iedomājams. Beļģijas karaļa<br />
deklarētais stāvoklis nemaz nenozīmē neitralitāti un vēl šinīs dienās Visoianu runājis ar Beļģijas<br />
sūtni Paternotu 1 par Beļģijas jauno politiku un Paternots pateicis, ka Beļģijas karaļa deklarācijai<br />
praktiskā nebūšot nekādas lielas nozīmes. No Paternota izteicieniem Visoianu sapratis, ka<br />
Anglija darot spiedienu uz Beļģiju. Beļģija gribot, tā Paternots teicis, tagad spēlēt uz Anglijas<br />
pusi, ar angļu kārti, bet vai tas izdosies, kā to domājuši Beļģijā, tas liels jautājums. No citas kādas<br />
puses Visoianu dzirdējis, ka Beļģijai likuši saprast, ja tā vēlas ieņemt citu stāvokli, atsavrupāku, 2<br />
kas mazāk rēķinātos ar Lielbritānijas interesēm, tad Lielbritānijai nevarot būt arī nekādas<br />
intereses pie Beļģijas koloniju stāvokļa. Atļaujos piemetināt te, ka no kādas citas puses dzirdēju,<br />
ka franči likuši beļģiem to pašu saprast. Tagad beļģi jūtas piespiesti, tā piezīmē Visoianu, dot<br />
karaļa deklarācijai interpretāciju, kas iznīcina gandrīz pilnīgi pašu deklarāciju. Polijā tagad<br />
runājot, ka Rumānija sekos Beļģijas piemēram. To nevarot iedomāties, jeb varbūt tikai tādā<br />
veidā, ka visa Mazā Antante nostājas citādi un deklarē kopīgi neitrālas politikas principu. Vai tas<br />
ko varētu dot Mazai Antantei, par to jāšaubās. Par šejienes ministrijas ieskatiem Visoianu<br />
izteicās, ka nedraudzība pret Titulesku pastāvot vēl vienmēr tāpat kā agrāk. Tās esot pilnīgi<br />
personīgas lietas, sajūtas, kuras spēlē šejienes ārlietu vadībā lielu lomu. Jums jau laikam zināms,<br />
atļaujat piemetināt, ka bez pārmaiņas, kas notiek te, paredzēta pārmaiņa arī Rīgā. Uz Rīgu esot<br />
nozīmēts tagadējais Rumānijas sūtnis Sofijā. Papriekšu šim bijis domāts postenis Londonā, bet<br />
1<br />
Aleksandrs Paternots de la Vailē (Paternotte de la Vailée), Beļģijas diplomāts. 1936.–1939. g. sūtnis Polijā.<br />
2<br />
Atsavrupāks – domāts patstāvīgāks.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 311<br />
tad pēkšņi nācis cits lēmums. Visoianu pazīstot viņu kā labu darbinieku, ļoti inteliģentu un<br />
aktīvu. Sarunas beigās uznācām uz poļu preses stāvokli Beļģijas deklarācijas jautājumā. No šīs<br />
izteicieniem var saprast, ka Polija nostājas pilnīgi uz viedokļa, ka deklarācija un tās paredzētā<br />
politika atbilst Polijas ieskatiem, uz ko norāda Ārlietu ministrijai tuvu stāvošās aģentūras<br />
šodienējais ziņojums. Tam ierādīta redzama vieta. Starp citu, tajā uzsvērts, ka ir nepieciešams<br />
dzīves dinamikai piegriezt lielāku vērību, bet ne juridiskām formām, ka vajadzīgs katrai valstij<br />
vērot tikai savu stāvokli, bet nevarot vēl sacīt, Beļģija ar savu deklarāciju vien būtu radījusi jau<br />
kādu neitrālu stāvokli. Neitralitātes deklarācija esot tikai norādījums uz tālāko Beļģijas politisko<br />
virzienu.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 1900. l., 222.–224. lp.<br />
116. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 22 nd October 1936<br />
Today Romania’s Envoy in Warsaw Vişoianu came to me on a farewell visit. It was a ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
sudden visit because after changes had occurred in <strong>the</strong> administration of Romania’s foreign<br />
affairs, resignation of some Romania’s envoys was indeed discussed, <strong>the</strong> Envoy to this country<br />
was also mentioned, yet everything seemed to get settled. Then <strong>the</strong> Envoy had suddenly<br />
received a notice that his resignation, which he had handed in earlier, had been accepted. The<br />
Envoy has done it in <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> visit of Romania’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
Antonescu to Warsaw that has to take place in <strong>the</strong> very near future. Whe<strong>the</strong>r it will happen as<br />
soon as it has been announced is doubtful, but anyway <strong>the</strong>y want to precipitate <strong>the</strong> change [of<br />
envoys] here, so that <strong>the</strong> new envoy is already settled in when Antonescu comes. Envoy<br />
Vişoianu was one of <strong>the</strong> closest Titulescu’s collaborators and Titulescu himself described him as<br />
his friend. Quite recently Vişoianu visited Titulescu in Saint-Moriz where <strong>the</strong> latter is only<br />
slowly recovering. He has risen from bed only recently. From his talk with Titulescu Vişoianu<br />
has become sure that <strong>the</strong> current situation in <strong>the</strong> administration of Romania’s foreign policy<br />
will not be permanent although one cannot know when Titulescu will return to active work<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r as Minister of Foreign Affairs or probably as <strong>the</strong> head of government. It is not completely<br />
clear yet by what kind of plots it has been achieved that Titulescu remains outside <strong>the</strong><br />
government. But that much is known that current Prime Minister Tătărescu 1 has been against<br />
Titulescu’s inclusion in <strong>the</strong> cabinet [of ministers], underlining that he had always had<br />
difficulties with Titulescu’s objections and arguments pertaining to Romania’s domestic policy.<br />
The King on his part had it explained to Titulescu that he had always been satisfied with<br />
Titulescu’s policy and that nothing had been done from his part for Titulescu to remain outside<br />
<strong>the</strong> cabinet [of ministers]. The Envoy said that both Tătărescu and <strong>the</strong> King had played a little<br />
non-openly and that now each of <strong>the</strong>m as if were making excuses, being aware that Titulescu’s<br />
authority was high and that sooner or later this issue would have to be readdressed. The King’s<br />
intention is [so <strong>the</strong> Envoy thinks] to have <strong>the</strong> government incline more towards <strong>the</strong> extreme<br />
side, but he knows that Titulescu, when he is part of <strong>the</strong> cabinet [of ministers] will be against it.<br />
The Envoy said he could not imagine Romania changing its foreign policy course. The status<br />
that <strong>the</strong> King of Belgium has declared does not mean neutrality at all and <strong>the</strong>se days Vişoianu<br />
1<br />
Gheorghe Tătărescu (1866-1957) was a Romanian liberal politician and diplomat, President of <strong>the</strong> Council of<br />
Ministers (1934-1937, 1939-1940), Vice-President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1945-1947), Minister of Romania in<br />
Paris (1938-1939).
312 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
talked to Envoy of Belgium Paternotte 1 on Belgium’s new policy and Paternotte had remarked<br />
that <strong>the</strong> declaration by <strong>the</strong> King of Belgium would have no great practical significance. Vişoianu<br />
had derived from Paternotte’s statements that England exerted pressure on Belgium. Belgium<br />
wanted, so Patternotte had remarked, to play on England’s side now, with <strong>the</strong> English card, but<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y would succeed <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>y in Belgium expected, that was a big question. From a<br />
different source Vişoianu has heard that Belgium had been made to understand that if it wishes<br />
to take a different position, a more independent one reckoning less with <strong>the</strong> interests of Great<br />
Britain, Great Britain would show no interest in <strong>the</strong> condition of Belgium’s colonies ei<strong>the</strong>r. I<br />
take <strong>the</strong> liberty of adding that I heard from a different source that <strong>the</strong> French had given <strong>the</strong><br />
Belgians <strong>the</strong> same sort of message. According to Vişoianu now <strong>the</strong> Belgians felt pressed to<br />
provide an interpretation of <strong>the</strong> King’s declaration that almost fully annul <strong>the</strong> declaration itself.<br />
In Poland <strong>the</strong>y say now that Romania will follow Belgium’s example. Vişoianu said he could not<br />
picture it, except only if <strong>the</strong> entire Little Entente took a different position and jointly declared<br />
<strong>the</strong> principle of neutral policy. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Little Entente can benefit anything from it, is to be<br />
doubted. Concerning <strong>the</strong> attitude of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of this country [Poland], Vişoianu remarked<br />
that [its] unfriendliness towards Titulescu persisted as before. [He said that] it was due to<br />
absolutely personal matters, to feelings that played a great role in <strong>the</strong> administration of foreign<br />
affairs of this country. You probably already know, I take <strong>the</strong> liberty of adding, that apart from<br />
<strong>the</strong> change taking place here, a change in Riga is also anticipated. They say that <strong>the</strong> current<br />
Romania’s Envoy in Sofia has been transferred to Riga. Initially <strong>the</strong> position in London was<br />
intended for him, but <strong>the</strong>n suddenly a different decision was made. Vişoianu knows him as a<br />
good employee, very intelligent and active. At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> discussion we addressed <strong>the</strong><br />
position of <strong>the</strong> Polish press on <strong>the</strong> issue of Belgium’s declaration. From its [press] statements it<br />
can be derived that Poland fully believes that <strong>the</strong> declaration and <strong>the</strong> policy that it envisages<br />
fully comply with Poland’s position as pointed out in a statement by an agency, which has close<br />
ties with <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is attributed much attention. Among o<strong>the</strong>r things it<br />
[<strong>the</strong> agency’s statement] underlines that more attention should be attributed to <strong>the</strong> dynamics<br />
of life ra<strong>the</strong>r than to judicial forms, that each country should mind its own position only but<br />
that it cannot be said yet that by its declaration alone Belgium has already acquired a neutral<br />
status. The declaration of neutrality is seen as only a signal of <strong>the</strong> political direction that<br />
Belgium intends to pursue in <strong>the</strong> future.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 1900, s. 222–224.<br />
117. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1936. g. 26. nov. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Lielu ievērību piegriež Rumānijas ārlietu ministra Antonesku vizītei Varšavā. Par to bija<br />
gadījums vakar sarunāties Anglijas vēstniecībā un pie Grieķijas sūtņa. 2 Visi uzsver, ka<br />
Antonesku centīsies atjaunot agrāko draudzību starp Rumāniju un Poliju, kas Titulesku laikā<br />
bija cietusi. Esmu ārlietu ministrijā te dzirdējis vārdus par Titulesku personu un viņa politiku,<br />
kas neskanēja glaimīgi. Bijušā ārlietu ministra lomu tēloja kā atkarīgu no starptautiskām<br />
veikalnieku aprindām, sevišķi bankām Parīzē. Tagad pēc Titulesku aiziešanas, varēja tūdaļ<br />
manīt pārmaiņas šejienes jūtās. Patiesībā Titulesku laikā no šejienes centās vienmēr paturēt<br />
1<br />
Alexandre Paternotte de la Vailée, Belgian diplomat. 1936– 1939 Envoy to Poland.<br />
2<br />
Grieķijas sūtnis Polijā 1935.–1939. g. bija Kimons Kolass (Kóllas), kurš no 1937. g. bija akreditēts arī Latvijā.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 313<br />
labus sakarus ar aprindām, kas Bukarestē atrodas karaļa tuvumā, ko esmu varējis novērot<br />
dažādās sarunās ministrijā. Ar Antonesku iestāšanos valdībā šie sakari atjaunoti vēl plašākos<br />
apmēros, Rumānijas sūtnim Varšavā, kas stāvēja tuvu Titulesku, vajadzēja aiziet, kā arī citiem<br />
sūtņiem, kā piemēram: Vīnē, Rīgā, lai jaunie sakari būtu neatkarīgāki no agrākās politikas.<br />
Jaunais ārlietu ministrs grib visiem spēkiem atgriezties pie agrākā draudzīgā stāvokļa, un varētu<br />
varbūt teikt, ka viņa pirmie soļi tai ziņā bijuši pat pārāk spilgti, kā to aprāda šejienes<br />
diplomātiskajā korpusā, kas tādā spilgtumā redz zināmu vājību un nepietiekošu taktisku<br />
apsvērumu. Antonesku presei ir devis paskaidrojumus par savu vizīti Varšavā, kuros uzsvērts,<br />
ka Rumānija ieskata Poliju par svarīgu lielvalsti austrumos, un, ka tiklab Rumānija, kā Polija<br />
centīšoties sadarboties vēl vairāk pastiprināt stāvokli, kas piekristu lielai valstij austrumos un<br />
austrumu politikā. Bez tam Antonesku uzsvēris, ka Rumānija ir pret katru revizionistisku<br />
politiku un, ka Polija stāvot uz tāda paša viedokļa. Izteicienos, kas zīmējas uz Maskavu,<br />
Antonesku bijis atturīgāks nekā šejienes aprindas, no kurām inspirēti apcerējumi presē un<br />
kuros teikts, ka Antonesku iesākšot daudz neatkarīgāku no Maskavas politiku, nekā tas bijis<br />
Titulesku laikā. Te paspīd zināma ieskaņa, kas, bez šaubām, būs dzirdēta Maskavā un par kuru<br />
varētu teikt, ka tā parādās tagad asāki, nekā visu pēdējo laiku. Visos apcerējumos, kas atrodas<br />
presē, uzsver, ka Polijas – Rumānijas savienība atrodas abu valstu tradīcijās un, ka šī savienība<br />
nodomāta abu valstu aizsardzībai. Abas valstis ir pret imperiālistiskām tendencēm, grib<br />
pasargāt mieru, abas var iespaidot starptautiskā laukā notikumu gaitu austrumos un<br />
Viduseiropā. Neviens no viņām negrib iejaukties citu valstu dzīvē, bet tās nevar paiet garām<br />
starptautiskām aktuālām problēmām. Mirušais maršals Pilsudskis 1 licis lielu svaru uz draudzīgo<br />
savienību ar Rumāniju. Savienība starp Poliju un Rumāniju pamatojas uz bilaterālu nolīgumu,<br />
kas nozīmējot, ka abas ir brīvas un savienību nevarētu uzskatīt par tiltu uz Mazo Antanti, kuras<br />
iejomā Polija nemaz nedomā ieiet. Ar tādu izturēšanos Polija nedomā izrādīt kādu nelabvēlīgu<br />
jūtu pret Mazās Antantes bloku, bet tikai liek saprast, ka mūsu stāvoklis saskan ar mūsu tiešām<br />
interesēm. Bez tam jāuzsver, tā piemetina apcerējumos, ka tiklab Rumānija kā Polija stāvot te<br />
pret ideoloģiskiem blokiem un negrib tiem dot savu atbalstu. Saimnieciskos jautājumos, izsakās<br />
prese, ka arī tie spēlēšot sarunās lielu lomu, bez tam satiksmes kustība pa ceļu no Polijas ostām<br />
uz Rumānijas Melnās jūras piekrasti. Satiksmes ceļiem starp Gdiņu un Dancigu pie Baltijas jūras<br />
un šo piekrasti ierādāma liela nozīme un jācenšoties tos pastiprināt, izkopjot visu ceļu sistēmu<br />
starp Baltijas jūru un Melno jūru. Poļu prese pilnīgi pievienojas rumāņu preses balsīm, kas<br />
uzsver, ka Rumānijai ar Poliju piekrīt zināma svarīga loma joslā, kas šķir Padomju Krieviju no<br />
Vācijas. Pēc sarunām Londonā Polija esot vēl vairāk sapratusi šo lomu un atzinusi to par<br />
pareizu, ka nepieciešams radīt neitrālu barjeru, kas šķirtu vienu no otras naidīgās puses. Poļu<br />
prese gan šai sakarā mazāk uzsver, ka pie tādas lomas joslas stāvoklī piedalās ar savu atbalstu<br />
Francija un Anglija. To vairāk izceļ rumāņu prese. Valdībai tuvu stāvošā prese stipri izvirza<br />
jautājumu par Rumānijas un Polijas interesēm starp Baltijas jūru un Melno jūru, kas<br />
piespiedušās 1921. gadā radīt militāro savienību starp abām valstīm. Šai Eiropas daļā, tā izteicās<br />
„Polska Zbrojna”, 2 abas valstis var spēlēt izšķirošu lomu, ieņemt noteicošu stāvokli, pie kam<br />
atkārtoti norāda uz abu valstu savienības bilaterālo raksturu, kas liek saprast, ka Polija<br />
1<br />
Juzefs Pilsudskis (Piłsudski; 1867–1935), Polijas maršals, valstsvīrs. 1918.–1922. g. Polijas Valsts galva, armijas<br />
virspavēlnieks. 1926. g. realizēja valsts apvērsumu, pēc tā faktiski diktators, ieņēma armijas ģenerālinspektora<br />
amatu, vairākkārt – kara lietu ministrs, premjerministrs.<br />
2<br />
Polska Zbrojna – Polijas Kara lietu ministrijas oficiālais dienas laikraksts 1921.–1939. g. Varšavā.
314 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
negribētu, vismaz pagaidām nē, rādīt vēlēšanos pieslieties tuvāk Mazās Antantes blokam. Man<br />
bija gods Jums vakarējā ziņojumā ieminēties par šo jautājumu sakarā ar sarunu, kas man bija ar<br />
Čehoslovākijas sūtni Dr. Slaviku, 1 no kura izteicieniem varēja saprast, ka Mazās Antantes valstis,<br />
vienā vai otrā veidā, gribētu uzņemt sakarus ar Poliju tās centienos panākt jaunā rietumpaktā<br />
austrumpuses drošības ievērošanu. No balsīm presē var vērot, ka pret tādu nodomu pastāv<br />
zināms vēsums. No Čehoslovākijas sūtņa dzirdēju, ka Antonesku noturēs te mazu apspriedi,<br />
kurā piedalīsies Mazās Antantes valstis, bez tam Francija, un kurā Antonesku informēs sūtņus<br />
[kopā] ar [Francijas] vēstnieku par sarunām te Varšavā.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 1900. l., 220.–221. lp.<br />
117. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 26 th November 1936<br />
The visit of Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonescu to Warsaw is attributed great<br />
attention. Yesterday I had <strong>the</strong> chance to talk about it in England’s Embassy and with <strong>the</strong> Envoy<br />
of Greece 2 . Everybody underlines that Antonescu will try to restore <strong>the</strong> earlier friendship<br />
between Romania and Poland that has suffered under Titulescu. Here in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs I have heard words about <strong>the</strong> person of Titulescu and his policy that were not flattering.<br />
The role of <strong>the</strong> former Minister of Foreign Affairs was presented as dependant on international<br />
business circles, particularly on banks in Paris. Right after Titulescu left, changes in <strong>the</strong> feelings<br />
[attitude] here became evident. In fact during Titulescu’s time <strong>the</strong>y here always tried to<br />
maintain good contacts with <strong>the</strong> circles, which stand close to <strong>the</strong> King in Bucharest, as much as<br />
I have been able to observe in different discussions in <strong>the</strong> Ministry. With Antonescu’s entering<br />
<strong>the</strong> government <strong>the</strong>se contacts have been restored on an even larger scale, Romania’s Envoy in<br />
Warsaw who stood close to Titulescu as well as o<strong>the</strong>r envoys, for example those in Vienna and<br />
in Riga, had to go in order to make <strong>the</strong> new contacts less dependent on <strong>the</strong> former policy. The<br />
new Minister of Foreign Affairs wants to do his utmost to restore <strong>the</strong> friendly situation that<br />
used to exist earlier and it can probably be said that his first steps in that direction have been<br />
too striking, as is remarked in <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps here, which in such striking-ness see certain<br />
weakness and insufficient tactical consideration. Antonescu made explanations to <strong>the</strong> press<br />
about his visit to Warsaw underlining that Romania regarded Poland as an important power in<br />
<strong>the</strong> east and that both Romania and Poland would try to co-operate in order to consolidate <strong>the</strong><br />
position that behoved a large country in <strong>the</strong> east and in eastern policy. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, Antonescu<br />
emphasised that Romania was against any sort of revisionist policy and that Poland was of <strong>the</strong><br />
same opinion. In his statements vis-à-vis Moscow Antonescu has been more reserved than <strong>the</strong><br />
local public, which has inspired articles in <strong>the</strong> press that say that Antonescu will launch a policy<br />
much more independent from Moscow than it had been in Titulescu’s time. A certain prelude<br />
can be noticed here that, no doubt, will be heard in Moscow and about which it can be said that<br />
now it is keener than it has been lately. All articles in <strong>the</strong> press underline that Poland–Romania<br />
union is in <strong>the</strong> tradition of both states and that this union is meant to serve <strong>the</strong> defence of both<br />
states. Both states are against imperialist trends, want to safeguard peace, <strong>the</strong>y both can<br />
influence <strong>the</strong> course of developments in international arena in <strong>the</strong> east and in Central Europe.<br />
None of <strong>the</strong> states wants to intervene in <strong>the</strong> internal life of o<strong>the</strong>r states, but <strong>the</strong>y cannot ignore<br />
1<br />
Jurajs Slaviks (Slávik; 1890–1969), Čehoslovākijas valstsvīrs, diplomāts. 1936.–1939. g. sūtnis Polijā.<br />
2<br />
In 1935–1939 <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Greece to Poland was Kimon Kóllas, who in 1937 became accredited also in Latvia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 315<br />
topical international problems [<strong>the</strong> newspapers write]. Deceased Marshal Piłsudski 1 attributed<br />
great importance to <strong>the</strong> friendly union with Romania. Union between Poland and Romania<br />
builds on a bilateral agreement which means that both are free countries and <strong>the</strong> union cannot<br />
be regarded as a bridge to <strong>the</strong> Little Entente, <strong>the</strong> framework of which Poland does not intend to<br />
enter. With such behaviour Poland does not mean to display any unfavourable feelings towards<br />
<strong>the</strong> bloc of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente, but only sends <strong>the</strong> message that our situation matches our direct<br />
interests. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore it should be underlined, so it is added in <strong>the</strong> press articles, that both<br />
Romania and Poland stand against ideological blocs and do not want to support <strong>the</strong>m. The<br />
press says that economic issues, too, will play an important role in <strong>the</strong> discussions, as well as<br />
road traffic from Poland’s ports to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea shore of Romania. The communication roads<br />
between Gdynia and Danzig on <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea should be attributed great importance and <strong>the</strong>y<br />
should be consolidated by cultivating <strong>the</strong> entire system of roads between <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea and <strong>the</strong><br />
Black Sea.<br />
The Polish press fully joins in <strong>the</strong> voices of <strong>the</strong> Romanian press, which underline that<br />
Romania and Poland play an important role in <strong>the</strong> belt that divides Soviet Russia from<br />
Germany. After <strong>the</strong> discussions in London Poland has realised this role even better and come to<br />
<strong>the</strong> conclusion that it is necessary to create a neutral barrier, which would divide <strong>the</strong> hostile<br />
parties. In this connection however <strong>the</strong> Polish press underlines to a much lesser degree that in<br />
this role of <strong>the</strong> belt France and England should also take part with <strong>the</strong>ir support. The Romanian<br />
press underlines this aspect to a larger degree. The press that stand close to <strong>the</strong> government<br />
pays much attention to <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> interests of Romania and Poland in <strong>the</strong> territory<br />
between <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea and <strong>the</strong> Black Sea that had forced both states to conclude a military<br />
alliance in 1921. In this part of Europe, as remarked „Polska Zbrojna” 2 , both states can play a<br />
decisive role, take a decisive position, fur<strong>the</strong>rmore <strong>the</strong> bilateral character of <strong>the</strong> union of <strong>the</strong><br />
two states is pointed out thus sending <strong>the</strong> message that Poland does not want, at least for <strong>the</strong><br />
time being, to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> wish of approaching closer <strong>the</strong> bloc of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente. I had<br />
<strong>the</strong> honour to mention to you this issue in my yesterday’s report in <strong>the</strong> context of my discussion<br />
with Envoy of Czechoslovakia Dr. Slavik 3 , whose statements allowed me to understand that <strong>the</strong><br />
countries of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente would like to establish contacts with Poland in that or o<strong>the</strong>r form<br />
with regard to <strong>the</strong> latter’s efforts to make <strong>the</strong> security of <strong>the</strong> eastern part respected in <strong>the</strong> new<br />
western pact. The voices in <strong>the</strong> press allow observing that attitude towards such intention is<br />
somewhat cool. From <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Czechoslovakia I heard that Antonescu would hold a small<br />
conference here with <strong>the</strong> participation of <strong>the</strong> states of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente and also France and<br />
that in this conference Antonescu would inform Envoys and <strong>the</strong> Ambassador about <strong>the</strong><br />
discussions here in Warsaw.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 1900, s. 220–221.<br />
1<br />
Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), Marshal of Poland, statesman. 1918–1922 Head of state of Poland, Supreme<br />
Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army. In 1926 he launched a coup d’etat and after that was a factual dictator, he has been<br />
Inspector General of <strong>the</strong> Army, several times – Minister of War Affairs, Prime Minister.<br />
2<br />
„Polska Zbrojna” – official daily newspaper of Poland’s Ministry of War Affairs, issued in Warsaw in 1921–1939.<br />
3<br />
Juraj Slávik (1890–1969), Czechoslovakian statesman and diplomat. 1936 –1939 Envoy to Poland.
316 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
118. Telegrama ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Vasile Stoica 1 nr. 86<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Victor Antonescu, 27 februarie 1937<br />
Sosit la Riga la 8 februarie am fost primit în gară de Dl. Olavs 2 , directorul protocolului din<br />
ministerul de externe, dl. Teodor Scorțescu, însărcinatul nostru cu afaceri și de dl. Percy<br />
Zimmerman 3 , consulul nostru onorific în acest oraș.<br />
A doua zi, am fost solicitat de reprezentații presei locale și baltice să le fac unele declarații<br />
despre misiunea mea aici. Interviul meu a fost în linii generale următorul:<br />
„Am acceptat cu plăcere numirea mea în Letonia. Motivele mele au fost unul subiectiv, altul<br />
obiectiv. Primul motiv a fost de caracter subiectiv: sunt transilvănean, prin urmare fost supus<br />
ungur; am luptat, ca voluntar, în cadrele armatei române, apoi în cele ale armatei franceze<br />
pentru liberarea patriei mele de sub dominația ungurească. E deci foarte natural ca un om care<br />
a luptat pentru libertatea patriei sale să aibă o profundă simpatie pentru un popor care, de<br />
asemenea, a trăit sub un jug străin și a trebuit să lupte pentru a-și recuceri independența.<br />
Numai cei care au îndurat stăpâniri străine și care au vărsat sânge pentru independența lor știu<br />
într-adevăr ce însemnă libertatea.<br />
Al doilea motiv a fost de caracter obiectiv: există astăzi în viața internațională atâtea curente<br />
și agitații care tulbură și amenință liniștea și chiar existența statelor mijlocii și mici; în special<br />
ale celor dintre Marea Baltică, Marea Neagră și Egee. Aceste națiuni sunt datoare, în propriul lor<br />
interes, nu numai să mențină bunele lor relațiile de până acum, ci totodată să intensifice și să<br />
adâncească aceste relații. Va trebui ca aceste state să ajungă la o colaborare francă și amicală pe<br />
terenul internațional, sprijinindu-se reciproc pentru păstrarea independenței lor naționale și<br />
politice.”<br />
Am adăugat impresiile excelente ce mi-a făcut Letonia de la frontiera polonă până la Riga și<br />
convingerea că numai libertatea deplină oferă unei națiuni posibilitatea de a da deplina măsură<br />
a forțelor și capacităților sale.<br />
A patra zi, în 11 februarie, am avut o lungă întrevedere cu dl. Vilhelms Munters, ministrul<br />
afacerilor externe, pentru stabilirea audienței de prezentare a scrisorilor mele de acreditare.<br />
Domnia sa m-a rugat să arăt Excelenței Voastre mulțumirile guvernului leton pentru<br />
trimiterea mea la acest post. Mi-a exprimat apoi mulțumirile sale pentru declarațiile ce am făcut<br />
presei; în special pentru accentuarea necesității unei apropieri și colaborări a statelor din zona<br />
dintre Marea Baltică și Marea Neagră, care e întru toate în vederile guvernului leton. Mi-a<br />
declarant, de asemenea, că, având ocazia de a vedea pe Excelența Voastră în luna ianuarie la<br />
Geneva, a rămas cu impresia că Excelența Voastră, de asemenea, ar privi cu ochi buni această<br />
apropiere. A rămas să reluăm conversația asupra acestui subiect ceva mai târziu, după ce voi fi<br />
trecut prin formalitățile prezentărilor la Președintele Republicii.<br />
Dl. Munters mi-a făcut apoi o expunere succintă a situației din Letonia și a legăturilor<br />
internaționale ale acestei țări, insistând în special asupra neutralității absolute a ei și a<br />
Înțelegerii Baltice în antagonismul dintre Rusia și Germania.<br />
Scrisorile de acreditare le-am putut prezenta Președintelui Kārlis Ulmanis în 24 februarie.<br />
1<br />
Vasile Stoica (1889-1959) a fost jurnalist și diplomat român, Ministru al României în Albania (1930-1932), Bulgaria<br />
(1932-1936), Țările Baltice (1937-1939), Ambasador în Turcia (1939-1940), Subsecretar de stat la Propagandă (numit<br />
în 1940), Secretar General al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine (1945-1946). Ministru al României în Olanda și Belgia<br />
(1946-1947). A decedat în închisoarea comunistă de la Jilava.<br />
2<br />
Vilis Olavs (1902-1944) a servit ca Director al Diviziei Administrativă și de Protocol între anii 1936-1940.<br />
3<br />
Alexandre Percy von Zimmerman (născut 1883) a fost consulul României la Riga în perioada 1930-1940.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 317<br />
Primirea s-a făcut cu ceremonialul obișnuit și destul de riguros. Alocațiunea mea am ținut-o<br />
în limba franceză; Președintele mi-a răspuns în limba letonă.<br />
În alocațiunea mea am zis printre altele următoarele:<br />
„Sunt deosebit de fericit de misiunea ce Maiestatea Sa s-a îndurat să-mi încredințeze. Pentru<br />
un român nu poate fi misiune mai plăcută decât să își reprezinte țara în mijlocul unei națiuni<br />
care, asemeni națiunii române, a luptat secole îndelungate pentru libertate și care în fine, cu<br />
prețul unor sacrificii fără număr, a triumfat asupra dominației străine.<br />
Idealul de dreptate și de drept de care țările noastre au fost totdeauna animate le-a așezat,<br />
după marele război, alături în marea acțiune a păcii; credincioase principiilor Societății<br />
Națiunilor, ele nu au încetat niciodată de a da întregul lor sprijin sforțărilor, care prin<br />
respectarea independenței recucerite, prin egalitatea juridică dintre națiunile mari și mici,<br />
printr-un sistem eficace de securitate colectivă, trebuie să reușească a da popoarelor pacea și<br />
bunăstarea.<br />
Din amintirile trecutului și din această colaborare în serviciul păcii au rezultat legăturile de<br />
amiciție și de perfectă înțelegere care unesc așa de armonios România și Letonia.”<br />
În răspunsul său președintele Ulmanis a zis:<br />
„Apreciez mult sentimentele de care este animată Excelența Voastră cu ocazia numirii sale<br />
la înaltul post de reprezentant oficial al României în mijlocul națiunii letone. Analogia în<br />
destinele cele două popoare ale noastre, pe care Excelența Voastră a evocat-o acum, aspirațiile<br />
lor seculare, care nu au putut fi înfăptuite decât cu prețul celor mai grave sacrificii și al sângelui<br />
celor mai buni fii ai lor vărsat în numele sfintei cauze a libertății și a independenței, au creat<br />
între ele o atmosferă de simpatie și de încredere care de la începutul independenței Letoniei a<br />
favorizat stabilirea unor relații oficiale între cele două state, precum și colaborarea concertată<br />
pusă de cele două guverne ale noastre în serviciul nobilelor principii de umanitate și echitate<br />
internațională, care singure pot asigura națiunilor pacea și fructele muncii lor. Această<br />
colaborare, sunt fericit s-o constat, s-a desfășurat întotdeauna în cea mai perfectă armonie și<br />
nici un dezacord n-a venit s-o tulbure în chestiunile internaționale a căror soluție decurge din<br />
zisele principii.”<br />
După schimbul de alocuțiuni am fost invitat de Președintele Ulmanis la o conversație<br />
particulară în biroul său, la care a luat parte și Dl. Munters. Conversația a decurs în limba<br />
engleză.<br />
Președintele m-a rugat să arăt Maiestății Sale Regelui și guvernului român recunoștința sa și<br />
a guvernului său pentru numirea făcută în persoana mea, despre care Domnia sa citise în cartea<br />
„Weltrevolution” a Președintelui Masaryk 1 și știe că în marea acțiune de propagandă desfășurată<br />
în 1918 în America am lucrat, alături de domnii Masaryk și Paderewski 2 pentru dezrobirea și<br />
colaborarea tuturor națiunilor de la Marea Baltică la Marea Neagră și Marea Egee. Mi-a cerut<br />
unele amănunte despre acțiunea noastră de atunci și mi-a mulțumit și Domnia sa pentru<br />
declarațiile ce am făcut presei care, pare-se, că au fost foarte bine primite de publicul leton.<br />
1<br />
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937) a fost politician, sociolog și filozof ceh, fondator al statului cehoslovac și<br />
președinte al acestuia (1918-1935). S-a aflat în fruntea Uniunii Europei Mediane (Mid-European Union) în S.U.A.<br />
vizând destrămarea imperiilor multinaționale, în această calitate colaborând îndeaproape cu Vasile Stoica, unul<br />
dintre liderii acesteia.<br />
2<br />
Ignacy Jan Paderewski (1860-1941) a fost pianist, compozitor, diplomat și om politic polonez, Prim Ministru și<br />
Ministru al Afacerilor Externe al Poloniei (1919). Ca și Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk și Vasile Stoica a fost implicat în<br />
activitatea Uniunii Europei Mediane (Mid-European Union).
318 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Conversația noastră a trecut apoi asupra vieții politice și economice a României, asupra<br />
școlilor și instituțiilor ei culturale. Președintele mi-a urat apoi succes în misiunea mea și m-a<br />
asigurat că personal va fi încântat să mă vadă cât mai des la Domnia sa.<br />
Am fost adus la legație cu același ceremonial ca și la ducere.<br />
După o jumătate de oră, m-am dus, însoțit de directorul protocolului și de Dl. Scorțescu, la<br />
„Cimitirul Eroilor”, omagiu de sobră, dar impresionantă arhitectură, ridicat de Letonia morților<br />
săi pentru libertate. Am fost primit la intrare de ministrul războiului, Generalul Balodis,<br />
înconjurat de comandantul garnizoanei Riga și de mai mulți ofițeri superiori. Intrând, în<br />
sunetul clopotelor pentru sufletele celor căzuți, am depus pe altar o coroană de flori cu<br />
tricolorul românesc.<br />
P.S. Anexez la acest raport textul alocațiunii mele și al răspunsului Președintelui Ulmanis. 1<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 127-131.<br />
118. Telegram no. 86 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga Vasile<br />
Stoica 2 to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Victor Antonescu, 27 th February<br />
1937<br />
After I arrived in Riga on February 8 th , I was welcomed in <strong>the</strong> train station by Mr. Olavs 3 ,<br />
Chief of <strong>the</strong> Protocol in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of External Affairs, Teodor Scorţescu, our Chargé d’Affairs<br />
and Mr. Percy Zimmerman 4 , our Honorary Consul in this city.<br />
The following day, I was called by <strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>the</strong> local and Baltic press to make<br />
statements about my mission here. My interview was generally <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
“It was my pleasure to accept my appointment in Latvia. I had two reasons: a subjective one<br />
and an objective one. The first reason was subjective: I am from Transylvania, thus a former<br />
Hungarian subject, I fought as a volunteer in <strong>the</strong> Romanian army and <strong>the</strong>n in <strong>the</strong> French army<br />
for <strong>the</strong> freedom of my mo<strong>the</strong>r country from <strong>the</strong> Hungarian domination. It is thus very natural<br />
that a man who fought for <strong>the</strong> freedom of his mo<strong>the</strong>r country may have a deep sympathy for a<br />
people that also lived under a foreign yoke and had to fight to regain independence. Only those<br />
who have endured foreign domination and that shed <strong>the</strong>ir own blood for <strong>the</strong>ir independence<br />
know what freedom truly means.<br />
The second reason was objective: in nowadays international life <strong>the</strong>re are so many currents<br />
and bustles that disturb and threaten <strong>the</strong> peace and even <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong> medium and<br />
small states; especially of <strong>the</strong> ones between <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Aegean Sea. These<br />
nations have <strong>the</strong> duty, in <strong>the</strong>ir own interest, not only to maintain <strong>the</strong>ir good <strong>relations</strong> <strong>the</strong>y<br />
benefitted from until now, but also to enhance and deepen <strong>the</strong>se <strong>relations</strong>. These states will<br />
have to reach a sincere and amicable collaboration on international ground, by supporting one<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong> maintenance of <strong>the</strong>ir national and political independence.”<br />
1<br />
Acesta nu este inclus în volumul de față.<br />
2<br />
Vasile Stoica (1889-1959) was a Romanian journalist and diplomat, Minister of Romania in Albania (1930-1932),<br />
Bulgaria (1932-1936), <strong>the</strong> Baltic States (1937-1939), Ambassador to Turkey (1939-1940), Secretary of State for<br />
Propaganda (appointed in 1940), Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1945-1946). Minister of<br />
Romania in <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands and Belgium (1946-1947). He died in <strong>the</strong> communist prison in Jilava.<br />
3<br />
Vilis Olavs (1902-1944) served as Director of Administration and Protocol Division between 1936-1940.<br />
4<br />
Alexandre Percy von Zimmerman (born 1883) was Consul of Romania in Riga during 1930-1940.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 319<br />
I added my excellent impressions about Latvia from <strong>the</strong> Polish border up to Riga and <strong>the</strong><br />
conviction that only complete freedom offers a nation <strong>the</strong> possibility of proving its maximum<br />
forces and capacities.<br />
The fourth day, on February 11 th , I had a long meeting with Mr. Vilhelms Munters, Minister<br />
of Foreign Affairs, in order to establish my hearing for <strong>the</strong> presentation of my letters of<br />
accreditation.<br />
He asked me to show Your Excellency <strong>the</strong> appreciation of <strong>the</strong> Latvian government for my<br />
assignment to this position. Then he thanked me for <strong>the</strong> statements I gave to <strong>the</strong> press;<br />
especially for emphasizing <strong>the</strong> necessity of an approach and collaboration of <strong>the</strong> states in <strong>the</strong><br />
area between <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea and <strong>the</strong> Black Sea, which is considered by <strong>the</strong> Latvian government.<br />
He also said that after his encounter with Your Excellency in Geneva in January, he understood<br />
that Your Excellency would consider this approach appropriate as well. We agreed to resume<br />
<strong>the</strong> discussion on this matter later on, after <strong>the</strong> formalities of my presentation to <strong>the</strong> President<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Republic.<br />
Afterwards, Mr. Munters told me in brief about <strong>the</strong> situation in Latvia and about <strong>the</strong><br />
international connections of this country, insisting in particular on its absolute neutrality and<br />
on <strong>the</strong> Baltic Agreement in <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> hostility between Russia and Germany.<br />
I was able to present my letters of accreditation to President Kārlis Ulmanis on<br />
February 24 th .<br />
I was received with <strong>the</strong> usual ceremonial and ra<strong>the</strong>r rigorously. I held my speech in French;<br />
<strong>the</strong> President answered in Latvian.<br />
Here is what I talked about in my speech, among o<strong>the</strong>r things:<br />
“I am extremely happy for <strong>the</strong> mission that His Majesty entrusted me. To a Romanian <strong>the</strong>re<br />
cannot be a more pleasant mission than to represent his country in <strong>the</strong> middle of a nation<br />
which, like <strong>the</strong> Romanian nation, has fought for centuries for freedom and which eventually,<br />
with <strong>the</strong> price of countless sacrifices, defeated <strong>the</strong> foreign domination.<br />
The justice and rightness ideal that has always inspired our countries brought <strong>the</strong>m toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
after <strong>the</strong> war in <strong>the</strong> great peace action; being faithful to <strong>the</strong> principles of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y have never stopped supporting <strong>the</strong> efforts that, by respecting <strong>the</strong> re-conquered<br />
independence, by legal equality of large and small nations, by an efficient system of collective<br />
safety, must succeed in giving peoples peace and welfare.<br />
The past memories and this collaboration in <strong>the</strong> service of peace resulted in <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> of<br />
friendship and perfect agreement that harmoniously unite Romania and Latvia.”<br />
President Ulmanis responded:<br />
“I truly appreciate Your Excellency’s feelings for your appointment in <strong>the</strong> high position of<br />
official representative of Romania in <strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong> Latvian nation. The analogy in <strong>the</strong><br />
destinies of our two peoples that Your Excellency has just evoked, <strong>the</strong>ir centennial aspirations,<br />
which could be achieved only with <strong>the</strong> price of <strong>the</strong> most serious sacrifices and of <strong>the</strong> blood of<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir best sons shed in <strong>the</strong> name of <strong>the</strong> sacred cause of freedom and independence created an<br />
atmosphere of sympathy and confidence, which at <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> independence of Latvia<br />
favoured <strong>the</strong> establishment of official <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two states and <strong>the</strong> agreed<br />
collaboration put by our two governments in <strong>the</strong> service of <strong>the</strong> noble humanity and<br />
international equity principles, which are <strong>the</strong> only ones that can ensure to <strong>the</strong> nations peace<br />
and <strong>the</strong> fruit of <strong>the</strong>ir work. This collaboration – I am happy to observe – has always developed
320 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
in perfect harmony and no disagreement came to disturb it in <strong>the</strong> international matters whose<br />
solution derives from <strong>the</strong> said principles.”<br />
After <strong>the</strong> exchange of speeches I was invited by President Ulmanis to a private discussion in<br />
his office, in which Mr. Munters partook as well. The conversation was held in English.<br />
The president asked me to show His Majesty <strong>the</strong> King and <strong>the</strong> Romanian government his<br />
own and his government’s gratitude for my appointment, about which he had read in <strong>the</strong> book<br />
“Weltrevolution” of President Masaryk 1 and he knew that during <strong>the</strong> great propaganda action<br />
from 1918 in America I worked toge<strong>the</strong>r with Mr. Masaryk and Mr. Paderewski 2 for <strong>the</strong> freedom<br />
and collaboration of all <strong>the</strong> nations from <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea and <strong>the</strong> Aegean Sea. He<br />
asked for details about our action back <strong>the</strong>n and thanked me as well for <strong>the</strong> statements I gave to<br />
<strong>the</strong> press that seem to have been received very well by <strong>the</strong> Latvian public.<br />
Our conversation <strong>the</strong>n focused on <strong>the</strong> political and economic life of Romania, on its schools<br />
and cultural institutions. The president wished me a successful mission and assured me that he<br />
would be delighted to see me as often as possible in his office.<br />
I was accompanied to <strong>the</strong> legation with <strong>the</strong> same ceremonial as <strong>the</strong> arrival one.<br />
After half an hour, accompanied by <strong>the</strong> chief of protocol and Mr. Scorţescu I went to <strong>the</strong><br />
“Heroes’ Cemetery”, a homage of sober but impressive architecture erected by Latvia to <strong>the</strong><br />
dead for freedom. I was received at <strong>the</strong> entrance by <strong>the</strong> minister of war, General Balodis,<br />
surrounded by <strong>the</strong> commander of <strong>the</strong> Riga garrison and several higher officers. In <strong>the</strong> sound of<br />
bells dedicated to <strong>the</strong> souls of <strong>the</strong> dead, I entered and laid a wreath with <strong>the</strong> Romanian colours<br />
to <strong>the</strong> altar.<br />
P.S. I attach hereto <strong>the</strong> text of my speech and that of President Ulmanis’ response. 3<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 127-131.<br />
119. Telegrama ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Vasile Stoica nr. 118<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Victor Antonescu 4 , 24 martie 1937<br />
Mai multe ziare și reviste letone și lituaniene sunt înclinate a publica articole<br />
corespunzătoare despre situația economică, politică și culturală a României.<br />
La legație însă nu am găsit nici o carte și nici o publicație conținând material utilizabil.<br />
Am onoarea a ruga pe Excelența Voastră să dispună a mi se trimite urgent prin poștă<br />
ultimele noastre publicații, dări de seamă și volume în privința aceasta. În caz de nevoie mi se<br />
pot trimite numerele de Anul Nou ale ziarelor și revistelor noastre economice care dau articole<br />
recapitulative.<br />
Rezoluție: Domnului R. Anastasiu + rugămintea de a satisface cererea, semnat indescifrabil<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 134.<br />
1<br />
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937) was a Czech politician, sociologist and philosopher, founder of <strong>the</strong><br />
Czechoslovak state and its first president (1918-1935). Chaired <strong>the</strong> Mid-European Union in <strong>the</strong> U.S. targeting<br />
multinational empires collapse and as such worked closely with Vasile Stoica, one of its leaders.<br />
2<br />
Ignacy Jan Paderewski (1860-1941) was a Polish pianist, composer, diplomat and politician. Prime Minister and<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland (1919). Similarly with Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Vasile Stoica, he was<br />
involved in <strong>the</strong> activity of <strong>the</strong> Mid-European Union.<br />
3<br />
This part is not included in this volume.<br />
4<br />
Victor Antonescu (1871-1947) a fost jurist, om politic liberal și diplomat român, Ministru al Afacerilor Străine<br />
(1936-1937).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 321<br />
119. Telegram no. 118 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga Vasile<br />
Stoica to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Victor Antonescu, 24 th March 1937<br />
Several Latvian and Lithuanian newspapers and magazines tend to publish appropriate<br />
articles about <strong>the</strong> economic, political and cultural situation of Romania.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less I could not find any book or any publication with useful material at <strong>the</strong><br />
legation.<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour of asking Your Excellency to order <strong>the</strong> urgent dispatch by mail of our<br />
latest publications, reports and volumes in this regard. If necessary, <strong>the</strong> New Year editions of<br />
our economic newspapers and magazines with recapitulative articles can be sent.<br />
Resolution: To Mr. R. Anastasiu + kind appeal of satisfying <strong>the</strong> request, illegible signature<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 134.<br />
120. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Vasile<br />
Stoica nr. 153 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Victor Antonescu 1 , 10 aprilie<br />
1937<br />
Diplomația engleză dezvoltă în Țările Baltice o prudentă, dar tenace, acțiune pentru<br />
ridicarea lor economică, pentru strângerea legăturilor lor reciproce și pentru consolidarea<br />
alianței lor recente. În general, precum reiese din conversațiile cu colegul meu englez de aici,<br />
guvernul britanic dorește și lucrează în sensul ca în zona baltică – inclusiv Finlanda – pacea să<br />
nu fie tulburată din nicio parte, ca astfel aceste state având răgazul a se consolida, să constituie<br />
o forță de rezistență cât mai mare pentru cazul când, în viitor, fie Rusia, fie Germania ar încerca<br />
să tulbure ordinea actuală.<br />
De aceea Marea Britanie caută, pe de o parte, să ajute economic Statele Baltice, pe de altă<br />
parte, să împiedice orice neînțelegere și să potolească orice înverșunare între ele și vecinii lor.<br />
Între țările cumpărătoare ale produselor Estoniei, Letoniei și Lituaniei, Marea Britanie ocupă<br />
locul întâi, iar balanța ei comercială cu aceste state este mult deficitară.<br />
Pe de altă parte, sfaturile și intențiile ei discrete au avut un rol atât în menținerea relațiilor<br />
amicale – cu vizite și cu unele legături comerciale – între Înțelegerea Baltică și U.R.S.S., cât și<br />
[în] îmbunătățirea recentă produsă prin călătoria domnului Holsti la Moscova a raporturilor<br />
fino-sovietice, precum, de asemenea, au contribuit mult la temperarea spiritelor în conflictul<br />
Vilnei, între Lituania și Polonia, și în conflictul Memelului, între Lituania și Germania.<br />
Marea Britanie ar vedea cu ochi buni o apropiere și chiar o colaborare între grupul<br />
scandinav (Danemarca, Suedia, Norvegia și Finlanda) și Înțelegerea Baltică. Într-o astfel de<br />
înțelegere ar vedea o garanție mai mult pentru libertatea bazinului baltic și a navigației baltice.<br />
Se crede în cercurile <strong>diplomatic</strong>e și se speră în cele guvernamentale de aici că Foreign<br />
Office-ul n-a lipsit a-și exprima această părere către Dl. Sandler, ministrul de externe al Suediei,<br />
și către Dl. Stauning 2 , ministrul de externe al Danemarcei, cu ocazia recentelor lor călătorii la<br />
Londra și că Lordul Plymouth, în călătoria pe care, după ziarele finlandeze, o va face în ultimele<br />
zile din mai, în Finlanda și în statele Înțelegerii Baltice, de asemenea va căuta să promoveze idea<br />
apropierii între cele două grupări.<br />
1<br />
Victor Antonescu (1871-1947) was a Romanian lawyer, liberal politician and diplomat, Minister for Foreign Affairs<br />
(1936-1937).<br />
2<br />
Thorvald August Marinus Stauning (1873-1942) a fost cel dintâi Prim Ministru social-democrat al Danemarcei<br />
(1924-1926, 1929-1942). Președinte al Partidului Social-Democrat (1910-1939). Ministrul Afacerilor Externe al<br />
Danemarcei era Peter Rochegune Munch (1929-1940).
322 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1923-1940. Relații cu Anglia, Argentina, Bulgaria,<br />
Cehoslovacia, China, Danemarca, Elveția, Estonia, Finlanda, Franța, Germania, Grecia, Italia,<br />
vol. 7, filele 10-11.<br />
120. Diplomatic Report no. 153 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga<br />
Vasile Stoica to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Victor Antonescu, 10 th April<br />
1937<br />
The English diplomacy is carrying out in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries a prudent but tenacious action<br />
for <strong>the</strong>ir economic growth, for <strong>the</strong> tightening of <strong>the</strong>ir mutual connections and for <strong>the</strong><br />
consolidation of <strong>the</strong>ir recent alliance. In general, as resulted from my conversations with my<br />
English colleague here, <strong>the</strong> British government wishes and is making efforts so that in <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
area – including Finland – peace may not be disturbed by any part, so that <strong>the</strong>se states may<br />
have <strong>the</strong> time to consolidate and constitute a resistance force as strong as possible for <strong>the</strong><br />
future, when ei<strong>the</strong>r Russia or Germany would try to disturb <strong>the</strong> current order.<br />
This is why Great Britain on <strong>the</strong> one hand wants to help from an economic point of view <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States, and on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand wants to prevent any divergence and solve any conflict<br />
between <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong>ir neighbours.<br />
Among <strong>the</strong> countries that buy <strong>the</strong> products of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Great Britain<br />
holds <strong>the</strong> first position, and its commercial balance with <strong>the</strong>se states is ra<strong>the</strong>r adverse.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, its discreet advice and intentions play an important role both in<br />
maintaining <strong>the</strong> amicable <strong>relations</strong> – with visits and some business connections – between <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic Union and <strong>the</strong> USSR, and in <strong>the</strong> recent improvement of <strong>the</strong> Finish-Soviet <strong>relations</strong><br />
produced by Mr. Holsti’s trip to Moscow, and <strong>the</strong>y have also contributed significantly to<br />
tempering <strong>the</strong> spirits in <strong>the</strong> Vilna conflict, between Lithuania and Poland, and in <strong>the</strong> Memel<br />
conflict, between Lithuania and Germany.<br />
Great Britain would agree to an approach and even to collaboration between <strong>the</strong><br />
Scandinavian group (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland) and <strong>the</strong> Baltic Agreement. It<br />
would see such agreement as a much stronger guarantee for <strong>the</strong> freedom of <strong>the</strong> Baltic rim area<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Baltic navigation.<br />
The <strong>diplomatic</strong> circles here believe and <strong>the</strong> governmental ones hope that <strong>the</strong> Foreign Office<br />
has expressed this opinion to Mr. Sandler, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden and to Mr.<br />
Stauning 1 , Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, on <strong>the</strong>ir recent travels to London and that<br />
Lord Plymouth, in <strong>the</strong> travel that <strong>the</strong> Finish newspapers state he will take during <strong>the</strong> last days of<br />
May to Finland and in <strong>the</strong> states of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Union, will also try to promote <strong>the</strong> idea of<br />
approaching <strong>the</strong> two groups.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, 1923-1940. Relations with England, Argentina, Bulgaria,<br />
Czechoslovakia, China, Denmark, Switzerland, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,<br />
Italy, vol. 7, s. 10-11.<br />
1<br />
Thorvald August Marinus Stauning (1873-1942) was <strong>the</strong> first Social Democratic Prime Minister of Denmark (1924-<br />
1926, 1929-1942). Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Social Democratic Party (1910-1939). Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark at<br />
<strong>the</strong> time was Peter Rochegune Munch (1929-1940).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 323<br />
121. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1937. g. 27. apr. konfidenciālais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Vakar pieņemšanā pie jaunā Austrijas sūtņa, kur bija sapulcējušies daudzi no šejienes<br />
sabiedrības un no diplomātiskā korpusa, runas pa lielākai daļai grozījās ap ministra Beka<br />
braucienu uz Bukaresti. Par brauciena nozīmi izteicās dažādi. Pārsvarā tomēr bija ieskats, ka<br />
brauciens nevarēšot neko daudz grozīt Rumānijas stāvoklī. To aizstāvēja īpaši Čehoslovākijas<br />
sūtnis Dr. Slaviks. Čehoslovākija esot pilnīgi droša, ka Rumānija neielaidīšoties nekādās spēlēs,<br />
kas varētu nelabvēlīgi skart Čehoslovākijas likteni un tāpat Rumānija esot ļoti draudzīga Mazai<br />
Antantei. Kaut kāds nopietnāks pagrieziens uz kādu citu pusi Rumānijas politikai neesot<br />
iespējams [..]. Rumānijas sūtnis Zamfiresku teicis Slavikam, ka Beka brauciens nebūšot ar<br />
lielāku nozīmi un ka Beka galvenais uzdevums nokārtot prezidenta Moscicka 1 un Ridza-<br />
Smiglija 2 ciemošanos Bukarestē, kā arī otrādi, paredzot vizītes no Rumānijas Polijā, pirmā kārtā,<br />
Rumānijas karaļu braucienu uz Varšavu. No kādas citas puses sarunā taisīja ierunas un aizrādīja,<br />
ka pašreizējos apstākļos Beka vizīte esot tomēr svarīgāka, nekā tas izliekas. Šejienes franču<br />
aprindās skatās uz vizīti ar zināmām aizdomām, jo Beks centīšoties arī Rumānijā panākt<br />
iespaidus, kas Rumāniju ietuvinātu Polijas politiskai līnijai. Ne par velti poļu oficiālā prese<br />
uzsvērusi, ka Polijas politika esot neatkarīga, tīri poliska un tāpat Rumānijas politikai jātop<br />
rumāniskai. Tādi aizrādījumi parādoties vienmēr, kad frančiem jāpiedzīvo kaut kas nepatīkams<br />
no poļu puses. Vēl bez tam aizrādīja, ka te Varšavā baidoties no Titulesku atgriešanās vadošā<br />
politiskā vietā, kas Polijai būtu ļoti nepatīkami, jo Titulesku te ļoti neieredz. Neesot izslēgts, ka,<br />
pateicoties Beka iespaidam, Rumānija pietuvojas Itālijai un ieiet tās iespaida sfērā [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2179. l., 259. lp.<br />
121. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs V. Munters, 27 th April 1937<br />
Yesterday at <strong>the</strong> reception hosted by <strong>the</strong> new Envoy of Austria, where many representatives<br />
of <strong>the</strong> local society and <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps had ga<strong>the</strong>red, discussions mostly centred on<br />
Minister Beck’s trip to Bucharest. Various opinions were voiced about <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong><br />
trip. However, <strong>the</strong> view dominated that <strong>the</strong> trip would not change anything much in Romania’s<br />
situation. This view was particularly advocated by Envoy of Czechoslovakia Dr. Slavik.<br />
[According to him] Czechoslovakia is completely sure that Romania will not get mixed into any<br />
games, which could have an adverse impact on <strong>the</strong> fate of Czechoslovakia, and that Romania is<br />
very friendly towards <strong>the</strong> Little Entente. No serious turn into a different direction is possible in<br />
Romania’s policy [..] Romania’s Envoy Zamfirescu 3 has told Slavik that Beck’ s trip would not<br />
have great importance and that Beck’s main task was to arrange President Mościcki 4 and Rydz-<br />
1<br />
Ignacijs Moscickis (Mościcki; 1867–1946), Polijas valstsvīrs. 1926.–1939. g. Valsts prezidents.<br />
2<br />
Edvards Ridzs-Smiglijs (Rydz-Śmigły; 1886–1941), Polijas armijas maršals. No 1935. g. bruņoto spēku<br />
ģenerālinspektors, 1939. g. sept. – armijas virspavēlnieks.<br />
3<br />
Alexandru Duiliu Zamfirescu (1892-1968) was a novelist, translator and diplomat. Charge d'affaires in <strong>the</strong><br />
Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands (1929-1932), Minister in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Brazil, Minister in Portugal (1933-1936), Poland<br />
(1937-1938), Italy (1938) and Denmark (1939).<br />
I se încredinţează misiuni <strong>diplomatic</strong>e: ataşat, secretar şi prim-secretar de legaţie la Roma şi Berlin (1919-1928),<br />
însărcinat cu afaceri la Haga (1929-1932), ministru plenipotenţiar la Rio de Janeiro, însărcinat cu organizarea<br />
legaţiilor României în Chile, Argentina şi Brazilia, precum şi în Portugalia (1933-1936), ministru plenipotenţiar la<br />
Varşovia (1937-1938), Roma (1938) şi Copenhaga (1939). În 1944 se vede destituit, iar în 1948 pensionat. Cu toate<br />
acestea, în 1957 e desemnat delegat al României în Brazilia.<br />
4<br />
Ignacy Mościcki (1867–1946), Polish statesman. 1926–1939 President of Poland.
324 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Śmigły’s 1 trips to Bucharest and vice versa – to have visits from Romania planned to Poland, first<br />
and foremost Romania’s Kings’ trip to Warsaw. Somebody else raised objections to that in <strong>the</strong><br />
discussion and remarked that in <strong>the</strong> current situation Beck’s visit was more important though<br />
than it seemed. The local French circles regard this visit with certain suspicion, thinking that<br />
Beck will try to exert influence on Romania that would bring Romania closer to Poland’s<br />
political line. It is not without a reason that <strong>the</strong> Polish official press has underlined that Poland’s<br />
policy is independent, purely Polish and Romania’s policy likewise has to become Romanian.<br />
They say that such comments are voiced always when <strong>the</strong> French are faced with something<br />
unpleasant from <strong>the</strong> Polish part. It was also mentioned that here in Warsaw <strong>the</strong>y were afraid of<br />
Titulescu’s return to a leading political position that would be very unpleasant for Poland<br />
because Titulescu was hated here very strongly. They say it is not excluded that, thanks to<br />
Beck’s influence, Romania draws closer to Italy and enters <strong>the</strong> latter’s sphere of influence [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2179, s. 259.<br />
122. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1937. g. 10. maija konfidenciālais ziņojums<br />
ārlietu ministram V. Munteram<br />
Man bija saruna ar Igaunijas sūtni Markusu 2 un viņš man atstāstīja par savu tikšanos ar<br />
ārlietu ministru Beku, pie kura viņš bijis 4. maijā. Markuss bija vēlējies no Beka dzirdēt, ko viņš<br />
sacīs par savu braucienu uz Bukaresti. Beka paskaidrojumi bijuši pēc Markusa atstāstījuma<br />
sekojoši: Bukarestes braucienam bijuši tikai paši labākie nodomi. Nekad viņš, Beks, neesot<br />
domājis attālināt Rumāniju no Mazās Antantes valstīm. Visi pretējie apgalvojumi ir pilnīgi bez<br />
pamata. Kad Titulesku bijis valdībā, Rumānija pārāk aizrāvusies ar Tautu Savienību un pats<br />
Titulesku centies spēlēt Eiropas politiķa lomu, piemirsdams pašus tuvākos savus uzdevumus.<br />
Bet Tautu Savienība zaudējusi savus iespaidus, tā kļuvusi vāja. Rumānija sākusi koķetēt ar<br />
Padomju Savienību, pavisam piemirsdama Poliju, ar kuru tai ir līgums. Tādi apstākļi noveduši<br />
pie Titulesku atstāšanas ārpus valdības, jo karalis it labi sapratis greizo politiku, pie kuras<br />
pieturējies Titulesku. Tagad notiek pagrieziens uz citu pusi un vecās draudzības saites ar Poliju<br />
Rumānija no savas puses cenšas pastiprināt. Atstāstīdams sarunu ar Beku dažādos izteicienos,<br />
Markuss pats piezīmēja, ka acīmredzot šie paskaidrojumi nedod neko jaunu un atkārto tikai jau<br />
presē daudzkārt teikto. Bijis tikai vērojams, ka Beks ļoti nelabvēlīgi noskaņots pret Titulesku [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2179. l., 240. lp.<br />
122. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs V. Munters, 10 th May, 1937<br />
I had a discussion with Estonia’s Envoy Markus 3 and he told me about his meeting with<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck, whom he visited on 4 th May. Markus had wanted to hear what<br />
Beck would say about his trip to Bucharest. According to Markus, Beck had offered <strong>the</strong><br />
following explanations: Intentions of <strong>the</strong> trip to Bucharest had been only <strong>the</strong> very best. He,<br />
Beck, had never meant to estrange Romania from <strong>the</strong> countries of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente. All<br />
statements to <strong>the</strong> contrary were absolutely groundless. When Titulescu was in <strong>the</strong> government,<br />
1<br />
Edward Rydz-Śmigły (1886–1941), Marshal of Poland. From 1935 Inspector General of <strong>the</strong> Armed Forces,<br />
September 1939 – Supreme Commander.<br />
2<br />
Hanss Johans Markuss (Markus; 1884–1969), Igaunijas diplomāts. 1935.–1939. g. sūtnis Polijā, 1939.–1940. g.<br />
Ungārijā un Rumānijā ar sēdekli Budapeštā.<br />
3<br />
Hans Johan Markus (1884–1969), Estonian diplomat, 1935–1939 Envoy to Poland, 1939–1940 Envoy to Hungary<br />
and Romania with seat in Budapest.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 325<br />
Romania had been too much carried away by <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and Titulescu himself had<br />
tried to play <strong>the</strong> role of a European politician, forgetting his immediate tasks. But <strong>the</strong> League of<br />
Nations had lost its influence, it had become weak. Romania begun to flirt with <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Union, altoge<strong>the</strong>r forgetting Poland, with which it had an agreement. Such circumstances had<br />
led to <strong>the</strong> leaving of Titulescu outside <strong>the</strong> government because <strong>the</strong> King had well understood<br />
<strong>the</strong> crooked policy that Titulescu had pursued. Now a turn into a different direction was taking<br />
place and Romania on its part was trying to streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> old ties of friendship with Poland.<br />
Having related his discussion with Beck with <strong>the</strong> help of various expressions [used in <strong>the</strong><br />
discussion], Markus remarked from his own part that <strong>the</strong>se explanations obviously had not<br />
contributed anything new and merely repeated what had been already said in <strong>the</strong> press many<br />
times. It was only obvious that Beck was very ill-disposed towards Titulescu [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2179, s. 240.<br />
123. Latvijas sūtņa Prāgā M. Nukšas 1937. g. 13. maija raksts Ārlietu ministrijas<br />
Juridiskās nodaļas vadītājam A. Kampem 1<br />
Saņēmu Jūsu š. g. 11.maija rakstu [..]. Līguma projektu šodien iesniedzu Čehoslovākijas<br />
Ārlietu ministrijai [..]. Šodien informēju arī Bukaresti un Belgradu par mūsu nodomu sūtīt uz<br />
turieni delegāciju sarunu vešanai par preču apmaiņas veicināšanu; lūdzu attiecīgo valstu Ārlietu<br />
ministrijas sūtniecību informēt, vai viņām sarunu vešana ap jūnija mēneša vidū 2 būtu<br />
iespējama. Par delegācijas sūtīšanu paziņoju arī mūsu goda ģenerālkonsuliem Bukarestē un<br />
Belgradā.<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 13. apr., 576. l., b. p.<br />
123. Note by Latvia’s Envoy in Prague M. Nukša to head of <strong>the</strong> Law Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Kampe 3 , 13 th May 1937<br />
I have received your note of 11 th May, this year [..] Today I submitted draft agreement to <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia [..] Today I informed Bucharest and Belgrade, too,<br />
about our intention to send a delegation <strong>the</strong>re to negotiate <strong>the</strong> ways to promote <strong>the</strong> exchange<br />
of goods; I asked <strong>the</strong> legations of <strong>the</strong> Ministries of Foreign Affairs of <strong>the</strong> respective countries to<br />
inform me whe<strong>the</strong>r it would be possible to hold <strong>the</strong> negotiations around mid-June. 4 I informed<br />
also our Honorary General Consuls in Bucharest and Belgrade about <strong>the</strong> sending of <strong>the</strong><br />
delegation.<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 13, file 576, without pagination.<br />
124. Latvijas sūtņa Prāgā M. Nukšas 1937. g. 20. maija raksts Ārlietu ministrijas<br />
Juridiskās nodaļas vadītājam A. Kampem<br />
Šeklāt pagodinos Jums piesūtīt norakstu no mūsu ģenerālkonsula Bukarestē T. V. Orgidana<br />
š. g. 18. maija raksta No. 912/1937. Pie šī gadījuma atļaujos norādīt uz to, ka arī ģenerālkonsuls<br />
pastāv uz delegācijas brauciena paātrināšanu. Bez tam ģenerālkonsuls norāda uz to, ka viņš<br />
1<br />
Andrejs Kampe (1905–1942), Latvijas diplomāts. No 1936. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Juridiskās nodaļas vadītājs, 1938.–<br />
1940. g. Līgumu departamenta direktors. Nogalināts padomju apcietinājumā.<br />
2<br />
Sarunas notika Bukarestē 1937. g. decembrī.<br />
3<br />
Andrejs Kampe (1905–1942), Latvian diplomat. From 1936 Head of <strong>the</strong> Law Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs, 1938–1940 Director of <strong>the</strong> Treaties Department. Executed in Soviet imprisonment.<br />
4<br />
The negotiations took place in Bucharest in December 1937.
326 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
nevarēs piedalīties apspriedēs, ja sūtniecība viņu oficiāli nenotificē, 1 kādēļ laipni lūdzu paziņot<br />
pārējo delegātu vārdus, kā arī darīt man zināmu Jūsu viedokli par to, vai Orgidans būtu<br />
notificējams. No savas puses Orgidana ieskaitīšanu varu tikai atbalstīt, viņš pieskaitāms pie<br />
darbīgākiem goda pārstāvjiem un bauda uzticību Rumānijas oficiālās aprindās.<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 13. apr., 576. l., b. p.<br />
124. Note by Latvia’s Envoy in Prague M. Nukša to head of <strong>the</strong> Law Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Kampe, 20 th May 1937<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour hereby to attach a copy of note No. 912/1937 from our General Consul in<br />
Bucharest T.V. Orghidan, dated 18 th May, this year. I avail myself of <strong>the</strong> opportunity to remark<br />
that <strong>the</strong> General Consul, too, insists on <strong>the</strong> precipitation of <strong>the</strong> delegation’s trip. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore,<br />
<strong>the</strong> General Consul notes that he will not be able to take part in <strong>the</strong> meetings if <strong>the</strong> Legation<br />
does not notify him officially 2 , for this reason I kindly ask you to inform me of <strong>the</strong> names of <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r delegates and to let me know your opinion on whe<strong>the</strong>r Orghidan should be notified.<br />
From my own part I can only support Orghidan’s inclusion, he is among <strong>the</strong> most active<br />
honorary representatives and enjoys trust in Romania’s official circles.<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 13, file 576, without pagination.<br />
125. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1937. g. 7. jūn. konfidenciālais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Vakar jāšanas sacensību laikā diplomātiskā tribīnē dzirdēja daudz interesējamies, kāda<br />
nozīme varētu būt Polijas Valsts prezidenta braucienam uz Bukaresti, kuru viņš iesāka vakar.<br />
Galvenā noskaņa sarunās par to ir sekojoša:<br />
Neko sevišķu prezidentam vizīte nevarētu pielikt pie tā, kas darīts jau no ārlietu ministra<br />
Beka, kad tas bija Bukarestē un vizīte, kuru izdara tagad pats Valsts prezidents, varētu tikai<br />
nozīmēt agrāko sarunu ceremoniālo apstiprinājumu. Bet arī aizrāda, ka braucienam varētu būt<br />
lielāka nozīme, ievērojot agrākā Rumānijas ārlietu ministra Titulesku pastiprinātu darbību,<br />
kādu tas attīsta Parīzē un Londonā. Vieni saka, ka Rumānija šo darbību atzīstot par greizu, citi<br />
atkal, ka Titulesku uzstāšanos jāuzskatot par sagatavošanos uz viņa atgriešanos valdībā.<br />
Pēdējais uzskats ņēma vakarējās sarunās redzamu pārsvaru. Norvēģijas sūtnis bija caur savu<br />
ministriju saņēmis no Bukarestes ziņas, ka tur paredzot, vēlākais rudenī, tagadējās rumāņu<br />
valdības krišanu. Titulesku atgriezīšoties vistuvākajā laikā Bukarestē, lai tur uzstātos Senātā, un<br />
jau tagad tiekot gatavoti visi ceļi Titulesku uz valdības vadītāja lomu. Protams, tā [Norvēģijas<br />
Ārlietu ministrija] piemetināja, ka Titulesku nodomi var arī neizdoties, bet ātrāk jādomājot, ka<br />
tie veikšoties. Paredz pat, ka varētu notikt krīze ap Rumānijas troni. Visu slēdziens ir, ka tādā<br />
gadījumā ministra Beka uzsāktā politika piedzīvos neveiksmi. Tagadējais ārlietu ministrs<br />
Antonesku esot jau tagad uzsācis tuvākas sarunas ar Ļitvinovu par kādu starp Rumāniju un<br />
Padomju Savienību noslēdzamu draudzības paktu, kas te pavisam nepatīkot. Tamlīdz uzsvēra,<br />
ka Rumānijas saimnieciskais stāvoklis esot grūts un, ka tas lielā mērā atkarājoties no Francijas,<br />
kādu stāvokli šī gribētu ieņemt. Francija varētu viegli piespiest Rumāniju grozīt savu<br />
izturēšanos, ja tā atradīs to par vajadzīgu noteiktā brīdī [..]. Varot vērot Itālijas simpātijas pret<br />
poļu–rumāņu sarunām, kuras novedīšot pie Mazās Antantes vājināšanās, pirmā kārtā, pie<br />
Čehoslovākijas iespaida atslābšanas un tālākā ceļā šī politika mazināšot Padomju Savienības<br />
1<br />
Domāta oficiāla iekļaušana delegācijas sastāvā.<br />
2<br />
Here <strong>the</strong> Honorary Consul’s official inclusion in <strong>the</strong> delegation is meant.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 327<br />
ietekmes. Arī vakarējās sarunās šīs domu gaitas, kas parādījās poļu presē, spēlēja lomu, bet<br />
izsacīja šaubas, vai tās realizēsies. Rumānija katrā ziņā mēģināšot izsargāties no kaut kādas<br />
kombinācijas, kuru Padomju Savienība varētu uzskatīt sev par naidīgu [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2179. l., 217.–219. lp.<br />
125. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs V. Munters, 7 th June 1937<br />
Yesterday during a horse-race I heard many people in <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> stand inquire about<br />
<strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> visit by Poland’s President to Bucharest that he began yesterday. The<br />
dominating attitude in <strong>the</strong> discussions about it is following:<br />
The President’s visit cannot add anything to what Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck has<br />
already done when he was in Bucharest and <strong>the</strong> visit that <strong>the</strong> President himself is making now<br />
could only mean a ceremonial confirmation of <strong>the</strong> [results of <strong>the</strong>] previous negotiations. But it<br />
is also being remarked that <strong>the</strong> trip could have greater importance, considering increased<br />
activity of Romania’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Titulescu in Paris and London. Some<br />
say that Romania regards this activity as crooked, some o<strong>the</strong>rs – that Titulescu’s activities<br />
should be regarded as a preparation for his return to <strong>the</strong> government. The latter view clearly<br />
dominated in yesterday’s discussions. The Envoy of Norway has received information from<br />
Bucharest through his Ministry that <strong>the</strong>re <strong>the</strong>y are expecting <strong>the</strong> fall of <strong>the</strong> present Romanian<br />
government, at <strong>the</strong> latest this autumn. Titulescu will return to Bucharest in <strong>the</strong> very near future<br />
in order to speak at <strong>the</strong> Senate and all roads are already being paved for Titulescu to become<br />
<strong>the</strong> head of government. Of course, it was also added that Titulescu’s intentions could fail as<br />
well, but one should ra<strong>the</strong>r expect him to succeed. A possibility that a crisis may set in with<br />
regard to <strong>the</strong> throne of Romania is even admitted. Everybody believes that in <strong>the</strong> latter case <strong>the</strong><br />
policy that Minister Beck has launched will fail. Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonescu is<br />
said already to have launched closer negotiations with Litvinov about a pact of friendship to be<br />
concluded between Romania and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, which prospect is very much disliked here.<br />
It was also underlined that Romania’s economic situation was difficult and largely dependant<br />
on <strong>the</strong> position that France would be willing to take. France, <strong>the</strong>y say, could easily force<br />
Romania to change its behaviour if <strong>the</strong> former finds it necessary at a particular moment [..]<br />
They say that Italy is clearly being positive about Polish–Romanian negotiations, which would<br />
lead to <strong>the</strong> weakening of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente, first of all to <strong>the</strong> lessening of Czechoslovakia’s<br />
influence and in a longer run this policy would lessen <strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. This<br />
train of thought, which appeared in <strong>the</strong> Polish press, also played a certain role in yesterday’s<br />
discussion, but doubt was expressed, whe<strong>the</strong>r such expectations would come true. Romania,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y say, will by all means try to avoid a combination that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union could regard as<br />
hostile to it [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2179, s. 217–219.<br />
126. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Vasile<br />
Stoica nr. 354 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Victor Antonescu, 12 iunie<br />
1937<br />
Precum am avut onoarea de a raporta prin telegrama mea nr. 341 din 9 iunie, lordul<br />
Plymouth a sosit la Riga, venind de la Tallinn în 6 și a plecat de aici la Kaunas în 8 iunie. De aici
328 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
a plecat apoi spre Berlin în 10 iunie. A stat deci în capitala letonă 2 zile și jumătate, iar în cea<br />
lituaniană tot atâtea.<br />
În raportul meu nr. 153 din 10 aprilie am arătat Excelenței Voastre că acțiunea diplomației<br />
britanice în Țările Baltice este foarte activă, că Marea Britanie sprijină consolidarea acestora și<br />
vede cu multă bunăvoință strângerea relațiilor dintre Țările Baltice și cele scandinave. La rândul<br />
lor acestea, în fața antagonismului ruso-german, privesc cu încredere la Marea Britanie și țin<br />
deplină seamă de indicațiile Londrei.<br />
Călătoria Lordului Plymouth n-a avut alt scop decât confirmarea și încurajarea acestei<br />
politici. Firește primirea Domniei sale avea să fie călduroasă, cu atât mai vârtos că, precum am<br />
raportat, acum o lună avusese ca înainte-mergător pe amiralul Sir H. Richmond 1 , iar atmosfera<br />
probritanică, și de altfel favorabilă, fusese încălzită încă de festivitățile de la Londra și de știrile<br />
despre înarmările britanice.<br />
I.<br />
Lordul Plymouth a sosit de la Tallinn la Riga în dimineața de 6 iunie. A fost primit în gară de<br />
Dl. Munters, ministrul de externe, de funcționarii superiori ai ministerului, de Sir Edmond<br />
Monson 2 , ministrul Marii Britanii, și de ziariști. În prima și a doua zi a făcut vizite și câteva<br />
excursii. A doua zi la amiază a fost primit de președintele Ulmanis, care a dat un dejun în<br />
onoarea Domniei sale, iar seara a luat parte la un dineu oferit de ministrul de externe. A treia zi<br />
dimineață a vizitat muzeele Rigăi, a luat parte la dejunul delegației britanice, la care am fost<br />
invitat și eu, iar la orele 2 după-amiază a plecat cu aeroplanul la Kaunas.<br />
Conversații au avut [loc] cu președintele Ulmanis, cu vicepreședintele Consiliului<br />
Skujenieks, cu ministrul de finanțe Ēķis, și mai cu seamă cu ministrul de externe Munters, care<br />
l-a însoțit în toate excursiile.<br />
Despre scopul vizitei sale, Lordul Plymouth a declarat într-un interviu:<br />
„Vizita mea este o manifestare a amiciției care a existat și va exista totdeauna între Regatul<br />
Unit și Letonia. Nu îndeplinesc niciun fel de misiune politică. Am dorit de mult timp să am<br />
ocazia de a vedea mai de aproape viața Letoniei și de a face cunoștință conducătorilor ei.<br />
Experiența unor ani îndelungați m-a învățat că astfel de întâlniri personale și înțelegerea<br />
reciprocă sunt mijlocul cel mai potrivit pentru aplanarea și eliminarea dezacordurilor sau<br />
conflictelor.”<br />
Cu ocazia dineului oferit de D. Munters a avut loc un schimb de scurte cuvântări. Dl.<br />
Munters, după ce a făcut elogiul sforțărilor Lordului Plymouth în „comitetul de neintervenție”<br />
de la Londra, a declarat: „Noi suntem partizanii înfocați ai păcii, dar ne dăm totodată seama că<br />
pentru a menține pacea, pentru a stabili un respect al solidarității internaționale și a crea o stare<br />
de spirit care să facă războiul imposibil, sunt necesare nu numai cuvintele și sentimentele, dar și<br />
sforțările și faptele. În persoana domniei voastre noi vedem reprezentantul acestei politici de<br />
pace și colaborare internațională.”<br />
Vorbind apoi de relațiile cu Marea Britanie, dl. Munters a zis: „Se împlinesc aproape 18 ani<br />
de când guvernul englez ne-a trimis primii săi reprezentanți: vase din flota Maiestății Sale și<br />
1<br />
Sir Herbert William Richmond (1871-1946) a fost un amiral și profesor britanic care s-a remarcat în Primul Război<br />
Mondial. A predat la Cambridge University. Vizita a avut loc în aprilie 1937, oaspetele susținând și o conferința la<br />
Universitatea din Riga.<br />
2<br />
Edmound St. John Debonaire John Monson (1883-1969) a fost Ministrul Marii Britanii în Letonia între 1935-1938.<br />
Anterior ocupase aceeași poziție în Columbia (1926-1929), Mexic (1929-1934). Va urma numirea ca Ministru în<br />
Suedia (1938-1939).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 329<br />
ofițeri de-ai armatei britanice. Aceștia au fost alături de noi în momentele cele mai dificile, dar<br />
și cele mai neuitate, ale luptelor noastre pentru independență. Și-au făcut datoria cu calmul și<br />
discreția pe care suntem obișnuiți a le identifica cu englezii și au rămas amici ai noștri până în<br />
ziua de astăzi. Cinci ani mai târziu, în 1923, am primit vizita unei delegații a Camerei<br />
Comunelor, și de atunci până astăzi am stabilit un număr tot mai mare de legături politice,<br />
economice și culturale între cele două țări. Vizita domniei voastre este prima vizită a unui<br />
membru al guvernului britanic și, ca atare, ea încheie o perioadă de activitate plină de succes și<br />
constituie un semn bun pentru înflorirea relațiilor noastre mutuale în viitor.”<br />
În răspunsul său prin care mulțumea călduros de primirea ce i-a fost făcută, Lordul<br />
Plymouth, exprimându-și convingerea că vizita domniei sale va ajuta la cimentarea și mai solidă<br />
a relațiilor letono-britanice, a zis: „Aceste relații izvorăsc, așa cum a subliniat-o dl. Munters<br />
acum, nu numai dintr-o strânsă amiciție și din legăturile mutuale în domeniul economic și<br />
cultural, ci și din scopul nostru comun în sfera mai largă a colaborării internaționale. Este,<br />
poate, foarte puțin necesar să vă asigur că baza politicii externe a guvernului Maiestății Sale este<br />
menținerea păcii generale și perpetue și a înțelegerii în lumea întreagă. Guvernul leton ne-a<br />
arătat că scopurile sale sunt aceleași.”<br />
În ce privește conversațiile Lordului Plymouth ele au fost în mare parte, precum m-a<br />
informat colegul meu britanic, o parafrazare a celor spuse în aceste două discursuri, de a<br />
îndemna la o strictă neutralitate între nemți și soviete, la o colaborare între Țările Baltice și<br />
scandinave și la o caldă fidelitate față de Societatea Națiunilor și dând asigurări de toată<br />
bunăvoința și chiar de solicitudinea Marii Britanii, iar Dl. Munters și colegii săi din Guvern<br />
arătând că această politică a fost urmată de Letonia și până acum și că însuși interesul strict<br />
național le dictează să nu se abată de la ea.<br />
Lordul Plymouth, totodată, și-a exprimat dorința ca schimburile comerciale între Letonia și<br />
Marea Britanie să fie intensificate, în special ca importul leton de mărfuri engleze să fie sporit,<br />
echilibrând, pe cât posibil, balanța comercială, care până acum este cu mult deficitară pentru<br />
Marea Britanie.<br />
Într-o scurtă conversație ce a avut-o cu mine cu ocazia dejunului de la legația britanică,<br />
Lordul Plymouth mi-a spus că a venit în Țările Baltice să se informeze, că aceste țări i-au făcut o<br />
foarte bună impresie și că guvernul britanic care dorește o Mare Baltică liberă, privește cu<br />
simpatie atât sforțările lor economice, cât și politica lor precaută.<br />
Opinia cercurilor conducătoare și a publicului leton față de călătoria domnului Plymouth și<br />
față de Marea Britanie în împrejurările actuale este fidel oglindită în editorialul din 6 iunie al<br />
ziarului „Rīts” din Riga scris cu ocazia acestei vizite.<br />
Toate Statele Baltice – zice ziarul – inclusiv Scandinavia sunt în prezent strâns legate de<br />
Marea Britanie și s-au alăturat așa-numitului „bloc al sterlinei”. Din punct de vedere politic, de<br />
asemenea, Statele Baltice sunt cele care susțin mai activ și mai integral aspirațiile de pace și<br />
securitate ale Marii Britanii în nord-estul Europei. Statele mici și statele mijlocii văd în<br />
colaborarea lor cu Marea Britanie, a cărei greutate politică devine tot mai mare și mai influentă,<br />
garanția cea mai sigură a independenței lor. Englezii au avut ani îndelungați de-a rândul<br />
încredere în Societatea Națiunilor, conflagrația italo-abisiniană însă, sentimentele militariste ale<br />
Germaniei național-socialiste, conflictele armate din Extremul Orient și alte împrejurări i-au<br />
obligat să-și revizuiască opiniile despre Geneva. Au ajuns la convingerea că numai o Mare<br />
Britanie puternică militărește, în colaborare strânsă și în perfect acord cu Franța, poate
330 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
salvgarda Societatea Națiunilor de o criză fatală și îi poate da forță de lucru și de luptă pentru<br />
pace și securitate în Europa. Securitatea în apus este legată de securitatea în celelalte părți ale<br />
Europei; ideea păcii indivizibile este la baza politicii externe a Imperiului Britanic, care<br />
întotdeauna și cu tot prestigiul și puterea sa a susținut securitatea colectivă și principiile<br />
Societății Națiunilor. Acum această politică este susținută de o putere militară impresionantă,<br />
ceea ce a și dat unele rezultate îmbucurătoare. Astfel se explică faptul că Germania a devenit cu<br />
mult mai măsurată și mai conciliantă și că evenimentele spaniole n-au provocat o conflagrație.<br />
„Anglitera – zice în încheiere ziarul – a avut totdeauna simpatii pentru statele mici și, în<br />
actualul caz concret, pentru Letonia. Să ne aducem aminte de luptele noastre pentru<br />
independență, la care flota engleză a luat parte efectiv și să nu uităm neprețuitul sprijin dat<br />
bărbaților noștri de stat de către diplomația britanică pentru consolidarea și stabilizarea<br />
situației internaționale a Letoniei. De atunci Anglitera a luat în schimburile noastre comerciale<br />
primul loc, iar comerțul nostru cu porturile ei este cel mai viu și cel mai activ...”<br />
II.<br />
Plecat din Riga cu aeroplanul în 8 iunie, la orele 2, Lordul Plymouth a sosit după o oră de<br />
zbor la Kaunas. A fost primit la aerodrom de dl. Lozoraitis, ministrul de externe, de toți<br />
funcționarii superiori ai ministerului, de un mare număr de diplomați și personalități<br />
lituaniene.<br />
Ca și în Riga, au avut loc mai apoi, în cele două zile și jumătate, vizite, întrevederi și excursii.<br />
Întrevederi îndelungate au avut loc cu președintele republicii, Smetona, cu primul ministru<br />
Tūbelis și mai ales cu ministrul de externe Lozoraitis.<br />
În 8 iunie seara, dl. Lozoraitis a oferit un dineu urmat de o recepție în onoarea oaspetelui<br />
britanic.<br />
În discursul rostit cu această ocazie Domnia sa a arătat că relațiile amicale care există între<br />
Marea Britanie și Lituania, care există din cele dintâi zile ale independenței recâștigate, s-au<br />
dezvoltat tot mai mult în ultimii ani. Aceasta se vede mai ales în domeniul economic, schimbul<br />
de mărfuri între cele două țări fiind într-o continuă creștere, iar Marea Britanie devenind<br />
principala piață a produselor lituaniene. Dar relațiile au devenit strânse și pe terenul politic.<br />
Atât Marea Britanie, cât și Lituania sunt profund devotate păcii.<br />
„Lituania – a spus ministrul – salută politica de colaborare pe care a preconizat-o Marea<br />
Britanie și ale cărei temelii sunt fixate prin pactul Societății Națiunilor, pact căruia Lituania îi<br />
rămâne leal devotată.”<br />
În răspunsul său, Lordul Plymouth a arătat legăturile amicale, care datează încă din evul<br />
mediu, între Lituania și Marea Britanie și și-a exprimat convingerea că acestea se vor consolida<br />
mai mult în viitor și că însăși vizita Domniei sale va fi o contribuție la intensificarea lor.<br />
În 9 iunie, la dejun, Lordul Plymouth a fost oaspetele președintelui Smetona.<br />
Conversațiile pe care Domnia sa le-a avut în capitala lituaniană au urmat aceeași linie și au<br />
dezbătut aceleași idei ca și conversațiile din Riga. Chiar și problema economică este identică:<br />
comerțul anglo-lituanian este mult deficitar pentru Anglitera.<br />
Sunt însă două probleme ale politicii lituaniene asupra cărora Lordul Plymouth a cerut<br />
informații amănunțite: problema Klaipediei (Memelului) și problema Vilnei. Dacă pentru cea<br />
dintâi s-a găsit un modus vivendi și astfel relațiile cu Germania s-au ameliorat mult în anul din<br />
urmă, cea de-a doua, din nenorocire, pare insolubilă și zădărnicește orice posibilitate de relații<br />
normale cu cel mai natural dintre vecinii Lituaniei, Polonia. Precum mă informează colegul
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 331<br />
meu lituanian, Lordului Plymouth i s-au dat în aceste chestiuni toate lămuririle și toată<br />
documentația necesară. În afară însă de exprimarea dorinței de a se găsi o soluție pentru<br />
curmarea conflictului cu Polonia, Lordul Plymouth s-a ferit de a-și arăta vreo părere sau de a<br />
încerca vreo mediere. Domnia sa a declarat însă că despre constatările făcute în această<br />
călătorie în Țările Baltice va face un raport Domnului Eden.<br />
Cum a fost primită în Lituania călătoria Lordului Plymouth și ce sentimente și idei a stârnit,<br />
se poate vedea în editorialul din 8 iunie al oficiosului „Lietuvos Aidas”.<br />
„Marea Britanie – zice ziarul – această țară clasică a libertății, a văzut cu bunăvoință<br />
încercările Lituaniei de a-și recâștiga independența. Lituanienii nu vor uita niciodată ajutorul pe<br />
care li l-a dat Anglia după Marele Război. Influența Marii Britanii a fost în repetate rânduri<br />
decisivă în soluționarea unor afaceri importante ale politicii noastre externe, fie în Geneva, fie în<br />
alte instituții internaționale. Ne putem aminti astăzi cu satisfacție și recunoștință că atitudinea<br />
Marii Britanii a fost întotdeauna bazată pe drept și dreptate și de aceea ne-a fost favorabilă.<br />
Politica Marii Britanii tinde la menținerea păcii. Marea Britanie apără principiul păcii<br />
indivizibile și al securității colective așa cum acest principiu decurge din pactul Societății<br />
Națiunilor. Acesta este tocmai jalonul principal în directiva politicii noastre externe.”<br />
În ce privește presa străină părerile ei variază.<br />
Presa engleză în frunte cu „Times” și cea franceză, în frunte cu „Le Temps” și „Journal des<br />
Débats”, comentează călătoria Lordului Plymouth în termeni favorabili și accentuează utilitatea<br />
pentru pace a bunelor relații dintre Marea Britanie și Statele Baltice, aducând acestora elogii<br />
pentru atitudinea lor prudentă.<br />
Ziarul sovietic „Izvestia” interpretează această călătorie ca un refuz al Angliei de a lăsa<br />
Germaniei dominația Mării Baltice pe care aceasta o consideră ca sigură după acordul naval<br />
anglo-german din iulie 1935. Englezii, după ziarul sovietic, își întăresc pozițiile contra<br />
amenințărilor fasciste germane și italiene, atât în Statele Baltice și în Scandinavia, cât și în<br />
Europa Centrală și Orientală, ceea ce creează mari dificultăți politicii agresive.<br />
„Boersenzeitung” din Berlin comentează cu ocazia acestei vizite politica Statelor Baltice,<br />
arătând că aceasta păstrează o strictă neutralitate între Germania și Rusia și caută legături mai<br />
strânse cu statele scandinave, iar acum de când Marea Britanie arată mare interes pentru<br />
afacerile scandinave și chestiunile Europei Orientale, își pun speranțele în Londra și se simt<br />
adăpostite de aripile „pax britannica”.<br />
În rezumat, vizita Lordului Plymouth în Finlanda, Estonia, Letonia și Lituania a fost – lăsând<br />
la o parte forma protocolară de restituire a unor vizite anterioare făcute la Londra – o călătorie<br />
de informație pentru Domnia sa și pentru Foreign Office, de propagandă pentru intensificarea<br />
anglofiliei în aceste țări și de încurajare pentru păstrarea atitudinii lor actuale de neutralitate și<br />
abstențiune atât față de Germania cât și față de Uniunea Sovietică.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1923-1940. Relații cu Anglia, Argentina, Bulgaria,<br />
Cehoslovacia, China, Danemarca, Elveția, Estonia, Finlanda, Franța, Germania, Grecia, Italia,<br />
vol. 7, filele 18-26.
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126. Diplomatic Report no. 354 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Ministry of Romania in Riga<br />
Vasile Stoica to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Victor Antonescu, 12 th June<br />
1937<br />
As I had <strong>the</strong> honour of reporting by telegram no. 341 from June 9 th , Lord Plymouth arrived in<br />
Riga from Tallinn on <strong>the</strong> 6 th and left to Kaunas on June 8 th . On June 10 th he left for Berlin. So he<br />
spent 2 days and a half in <strong>the</strong> Latvian capital and as much in <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian capital.<br />
In my report no. 153 from April 10 th I showed to Your Excellency that <strong>the</strong> action of <strong>the</strong> British<br />
diplomacy in <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries is very active, that Great Britain supports <strong>the</strong>ir consolidation<br />
and sees in good will <strong>the</strong> tightening of <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries and <strong>the</strong><br />
Scandinavian countries. In <strong>the</strong>ir turn, before <strong>the</strong> Russian-German hostility, <strong>the</strong>y confide in<br />
Great Britain and observe London’s instructions completely.<br />
Lord Plymouth’s travel had <strong>the</strong> sole purpose of confirming and encouraging this policy.<br />
Naturally, he was received warmly, all <strong>the</strong> more so as a month before Admiral Sir H. Richmond 1<br />
had preceded him, and <strong>the</strong> pro-British and after all favourable atmosphere had been warmed<br />
up by <strong>the</strong> very festivities in London and by <strong>the</strong> news about <strong>the</strong> British arming.<br />
I.<br />
Lord Plymouth arrived from Tallinn in Riga in <strong>the</strong> morning of June 6 th . He was welcomed in<br />
<strong>the</strong> train station by Mr. Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs, by <strong>the</strong> ministry higher clerks, by<br />
Sir Edmond Monson 2 , Minister of Great Britain, and by journalists. The first and second days he<br />
paid visits and took a few trips. The second day at noon, he was received by President Ulmanis,<br />
who invited him to lunch and in <strong>the</strong> evening he participated in a dinner offered by <strong>the</strong> minister<br />
of foreign affairs. The third day in <strong>the</strong> morning, he visited <strong>the</strong> museums in Riga, had lunch with<br />
<strong>the</strong> British delegation, to which I was invited as well, and at 2 o’clock p.m. he left by plane to<br />
Kaunas.<br />
He had conversations with President Ulmanis, with Council Vice-President Skujenieks, with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Minister of Treasury Ēķis and more importantly with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
Munters, who accompanied him in all his trips.<br />
As regards <strong>the</strong> purpose of his visit, Lord Plymouth stated <strong>the</strong> following in an interview:<br />
“My visit is a manifestation of <strong>the</strong> friendship that existed and will always exist between <strong>the</strong><br />
United Kingdom and Latvia. I am not fulfilling any political mission. I have wanted for a long<br />
time to have <strong>the</strong> opportunity of seeing up closely <strong>the</strong> life of Latvia and of meeting its leaders.<br />
The experience of long years taught me that such personal meetings and mutual understanding<br />
are <strong>the</strong> most appropriate manner for <strong>the</strong> mitigation and elimination of disagreements or<br />
conflicts.”<br />
On <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> dinner offered by Mr. Munters, an exchange of brief speeches<br />
occurred. After praising Lord Plymouth’s efforts in <strong>the</strong> “non-intervention committee” from<br />
London, Mr. Munters said: “We are <strong>the</strong> passionate partisans of peace, but we realize at <strong>the</strong> same<br />
time that in order to maintain peace, in order to establish respect for international solidarity<br />
and to create a state of mind that should make war impossible, we need not only words and<br />
1<br />
Sir Herbert William Richmond (1871-1946) was a British admiral and professor who distinguished himself in<br />
WWI. He taught at Cambridge University. The visit took place in April 1937, <strong>the</strong> guest giving also a conference at<br />
<strong>the</strong> University of Riga.<br />
2<br />
Edmound St. John Debonaire John Monson (1883-1969) was Minister of Great Britain in Latvia between 1935-<br />
1938. Previously had occupied <strong>the</strong> same position in Colombia (1926-1929), Mexico (1929-1934). Eventually he will<br />
be appointed as Minister in Sweden (1938-1939).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 333<br />
feelings, but also efforts and deeds. We see in you <strong>the</strong> representative of this policy of<br />
international peace and collaboration.<br />
Then, talking about <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with Great Britain, Mr. Munters said: “It is almost 18 years<br />
since <strong>the</strong> English government has sent us <strong>the</strong>ir first representatives: ships of His Majesty’s fleet<br />
and officers of <strong>the</strong> British army. They have stood beside us in our most difficult moments, as<br />
well as in <strong>the</strong> most memorable ones, of our fight for independence. They did <strong>the</strong>ir duty with <strong>the</strong><br />
calm and discretion that we are used to identify with Englishmen and are still our friends today.<br />
Five years later, in 1923, I received <strong>the</strong> visit of a delegation of <strong>the</strong> House of Commons, and since<br />
<strong>the</strong>n and until now we have had an increasing number of political, economic and cultural<br />
connections between <strong>the</strong> two countries. Your visit is <strong>the</strong> first visit of a member of <strong>the</strong> British<br />
government and, as such, it ends a period of successful activity and constitutes a good sign for<br />
<strong>the</strong> bloom of our future mutual <strong>relations</strong>.”<br />
In response, Lord Plymouth warmly thanked for <strong>the</strong> welcome, and expressing his conviction<br />
that his visit would help in <strong>the</strong> consolidation of <strong>the</strong> Latvian-British <strong>relations</strong>, he said: “These<br />
<strong>relations</strong> spring, as Mr. Munters has emphasized now, not only from a tight friendship, but also<br />
from <strong>the</strong> mutual <strong>relations</strong> in <strong>the</strong> economic and cultural fields, also from our common purpose<br />
in <strong>the</strong> wider sphere of international collaboration. It is maybe very little necessary for me to<br />
assure you that <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> foreign policy of <strong>the</strong> Government of His Majesty is to maintain<br />
general and perpetual peace and agreement worldwide. The Latvian government showed that<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own purposes are <strong>the</strong> same.”<br />
As regards <strong>the</strong> conversations of Lord Plymouth, <strong>the</strong>y were for <strong>the</strong> most part, as my British<br />
colleague informed me, a rephrase of <strong>the</strong>se two speeches, advising strict neutrality between<br />
Germans and Soviets, collaboration between <strong>the</strong> Baltic and Scandinavian countries and warm<br />
faithfulness to <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, assuring <strong>the</strong> benevolence and even solicitude of Great<br />
Britain, and Mr. Munters and his Government colleagues showed that this policy was attended<br />
by Latvia until now and that strictly national interest itself dictates not to deviate from it.<br />
Lord Plymouth also expressed his wish of intensifying <strong>the</strong> commercial exchange between<br />
Latvia and Great Britain, especially in order to enhance <strong>the</strong> Latvian importation of English<br />
merchandise, thus balancing as much as possible <strong>the</strong> trade balance, which until now has been<br />
much adverse for Great Britain.<br />
In a short conversation between Lord Plymouth and myself during lunch at <strong>the</strong> British<br />
legation, he told me that he came to <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries to collect information and that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
countries gave him a very good feeling and that <strong>the</strong> British government, who wishes a free<br />
Baltic Sea, saw with good eyes both <strong>the</strong>ir economic efforts and <strong>the</strong>ir cautious policy.<br />
The opinion of <strong>the</strong> leading circles and of <strong>the</strong> Latvian public regarding Mr. Plymouth’s stay<br />
and regarding Great Britain in <strong>the</strong> current circumstances is faithfully mirrored in <strong>the</strong> editorial<br />
from June 6 th of “Rīts” newspaper from Riga, written for this visit.<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> newspaper, all <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, including Scandinavia, are currently tightly<br />
connected to Great Britain and joined <strong>the</strong> so-called “pound block”. From <strong>the</strong> political point of<br />
view, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States are also <strong>the</strong> ones supporting more actively and wholeheartedly <strong>the</strong> peace<br />
and safety aspirations of Great Britain in <strong>the</strong> North-Eastern Europe. Small and medium states<br />
see in <strong>the</strong>ir collaboration with Great Britain, whose political importance becomes ever higher<br />
and influential, <strong>the</strong> most certain guarantee for <strong>the</strong>ir independence. Englishmen have confided<br />
for years in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, but <strong>the</strong> Italian-Abyssinian conflagration, <strong>the</strong> militaristic
334 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
feelings of national-socialist Germany, <strong>the</strong> armed conflicts from <strong>the</strong> Far East and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
circumstances forced <strong>the</strong>m to review <strong>the</strong>ir opinions about Geneva. They reached <strong>the</strong> conclusion<br />
that only a militarily powerful Great Britain, in tight collaboration and in complete agreement<br />
with France, can safeguard <strong>the</strong> League of Nations against a fatal crisis and give <strong>the</strong> manpower<br />
and fighting power for peace and safety in Europe. Western safety is related to <strong>the</strong> safety in <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r parts of Europe; <strong>the</strong> idea of undividable peace is <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> external policy of <strong>the</strong><br />
British Empire, which has always supported collective safety and <strong>the</strong> principles of <strong>the</strong> League of<br />
Nations, with all its prestige and power. Now this policy is supported by impressive military<br />
power, which has already given gladdening results. This is <strong>the</strong> explanation of <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
Germany has become much more moderate and conciliating and that <strong>the</strong> Spanish events have<br />
not generated a conflagration.<br />
“England – <strong>the</strong> newspaper concludes – has always sided with small states and in <strong>the</strong> current<br />
concrete case, with Latvia. Let us remember our fights for independence, in which <strong>the</strong> English<br />
fleet participated effectively, and let us not forget <strong>the</strong> priceless support given to our statesmen<br />
by <strong>the</strong> British diplomacy for <strong>the</strong> consolidation and stabilization of <strong>the</strong> international situation of<br />
Latvia. Since <strong>the</strong>n, England has been on <strong>the</strong> first place in our commercial exchange, and our<br />
commerce with its ports is <strong>the</strong> most vivid and active ...”<br />
II.<br />
On June 8 th , at 2 o’clock, Lord Plymouth departed from Riga by plane and after one hour’s<br />
flight, he reached Kaunas. He was welcomed at <strong>the</strong> airfield by Mr. Lozoraitis, Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs, by all <strong>the</strong> higher clerks of <strong>the</strong> ministry, by a large number of diplomats and<br />
Lithuanian personalities.<br />
Just like in Riga, for two days and a half visits, meetings and trips took place.<br />
He had long meetings with Mr. Smetona, President of <strong>the</strong> republic, with <strong>the</strong> prime-minister<br />
Tūbelis, and especially with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs Lozoraitis.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> evening of June 8 th , Mr. Lozoraitis offered a dinner followed by a reception in honour<br />
of <strong>the</strong> British guest.<br />
In his speech on this occasion, he showed that <strong>the</strong> friendly <strong>relations</strong> existing between Great<br />
Britain and Lithuania from <strong>the</strong> first days of <strong>the</strong> regained independence have developed more<br />
and more lately. This is especially obvious in <strong>the</strong> economic field, as <strong>the</strong> exchange of<br />
merchandise between <strong>the</strong> two countries is growing, and Great Britain becomes <strong>the</strong> main<br />
market for <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian products. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong> became tight at political level,<br />
too. Both Great Britain and Lithuania are profoundly devoted to peace.<br />
“Lithuania – <strong>the</strong> minister said – greets <strong>the</strong> collaboration policy that Great Britain foresaw<br />
and whose bases are established through <strong>the</strong> Pact of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, to which Lithuania<br />
remains devoted.”<br />
In his response, Lord Plymouth showed <strong>the</strong> friendly <strong>relations</strong> dating back to <strong>the</strong> Middle<br />
Ages, between Lithuania and Great Britain and expressed his conviction that <strong>the</strong>se relation will<br />
consolidate more in <strong>the</strong> future and that his visit itself will be a contribution to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
enhancement.<br />
On June 9 th , Lord Plymouth was President Smetona’s guest.<br />
The conversations he had in <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian capital followed <strong>the</strong> same line and debated <strong>the</strong><br />
same ideas as <strong>the</strong> conversations in Riga. Even <strong>the</strong> economic issue is <strong>the</strong> same: <strong>the</strong> Anglo-<br />
Lithuanian trade is much adverse for England.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 335<br />
There are still two issues of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian policy on which Lord Plymouth asked for<br />
detailed information: <strong>the</strong> Klaipėda (Memel) issue and <strong>the</strong> Vilna issue. If for <strong>the</strong> first a modus<br />
vivendi was found and thus <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with Germany improved a great deal in <strong>the</strong> past year,<br />
<strong>the</strong> second one unfortunately seems hopeless and foils any possibility of normal <strong>relations</strong> with<br />
<strong>the</strong> most natural of Lithuania’s neighbours, Poland. As I am informed by my Lithuanian<br />
colleague, Lord Plymouth was given all explanations and necessary documentation in <strong>the</strong>se<br />
matters. But apart from expressing his wish of finding a solution to end <strong>the</strong> conflict with<br />
Poland, Lord Plymouth avoided to express any opinion or to attempt any mediation. He stated<br />
that he would report to Mr. Eden about his findings in this trip to <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries.<br />
The editorial from June 8 th of <strong>the</strong> officious “Lietuvos Aidas” describes how Lord Plymouth’s<br />
visit was received in Lithuania and <strong>the</strong> feelings and ideas it aroused.<br />
“Great Britain – <strong>the</strong> newspaper says – this classic country of liberty, saw with benevolence<br />
Lithuania’s attempts of regaining independence. Lithuanians will never forget England’s<br />
support after <strong>the</strong> Great War. The influence of Great Britain was repeatedly decisive in solving<br />
important business of our external policy, ei<strong>the</strong>r in Geneva or in o<strong>the</strong>r international<br />
institutions. We can remember today with satisfaction and gratitude that <strong>the</strong> attitude of Great<br />
Britain has always been based on righteousness and justice, which is why it has been favourable<br />
to us. The policy of Great Britain tends to maintain peace. Great Britain defends <strong>the</strong> principle of<br />
undividable peace and collective safety, as it derives from <strong>the</strong> pact of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations.<br />
This is <strong>the</strong> precise main landmark in <strong>the</strong> guideline of our external policy.”<br />
As for <strong>the</strong> foreign press, <strong>the</strong> opinions vary.<br />
The English press starting with “Times” and <strong>the</strong> French press starting with “Le Temps” and<br />
“Journal des Débats” comment <strong>the</strong> voyage of Lord Plymouth favourably and emphasize <strong>the</strong><br />
usefulness of <strong>the</strong> good <strong>relations</strong> between Great Britain and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States aimed for peace,<br />
praising <strong>the</strong>m for <strong>the</strong>ir cautious attitude.<br />
The Soviet newspaper „Izvestia” interprets this voyage as <strong>the</strong> refusal of England to leave <strong>the</strong><br />
domination of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, which it considers safe after <strong>the</strong> Anglo-German naval agreement<br />
from July 1935, to Germany. According to <strong>the</strong> Soviet newspaper, Englishmen consolidate <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
positions against <strong>the</strong> German and Italian fascist threats, both in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and in<br />
Scandinavia, and in Central and Eastern Europe, which generates great difficulties to <strong>the</strong><br />
aggressive policy.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> occasion of this visit, „Boersenzeitung” from Berlin comments on <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States, showing that <strong>the</strong>y maintain strict neutrality between Germany and Russia and<br />
look for tighter <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Scandinavian states, and since Great Britain proves to be<br />
interested in <strong>the</strong> Scandinavian business and <strong>the</strong> issues of Eastern Europe, <strong>the</strong>y anchor <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
hopes in London and feel sheltered by <strong>the</strong> “pax Britannica” wings.<br />
To sum up, Lord Plymouth’s visit to Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was – putting<br />
aside <strong>the</strong> formal way of returning previous visits to London – an informative journey for him<br />
and for <strong>the</strong> Foreign Office, a journey of propaganda for <strong>the</strong> intensification of <strong>the</strong> anglophilia in<br />
<strong>the</strong>se countries and of encouragement for <strong>the</strong> maintenance of <strong>the</strong>ir current neutrality and<br />
abstinence attitude both towards Germany and towards <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, vol. 7, s. 18-26.
336 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
127. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1937. g. 28. jūn. konfidenciālais ziņojums<br />
ārlietu ministram V. Munteram<br />
Rumānijas karaļa viesošanās Varšavā nav līdz šim devusi daudz ko vairāk par to, ko jau<br />
dzirdēja, kad viesojās Rumānijā Polijas Valsts prezidents. Tie paši apgalvojumi, kādus dzirdēja<br />
toreiz, atkārtojas tagad. Preses izteicieni vienādi noskaņoti, un tie zināmā mērā dalās ļoti stipri,<br />
pie kam opozīcijas prese uztur spēkā visus tos pašus iebildumus, kādus tā izteica agrāk.<br />
Nekādas īstas un patiesas sajūsmas te neredz. Viss sarīkojums ir lielā mērā oficiāls, mazāk<br />
sabiedrisks. Pils mielastā teiktās runās nav nekādu uzkrītošu atsevišķu lietu, kas norādītu uz<br />
politiskām noskaņām. Mielastā pārsteidza it visus, ka pēkšņi Valsts prezidenta runā parādījās<br />
ierosinājums par Polijas sūtniecības Bukarestē pārvēršanu vēstniecībā. Šis ierosinājums bija ļoti<br />
atturīgi izteikts un tāpat atturīgā formā atbildēja uz šo ierosinājumu karalis. Runas bija jau<br />
franču tulkojumā katram viesim noliktas priekšā, kopā ar meniju [ēdienkarti] un, tātad ar runu<br />
saturu varēja iepazīties tādēļ dinejas sākumā. Kad nāca ierosinājums par sūtniecību pacelšanu<br />
augstākā pārstāvībā, daudzi apskatījās un jautāja, ko gan tas varētu nozīmēt, ka ierosinājums<br />
nācis pēkšņi. Bija novērots, ka priekšlikums izstrādāts turpat pie galda, pie kam Beks uzmeta<br />
runas papildinājumu, tad notikusi staigāšana pie karaļa. Tuvāk sēdošie varējuši redzēt, ka<br />
notiek dzīva domu izmaiņa par ierosinājumu. Rumānijas sūtnis Zamfiresku, kas man sēdēja<br />
pretim pie galda, neko nezināja, ka ierosinājumu taisa, un viņš bija ļoti pārsteigts. Teiktos<br />
vārdus, zīmējoties uz pārstāvniecību paaugstināšanu, visādi mēģina iztulkot. Apšaubīja pat, vai<br />
atturīgā ierosinājuma forma nepaliks tikai kā ideja, un ka šīs idejas realizēšanai vēl labs laika<br />
sprīdis priekšā. Francijas vēstnieks Noels 1 taisīja piezīmi, ka Čehoslovākijai ar Dienvidslāviju<br />
vajadzēšot paaugstināt arī savas sūtniecības par vēstniecībām. Citi atkal aizrādīja, ka pēkšņais<br />
žests varētu izsaukt izbrīnu Parīzē. Prātošana ap to nebeidzās arī vakar lielās militārās parādes<br />
laikā [..]. Sarunās pa karaļa viesošanās laiku ļoti bieži varēja novērot zināmas rūpes par<br />
pašreizējo stāvokli, lai gan nevarētu teikt, ka valdītu lielāka bezcerība [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2179. l., 208.–209. lp.<br />
127. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs V. Munters, 28 th June 1937<br />
So far <strong>the</strong> visit of Romania’s king to Warsaw has not given much more than what was<br />
already heard when <strong>the</strong> President of Poland was visiting Romania. The same statements that<br />
were heard <strong>the</strong>n are now being reiterated. The press statements also persist in <strong>the</strong> same mood<br />
and to a certain extent are very strongly divided and <strong>the</strong> opposition press persists with <strong>the</strong> same<br />
objections that it voiced earlier. No real and genuine enthusiasm can be observed. The entire<br />
event is largely official ra<strong>the</strong>r than public. Speeches delivered at <strong>the</strong> banquet in <strong>the</strong> palace<br />
contain no concrete striking details, which would point to political attitudes. At <strong>the</strong> banquet<br />
everybody was surprised by <strong>the</strong> sudden proposition voiced in <strong>the</strong> President’s speech for an<br />
Embassy of Poland to be opened in Bucharest. This proposition was expressed in a very<br />
reserved manner and <strong>the</strong> King replied to <strong>the</strong> proposition in an equally reserved manner. The<br />
speeches in translation into French had been placed in front of every guest toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong><br />
menu so that <strong>the</strong> content of <strong>the</strong> speeches could be studied at <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> dinner.<br />
When it came to <strong>the</strong> suggestion about <strong>the</strong> raising of missions to <strong>the</strong> highest level, many looked<br />
1<br />
Leons Noels (Noël; 1888–1986), Francijas diplomāts. 1932.–1935. g. sūtnis Čehoslovākijā, 1935.–1939. g. vēstnieks<br />
Polijā.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 337<br />
[into <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> speech, where <strong>the</strong> suggestion was missing] and asked what it could mean<br />
that <strong>the</strong> proposition came so suddenly. It had been noticed that <strong>the</strong> proposal had been<br />
elaborated on site, at <strong>the</strong> table, Beck drafting an amendment to <strong>the</strong> speech and <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> King<br />
had been approached. Those who were sitting closer were able to see a live exchange of views<br />
about <strong>the</strong> proposition. Romania’s Envoy Zamfirescu who was sitting across <strong>the</strong> table from me<br />
knew nothing about such a proposition being prepared and he was very surprised. Different<br />
interpretations of <strong>the</strong> uttered words related to <strong>the</strong> raising of <strong>the</strong> level of legations are<br />
attempted. It was even suggested that <strong>the</strong> proposition in its reserved form would remain an<br />
idea only and that long time would pass before <strong>the</strong> actual implementation of <strong>the</strong> idea.<br />
Ambassador of France Noël 1 remarked that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, too would have to<br />
raise <strong>the</strong>ir legations to <strong>the</strong> level of embassies. O<strong>the</strong>rs noted that <strong>the</strong> sudden gesture could cause<br />
surprise in Paris. Speculation about it did not cease during <strong>the</strong> grand military parade yesterday<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r [..] In <strong>the</strong> discussions during <strong>the</strong> King’s visit certain concern about <strong>the</strong> current situation<br />
could very often be heard although it cannot be said that hopelessness has increased [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2179, s. 208–209.<br />
128. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1937. g. 30. jūn. konfidenciālais ziņojums<br />
ārlietu ministram V. Munteram<br />
Rumānijas karaļa viesošanās [laikā] norisinājās vairākas plašas svinības, kurās bija iespējams<br />
satikties ar dažādiem cilvēkiem un taisīt dažādus vērojumus [..]. Pēc mielasta Karaļa pilī<br />
pagājušo sestdienu, kurā, kā jau man gods bija ziņot, Polijas Valsts prezidents savas runas<br />
beigās izteica vēlēšanos pārvērst Polijas sūtniecību Bukarestē par vēstniecību, visās sarunās<br />
atkārtojas jautājums, ko gan šī propozīcija nozīmē [..]. Vakar pēdējā pieņemšanā pie Rumānijas<br />
karaļa kāda informēta persona man teica, ka Beks ierosinājis tādu domu, jau Bukarestē būdams,<br />
bet tur esot izvairījušies. Tagad pašā mielastā Beks nācis no jauna ar savu ierosinājumu [..]. Šī<br />
runas daļa, zīmējoties uz sūtniecības pārvēršanu vēstniecībā, uzkrita visiem, kā jau teikts, atrod<br />
vēl vienmēr interesi, pie kam aizrāda, ka Beka nodoms bijis arī šai gadījumā turpināt<br />
Čehoslovākijas izolēšanas politiku. Tāds ir vispārējs spriedums diplomātiskā korpusā. Aizrāda<br />
vēl, ka rumāņi bija gan frančiem teikuši jau dažas dienas pirms minētā mielasta, ka poļiem esot<br />
tāda ideja, bet poļi no savas puses frančiem nav neviena vārda sacījuši. To man apstiprināja no<br />
Francijas vēstniecības, pie kam piemetināja, ka šī izturēšanās atradīšot atkal nepatīkamu atbalsi<br />
Parīzē. Tā pati persona, kas man to sacīja, atgriezusies dažas dienas atpakaļ no Parīzes, un tā<br />
varējusi tur vērot, ka visās aprindās noskaņojums pret Poliju paliekot ļaunāks. Svinībās varēja<br />
vērot, ka Padomju vēstniecība izturas pret tām ne visai labvēlīgi un draudzīgi. Pats vēstnieks īsi<br />
pirms karaļa ierašanās Polijā aizbrauca uz Franciju un viņa vietas izpildītājs Vinogradovs 2 nekur<br />
nebija redzams. Šur tur tikai militārais atašejs parādījās un kāds no jaunākiem civiliem<br />
atašejiem. Spriežot pēc iespaidiem, kas man bija no pēdējās sarunas ar vēstnieku Davtjanu, 3 par<br />
kuru jau ziņoju, jādomā, ka šī izturēšanās politiski vērtējama un, ka tā runā par tām pašām ne<br />
visai draudzīgām attiecībām, kas pastāv starp Poliju un Padomju Savienību, un kurām, cik var<br />
vērot, nav nekādas izredzes uzlaboties [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2179. l., 188.–190. lp.<br />
1<br />
Léon Noël (1888–1986), French diplomat, 1932–1935 Envoy to Czechoslovakia, 1935–1939 Ambassador to Poland.<br />
2<br />
Boriss Vinogradovs (1903–1938), Padomju Savienības diplomāts. Vēstniecības 1. sekretārs Polijā.<br />
3<br />
Jakovs Davtjans (1888–1937), Padomju Savienības diplomāts. 1934.–1937. g. vēstnieks Polijā.
338 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
128. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs V. Munters, 30 th June 1937<br />
[During] <strong>the</strong> visit of Romania’s King several large-scale festivities took place, at which it was<br />
possible to meet different people and to make observations [..] After <strong>the</strong> banquet in <strong>the</strong> King’s<br />
palace last Saturday, during which, as I already had <strong>the</strong> honour to report, at <strong>the</strong> end of his<br />
speech <strong>the</strong> President of Poland expressed a wish to turn Poland’s legation in Bucharest into an<br />
embassy, in all discussions <strong>the</strong> question what this proposition actually means is being repeated<br />
[..] Yesterday, in <strong>the</strong> last reception hosted by <strong>the</strong> King of Romania a well-informed person told<br />
me that Beck had expressed such an idea already during his visit in Bucharest but <strong>the</strong>re it had<br />
been avoided. Now at <strong>the</strong> banquet of all places Beck has again come forward with his<br />
proposition [..] The particular part of his speech that concerns <strong>the</strong> turning of <strong>the</strong> legation into<br />
an embassy stroke everyone, as was already mentioned, it is still attracting interest and it is<br />
being remarked that it had been Beck’s intention on this occasion, too, to continue <strong>the</strong> policy of<br />
isolating Czechoslovakia. It is <strong>the</strong> general opinion of <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps. It is also being noted<br />
that already a few days before <strong>the</strong> aforementioned banquet <strong>the</strong> Romanians had told <strong>the</strong> French<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Poles had such an idea but <strong>the</strong> Poles in <strong>the</strong>ir turn had not said a word about it to <strong>the</strong><br />
French. I got <strong>the</strong> confirmation of it at <strong>the</strong> French Embassy where it was also added that such<br />
behaviour would find a very unpleasant echo in Paris. The person who told me this a few days<br />
ago had returned from Paris where he could have observed <strong>the</strong> attitude towards Poland<br />
becoming worse and worse in all circles. It was possible to notice that <strong>the</strong> attitude of <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Embassy towards <strong>the</strong>m [<strong>the</strong> festivities] was not particularly favourable and friendly. The<br />
Ambassador himself left for France shortly before <strong>the</strong> King’s visit to Poland and his deputy<br />
Vinogradov 1 was nowhere to be seen. Only <strong>the</strong> military attaché and some of <strong>the</strong> junior civil<br />
attachés appeared at some places. Based on <strong>the</strong> impression that I got from my last discussion<br />
with Ambassador Davtjan 2 , about which I already reported, <strong>the</strong> conclusion should be drawn<br />
that this attitude is to be evaluated in political terms [as a political signal] and that it signalised<br />
<strong>the</strong> not-very-friendly <strong>relations</strong> that exist between Poland and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and, as far as it<br />
can be observed, have no prospect whatsoever to improve [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2179, s. 188–190.<br />
129. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1937. g. 3. jūl. konfidenciālais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram par Polijas–Rumānijas attiecībām.<br />
Šodien man bija apspriede ar Igaunijas sūtni Markusu par tekošiem jautājumiem, kā tas<br />
parasts. Mēs pakavējāmies tūliņ sākumā pie novērojumiem pa Rumānijas karaļa viesošanās<br />
laiku, sev jautājot, kāda varētu būt politiska nozīme un svars Varšavas–Bukarestes politikai.<br />
Savos novērojumos varēju konstatēt, ka tiklab vāci, kā itāļi, cik to var saskatīt te, raugās uz<br />
Rumānijas–Polijas satuvošanos ar zināmu atturību, jā, pat šaubām, kas no tā varētu iznākt.<br />
Markusam bijusi saruna ar vāciem, man ar itāļiem, kā par to jau Jums ziņoju atsevišķi, un abi<br />
mēs dabūjuši iespaidu, ka preses balsis, kas tik jūsmīgi izteicās Beka vizītes laikā Bukarestē par<br />
rumāņu–poļu līgumu un abu tautu paredzamo politiku, tagad daudz klusākas un tādu pašu<br />
iespaidu dabū no sarunām. Vāciem izliekoties, ka jaunā ass varētu vest pārāk patstāvīgu politiku<br />
un var arī savu iespaidu mēģināt paplašināt Balkānos, neatkarīgi no vācu–itāļu virziena.<br />
1<br />
Boris Vinogradov (1903–1938), Soviet diplomat, First Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Embassy in Poland.<br />
2<br />
Jakov Davtjan (1888–1937), Soviet diplomat, 1934–1937 Ambassador in Poland.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 339<br />
Apsvēruši visus šos novērojumus, nācām pie ieskata, ka tiešām Varšavas–Bukarestes ass var<br />
pastiprināt joslas pozīciju starp Padomju Krieviju un Vāciju un bez tam padarīt vispār poļu–<br />
rumāņu politiku brīvāku, ja vien būs priekš tam vajadzīgā vēlēšanās un noteiktība.<br />
Neapšaubāmi, ka abas valstis pēc līguma attiecību pastiprināšanas varēs censties sev pietuvināt<br />
dažas citas zemes, tādas, kas pieskaras Melnajai jūrai un tādas, kas pieiet pie Baltijas jūras. Ka uz<br />
tādu pusi ir tieksme, un ka to vēlas abas valstis, var saprast no preses atsauksmēm, tiklab poļu,<br />
kā rumāņu pusē. Apspriedām tālāk dažus izteicienus, ko esam dzirdējuši no šejienes Ārlietu<br />
ministrijas vai arī diplomātiskā korpusā un te konstatējām, ka Polijas nostāšanās pret lorda<br />
Plimuta, 1 ārlietu ministra Sandlera, 2 kā arī Jūsu ceļojumu uz Maskavu 3 ir ļoti atturīga. [..] pēc<br />
apspriedes ar sūtni Markusu pie manis bija ar vizīti padomju Krievijas [vēstniecības] pagaidu<br />
vadītājs Vinogradovs, – kuru esmu raksturojis kādā agrākā ziņojumā, arī šoreiz izteicās daudz<br />
atklātāk, nekā pats vēstnieks Davtjans mēdz to darīt. Viņš tūdaļ iesāka ar to pašu Varšavas–<br />
Bukarestes politiku. Varot jau būt, ka arī itāļi un vāci jautā, ko šī politika nozīmē, bet Padomju<br />
Krievija skatoties uz to ar lielu šaubu un uzņemot svinības Varšavā kā demonstrāciju pret sevi.<br />
Rumānija gan saprotot, ka tā lielā mērā atkarājas no Padomju Savienības, tās politikai vajadzētu<br />
būt ļoti uzmanīgai, kas tā diemžēl tagad vairs neesot. Līgums starp Poliju un Rumāniju bijis<br />
slēgts pavisam citā laikā, 4 kad tam bija kāds pamats, kamēr tagad šis līgums novecojis un, ja<br />
viņu tagad tik skaļi pastiprina, tad tam sava nozīme. Polijai pieder šai gadījumā iniciatīva un tas<br />
ir raksturīgi. Beka politika ir pazīstama un par to nav Padomju Krievijā divējādu domu.<br />
Tagadējo Rumānijas politiku ved pats karalis un viņa nedraudzīgais noskaņojums pret Padomju<br />
Savienību ir pazīstams, vēl vairāk viņa tuvinieku ieskati, kas ir visi naidīgi pret Krieviju. Gan<br />
saka, ka Titulesku nāks atpakaļ, bet mums ir šaubas, tā teica Vinogradovs, un mēs nedomājam,<br />
ka Rumānijas politika varēs tik drīz grozīties, bet, sakarā [saistībā] ar Varšavu, tā var palikt tikai<br />
ļaunāka. Sarunā Vinogradovs man tēloja, kā pēc viņa – krievu domām saprast notikumus<br />
Padomju Savienībā. Par šo sarunas daļu būs man gods ziņot atsevišķi.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2179. l., 196.–198. lp.<br />
129. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs V. Munters on Poland–Romania <strong>relations</strong>, 3 rd July 1937<br />
Today I had a meeting with Estonia’s Envoy Markus to discuss <strong>the</strong> current issues, as is our<br />
tradition. At <strong>the</strong> very beginning we dwelled on <strong>the</strong> observations made during <strong>the</strong> visit of<br />
Romania’s King, wondering what could be <strong>the</strong> political meaning and weight of Warsaw–<br />
Budapest policy. From my own observations I was able to draw <strong>the</strong> conclusion that both <strong>the</strong><br />
Germans and Italians, as much as it can be seen here, regard <strong>the</strong> approaching of Romania and<br />
Poland with reserve, indeed, even with doubt about what could come of it. Markus has had a<br />
discussion with <strong>the</strong> Germans, me – with <strong>the</strong> Italians, as I already reported to you individually,<br />
and we both have got <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> voices in <strong>the</strong> press, which during Beck’s visit to<br />
Bucharest spoke so enthusiastically about <strong>the</strong> Romanian–Polish agreement and <strong>the</strong> predictable<br />
1<br />
Aivors Mailzs Vindzors-Klīvs, 2. Plimutas grāfs (Plymouth; 1889–1943), Lielbritānijas lords, valstsvīrs. 1936.–1939.<br />
g. valsts parlamentārais apakšekretārs ārlietās (viceministrs), Starptautiskās Neiejaukšanās komitejas<br />
priekšsēdētājs.<br />
2<br />
Rikards Sandlers (Sandler; 1884–1964), Zviedrijas valstsvīrs. 1911.–1934. g. Zviedrijas Sociāldemokrātiskās partijas<br />
Centrālās komitejas loceklis. Vairākkārt Ministru kabineta loceklis, 1925. g. premjerministrs, 1927., 1929., 1931.–<br />
1932. g. pārstāvis Tautu Savienībā, 1932.–1940. g. ārlietu ministrs.<br />
3<br />
Vilhelms Munters vizītē Maskavā, Sevastopolē, Harkovā un Ļeņingradā bija 1937. g. 15.–22. jūnijā.<br />
4<br />
Runa ir par 1921. g. noslēgto Polijas – Rumānijas līgumu par militāro sadarbību.
340 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
policy of <strong>the</strong> two peoples, are much more silent now, and <strong>the</strong> discussions leave <strong>the</strong> same<br />
impression. The Germans are said to suspect that <strong>the</strong> new axis could pursue an overly<br />
independent policy and may also try to expand its influence in <strong>the</strong> Balkans, regardless of <strong>the</strong><br />
German–Italian axis. Having considered all of <strong>the</strong>se observations, we came to <strong>the</strong> conclusion<br />
that Warsaw–Bucharest axis may indeed streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>the</strong> belt between Soviet<br />
Russia and Germany, and in addition, make <strong>the</strong> Polish–Romanian policy freer in general, if only<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> necessary wish and commitment for that. No doubt, after <strong>the</strong> consolidation of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
contractual <strong>relations</strong> both countries will be in <strong>the</strong> position of drawing some o<strong>the</strong>r countries<br />
closer to <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>the</strong> countries that stand on <strong>the</strong> coast of <strong>the</strong> Black Sea and countries that have<br />
access to <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea. That <strong>the</strong>re is an inclination in that direction and that it is what both<br />
countries want, could be understood from reports in <strong>the</strong> press, both <strong>the</strong> Polish and Romanian.<br />
We also discussed a few statements that we had heard voiced in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
of this country or in <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps and came to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that Poland’s attitude<br />
towards Lord Plymouth’s 1 , Minister of Foreign Affairs Sandler’s 2 , as well a Your trip to Moscow 3<br />
was very reserved. [..] After <strong>the</strong> discussion with Envoy Markus I was visited by Soviet Russia’s<br />
[Embassy’s] interim head Vinogradov – whom I have described in an earlier report, and this<br />
time again he spoke much more openly than Ambassador Davtjan himself usually does. He<br />
immediately started [<strong>the</strong> conversation] with <strong>the</strong> same [issue of] Warsaw–Bucharest policy. [He<br />
said that] it was probably true that <strong>the</strong> Italians and Germans were wondering what this policy<br />
meant, but Soviet Russia regarded it with great doubt and perceived <strong>the</strong> celebrations in Warsaw<br />
as a demonstration against itself. Romania did understand [he remarked] that it was largely<br />
dependant on Soviet Russia, its policy should be very careful, which it regretfully no longer was.<br />
The agreement between Poland and Romania had been concluded in a completely different<br />
time 4 , when it had some grounds, while now <strong>the</strong> agreement was dated and if now it was<br />
consolidated with so much noise, <strong>the</strong>n it had a meaning of its own. On this occasion <strong>the</strong><br />
initiative was coming from Poland and it was typical. Beck’s policy was well-known and in<br />
Soviet Russia opinions did not differ on it. The current Romania’s policy was pursued by <strong>the</strong><br />
King himself and his unfriendly-to-<strong>the</strong>-Soviet Union attitude was well-known and even more so<br />
– <strong>the</strong> views of his relatives, all of whom were hostile towards Russia. “They say though that<br />
Titulescu would return, but I doubt it,” said Vinogradov, “and we do not think that Romania’s<br />
policy will have a chance to change so fast but with regard to Warsaw it can become only<br />
worse.” In <strong>the</strong> discussion Vinogradov described to me <strong>the</strong> way how in his – a Russian person’s<br />
opinion <strong>the</strong> events taking place in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union should be perceived. About this part of <strong>the</strong><br />
conversation I will have <strong>the</strong> honour to report individually.<br />
LVVA, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2179, s. 196–198.<br />
1<br />
Ivor Miles Windsor-Clive, 2 nd Earl of Plymouth (1889–1943), British Lord, 1936–1939 Parliamentary Under-<br />
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (vice-minister), Chairman of <strong>the</strong> International Committee for Non-<br />
Intervention.<br />
2<br />
Richard Sandler (1884–1964), Swedish statesman, 1911–1934 member of <strong>the</strong> Central Committee of <strong>the</strong> Social<br />
Democratic Party of Sweden. Several times member of <strong>the</strong> Cabinet, 1925 Prime Minister, 1927, 1929, 1931–1932<br />
representative in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, 1932–1940 Minister of Foreign Affairs.<br />
3<br />
Vilhelms Munters visited Moscow, Sevastopol, Kharkov and Leningrad on 15 th – 22 nd June, 1937.<br />
4<br />
Here is meant <strong>the</strong> treaty on military co-operation concluded between Poland and Romania in 1921.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 341<br />
130. Latvijas Ārlietu ministrijas Administratīvās un protokola nodaļas 1937. g. 17.<br />
sept. raksts Juridiskajai nodaļai<br />
Ārlietu ministrs V. Munters ziņo no Ženēvas, ka Rumānijas ārlietu ministrs Antonesku š. g.<br />
16. septembrī piekritis tirdzniecības sarunām ar Latviju 11. decembrī. Antonesku lūdzis, lai mūsu<br />
ģenerālkonsuls Bukarestē T. Orgidans ierodas Rumānijas Ārlietu ministrijā uz pārrunām pēc<br />
Antonesku atgriešanās no Ženēvas.<br />
Par sarunām informēts sūtnis Prāgā M. Nukša un lūgts Antonesku piekrišanu apstiprināt ar<br />
notu Rumānijas Ārlietu ministrijai.<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 13. apr., 576. l., b. p.<br />
130. Note by Administrative and Protocol Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs of Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Law Department, 17 th September 1937<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Munters reports from Geneva that on 16 th September, this year<br />
Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonescu has agreed to have trade negotiations with<br />
Latvia on 11 th December. Antonescu has asked for our general Consul in Bucharest T. Orghidan<br />
to come to Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a discussion after Antonescu’s return from<br />
Geneva.<br />
Envoy in Prague M. Nukša was informed about <strong>the</strong> discussion and was asked to write a note<br />
to Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirming Antonescu’s agreement [to have<br />
negotiations].<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 13, file 576, without pagination.<br />
131. Latvijas sūtniecības Prāgā I šķiras sekretāra Ē. Igenberga 1937. g. 30. dec.<br />
ziņojums sūtnim M. Nukšam<br />
Š. g. 6. decembrī saņēmu saimnieciskās delegācijas priekšsēdētāja, vicedirektora J. Volmāra 1<br />
kunga telegrammu no Bukarestes un steidzami tai pašā dienā izbraucu uz Bukaresti, lai<br />
pievienotos delegācijai. Darbībai delegācijā nekādas speciālas instrukcijas no mūsu ministrijas<br />
nesaņēmu, tādēļ darbojos tur, pamatojoties uz priekšdarbiem, kurus izvedu Prāgā. Bez tam,<br />
ierodoties Bukarestē, saņēmu arī plašus materiālus no delegācijas priekšsēdētāja. Par savu<br />
uzdevumu uzskatīju arī formālās un protokolārās puses kārtošanas.<br />
Rumānija. Bukarestē vispirms izdarījām vizītes Ārlietu ministrijā, kur viceministrs pieņēma<br />
delegācijas priekšsēdētāju, tad, kad es vēl nebiju ieradies Bukarestē. Pēc manas ierašanās kopīgi<br />
apmeklējām Ārlietu ministrijas Tautsaimniecības departamenta, pilnvaroto ministru Hristu,<br />
protokolšefu Grigorkea un bijušo Rumānijas sūtni Rīgā Valimaresku. Tirdzniecības ministrijā<br />
apmeklējām ministru Bujoiu un ģenerālsekretāru Marianu. Neskatoties uz to, ka mūsu<br />
delegācija ieradās Bukarestē dažas dienas pirms nozīmētā termiņa, kā arī uz to, ka rumāņiem<br />
tai pašā laikā Bukarestē nācās vest sarunas ar turkiem un vāciešiem, rumāņu delegācija tika<br />
tūdaļ sastādīta, un mēs varējām jau 9. decembrī noturēt pirmo sēdi. Rumānijas delegācijas<br />
vadītājs bija prof.[esors] Jons Gr. Dimitresku, Tirdzniecības ministrijas Ārējās tirdzniecības<br />
departamenta direktors. Bez tam delegācijā iegāja ing. Stefans Mitesku, Kontingentu direkcijas<br />
vadītājs, Aurels Smadu, Eksporta institūta direktors, Demetrie D. Buzdugans, Ārlietu ministrijas<br />
padomnieks, Demetrie Emanoils, Rumānijas Nacionālbankas Tirdzniecības līgumu direkcijas<br />
loceklis. Sēdes notika Eksportinstitūta telpās un mūsu delegācijā, kā lietpratējs piedalījās arī<br />
1<br />
Jānis Volmārs (1900–1982), Latvijas Finanšu ministrijas Rūpniecības departamenta vicedirektors. Miris ASV.
342 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
mūsu goda ģenerālkonsuls T. Orgidans, kurš, pateicoties saviem sakariem un lietpratībai,<br />
izrādījās par visai vērtīgu atbalstu mūsu darbā. Delegāciju sēdes notika gan priekšpusdienās,<br />
gan pēcpusdienā, bet starplaikā vairākas reizes sanācām uz delegācijas iekšējām apspriedēm.<br />
Mūsu eksports uz Rumāniju nekad nebija liels. Tikai 1930. un 1932. gadā mūsu eksports nedaudz<br />
pārsniedza miljonu latu, lai pēc tam atkal noslīdētu gandrīz līdz nullei, kā tas bija pagājušajā<br />
gadā. Mūsu galvenās preces ir linu diedziņi, linsēklas, ultramarīns un gumijas apavi, pie kam,<br />
pateicoties savas rūpniecības attīstībai, pēdējās divas preces Rumānijai vairs gandrīz nav<br />
vajadzīgas, un paliek galvenām kārtām linu diedziņi un linsēklas un mazākos apmēros –<br />
gumijas apavi. Mums turpretim arvien ir iespējams Rumānijā iegādāties naftas produktus, kādēļ<br />
sarunas vairāk grozījās ap to, kā padarīt par iespējamu mūsu eksportu uz Rumāniju, lai varētu<br />
līdzsvarot apgrozījumus. Te noskaidrojās, ka līdz šim Rumānijas Nacionālbanka atļāva ievest<br />
Latvijas preces tikai uz tā saucamo „K” (kompensācijas) atļauju pamata, tas nozīmē, ka<br />
samaksāt par Latvijas precēm varēja tikai ar brīvā tirgū iegūto valūtu, kura Bukarestē kotējās par<br />
apmēram 30% augstāk, nekā oficiālais kU.R.S.S. . Tas padarīja mūsu kalkulāciju par nereālu un<br />
tādēļ mūsu preces vairs neatmaksājās ievest. Tagad noslēgtajā līgumā noteikts, ka Rumānijas<br />
Nacionālbankai jādod „devises libres” 1 un nevis kompensācijas jeb eksportvalūtu, kā agrāk. Šeit,<br />
pēc manām domām, ir arī galvenie panākumi, jo tagad mūsu preces noteikti bauda vislabāko<br />
ievedkārtību Rumānijā. Atkarāsies no mūsu tirgotāju interesēm un Rumānijas cenām, vai varēs<br />
tagad izmantot radušos izdevību. Tā, piemēram, ģenerālkonsuls T. Orgidans, kurš ir arī Hoffa 2<br />
firmas pārstāvis Bukarestē, mums noteikti apgalvo, ka pasūtījumi uz linu diedziņiem tagad<br />
nodrošināti. Jāsaka, liela interese bija arī par linsēklām, no kurām Rumānija domā vēl šogad<br />
pasūtīt vairākus simtus tonnu. Tā kā mūsu delegācija no savas puses sevišķi uzsvēra<br />
nepieciešamību bilanci līdzsvarot, Rumānijas delegācijai vajadzēja ieņemt stāvokli šai lietā un tā<br />
no sākuma mūsu viedoklim piekrita. Tomēr vēlāk Rumānijas Nacionālbanka pretojās tam, lai<br />
līdzsvara princips tiktu formulēts pašā līgumā, kurš tad varētu eventuāli tikt izlietots kā<br />
precedents citās sarunās. Tādēļ, lai to apietu, ieveda speciālu vēstuļu apmaiņu, kura nosaka, ka<br />
tagad Rumānijai pirmais ir jārezervē brīvo devīzu kontingents 8 miljonu leju vērtībā, kuras tiks<br />
piešķirtas Latvijas preču importieriem Rumānijā, bet mēs tad varēsim atļaut Rumānijas preces<br />
atkarībā no tā, ciktāl mūsu eksports uz šo valsti attīstīsies. Līgumu un vēstules parafēja 14.<br />
decembrī, pie kam tagad jāsaka, ka pēc vairākiem gadiem neskaidrības abu valstu tirdzniecībā,<br />
atkal ir noteikti principi, uz kuriem tirdzniecība varēs attīstīties.<br />
Jāsaka, ka visur Rumānijā mūsu delegācijai izrādīta vislielākā pretimnākšana. Delegāciju<br />
pieņēma arī tirdzniecības ministrs, kurš no savas puses uzdeva saviem pārstāvjiem rūpēties par<br />
sarunu drīzu noslēgšanu. Jāatzīst, ka patiesi te vienošanās panākta rekorda laikā, jo parasti<br />
ārzemju delegācijas Rumānijā paliek daudz ilgāk.<br />
[..]. 3<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 13. apr., 576. l., b. p.<br />
1<br />
Devises libres (franču val.) – brīvi konvertējamā valūta.<br />
2<br />
Runa par Jelgavas linu manufaktūru (vērptuvi), akciju sabiedrību „J. Hoff”, kura nodarbināja vairāk par 1600<br />
strādniekiem.<br />
3<br />
Pēc Rumānijas Latvijas delegācijas apmeklēja arī Dienvidslāviju un Čehoslovākiju.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 343<br />
131. Report by First Secretary of Latvia’s Legation in Prague Ē. Igenbergs to Envoy M.<br />
Nukša, 30 th December 1937<br />
On 6 th December, this year I received a telegram from head of <strong>the</strong> economic delegation<br />
Vice-Director Mr. J. Volmārs 1 from Bucharest and urgently left for Bucharest on <strong>the</strong> same day to<br />
join <strong>the</strong> delegation. I did not receive any special instructions from our Ministry about my<br />
function in <strong>the</strong> delegation, thus in my activities <strong>the</strong>re I built on <strong>the</strong> preparatory work that I had<br />
done in Prague. Moreover, having arrived in Bucharest, I also received a large amount of<br />
materials from <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> delegation. I considered it also my duty to organize <strong>the</strong> formal<br />
and protocolary issues.<br />
Romania. In Bucharest we first of all paid visits to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where<br />
Vice-Minister had received <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> delegation before I arrived in Bucharest. After my<br />
arrival we toge<strong>the</strong>r visited plenipotentiary minister of <strong>the</strong> Economic Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Christu 2 , Chief of protocol Grigorcea and Romania’s former Envoy in<br />
Riga Văllimărescu. In <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Commerce we visited Minister Bujoiu 3 and Secretary<br />
General Marian. Although our delegation had arrived in Bucharest a few days before <strong>the</strong> due<br />
time and although at <strong>the</strong> very same time <strong>the</strong> Romanians had to hold negotiations with <strong>the</strong><br />
Turks and Germans in Bucharest, <strong>the</strong> Romanian delegation was formed without delay and<br />
already on 9 th December we could hold <strong>the</strong> first meeting. Romania’s delegation was headed by<br />
prof[fessor] Ion Gr. Dimitrescu, Director of <strong>the</strong> External Trade Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Commerce. The delegation also included ing. Stefan Mitescu, head of <strong>the</strong> Contingents Office,<br />
Aurel Smadu, Director of <strong>the</strong> Exports Institute, Demetrie D. Buzdugan, Councillor at <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Demetrie Emanoil, Member of <strong>the</strong> Trade Agreements Office of<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Bank of Romania. Meetings took place in <strong>the</strong> facilities of <strong>the</strong> Exports Institute and<br />
in <strong>the</strong> capacity of an expert our delegation included our Honorary General Consul T. Orghidan,<br />
who, thanks to his contacts and competence, turned out to be a highly valuable support in our<br />
work. The delegations met both in mornings and in afternoons and between <strong>the</strong> meetings we<br />
several times held internal consultations within <strong>the</strong> delegation. Our exports to Romania have<br />
never reached a large volume. Only in 1930 and 1932 our exports slightly exceeded one million<br />
lats, subsequently to fall again almost to zero, as was <strong>the</strong> case last year. Our main [export]<br />
commodities are flax yarn, linseed, ultramarine and rubber footwear, moreover <strong>the</strong> last two<br />
categories are no longer demanded in Romania almost at all thanks to <strong>the</strong> development of local<br />
production and <strong>the</strong>re remain mostly flax yarn and linseed and in lesser amounts – rubber<br />
footwear. We in turn still have <strong>the</strong> chance to buy oil products in Romania, for which reason <strong>the</strong><br />
negotiations for <strong>the</strong> most part focused on <strong>the</strong> way how to make our export to Romania possible,<br />
in order to be able to balance <strong>the</strong> turnover. It turned out that so far <strong>the</strong> National Bank of<br />
Romania had permitted importing Latvia’s goods only based on <strong>the</strong> -so-called “K”<br />
(compensation) permits, which means that payment for Latvia’s goods was possible only in<br />
currency acquired in <strong>the</strong> free market, <strong>the</strong> exchange rate of such currency in Romania being<br />
approximately by 30% higher than <strong>the</strong> official rate. It made our calculation unrealistic and for<br />
this reason it was no longer cost-effective to export our goods. The agreement, which is now in<br />
1<br />
Jānis Volmārs (1900–1982), Vice-Director of <strong>the</strong> Industry Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Finance. Died in <strong>the</strong> USA.<br />
2<br />
Ion Christu (1895-1953) was a Romanian lawyer, economist, diplomat and politician. Minister for Foreign Trade<br />
(1940). Member of <strong>the</strong> Romanian delegation at <strong>the</strong> Paris Peace Conference (1945-1946). He died in political prison.<br />
3<br />
Ion Bujoiu (1894-1956) was a Romanian engineer, businessman and politician. Minister for National Economy<br />
(1939), member of anti-Communist resistance movement. He died in political prison.
344 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
force, stipulates that <strong>the</strong> National Bank of Romania should give „devises libres” 1 and not<br />
compensations or export currency as before. These, in my opinion, are <strong>the</strong> main achievements,<br />
because now our commodities definitely enjoy <strong>the</strong> best import procedure in Romania. It will<br />
depend on interest from <strong>the</strong> part of our businessmen and on prices in Romania, whe<strong>the</strong>r it will<br />
be possible to use <strong>the</strong> opportunity, which has emerged now. Thus, for example, General Consul<br />
T. Orghidan, who is also <strong>the</strong> representative of Hoff 2 company in Bucharest, affirms that<br />
procurement of flax yarn is now ensured. It should be mentioned that interest was great also in<br />
linseed, of which Romania intends to order several hundred tons still this year. Since our<br />
delegation particularly emphasised <strong>the</strong> need to establish balance in <strong>the</strong> bilateral trade,<br />
Romania’s delegation had to adopt a certain position on this issue and at <strong>the</strong> beginning it<br />
accepted our view. However, later <strong>the</strong> National Bank of Romania objected to <strong>the</strong> inclusion of<br />
<strong>the</strong> principle of balance in <strong>the</strong> agreement itself because in that case such principle could<br />
eventually be used as a precedent in o<strong>the</strong>r negotiations. Thus, in order to avoid it, an exchange<br />
of special letters was agreed on, in compliance with which Romania first of all has to reserve a<br />
contingent of <strong>the</strong> free devises [currency] in <strong>the</strong> amount of 8 million lei, which <strong>the</strong>n will be<br />
granted to <strong>the</strong> importer of Latvia’s goods to Romania and we <strong>the</strong>n will be able to permit [<strong>the</strong><br />
import of] Romania’s goods depending on <strong>the</strong> level of development of our exports to that<br />
country. The agreement and letters were initialized on 14 th December and it should be noted<br />
that now, after several years of uncertainty in <strong>the</strong> bilateral trade, principles again have been<br />
fixed, based on which <strong>the</strong> development of trade will be possible.<br />
It should be remarked that everywhere in Romania our delegation was welcomed with very<br />
obliging attitude. The delegation was also received by <strong>the</strong> Minister of Commerce who on his<br />
part instructed his staff to ensure that <strong>the</strong> negotiations were completed soon. It must be<br />
admitted that <strong>the</strong> agreement was indeed reached in a record-short time for this country as<br />
usually foreign delegations stay in Romania much longer [..]. 3<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 13, file 576, without pagination.<br />
132. Latvijas sūtņa Prāgā M. Nukšas 1938. g. 12. janv. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Čehu politiskās aprindas sagaidīja jauno Rumānijas ārlietu ministru Mikesku viņa pirmā<br />
vizītē ar nedalītām neuzticamības jūtām. Uz piedzīvojumu pamata, visas pārmaiņas, kuras<br />
bijušas Bukarestē pie Titulesku iziešanas, atnesušas Prāgai vilšanos, neskatoties uz daudzajiem<br />
sirsnīgas draudzības un uzticības apliecinājumiem. Ja arī Rumānijā nav noticis nekas tāds, kas<br />
būtu bijis vērsts pret Čehoslovākijas interesēm, tomēr, no otras puses, nav noliedzams tas fakts,<br />
ka Rumānijā ir apstājusies vairāku nodomu realizēšana, tieši tādu nodomu, kuros Prāga bija<br />
ieinteresēta un kuru piepildīšanos viņa gaidīja. Gogas kabineta ārpolitikas kU.R.S.S. , bez<br />
šaubām, vēl vairāk attālināsies no Titulesku nospraustās līnijas, nekā to varēja vērot Antonesku<br />
laikā. Čehoslovākijas pārstāvji Bukarestē, sevišķi Šeba, 4 nekad nebija slēpuši savas politiskās<br />
simpātijas un antipātijas, reizēm par daudz demonstratīvi rādījuši tās uz āru. Ar Rumānijas<br />
politiķu labo spārnu, pie kura pieder Goga ar saviem tagadējiem ministriem, čehu attiecības bija<br />
1<br />
Devises libres (French) – freely convertible currency.<br />
2<br />
Here is meant flax manufacture (spinning mill) in Jelgava town joint stock company „J. Hoff”, which employed<br />
more than 1600 workers.<br />
3<br />
After Romania <strong>the</strong> delegation of Latvia visited also Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.<br />
4<br />
Čehoslovākijas sūtnis Rumānijā bija Jans Šeba (Šeba).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 345<br />
tikai vēsi pieklājīgas, ne vairāk. Tā vai citādi, tagad nepieciešams ir pielāgoties jauniem<br />
apstākļiem un tādēļ, itin dabīgi, ka Mikesku vizīte tika Prāgā gaidīta.<br />
Rumānijas ārlietu ministrs uzturējās Prāgā nepilnas 24 stundas. Šinī īsajā brīdī viņš satikās<br />
vienīgi ar čehiem un ar Čehoslovākijas sabiedroto valstu – Francijas un Jugoslāvijas, bet ne<br />
Padomju Krievijas diplomātiem. Bet arī tiem satikšanās gadījums bija vienīgi ārlietu ministra<br />
Kroftas 1 dotā intīmā dinejā, uz kuru Francijas un Jugoslāvijas pārstāvji bija lūgti. Krofta un<br />
Mikesku te pirmo reiz apmainījās runām. Atzīmējams, ka Krofta iesāk ar uzrunu „Monsieur le<br />
Ministre et cher ami”, 2 lieto tekstā visur „vous”, 3 kamēr Mikesku atbild ar „Monsieur le<br />
Ministre”, 4 sākumā lieto „Votre Excellence” 5 un tikai runas vidū atsilst, kad viņš izsaka prieku<br />
par no jauna konstatēto vienprātību mērķos un līdzekļos, apspriežoties „avec vous, Monsieur le<br />
Ministre et désormais cher ami”. 6 Varbūt, ka šāda pakāpenība ir tikai retorisks paņēmiens, bet<br />
varbūt arī, ka tā ir aprēķināta nianse.<br />
Mikesku apspriedās ar Kroftu, ar Benešu, ar Hodžu. 7 Ārvalstu diplomātiem nebija dota<br />
izdevība Mikesku sastapt. Ziņas par apspriežu gaitu ir, pagaidām, vienīgi no čehu avotiem.<br />
Satiku ārlietu ministri Kroftu vakar kādā dinejā. Viņš bija ar rezultātiem visai apmierināts un<br />
man palika iespaids, ka šis apmierinājums bija īsts, neliekuļots. Visos ārpolitiskos jautājumos<br />
esot konstatēta vienprātība tādos pat apmēros, kā agrāk. Rumānijas ārpolitika iepretim Mazai<br />
Antantei, Čehoslovākijai, Francijai un Tautu Savienībai paliekot negrozīta. Tāds ir īsumā sarunu<br />
gala noslēgums, kas izteikts arī communiqué 8 un no Krofta no jauna apstiprināja. Mikesku vēl<br />
apgalvojis Dr. Kroftam, ka arī Rumānijas iekšpolitikā nekādas radikālas maiņas neesot<br />
sagaidāmas. Sākumā esot bijis jādod vēlētājiem kāds gandarījums, bet visumā Gogas kabinets<br />
turpmāk gribot ieturēt mierīgu nacionālu gaitu. Goga mēģināšot pārliecināt arī dzelzgvardes<br />
vadoņus neiet pārāk tāli un pārāk strauji.<br />
Pēc tās informācijas, kas šeit ir Prāgā, arī karalis noteikti prasot no jaunās valdības ieturēt<br />
mērenību. Visas politiskās aprindas Čehoslovākijā pirmos asos šaubu brīžos pēc Gogas kabineta<br />
sastādīšanas, dibināja savu paļāvību uz karali Karolu, būdamas pārliecinātas, ka viņš ir noteikts<br />
līdzšinējās ārpolitikas piekritējs. Tagad, spriežot pēc noskaņas, kāda te pastāv pēc Mikesku<br />
vizītes, liekas, ka šī pārliecība ir sevi attaisnojusi.<br />
Prāgā ir klusa doma, ka Gogas kabinetam nebūs ilgs mūžs, ko it kā aplinkus apstiprinājusi<br />
Mikesku jaunā daiļā kundze (pēc skaita trešā), kura vīru pavadīja ceļojumā. Uz Kroftas<br />
ieaicinājumu apmeklēt drīzumā Prāgu un Čehoslovākiju labāk patīkamā laikā un mazākā steigā,<br />
Mikesku kundze atbildējusi: „Labprāt, bet šaubos, vai tas būs iespējams, vai mēs vēl būsim pie<br />
varas.” „Taču…” – „Tad ar Jūsu palīdzību”.<br />
Neskatoties uz patlaban nodibināto draudzību un labo saskaņošanos visos ārpolitiskos<br />
jautājumos, Prāga neskumtu, ja Mikesku kundzes melanholiskā nojauta piepildītos. Goga, kā<br />
partijas vadonis, ir labi pazīstams. Viņš, būdams opozīcijā, bija viens no tiem Rumānijas<br />
1<br />
Kamils Krofta (Krofta; 1876–1945), Čehoslovākijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1927.–1936. g., ārlietu viceministrs, 1936.–<br />
1938. g. ārlietu ministrs.<br />
2<br />
Monsieur le Ministre et cher ami (franču val.) – ministra kungs un dārgais draugs.<br />
3<br />
Vous (franču val.) – Jums.<br />
4<br />
Monsieur le Ministre (franču val.) – ministra kungs.<br />
5<br />
Votre Excellence (franču val.) – Jūsu Ekselence.<br />
6<br />
Avec vous, Monsieur le Ministre es désormais cher ami (franču val.) – ar Jums, Ministra kungs un kopš šī brīža<br />
dārgais draugs.<br />
7<br />
Milans Hodža (Hodža; 1878–1944), Čehoslovākijas valstsvīrs. 1935.–1938. g. premjerministrs.<br />
8<br />
Communiqué (franču val.) – paziņojums.
346 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
politiķiem, kas visvairāk pievērsās jaunai Vācijai, sajūsminājās par viņas tagadējo darba,<br />
nodomu un centienu ritmu. Šī Gogas politiskā pagātne, ja tā bija īsta un neliekuļota, nav<br />
iznīdējama no vienas dienas uz otru. Un kaut gan viņš kā Ministru prezidents ir spiests daudz<br />
stingrāk rēķināties ar Rumānijas ārpolitikas realitātēm, viņa simpātijas Vācijai, Itālijai un Polijai<br />
ir jau no jauna izteikušās. Mikesku vizīte, liekās, nebūs izklīdinājusi Prāgā visas aizdomas.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2387. l., 9.–10. lp.<br />
132. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Prague M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 12 th January 1938<br />
The Czech political circles met Romania’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs Micescu 1 who had<br />
arrived on his first visit with unmixed feelings of distrust. It was based on experience: all<br />
changes that had transpired in Bucharest after Titulescu’s leaving had disappointed Prague in<br />
spite of <strong>the</strong> numerous displays of friendship and trust. Although nothing has happened in<br />
Romania that would be targeted against <strong>the</strong> interests of Czechoslovakia, <strong>the</strong> fact cannot be<br />
denied that <strong>the</strong> implementation of several intentions had become stuck in Romania and <strong>the</strong>se<br />
had been <strong>the</strong> intentions that Prague had been interested in and <strong>the</strong> implementation of which it<br />
had looked forward to. The foreign policy course of Goga’s cabinet, no doubt, will withdraw<br />
even fur<strong>the</strong>r from <strong>the</strong> line set by Titulescu than it was <strong>the</strong> case in Antonescu’s time. The<br />
representatives of Czechoslovakia in Bucharest, Šeba 2 in particular, had never concealed <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
political affinities and dislikes, sometimes displaying <strong>the</strong>m in an excessively demonstrative<br />
manner. With Romania’s right-wing politicians whom Goga 3 and his acting ministers belong to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Czechs have had only coldly polite <strong>relations</strong> and not more than that. Be as it is, now it is<br />
necessary to adapt to <strong>the</strong> new circumstances and thus, naturally, Micescu’s visit was expected in<br />
Prague.<br />
Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stayed in Prague for less than 24 hours. In that short<br />
time span he met only Czechs and <strong>the</strong> diplomats of Czechoslovakia’s allies – France and<br />
Yugoslavia – but not those of Soviet Russia. But even <strong>the</strong> meeting with <strong>the</strong> former took place<br />
only during an intimate dinner hosted by Minister of Foreign Affairs Krofta 4 to which<br />
representatives of France and Yugoslavia were invited. This was <strong>the</strong> first time that Krofta and<br />
Micescu exchanged speeches. It is worth noting that Krofta begins his speech with address<br />
„Monsieur le Ministre et cher ami” 5 and throughout <strong>the</strong> text consequently uses “vous” 6 , while<br />
Micescu replies with „Monsieur le Ministre” 7 , at <strong>the</strong> beginning says „Votre Excellence” 8 and gets<br />
warmer only in <strong>the</strong> middle of his speech where he expresses joy about <strong>the</strong> unity of goals and<br />
means that had been reconfirmed during <strong>the</strong> discussion „avec vous, Monsieur le Ministre et<br />
1<br />
Istrate Micescu (1881-1951) was a Romanian lawyer and politician, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1937-1938).<br />
2<br />
Czechoslovakia’s Envoy to Romania was Jan Šeba.<br />
3<br />
Octavian Goga (1881-1938) was a Romanian nationalist poet and politician, Prime Minister of Romania (1937-<br />
1938), Member of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Academy (since 1920). He held anti-Semitic views.<br />
4<br />
Kamil Krofta (1876–1945), Czechoslovakian diplomat, statesman. 1927–1936 Vice - Minister of Foreign Affairs,<br />
1936 –1938 Minister of Foreign Affairs.<br />
5<br />
Monsieur le Ministre et cher ami (French) – Mr. Minister and dear friend.<br />
6<br />
Vous (French) – You.<br />
7<br />
Monsieur le Ministre (French) – Mr. Minister.<br />
8<br />
Votre Excellence (French) – Your Excellency.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 347<br />
désormais cher ami” 1 . Probably such gradualness is only a rhetoric tool, but it may also be a<br />
calculated nuance.<br />
Micescu had a meeting with Krofta, Beneš and Hodža. 2 Foreign diplomats were not given<br />
<strong>the</strong> chance to meet Micescu. For <strong>the</strong> time being information about <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> discussions<br />
comes only from <strong>the</strong> Czech sources.<br />
I met Minister of Foreign Affairs Krofta at a dinner yesterday. He was highly satisfied with<br />
<strong>the</strong> result and I got <strong>the</strong> impression that his satisfaction was genuine, unfeigned. [He said that]<br />
conformity of opinion had been ascertained on all foreign policy issues to <strong>the</strong> same degree as<br />
before. Romania’s foreign policy with regard to <strong>the</strong> Little Entente, Czechoslovakia, France and<br />
<strong>the</strong> League of Nations remained unchanged. That is <strong>the</strong> summary of <strong>the</strong> discussions that was<br />
stated also in a communiqué and reaffirmed by Krofta. Micescu had also reassured Dr. Krofta<br />
that no radical changes were to be expected in Romania’s domestic policy ei<strong>the</strong>r. At first <strong>the</strong><br />
electorate had to be given some kind of atonement but in general Goga’s cabinet wanted to<br />
pursue peaceful national development in <strong>the</strong> future. Goga would try to persuade <strong>the</strong> leaders of<br />
<strong>the</strong> iron guard, too, not to go too far and too fast [said Krofta].<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> information available here in Prague, <strong>the</strong> King, too, firmly demands <strong>the</strong><br />
new government to observe moderation. In <strong>the</strong> first moments of acute doubt after <strong>the</strong><br />
formation of Goga’s cabinet all political circles in Czechoslovakia relied on King Carol, being<br />
sure that he is a committed supporter of <strong>the</strong> existing foreign policy [course]. Now, judging from<br />
<strong>the</strong> mood that dominated here after Micescu’s visit, it seems that this confidence has been<br />
justified.<br />
A silent thought [hope] exists in Prague that Goga’s cabinet will not have a long life as has<br />
been as if implicitly confirmed by Micescu’s beautiful new (third in a row) wife, who<br />
accompanied her husband on this trip. To Krofta’s invitation to visit Prague and Czechoslovakia<br />
[in general] in a more pleasant season and in a less hurried manner, Mrs. Micescu had replied:<br />
„Gladly, but I doubt whe<strong>the</strong>r it will be possible, whe<strong>the</strong>r we will still hold power.“ „However...“ –<br />
„<strong>the</strong>n with your help“.<br />
In spite of <strong>the</strong> now established friendship and good coordination on all foreign policy issues,<br />
Prague would not grieve if Mrs. Micescu’s melancholic premonition came true. Goga is well<br />
known as a leader of <strong>the</strong> party. While in opposition he was one of those Romania’s politicians<br />
who most eagerly turned towards new Germany, admired its current rhythm of work,<br />
intentions and aspirations. This political past of Goga’s, if it was genuine and unfeigned, cannot<br />
be erased from day to day. And although as Prime Minister he must reckon with Romania’s<br />
foreign policy realities to a much greater extent, his affinity for Germany, Italy and Poland has<br />
manifested itself again. It seems that Micescu’s visit has not dispersed all suspicion in Prague.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2387, s. 9–10.<br />
1<br />
Avec vous, Monsieur le Ministre es désormais cher ami (French) – with you, Mr. Minister, and from now on - dear<br />
friend.<br />
2<br />
Milan Hodža (1878–1944), Czechoslovakian statesman. 1935–1938 Prime Minister.
348 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
133. Finanšu ministrijas Tirdzniecības un rūpniecības departamenta direktora A.<br />
Zakenfelda 1 1938. g. 5. febr. raksts Ārlietu ministrijas Juridiski-administratīvā<br />
departamenta direktora v. i. A. Kampem.<br />
Norādot Jums uz mūsu ģenerālkonsula T. Orgidana vēstules norakstu, pagodinamies<br />
paskaidrot, ka rakstā minētais atbilst īstenībai un, ka ar Rumāniju 1937. gada 14. decembrī<br />
parafētās saimnieciskās vienošanās nokavēšanos mēs zaudējam iespēju izmantot mūsu preču<br />
importam Rumānijas Nacionālās bankas rezervētos 8 milj. lejas š. g. pirmam ceturksnim. Būtu<br />
vēlams panākt, ka nokavēto laiku attiecībā uz 8 miljonu leju piešķiršanu attiecinātu uz<br />
nākošiem trim mēnešiem pēc vienošanās spēkā stāšanās.<br />
Jautājumā par pudeļu korķu eksportu pagodinamies ziņot, ka esam atbildējuši mūsu<br />
ģenerālkonsulam, norādot stāties tiešos sakaros ar Vikandera 2 korķu rūpniecības<br />
a[kciju]/s[abiedrību] Liepājā.<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 13. apr., 576. l., b. p.<br />
133. Note by Director of <strong>the</strong> Trade and Industry Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Finance A. Zakenfelds 3 to Acting Director of Legal and Administrative Department of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Kampe, 5 th February 1938<br />
With reference to <strong>the</strong> copy of letter from our General Consul T. Orghidan, we have <strong>the</strong><br />
honour to explain that <strong>the</strong> content of <strong>the</strong> note accords with realities and that by delaying <strong>the</strong><br />
implementation of <strong>the</strong> economic agreement initialized with Romania on 14 th December, 1937<br />
we lose <strong>the</strong> opportunity to use for <strong>the</strong> import of our goods <strong>the</strong> 8 million lei that <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Bank of Romania has reserved for <strong>the</strong> first quarter of this year. It would be advisable to achieve<br />
that <strong>the</strong> allocated 8 million lei, <strong>the</strong> term of usage of which has been missed, are transferred to<br />
<strong>the</strong> period of <strong>the</strong> subsequent three months after <strong>the</strong> agreement comes into force.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> export of bottle corks we have <strong>the</strong> honour to report that we have replied<br />
to our General Consul, advising him to contact directly Vikanders‘ 4 cork manufacturing a/s<br />
[joint stock company] in Liepāja.<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 13, file 576, without pagination.<br />
134. Izvilkums no Latvijas Iekšlietu ministrijas Politiskās pārvaldes aģenta “Liepas”<br />
1938. g. 31. maija ziņojums pārvaldes Jelgavas rajona priekšniekam<br />
Š. g. maija mēneša beigās Rīgā no Gustava Celmiņa 5 saņemta vēstule–ziņojums. Ziņojums<br />
bijis rokrakstā, un tas bijis G. Celmiņa rokraksts. Vēstulē Celmiņš rakstījis par braucienu uz<br />
Rumāniju un satikšanos ar Kodreanu š. g. februāra mēnesī (pirms pēdējās apcietināšanas). Esot<br />
1<br />
Arturs Zakenfelds (1895 – pēc 1957), Latvijas būvinženieris, rūpnieks un valsts ierēdnis. Miris ASV.<br />
2<br />
1886. g. dibinātā korķa un linoleja fabrika „Vikanders un Larsons”, 1919. g. atjaunoja darbību, no 1928. g.<br />
Zviedrijas firmas īpašumā, nosaukta par Vikandera korķu rūpniecības akciju sabiedrību. Viens no lielākajiem<br />
Liepājas rūpniecības uzņēmumiem, produkcija tika eksportēta.<br />
3<br />
Arturs Zakenfelds (1895 – after 1957), Latvian construction engineer, manufacturer and civil servant. Died in USA.<br />
4<br />
Factory of corks and linoleum „Vikanders un Larsons”, established in 1886, resumed production in 1919, from<br />
1928 was owned by a Swedish company and renamed Vikanders cork manufacturing joint stock company. One of<br />
<strong>the</strong> largest industrial enterprises in Liepāja, its produce was exported.<br />
5<br />
Gustavs Celmiņš (1899–1968), Latvijas armijas leitnants (1919.–1924. g.), labējs politisks darbinieks. 1926.–1927. g.<br />
Ārlietu ministrijas atašejs, atbrīvots no amata. Darbojies nacionālajās organizācijās. No 1932. g. latviešu tautas<br />
apvienības „Ugunskrusts” (1933. g. pārdēvēta par „Pērkonkrustu”) Centrālās valdes priekšnieks. 1934. g. jūn.<br />
apcietināts, 1935. g. piespriesti 3 gadi ieslodzījuma par politisko darbību. Pēc atbrīvošanas 1937. g. izraidīts no<br />
Latvijas. Dzīvojis Itālijā. Miris Meksikā.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 349<br />
nodibinājis labas attiecības ar Rumānijas Dzelzs gvardi un pārrunāts jautājums par<br />
starptautiskas centrāles nodibināšanu Šveicē. Starp citu, vēstulē Celmiņš rakstījis, ka no<br />
Rumānijas ticis prom ar policijas palīdzību (domājams, izraidīts). Rumānijā brīvmūrniekiem<br />
esot vājas pozīcijas, turpretīm Dienvidslāvijā tie esot stipri [..].<br />
LVVA, 3235. f., 1./22. apr., 709. l., 188. lpp.<br />
134. Excerpt from report by agent “Liepa” of <strong>the</strong> Political Authority of Latvia’s<br />
Ministry of Interior to Chief of <strong>the</strong> Authority’s Jelgava division, 31 st May 1938<br />
In late May, this year, a letter – report was received from Gustavs Celmiņš 1 in Riga. The<br />
report was handwritten and it was G. Celmiņš’ handwriting. In his letter Celmiņš described his<br />
trip to Romania and his meeting with Codreanu 2 in February, this year (before his latest arrest).<br />
[He writes that] he has established good <strong>relations</strong> with Romania’s Iron Guard and discussed <strong>the</strong><br />
issue of founding a central organisation in Switzerland. Among o<strong>the</strong>r things Celmiņš wrote in<br />
his letter that he had got out of Romania with <strong>the</strong> help of police (most likely, he was deported).<br />
In Romania Free Masons are said to have weak positions, while in Yugoslavia <strong>the</strong>y are strong<br />
[..].<br />
SHAL, f. 3235, d. 1/22, file 709, p. 188.<br />
135. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Valtera 1938. g. 4. jūn. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
[..] no jauna te diezgan stipri tagad diskutē Rumānijas robežu stāvokli un Rumānijas tālāko<br />
politiku. Tas stāv sakarā ar Rumānijas Ģenerālštāba šefa Jonesku braucienu uz Varšavu. Šo<br />
braucienu iztulko dažādi. Aizrāda, ka tas bijis jau agrāk nodomāts, citi atkal saka, ka brauciens<br />
esot sasteigts, jo krievi lielā mērā pulcējot karaspēkus pie Rumānijas robežas. Norunās starp<br />
Rumāniju un Poliju esot paredzēts, ka atsevišķos gadījumos satiekas abu valstu ģenerālštābu<br />
šefi, un tāds gadījums esot tagad. No kādas ļoti informētas puses man zināja teikt, ka Padomju<br />
Krievija vedusi pēdējā laikā dzīvas sarunas ar Rumāniju un starp citu bijusi runa par Rumānijas<br />
ieņemamo stāvokli, ja Padomju Krievija Čehoslovākijas konfliktā būtu spiesta iejaukties.<br />
Jautājums esot ticis cilāts arī Londonā, ko man zināja teikt kāds, kas atgriezies nupat no<br />
Londonas. Rumāņi esot tikuši mudināti ārkārtējos gadījumos neatteikties laist cauri Padomju<br />
Krievijas karaspēku caur nelielu Rumānijas robežas daļu, kādiem 30 kilometriem. Gandrīz<br />
sensacionāla man izklausījās ziņa, ko saņēmu no vēl kādas puses, proti, ka Rumānija it kā būtu<br />
vienojusies ar Padomju Krieviju par karaspēka caurlaišanu, pie kam esot norunāti visi<br />
noteikumi, kas būtu ievērojami no krievu puses. Šī ziņa man nāk no kādas puses, par kuru<br />
gandrīz nemaz nevarētu šaubīties. Par to, ka Padomju Krievija konflikta gadījumā lielā mērā<br />
varētu traucēt Vāciju ar savu gaisa spēku, te vairs nešaubās [..]. Tālāk esmu varējis vērot, ka<br />
šejienes Padomju vēstniecība nes stiprus refleksus no pieaugoša naida Padomju Krievijā pret<br />
Poliju. Ir kaut kas mainījies šejienes krievu nostājā, valodā, kas liecina par kādu jaunu<br />
noskaņojumu, daudz asāku un brutālāku, nekā to varēja agrāk vērot. Tagadējās Krievijas<br />
1<br />
Gustavs Celmiņš (1899–1968), lieutenant of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1919–1924), right-wing politician. 1926–1927<br />
Attaché of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dismissed. Active in nationalist organisations. From 1932 Chairman of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Central Board of Latvian People’s society „Ugunskrusts” (“Firecross”) (in 1933 renamed „Pērkonkrusts”<br />
(”Thundercross)). Arrested in June 1934, in 1935 sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment for his political activities.<br />
After release from prison in 1937 exiled from Latvia. Lived in Italy. Died in Mexico.<br />
2<br />
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu (1899-1938) was <strong>the</strong> charismatic leader (Captain) of <strong>the</strong> extreme right-wing Legion of<br />
Archangel Michael (or Iron Guard) from 1927 to his murder by order from King Carol II.
350 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
vēstniecības locekļi ir visi no jaunās krievu paaudzes, daudz cietāki, pat rupjāki nekā agrākie un<br />
var redzēt, ka šī jaunā paaudze izturas daudz lepnāki [..]. Krievu karaspēka pulcēšana pie<br />
Rumānijas–Polijas robežām netiek no krieviem nemaz noliegta, un tie tikai vīpsnā. Tāpat<br />
diplomātiskā korpusā ziņas par karaspēka sablīvēšanu neapšauba [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2379. l., 143.–144. lp.<br />
135. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Valters to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 4 th June 1938<br />
[...] Ra<strong>the</strong>r intense discussions are again taking place here about <strong>the</strong> situation on Romania’s<br />
borders and Romania’s future policy. It is related to <strong>the</strong> trip by Chief of Romania’s General Staff<br />
Ionescu to Warsaw. This trip is being interpreted in various ways. It is being noted that <strong>the</strong> trip<br />
has been planned earlier, while o<strong>the</strong>rs say that it is made in a rush because <strong>the</strong> Russians actively<br />
ga<strong>the</strong>r troops at Romania’s border. They say that in <strong>the</strong> agreement between Romania and<br />
Poland it is envisaged that chiefs of <strong>the</strong> general staff of both countries should meet on concrete<br />
occasions and this is such an occasion. A very well informed source told me that lately Soviet<br />
Russia had launched lively discussions with Romania and that among o<strong>the</strong>r things <strong>the</strong> position<br />
that Romania should take in case Soviet Russia was forced to intervene in Czechoslovakia’s<br />
conflict was discussed. This issue had been addressed in London as well, as I heard from<br />
somebody who has just returned from London. Romanians had been urged on emergency cases<br />
not to deny <strong>the</strong> troops of Soviet Russia a way-leave through a small part of Romania’s border<br />
[area], approximately 30 kilometres long. The news that I received from ano<strong>the</strong>r source seemed<br />
almost sensational to me, namely, that Romania had come to an agreement with Soviet Russia<br />
about <strong>the</strong> transit permit for <strong>the</strong> troops and that all conditions that <strong>the</strong> Russians should meet<br />
had been agreed on. This piece of information comes from a source, which I could not question<br />
almost at all. It is no longer doubted here that in case of a conflict Soviet Russia could greatly<br />
bo<strong>the</strong>r Germany with its air force [..] Fur<strong>the</strong>r I have been able to observe that <strong>the</strong> local Soviet<br />
Embassy strongly reflects <strong>the</strong> growing hatred against Poland in Soviet Russia. Something has<br />
changed in <strong>the</strong> attitude and language of <strong>the</strong> Russians here that testifies to a different state of<br />
mind, much more acute and brutal than could be observed before. All <strong>the</strong> current staff<br />
members of Russia’s Embassy come from a new generation of Russians and are much harder,<br />
even ruder than <strong>the</strong> previous ones and it can be seen that this new generation carries itself with<br />
much more pride [..] The Russians do not even deny <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>ring of <strong>the</strong> Russian troops at<br />
Romanian –Polish borders and only smirk [about it]. The <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps do not question <strong>the</strong><br />
news about <strong>the</strong> concentration of <strong>the</strong> troops ei<strong>the</strong>r [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2379, s. 143–144.<br />
136. Latvijas Ārlietu ministrijas 1938. g. 22. aug. raksts sūtniecībai Prāgā<br />
Administratīvā un protokola nodaļa pagodinās paziņot, ka Valsts cukura monopola<br />
pārvaldnieks J. Laže 1 izbrauks komandējumā uz Poliju, Rumāniju un Bulgāriju iepazīties ar<br />
cukurbiešu audzēšanas un cukurrūpniecības apstākļiem šajās valstīs. J. Lažes kungs uzturēsies<br />
ārzemēs starp š. g. 20. augustu un 20. septembri.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 4. apr., 342. l., 3. lp.<br />
1<br />
Jānis Laže (1886–1969), Latvijas inženieris tehnologs. No 1933. g. Cukurrūpniecības pārvaldes priekšnieks, 1934.–<br />
1940. g. Valsts cukura monopola pārvaldnieks. Miris Latvijā.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 351<br />
136. Note by Latvia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Legation in Prague, 22 nd August<br />
1938<br />
The Administrative and Protocol Department has <strong>the</strong> honour to inform you that<br />
administrator of State Sugar Monopoly J. Laže 1 will go on a business trip to Poland, Romania<br />
and Bulgaria to study <strong>the</strong> conditions of <strong>the</strong> cultivation of sugar beets and sugar industry in<br />
<strong>the</strong>se countries. Mr. J. Laže will stay abroad between 20 th August and 20 th September, this year.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 4, file 342, s. 3.<br />
137. Telegrama ministrului României la Riga Vasile Stoica nr. 89400 către Ministrul<br />
Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, 13 septembrie 1938<br />
Sunt informat că unii evrei letoni, lituanieni și polonezi, care au permisul de intrare în<br />
Palestina și deci obțin viză de tranzit prin România, dispar din trenuri în trecerea lor de la<br />
Grigore Ghica Vodă la Constanța și rămân în țară ascunși de rudeniile lor. Cum numărul<br />
evreilor obligați a emigra din aceste regiuni este în continuă creștere, sporește în aceeași<br />
proporție și numărul celor care rămân clandestin la noi. Rog să se precizeze dacă ordinul<br />
ministerial nr. 52934 din 9 septembrie se extinde și asupra vizelor de tranzit sau se aplică numai<br />
vizelor de intrare.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 103.<br />
137. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Riga Vasile Stoica no. 89400 to Foreign<br />
Minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, 13 th September 1938<br />
I am informed that some Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Jews, who have security clearance<br />
for Palestine and thus obtain a visa to transit Romania, disappear from <strong>the</strong> train on <strong>the</strong>ir way<br />
from Grigore Ghica Vodă to Constanța and are hidden by <strong>the</strong>ir relatives in <strong>the</strong> country. As <strong>the</strong><br />
number of Jews forced to emigrate from <strong>the</strong>se regions is constantly increasing, <strong>the</strong> number of<br />
those who remain illegally in our country increases accordingly. Please indicate whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
ministerial order no. 52934 from September 9 th extends to transit visas or is applied only to<br />
entry visas.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 103.<br />
138. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā L. Ēķa 2 1938. g. 21. okt. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Politisko interešu degpunktā Varšavā pašureiz ir ministra Beka brauciens uz Rumāniju un<br />
tur vesto sarunu rezultāts. Vakar vakara un šodienas poļu presē par šīm sarunām ir atrodams<br />
gaužām maz. Toties, kā tas šeit parasts, diplomātiskā korpusa ļaudis pārtiek un kolportē<br />
dažādas baumas [..]. Dominējoši ir ieskati, ka Beka kungs šoreiz pārbraucis ar tukšu somu [..].<br />
Rumānija izturējusies ar rezervēm pret poļu priekšlikumu un iemesli šīm rezervēm esot šādi:<br />
Rumānija gribot palikt lojāla iepretim Čehoslovākijai, kur Rumānijai esot plašas saimnieciskas<br />
1<br />
Jānis Laže (1886–969), Latvian engineer, technologist. From 1933 Head of <strong>the</strong> Sugar Industry Authority, 1934 –<br />
1940 Administrator of State Sugar Monopoly. Died in Latvia.<br />
2<br />
Ludvigs Ēķis (1892–1943), Latvijas valstsvīrs un diplomāts. No 1920. g. dažādos amatos Ārlietu ministrijā, 1925.–<br />
1928. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Administratīvās un protokola nodaļas vadītājs, 1928.–1931. g. I šķiras sekretārs<br />
sūtniecībā Londonā, 1931.–1934. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Rietumu nodaļas vadītājs, 1934. g. sūtnis Lietuvā, 1934.–1938.<br />
g. finanšu ministrs, 1938.–1939. g. sūtnis Polijā un Ungārijā ar sēdekli Varšavā, no 1939. g. – Rumānijā un Ungārijā<br />
(no 1940. g. apr. arī Turcijā) ar sēdekli Bukarestē. Miris ASV.
352 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
un politiskas intereses. Otrām kārtām, Rumānija nevēloties pārāk lielu Ungārijas stiprināšanu.<br />
Treškārt, Bukareste ar lielu skepsi skatās uz eventuālu ungāru garantiju attiecībā uz<br />
Septiņkalnes 1 apgabalu. Ceturtām kārtām, Rumānija nevēloties piedalīties kombinācijās, kas<br />
kaitinātu vāciešus, kas, kā zināms, būtu poļu–ungāru kopēja robeža, pēc kā abas šīs valstis tik<br />
ļoti pašreiz cenšās. Karpatrutēnijas atdošana ungāriem apdraudētu Bukovinas un Septiņkalnes<br />
aizsardzību. Runājot ar pāris diplomātiskā korpusa locekļiem, arī no tiem dzirdēju līdzīgus<br />
ieskatus, t. i., ka ārlietu ministrs Beks šoreiz nav panācis to, ko vēlējies. Liekas gan skaidrs, ka ja<br />
šī neveiksme tiešām tāda arī būtu, Beka kungs neapmierināsies un mums jāgaida tālākie<br />
notikumi un tālākie soļi, ko šai virzienā darīs Polija un Ungārija. Franču un angļu interese it kā<br />
pilnīgi atslābusi un iespaids tāds, ka ar Franciju un Angliju dienvidaustrumu politikas<br />
jautājumos neviens vairs nopietni nerēķinās [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2379. l., 188. lp.<br />
138. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw L. Ēķis 2 to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 21 st October 1938<br />
Currently <strong>the</strong> political interests in Warsaw are focused on Minister Beck’s trip to Romania<br />
and <strong>the</strong> result of <strong>the</strong> negotiations that took place <strong>the</strong>re. In <strong>the</strong> Polish press of yesterday evening<br />
and today very little can be found about <strong>the</strong>se negotiations. But, as is <strong>the</strong> tradition here, it is<br />
made up for by various rumours that <strong>the</strong> people of <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps live on and hawk [..]<br />
The dominating view is that this time Mr. Beck has returned home with an empty bag [..]<br />
[Firstly,] Romania is said to have treated <strong>the</strong> Polish proposition with reserve and <strong>the</strong> reason for<br />
its reserved attitude is <strong>the</strong> following: Romania wants to stay loyal to Czechoslovakia, where it<br />
has extensive economic and political interests. Secondly, Romania does not want Hungary to be<br />
excessively streng<strong>the</strong>ned. Thirdly, it is with great scepticism that Bucharest regards <strong>the</strong> eventual<br />
Hungarian guarantee pertaining to Transylvania. Fourthly, Romania does not want to<br />
participate in combinations, which would irritate <strong>the</strong> Germans, who, as we know, would<br />
constitute a common Polish–Hungarian border that both <strong>the</strong>se countries are currently very<br />
much aspiring for. The cession of <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Ru<strong>the</strong>nia to <strong>the</strong> Hungarians would threaten<br />
<strong>the</strong> defence of Bukovina and Transylvania. Also in discussions with a couple of members of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> corps I heard a similar view, i.e. that this time Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck had<br />
not achieved what he had wanted. It seems clear though that if he indeed has failed in this way,<br />
Mr. Beck will not calm down and we should expect fur<strong>the</strong>r developments and fur<strong>the</strong>r steps that<br />
Poland and Hungary will make in this direction. The French and English interest seems to have<br />
completely relaxed and <strong>the</strong> impression is that with regard to <strong>the</strong> issues of South–East policy<br />
nobody is seriously reckoning with France and England any longer [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2379, s. 188.<br />
1<br />
Domāta Transilvānija.<br />
2<br />
Ludvigs Ēķis (1892–1943) – Latvian statesman and diplomat. From 1920 held different positions in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs, 1925–1928 Head of Administration and Protocol Division of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1928–<br />
1931 First Secretary at <strong>the</strong> Legation in London, 1931–1934 Head of <strong>the</strong> Western Division of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs, 1934 Envoy to Lithuania, 1934–1938 Minister of Finance, 1938–1939 Envoy to Poland and Hungary with seat<br />
in Warsaw, from 1939 Envoy to Romania and Hungary (from April 1940 also to Turkey) with seat in Bucharest.<br />
Died in USA.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 353<br />
139. Telegrama ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Vasile Stoica nr. 1169<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Petrescu-Comen, 25 octombrie<br />
1938<br />
Cercurile polone de aici și Legația Poloniei însăși răspândesc între ziariștii și conducătorii<br />
Letoniei știrea că Polonia va continua acțiunea pentru o frontieră comună cu Ungaria. Aceasta<br />
este prezentată ca o necesitate pentru a împiedica întinderea brațului german prin Cehoslovacia<br />
până în Ucraina și totodată pentru a potoli Ungaria care în acest caz nu ar mai revendica alte<br />
teritorii.<br />
Miniștrii finlandez și estonian de aici, în conversațiile lor, au mers mai departe, susținând că<br />
nu numai rutenii trebuie anexați Ungariei, dar trebuie modificate în favoarea acesteia și<br />
frontierele cu România și Iugoslavia. Pare că în Estonia și Finlanda aceasta este opinia cercurilor<br />
oficiale.<br />
În Letonia și Lituania atitudinea leală a României față de Cehoslovacia și față de un tratat<br />
internațional a stârnit, mai ales după München, un real sentiment de apreciere. Mulți ofițeri<br />
letoni, dintre care trei generali și comandantul flotilei, mi-au exprimat admirația pentru M.S.<br />
Regele, guvernul și poporul român, accentuând că atitudinea hotărâtă a României constituie un<br />
mare reconfort și este de înaltă semnificație morală.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 155.<br />
139. Telegram no. 1169 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga Vasile<br />
Stoica to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Petrescu-Comen, 25 th<br />
October 1938<br />
The Polish circles here and <strong>the</strong> Legation of Poland itself disseminate among <strong>the</strong> journalists<br />
and leaders of Latvia <strong>the</strong> news that Poland will continue <strong>the</strong> action for a common border with<br />
Hungary. This is presented as a necessity to prevent <strong>the</strong> extension of <strong>the</strong> German arm across<br />
Czechoslovakia to Ukraine and at <strong>the</strong> same time to moderate Hungary, which in this event<br />
would not claim any o<strong>the</strong>r lands.<br />
The Finnish and Estonian ministers here went fur<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong>ir conversations and stated that<br />
not only Ru<strong>the</strong>nians should be attached to Hungary, but <strong>the</strong> borders with Romania and<br />
Yugoslavia should also be changed in favour of Hungary. It seems that this is <strong>the</strong> opinion of <strong>the</strong><br />
official circles in Estonia and Finland.<br />
In Latvia and Lithuania, <strong>the</strong> loyal attitude of Romania towards Czechoslovakia and<br />
regarding an international treaty awoke a true appreciation feeling, many Latvian officers, of<br />
whom three generals and <strong>the</strong> flotilla commander, expressed <strong>the</strong>ir admiration for His Majesty<br />
<strong>the</strong> King, <strong>the</strong> Romanian government and people, pointing out that <strong>the</strong> firm attitude of Romania<br />
is a great reassurance and of high moral significance.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 155.<br />
140. Telegrama ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga Vasile Stoica nr. 1213<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Nicolae Petrescu-Comen, 6 noiembrie<br />
1938<br />
La 17 și 18 noiembrie vor avea loc la Riga serbările aniversării a 20-a a independenței letone.<br />
Rog pe Excelența Voastră a mă autoriza să reprezint cu această ocazie pe M.S. Regele și<br />
guvernul român. O telegramă de felicitări către Președintele Republicii letone ar fi binevenită.
354 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Totodată, rog pe Excelența Voastră să intervină la Societatea de Radio ca, având în vedere că<br />
la serbările noastre naționale postul de radio din Riga a difuzat un program de muzică<br />
românească, să se difuzeze și de către posturile noastre, în ziua de 18, un program de muzică<br />
letonă, pentru care are discuri aduse de mine acum un an.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 156.<br />
140. Telegram no. 1213 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga Vasile<br />
Stoica to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Petrescu-Comen, 6 th<br />
November 1938<br />
On November 17 th and 18 th <strong>the</strong> 20-year anniversary from <strong>the</strong> Latvian independence will be<br />
celebrated in Riga. I kindly request Your Excellency to authorize me to represent His Majesty<br />
<strong>the</strong> King and <strong>the</strong> Romanian government on this occasion. A congratulations telegram to <strong>the</strong><br />
President of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Republic would be appropriate.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time I ask Your Excellency to intercede at <strong>the</strong> Radio Society so that our stations<br />
may broadcast on <strong>the</strong> 18 th a Latvian music programme using <strong>the</strong> disks I brought a year ago,<br />
taking into account that on <strong>the</strong> day of our national holidays, <strong>the</strong> radio station in Riga broadcast<br />
a Romanian music programme.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 156<br />
141. Telegrama ministrului României la Riga Vasile Stoica nr. 152 către Ministrul<br />
Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 4 Februarie 1939<br />
Referindu-mă la telegrama mea nr. 1254 din 1938.<br />
În cursul audienței de azi, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Letoniei m-a rugat să comunic în<br />
mod confidențial Excelenței Voastre că guvernul leton este decis, în principiu, a transfera<br />
legația din Praga la București și că această transferare va avea loc înainte de 1 octombrie viitor.<br />
Domnia sa a adăugat că Letonia consideră necesar a se stabili relații mai strânse decât până<br />
acum cu România.<br />
În consecință, socotesc că din partea noastră nu ar fi oportun a acredita în Letonia un<br />
ministru cu reședința în altă țară, ci ar fi preferabil a lăsa deocamdată un Însărcinat cu Afaceri,<br />
rezervându-ne posibilitatea acreditării unui Ministru rezident la Riga. Acesta ar putea fi numit<br />
odată cu transferarea Legației Letoniei la București.<br />
Explicații amănunțite voi putea da Excelenței Voastre la sosirea mea la București, la 13 ale<br />
lunii curente.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 11.<br />
141. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Riga Vasile Stoica no. 152 to Foreign<br />
Minister Grigore Gafencu, 4 th February 1939<br />
Referring to my telegram no. 1254 from 1938.<br />
During my audience today, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia asked me to<br />
confidentially inform Your Excellency that <strong>the</strong> Latvian government decided in principle to<br />
transfer <strong>the</strong> legation from Prague to Bucharest and that this transfer would take place before<br />
October 1 st next year. He added that Latvia considered it necessary to establish closer <strong>relations</strong><br />
with Romania than ever before.<br />
Therefore, I consider that it would not be appropriate on our part to accredit in Latvia a<br />
minister residing in ano<strong>the</strong>r country, but it would be preferable to appoint a Chargé d'Affaires
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 355<br />
for <strong>the</strong> present, reserving <strong>the</strong> possibility to accredit a minister residing in Riga. He could be<br />
appointed at <strong>the</strong> same time with <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Legation to Bucharest.<br />
I can provide Your Excellency with detailed explanations upon my arrival in Bucharest on<br />
<strong>the</strong> 13 th of this month.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s.<br />
142. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā L. Ēķa 1939. g. 8. marta ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram par Rumānijas ārlietu ministra G. Gafenku vizīti Polijā<br />
Aizvakar noslēdzās šeit pēdējo nedēļu viena pēc otras sekojošās ārlietu ministru vizītes.<br />
Pēdējā Rumānijas ārlietu ministra Gafenku vizīte, kā to jau vienā no saviem ziņojumiem<br />
piezīmēju, bija visinteresantākā arī ar uz ārieni redzamiem, resp. dzirdamiem rezultātiem.<br />
Vizītes pamatojums arī bija pārliecinošāks, nekā iepriekšējos divos gadījumos – Ribentropa 1 un<br />
gr.[āfa] Čano 2 gadījumā. Rumānijai un Polijai kā sabiedrotajām, kopš pag. rudeņa Beka<br />
nesekmīgā ceļojuma uz Galacu, bija pārtrūkuši visi nepieciešamie kontakti, sadarbības iespējas<br />
un atmosfēra starp Varšavu un Bukaresti bija diezgan vēsa un atturīga. Š.[ī] gada sākumā Polijas<br />
ārlietu ministra taisītās ekstratūres uz Berhtesgādenu, Ribentropa, Frontes cīnītāju savienības,<br />
Vācijas policijas šefa un SS 3 priekšnieka Himlera 4 vizītes un medības, ungāru mudināšana uz<br />
Karpatukrainas pusi, pašu poļu aģentu un apslēpta trieciennieku koncentrēšana Karpatos,<br />
Rumānijai nebija patīkama un neko labu nesolīja. Rumāņu atteikšanās Galacas konferenču 5<br />
laikā spēlēt kopēju spēlīti ar poļiem Karpatrutēnijas un poļu – ungāru kopējās robežas<br />
jautājumā bija līdzšinējās vēsās atmosfēras galvenie iemesli jo rumāņiem licies puslīdz skaidrs,<br />
ka nākošais dalīšanas objekts un vācu ekspansijas teritorija pēc Čehoslovākijas varēja būt vienīgi<br />
Rumānija. Ar diezgan skaidri jūtamu psiholoģisku pārmaiņu Eiropas un arī<br />
Dienvidaustrumeiropas politiskā atmosfērā Ungārijas ministru prezidenta maiņu, Jugoslāvijas<br />
valdības maiņu, poļu studentu un poļu sabiedriskās domas (gan opozicionārās) uzstāšanos un<br />
beidzot ar rumāņu noteikto, kaut arī brutāli nežēlīgo „Dzelzsgvardes” likvidēšanu, bija pienācis<br />
laiks, ka rumāņiem, tā arī poļiem meklēt iespēju atjaunot veco solidaritāti un sadarbību, kura arī<br />
pēdējā vizītē it visā pilnībā rekonstruēta un par jaunu nostiprināta. Jautājumi, kas šķīra Polijas<br />
un Rumānijas viedokļus, bija Karpatukraina (poļu–ungāru kopējās robežas jautājums) un<br />
apslēptā pretdarbība vācu dinamismam Dienvidaustrumu virzienā. Tamdēļ arī punkts par<br />
Rumānijas un Polijas attiecībām ar Vāciju ir bijis viens no galvenajiem. Pārrunāta arī iespēja par<br />
Polijas līdzdalību Balkānu komitejā un attiecību, pagaidām tirdzniecisku, uzlabošanu starp<br />
Padomju Krieviju un Rumāniju. Ar sevišķu pastrīpojumu presē tiek atreferēts par satiksmes<br />
jautājumu uzlabošanu starp Baltijas un Melno jūru, pirmā kārtā paredzēts saskaņot un uzlabot<br />
1<br />
Joahims fon Ribentrops (von Ribbentrop; 1893–1946), Vācijas valstsvīrs un diplomāts. 1936.–1938. g. vēstnieks<br />
Lielbritānijā, 1938.–1945. g. ārlietu ministrs.<br />
2<br />
Galeaco Čano (Ciano; 1903–1944), Itālijas diplomāts un valstsvīrs, grāfs, no 1930. g. Ministru rezidenta un<br />
diktatora B. Musolīni (1883–1945) znots. Bija atašejs Riodežaneiro, konsuls Šanhajā, Ārlietu ministrijas Preses<br />
nodaļas vadītājs. 1935.–1936. g. preses un propagandas ministrs, 1936.–1943. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1943. g. vēstnieks<br />
Vatikānā.<br />
3<br />
SS – Shutzstaffel (vācu val.); aizsardzības vienības: Vācu nacionālsociālistiskās partijas galvenās paramilitārās,<br />
vēlāk – militārās vienības<br />
4<br />
Heinrihs Himlers (Himmler; 1900–1945) – Vācijas valstsvīrs, no 1936. g. Gestapo (slepenās valsts policijas)<br />
vadītājs.<br />
5<br />
1938. g. 18.–19. okt. Galacā Polijas ārlietu ministrs J. Beks tikās ar Rumānijas karali, cenšoties panākt Rumānijas<br />
piekrišanu Ungārijas prasību apmierināšanai Aizkarpatu Ukrainā. Taču Rumānija atbildēja negatīvi, jo baidījās no<br />
Ungārijas prasībām Transilvānijā un ievēroja solidaritāti ar savu sabiedroto Čehoslovākiju.
356 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
dzelzceļa satiksmi starp Varšavu un Bukaresti un tālāk uz Salonikiem, un otrām kārtām, par<br />
kanāla būvēšanu, kas savienotu ūdensceļa veidā Baltijas un Melno jūru, ejot pa Vislu, Sanu,<br />
Dņestru, Prutu, Donavu uz Melno jūru. Esmu gan dzirdējis piezīmes, ka šis kanāla projekts vēl<br />
pagaidām jāuzskata par stipri teorētisku un problemātisku, jo tas maksāšot milzīgas summas,<br />
kuras nevienai, ne otrai projekta taisītāju pusei pašreiz nav rīcībā. Runā gan, ka Beks Londonā šī<br />
gada aprīlī būšot mēģināt ieinteresēt angļus šī grandiozā projekta finansēšanā, bet angļiem, kā<br />
man liekas, vairāk interesē, lai poļi pirktu vairāk angļu preces. Tāpat ar lielu reklāmu tiek<br />
sludināta poļu–rumāņu uzstāšanās starptautiskā forumā žīdu jautājumā. Abām šīm zemēm<br />
žīdu jautājums tiešām ir ļoti smags, un ir saprotams, ka abas zemes interesējas par šīs lietas<br />
kārtošanu starptautiskā apjomā. Gafenku gan godīgi piezīmēja, ka ar nesen no poļu valdības<br />
partijas OZON’a 1 deklarēto koloniju prasīšanu rumāņiem neesot nekas kopējs un tas<br />
neietilpstot poļu–rumāņu alianses rāmjos.<br />
No Gafenku teiktām frāzēm tomēr izriet, ka rumāņi tagad vairs nav pret Karpatukrainas<br />
nokārtošanas poļu–ungāru versiju, jo šī Karpatukraina tiešām ir nemiera pūznis un rumāņus tik<br />
ļoti interesējošā tiešā satiksme ar Čehoslovākiju ar Vīnes šķīrējtiesas lēmumu tik un tā ir<br />
pārtraukta. Uzmanīgi tomēr Gafenku piezīmē, ka jārēķinoties ar šo Vīnes šķīrējtiesas lēmumu.<br />
Ja nu tiešām tuvākā laikā būtu jārēķinās ar Karpatukrainas likvidēšanu, resp., tās pievienošanu<br />
Ungārijai, tad gluži bez satricinājumiem šī Čehoslovākijas tālākā apcirpšana nepaliks.<br />
Esmu uzstādījis jautājumu kādam šejienes kolēģim, vai Čehoslovākija zināmos apstākļos<br />
samierinātos ar tālāku viņas teritorijas apgraizīšanu, dabūju dzirdēt, ka čehiem šis<br />
Karpatukrainas jautājums esot svarīgs aiz morāliskiem, prestiža, ģeopolitiskiem un slāviskuma<br />
aizstāvēšanas apsvērumiem. Eksistences jautājums tur nekādā ziņā neesot, bet viņi negribētu,<br />
ka Karpatukraina nonāktu Čehoslovākijas pretinieku rokās. Esot bijusi kādreiz runa par<br />
Karpatukrainas atdošanu poļiem, kas čehiem, neskatoties uz visiem strīdiem un saspīlējumiem,<br />
tomēr būtu pieņemamāka solūcija [risinājums], nekā Karpatukrainas atdošana ungāriem.<br />
Rumāņiem tagad šī lieta puslīdz indiferenta [vienaldzīga] un rumāņi būtu gatavi Karpatukrainu<br />
„izandelēt”, ja vien caur to panāktu ungāru apetītes apmierināšanu un galvenā kārtā to, lai<br />
ungāri liktu rumāņus mierā ar savām prasībām par ungāru apdzīvoto apgabalu<br />
atkalpievienošanu Ungārijai Transilvānijā un citos pierobežas apgabalos [..].<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2538. l., 108.–110. lp.<br />
142. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters about <strong>the</strong> visit of Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Gafencu to Poland,<br />
8 th March 1939<br />
The day before yesterday came to completion one of <strong>the</strong> visits of foreign Ministers of<br />
Foreign Affairs that had followed each o<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> recent weeks. The last one, <strong>the</strong> visit of<br />
Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Gafencu, as I already mentioned in one of my reports, was<br />
<strong>the</strong> most interesting one and had a result that could be seen, i.e. heard on <strong>the</strong> outside. The<br />
reason of <strong>the</strong> visit was more conclusive than that of <strong>the</strong> two previous cases – on <strong>the</strong> case of<br />
Ribbentrop 2 and C[ount] Ciano 1 . After Beck’s unsuccessful trip to Galați last autumn all <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (OZN) – Polijas Nacionālās apvienošanās nometne, dēvēts arī par „Ozonu”, 1937.<br />
g. izveidota politiska organizācija valdības atbalstam.<br />
2<br />
Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893–1946), German statesman and diplomat. 1936–1938 Ambassador in Great Britain,<br />
1938–1945 Minister of Foreign Affairs.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 357<br />
mutual contacts that Romania and Poland as allies must maintain as well as opportunities of<br />
bilateral co-operation had slackened off and <strong>the</strong> atmosphere between Warsaw and Bucharest<br />
was ra<strong>the</strong>r cold and reserved. The extra-tours made by Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to<br />
Berchtesgaden, visits and hunting trips by Ribbentrop, <strong>the</strong> Union of <strong>the</strong> Front Combatants,<br />
Germany’s Chief of Police and Chief of SS 2 Himmler 3 , <strong>the</strong> urging of <strong>the</strong> Hungarians towards <strong>the</strong><br />
Carpathian Ukraine, <strong>the</strong> concentration of Polish agents and secret dislocation of storm-troopers<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Carpathians were not agreeable to Romania and did not bid anything good. The<br />
Romanians’ refusal to play a joint game with <strong>the</strong> Poles on <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Ru<strong>the</strong>nia<br />
and Polish–Hungarian common border during <strong>the</strong> conferences in Galați 4 were <strong>the</strong> main<br />
reasons of <strong>the</strong> cold atmosphere because it had seemed more of less clear to <strong>the</strong> Romanians that<br />
after Czechoslovakia only Romania could be <strong>the</strong> next object of division and <strong>the</strong> next territory of<br />
German expansion. With a ra<strong>the</strong>r clearly perceptible psychological change in <strong>the</strong> political<br />
atmosphere of Europe and in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe, too, with <strong>the</strong> change of Prime Minister in<br />
Hungary, and <strong>the</strong> change of government in Yugoslavia, with <strong>the</strong> activities of Polish students<br />
and Polish society (although <strong>the</strong> oppositionist one) and finally with <strong>the</strong> Romanians’ determined<br />
abolition, although brutally ruthless, of <strong>the</strong> “Iron Guard”, <strong>the</strong> time had come for both <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians and Poles to look for an opportunity to restore <strong>the</strong> former solidarity and cooperation,<br />
which during <strong>the</strong> last visit was fully reconstructed and consolidated anew. The issues<br />
that divided <strong>the</strong> views of Poland and Romania were <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Ukraine (<strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong><br />
common Polish–Hungarian border) and <strong>the</strong> covert counteraction to German dynamism into<br />
sou<strong>the</strong>ast direction. For that reason Romania’s and Poland’s <strong>relations</strong> with Germany have been<br />
one of <strong>the</strong> main issues. The possibility of Poland’s participation in <strong>the</strong> Balkan Committee and<br />
improvement of <strong>relations</strong>, for <strong>the</strong> time being economic ones, between Soviet Russia and<br />
Romania were also discussed. The press with a particular emphasis reports about <strong>the</strong><br />
improvement of transportation issues between <strong>the</strong> Baltic and <strong>the</strong> Black Seas, in <strong>the</strong> first<br />
instance it is planned to co-ordinate and improve railway traffic between Warsaw and<br />
Bucharest and fur<strong>the</strong>r to Thessalonica and <strong>the</strong>n to build a channel, which would by waterway<br />
connect <strong>the</strong> Baltic and <strong>the</strong> Black Seas, going along <strong>the</strong> Vistula, Sana, Dniester, Prut, Danube<br />
and <strong>the</strong> Black Sea. However I have heard remarks that for <strong>the</strong> time being <strong>the</strong> project of this<br />
channel is to be regarded as being largely <strong>the</strong>oretic and problematic, because it would cost huge<br />
amounts of money that none of <strong>the</strong> participating sides currently has. Never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>the</strong>y also say<br />
that in London in April, this year Beck will try to arouse interest of <strong>the</strong> English in <strong>the</strong> financing<br />
of this grandiose project, but <strong>the</strong> English, as it seems to me, are more interested in having <strong>the</strong><br />
Poles buy English goods. The Polish–Romanian presentation at an international forum on<br />
Jewish issue is also being greatly advertised. The Jewish issue is indeed very difficult for both<br />
1<br />
Galeazzo Ciano (1903–1944), Italian diplomat and statesman, Count, from 1930 son-in-law of Prime Minister and<br />
Dictator B. Mussolini. Had served as attaché in Rio de Janeiro, consul in Shanghai, Head of <strong>the</strong> Press Division of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1935–1936 Minister of Press and Propaganda, 1936–1943 Minister of Foreign Affairs,<br />
1943 Ambassador to Vatican.<br />
2<br />
SS – Shutzstaffel (German) – defence units: chief paramilitary, later military units of <strong>the</strong> German National<br />
Socialist Worker’s Party.<br />
3<br />
Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945) – German statesman, from 1936 Head of Gestapo (Secret State Police).<br />
4<br />
In Galați on 18 th – 19 th October, 1938 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland J. Beck met <strong>the</strong> King of Romania, trying<br />
to achieve Romania’s approval for <strong>the</strong> meeting of <strong>the</strong> claims of Hungary in <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Ukraine. Romania<br />
however rejected <strong>the</strong> proposition, fearing Hungary’s claims in Transylvania and being solidary with its ally<br />
Czechoslovakia.
358 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
<strong>the</strong>se countries and it is understandable that <strong>the</strong>y are interested in straightening <strong>the</strong>se issues<br />
out on an international scale. Gafencu however openly noted to me that Romanians had<br />
nothing to do with <strong>the</strong> recent demand for <strong>the</strong> declared colonies by <strong>the</strong> Polish governmental<br />
party OZON 1 and that this issue did not fit into <strong>the</strong> framework of <strong>the</strong> Polish–Romanian alliance.<br />
From <strong>the</strong> phrases uttered by Gafencu it never<strong>the</strong>less follows that <strong>the</strong> Romanians are no<br />
longer against <strong>the</strong> Polish–Hungarian version of straightening out <strong>the</strong> [issue of <strong>the</strong>] Carpathian<br />
Ukraine, because this Carpathian Ukraine is indeed a breeding bed of unrest and <strong>the</strong> direct<br />
traffic with Czechoslovakia that <strong>the</strong> Romanians were so much interested in was anyway<br />
suspended by <strong>the</strong> verdict of <strong>the</strong> court of arbitration in Vienna. Still, Gafencu cautiously notes<br />
that this verdict of <strong>the</strong> arbitration court in Vienna has to be reckoned with. If <strong>the</strong> abolition of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Carpathian Ukraine, i.e. its annexation to Hungary in <strong>the</strong> nearest future indeed has to be<br />
reckoned with, such fur<strong>the</strong>r trimming of Czechoslovakia will not go entirely without any shock.<br />
I asked a colleague here whe<strong>the</strong>r under certain circumstances Czechoslovakia would<br />
reconcile with a fur<strong>the</strong>r trimming of its territory and I received <strong>the</strong> answer that this issue of <strong>the</strong><br />
Carpathian Ukraine was important for <strong>the</strong> Czechs for moral, prestige and geopolitical issues<br />
and for <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> defence of Slav-ianism. It was in no way an issue of existential<br />
importance, but <strong>the</strong>y would not like to see <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Ukraine coming into <strong>the</strong> hands of<br />
Czechoslovakia’s adversaries. The cession of <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Ukraine to <strong>the</strong> Poles had been<br />
discussed once, which option would be a more acceptable solution for <strong>the</strong> Czechs, in spite of all<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir discords and tensions [between <strong>the</strong> Czechs and Poles) than <strong>the</strong> cession of <strong>the</strong> Carpathian<br />
Ukraine to <strong>the</strong> Hungarians. The Romanians are now more or less indifferent to this issue and<br />
would be ready “to sell out” <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Ukraine if that satisfied <strong>the</strong> Hungarians’ appetite<br />
and – what is most important – ensured that <strong>the</strong> Hungarians no longer trouble <strong>the</strong> Romanians<br />
with <strong>the</strong>ir demands for <strong>the</strong> re-annexation of <strong>the</strong> regions inhabited by <strong>the</strong> ethnic Hungarians in<br />
Transylvania and of o<strong>the</strong>r border areas to Hungary [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2538, s. 108–110.<br />
143. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga E.C. Teodorescu nr. 608<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 5 mai 1939<br />
Aflu din surse demne de toată încrederea că știrea conform căreia Germania ar fi propus și<br />
Letoniei un pact bilateral de neagresiune 2 și că propunerea ar fi fost acceptată corespunde în<br />
total adevărului.<br />
Ducându-mă astăzi la Ministerul Afacerilor Străine leton spre a obține o confirmare oficială<br />
și informații complementare, m-am lovit de obișnuita și inexplicabila atitudine de exagerată<br />
reticență care caracterizează raporturile dintre Guvernul leton și diplomații străini.<br />
Singura confirmare ce am putut-o obține este că: „s-a stabilit într-adevăr un contact în acest<br />
sens.”<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 54.<br />
1<br />
Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (OZN) – The Camp of National Unity, called also „Ozon”, a political organisation<br />
established in 1937 in support of <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
2<br />
Pactul de Neagresiune Germano-Leton a fost semnat la Berlin la 7 iunie 1939.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 359<br />
143. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga E.C. Teodorescu no. 608 to<br />
Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 5 th May 1939<br />
I found out from o<strong>the</strong>r trustworthy sources that <strong>the</strong> news according to which Germany had<br />
also proposed to Latvia a bilateral non-aggression pact 1 and that <strong>the</strong> proposal that had been<br />
accepted fully corresponded to <strong>the</strong> truth.<br />
Today I went to <strong>the</strong> Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to obtain an official confirmation and<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r information, and I came across <strong>the</strong> usual and inexplicable attitude of exaggerated<br />
reluctance that characterizes <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> Latvian government and <strong>the</strong> foreign<br />
diplomats.<br />
The only confirmation I could get is that: "contact was indeed established to this purpose."<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 54<br />
144. Telegrama ministrului plenipotențiar al României la Riga George Lecca nr. 813<br />
către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 28 iunie 1939<br />
Am onoarea de a aduce la cunoștința Excelenței Voastre că am fost primit astăzi în audiență<br />
de prezentare de către Dl Munters, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Letoniei.<br />
După ce mi-a vorbit de politica Letoniei care se poate rezuma la o perfectă neutralitate față<br />
de toți, refuzând orice fel de garanții, Domnia Sa a trecut la chestiunea negocierilor pactului<br />
anglo-franco-sovietic. Dl Munters nu crede că acest pact se va încheia, situația internă a<br />
Sovietelor nepermițându-le să-și ia angajamente în afară. Este posibil, adaugă Domnia sa, să se<br />
ajungă la o înțelegere principială, fără a se încheia pactul. De altfel, Anglia nu urmărește încă<br />
încheierea pactului, cât mai ales o neutralizare a Sovietelor, în cazul unui eventual conflict,<br />
pentru a împiedica o înțelegere germano-sovietică.<br />
Dl. Munters mi-a afirmat că Berlinul va face mari presiuni la Moscova, arătând că încheierea<br />
pactului ar însemna pentru Germania o „completă încercuire” și în acest caz ea ar fi obligată ca<br />
„să facă imediat ceva” pentru ruperea cercului. În același timp Germania a făcut o propunere la<br />
Londra ca să ia parte la o manifestare comună a „albilor” contra „galbenilor” față de<br />
evenimentele de la Tientsin.<br />
Dl. Munters mi-a adăugat că nu ar fi de mirare ca Japonia să refacă solidaritatea europeană.<br />
Cu prilejul acestei vizite, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Letoniei mi-a spus că Legația<br />
Letoniei în România va fi reînființată și că noul Ministru, care va avea reședința la București, va<br />
fi în curând numit.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 161.<br />
144. Telegram no. 813 of <strong>the</strong> Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Riga George<br />
Lecca to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Grigore Gafencu, 28 th June 1939<br />
I am honoured to inform Your Excellency that today I have been received in an introduction<br />
audience by Mr. Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia.<br />
After he spoke to me about Latvia’s policy that can only imply perfect neutrality to everyone,<br />
by refusing any kind of guarantees, His Excellency proceeded to <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> negotiations on<br />
<strong>the</strong> Anglo-French-Soviet pact. Mr. Munters does not believe that this pact will be signed, as <strong>the</strong><br />
internal situation of <strong>the</strong> Soviets does not allow <strong>the</strong>m to make commitments abroad. His<br />
Excellency also says that an agreement of principle may be reached, without <strong>the</strong> conclusion of<br />
1<br />
The German–Latvian Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Berlin on June 7, 1939
360 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
<strong>the</strong> pact. Actually, <strong>the</strong> objective of England is not <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> pact yet, but <strong>the</strong><br />
neutralization of <strong>the</strong> Soviets in case of a potential conflict, in order to prevent a German-Soviet<br />
agreement.<br />
Mr. Munters asserted that Berlin will put very much pressure on Moscow, showing that <strong>the</strong><br />
signing of <strong>the</strong> pact would mean “complete encirclement” to Germany, and in this case it would<br />
be forced to “do something immediately” to break <strong>the</strong> circle. At <strong>the</strong> same time, Germany made<br />
a proposal to London to partake in a common manifestation of “white” against “yellow” people<br />
related to <strong>the</strong> events in Tientsin.<br />
Mr. Munters added that it would not be a surprise if Japan re-edified European solidarity.<br />
On this occasion, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia told me that <strong>the</strong> Latvian Legation<br />
in Romania would be restored and <strong>the</strong> new Minister would be appointed soon and would reside<br />
in Bucharest.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 161.<br />
145. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Marcel Romanescu nr.<br />
885 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 11 iulie 1939<br />
La sfârșitul acestei luni sau la începutul lui august, Dl. Artūrs Stegmanis 1 , Director politic în<br />
Ministerul Afacerilor Străine, va întreprinde o călătorie de informații în România, Bulgaria,<br />
Iugoslavia și Grecia.<br />
Scopul călătoriei Domniei sale la noi este dublu: să-și dea seama de rezultatele recentei<br />
expoziții letone la București, care se anunță mulțumitoare și să studieze chestiunea înființării<br />
unei legații letone la București.<br />
În privința ultimului punct, guvernul din Riga oscilează încă – din motive de economie –<br />
între formula unui Însărcinat cu Afaceri en pieds, cu atribuții mai mult comerciale, și o misiune<br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong>ă completă, comportând un Ministru Plenipotențiar acreditat și un atașat comercial.<br />
Dl. Munters îmi spunea că va tranșa chestiunea cu Dl. A. Valdmanis 2 , Ministrul Finanțelor<br />
îndată după călătoria Domnului Stegmanis la București.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 162.<br />
145. Telegram no. 885 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania in Riga Marcel Romanescu<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Grigore Gafencu, 11 th July 1939<br />
At <strong>the</strong> end of this month or at <strong>the</strong> beginning of August, Mr. Artūrs Stegmanis 3 , Political<br />
Director in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will undertake an informative visit to Romania,<br />
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece.<br />
The purpose of his visit is double: assessing <strong>the</strong> outcomes of <strong>the</strong> Latvian exhibition in<br />
Bucharest, which is expected to be satisfying, and studying <strong>the</strong> matter of <strong>the</strong> foundation of a<br />
Latvian legation in Bucharest.<br />
As regards <strong>the</strong> latter, <strong>the</strong> government in Riga still oscillates – due to economic reasons –<br />
between <strong>the</strong> variant of a Chargé d’Affaires en pieds, with ra<strong>the</strong>r commercial assignments, and a<br />
1<br />
Artūrs Stegmanis (1902-1986) a fost diplomat în Ministerul Afacerilor Externe leton (1919-1940), Director al<br />
Departamentului Politic (1938-1940). Deportat în U.R.S.S. după ocupația sovietică.<br />
2<br />
Alfrēds Valdmanis (1908-1970) a fost un om politic leton, ultimul Ministru de Finanțe al Letoniei independente<br />
(1939-1940).<br />
3<br />
Artūrs Stegmanis (1902-1986) was a Latvian diplomat in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1919-1940), Director of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Political Department (1938-1940). Deported to <strong>the</strong> U.R.S.S. after <strong>the</strong> Soviet occupation of his country.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 361<br />
complete <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission with an accredited Plenipotentiary Minister and a trade<br />
representative. Mr. Munters told me that he would discuss <strong>the</strong> matter with Mr. A. Valdmanis 1 ,<br />
Minister of Treasury, immediately after Mr. Stegmanis’ voyage to Bucharest.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 162.<br />
146. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Marcel Romanescu nr.<br />
900 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 12 iulie 1939<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine, Munters, mi-a repetat ieri motivele refuzului Statelor Baltice de<br />
a primi garanții incompatibile cu neutralitatea lor. Fără a-mi ascunde că Letonia a fost profund<br />
vexată de a fi fost abia informată de negocierile de la Moscova, fapt ce mi-a fost confirmat de<br />
Ministrul Angliei, Dl. Munters a stăruit asupra impresiei că Rusia ar urmări, sub pretextul<br />
garanțiilor, să-și deschidă posibilitatea unei intervenții în Statele baltice; cu toată fierberea de<br />
care se resimt bursa și afacerile comerciale, Dl. Munters consideră că ultima săptămână a adus<br />
grație fermității britanice, o răcire a procesului de la Danzig și nu crede într-o recrudescență a<br />
crizei în cursul lunii august, de care se tem cercurile engleze, americane, italiene și poloneze de<br />
aici.<br />
Dacă situația se menține neschimbată, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine întrevede chiar putința<br />
unor negocieri polono-germane în toamnă.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 65.<br />
146. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Marcel Romanescu no. 900<br />
to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 12 th July 1939<br />
Yesterday Mr. Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs, told me again <strong>the</strong> reasons for <strong>the</strong> refusal<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States of receiving guarantees which are incompatible with <strong>the</strong>ir neutrality.<br />
Without concealing from me <strong>the</strong> fact that Latvia was deeply vexed that it was barely informed<br />
of <strong>the</strong> negotiations in Moscow, which was confirmed to me by <strong>the</strong> Minister of England, Mr.<br />
Munters insisted on <strong>the</strong> belief that Russia would pursue, under <strong>the</strong> pretext of guarantees, to<br />
open <strong>the</strong> possibility of an intervention in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States; due to all <strong>the</strong> bustle felt by <strong>the</strong> stock<br />
and <strong>the</strong> commercial affairs, Mr. Munters believes that, owing to <strong>the</strong> British determination, last<br />
week brought <strong>the</strong> cooling of <strong>the</strong> process from Danzig and does not believe in a recrudescence of<br />
<strong>the</strong> crisis in August, which is feared by <strong>the</strong> English, American, Italian and Polish circles here.<br />
If <strong>the</strong> situation remains unchanged, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs sees even <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
of Polish-German negotiations in autumn.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 65.<br />
147. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Marcel Romanescu nr.<br />
922 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 14 iulie 1939<br />
Presa locală reproduce știrea din Londra că, într-o convorbire cu Sir Orme Sargent, Domnul<br />
Tilea ar fi comunicat Guvernului englez că ne opunem oricărei clauze în proiectatul acord<br />
anglo-franco-sovietic care ar îngădui Guvernului U.R.S.S. să interpreteze definiția agresorului în<br />
sensul unui amestec în afacerile noastre interne. Se deduce de aici paralelismul de atitudine<br />
între România și Statele baltice.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 67.<br />
1<br />
Alfrēds Valdmanis (1908-1970) was a Latvian politician, <strong>the</strong> last independent Latvia's Finance Minister (1939-<br />
1940).
362 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
147. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Marcel Romanescu no. 922<br />
to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 14 th July 1939<br />
The local media reproduces <strong>the</strong> news from London according to which, in a conversation<br />
with Sir Orme Sargent, Mr. Tilea communicated to <strong>the</strong> English Government that we opposed<br />
any provision in <strong>the</strong> planned Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement that would allow <strong>the</strong> USSR<br />
Government to interpret <strong>the</strong> definition of <strong>the</strong> aggressor as interference in our internal affairs.<br />
The parallelism of attitude between Romania and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States is thus inferred.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 67.<br />
148. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Marcel<br />
Romanescu nr. 1047 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 8<br />
august 1939<br />
Ca urmare la raportul meu nr. 885 cât și la telegrama nr. 1031 cu data de ieri, am onoarea să<br />
aduc la cunoștința Excelenței Voastre ca Dl. Artūrs Stegmanis, Director politic în Ministerul<br />
Afacerilor Străine, va părăsi Riga la 15 sau 16 august.<br />
După o ședere de două-trei zile la Varșovia, Domnia sa își va continua călătoria la București,<br />
unde contează să fie pe 20 august, spre a rămâne o săptămână.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 165.<br />
148. Diplomatic Report no. 1047 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania in Riga Marcel<br />
Romanescu to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign affairs of Romania Grigore Gafencu, 8 th August<br />
1939<br />
As a consequence to my report no. 885 and to my telegram no. 1031 dated yesterday, I have<br />
<strong>the</strong> honour of informing Your Excellency that Mr. Artūrs Stegmanis, Political Manager in <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will leave Riga on August 15 th or 16 th .<br />
After a two or three-day stay in Warsaw, he will continue his voyage in Bucharest, where he<br />
is bound to stay a week from August 20 th .<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 165.<br />
149. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești 1 nr. 1194 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 8<br />
septembrie 1939<br />
Opinia publică și cercurile conducătoare letone sunt optimiste în ceea ce privește<br />
posibilitatea pentru Statele Baltice de a rămâne neutre în actualul conflict, ceea ce explică și<br />
faptul că Letonia nu a luat până acum nici o măsură militară excepțională.<br />
Garanțiile date de Germania prin pactele de neagresiune ce a semnat cu Statele Baltice, sunt<br />
considerate aici de încredere. Sunt înclinat a crede că această încredere se întemeiază în<br />
principal pe credința că soarta armelor nu poate fi favorabilă Germaniei.<br />
1<br />
Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti (1908-1949) a fost un diplomat și politician român. Ministru al Afacerilor Străine<br />
(1944), secretar al Legației de la Stockholm (1937-1939), însărcinat cu afaceri în Țările Baltice (1939-1940). Director<br />
al Direcției Cabinetului și Cifrului al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine în al Doilea Război Mondial. Implicat în Actul<br />
de la 23 august 1944 de răsturnare a regimului Ion Antonescu. Fondator al Comitetului Național Român din exil. S-<br />
a stins din viață la New York.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 363<br />
Sentimentul față de Rusia a trecut prin diferite faze în ultimul timp. Emoția primului<br />
moment după semnarea pactului de neagresiune germano-rus, când a existat temerea că cele<br />
două regimuri și-au întins mâna pentru o politică de expansiune în nord-estul european, a făcut<br />
loc unei stări de spirit mai puțin alarmante și chiar optimiste. Se admite că dacă pactul de<br />
neagresiune germano-rus ar evolua spre o colaborare militară activă, Rusia ar avea, în cazul unei<br />
victorii comune probabile, perspectiva unor beneficii imediate și substanțiale. Pe de altă parte<br />
ea nu are niciun interes a contribui la hegemonia Germaniei în Europa, hegemonie a cărei<br />
greutate va fi, poate, prima a suporta mai târziu. Aici se crede deci că Rusia face o politică de<br />
expectativă, că ea va vinde materiile sale prime tuturor celor ce îi vor plăti, că este mulțumită a<br />
vedea între Puterile capitaliste un război de care ar putea profita pentru difuzarea doctrinelor<br />
comuniste și că face politica neutrului puternic, care va reclama de a-și spune cuvântul în<br />
viitorul reglement european.<br />
De aceea Statele Baltice consideră actualmente pactul de neagresiune germano-sovietic ca<br />
un eveniment fericit. Ele au privit întotdeauna cu mare teamă posibilitatea unei alianțe militare<br />
între Rusia și Puterile Occidentale, prin efectul căreia teritoriul lor ar fi devenit un câmp de<br />
bătaie între armatele unor Mari Puteri militare. O înfrângere germană cu neutralitatea Rusiei<br />
este pentru Statele Baltice formula ideală și visul lor nemărturisit.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, filele 98-99.<br />
149. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești 1<br />
no. 1194 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 8 th September 1939<br />
The Latvian public opinion and <strong>the</strong> leading circles are optimistic about <strong>the</strong> possibility for<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic States to remain neutral in <strong>the</strong> current conflict, which explains also <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
Latvia has not taken any exceptional military measure so far.<br />
The guarantees provided by Germany through <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts signed with <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States are deemed reliable in this case. I am inclined to believe that this confidence is<br />
mainly based on <strong>the</strong> belief that <strong>the</strong> war fate cannot be favourable to Germany.<br />
The feeling regarding Russia has gone through various phases lately. The emotion after<br />
signing <strong>the</strong> German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, when <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>the</strong> fear that <strong>the</strong> two<br />
regimes had shaken hands on a policy of expansion in North-Eastern Europe, gave way to a less<br />
alarming and even optimistic mood. It is admitted that if <strong>the</strong> German-Russian non-aggression<br />
pact evolved towards active military cooperation, in <strong>the</strong> case of a probable common victory,<br />
Russia would have <strong>the</strong> prospect of immediate and substantial benefits. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, she<br />
has no interest in contributing to <strong>the</strong> hegemony of Germany in Europe, hegemony whose<br />
weight may be, perhaps, <strong>the</strong> first to bear later. It is believed <strong>the</strong>refore that Russia has an<br />
expectative policy, that it will sell raw materials to all those who pay for <strong>the</strong>m, that it is happy to<br />
see a war between <strong>the</strong> capitalist powers that could be exploited to impart communist doctrines<br />
and that it adopts <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> strong neutral part, which will claim to express its opinion in<br />
<strong>the</strong> future European regulation.<br />
1<br />
Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti (1908-1949) was a Romanian politician and diplomat. Minister for Foreign Affairs<br />
(1944), Secretary of Legation in Stockholm (1937-1939), chargé d'affaires in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States (1939-1940). Director of<br />
Cabinet and Cipher of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs in World War II. Involved in <strong>the</strong> Act of August 23, 1944<br />
which toppled <strong>the</strong> regime of Ion Antonescu. Founder of <strong>the</strong> Romanian National Committee of exile. He passed<br />
away in New York.
364 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Therefore, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States consider <strong>the</strong> German-Soviet non-aggression pact as a happy<br />
event at present. They have always considered with great fear <strong>the</strong> possibility of a military<br />
alliance between Russia and <strong>the</strong> Western powers, which would result in <strong>the</strong>ir territory<br />
becoming a battlefield of <strong>the</strong> armies of some of <strong>the</strong> Great military Powers. A German defeat<br />
with Russia's neutrality is <strong>the</strong> ideal formula and <strong>the</strong>ir unconfessed dream for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 98-99.<br />
150. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 1203 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 14<br />
septembrie 1939<br />
Ministrul Afacerilor Străine, domnul Munters, mă roagă să trimit cererea Guvernului leton<br />
solicitând agrementul pentru acreditarea domnului Ludvigs Ēķis, Ministrul Letoniei în Polonia,<br />
în același timp ca Trimis Extraordinar și Ministru Plenipotențiar pe lângă Majestatea Sa Regele,<br />
Augustul nostru Suveran.<br />
Domnul Munters îmi cere în modul cel mai călduros a interveni pentru ca acest agrement să<br />
fie comunicat, dacă bineînțeles nu există nimic contra, de urgență, fapt pentru care Guvernul<br />
leton ar rămâne profund obligat față de Guvernul român. În cazul, într-adevăr, când domnul<br />
Ēķis ar fi obligat de împrejurări să părăsească teritoriul polonez, Guvernul leton ar dori ca<br />
domnia sa să-și poată continua fără întrerupere, din România, activitatea sa <strong>diplomatic</strong>ă pe<br />
care, în circumstanțele actuale, Guvernul leton pune mare preț.<br />
Domnul Ēķis și-ar prezenta scrisorile de acreditare îndată după acordarea agrementului.<br />
Adaug că Domnia Sa a ocupat posturile de Ministru în Lituania, Ministru de Finanțe, Ministru<br />
al Afacerilor Străine ad-interim. Din 1938 este Ministru în Polonia și Ungaria, cu reședința în<br />
Polonia.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 107.<br />
150. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 1203 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 14 th September 1939<br />
Mr. Munters, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs, asks me to relay <strong>the</strong> request to <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
Government, calling for approval for <strong>the</strong> accreditation of Mr. Ludvigs Ēķis, <strong>the</strong> Minister of<br />
Latvia in Poland, at <strong>the</strong> same time as Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of His<br />
Majesty <strong>the</strong> King, our Sovereign.<br />
Mr. Munters asks me most kindly to intercede so that this agreement may be<br />
communicated urgently, if we have nothing against it, of course, for which <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
government would remain deeply obliged to <strong>the</strong> Romanian government. If Mr. Eķis is forced by<br />
<strong>the</strong> circumstances to leave <strong>the</strong> Polish territory, <strong>the</strong> Latvian government wants him to continue<br />
his <strong>diplomatic</strong> activity from Romania without interruption, which <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government<br />
values highly under <strong>the</strong> current circumstances.<br />
Mr. Ēķis would present credentials immediately after approval is granted. I add that His<br />
Excellency held <strong>the</strong> positions of Minister of Lithuania, Minister of Finance, and interim Minister<br />
of Foreign Affairs. Since 1938 he has been a Minister in Poland and Hungary, residing in Poland.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 107.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 365<br />
151. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 1214 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 18<br />
septembrie 1939<br />
Intrarea trupelor sovietice în Polonia a produs aici o profundă îngrijorare și o mare impresie<br />
și ea deschide din nou, ca în primele zile după semnarea pactului de neagresiune germano-rus,<br />
perspectivele cele mai sumbre pentru Statele Baltice. Până în ultimul moment nu se credea aici<br />
în această posibilitate, chiar după articolul din ziarul „Pravda” care pentru unii era totuși un<br />
preludiu clar al celor întâmplate. Ministrul Afacerilor Străine mi-a declarat într-adevăr vinery, la<br />
o întrebare a mea, că consideră foarte puțin probabilă o acțiune rusă contra Poloniei.<br />
Tendința pesimistă a opiniei publice manifestă temerea că Sovietele ar putea căuta<br />
obținerea și în alte regiuni, și în special în Statele Baltice, a unor avantaje care în acest moment<br />
nu ar prezenta aproape niciun risc.<br />
Tendința optimistă crede că Rusia nu va merge mai departe și că scopul ei, în afară de<br />
stabilirea unei frontiere mai mult sau mai puțin etnografică, a fost de a accelera lichidarea<br />
frontului oriental, care comportă un pericol de eventuale complicații pentru Soviete și de a<br />
deplasa tot războiul pe frontul occidental, contribuind în același timp la prelungirea<br />
conflictului, ceea ce pentru multiple motive ar fi în interesul Rusiei.<br />
Aproape toată lumea se teme însă că dacă puterile occidentale s-ar acomoda cu o pace<br />
consacrând înfrângerea Poloniei și deci dominația Germanei în Europa Orientală, Rusia va fi<br />
împinsă a ocupa Statele Baltice pentru a evita ca ele să cadă sub o formă sau alta în lotul<br />
Germaniei. Se manifestă însă speranța cea mai fermă că această ipoteză nu se va produce și nu<br />
se poate desigur decât dori ca această speranță să se dovedească întemeiată.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, filele 113-114.<br />
151. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 1214 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 18 th September 1939<br />
The entry of <strong>the</strong> Soviet troops in Poland has produced here a deep concern and a great<br />
impression and it opens again, as during <strong>the</strong> first days after signing <strong>the</strong> German-Russian Non-<br />
Aggression Pact, <strong>the</strong> gloomiest prospects for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. Until <strong>the</strong> last moment, <strong>the</strong>y did<br />
not believe in this possibility here, even after <strong>the</strong> article in "Pravda" newspaper, which for some<br />
was still a clear prelude of <strong>the</strong> events that occurred. On Friday, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
told me that he considered a Russian action against Poland very unlikely.<br />
The pessimistic tendency of <strong>the</strong> public opinion manifests <strong>the</strong> fear that <strong>the</strong> Soviets might<br />
pursue advantages which would currently present almost no risk, in o<strong>the</strong>r regions, particularly<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
The optimistic tendency says that Russia will not go fur<strong>the</strong>r and that its purpose, besides<br />
establishing a more or less ethnographic border, was to accelerate <strong>the</strong> liquidation of <strong>the</strong> Eastern<br />
front, which carries a risk of possible complications for <strong>the</strong> Soviets and move <strong>the</strong> war to <strong>the</strong><br />
Western front, while contributing to <strong>the</strong> expansion of <strong>the</strong> conflict, which for various reasons<br />
would be in <strong>the</strong> interest of Russia.<br />
Almost everyone is afraid, however, that if <strong>the</strong> Western powers got accustomed to peace by<br />
consecrating <strong>the</strong> defeat of Poland and thus <strong>the</strong> German domination in Eastern Europe, Russia<br />
will be pushed to occupy <strong>the</strong> Baltic States to prevent <strong>the</strong>m from falling in one way or ano<strong>the</strong>r in<br />
Germany’s batch. However, <strong>the</strong>re is a most steadfast hope according to which this hypo<strong>the</strong>sis<br />
will not occur and it is only desirable that this hope may prove founded.
366 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 113-114.<br />
152. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 1220 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 21<br />
septembrie 1939<br />
Comunicatul de ieri al agenției „Tass” după care „în porturile țărilor baltice s-ar ascunde<br />
submarine poloneze și ale altor puteri și care s-ar bucura de sprijinul clandestin al unor<br />
personalități guvernamentale” a produs aici oarecare emoție. Mulți se tem că el ar putea fi un<br />
indiciu al intențiilor Rusiei cu privire la Statele Baltice, intenții care constituie problema<br />
formând în acest moment obiectul principal al preocupărilor întregii opinii publice.<br />
Acuzațiile sovietice sunt desigur neîntemeiate, iar pentru un observator obiectiv politica de<br />
neutralitate a Statelor Baltice nu ar putea da loc la nicio protestare justificată din partea<br />
vreuneia din puterile beligerante. Tocmai de aceea comunicatul în chestiune, care are aerul de a<br />
căuta pretexte, este considerat cu îngrijorare. După o opinie mai puțin alarmantă, acest<br />
comunicat este mai degrabă o manifestare de autoritate și un avertisment pentru politica<br />
Statelor Baltice, care vor trebui să țină seamă de interesele rusești.<br />
Punctul de vedere oficial se întemeiază aici pe pactele de neagresiune ce Statele Baltice au<br />
semnat cu Sovietele și pe declarația lui Molotov că Rusia va respecta neutralitatea celorlalte<br />
state. În Letonia și Lituania această declarație este pusă în relief cu oarecare insistență atât de<br />
presă, cât și de diferitele personalități guvernamentale în manifestațiile publice și în<br />
conversațiile private.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, filele 116-117.<br />
152. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 1220 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 21 st September 1939<br />
The yesterday communiqué of <strong>the</strong> press agency "Tass" according to which ”in <strong>the</strong> ports of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic countries, Polish and o<strong>the</strong>r powers’ submarines hid and enjoyed <strong>the</strong> clandestine<br />
support of some government personalities" caused excitement here. Many fear that it could be a<br />
sign of Russia's intentions concerning <strong>the</strong> Baltic States; <strong>the</strong>se intentions are problematic, as <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are <strong>the</strong> main object of concern for <strong>the</strong> entire public opinion at this time.<br />
The Soviet accusations are unfounded of course, and to an objective observer, <strong>the</strong> neutrality<br />
policy of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States could not give rise to any justified protest on <strong>the</strong> part of any of <strong>the</strong><br />
belligerent powers. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> communiqué in question, which seems to seek excuses, is<br />
worrying. According to a less alarming opinion, this communiqué is ra<strong>the</strong>r a manifestation of<br />
authority and a warning to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States policy, which should take into consideration <strong>the</strong><br />
Russian interests.<br />
The official point of view is based in <strong>the</strong> case on <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts signed by <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States with <strong>the</strong> Soviets and on Molotov's statement according to which Russia will respect<br />
<strong>the</strong> neutrality of o<strong>the</strong>r states. In Latvia and Lithuania, this statement is highlighted with<br />
somewhat insistently both by <strong>the</strong> press and <strong>the</strong> various government figures in <strong>the</strong> public<br />
demonstrations and <strong>the</strong> private conversations.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 116-117.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 367<br />
153. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 1247 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 29<br />
septembrie 1939<br />
Cu toate condițiile lui dure, care fac din Estonia o a doua Slovacie, nu este exagerat a spune<br />
că acordul ruso-estonian a fost primit aici cu un sentiment de relativă ușurare.<br />
Obsedată de pericolul rus, opinia publică letonă urmărea într-adevăr cu înfrigurare<br />
desfășurarea crizei ruso-estoniene și considera deja ipotezele cele mai pesimiste. Ori acordul<br />
intervenit este socotit ca un indiciu că Rusia se va mulțumi a face din Statele Baltice<br />
instrumentele sale docile și că nu are, cel puțin pentru moment, intenția de a proceda la o<br />
ocupație militară a acestor state, cum o făceau de temut unele manifestații din ultimul timp.<br />
Letonia, ale cărei raporturi cu Sovietele au fost întotdeauna sensibil mai bune decât cele ale<br />
Estoniei, speră să își reglementeze relațiile cu Rusia cu mai puține sacrificii decât vecina sa de la<br />
nord. Aceasta cu atât mai mult cu cât prin concesiile obținute din partea Estoniei, Sovietele<br />
domină deja Golful Riga și coasta letonă. Poate că, în cele din urmă, Letonia va acorda numai o<br />
bază navală în portul Libau, fost de altfel port militar rusesc și important prin faptul că nu este<br />
niciodată blocat de ghețuri.<br />
Oricât de îngrijorată ar fi Germania de această prezență rusească în Marea Baltică, pe vizita<br />
lui von Ribbentrop 1 la Moscova nu se pun aici speranțe pentru ameliorarea securității precare a<br />
Statelor Baltice. Dacă înainte de izbucnirea actualului conflict securitatea acestor state se baza<br />
în mare parte pe echilibrarea intereselor germano-ruse, acum, așa cum s-a văzut în Polonia,<br />
Germania nu poate decât să se încline în fața cererilor rusești.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, filele 122-123.<br />
153. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 1247 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 29 th September 1939<br />
Despite its harsh conditions that make Estonia a second Slovakia, it is not exaggerated to<br />
state that <strong>the</strong> Russian-Estonian agreement was received here with a feeling of relative relief.<br />
Obsessed with <strong>the</strong> Russian danger, <strong>the</strong> Latvian public opinion kept track quite feverishly of<br />
<strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> Russian-Estonian crisis and already made <strong>the</strong> most pessimistic<br />
assumptions. But <strong>the</strong> agreement reached is considered as an indication that Russia will be<br />
content to make <strong>the</strong> Baltic States its docile instruments and that it does not have, at least for<br />
<strong>the</strong> present, any intention of proceeding to military occupation of <strong>the</strong>se countries, even though<br />
some demonstrations made it redoubtable lately.<br />
Latvia, whose <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Soviets have always been noticeably better than those of<br />
Estonia, hopes to regulate <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong> with Russia with fewer sacrifices than its Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
neighbour. This is all <strong>the</strong> more so as through <strong>the</strong> concessions obtained from Estonia, <strong>the</strong> Soviets<br />
already dominate <strong>the</strong> Gulf of Riga and <strong>the</strong> Latvian coast. Perhaps ultimately, Latvia will grant<br />
only a naval base in <strong>the</strong> port of Libau, actually a former Russian military port, which is<br />
important due to <strong>the</strong> fact that it is never blocked by ice.<br />
1<br />
Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893-1946) a fost un diplomat și politician german, membru al NSDAP și apropiat al lui<br />
Adolf Hitler. Ministrul de externe al Germaniei (1938-1945). Semnatar al Pactului Ribbentrop-Molotov.<br />
Condamnat la moarte și executat pentru crime de război și crime împotriva umanității la procesul de la Nürnberg.
368 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
However worried Germany is by <strong>the</strong> Russian presence in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, von Ribbentrop 1 's<br />
visit to Moscow is not expected to improve <strong>the</strong> poor security of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. If before <strong>the</strong><br />
outbreak of <strong>the</strong> current conflict, <strong>the</strong> security of <strong>the</strong>se states relied heavily on <strong>the</strong> balancing of<br />
<strong>the</strong> German-Russian interests, now, as seen in Poland, Germany can only bow to Russian<br />
demands.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 122-123.<br />
154. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 1268 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 6<br />
octombrie 1939<br />
Tratativele letono-sovietice<br />
Acordul realizat între Letonia și Soviete comportă, ca și cel cu Estonia, un pact de asistență<br />
mutuală și dreptul pentru Sovietice de a avea în Letonia baze navale și mai multe aerodromuri,<br />
cât și de a întreține forțe militare strict necesare apărării acestora. Bazele navale vor fi stabilite<br />
în porturile Libau și Windau.<br />
Acordul comercial va comporta o sporire a schimburilor reciproce și facilități de tranzit<br />
către Marea Neagră și portul Murmansk pe coasta nordică scandinavă, care vor permite<br />
continuarea relațiilor Letoniei, în special cu Anglia, așa cum am arătat prin telegrama cifrată nr.<br />
1255.<br />
Negocierile cu Lituania continuă. Persistă părerea că regiunea Vilnei va fi retrocedată în<br />
schimbul unor condiții în genul celor acordate de (lipsă text) celelalte State baltice. Este greu de<br />
spus dacă Lituania câștigă sau pierde prin această tranzacție.<br />
Finlanda va fi și ea în curând reprezentată la Moscova. I se vor cere, între altele, baze navale<br />
în câteva insule din Golful Finlandei.<br />
În Statele Baltice opinia publică a primit cu resemnare aceste acorduri. Ea își dă seama că ele<br />
constituie compromisuri temporare și că valoarea lor ultimă este în funcție de evenimentele<br />
viitoare din Europa de care va depinde dacă aceste acorduri înseamnă începutul sfârșitului<br />
independenței acestor state sau numai servituți temporare de care ele se vor putea elibera mai<br />
târziu.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, filele 133-134.<br />
154. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 1268 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 6 th October 1939<br />
The Latvian-Soviet Negotiations<br />
The agreement between Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Soviets involves, like <strong>the</strong> one with Latvia, a mutual<br />
assistance pact and <strong>the</strong> right of <strong>the</strong> Soviets to have sea bases and several airfields in Latvia and<br />
to maintain military forces strictly necessary for <strong>the</strong> defence. The sea bases will be settled in<br />
Libau and Windau ports.<br />
The trade agreement will involve an enhancement of <strong>the</strong> mutual exchanges and facilities of<br />
transit to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea and Murmansk port on <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Scandinavian coast, which will<br />
1<br />
Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893-1946) was a German diplomat and politician, member of <strong>the</strong> NSDAP and one of<br />
Adolf Hitler's closest allies. Foreign Minister of Germany (1938-1945). Signatory of <strong>the</strong> Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.<br />
Sentenced to death and executed for war crimes and crimes against humanity at <strong>the</strong> Nuremberg trial.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 369<br />
allow <strong>the</strong> continuation of Latvia’s <strong>relations</strong>, especially with England, as shown in telegram no.<br />
1255.<br />
The negotiations with Latvia go on. The opinion that Vilna area will be retroceded in<br />
exchange of conditions similar to those granted by (missing text) <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States is<br />
maintained. It is hard to say whe<strong>the</strong>r Latvia wins or loses through this transaction.<br />
Finland will be soon represented in Moscow, too. It will be asked, among o<strong>the</strong>r things, for<br />
sea bases in a few islands from <strong>the</strong> Gulf of Finland.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, <strong>the</strong> public opinion received <strong>the</strong>se agreements resignedly. They realize<br />
that <strong>the</strong>se agreements are temporary compromises and that <strong>the</strong>ir ultimate value depends on<br />
<strong>the</strong> future events in Europe on which it will depend if <strong>the</strong>se agreements mean <strong>the</strong> beginning of<br />
<strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> independence of <strong>the</strong>se states or only temporary encumbrances which <strong>the</strong>y will<br />
be able to get rid of later on.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 133-134.<br />
155. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 1273 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 8<br />
octombrie 1939<br />
Ministrul Germaniei a început deja negocieri cu Guvernul leton în vederea stabilirii unui<br />
plan de repatriere a Germanilor din Letonia pe baza principiilor enunțate de Hitler în ultimul<br />
său discurs, prin care anunța o vastă acțiune de repatriere a elementelor germane din Europa<br />
Orientală.<br />
În ce privește pe cetățenii germani, ei vor părăsi imediat țara, mai multe vapoare așteptând<br />
deja în porturile letone în acest scop. Cât despre cetățenii letoni de origine germană, se prevede<br />
că afacerile lor vor fi lichidate și că ei vor părăsi la rândul lor Letonia în câteva luni. Guvernul<br />
leton nu face nicio dificultate pentru a ajunge la o înțelegere.<br />
Cum populația de origine germană, care se ridică după statistica oficială la peste 200 000 de<br />
suflete joacă un rol important în viața economică, se prevăd mari tulburări în acest domeniu.<br />
Se poate spune de pe acum că mulți nu vor dori să părăsească Letonia unde elementul<br />
german este stabilit de secole.<br />
Aceste evenimente au produs o profundă panică în opinia publică care acceptase cu<br />
resemnare acordul cu Rusia, de pe urma căruia spera, cel puțin pentru moment, într-o perioadă<br />
de calm. Ele sunt puse în legătură cu noile și iminentele evenimente în raporturile letonosovietice<br />
și ar reflecta completa dezinteresare [pe] care Germania ar fi constrânsă a [o] declara<br />
față de soarta regiunii baltice.<br />
Cred totuși că, prin acordurile cu Rusia, raporturile între Statele baltice și Soviete au intrat<br />
într-o fază de relativă stabilitate și că nu va interveni nicio schimbare notabilă atâta vreme cât<br />
rezultatul conflictului dintre Germania și Puterile occidentale nu va putea fi prevăzut.<br />
Schimbările politice interne rămân totuși posibile, dacă nu probabile.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, filele 135-136.<br />
155. Telegram no. 1273 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania in Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Grigore Gafencu, 8 th October 1939<br />
The Minister of Germany has already started negotiations with <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government<br />
with <strong>the</strong> view to establish a plan of repatriation of Germans from Latvia based on <strong>the</strong> principles
370 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
specified by Hitler in his last speech, through which he announced a vast action of repatriation<br />
of <strong>the</strong> German elements from Eastern Europe.<br />
As regards <strong>the</strong> German citizens, <strong>the</strong>y will leave <strong>the</strong> country immediately, as several ships are<br />
already waiting in <strong>the</strong> Latvian ports to this purpose. As for <strong>the</strong> Latvian citizens of German<br />
origin, it is foreseen that <strong>the</strong>ir business will be liquidated and that <strong>the</strong>y will leave Latvia, in turn,<br />
in a few months. The Latvian Government does not make efforts to reach an agreement.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> population of German origin which amounts according to <strong>the</strong> official statistics to<br />
over 200,000 souls plays an important role in <strong>the</strong> economic life, great disturbances are foreseen<br />
in this field.<br />
It can be asserted from this very moment that many people will not want to leave Latvia,<br />
where <strong>the</strong> German element has settled for centuries.<br />
These events generated deep panic among <strong>the</strong> public opinion, who has resignedly accepted<br />
<strong>the</strong> agreement with Russia, which <strong>the</strong>y hoped would result in a calm period, at least for <strong>the</strong><br />
moment. The events are connected to <strong>the</strong> new and imminent events in <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Soviet<br />
<strong>relations</strong> and would reflect <strong>the</strong> complete disinterest that Germany would be forced to declare as<br />
regards <strong>the</strong> fate of <strong>the</strong> Baltic region.<br />
I still believe that, by means of <strong>the</strong> agreements with Russia, <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States and <strong>the</strong> Soviets entered a stage of relative stability and that no notable change will take<br />
place as long as <strong>the</strong> outcome of <strong>the</strong> conflict between Germany and <strong>the</strong> Occidental Powers<br />
cannot be foreseen.<br />
Internal political changes are still possible, if not probable.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 135-136.<br />
156. Sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1939. g. 9. oktobra ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
No Jūsu telegrammas es saprotu, ka man jāpaliek šeit vai Budapeštā, skatoties pēc<br />
apstākļiem, kura no šīm galvaspilsētām būtu svarīgāka, kurā no tām varētu gūt vairāk<br />
informācijas un no kuras būtu vieglāki sakarus uzturēt ar Rīgu. Tā kā tikai sestdien (7. X)<br />
saņēmu akreditēšanās pilnvaras, tad līdz šim nevarēju izbraukt uz Budapeštu, lai personīgi<br />
uzņemtu pēc iespējas kontaktus un pārliecinātos par pārējiem apstākļiem. Jau tagad tomēr varu<br />
teikt, ka informācijas iegūšanas, sakaru, politiskā un saimnieciskā svara dēļ būtu jāpaliek šeit,<br />
Bukarestē, kā pastāvīgā rezidencē, apmeklējot Budapeštu iespējami bieži no šejienes. Sakaru<br />
uzturēšana ar Rīgu tikpat viegla vai grūta no šejienes, kā no Budapeštas. Budapeštā, kā dzirdu, ir<br />
jau ļoti daudz un dažādu ierobežojumu un saimnieciskas dabas grūtības, ko vēl šeit nemaz<br />
nejūt. Satiksme no šejienes ar Budapeštu diezgan ērta un ātra. Ja būs iespējams sazināties no<br />
Budapeštas, liekas, nebūs grūtību sazināties arī no šejienes. Militārās un diplomātiskās<br />
komplikācijas iespējamas kā Rumānijai, tāpat arī Ungārijai. Ja tādas būtu papriekšu Rumānijai,<br />
domāju, es varēšu ātri pārcelties uz Budapeštu bez sevišķi liela riska. Tāpēc manas domas<br />
nosveras, ka es mūsu valstij un ārlietu resoram varētu vairāk pakalpot un derīgs būt šeit, nekā<br />
Budapeštā. Tomēr galīgu manu atzinumu atļaujiet man taisīt un Jums priekšā celt pēc<br />
Budapeštas apmeklēšanas.<br />
Ja nu man jāierīkojas šeit (vai arī Budapeštā), tad man liktos, ka būs jāīrē kāds mēbelēts<br />
dzīvoklis, lai nebūtu pastāvīgā viesnīcu spiegu “uzraudzība”[..].<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 14. apr., 375. l., 221.–222. lp.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 371<br />
156. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 9 th October 1939<br />
From your telegram I understand that I should stay here or in Budapest, depending on<br />
which of <strong>the</strong>se capitals is most important, in which of <strong>the</strong>m more information could be<br />
obtained and from which it is easier to maintain contacts with Riga. Since I received my letters<br />
of credence only on Saturday (7 th October), I could not leave for Budapest earlier in order<br />
personally to establish contacts and to study o<strong>the</strong>r circumstances. However, I can say already<br />
now that with regard to <strong>the</strong> possibilities of <strong>the</strong> acquiring of information and for <strong>the</strong> sake of<br />
contacts, political and economic weight I should have my permanent residence here, in<br />
Bucharest, and from here visit Budapest as often as possible. The maintenance of contacts with<br />
Riga from here is as easy or difficult as it is from Budapest. In Budapest, as I heard, <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
already imposed very many and different restrictions and difficulties of economic character, <strong>the</strong><br />
likes of which are not felt here yet at all. Traffic from here to Budapest is ra<strong>the</strong>r convenient and<br />
fast. If it is possible to communicate from Budapest, it seems that <strong>the</strong>re will be no difficulties in<br />
communicating from here as well. Military and <strong>diplomatic</strong> complications are possible both in<br />
Romania and in Hungary. Should such complications occur in Romania first, I think I will be<br />
able move to Budapest quickly without a particularly great risk. Thus I am inclined to think that<br />
here I could serve better and be more useful to our country and to <strong>the</strong> foreign affairs<br />
department than in Budapest. However, allow me to draw and present to you my final<br />
conclusion after my visit to Budapest.<br />
Since I have to establish myself here (or in Budapest), it seems to me that I should rent a<br />
furnished apartment so that I do not have to be under constant “surveillance” of hotel spies [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 14, file 375, s. 221–222.<br />
157. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore<br />
Niculescu-Buzești nr. 1327 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore<br />
Gafencu, 23 octombrie 1939<br />
La 18 octombrie au fost semnate la Moscova acordurile comerciale ruso-leton și rusolituanian,<br />
reglementând relațiile economice între aceste state pentru exercițiul 1939/1940.<br />
Unele discuții preliminare, în special între Letonia și Soviete, începuseră deja înaintea<br />
ultimelor negocieri politice între Rusia și Statele Baltice, negocieri care s-au terminat prin<br />
semnarea recentelor tratate pentru desemnarea cărora s-a convenit a se întrebuința eufemismul<br />
de „asistență mutuală”. Aceste discuții au fost însă sensibil influențate de noile condiții politice,<br />
așa încât acordurile economice intervenite ar putea fi considerate ca făcând parte din cadrul<br />
general al revizuirii relațiilor dintre Statele Baltice și Soviete. Aceste acorduri sunt favorabile<br />
Statelor Baltice – Estonia a semnat și ea un acord similar cu câtăva vreme înainte – și ele<br />
constituie pentru aceste state singura compensație a situației atât de oneroase pe terenul politic<br />
creată prin noua reglementare a raporturilor lor cu Sovietele.<br />
Dispozițiile principale ale acordurilor economice sunt cele indicate prin telegramele acestei<br />
legații nr. 1255 din 3 octombrie și nr. 1268 din 8 octombrie. Ele sunt în număr de trei, și anume:<br />
O sporire considerabilă a schimburilor comerciale respective<br />
Pentru Letonia schimburile cu Sovietele vor trece de la 16 milioane de Lats cât au fost în 1938<br />
la 60 de milioane de Lats. Pentru Lituania de la aproximativ 20 de milioane la 40 de milioane.
372 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Printre articolele ce Țările Baltice vor importa din Rusia vor figura mașini agricole, petrol,<br />
benzină, sare, fire de bumbac și îngrășăminte chimice. Printre articolele de export animale vii,<br />
hârtie, unt etc.<br />
Este convenit de a se observa principiul echilibrării balanțelor comerciale.<br />
Facilități de tranzit pentru Țările Baltice către porturile Murmansk pe coasta nordică<br />
scandinavă, Sorka în Marea Albă și porturile Mării Negre.<br />
Se va facilita de asemenea acestor state utilizarea diferitelor cursuri de apă pentru<br />
transportul mărfurilor către aceste poturi.<br />
Pe această dispoziție se fondează aici speranțe că se vor putea relua relațiile comerciale cu<br />
Statele Occidentale și în special cu Anglia care absorbea o mare parte din exportul Statelor<br />
Baltice consistând în principal din produse agricole și alimentare.<br />
Condițiile actuale ale navigației în Marea Baltică, sub controlul flotei germane care<br />
împiedică orice transporturi destinate Angliei, au condus într-adevăr la o întrerupere completă<br />
a acestor relații care sunt pentru Statele Baltice de cea mai mare importanță, căci cu o producție<br />
similară Rusia nu va putea absorbi o parte foarte importantă din excedentul exportabil al<br />
Statelor Baltice – cu toată sporirea schimburilor prin aceste acorduri, relațiile cu Sovietele nu<br />
vor reprezenta decât aproximativ 15% din exportul exterior ale Statelor Baltice, iar dezvoltarea<br />
unui comerț cu Germania, pentru a-l înlocui pe cel cu Anglia, este privită cu oarecare<br />
suspiciune din cauza mijloacelor de plată reduse de care dispune Reichul. Mulți interpretează<br />
de altfel politica Germaniei de a împiedica comerțul dintre Anglia și Țările Baltice tocmai ca o<br />
presiune pentru a determina aceste state de a vinde Reichului produsele de care el are nevoie.<br />
Este evident că prin întreruperea comerțului englez în Marea Baltică, Germania nu poate aduce<br />
mari prejudicii Angliei, care are posibilitatea de a se aproviziona [de] pe alte piețe. Această<br />
situație ar putea însă constrânge Statele Baltice, în căutare de debușeuri, de a-și dezvolta<br />
comerțul lor cu Germania.<br />
Este apoi un alt aspect foarte important care determină Țările Baltice a prefera menținerea<br />
relațiilor lor cu Anglia; balanța lor comercială cu această țară este sensibil activă. Or, nici<br />
dezvoltarea relațiilor cu Sovietele, nici cea a relațiilor cu Germania nu le va permite a înlocui<br />
acest excedent. Relațiile cu Sovietele vor fi într-adevăr bazate pe principiul echilibrării<br />
schimburilor reciproce. Cât privește o eventuală dezvoltare a relațiilor cu Germania –<br />
actualmente deficitare pentru Țările Baltice – acest principiu este desigur, mai ales în<br />
circumstanțele actuale, formula cea mai fericită pe care aceste țări ar putea-o obține.<br />
În aceste condiții este explicabil ca Țările Baltice să pună un mare preț pe continuarea<br />
relațiilor lor cu Anglia și deci o mare speranță pe noile acorduri comerciale cu Sovietele.<br />
Rămâne de văzut în ce măsură această speranță poate fi realizată.<br />
În anexă trimit o statistică a comerțului exterior al Letoniei pentru prima jumătate a anului<br />
1939. Se poate vedea că relațiile cu Anglia sunt singurele care lasă Letoniei un sold activ<br />
substanțial. Dispariția acestui sold ar produce un gol iramplasabil în balanța de plăți a Letoniei<br />
și ar pune deci această țară într-o situație extrem de serioasă.<br />
Facilități de tranzit pentru Rusia către porturile letone.<br />
Ar părea curios ca în momentul în care, din cauza paralizării navigației în Marea Baltică,<br />
Statele Baltice obțin facilități de tranzit prin Rusia, aceasta din urmă să considere sporirea<br />
propriului său tranzit către porturile baltice. Aceasta se explică prin faptul că Statele Baltice<br />
sunt preocupate de continuarea comerțului cu Anglia, în timp ce Sovietele consideră o
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 373<br />
dezvoltare posibilă a comerțului lor cu Germania. Menționez că, în cazul când un asemenea<br />
comerț s-ar dezvolta – ceea ce depinde într-o mare măsură de evoluția situației politice generale<br />
europene – tranzitul prin Statele Baltice, care posedă câteva porturi bune ce nu sunt blocate de<br />
ghețuri cum sunt cele mai multe din porturile rusești din Golful Finlandei, ar prezenta pentru<br />
Soviete un interes apreciabil.<br />
În cercurile economice și financiare de aici acordurile cu Sovietele se bucură în general de o<br />
primire favorabilă întrucât ele sunt profitabile intereselor economice actuale ale Statelor Baltice.<br />
Aceste acorduri constituie sau cel puțin autorizează speranța unui remediu oportun al unor<br />
grave dificultăți economice pentru Țările Baltice ce își au originea în actualul conflict.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1923-1940, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, filele 352-355.<br />
157. Diplomatic Report no. 1327 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania in Riga Grigore<br />
Niculescu-Buzești to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Grigore Gafencu, 23 rd<br />
October 1939<br />
On October 18 th , <strong>the</strong> Russian-Latvian and Russian-Lithuanian trade agreements were signed<br />
in Moscow, regulating <strong>the</strong> economic <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong>se states for <strong>the</strong> economic year<br />
1939/1940.<br />
Some of <strong>the</strong> preliminary discussions, especially between Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Soviets, had started<br />
already before <strong>the</strong> last political negotiations between Russia and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, which<br />
resulted in <strong>the</strong> signing of <strong>the</strong> recent treaties which will be euphemistically referred to as<br />
“mutual assistance”. These discussions were none<strong>the</strong>less significantly influenced by <strong>the</strong> new<br />
political conditions, hence <strong>the</strong> new economic agreements could be considered part of <strong>the</strong><br />
general framework of <strong>the</strong> review of <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> Baltic and <strong>the</strong> Soviet States. These<br />
agreements are favourable to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States – Estonia also signed a similar agreement a while<br />
back – and <strong>the</strong>y constitute <strong>the</strong> only compensation of such onerous situation on <strong>the</strong> political<br />
ground created through <strong>the</strong> new regulation of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Soviets.<br />
The main dispositions of <strong>the</strong> economic agreements are <strong>the</strong> ones shown in <strong>the</strong> telegrams of<br />
this legation no. 1255 from October 3 rd and no. 1268 from October 8 th . There are three of <strong>the</strong>m,<br />
namely:<br />
A significant enhancement of <strong>the</strong> concerned trade exchanges?<br />
To Latvia, <strong>the</strong> exchanges with <strong>the</strong> Soviets will go from 16 million Lats in 1938 to 60 million<br />
Lats. To Lithuania, from approximately 20 million to 40 million.<br />
Among <strong>the</strong> items that will be imported by <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries from Russia, <strong>the</strong>re will be<br />
agricultural machines, earth oil, gasoline, salt, cotton threads and chemical fertilizers. Among<br />
<strong>the</strong> exported items, we can mention living animals, paper, butter etc.<br />
It is agreed to observe <strong>the</strong> principle of <strong>the</strong> balancing of trade balances.<br />
Facilities of transit for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States to <strong>the</strong> Murmansk ports from <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />
Scandinavian coast, Sorka at <strong>the</strong> White Sea and <strong>the</strong> ports of <strong>the</strong> Black Sea.<br />
These states will also be granted <strong>the</strong> use of different water courses for merchandise<br />
transportation to <strong>the</strong>se ports.<br />
This disposition is <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> hope that trade <strong>relations</strong> will be resumed with <strong>the</strong><br />
Occidental States, especially with England, which absorbed great part of <strong>the</strong> exported products<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, mainly consisting in agricultural and food products.<br />
The current sailing conditions in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, under <strong>the</strong> control of <strong>the</strong> German fleet which<br />
prevents any transportations destined to England, have truly led to a complete interruption of
374 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
<strong>the</strong>se <strong>relations</strong> that are extremely important to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, as with a similar production<br />
Russia will not be able to absorb a very important part of <strong>the</strong> exportable surplus of <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States – despite <strong>the</strong> enhancement of <strong>the</strong> exchanges based on <strong>the</strong>se agreements, <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong><br />
with <strong>the</strong> Soviets will only represent 15% of <strong>the</strong> external exportation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, and<br />
developing trade with Germany that may replace <strong>the</strong> trade with England is seen somewhat<br />
suspiciously because of <strong>the</strong> limited payment means of <strong>the</strong> Reich. In fact, many people interpret<br />
<strong>the</strong> German policy of preventing trade between England and <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries precisely as a<br />
pressure to determine <strong>the</strong>se states to sell to <strong>the</strong> Reich <strong>the</strong> products it needs. It is obvious that by<br />
interrupting <strong>the</strong> English trade in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, Germany cannot bring important prejudice to<br />
England, which can stock up from o<strong>the</strong>r markets. This situation could never<strong>the</strong>less constrain<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic States in search for outlets to develop <strong>the</strong>ir trade with Germany.<br />
There is also ano<strong>the</strong>r very important aspect that makes <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries prefer <strong>the</strong><br />
maintenance of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong> to England; <strong>the</strong>ir trade balance with this country is considerably<br />
active. Nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Soviets, nor <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
<strong>relations</strong> with Germany would allow <strong>the</strong>m to replace this overplus. The <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviets will be indeed based on <strong>the</strong> principle of balancing mutual exchanges. As for a potential<br />
development of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong> with Germany – currently poor for <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries – this<br />
principle is, of course, especially in <strong>the</strong> current circumstances, <strong>the</strong> most favourable formula that<br />
<strong>the</strong>se countries could obtain.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong>se circumstances it is explainable that <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries make much of <strong>the</strong><br />
continuation of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong> with England and thus have high expectations as regards <strong>the</strong><br />
trade agreements with <strong>the</strong> Soviets. We will see <strong>the</strong> degree to which <strong>the</strong>se expectations are<br />
achievable.<br />
I attach hereto a statistics of <strong>the</strong> external trade of Latvia for <strong>the</strong> first half of 1939. It can be<br />
seen that <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with England are <strong>the</strong> only ones that leave Latvia a substantial active<br />
balance account. The disappearance of this balance account would generate an irreplaceable<br />
gap in <strong>the</strong> payment balance of Latvia and would thus put this country in an extremely serious<br />
situation.<br />
Facilities of transit for Russia to <strong>the</strong> Latvian ports.<br />
It would seem odd that <strong>the</strong> moment when, due to <strong>the</strong> paralysis of navigation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
Sea, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States obtain facilities of transit across Russia, <strong>the</strong> latter would consider <strong>the</strong><br />
enhancement of its own transit to <strong>the</strong> Baltic ports. This is explained by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States are concerned by <strong>the</strong> continuation of <strong>the</strong>ir trade with England while <strong>the</strong> Soviets consider<br />
it possible to develop <strong>the</strong>ir trade with Germany. I mention that in <strong>the</strong> event such trade<br />
developed – which depends to a great extent on <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> general European political<br />
situation – <strong>the</strong> transit across <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, which own a few good ports that are not blocked<br />
by ice like most Russian ports from <strong>the</strong> Gulf of Finland, would be of great interest for <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviets.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> economic and financial circles here <strong>the</strong> agreements with <strong>the</strong> Soviets are generally<br />
seen with good eyes, as <strong>the</strong>y are profitable for <strong>the</strong> current economic interests of <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States. These agreements constitute or at least authorize <strong>the</strong> hope for an opportune remedy of<br />
serious economic difficulties for <strong>the</strong> Baltic Countries originating in <strong>the</strong> current conflict.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940, USSR, vol. 9, s. 352-355.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 375<br />
158. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 1341 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 24<br />
octombrie 1939<br />
Acordul ruso-leton pentru punerea în aplicare a tratatului de asistență mutuală între cele<br />
două țări s-a semnat aseară. Ca și în Estonia, este probabil că nu toate condițiile sale vor fi date<br />
publicității pentru a nu alarma opinia publică.<br />
Aud că efectivele sovietice în Letonia vor cuprinde 25 000 de oameni. Armata letonă în timp<br />
de pace numără 20 000 oameni. Intrarea trupelor sovietice ar fi prevăzută pentru ziua de 26<br />
octombrie.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 138.<br />
158. Telegram no. 1341 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania in Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Grigore Gafencu, 24 th October<br />
1939<br />
The Russian-Latvian agreement for <strong>the</strong> enforcement of <strong>the</strong> mutual assistance treaty between<br />
<strong>the</strong> two countries was signed last night. As in Estonia, probably not all its terms will be made<br />
public to avoid alarming <strong>the</strong> public opinion.<br />
Rumour has it that <strong>the</strong> Soviet people in Latvia will include 25,000 people. The Latvian army<br />
during peaceful times has 20,000 people. The Soviet troops are expected to enter on October<br />
26 th .<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 138.<br />
159. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1939. g. 26. okt. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram (no Budapeštas)<br />
Pēc dažu dienu pavadīšanas Budapeštā un Jūsu telegrammas saņemšanas 24. oktobrī, man<br />
jālūdz Jūsu piekrišana sūtniecības sēdekli ierīkot Bukarestē. Kā jau manā š. g. 9. oktobra rakstā<br />
Jums rakstīju, tad politiskā un saimnieciskā svara un iespaidu apmēra dēļ Rumānija katrā ziņā<br />
stādāma pirmā vietā. Personīgu ērtību un mierīgas dzīves ziņā gan šejienes galvaspilsētai varētu<br />
dot priekšroku, bet krīt svarā vienīgi tas, kur es mūsu valdībai un mūsu resoram varētu vairāk<br />
derīgs būt. Uz to man ir tikai viena atbilde – Bukarestē. Gadījumā, ja kaut kas sašķobītos, tad jau<br />
es domāju pie laika zināt dabūt un paspēsim, ja vajadzīgs būtu, pārgrupēties. Bez tam krīt svarā<br />
arī taupības jautājums: Bukarestē, vismaz pašreiz, dzīves dārdzība stipri zemāka, nekā šeit. Tur<br />
arī nav nekādu ierobežojumu, lai gan arī šeit, izņemot benzīna racionēšanu un dažu<br />
koloniālpreču pārdošanas ierobežošanu (tēja, kafija), nekā cita taisni ikdienas dzīvē no kara<br />
nejūt. Par Bukarestes izvēlēšanu kā sēdekli runā arī zināma reciprocitāte, jo rumāņi ilgus gadus<br />
uzturēja pilnu sūtniecību Rīgā, kurpretīm ungāri sūtniecību turējuši tikai Helsinkos. Galvenais<br />
tomēr ir tas, ka Bukarestē ir daudz un dažādu informācijas avotu, un tur daudz kas “notiek”, kas<br />
var Jums noderēt pie laika dabūt zināt, kurpretīm šeit ir klusums un miers.<br />
Sazināšanās iespējas vienādas puslīdz kā no Bukarestes, tā no šejienes. Steidzamām un<br />
konfidenciālām lietām jālieto telegrāfs. No Bukarestes man ir iespēja izmantot arī šad tad<br />
skandināvu kurjerus. Nevainīgas lietas var mierīgi sūtīt pa pastu.<br />
Ja iznāktu kādas perturbācijas Balkānos, tad tas attieksies puslīdz uz visām šī rajona valstīm,<br />
un tādam gadījumam man jau iepriekš jālūdz atļauja rīkoties pēc apstākļiem un iespējām [..].<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 14. apr., 134. l., 1. lp.
376 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
159. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters (from Budapest), 26 th October 1939<br />
Having spent a few days in Budapest and received your telegram on 24 th October, I must ask<br />
your approval for establishing <strong>the</strong> seat of <strong>the</strong> Legation in Bucharest. As I already wrote to you in<br />
my note of 9 th October, in terms of <strong>the</strong> political and economic weight and influence Romania<br />
should definitely be put in <strong>the</strong> first place. In terms of personal comfort and peaceful life <strong>the</strong><br />
capital of this country could indeed be given preference, but <strong>the</strong> only criterion, which matters,<br />
is where I could be of more use for our government and department. And to that question I<br />
have only one reply – it is in Bucharest. Should <strong>the</strong> situation become unsteady, I think we shall<br />
learn it in due time and, if necessary, shall have time to regroup ourselves. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> issue<br />
of economy is also important: in Bucharest, at least at present, life is much cheaper than here.<br />
There are also no restrictions imposed <strong>the</strong>re, although here, too, with <strong>the</strong> exception for<br />
rationing of petrol and restrictions on <strong>the</strong> selling of some colonial goods (tea, coffee), no o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
direct impact of war can be felt in daily life. Certain reciprocity also speaks in favour of choosing<br />
Bucharest as <strong>the</strong> seat, because for many years <strong>the</strong> Romanians had a full Legation in Riga while<br />
<strong>the</strong> Hungarians have maintained Legation only in Helsinki. The main aspect however is that in<br />
Bucharest <strong>the</strong>re are many and various sources of information and much is “going on” <strong>the</strong>re that<br />
could be useful for you to hear in due time, while here <strong>the</strong>re is silence and peace.<br />
Communication possibilities from Bucharest and from here are more or less equal. For<br />
urgent and confidential matters telegraph must be used. In Bucharest I also have <strong>the</strong> chance<br />
now and <strong>the</strong>n to use Scandinavian couriers. Innocent matters may surely be sent by mail.<br />
In case any perturbation happens in <strong>the</strong> Balkans, it would more or less concern all <strong>the</strong><br />
countries of <strong>the</strong> region and for such cases I have to ask in advance your permission to act<br />
according to circumstances and possibilities [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 14, file 134, s. 1.<br />
160. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 1375 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 4<br />
noiembrie 1939<br />
În timpul negocierilor pentru tratatul militar ruso-leton, șeful delegației sovietice,<br />
vicecomisarul pentru marină Isakov 1 , a declarat șefului Statului Major al armatei letone că la<br />
terminarea negocierilor cu Finlanda se va produce o acțiune sovietică contra Basarabiei și că în<br />
acest scop se găsesc deja importante contingente concentrate în zonele militare Harkov și<br />
Odessa. Nu știu ce valoare trebuie atribuită declarațiilor acestui personaj. Ele ar fi însă<br />
semnificative pentru starea de spirit actuală a armatei sovietice.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 144.<br />
1<br />
Hovhannes Stepani Isakov (sau sub forma rusificată a numelui său Ivan Stepanovici Isakov, 1894-1967) a fost<br />
amiral sovietic, Șef al Statului Major al Marinei sovietice, adjunct al Ministrului Marinei, membru al Academiei de<br />
Științe a U.R.S.S. A jucat un rol esențial în dezvoltarea flotei militare sovietice la Marea Baltică și la Marea Neagră<br />
în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. A coordonat războiul naval al Uniunii Sovietice împotriva Finlandei<br />
în timpul Războiului de Iarnă.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 377<br />
160. Telegram no. 1375 of <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affaires of Romania in Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Grigore Gafencu, 4 th November<br />
1939<br />
During negotiations for <strong>the</strong> Russian-Latvian military treaty, <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
delegation, <strong>the</strong> vice-commissary for marine, Isakov 1 , told <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> General Staff of <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian army that at <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> negotiations with Finland a Soviet action would be<br />
undertaken against Bessarabia and that to this purpose <strong>the</strong>re were already important<br />
contingents concentrated in <strong>the</strong> military regions Kharkov and Odessa. I do not know if <strong>the</strong><br />
statements of this character are true or not. But <strong>the</strong>y should be meaningful for <strong>the</strong> current spirit<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Soviet army.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 144.<br />
161. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1939. g. 9. nov. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Izmantojot izdevību nosūtīt ziņojumus ar zviedru kurjera starpniecību, sniegšu Jums manus<br />
iespaidus un sarunās dzirdēto un no tām secināmos slēdzienus par stāvokli dienvidaustrumu<br />
Eiropā. Uzturoties Ungārijas galvaspilsētā no 21.X. – 4.XI.39 esmu tajā laikā apmeklējis<br />
[Ungārijas valstsvīrus].<br />
[..]. Saskaņota rīcība Balkānu valstu starpā, jeb tā sauktais Balkānu pakts, ir tikai pagaidām<br />
fantāzija, kuras realizēšana atduras uz neskaitāmām grūtībām. Vispirms pretišķības starp<br />
Rumāniju – Ungāriju un Rumāniju – Bulgāriju. Kā Ungārijai, tā Bulgārijai ir senas pretenzijas<br />
pret Rumāniju, un abas šīs “neapmierinātās” valstis tikai gaidīt gaida uz nopietnām rumāņu<br />
grūtībām ar krieviem, lai no iekšienes un ārienes censtos sasniegt savus mērķus un atkarotu<br />
Rumānijai Septiņkalni (ar apmēram 2 miljoniem ungāru un vāciešu) un Dobrudžu. Jugoslāvija<br />
cenšas spēlēt samierinātāja un vidutāja lomu. Ungāru–rumāņu attiecībās patiešām izdevās<br />
panākt diezgan jūtamu atslābumu. Bet tikko karaspēka vienības atvilktas no robežas, tūliņ<br />
rumāņiem bija jāsper tālejoši drošības soļi pret ungāriem Rumānijā. Runā par vairāku simtu<br />
ungāru arestiem Septiņkalnē, sevišķi garīdznieku un skolotāju aprindās. Ungāri saka, ka tā esot<br />
rumāņu bezkaunība, nervozitāte un “galvas zaudēšana” bīstamā stāvoklī, kādā rumāņi<br />
atrodoties. Ungāri neesot zosis, kas ļaušoties kaklus nogriezt bez pretīmturēšanās. Rumāņi<br />
saka, ka ungāri iztaisījuši veselu sazvērestību, savākuši veselus arsenālus ieroču etc. darbā. “Kā<br />
lai mēs to paciešam”, izsaucās kāds samērā svarīgs rumāņu diplomāts. Abu valstu prese par šo<br />
pēdējo dienu jauno saspīlējumu neko neraksta, un nav vēl visas cerības zaudētas, ka šie<br />
starpgadījumi neizsauks bīstamas komplikācijas, jo galu galā abām šīm valstīm un tautām ir<br />
stipras bailes par lielā austrumu kaimiņa tālākiem nolūkiem. Visas Balkānu valstis stiprā<br />
nemierā raugās (izņemot vienīgi Bulgāriju) uz austrumiem un, kā man kāds jugoslāvu augsts<br />
diplomāts teica: “Mums visiem (t. i., balkāniešiem) tagad “bikses trīc” par jaunā kaimiņa<br />
iespaidiem un nolūkiem pie Karpatiem un Donavas baseinā”. Ja Padomju Krievija ir pie<br />
Karpatiem, tad tas nozīmē, ka tā patiesībā ir jau pie Adrijas jūras! Šai sakarībā pie visām<br />
personām esmu novērojis ļoti lielu interesi par Baltijas jautājumu, jo no mūsu rajona pēdējā<br />
1<br />
Hovhannes Stepani Isakov (or according to <strong>the</strong> Russified form of his name Ivan Stepanovich Isakov, 1894-1967)<br />
was a Soviet admiral, Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Navy, Deputy Navy Minister, member of <strong>the</strong> Academy of Sciences<br />
of <strong>the</strong> USSR. He played a key role in <strong>the</strong> operations of <strong>the</strong> Soviet navy in <strong>the</strong> Baltic and Black Sea during <strong>the</strong><br />
Second World War. He coordinated <strong>the</strong> naval war of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union against Finland during <strong>the</strong> Winter War.
378 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
laika notikumiem grib secināt vai atšifrēt krievu īstos nolūkus Eiropā, sevišķi Balkānos un<br />
Eiropas dienvidaustrumos vispār [..].<br />
Neskaidrā nākotne un sarežģījumu varbūtība Rumānijā izsauc jūtamu nervozitāti, kas<br />
varbūt arī izskaidrojama ar raksturu dažādību, ja salīdzina stāvokli Bukarestē ar to, ko redzēju<br />
un dzirdēju Budapeštā. Bukarestē saimnieciskās grūtības nemana, lai gan dzīves dārdzība ceļas<br />
un spekulācija plaukst. Ļaudis šeit visas grūtības un nākotnes bažas laiž vieglāk pār galvu, nekā<br />
Ungārijā. Vēl visu laiku tiek lolotas cerības, ka krievi būs džentelmeņi un nespiedīs uz smagām<br />
koncesijām. Bet uz cerībām vien šajā laikā nevar būvēt valsts politiku. Arī iekšējā konsolidācija<br />
nav šeit tik noteikta un skaidra kā Ungārijā. Drusku “poliski” iespaidi paliek daudzās attiecībās<br />
no šīs zemes. Tāpēc arī uzspiestas cīņas gadījumā var būt līdzīgi iznākumi. Tomēr šeit sargās kā<br />
no uguns lietas sadzīt uz asumiem un vadošās aprindas mēģina laipot un sadzīvot mierā ar<br />
lielajiem kaimiņiem. 7. novembra PSRS svinībās 1 Padomju Krievijas lietvedis ir ticis pagodināts<br />
ar paša ministru prezidenta, ārlietu ministra un vēl dažu citu ministru kabineta locekļu<br />
apmeklējumu. Rumānija visciešāk sastrādā ar Turciju un Jugoslāviju, bet attiecībās ar Vāciju un<br />
Krieviju cenšas radīt iespaidu, ka saņemtā angļu–franču garantija neko lielu nenozīmē.<br />
Baumas dzirdamas, ka iekšpolitiskā ziņā nav īstas drošības un karalis meklējot jaunāku,<br />
enerģiskāku vīru, kas varētu uzņemties valdības vadību. Nav arī tagad īstais laiks radīt iekšējās<br />
konsolidācijas bāzi pie neuzticamām, stiprām ungāru, bulgāru, vācu un krievu (Besarābijā)<br />
minoritātēm. Arī rumāņu sabiedrībā nav vienprātības un piekrišanas brutālām varas metodēm,<br />
ar kādām sabiedriskās kārtības, resp. policijas ministrs rīkojas.<br />
Par Baltijas problēmām visur redzu un dzirdu lielu interesi. Informācija pa lielākai tiesai ir<br />
greiza un trūcīga. Liela nezināšana un pilnīga neorientēšanās Baltijas telpas elementārā<br />
ģeogrāfijā ir parasta parādība Rumānijā. Ungārijā nav skaidrības par pēdējā laika notikumiem<br />
Baltijas rajonā, bet ģeogrāfijas un jaunākās vēstures ziņā informācija ir diezgan pareiza un<br />
objektīva. Tagad Baltijas rajona notikumiem seko ļoti dzīvi un velk zināmas paralēles, lai<br />
daudzmaz saskatītu miglā tīto nākotnes notikumu gaitu šejienes rajonā. Krievu politiku man<br />
Budapeštā definēja kā ļoti gudru un viltīgu, kas atgādina seno angļu politiku. Es mēģinu<br />
izkliedēt diezgan plaši ieviesušos uzskatu, ka Latvija, Igaunija un Lietuva nav nekas vairāk, kā<br />
Padomju Krievijas protektorāti. Par Somiju nav daudz šaubu, ka viņai būs nolens volens 2<br />
jāakceptē krievu prasības. Mūsu prestižam un lietu pareizai nostādīšanai kaitē ļoti angļu<br />
propaganda, kas pilnīgi nevietā mūs nostāda pasaules sabiedriskās domas priekšā kā krievu<br />
protektorātus un Baltijas vāciešu aizceļošanu nostāda kā kaut ko drausmīgi netaisnu un it kā<br />
Baltijas vācieši vienīgie būtu nesuši kultūru un uzbūvējuši Baltijas valstis.<br />
Koncentrētā un konspekta veidā es varētu Balkānu rajona problēmu iespējamo attīstību<br />
formulēt sekojoši:<br />
a) Bailes no Padomju Krievijas spiež uz saprašanos ar šo jauno Eiropas politikas izšķirošo<br />
faktoru un spēku;<br />
b) Krievijas aktivitāte pašreiz vēl tikai Bulgārijā ir sākusi strādāt un gatavojas tālejošiem<br />
mērķiem. Krievu ekspansijas politikas (ne teritoriāli iekarojošas, bet iespaidu sfēras<br />
paplašināšana) mērķi, liekas, norāda uz Donavas deltu, varbūt arī augstāki, bulgāru ostām<br />
(varbūt arī dažas rumāņu) un Dardaneļiem;<br />
1<br />
Padomju Savienībā tika atzīmēta 1917. g. „Lielās Oktobra sociālistiskās revolūcijas” jeb boļševiku partijas<br />
organizētā apvērsuma gadadiena.<br />
2<br />
Sakāmvārds: Nolens, volens (latīņu val.) – gribot, negribot.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 379<br />
c) Itāļu ieņemto pretkomunistisko nostāju i apsveic, i bail no tās, jo tā var izsaukt krievu<br />
kontrakciju, no kuras visiem tik ļoti bail… (…”bikses trīc”);<br />
d) Gaidāmais “krievu spiediens” var izsaukt nesaskaņu akūtu paasināšanos pašu Balkānu<br />
valstu starpā. Rezultāts – visu Balkānu un arī Itālijas ieraušana aktīvā atklātā karā. Termiņus<br />
šādai varbūtībai min pavasarī (aprīlī);<br />
e) Eventuālas sabiedroto akcijas gadījumā neatvairāmi gaidāma Ungārijas okupācija no<br />
Vācijas jeb Sabiedroto ielaušanās Ungārijas līdzenumā, Austrijā un pat Čehoslovākijā. (Stipri<br />
fantastiska padarīšana!) Sabiedroto akcijas bāze: Turcija un Saloniki pie kondīcijas, ka Itālija<br />
stāv mierīga, vai taisa šo “enterprise” 1 līdzi;<br />
f) Itālija – liela jautājuma zīme, bet no kuras izturēšanās šejienes rajonā atkarājas vēl<br />
vairāk, nekā no Vācijas vai Krievijas. Vairāk dzird, ka Itālija lēni, bet droši virzās uz<br />
Rietumeiropas valstu pusi;<br />
g) Kamēr ieroči nav laisti darbā (ko patiesībā neviens negrib!), tirgojas un spekulē, cik un<br />
kā spēj, vislabāk ar abām karojošajām pusēm;<br />
h) Par Vāciju jo dienas jo mazāk runā un visu nelaimju cēloņus meklē un izskaidro ar<br />
naci[stu] īsredzīgo ārējo politiku un boļševiku “ielaišanu” Eiropā.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2540. l., 7.–12. lp.<br />
161. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 9 th November 1939<br />
Availing myself of <strong>the</strong> opportunity of sending my reports via a Swedish courier, I will share<br />
with you my impressions and what I have heard in discussions and <strong>the</strong> conclusions that can be<br />
drawn from <strong>the</strong>m about <strong>the</strong> situation in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe. During my stay in <strong>the</strong> capital of<br />
Hungary (from 21.X. to 4.XI.39) I have visited [Hungary’s statesmen].<br />
Coordinated action of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states or <strong>the</strong>-so-called Balkan Pact for <strong>the</strong> time being is a<br />
fantasy, <strong>the</strong> implementation of which meets with countless difficulties. First of all,<br />
contradictions between Romania and Hungary and between Romania and Bulgaria. Both<br />
Hungary and Bulgaria have old claims against Romania and both <strong>the</strong>se “dissatisfied” states hope<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Romanians running into serious difficulties with <strong>the</strong> Russians in order from inside and<br />
outside to try to reach <strong>the</strong>ir goals and to re-conquer Transylvania (with approximately 2 million<br />
Hungarians and Germans) and Dobruja from Romania. Yugoslavia tries to play <strong>the</strong> role of a<br />
peacemaker and a mediator. In <strong>the</strong> Hungarian–Romanian <strong>relations</strong> a ra<strong>the</strong>r perceptible<br />
relaxation was indeed achieved. But as soon as <strong>the</strong> troops were withdrawn from <strong>the</strong> border, <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians had to take far-reaching security measures against <strong>the</strong> ethnic Hungarians in<br />
Romania. They talk about <strong>the</strong> arrest of several hundred Hungarians in Transylvania, especially<br />
among clergy and teachers. The Hungarians say that it is [an expression of] <strong>the</strong> Romanians’<br />
shamelessness, nervousness and <strong>the</strong>ir tendency to “lose head” in a dangerous situation, <strong>the</strong> like<br />
of which <strong>the</strong> Romanians currently face. [The Hungarians declare] that <strong>the</strong>y are not geese who<br />
would let wringing <strong>the</strong>ir necks without resistance. The Romanians say that <strong>the</strong> Hungarians had<br />
organised a plot, collected a real armoury of weapons etc. “How can we tolerate it!” exclaims a<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r high-ranking Romanian diplomat. The press of both countries does not write anything<br />
about this new tension, which had occurred in <strong>the</strong> last few days and not all hopes have been<br />
lost yet that <strong>the</strong>se incidents would not cause dangerous complications, because in <strong>the</strong> long run<br />
1<br />
Enterprise (angļu val.) – pasākums.
380 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
both <strong>the</strong>se countries and peoples have strong fear of fur<strong>the</strong>r intentions of <strong>the</strong> large eastern<br />
neighbour. All Balkan states (except only Bulgaria) look towards <strong>the</strong> east with deep<br />
dissatisfaction and, as a high-ranking Yugoslavian diplomat told me: “Now we all (i.e. <strong>the</strong><br />
Balkan peoples) “are in fear and trembling” of <strong>the</strong> new neighbour’s influence and intentions<br />
near <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Mountains and in <strong>the</strong> Danube basin”. If Soviet Russia is at <strong>the</strong> Carpathians,<br />
it means that in fact it has already reached <strong>the</strong> Adriatic Sea! In this connection I have observed<br />
that everybody is very greatly interested in <strong>the</strong> Baltic issue because <strong>the</strong>y want to drawn<br />
conclusions from <strong>the</strong> latest developments in our region or based on <strong>the</strong>m to decipher <strong>the</strong><br />
Russians’ real intentions in Europe, particularly in <strong>the</strong> Balkans and in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe in<br />
general [..]<br />
The uncertain future and <strong>the</strong> likelihood of complications cause certain nervousness in<br />
Romania that can probably also be attributed to <strong>the</strong> difference in character, if we compare <strong>the</strong><br />
situation in Bucharest with what I saw and heard in Budapest. In Bucharest <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
difficulties cannot be noticed although <strong>the</strong> cost of living rises and black market blooms. People<br />
here disregard all difficulties and concerns about <strong>the</strong> future much easier than <strong>the</strong>y do in<br />
Hungary. Hope is still being cherished that <strong>the</strong> Russians will be gentlemen and will not insist<br />
on high concessions. But <strong>the</strong>se days national policy cannot be built on hope alone. The internal<br />
consolidation, too, is not as striking and clear as in Hungary. In many aspects this country<br />
leaves a somewhat “Polish” impression. For this reason, in case a war is imposed [on Romania],<br />
<strong>the</strong> outcome could be similar [to that in Poland]. However, here too, <strong>the</strong>y beware very much of<br />
discords and <strong>the</strong> ruling circles try to shift and shuffle and to get along with <strong>the</strong> large neighbours<br />
in peace. During <strong>the</strong> 7 th November celebrations in <strong>the</strong> USSR 1 <strong>the</strong> Soviet charge d’affaires was<br />
honoured with a visit by <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister himself, Minister of Foreign Affairs and several<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r members of <strong>the</strong> Cabinet of Ministers. Romania co-operates closest of all with Turkey and<br />
Yugoslavia but in <strong>relations</strong> with Germany and Russia tries to create an impression that <strong>the</strong><br />
received English–French guarantee does not mean much.<br />
There are rumours afloat that <strong>the</strong>re is no real stability in domestic policy and that <strong>the</strong> King<br />
is looking for a younger and more energetic man to assume <strong>the</strong> leadership of <strong>the</strong> government.<br />
This is not <strong>the</strong> right time ei<strong>the</strong>r to create a base of internal consolidation for <strong>the</strong> unreliable and<br />
strong Hungarian, Bulgarian, German and Russian (in Bessarabia) ethnic minorities. In <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian society <strong>the</strong>re is no consensus about and no support for <strong>the</strong> brutal methods of force<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Minister of Public Order, i.e. of police, applies.<br />
Everywhere I see and hear great interest in <strong>the</strong> problems of <strong>the</strong> Baltic. The information is<br />
mostly wrong and scarce. Acute lack of knowledge and sense of orientation in <strong>the</strong> elementary<br />
geography of <strong>the</strong> Baltic area is a customary phenomenon in Romania. In Hungary <strong>the</strong>re is a lack<br />
of understanding about <strong>the</strong> latest developments in <strong>the</strong> Baltic region, but in terms of geography<br />
and contemporary history <strong>the</strong>y possess ra<strong>the</strong>r correct and impartial information. Now <strong>the</strong><br />
developments in <strong>the</strong> Baltic region are being very lively followed and certain parallels are being<br />
drawn in order more or less to discern <strong>the</strong> uncertain course of future events in this region. In<br />
Budapest <strong>the</strong>y described to me <strong>the</strong> Russian policy as very smart and shrewd and resembling <strong>the</strong><br />
old English policy. I try to disperse <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r broadly spread view that Latvia, Estonia and<br />
Lithuania are nothing more than protectorates of Soviet Russia. About Finland <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
1<br />
The celebration of <strong>the</strong> anniversary of <strong>the</strong> “Great October Socialist Revolution” or <strong>the</strong> coup of <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik Party<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 381<br />
suspicion that it nolens volens 1 will have to accept <strong>the</strong> Russian demands. For our prestige and<br />
correct positioning of <strong>the</strong> situation very harmful is <strong>the</strong> English propaganda, which totally<br />
inappropriately presents us to <strong>the</strong> world’s public opinion as Russian protectorates and pictures<br />
<strong>the</strong> departure of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Germans as something horribly unfair and <strong>the</strong> Baltic Germans as <strong>the</strong><br />
sole carriers of culture to our region and <strong>the</strong> creators of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
In a concentrated form and as a summary I could formulate <strong>the</strong> possible development of <strong>the</strong><br />
problems of <strong>the</strong> Balkan region as follows:<br />
a) Fear of Soviet Russia compel [<strong>the</strong>m] to move towards mutual understanding with this<br />
new decisive factor and force in European policy;<br />
b) For <strong>the</strong> time being Russia has launched its activities only in Bulgaria and prepares to<br />
achieve far-reaching goals <strong>the</strong>re. The goals of <strong>the</strong> Russian expansion policy (not targeted at<br />
conquering territories, but ra<strong>the</strong>r at enlarging its sphere of influence) seem to point towards <strong>the</strong><br />
Danube delta, probably also higher upstream, to Bulgarian ports (probably also to some<br />
Romanian ones) and to <strong>the</strong> Dardanelles;<br />
c) The anti-Communist stance of <strong>the</strong> Italians is both welcomed and feared, because it can<br />
provoke Russian counteraction that everybody is so much afraid of ... (... „in fear and<br />
trembling“);<br />
d) The expected “Russian pressure” may cause acute aggravation of discords among <strong>the</strong><br />
Balkan states. The result: <strong>the</strong> dragging of <strong>the</strong> entire Balkans and Italy, too, into active and open<br />
war. As <strong>the</strong> term when such possibility may come true is mentioned <strong>the</strong> spring (April);<br />
e) In case of eventual action by <strong>the</strong> Allies, <strong>the</strong> occupation of Hungary by Germany or <strong>the</strong><br />
Allies’ encroaching on <strong>the</strong> Hungarian plain is inevitably expected. (A very fantastical scenario!)<br />
The base of <strong>the</strong> Allies’ action: Turkey and Thessalonica under <strong>the</strong> condition that Italy stands<br />
apart or joins in this “enterprise” 2 ;<br />
f) Italy – a big question mark, on <strong>the</strong> behaviour of which however much more depends in<br />
<strong>the</strong> region than on that of Germany and Russia. It is mostly said that Italy slowly, but steadily<br />
moves towards <strong>the</strong> Western European countries;<br />
g) While weapons are not put in action yet (which in fact nobody wants), <strong>the</strong>y bargain<br />
and profiteer as much and by whatever means <strong>the</strong>y can, preferably with both warring sides;<br />
h) From day to day Germany is mentioned less and less often and <strong>the</strong> root of all evil is<br />
looked for in and ascribed to <strong>the</strong> Nazi short-sighted foreign policy and to letting in Bolsheviks<br />
into Europe.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2540, s. 7–12.<br />
162. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1939. g. 17. nov. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Man ir izdevība ar somu kurjeru līdz mūsu sūtniecībai Berlīnē nosūtīt dažas ziņas.<br />
Dienvidaustrumu Eiropa. Kopš mana pēdējā š. g. 9. novembra ziņojuma šejienes rajonā nav<br />
nekādu pārmaiņu. Esmu tomēr starplaikā saticies un runājis ar daudziem diplomātiem –<br />
kolēģiem un arī dažiem rumāņu valstsvīriem. Vakar biju priekšā stādīšanas audiencē pie<br />
ministru prezidenta Konstantina Argetoianu. Saruna ar ministru prezidentu apm. ½ stundu.<br />
Parastās pieklājības frāzes. Rumānija pret Latviju un visām Baltijas valstīm jūtot patiesu<br />
1<br />
Saying “nolens volens” stems from <strong>the</strong> Latin and means “willy nilly”.<br />
2<br />
This word is of <strong>the</strong> Envoy’s own choosing and was inserted in <strong>the</strong> Latvian text (translator’s note).
382 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
draudzību un simpātiju. Tāda vienmēr bijusi rumāņu politika un tāda palikšot. Labākie<br />
novēlējumi mums šajos grūtos laikos. Informējās pie manīm par stāvokli. Tēloju no manas<br />
puses mūsu situāciju optimistiski, atspēkoju šad un tad dzirdētos un lasītos ļoti negatīvos<br />
iespaidus par krievu lomu, krievu bruņoto spēku dominēšanu etc. mūsu zemē. Ministru<br />
prezidents no savas puses sacīja, ka mēs esot pareizi rīkojušies, jo, taisot nesamērīgiem spēkiem<br />
pretestību, rezultāti varot būt tikai ļaunāki. Polijas piemērs. Viņa ieskati esot, ka pat pie<br />
sabiedroto pilnas uzvaras, nekad nevarēšot restaurēt Poliju agrākās robežās. Tautu<br />
pašnoteikšanās, etniskās minoritātes etc. esot jautājumi, kas nav izšķirami ar spēku, vismaz uz<br />
ilgu laiku nē. Bīstama mums varot kļūt krievu imperiālisma tālāka pieaugšana un līdz ar to,<br />
prasību pieaugšana pret mums. Tagad vajagot būt elastīgiem, lai saglabātu spēkus līdz kara<br />
beigām. Pie lielās norēķināšanās (mana frāze) izšķiroša nozīme būs tautām un valstīm, kas būs<br />
saglabājušas savus spēkus, morālos, tāpat arī materiālos un fiziskos. Viņa domas arī par Somiju,<br />
ka tai nāksies piekāpties. Par Rumānijas un Balkānu stāvokli ministru prezidents varot teikt, ka<br />
pagaidām šeit viss ir mierīgi, krievi pret Rumāniju izturoties korekti un nekādas prasības<br />
neizvirzot. Laikam tomēr baidoties no militārām komplikācijām. Ziema, katrā ziņā lielākoties,<br />
paiešot klusi. Par lielvalstu konflikta attīstību ministru prezidents bija ieskatos, ka esot daudz<br />
zīmju, ka uz pavasara pusi varot arī sagaidīt nopietnākas miera akcijas. Francijā esot ļoti plašas<br />
aprindas, kas vēloties mieru un arī Anglijā šādu ieskatu sabiedrības sektors neesot mazs. Esot<br />
iespējama gluži pretēja varbūtība par kara darbības paasināšanos, kas var ieraut arī Balkānu<br />
valstis karā. Rumānija darīšot visu, kas viņas spēkos, lai to novērstu.<br />
Iekšpolitiskā ziņā valdot miers un “Nacionālās atdzimšanas fronte” – (kaut kas līdzīgs<br />
mērenam fašismam) gūstot arvien lielāku piekrišanu un laižot dziļākas saknes tautā.<br />
Kādas neitrālas valsts sūtnis, kas šeit atrodas gandrīz 7 gadus, man ļoti plaši un atklāti<br />
atstāstīja savus iespaidus. Rumānijas nelaimes un grūtības meklējamas galvenā kārtā sliktā<br />
saimniecības organizēšanā. Starpnieku un spekulantu pārāk daudz. Valsts aparāts ļoti<br />
koruptīvs. Tagad cenšoties tīrīt, bet kaut kādi nezināmi spēki šos labos nodomus pārkrusto.<br />
Valsts iestādes nesen atpakaļ iedrošinājušās apcietināt vienu no lielākiem rumāņu (žīdu)<br />
spekulantiem, lielrūpnieku Maksu Aušnitu. Neskatoties uz pavisam tuvām attiecībām ar<br />
visaugstākām aprindām, Aušnitam bija no greznās pils jāpārvietojas cietumā [..]. Rumānija ir<br />
tomēr bagāta zeme un viss tas samērā mazu iespaidu atstāj uz ikdienišķo dzīvi, kura turpina<br />
ritēt samērā normāli un vēl acīmredzamā pārticībā pilsētās, bet stiprā nabadzībā pie<br />
zemniekiem, lai gan ne tālu tik miserablā 1 masštabā, 2 kā tas bija, par piemēru, Polijā. Arī<br />
rumāņu sādžās nav kailas nabadzības un bada, lai gan liels naudas trūkums un rūgtums, ka<br />
Bukarestes un citu centru spekulanti iebāž kabatā milzīgu peļņu uz nabaga zemnieka rēķina. Pa<br />
daļai šos apstākļus rumāņu sētā novēroju personīgi nesenā izbraukumā uz laukiem un Karpatu<br />
(dienvidos) apkārtnē.<br />
Ārpolitiskā ziņā šeit ir nogaidošs stāvoklis. Visu notikumu norisi cenšas paredzēt no krievu<br />
eventuālām akcijām, kas tomēr vēl nekādu skaidrību nerāda.<br />
Esmu dzirdējis baumu veidā, bet no ļoti labiem avotiem, ka visā drīzumā sagaidāms<br />
grandioza vācu militārā akcija Rietumu frontē. Hitlera piedraudētais slepenais, resp. jaunais<br />
ierocis esot jauna sprāgstviela, kas spējot sadragāt arī Mažino 3 līnijas biezās būves un pazemes<br />
1<br />
Domāts – niecīgā (angļu val. miserable – nožēlojams, bēdīgs, trūcīgs).<br />
2<br />
Domāts – mērogs (vācu val. Máßstab).<br />
3<br />
Mažino (Maginot) līnija – Francijas aizsardzības līnija uz Vācijas robežas.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 383<br />
ierīces. Vācu vilcināšanās ar ofensīvu esot izskaidrojama vienīgi ar to, ka šīs sprāgstvielas neesot<br />
saražots pietiekošā daudzumā. Līdz ko tas būšot noticis, vācu frontāls uzbrukums Mažino līnijai<br />
sākšoties un īsā laikā varot beigties katastrofāli (priekš Anglijas un Francijas). Tam kungam, kas<br />
man to stāstīja (Dienvidaustrumu valsts diplomāts), es piezīmēju, ka man šis stāsts stipri<br />
atgādina Žila Verna 1 romānus, bet šinīs laikos jau sen Žila Verna fantāzijas daudzās reālās lietās<br />
ir pārsniegtas [..]. Angļu un franču diplomāti šeit ir stipri atturīgi, neslēpj tomēr savu pārliecību,<br />
ka karš turpināšoties līdz sabiedroto galīgai uzvarai. Franču vēstnieks uzsvēra, ka karš būs ilgs,<br />
pat ilgāks, nekā 1914.–1918. gadā. Anglis teica, ka “pašreiz visu izšķiršot tikai spēks, un<br />
Lielbritānija, reiz sākusi pielietot “Machtpolitik”, 2 no tā nekādā ziņā neatteikšoties, kamēr savus<br />
mērķus nebūšot sasniegusi.”<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 7. apr., 2540. l., 14.–15. lp.<br />
162. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 17 th November 1939<br />
I have a chance to send a few pieces of news to our Legation in Berlin with a Finnish courier.<br />
Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe. Since my last report of 9 th November, this year no changes have taken<br />
place in this region. However, meantime I have met with and talked to many diplomats – my<br />
colleagues and a few Romanian statesmen. Yesterday I had an acquaintance audience with<br />
Prime Minister Constantin Argetoianu. The discussion with <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister lasted for<br />
approximately ½ hour. The traditional courtesy phrases. [The Prime Minister said that]<br />
Romania felt genuine friendship and affinity for Latvia and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States. It had always<br />
been and would remain Romanian policy. Best wishes for us in <strong>the</strong>se difficult times. He<br />
inquired me about <strong>the</strong> situation [in Latvia/ <strong>the</strong> Baltic region]. I presented our situation in<br />
optimistic light, refuted <strong>the</strong> very negative views of <strong>the</strong> Russian role, <strong>the</strong> domination of <strong>the</strong><br />
Russian armed forces etc. in our country that can be heard and read now and <strong>the</strong>n. The Prime<br />
Minister said that we had acted in <strong>the</strong> right manner because resisting disproportionate<br />
[disproporionately large] force could bring only worse result. The Polish example. He believes<br />
that even if <strong>the</strong> Allies reaped complete victory, it will never be possible to restore Poland in its<br />
former borders. Self-determination of peoples, ethnic minorities etc. are issues that cannot be<br />
resolved by force, at least not for long. He said that fur<strong>the</strong>r growth of Russian imperialism,<br />
which would bring along increased demands from us, could become dangerous to us. At this<br />
time we should be flexible in order to preserve force until <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> war. At <strong>the</strong> great<br />
settlement (my phrase) those peoples and states, which would have preserved <strong>the</strong>ir force, both<br />
moral as well as physical, would play <strong>the</strong> decisive role. As concerns Finland, he thinks that this<br />
country will have to give in. Describing <strong>the</strong> situation of Romania and <strong>the</strong> Balkans in general, <strong>the</strong><br />
Prime Minister said that for <strong>the</strong> time being everything was quiet <strong>the</strong>re, <strong>the</strong> Russians treated<br />
Romania in a correct manner without postulating any demands to it. Probably <strong>the</strong>y were afraid<br />
of military complications. Anyway, <strong>the</strong> winter for <strong>the</strong> most part was expected to pass quietly. As<br />
concerns <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> conflict among <strong>the</strong> powers, <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister expressed<br />
belief that <strong>the</strong>re were many signs showing that a serious peace campaign could be expected<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> spring. He said that in France <strong>the</strong>re were very broad circles who wished peace and<br />
also in England not a small part of <strong>the</strong> public was in a similar mood. A completely opposite<br />
1<br />
Žils Verns (Verne; 1828–1905), franču rakstnieks.<br />
2<br />
Machtpolitik (vācu val.) – spēka politika.
384 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
development: exacerbation of warfare that could engage <strong>the</strong> Balkan countries, too, was also<br />
possible. Romania, however, would do its utmost to avoid it.<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister <strong>the</strong> domestic policy situation was peaceful and “The Front<br />
of <strong>the</strong> National Revival” (something like a moderate fascism) was gaining increasing support<br />
and laying deeper and deeper roots among <strong>the</strong> people.<br />
An envoy of a neutral state, who has worked here for almost 7 years already, shared with me<br />
his views at length and very openly. He said that Romania’s misfortunes and difficulties were<br />
mostly due to <strong>the</strong> bad organisation of economy. There were too many mediators and profiteers.<br />
The state apparatus was very corrupt. Efforts were being exerted to cleanse it, but some kind of<br />
unidentified force was countering <strong>the</strong>se good intentions. Recently <strong>the</strong> state institutions had<br />
dared to arrest one of <strong>the</strong> major Romanian (Jewish) profiteers, industrialist Max Auschnitt 1 . In<br />
spite of his very close <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> highest circles, Auschnitt had to move from his<br />
luxurious palace to prison [<strong>the</strong> Envoy told me] [..] However, Romania is a rich country and all<br />
<strong>the</strong> above-said leaves a ra<strong>the</strong>r little impact on <strong>the</strong> daily life, which continues in a ra<strong>the</strong>r normal<br />
way and with obvious prosperity in cities but deep poverty among <strong>the</strong> peasants, although its<br />
scale is far from being as miserable as it is, for example, in Poland. The Romanian villages are<br />
likewise spared bare poverty and famine, although <strong>the</strong>re is an acute lack of money <strong>the</strong>re and<br />
bitterness about <strong>the</strong> fact that profiteers from Bucharest and o<strong>the</strong>r centres pocket huge profit at<br />
<strong>the</strong> poor peasant’s expense. These are partially my personal observations of <strong>the</strong> situation in <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian farmstead made during my recent trip to countryside and <strong>the</strong> Carpathian district (in<br />
<strong>the</strong> south).<br />
In <strong>the</strong> foreign policy sphere <strong>the</strong> situation is expectant. They base <strong>the</strong> forecast of all<br />
developments on <strong>the</strong> eventual Russians’ action, which however shows no clarity yet.<br />
I have heard rumours, which however came from very good sources, that a grandiose<br />
German military campaign is expected to take place in <strong>the</strong> Western front very soon. The secret,<br />
i.e. <strong>the</strong> new weapon that Hitler had threatened with is a new type of an explosive, which is able<br />
to smash even <strong>the</strong> dense constructions and underground facilities of <strong>the</strong> Maginot Line 2 . The<br />
German’s hesitation with an offensive is only due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> explosive had not been<br />
manufactured in sufficient quantity yet. As soon as it is done a frontal German attack on<br />
Maginot’s line will begin and could end in a disaster (for England and France) in a very short<br />
time. I remarked to <strong>the</strong> gentleman who told me this (a diplomat of a Sou<strong>the</strong>astern country)<br />
that this story resembled me very much of Jules Verne’s 3 novels, but in <strong>the</strong> present times Jules<br />
Verne’s fantasies had long since been surpassed with many real things [..] The English and<br />
French diplomats here are very reserved, yet <strong>the</strong>y do not conceal <strong>the</strong>ir belief that <strong>the</strong> war will<br />
continue until <strong>the</strong> Allies’ complete victory. The French Ambassador underlined that <strong>the</strong> war<br />
would be long, longer even than in 1914–1918. The Englishman said that now force alone would<br />
decide everything and Great Britain, once it had started to pursue “Machtpolitik” 4 , would on no<br />
account give it up until it reached its goals.<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 7, file 2540, s. 14–15.<br />
1<br />
Max Auschnitt (1888-1959) was one of <strong>the</strong> most prominent Romanian industrialists.<br />
2<br />
The Maginot Line – French defence line on its border with Germany.<br />
3<br />
Jules Verne (1828–1905), French novelist.<br />
4<br />
Machtpolitik (German) – power politics.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 385<br />
163. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1939. gada 4. decembra slepenais ziņojums<br />
ārlietu ministram V. Munteram<br />
Lai gan Ziemeļeiropas notikumi ģeogrāfiski ņemot no šejienes ir samērā tālu, tad tomēr<br />
Somijas notikumi ir atstājuši ļoti nospiedošu iespaidu arī Rumānijā un vispār Dienvidaustrumu<br />
Eiropā. Arī šeit noteicošās aprindas kultivēja optimismu un rādīja uz āru lielu bravūru, gatavību<br />
kauties, ja būtu jāsastopas ar prasībām, kas skartu Rumānijas neitralitāti un suverenitāti.<br />
Pastāvēja vāja ticība, vai gribēšana ticēt, ka krievi jau nu ar varu neko neiedrošināsies darīt, jo<br />
armija esot slikta, morāle vāja, kaujas spējas zemas, tehniskais aparāts nekur nederīgs,<br />
apbruņojums nepilnīgs, satiksmes organizācija neciešamā stāvoklī u. t. t. Tagad, kad krievi ar<br />
visu pārspējošu brutalitāti tomēr iesākuši atklātu cīņu ar somiem, arī šeit ir dūša saplakuse un<br />
arvien vairāk iesakņojas pārliecība, ka tikko krievi būs „gatavi” ar somiem, nākošais numurs ies<br />
vaļā šejienes rajonā. Zināma „zemes sagatavošana” ir jau notikusi Bulgārijā, kur aģentu tīkls<br />
diezgan plaši par zemi izplatīts, krievu sūtniecības sastāvs papildināts, un baumas cirkulē par<br />
tālu ejošām prasībām, kas iziet uz kontroli Donavas iztekā un tālāk uz Dardaneļiem.<br />
Noskaņojums stipri panisks, lai gan vēl trūkst konkrētu draudu un prasību. Ja nonāks līdz cīņai<br />
ar krieviem, tad šejienes sektors šai ziņā katrā ziņā ir vājāks par poļiem, un rezultāti nevarētu<br />
būt daudz labāki.<br />
Pašlaik taisu vizītes rumāņu un šejienes diplomātiskā korpusa ļaudīm. Viena no<br />
interesantākām sarunām man bija ar Vācijas šejienes sūtni Dr. Vilhelmu Fabriciusu. 1 Viņš vēl<br />
tikai dažas dienas atpakaļ bijis Berlīnē un runājis ar pašu fīreru. Pašapziņa un arogance – līdz<br />
debesīm! Viss esot paredzēts un sīki aprēķināts tagadējā karā, ka vienīgi vācieši spējot aprēķināt<br />
un lietas noorganizēt. Fīrers nekad nebūtu tādā karā ielaidies, kura iznākumu nevarētu ar visu<br />
noteiktību paredzēt. Anglija pieteikusi Vācijas iznīcināšanu – lūdzu, Vācija pieteic Lielbritānijas<br />
impērijas iznīcināšanu. Uz manu starpjautājumu, vai šis uzdevums nebūs tomēr pāri Vācijas<br />
spēkiem, un vai visa lieta pēc abpusējas „asins nolaišanas” tomēr neizbeigsies kompromisa ceļā,<br />
dzirdēju, ka ar tiem ļaudīm Londonā pilnīgi neiespējami runāt. Vācijas ieroči esot jauni un<br />
moderni, bumbvedēji vēl tikai rādīšot ko spējot, Lielbritānijas flote vēl tikai piedzīvošot īstās<br />
melnās nedēļas, ieroču un munīcijas krājumi Vācijai esot milzīgi, kur savā daļā esot arī<br />
jāpateicas Polijā atstātiem bruņojumiem. Pie Varšavas vien saņemtas 16 baterijas vismodernāko<br />
angļu lielgabalu, kuri nemaz vēl neesot bijuši iztīti no eļļas papīriem. Poļu munīcijas krājumi<br />
esot tieši darbā, visa Silēzijas rūpniecība strādājot blakus vācu un čehu rūpniecībai un pār visu<br />
stāvot līdz šim nepiedzīvotā ērtība Vācijas karos – viena fronte. Degvielu esot tik daudz, ka<br />
Vācija varētu kuru katru brīdi atļaut arī neierobežotu auto satiksmi, tikai kaučuka un riepu<br />
patēriņa dēļ un vispār nepieciešamas ierobežošanās dēļ nopietnos laikos, fīreris neļaujot brīvu<br />
autosatiksmi. Neesot laiki tagad priekš „Vergnügungsfahrt`iem”. 2 Vācija ražojot tik daudz<br />
mākslīgo degvielu, ka tas, ko vajagot no Rumānijas saņemt, nepārsniedzot rumāņu normālo<br />
eksportu miera laikos. To viņi arī saņemot. Varot tikai visus brīdināt, lai nepiedzīvotu rūgtu<br />
vilšanos, kas kalkulējot uz vācu iekšējām saimnieciskām vai politiskām grūtībām. Gara stāvoklis<br />
esot nopietns Vācijā, esot arī daudz neērtību, bet visas tās ir paredzētas un iekalkulētas. Neesot<br />
nekāda nelaime, ja dāmas un kungi tagad nevarot pēc iedomas un iegribas pasūtīt jaunus<br />
uzvalkus. Aprēķināts viss esot ilgam laikam uz priekšu. Uztura vielu Vācijā netrūkšot, par to<br />
gādāšot vācu organizācija okupētos Polijas apgabalos, Balkānu valstis un arī Krievija. Transporta<br />
1<br />
Vilhelms Fabriciuss (Fabricius), Vācijas diplomāts. Līdz 1941. g. Vācijas sūtnis Rumānijā.<br />
2<br />
Vergnügungsfahrt (vācu val.) – izklaides brauciens.
386 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
jautājumi Krievijā esot grūti un sliktā stāvoklī. Bet tagad jau strādājot daudzi vācu speciālisti<br />
Krievijā, kas tur aizbraukuši uz krievu aicinājumu un gan jau savedīšot kārtībā. Pagaidām<br />
paredzēts esot ziemeļu ceļš un caur Lembergu 1 un Rumāniju būšot arī iespējams satiksmi ar<br />
Krieviju nokārtot. Polijas dienvidos dzelzceļa līnijas jau pārnaglotas uz krievu platumu.<br />
Sarunas laikā vairākkārt mēģināju manu sarunu kolēģi izprovocēt uz atklātāku valodu<br />
krievu jautājumā. Tomēr šis kungs bija ļoti uzmanīgs. Vāciešu līdzšinējie piedzīvojumi ar<br />
krieviem esot labi. Krievi savas norunas turēšot. Mēs, Baltijas valstis, esot pavisam pareizi<br />
rīkojušies, ne tā somi. Somi par daudz ļāvušies angļu iespaidos. Arī tirdzniecībā un rūpniecībā<br />
somi bijuši par daudz atkarībā no angļiem. Tagad tas viss atspītēšoties. Žēl, pat ļoti žēl esot, ka<br />
somi „die Lage überspannt haben”. 2 Vilka zināmas paralēles ar poļu stāvokli un rīcību pagājušā<br />
vasarā.<br />
Rumāņiem stipri atspītēšoties vieglprātīgi pieņemtas angļu – franču garantijas. Viņš,<br />
Fabriciuss, esot vairākkārt karalim teicis, lai nenokavējot draudzības nodibināšanu ar Vāciju.<br />
Saimnieciski Rumānija un viss šis apgabals (visi Balkāni) esot tikai no Vācijas atkarīgi. Te esot<br />
ļoti slikta valdība un iekšējā kārtība, koruptīva līdz kauliem un asinīm. Tagad gan daudziem<br />
sākot atvērties acis, bet nez vai neesot jau par vēlu. Sevišķi asi runāja par Turciju. Turku valdības<br />
vīri, it īpaši Sarakoglu 3 esot angļu iespaidos. (Pie tam tika rādīts žests, kas atgādina nodilušas<br />
naudas rīvēšanu starp īkšķi un rādītāja pirkstu). Krievi nebūšot ilgi ciest, ka turki ar angļu<br />
ielaišanu Dardaneļos Melno jūru pārtaisījuši par ezeru. Turkiem alianse ar angļiem vēl ļoti, ļoti<br />
dārgi izmaksāšot.<br />
No patstāvīgas Polijas nekas liels vairs pāri nepalikšot. Ap Ļubļinu dibinot 8 miljoni lielu<br />
žīdu valsti, lieli gabali pievienoti Vācijai un kaut kas ap Varšavu, varbūt arī Krakova, palikšot<br />
poliski. Pārējais krieviem un leišiem Viļņa. Tā visa esot Smiglija-Ridza vaina. Ko gan šis vīrs<br />
iedomājies? Ka viņš pat neesot savu godu glābt pratis. Varējis ar kādu no daudzajiem<br />
aeroplāniem aizlidot pie sava kara spēka un tur kā vīrs cīnīties vai krist. Vācijai esot apm.<br />
700.000 poļu gūstekņu. Visiem šiem jaunajiem puišiem nu būšot dūšīgi jāstrādā tai pašā Polijā<br />
vācu vadībā un organizācijā. „Vai domājiet, ka vāciešiem pietrūks ko ēst?” Drīzāk gan tas<br />
notikšot ar angļiem, kuri jau tagad zaudējuši ¾ miljona tonnu no savas flotes. Tad impērijas<br />
nelaimes Indijā. Dienvidāfrikā un šur tur citur esot tikai vēl sākumā. „Neh, wir sind unserer<br />
Sache ganz sicher!” 4 Francūži esot dumji, ka piedaloties šinī karā. Poļi, par piemēram, esot bijuši<br />
dūšīgāki. Franči laikam lietu ņemšot nopietni tikai tad, kad kaušanās notikšot atkal uz viņu<br />
zemes. Vācieši tomēr angļu un franču pretestību nevērtējot zemu. Cīņa būšot grūta. Amerika<br />
lietu uztverot pārāk komerciāli, un kamēr Amerika varēšot bīstamos apmēros atbalstīt<br />
sabiedrotos, daudz kas varot notikt, kas rādīšot nenovēršamo iznākumu šajā cīņā. Eiropa un<br />
visa pasaule stāvot lielu pārvērtību priekšā. Tā domā oficiālie vācieši, žēl, ka es viņam nevarēju<br />
novēlēt labu izdošanos visos šajos plānos.<br />
Vācu mierīgā Balkānu penetrācija 5 norisinās intensīvi ar visādiem paņēmieniem. Vislabākās<br />
sekmes gūtas Jugoslāvijā, kur bez vācu piekrišanas gandrīz vairs nekas nenotiek. Šeit vēl karalis<br />
nav zaudējis noteikšanu un pagaidām visai maz ļaujas iespaidoties no ārējiem padomdevējiem.<br />
1<br />
Lemberga – Ļvovas nosaukums vācu valodā.<br />
2<br />
Die Lage überspannt haben (vācu val.) – situāciju vēl vairāk sarežģījuši.<br />
3<br />
Mehmets Sarakoglu (Saracoğlu; 1887–1953), Turcijas valstsvīrs. 1938.–1942. g. ārlietu ministrs.<br />
4<br />
Neh, wir sind unserer Sache ganz sicher (vācu val.) – nu, mēs par savu lietu esam pilnībā pārliecināti.<br />
5<br />
Penetration (angļu val.) – iespiešanās.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 387<br />
Rumānijā saimnieciskā dzīvē ārēji redzamu grūtību vēl nav. Ir tikai liela nenoteiktība un<br />
nezināšana par nākotni. Nav arī jaunā valdība vēl izšķīrusies, kādus ceļus iet. Ja būtu satiksmes<br />
iespējas, man liekas, ka varētu būt runa par konkrētiem veikaliem ar Rumāniju.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 7. apr., 2540. l., 4.–6. lp.<br />
163. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 4 th December 1939<br />
Although in geographic terms events taking place in Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Europe are ra<strong>the</strong>r far from<br />
here, developments in Finland have left a very depressing impact also in Romania and in<br />
Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe in general. Here, too, <strong>the</strong> ruling circles cultivated optimism and displayed<br />
great bravado and readiness to fight if demands were postulated that would concern Romania’s<br />
neutrality and sovereignty. A vague hope or a wish to hope had existed that <strong>the</strong> Russians would<br />
not dare to use force because <strong>the</strong>ir army was considered as weak, morals – low, fighting capacity<br />
– poor, its technical supply – unfit, military equipment – inadequate, logistics – in a disastrous<br />
condition etc. Now, when <strong>the</strong> Russians with unsurpassed brutality have openly waged war<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Finns, here too, spirits have dropped and belief is increasingly taking root that when<br />
<strong>the</strong> Russians “are done” with <strong>the</strong> Finns, this region will be next. A certain “preparation of <strong>the</strong><br />
land” has already taken place in Bulgaria, where <strong>the</strong> network of agents is ra<strong>the</strong>r comprehensive,<br />
<strong>the</strong> staff of <strong>the</strong> Russian Embassy has been increased and rumours are spreading about farreaching<br />
demands pertaining to control over <strong>the</strong> Danube source and over territories fur<strong>the</strong>r on<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> Dardanelles. The mood is ra<strong>the</strong>r panicky, although no concrete threat or demands<br />
have been posed yet. If it comes to a fight with <strong>the</strong> Russians, this sector is for sure weaker than<br />
<strong>the</strong> Poles and <strong>the</strong> outcome could not be much better.<br />
I am now paying visits to <strong>the</strong> people in <strong>the</strong> Romanian and foreign <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps. One of<br />
<strong>the</strong> most interesting discussions that I had was with Envoy of Germany to this country Dr.<br />
Wilhelm Fabricius. 1 Only a few days ago he was in Berlin and talked to <strong>the</strong> Führer himself. His<br />
confidence and arrogance – sky-high! [He told me that] in <strong>the</strong> ongoing war everything had been<br />
provided for and calculated in detail and only <strong>the</strong> Germans were capable of calculating and<br />
organizing things. England had declared <strong>the</strong> annihilation of Germany – if it pleases you,<br />
Germany declared <strong>the</strong> annihilation of <strong>the</strong> British Empire. To my question whe<strong>the</strong>r this task<br />
would not be above Germany’s power and whe<strong>the</strong>r after <strong>the</strong> mutual “bloodletting” all this thing<br />
would not end in a compromise, I heard [<strong>the</strong> reply] that with those people in London it was<br />
absolutely impossible to talk to. Germany’s weapons were new and modern, <strong>the</strong> bombers were<br />
yet to reveal <strong>the</strong>ir full capacity, <strong>the</strong> Great Britain’s fleet was yet to experience <strong>the</strong> really black<br />
weeks, Germany had huge reserves of weapons and ammunition partly thanks to <strong>the</strong> armament<br />
left in Poland. At Warsaw alone 16 batteries of <strong>the</strong> latest type of English cannons not yet<br />
unwrapped from <strong>the</strong> oiled paper had been captured. The Polish reserves of ammunition were<br />
put at work at that precise time, <strong>the</strong> entire industry of Silesia worked side by side with <strong>the</strong><br />
German and Czech industry and above all <strong>the</strong>re stood <strong>the</strong> luxury, <strong>the</strong> like of which Germany<br />
had not enjoyed in any previous war – one front. There was so much fuel that Germany could<br />
anytime afford allowing unlimited car traffic, it was only due to <strong>the</strong> consumption of rubber and<br />
tyres and <strong>the</strong> general need for limitation in serious times that <strong>the</strong> Führer did not allow free car<br />
1<br />
Wilhelm Fabricius, German diplomat, until 1941 Germany’s Envoy to Romania.
388 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
traffic. This was not <strong>the</strong> right time for “Vergnügungsfahrt”s. 1 Germany produced so much of<br />
artificial fuel that <strong>the</strong> amount due from Romania did not exceed <strong>the</strong> amount of Romania’s<br />
peace-time export. That was how much <strong>the</strong>y actually received. Everybody who was reckoning<br />
with Germans’ domestic economic or political difficulties could only be warned to be spared<br />
bitter disappointment. The moral state in Germany was serious, <strong>the</strong>re were also many<br />
inconveniences, but <strong>the</strong>y all had been predicted and taken into consideration. It was no<br />
misfortune that ladies and gentlemen could not order new suits on <strong>the</strong>ir wishes and whims.<br />
Everything had been calculated for a long time ahead. Germany was not expected to run short<br />
of food, as <strong>the</strong> German organisation in <strong>the</strong> occupied Polish regions, <strong>the</strong> Balkan states and also<br />
in Russia was to take care of that. The transportation issues in Russia were difficult and in bad<br />
condition. But many German specialists were already working in Russia on <strong>the</strong> Russians’<br />
invitation and <strong>the</strong>y would put things in order. For <strong>the</strong> time being it was planned to use <strong>the</strong><br />
nor<strong>the</strong>rn way through Lemberg 2 and Romania and it would also be possible to arrange<br />
transportation with Russia. In south of Poland railway lines had already been re-nailed<br />
[changed] to <strong>the</strong> Russian width [said <strong>the</strong> German Envoy].<br />
During <strong>the</strong> discussion I several times tried to provoke my colleague to use a more open<br />
language on <strong>the</strong> Russian issue. However, this gentleman was very cautious. He said that <strong>the</strong><br />
experience with <strong>the</strong> Russians so far had been good. The Russians would keep <strong>the</strong>ir word. We,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic States, had done <strong>the</strong> right thing, unlike <strong>the</strong> Finns. The Finns had yielded too much to<br />
<strong>the</strong> English influence. The Finns had depended too much on <strong>the</strong> English in trade and industry,<br />
too. Now it all would backfire. It was a pity, even very much a pity that <strong>the</strong> Finns „die Lage<br />
überspannt haben”. 3 He drew certain parallels with <strong>the</strong> Polish situation and behaviour in <strong>the</strong> last<br />
summer.<br />
[The Envoy of Germany said that] <strong>the</strong> thoughtlessly accepted British–French guarantees<br />
would rebound heavily on Romania. He, Fabricius, had repeatedly recommended <strong>the</strong> King not<br />
to miss <strong>the</strong> chance to establish friendship with Germany. In economic terms Romania and <strong>the</strong><br />
entire region (all <strong>the</strong> Balkans) depended only on Germany. There <strong>the</strong> government and domestic<br />
order were very bad and thoroughly corrupt. Many eyes had begun to open to this fact but it<br />
might be too late. In a particularly harsh manner he spoke about Turkey. The men in <strong>the</strong><br />
Turkish government, Saracoğlu 4 in particular were under <strong>the</strong> English influence. (Saying this, he<br />
made a gesture that resembled <strong>the</strong> rubbing of worn out money between his thumb and index<br />
finger). The Russians would not tolerate long <strong>the</strong> fact that by letting <strong>the</strong> English into <strong>the</strong><br />
Dardanelles <strong>the</strong> Turks had turned <strong>the</strong> Black Sea into a lake. The alliance with <strong>the</strong> English would<br />
cost very very dearly to <strong>the</strong> Turks.<br />
[The Envoy of Germany said that] nothing much would remain of independent Poland. A<br />
Jewish state with <strong>the</strong> population of 8 million was being set up around Lublin, large regions had<br />
been annexed to Germany and [only] something around Warsaw and probably also Krakow<br />
would remain Polish [possession]. The rest [would go] to <strong>the</strong> Russians, but Vilnius – to <strong>the</strong><br />
Lithuanians. It all was Śmigły-Rydz’s fault. What that man had got into his head? He had not<br />
been able to salvage even his own honour. He should have flown to his troops on one of <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Vergnügungsfahrt (German) – a pleasure ride.<br />
2<br />
Lemberg – <strong>the</strong> German name for <strong>the</strong> present-day Lviv (in Ukraine).<br />
3<br />
Die Lage überspannt haben (German) – <strong>the</strong>y have made <strong>the</strong> situation even more complicated.<br />
4<br />
Mehmet Saracoğlu (1887–1953), Turkish statesman. 1938–1942 Minister of Foreign Affairs.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 389<br />
many airplanes and fought and fallen <strong>the</strong>re like a man. Germany had captured approximately<br />
700 000 Polish prisoners of war. All <strong>the</strong>se young guys would have to work hard in Poland under<br />
German supervision and organisation. “Do you think that <strong>the</strong> Germans will not have enough to<br />
eat?” [<strong>the</strong> German Envoy asked]. It would sooner happen to <strong>the</strong> English who had already lost ¾<br />
million tons of <strong>the</strong>ir fleet. Then <strong>the</strong> Empire’s misfortunes in India. [What was happening] in<br />
South Africa and in some o<strong>the</strong>r places was only a beginning. „Neh, wir sind unserer Sache ganz<br />
sicher!” 1 The French were foolish to take part in this war [<strong>the</strong> German Envoy remarked]. The<br />
Poles, for example, had been more courageous. The French would probably take this thing<br />
seriously only when <strong>the</strong> fight would again take place on <strong>the</strong>ir soil. The Germans however were<br />
underestimating <strong>the</strong> English and French resistance [<strong>the</strong> German Envoy admitted]. The fight<br />
would be difficult. America perceived this matter from an excessively commercial angle and as<br />
long as America had <strong>the</strong> chance to support <strong>the</strong> Allies on a dangerous scale, much could happen<br />
that would show <strong>the</strong> inevitable outcome of <strong>the</strong> fight. Europe and <strong>the</strong> entire world were on <strong>the</strong><br />
threshold of great change [<strong>the</strong> German Envoy said]. This was what <strong>the</strong> official Germans think<br />
and it was a pity that I could not wish him good luck in carrying out all those plans.<br />
The peaceful German penetration 2 into <strong>the</strong> Balkans is taking place intensively and by all<br />
kinds of means. The best success has been achieved in Yugoslavia, where almost nothing takes<br />
place without German approval any longer. Here [in Romania] <strong>the</strong> King has not yet lost<br />
command of <strong>the</strong> situation and at least for <strong>the</strong> time being does not yield much to <strong>the</strong> influence<br />
of external advisors.<br />
There are no externally visible difficulties in Romania’s economic life yet. There is only great<br />
uncertainty and lack of knowledge about <strong>the</strong> future. The new government has not decided yet<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r which way to go. If <strong>the</strong>re were transportation possibilities, I think, we could have<br />
considered concrete business deals with Romania.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 7, file 2540, s. 4–6.<br />
164. Latvijas sūtņa L.Ēķa 1939. g. 9. dec. slepenais ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Bukarestē somu–krievu kara atskaņas stipri iespaidīgas. Dzīvoja šeit pārliecībā, ka krievi gan<br />
neko ar varu nedarīs. Tagad nu ir skaidrs, ka dotā momentā tomēr jārēķinās ar krievu militāro<br />
spiedienu. Kā dzirdam, tad steigā tiek būvēti nocietinājumi Besarābijā un citos virzienos, lai<br />
aizbarikadētu event[uālu] krievu spēku ieplūšanu Donavas deltas rajonā. Pārliecības tomēr nav,<br />
ka rumāņi vispār būtu spējīgi taisīt nopietnu pretestību. Agrākais ministru prezidents<br />
Argetoianu esot cerējis uz Vācijas atbalstu. Bijis piekāpīgs arī vācu saimniecisko prasību priekšā.<br />
Tāpēc viņam bija jāaiziet. Tataresku cerot noorganizēt līdz pavasarim rumāņu armiju, robežas<br />
un defensīvās līnijas nocietinājumu darbus. Cerot arī uz turku, grieķu un angļu tiešu palīdzību.<br />
Baumu bez gala. Pāris dienas atpakaļ sākuši jau pakot čemodānus daži bailīgākie. Bailīgie te ir<br />
ļoti daudz. Panikas iemesli: krievi jau iesnieguši ultimātu. Drīz būšot Besarābijā, Moldāvijā,<br />
Konstancā etc. krievi iekšā. Patiesais iemesls Kominternes kaut kāda izdevuma artiķelis ar<br />
saturu, lai rumāņi neiedomājoties, ka krievi nekā neprasīs un ka tiem nekā nebūtu ko prasīt.<br />
Rumāņu stāvoklis, ja kaut ko teritoriālu dod krieviem, jādod arī ungāriem un bulgāriem. Visus<br />
tomēr apmierināt nevar un tāpēc nezina, ko iesākt. Kauties – būtu pareizā izeja, bet priekš tā<br />
1<br />
Neh, wir sind unserer Sache ganz sicher (German) – Well, we are completely sure about our cause.<br />
2<br />
„Penetration” again is a word of <strong>the</strong> Envoy’s own choosing (translator’s note).
390 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
vajag vairāk, nekā tikai labas gribas pie vadošām personām vien. Besarābijā kliedzoša<br />
nabadzība. Tauta, zemnieki, bezdarbnieki – Sarkano armiju gaida tiešām kā atbrīvotāju un<br />
cilvēcīgāku apstākļu nesēju. Nav labi.<br />
Petrolejas rajonos mūs uztrauc biežie ugunsgrēki. Vācieši saka, ka angļu Secret service 1 laižot<br />
uguni klāt, bet daudzi netic, ka angļi tīšām dedzinātu taisni savu (angļu–franču) petrolejas<br />
kompāniju avotus un destilācijas. Drīzāk dedzinātāji būs tie, kas citus apvaino. Uzkrītoši bieži<br />
tomēr notiek taisni petrolejas un benzīna vilcienu katastrofas. Dzelzceļu katastrofas šinī zemē ir<br />
parasta lieta, bet tāda petrolejas vilcienu speciāla selekcija tomēr vedina uz pārdomām. Angļu–<br />
franču kapitālspējīgās tirdzniecības sabiedrības un firmas īrē rumāņu vagonus, maksā bargu<br />
naudu un lika tiem vagoniem dīkā stāvēt, nolūks skaidrs: lai nebūtu vāciešiem iespējams savus<br />
iepirkumus no šejienes transportēt! Tāpat arī angļi un franči taisa lielus preču iepirkumus<br />
Balkānos vispār un, ja arī nevar tos notransportēt, tad vispār lai vācietis nedabū! Pats neēd, bet<br />
citam arī nedod! Cīņa norit pagaidām klusībā, bet paliek stipri intensīva. Ja sāks kaut kas<br />
šķobīties šajā rajonā, būs liels sajukums un putra. Krievi palaiduši vaļā caur Rumāniju un<br />
Ungāriju lielāku porciju čehu leģiona gūstekņus, lai braucot uz Franciju cīnīties. Vācieši<br />
revanšējas un palaiduši vaļā ukrainiešus un turpina atbalstīt ukraiņu organizācijas, lai tās tomēr<br />
neaizmirstu šad un tad jaunajiem vācu Maskavas “draugiem” sarīkot vienu otru cūcību un<br />
nepatikšanu [..]. Baumas par to, ka krievi ar vāciešiem beigu beigās tomēr klups viens otram<br />
matos, paliek arvien intensīvākas. Ar zināmu humoru šeit vēro arī vācu ieroču piegādi Somijai,<br />
Rumānijai to vajadzībām pret krieviem [..].<br />
Rumāņu iekšpolitiskās padarīšanās ir gaidāmas atkal pārmaiņas. Konflikti un savstarpējas<br />
nesaskaņas briest. Karalis rīkojas diktatoriski un nerēķinoties arī neko daudz ar savu agrāko<br />
draugu, tagadējo ministru prezidentu Tataresku. Pret ministru prezidenta gribu notikušas dažas<br />
iecelšanas ministru kabineta sastāvā, sevišķi viceministru posteņos. Tataresku jau vienreiz<br />
iesniedzis demisiju, bet tā nav pieņemta.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 2.–3. lp.<br />
164. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 9 th December 1939<br />
In Bucharest <strong>the</strong> repercussions of <strong>the</strong> Finnish–Russian war are very impressive. They had<br />
lived here in belief that <strong>the</strong> Russians would do nothing by force. Now it has become clear that at<br />
<strong>the</strong> present moment <strong>the</strong> Russian military pressure must be reckoned with. As we hear,<br />
fortifications are being erected in a hurry in Bessarabia and towards o<strong>the</strong>r directions in order to<br />
block up <strong>the</strong> event[ual] inflow of <strong>the</strong> Russian troops into <strong>the</strong> region of <strong>the</strong> Danube delta. Yet<br />
confidence is lacking that <strong>the</strong> Romanians are at all able to offer serious resistance. Former<br />
Prime Minister Argetoianu is said to have hoped for support from Germany. He had been pliant<br />
also to German economic demands. For this reason he had to go. Tătărescu is said to hope by<br />
<strong>the</strong> spring to organize <strong>the</strong> Romanian Army and <strong>the</strong> fortification works on <strong>the</strong> border and <strong>the</strong><br />
defensive line. He is said to be also hoping for direct help from <strong>the</strong> Turks, Greeks and English.<br />
No end to rumours. A couple of days ago some <strong>the</strong> most faint-hearted already started to pack<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir suitcases. Of <strong>the</strong> faint-hearted <strong>the</strong>re are very many. The reasons of <strong>the</strong> panic: <strong>the</strong> Russians<br />
have already presented an ultimatum. The Russians are said soon to enter Bessarabia, Moldova,<br />
Constanța etc. The actual reason [for <strong>the</strong> panic] is an article in some kind of a publication by<br />
1<br />
Secret service (angļu val.) – Slepenais dienests (Lielbritānijas drošības dienesta nosaukums).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 391<br />
Comintern saying that <strong>the</strong> Romanians should not get it into <strong>the</strong>ir heads that <strong>the</strong> Russians<br />
would not demand anything from <strong>the</strong>m and that <strong>the</strong>y had nothing to demand from. Romania’s<br />
situation: if it cedes something territorial to <strong>the</strong> Russians, it must cede something to <strong>the</strong><br />
Hungarians and Bulgarians, too. Yet it is impossible to make everybody happy and thus <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians do not know what to do. Fighting would be <strong>the</strong> correct choice, but it requires<br />
something more than a good will among <strong>the</strong> ruling circles. Bessarabia is in dire poverty. The<br />
people, peasants, <strong>the</strong> unemployed really expect <strong>the</strong> Red Army as a liberator and a carrier of<br />
more humane living conditions. It is no good.<br />
We are concerned about <strong>the</strong> frequent fires in <strong>the</strong> kerosene-producing districts. The<br />
Germans say that <strong>the</strong> English secret service was setting things on fire, but many do not believe<br />
that <strong>the</strong> English would deliberately set fire to <strong>the</strong> sources and distillation [facilities] of <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
(English–French) kerosene companies. It is more likely that <strong>the</strong> arsonists are those who put <strong>the</strong><br />
blame on o<strong>the</strong>rs. However it is <strong>the</strong> kerosene and petrol trains among all o<strong>the</strong>rs that suffer<br />
accidents with striking frequency. In this country railway accidents are an everyday occurrence<br />
but such a special selection of kerosene trains of all o<strong>the</strong>rs do give food for thought. The capital<br />
capable English–French commercial societies and companies hire Romanian wagons, pay huge<br />
amounts of money and <strong>the</strong>n leave <strong>the</strong> wagons idling, <strong>the</strong> intention is clear: to leave <strong>the</strong><br />
Germans no possibility of transporting <strong>the</strong>ir purchases from here! The English and French also<br />
make large purchases of goods in <strong>the</strong> Balkans in general and, even if <strong>the</strong>y cannot transport<br />
<strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>n [at least] let <strong>the</strong> German does not get <strong>the</strong>m! Even if you do not eat it yourself, do not<br />
let anyone eat ei<strong>the</strong>r [dog on a haystack]! For <strong>the</strong> time being <strong>the</strong> struggle is taking place in<br />
silence, but it is becoming very intense. If something starts to crumble in this region, <strong>the</strong>re will<br />
be a great chaos and mess. The Russians have released a large portion of <strong>the</strong> captured [soldiers<br />
of <strong>the</strong>] Czech legion through Romania and Hungary for <strong>the</strong>m to go to France and fight. By way<br />
of revenge <strong>the</strong> Germans have released <strong>the</strong> Ukrainians and continue to support Ukrainian<br />
organisations for <strong>the</strong>m not to forget now and <strong>the</strong>n to do a swinish trick and cause trouble to <strong>the</strong><br />
new German “friends” in Moscow [..] The rumours that <strong>the</strong> Russians and Germans will<br />
eventually pounce upon each o<strong>the</strong>r are becoming more and more intense. The supply of<br />
German-made weapons to Finland and Romania for use against <strong>the</strong> Russians is also observed<br />
with certain irony here [..].<br />
Change is again expected in <strong>the</strong> Romanian domestic policy matters. Conflicts and mutual<br />
discords are swelling. The King behaves like a dictator and does not take much into<br />
consideration his former friend, now Prime Minister Tătărescu ei<strong>the</strong>r. Some persons have been<br />
appointed members of <strong>the</strong> cabinet of ministers, particularly in <strong>the</strong> vice-ministerial positions,<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister’s will. Tătărescu once already handed in his resignation, but it was<br />
rejected.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 2–3.<br />
165. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1939. dec. [starp 9. un 19. dec.] slepenais<br />
ziņojums ārlietu ministram V. Munteram<br />
Es šodien biju vizītē pie Ministru prezidenta G. Tataresku. Stāstīja man par Rumānijas un<br />
dienvidaustrumu Eiropas apstākļiem un izjautāja mani arī par stāvokli mūsu zemē un ziemeļos.<br />
Atstāja ļoti enerģiska cilvēka iespaidu. Grūti esot būt par Rumānijas ministru prezidentu, jo<br />
tauta gadusimtiem dzīvojusi vaļīgi, nemīlot disciplīnu, ne tā kā pie mums ziemeļos, zemnieks
392 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
labāk dzīvojot trūkumā, nekā ļaujoties modernizēties. Rumāņu zemnieks esot liels<br />
individuālists, nemīlot ne kooperāciju, nedz rīkošanu no augšas. Šajā ziņā vēl nākšoties izcīnīt<br />
smagas cīņas ar kūtrumu un nezināšanu. Rumānija starptautiskā spēlē negribot ņemt dalību.<br />
Sargāšot savu neitralitāti un robežu neaizskaramību ar visiem līdzekļiem. Rumāņi būšot<br />
vairīties no konflikta ar saviem kaimiņiem ar visu enerģiju un turēties malā līdz pēdējai iespējai.<br />
Tomēr ārpus Rumānijas un tuvāko kaimiņu starpā esot spēki, par kuriem rumāņu spēki un<br />
gribēšana vai negribēšana nekā nevarot noteikt. Liekoties, ka Eiropas tautām vēl tumšākas<br />
dienas stāv priekšā. Jārēķinoties ar lielām sociālām pārgrozībām, trūkumu un masu nemieru. Ja<br />
Rumāniju aizskāršot, rumāņi kaušoties, neskatoties uz iznākumu, jo viss atkarājoties tik un tā<br />
no tam, kādi spēki galu galā uzvarēs – brutālie vai morālie. Jādomājot, ka pēdējie un tādā<br />
gadījumā arī visas nodarītās pārestības izlabošot.<br />
Attiecības ar Krieviju Ministru prezidents cenšoties uzlabot, bet šaubas esot, vai Krievija to<br />
vēloties un saprast gribot. Varbūt, kad notikumi ziemeļos vedīšot uz pārdomām pie jaunas<br />
avantūru iesākšanas. Mūsu līgumi ar krieviem Ministru prezidentam visumā bija jau pazīstami.<br />
Mūsu rīcību pilnā mērā attaisno un cer, ka pie galīgās norēķināšanās daudz kas var atkal par<br />
labu grozīties. Es teicu, ka praktiskā dzīvē mūsu iedzīvotāji neko daudz no krievu garnizoniem<br />
nemana un, ka vispārīgi krievi līdz šim nav parādījuši nekādas tieksmes iejaukties mūsu iekšējās<br />
lietās. Saimnieciskās lietās, cik spriežu no mūsu preses, arī ir panākts ļoti apmierinošs<br />
atrisinājums, jauna tirdzniecības līguma veidā un mēs tagad saņemam preces no krieviem,<br />
kuras citur nekur nav iespējams dabūt transporta ceļu slēgšanas dēļ. (Patiesībā man gan<br />
gaužām maz informācijas ir rīcībā par visām šīm lietām mūsu mājās, bet no vienas otras preses<br />
atzīmes šādus slēdzienus varēju taisīt). Ministru prezidents teica, ka Rumānijai būtu interese<br />
iepirkt linsēklas, linus un varbūt arī citus ražojumus. Jautājums tikai esot par satiksmes ceļu<br />
atrašanu.<br />
Pieminēja mūsu sūtni Parīzē, ka esot rīkojis ļoti jauku izstādi latvju mākslai. Vispār esot bijis<br />
ļoti patīkami sastrādāt ar Grosvalda kungu. Man viņš varot piesolīt rumāņu valdības draudzību<br />
un atbalstu visos jautājumos. Rumānija ar visdziļāko simpātiju skatoties uz Latviju un<br />
daudzējādā ziņā mūsu zemi sev nostādot kā paraugu, neskatoties, ka mēs vēl samērā jauni<br />
starptautiskajā saimē.<br />
Runāja arī par minoritāšu problēmu. Vāciešu vai pat ungāru pārcelšanu no Rumānijas uz<br />
„Mutterlandēm” nebūšot izdarāms, jo pārceļamie nemaz tā kaut ko nevēloties. Ar ungāriem gan<br />
varbūt varētu šādu lietu izdarīt, jo citādi ungāru minoritātes jautājums Rumānijā nemaz neesot<br />
nokārtojams, ja negribot nodarīt rumāņiem trīskārtīgu netaisnību. Apgabalos, uz kuriem<br />
pretendējot ungāri, pret vienu ungāru jādod pretī 2–3 rumāņi. Kā ungāri, tā arī vācieši Rumānijā<br />
patiesībā esot emigranti – kolonisti, kas iespiesti rumāņu apgabalos.<br />
Vietējā diplomātiskā korpusā stipri runā par drīzu situācijas maiņu šejienes rajonā. Ungāru –<br />
krievu robežincidenti jau sāk parādīties uz āru. Bulgārijā arī notiek mīklainas lietas ar krieviem.<br />
Sīrijā un arī Turcijā esot jau sagrupēti ievērojami sabiedroto spēki. Stāsta par vienu miljonu<br />
karavīru. Angļu flotes kontrole pie Dardaneļiem paliek stingrāka un biežāka. Rumānijā atkal par<br />
jaunu notiek automobiļu rekvizīcijas, lai gan citādi nekādu ierobežojumu nedz auto satiksmē,<br />
nedz citādi nav. Vienīgi dzelzceļa biļetes nepārdod tālāk, ka vienīgi līdz robežai.<br />
Dārdzība šeit kāpj ļoti strauji. Sāk trūkt importējamās izejvielas, bet ikdienišķā dzīvē vēl<br />
nekas netrūkst un dzīve rit savu normālo, kaut arī drusku nervozu gaitu. Vienīgi ugunsgrēki un
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 393<br />
sabotāžas akti petrolejas rajonā un svarīgās fabrikās sāk pārāk bieži atkārtoties. Par to<br />
rumāņiem jāpateicas ļoti daudziem ārzemju „viesiem”, kas te pilda malu malas.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 4. lp.<br />
165. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, [between 9 th and 19 th December] 1939<br />
Today I was received in an audience by new Prime Minister G. Tătărescu. He told me about<br />
<strong>the</strong> situation in Romania and in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe [in general] and inquired me about <strong>the</strong><br />
situation in my country and in <strong>the</strong> north [of Europe in general]. He left on me <strong>the</strong> impression of<br />
a very energetic man. [He remarked that] it was difficult to work as Romania’s Prime Minister<br />
because for centuries <strong>the</strong> nation had lived loosely and had developed dislike for discipline<br />
unlike us, in <strong>the</strong> North, <strong>the</strong> [Romanian] farmer preferred poverty to yielding to modernization.<br />
The Romanian farmer was a great individualist: he hated both co-operation and orders from<br />
above. In this regard hard struggles against laziness and ignorance still were to be won.<br />
[According to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister] Romania does not want to be part of <strong>the</strong> international game<br />
and will by all possible means protect its neutrality and immunity of its borders. The<br />
Romanians will do <strong>the</strong>ir utmost to avoid conflict with <strong>the</strong>ir neighbours and to stand apart as<br />
long as <strong>the</strong>re is a least chance to do so. Yet [<strong>the</strong> Prime Minister thinks that] outside Romania<br />
and among its closest neighbours <strong>the</strong>re are forces whom Romanians’ wishes or unwillingness<br />
cannot influence. It seems [to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister] that <strong>the</strong> peoples of Europe will face even<br />
darker days. Great social change, poverty and mass unrest have to be reckoned with. If Romania<br />
is endangered, <strong>the</strong> Romanians will fight without a thought for <strong>the</strong> outcome because everything<br />
depends on what kind of forces will reap <strong>the</strong> final victory – <strong>the</strong> brutal ones or <strong>the</strong> ones with<br />
morals [high moral standards]. One should think that <strong>the</strong> latter will and in that case, all<br />
grievances would be amended.<br />
[The Prime Minister said that] he was trying to improve [Romania’s] <strong>relations</strong> with Russia,<br />
yet he was not sure that <strong>the</strong> Russians wanted <strong>the</strong> same and wished to understand it. Probably<br />
<strong>the</strong> events in <strong>the</strong> North would make [<strong>the</strong> Russians] think twice before embarking on a new<br />
adventure. The Prime Minister was already in general lines informed about our [<strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States’] agreements with <strong>the</strong> Russians. He finds our behaviour fully justified and hopes that<br />
many things may take a turn for <strong>the</strong> better at <strong>the</strong> final settlement. I said that in <strong>the</strong>ir daily lives<br />
our population did not much felt <strong>the</strong> presence of <strong>the</strong> Russian garrison and that so far <strong>the</strong><br />
Russians had not displayed any inclination to intervene into our internal matters. In economic<br />
matters, as far as I had derived from our press, a very satisfying solution had been achieved, too,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> shape of a new trade agreement and now we received from <strong>the</strong> Russians goods, which<br />
could not be obtained elsewhere due to <strong>the</strong> closure of transportation roads. (In fact I have very<br />
little information at my disposal about <strong>the</strong>se matters in our country but some remarks in <strong>the</strong><br />
press allowed me to draw such conclusions). The Prime Minister said that Romania would be<br />
interested in importing linseed, flax and, possibly, o<strong>the</strong>r products [from Latvia]. The only issue<br />
was finding transportation roads.<br />
[The Prime Minister] mentioned our Envoy in Paris and said that he had organised a very<br />
nice exhibition of Latvian art. It had in general been very pleasant to co-operate with Mr.<br />
Grosvalds. [He said that] he could offer me <strong>the</strong> friendship of <strong>the</strong> Romanian government and its<br />
support on all issues. Romania regarded Latvia with <strong>the</strong> deepest feelings of affinity and in many
394 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
aspects considered it as a paragon, in spite of <strong>the</strong> fact that we [<strong>the</strong> Latvians] were still ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
young in <strong>the</strong> international community.<br />
[The Prime Minister] also talked about <strong>the</strong> minorities’ issue. The transfer of <strong>the</strong> ethnic<br />
Germans or even Hungarians from Romania to <strong>the</strong>ir “Mutterlands” would not be possible<br />
because those who were to be transferred were not particularly eager about it. Still with <strong>the</strong><br />
Hungarians this thing could probably be done because <strong>the</strong>re was no o<strong>the</strong>r way at all to resolve<br />
<strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> Hungarian minority in Romania unless one wanted to do triple injustice to <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians. In <strong>the</strong> districts claimed by <strong>the</strong> Hungarians 2–3 Romanians should be exchanged for<br />
one Hungarian person. Both <strong>the</strong> Hungarians and Germans in fact were émigrés – colonists who<br />
had been squeezed into Romanian districts [<strong>the</strong> Prime Minister remarked].<br />
In <strong>the</strong> local <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps <strong>the</strong>re is much talk about <strong>the</strong> change of <strong>the</strong> situation in this<br />
region that is to happen soon. Incidents on <strong>the</strong> Hungarian – Russian border already become<br />
known to <strong>the</strong> public. Mysterious things happen with <strong>the</strong> Russians in Bulgaria, too. In Syria and<br />
also in Turkey considerable Allies’ forces are said to have already been grouped. They speak<br />
about one million soldiers. The control of <strong>the</strong> Dardanelles by <strong>the</strong> British fleet becomes more<br />
rigorous and frequent. The requisition of cars again takes place in Romania although <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
no o<strong>the</strong>r restrictions ei<strong>the</strong>r pertaining to car traffic or in o<strong>the</strong>r fields. It is only that railway<br />
tickets are sold to destinations solely within <strong>the</strong> national borders and not fur<strong>the</strong>r than that.<br />
Cost of living is climbing very fast here. The importable fuel starts to be lacking but <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
nothing lacking yet in <strong>the</strong> daily life and life follows its normal, although somewhat nervous<br />
course. It is only that fires and acts of sabotage in <strong>the</strong> kerosene-producing district and <strong>the</strong> major<br />
factories become too frequent. For that <strong>the</strong> Romanians have to thank <strong>the</strong> very numerous<br />
foreign “guests” who fill all places here.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 4.<br />
166. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1939. g. 19. dec. ziņojums Ārlietu ministrijai<br />
Jūsu zināšanai un arhīva papildināšanai nosūtu Jums norakstu no manas uzrunas, kādu<br />
turēju akreditējoties pie Rumānijas karaļa Karola II 1939. g. 18. oktobrī Kotrokeni pilī. Pievienoju<br />
arī šejienes Ārlietu ministrijas notas norakstu 17.X.1939 – Nr. 65137, kas satur paziņojumu par<br />
izpildāmām formalitātēm. Varu piezīmēt, ka akreditēšanās pie Rumānijas karaļa notiek ļoti<br />
iespaidīgas ceremonijas pavadīta. Dienu iepriekš man bija jātaisa vizīte pie galvenā maršala, ar<br />
kuru pārrunājām visus sīkumus. Akreditēšanās dienā piebrauca pie viesnīcas karaliskais auto un<br />
karaļa adjutants ieradās pie manis viesnīcas salonā. Aprēķinot precīzu laiku, devāmies ceļā uz<br />
Kotrokeni pili, kas atrodas ārpus pilsētas, bet ne visai tālu. Pa priekšu brauca policijas motocikls,<br />
kas apturēja visu satiksmi, laižot darbā savas sirēnas un svilpjus. Karaļa vasaras pils Kotrokeni,<br />
kurā karalis uzturējās, jo galveno pili Bukarestes centrā pašreiz pārbūvē un izdaiļo, atrodas<br />
milzīga parka vidū. Pie ieejas resp. iebrauktuves jau pirmās goda sardzes. Pie pils ieejas<br />
nostādīts bataljons ar karogu un liels orķestris. Man izkāpjot no automobiļa un nostājoties uz<br />
pils kāpnēm, orķestris spēlēja Latvijas himnu un karavīri sveica ar „godam sveikt”. Pēc tam mani<br />
pils vestibilā iepazīstināja ar veselu rindu galminieku. Audienču zāle otrā stāvā. Tur mazākā zālē<br />
saformējās vesela procesija, kuru veda galma maršals un man tam jāseko, pavadītam no diviem<br />
citiem katrā pusē un man vēl sekojot dažiem citiem. Audiences zāle, pagara telpa, kurai visā<br />
garumā jāsoļo cauri. Karalis tērpies militārā formā ar baltu pelerīnu, uz kura izšūts liels krusts<br />
(rumāņu varoņu krusts), stāv pašā dibenā un ar interesi nolūkojas uz tuvojošos procesiju. Uz
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 395<br />
lielas grīdas segas, soļus 15 atstatumā, novietots sarkans spilvens, tad 5 soļi tuvāk – otrs tāds pat.<br />
Pie katra no tiem man jāpaklanās un pie pēdējā man jāapstājas (apm. 5 soļi no karaļa). Jānolasa<br />
runa, jāpasniedz akreditēšanas grāmata un jāatkāpjas pieci soļi atpakaļ uz manu agrāko vietu.<br />
Tad karalis atbild manai uzrunai. Runā brīvi, bez papīra, improvizētā runā. Pateicas par mūsu<br />
prezidenta sveicieniem, patīkami esot, ka es esot izvēlēts reprezentēt mūsu valsti pie viņa, cer<br />
uz manu ilgu un patīkamu palikšanu Rumānijā. Pēc tam novēlējumi mūsu prezidentam, tautai<br />
un valstij. Tad karalis smaidīdams nāk man klāt un minūtes 10 sarunājas brīvi tekošā sarunā.<br />
Interesējās par manām strapacēm 1 Polijā, par manu agrāko karjeru, par bažām, kādas mūsu<br />
zeme pārdzīvojot. Kustības dzīvas, bet sejā un acīs redzams nogurums. Vēlāk man adjutants<br />
stāstīja, ka karalis strādājot līdz plkst. 3 naktī. Novēlēja man patīkamu uzturēšanos Rumānijā ar<br />
„au revoir” 2 , spiežot roku, atvadījās. Svīta palika stāvot un visi tie paši, kas mani ieveda zālē,<br />
pavadīja līdz kāpnēm. Izejot no pils, atkal karavīri sveica ar „godam sveikt” un orķestris spēlēja<br />
Latvijas himnu.<br />
Tādā pat kārtībā, kā uz pili braucot, mani adjutants atveda atpakaļ viesnīcā un ceremonija<br />
bija galā.<br />
Jāpiezīmē, ka karaliskais auto ar policijas motociklu pa priekšu drāzās cauri pilsētai ar<br />
milzīgu ātrumu, kas iespējams tikai tāpēc, ka visa satiksme bija noturēta no pa priekšu braucošā<br />
motocikla.<br />
LVVA, 2570. f., 14. apr., 375. l., 259.–260. lp.<br />
166. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 th<br />
December 1939<br />
For your information and <strong>the</strong> archives I am hereby sending you a copy of my speech that I<br />
delivered as I handed in my letters of credence to King of Romania Carol II in Cotroćeni palace<br />
on 18 th October, 1939. I also attach a copy of note No. 65137 of 17. X. 1939 by <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs of this country containing information about <strong>the</strong> formalities to be followed. I<br />
can remark that <strong>the</strong> submission of <strong>the</strong> letters of credence to <strong>the</strong> King of Romania is<br />
accompanied by a very impressive ceremony. A day before I had to visit <strong>the</strong> Chief Marshal with<br />
whom I discussed all <strong>the</strong> details. On <strong>the</strong> day of accreditation <strong>the</strong> royal car drove up to <strong>the</strong> hotel<br />
and <strong>the</strong> King’s aide-de-camp approached me in <strong>the</strong> hotel’s lobby. Having accurately calculated<br />
<strong>the</strong> time, we departed for Cotroćeni palace, which is located outside <strong>the</strong> city, but not very far<br />
from it. A police motorcycle led <strong>the</strong> way, stopping all <strong>the</strong> traffic and putting its sirens and<br />
whistles to use. The King’s summer palace Cotroćeni where <strong>the</strong> King resided because <strong>the</strong> main<br />
palace in <strong>the</strong> centre of Bucharest currently undergoes reconstruction and redecoration stands<br />
in <strong>the</strong> middle of a huge part. The first guard of honour [was standing] already at <strong>the</strong> entrance,<br />
i.e. at <strong>the</strong> drive. At <strong>the</strong> entrance to <strong>the</strong> palace <strong>the</strong>re was standing a battalion with a flag and a<br />
large orchestra. As I stepped out of <strong>the</strong> car and took my position at <strong>the</strong> stairway to <strong>the</strong> palace<br />
<strong>the</strong> orchestra played <strong>the</strong> national an<strong>the</strong>m of Latvia and <strong>the</strong> soldiers gave me a salute with<br />
Present Arms. After that a whole range of court officials were presented to me in <strong>the</strong> palace’s<br />
lobby. The audience hall [is] on <strong>the</strong> second floor. There a procession was formed up in a smaller<br />
hall, <strong>the</strong> Marshal led <strong>the</strong> way and I had to follow, accompanied by two o<strong>the</strong>rs on each side of<br />
me and some o<strong>the</strong>rs following me. The audience hall [is] a long-ish room, which one has to<br />
1<br />
Domātas grūtības.<br />
2<br />
Au revoir (franču val.) – ardievas.
396 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
walk through. The King, dressed in military uniform and a white cloak with a large cross<br />
embroidered on it (<strong>the</strong> Romanian Heroes’ Cross), stood at <strong>the</strong> far end of <strong>the</strong> room and watched<br />
<strong>the</strong> approaching procession with interest. On a large carpet, about 15 steps far<strong>the</strong>r a red pillow<br />
was placed and 5 steps closer – ano<strong>the</strong>r one like that. At each of <strong>the</strong>m I had to bow and at <strong>the</strong><br />
last one I had to stop (approximately 5 steps from <strong>the</strong> King). I had to read out my speech,<br />
present my letters of credence and recede five steps back to my former position. Then <strong>the</strong> King<br />
gave a response speech. He spoke by heart, without a paper, giving an improvised speech. He<br />
thanked me for <strong>the</strong> greetings from our President, [said that] it was a pleasure that I had been<br />
chosen to represent my country to him, [that] he hoped that I would have a long and pleasant<br />
stay in Romania. Then followed his best wishes to our President, <strong>the</strong> people and state. Then <strong>the</strong><br />
King approached me smiling and for some 10 minutes we were engaged in a free, fluent<br />
conversation. [He] inquired me about <strong>the</strong> hardships that I had faced in Poland, about my earlier<br />
career, about <strong>the</strong> concerns that our country was experiencingd. He had lively gestures, but his<br />
face and eyes betrayed exhaustion. Later <strong>the</strong> aide-de-camp told me that <strong>the</strong> King worked till 3<br />
am. [The King] wished me a pleasant stay in Romania and with „au revoir” 1 and a handshake he<br />
took <strong>the</strong> leave. The entourage remained standing and all of <strong>the</strong> persons who had ushered me<br />
into <strong>the</strong> hall, escorted me to <strong>the</strong> stairway. As I left <strong>the</strong> palace, <strong>the</strong> soldiers again gave a salute<br />
with Present Arms and <strong>the</strong> orchestra played <strong>the</strong> national an<strong>the</strong>m of Latvia.<br />
Following <strong>the</strong> same procedure as on <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong> palace, <strong>the</strong> aide-de-camp took me back<br />
to <strong>the</strong> hotel and <strong>the</strong> ceremony was over.<br />
It should be noted that <strong>the</strong> royal car with a police motorcycle in front of it dashed through<br />
<strong>the</strong> city at enormous speed, which was possible only because all traffic was stopped by <strong>the</strong><br />
motorcycle, which led <strong>the</strong> way.<br />
SHAL, f. 2570, d. 14, file 375, s. 259–260.<br />
167. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 16 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 10<br />
Ianuarie 1940<br />
În anumite cercuri de aici se subliniază tăcerea absolută pe care Guvernul Sovietic o observă<br />
în ultimul timp în jurul „guvernului popular” finlandez Kuusinen 2 . Această tăcere este în<br />
general interpretată în sensul că n-ar fi exclus ca Sovietele să accepte la un moment dat și în<br />
circumstanțe ce rămân de determinat discuții cu actualul Guvern finlandez în vederea unei<br />
soluții pacifice.<br />
Este cert că asemenea soluție ar fi primită cu cea mai mare favoare în Statele Baltice.<br />
Prelungirea conflictului, care ar putea antrena țările scandinave și asistența directă a puterilor<br />
occidentale [oferită] acestora, ar avea de efect constituirea unui front comun germano-rus în<br />
Baltica. Ori atât o fuziune completă germano-rusă cât și întinderea războiului în Nord<br />
constituie amenințările cele mai grave pentru existența Statelor Baltice.<br />
S-ar putea deci pune întrebarea dacă, prevăzând posibilitatea unei soluții pacifice, cercurile<br />
baltice nu-și iau dorințele drept realități. Totuși, dacă se consideră interesele capitale sovietice<br />
1<br />
Au revoir (French) – goodbye.<br />
2<br />
Otto Wilhelm (Wille) Kuusinen (1881-1964) a fost un politician finlandez și sovietic cu vederi de extrema stângă,<br />
șef al guvernului fantomatic creat de sovietici la Terijoki (1939-1940), ulterior președinte al Prezidiului Suprem al<br />
R.S.S. Karelo-finlandeză (1940-1956), secretar al C.C. al P.C.U.S. (1957–1964).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 397<br />
legate de acest război, o soluție pacifică n-ar trebui exclusă cu desăvârșire din domeniul<br />
posibilităților. Continuarea conflictului ar împinge într-adevăr, aproape inevitabil, Sovietele pe<br />
calea unei alianțe formale cu Germania și a unei beligeranțe directe cu puterile occidentale, cale<br />
pe care politica sovietică a manifestat până în prezent o destul de firească repulsie de a înainta.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 1-2.<br />
167. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 16 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 10 th January 1940<br />
Certain circles here emphasize <strong>the</strong> absolute silence that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Government has kept<br />
lately around <strong>the</strong> Finnish "popular government" Kuusinen 1 . This silence is generally interpreted<br />
as <strong>the</strong> possibility that <strong>the</strong> Soviets may accept, at a certain point and under circumstances that<br />
are to be determined, discussions with <strong>the</strong> current Finnish government for a peaceful solution.<br />
It is clear that such a solution would be received with <strong>the</strong> greatest favour in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
The prolonging of <strong>the</strong> conflict, which could involve <strong>the</strong> Scandinavian countries and <strong>the</strong>ir direct<br />
assistance by <strong>the</strong> Western powers, will have <strong>the</strong> effect of establishing a joint German-Russian<br />
front in <strong>the</strong> Baltic region. But <strong>the</strong> complete German-Russian fusion as well as <strong>the</strong> advancement<br />
of <strong>the</strong> war to <strong>the</strong> North is one of <strong>the</strong> most serious threats to <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
We could <strong>the</strong>refore question whe<strong>the</strong>r, by predicting <strong>the</strong> possibility of a peaceful solution,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic circles take wishes for reality. However, if one considers <strong>the</strong> capital Soviet interests<br />
about this war, a peaceful solution should not be excluded completely from <strong>the</strong> field of<br />
possibilities. Continuing <strong>the</strong> conflict would push indeed, almost inevitably, <strong>the</strong> Soviets on <strong>the</strong><br />
path of a formal alliance with Germany and of a direct belligerence with <strong>the</strong> Western powers,<br />
on which <strong>the</strong> Soviet policy has shown up to date a ra<strong>the</strong>r natural repulsion of advancing.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 1-2.<br />
168. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. g. 15. janv. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Bukarestē un vispār Balkānos svētku laikā un tūliņ pēc Jaunā gada ir bijusi ļoti liela rosība<br />
politiskā aktivitātē, kas arī pašreiz vēl turpinās. Rumānija ir mēģinājusi noskaidrot iespējamības<br />
stāvoklī savu stāvokli un tuvākās nākotnes izredzes. Karalis, kura rokās koncentrējas visa vara,<br />
svētku laikā simboliskā kārtā taisījis 3 izbraukumus uz Rumānijas vārīgiem punktiem:<br />
Transilvāniju (ungāru robeža), Konstancu (Bulgārijas Dobrudža) un Kišiņevu (Besarābija) [..].<br />
Savādi ir, ka arī šeit, Dienvideiropā, visas acis un cerības vēršas uz Somiju. “Ja vien tie somi<br />
varētu turēties kādus 3 mēnešus, tad mums neviens nekā nepadarīs”, tā man par piemēru,<br />
šodien teica kāds ļoti augsts rumāņu Ārlietu ministrijas darbinieks. Vispārīgi sakot, ir<br />
jākonstatē, ka krievu grūtības un nespēja tikt galā īsā laikā ar somiem šeit lielā mērā ir<br />
piedevušās dūšu un pašpaļāvību. Rumānija sevi uzskata pašreizējos apstākļos ļoti labā<br />
starptautiskā stāvoklī. Krievi ir bijuši spiesti pēdējā laikā atvilkt karaspēku no poļu Galīcijas, kur<br />
pēc vieglās poļu kampaņas bijuši sakoncentrēti diezgan ievērojami krievu “elite” spēki. Tie tagad<br />
esot aizbraukuši uz ziemeļiem. [..]. Pēdējā laikā rumāņi ir atraduši iespēju drusku draudzīgāki<br />
1<br />
Otto Wilhelm (William) Kuusinen (1881-1964) was a Finnish and Soviet politician with extreme left views, head<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Soviet ghostly government created in Terijoki (1939-1940), <strong>the</strong>n president of <strong>the</strong> Presidium of <strong>the</strong> Supreme<br />
Karelo-Finnish SSR (1940-1956) and Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Central Committee of <strong>the</strong> Communist Party of <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
Union (1957–1964).
398 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
sarunāties ar bulgāriem. [..]. Bulgārijas vadošās aprindas, redzot krievu pārāk lielo interesi par<br />
viņu ostām, redzot arī cenšanos izveidot iekšzemē veselu aģentūru tīklu zem tirdzniecības<br />
aģentu segas, esot sapratušas, ka flirts ar krieviem neko labu nesola un tamdēļ radušās<br />
tendences saprasties ar kaimiņiem, pirmā kārtā rumāņiem. Karalis Boriss 1 kādas neitrālas valsts<br />
sūtnim esot izteicies, ka bulgāri nekādā ziņā nesaņemšot Dobrudžu no krievu rokām, jo tas<br />
būtu tikai pagaidām un pie pirmās izdevības tiem to atkal atņemtu. [..].<br />
Baumu šajā pilsētā ir bez gala. Tas varbūt izskaidrojams arī ar šīs tautas raksturu, kurai patīk<br />
grozīties pa kafejnīcām un restorāniem un, ja reiz cilvēki lielā barā kopā, tātad tiem par kaut ko<br />
jārunā. Iekšpolitiski ir tā kā mierīgāks kļuvis, lai gan Nacionālās Atdzimšanas frontei ne visai<br />
labi veicas ar nacionālās vienības veidošanu. Masa ir indiferenta, uz laukiem nabadzīga un<br />
vienaldzīga pret visu, kas notiek ārpus viņu sādžas, bet pilsētās proletariāts kaujas ar strauji<br />
augošo dzīves dārdzību; veikalnieciskā pasaule iegrimusi spekulācijā līdz ausīm, kurai iepakaļ<br />
nepaliek arī aristokrātija un inteliģence. Bet arī vēl tagad man jāapstiprina, ka Rumānija ir<br />
bagāta zeme. Veikali vēl joprojām ir preču pilni un netrūkst pat ārzemju greznuma preces,<br />
nerunājot nemaz par pārtiku, kas šeit ir pārpilnībā. Arī lielā sala laikā, kas šeit jau turpinās pāris<br />
nedēļas, transports un piegāde funkcionē pavisam labi. Trūkst speciālistu fabrikās un darbnīcās,<br />
kam par iemeslu ir diezgan tālu progresējusī klusā mobilizācija. Par rumāņu karaspēku neesmu<br />
dzirdējis diezin cik glaimojošas atsauksmes, bet šīs atsauksmes esmu dzirdējis lielu tiesu no<br />
ārzemniekiem, kuri nav visai objektīvi savos spriedumos. Bukareste ir pilna vāciešiem un tā pati<br />
parādība, ko pieminēju kādā agrākā ziņojumā, t. i., ka Bukarestē kafejnīcās un restorānos, pēc<br />
tautībām spriežot, apgrozās 3 vienlīdzīgas daļas: 1/3 rumāņu, 1/3 poļu un 1/3 vāciešu. [..].<br />
Rumānijas noteicošo aprindu ieskati vēl vairāk novirzās uz to, ka pašreizējais Eiropas karš<br />
katrā ziņā izšķirsies par labu Antantei, jo apstākļi Vācijā kļuvuši kliedzoši grūti. Ja Vācija spertu<br />
izmisuma soli un iebruktu Holandē un Beļģijā, šeit domā, ka tam sekotu atklāta kara<br />
pieteikšana Vācijai arī no Ziemeļamerikas Savienoto Valstu puses. Tādā gadījumā par iznākumu<br />
nevarot būt šaubu.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 9.–11. lp.<br />
168. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 15 th January 1940<br />
In Bucharest and in <strong>the</strong> Balkans in general <strong>the</strong> political activity has been very high during<br />
<strong>the</strong> holidays and right after <strong>the</strong> New Year and still continues. Romania has tried to identify <strong>the</strong><br />
possibilities opened by its present position and its prospects for <strong>the</strong> nearest future. During <strong>the</strong><br />
holidays <strong>the</strong> King, in whose hands all power is concentrated, made 3 symbolic trips to sensitive<br />
spots of Romania: to Transylvania (<strong>the</strong> Hungarian border), Constanța (Dobruja of Bulgaria) and<br />
Chișinău (Bessarabia) [..]<br />
It is strange that even here, in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Europe, all eyes and hopes are turned on Finland. “If<br />
only those Finns could hold on for some 3 months, nobody could do us any harm”, this is, for<br />
example, what a very high-ranking official at <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me<br />
today. In general, <strong>the</strong> conclusion should be drawn that <strong>the</strong> difficulties, which <strong>the</strong> Russians are<br />
facing in trying to cope with <strong>the</strong> Finns, and <strong>the</strong>ir inability to do it quickly have largely boosted<br />
courage and self-confidence here. Romania considers that under <strong>the</strong> existing circumstances it is<br />
in a very good international situation. Lately <strong>the</strong> Russians have been forced to withdraw <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
1<br />
Boriss III (1894–1943), Bulgārijas cars 1918.–1943. g.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 399<br />
troops from Polish Galicia, where after <strong>the</strong> easy Polish campaign ra<strong>the</strong>r considerable Russian<br />
“elite” forces had been concentrated. Now <strong>the</strong>y are said to have moved to <strong>the</strong> north [..] Lately<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanians have found a possibility to talk to <strong>the</strong> Bulgarians in a slightly friendlier manner<br />
[..] The ruling circles of Bulgaria, observing <strong>the</strong> excessive Russian interest in <strong>the</strong>ir ports and<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir aspiration to establish a whole network of agencies in <strong>the</strong>ir land under <strong>the</strong> cover of<br />
commercial agents, are said to have realized that flirting with <strong>the</strong> Russians bid nothing good<br />
and it has triggered <strong>the</strong>ir inclination to come to an agreement with <strong>the</strong>ir neighbours, <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians in <strong>the</strong> first instance. King Boris 1 is reported to have said to an envoy of a neutral<br />
state that it would by no means be from <strong>the</strong> Russian hands that <strong>the</strong> Bulgarians would receive<br />
Dobruja because that would be only temporarily and <strong>the</strong>y [<strong>the</strong> Russians] would take it back<br />
again at <strong>the</strong> first opportunity. [..].<br />
There is no end to rumours in this city. It is probably also due to <strong>the</strong> character of this people<br />
who like frequenting cafes and restaurants and when people are ga<strong>the</strong>red in a large crowd, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
have to talk about something. In terms of domestic policy it has as if become quieter, although<br />
<strong>the</strong> Front of <strong>the</strong> National Revival does not have very much success in establishing national<br />
unity. The mass is indifferent, in countryside it is poor and not caring about anything that<br />
happens outside <strong>the</strong>ir village, but in cities <strong>the</strong> proletariat is fighting with <strong>the</strong> fast growing cost<br />
of living; <strong>the</strong> business world is immersed up to <strong>the</strong>ir ears in profiteering and aristocracy and<br />
intellectuals do not much lag behind. But I still must assert that Romania is a rich country.<br />
Shops are still full of goods and even foreign luxury items are not lacking, not to mention food,<br />
of which <strong>the</strong>re is plenty. Even during <strong>the</strong> spell of bitter frost, which has lasted here for a couple<br />
of weeks already, <strong>the</strong> transportation and provision of supplies function quite well. There is a<br />
lack of specialists in factories and workshops, which is due to <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r far advanced silent<br />
mobilisation. About <strong>the</strong> Romanian troops I have heard not very flattering comments, but those<br />
comments largely came from foreigners who are not quite impartial in <strong>the</strong>ir judgement.<br />
Bucharest is full of Germans and <strong>the</strong> same phenomenon that I mentioned in an earlier report<br />
still persists, i.e. in cafes and restaurants in Bucharest, <strong>the</strong> customers come from 3 equally large<br />
groups in terms of <strong>the</strong>ir nationality: 1/3 are Romanians, 1/3 – Poles and 1/3 – Germans [..]<br />
Romania’s dominating circles are even more inclined to think that <strong>the</strong> ongoing war in<br />
Europe will definitely end in favour of <strong>the</strong> Entente because <strong>the</strong> conditions in Germany have<br />
become cryingly difficult. They here think that if Germany made a desperate step of invading<br />
Holland and Belgium, a declaration of an open war to Germany would follow also from <strong>the</strong> part<br />
of <strong>the</strong> United States of North America. In that case <strong>the</strong> outcome would leave no doubt.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 9–11.<br />
169. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 18. janvāra slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Laikam gan pastāvošās nervozitātes dēļ rietumu un ziemeļu apgabalos, arī manā rajonā ir<br />
vērojama pēdējās dienās stipra „šiverēšanās”. Ministru prezidents kopš pagājušas piektdienas<br />
notur sēdes katru dienu. Ko tur īsti spriež, nevar uz reizi uzminēt, bet kaut kas nelabs ir gaisā.<br />
Viena daļa ļaužu ir gaisā [pārliecībā], ka grāfa Čāki 2 un Čano apspriežu rezultātā nekas labs<br />
neesot gaidāms priekš rumāņiem. No otra puses atkal dzirdu gluži pretējo, t. i. ka itāļi gribot<br />
1<br />
Boris III (1894–1943), Tsar of Bulgaria 1918–1943.<br />
2<br />
Ištvāns Čāki (Csáky; 1894–1941), Ungārijas valstsvīrs. 1938.–1941. g. ārlietu ministrs.
400 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
būt pa draugam kā ar ungāriem, tā arī rumāņiem. Rumāņu un itāļu starpā pašreiz norit<br />
intensīvas apspriedes par saimnieciskiem darījumiem. Tā kā no vāciešiem pat preces vairs<br />
nevarot dabūt pretim un klīringa saldo skaitoties rumāņiem par labu kādi 4,5–5 miljardi leju,<br />
tad rumāņi, nolens – volens, būšot [spiesti] stopēt eksportu uz Vāciju un labāk pārdošot savas<br />
visur meklētās mantas uz Itāliju, iegūstot līdz ar to arī itāļu politiskās simpātijas, kuras šinī<br />
rajonā, plašākā apmērā ņemot, tiek diskontētas ļoti augstu. Pa starpām iet militārā gatavošanās<br />
uz priekšu un, ja ticēt optimistiskiem rumāņu militāro aprindu nostāstiem, tad robežu<br />
nostiprinājumi esot pēdējā laikā labi veikti. Esot pat izmēģināts stiprums ar artilēriju. Pilsētā ir<br />
jūtama pastiprināta mobilizācija, jo arvien vairāk trūkst veikalos un darbnīcās iestrādājušos<br />
spēku, kas paņemti armijā. Arī automobiļu rekvizīcijas turpinās.<br />
Šejienes poļu bēgļi meklē [iespējas] pa visādiem ceļiem tikt no Rumānijas ārā. Kāds<br />
Dienvidamerikas [valsts] sūtnis man stāsta, ka viņu apgrūtinot simtiem poļu dēļ vīzām. Stāsta<br />
arī par kādu gadījumu, kur kāds bij. poļu armijas virsnieks uzrādījis 15.000 angļu mārciņas un<br />
lūdzis atļauju braukt uz Dienvidameriku, kur nodarbošoties ar rūpniecību. Arī citi poļi bijuši pie<br />
viņa un uzrādījuši lielākas naudas summas. Tīrā mistērija, kur šiem ļaudīm nauda gadījusies.<br />
Trūcīgie dzīvo nometnēs puslīdz brīvi un saņem 100 lejas dienā no rumāņu valdības. Rumāņi<br />
savukārt dabūjot vienu daļu no amerikāņu palīdzības organizācijām, bet lielāko tiesu paredzot<br />
segt no summām, kas ir rumāņu rīcībā un, kas agrāk piederēja Polijai, vai uz kurām Polijai būtu<br />
bijušas pamatotas pretenzijas, kā, par piemēru, klīringa saldo 1 par poļu piegādātām precēm un<br />
bruņošanās piederumiem vēl pirms kara sākuma. Lielas summas iztaisot arī tie bruņošanās<br />
piederumi, lidmašīnas (apm. 300), automobiļi (ap 10.000), kas te ieplūda pie lielās bēgšanas<br />
pag[ājušā] g[ada] septembrī.<br />
Par poļu lietām Rumānijā sniegšu Jums atsevišķu ziņojumu, kad šo matēriju būšu<br />
pamatīgāki apstrādājis un dažādas baumas vispusīgāki pārbaudījis.<br />
Izrādās, nav taisnība manos agrākos pāris ziņojumos pieminētā versija par Beka slimību. Par<br />
dzeršanu gan apstiprinās. Pašlaik Beks ar ģimeni ir Brašovā glaunākā šīs pilsētas viesnīcā. Tur<br />
tiekot rīkotas īsti „poliskas” balles un uzdzīvošana notiekot pēc zināmā stāsta „Pir vo vremja<br />
čumi”. 2 Beka ģimene lamājot rumāņus tā, kā visa zāle skan. Arī īsti poliski.<br />
Satiku nesen bij. rumāņu sūtni Rīgā Stoiku. Viņš tagad, kā zināms, ir vēstnieks Ankārā.<br />
Nedabūjām neko lielu runāt, jo Stoika bija stipri nevaļīgs, bet solīja pie nākošā apmeklējuma<br />
Bukarestē ar mani sīkāki aprunāties. Teica, ka Ankārā attiecībā uz Dienvideiropas lietām<br />
satekot visi diegi kopā. Ļoti nervoza esot viņa rezidence (Ankāra), un tanī rajonā daudz kas<br />
gatavojoties.<br />
Fon Pāpens 3 tur savu lomu izspēlējis un zaudējis. Atzīmējams, ka Pāpens bez kautrēšanās un<br />
ženierēšanās 4 lamā krievus – lieliniekus. Par Hitleru runājot tikai kā par „Herr Hitler”, 5<br />
izvairoties no vārda „Führer”. 6 Pāpena darba istabā un salonos neesot redzamas Hitlera<br />
1<br />
Klīringa saldo – bezskaidras naudas norēķinu negatīvā starpība.<br />
2<br />
Sakāmvārda versija krievu valodā: Dzīres mēra laikā.<br />
3<br />
Francs fon Pāpens (von Papen; 1879–1969), Vācijas valstsvīrs, diplomāts. 1932. g. kanclers, 1933.–1934. g.<br />
vicekanclers, 1934.–1938.g. vēstnieks Austrijā, 1938.–1944. g. Turcijā.<br />
4<br />
Ženierēties (žarg.) – kaunēties, izvairīties no atbildes (franču val. gêne – arī kautrība, neērtums).<br />
5<br />
Herr Hitler (vācu val.) – Hitlera kungs.<br />
6<br />
Führer (vācu val.) – fīrers, vadonis.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 401<br />
fotogrāfijas, bet toties vairākas Hindenburga 1 un Gēringa. (Pēdējo versiju man stāstīja kāds<br />
šejienes kolēģis, kas nesen bija Ankārā, ne Stoika).<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 24.–25. lp.<br />
169. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 18 th January 1940<br />
It is most likely due to <strong>the</strong> existing nervousness in <strong>the</strong> western and nor<strong>the</strong>rn regions that in<br />
my region, too, lively “movement” is to be observed in <strong>the</strong> last few days. Since last Friday <strong>the</strong><br />
Prime Minister has held meetings every day. What <strong>the</strong>y really discuss <strong>the</strong>re cannot be guessed<br />
easily but <strong>the</strong>re is something bad in <strong>the</strong> air. Some think that <strong>the</strong> result of meetings between<br />
Count Csáky 2 and Ciano bid nothing good for <strong>the</strong> Romanians. From some o<strong>the</strong>rs I hear<br />
completely contrary views, i.e. that <strong>the</strong> Italians want to be friends of both <strong>the</strong> Hungarians and<br />
Romanians. Intense discussions on economic deals are now taking place between <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians and Italians. Since from <strong>the</strong> Germans even goods can no longer be received in<br />
return and <strong>the</strong> clearing-saldo constituted some 4.5–5 billion lei in favour of <strong>the</strong> Romanians, <strong>the</strong><br />
latter will nolens volens stop exports to Germany and would ra<strong>the</strong>r sell <strong>the</strong>ir goods, which are<br />
demanded everywhere, to Italy, <strong>the</strong>reby acquiring also <strong>the</strong> Italians’ political sympathies, which<br />
are valued very high in <strong>the</strong> entire region. In <strong>the</strong> meantime <strong>the</strong> military preparations advance<br />
and if optimistic stories spread by <strong>the</strong> Romanian military circles can be believed, <strong>the</strong><br />
fortification of <strong>the</strong> borders has been carried out well lately. They say that <strong>the</strong>ir strength has<br />
even been tested with artillery. Increased mobilisation can be felt in <strong>the</strong> city, as shops and<br />
workshops face an increasing shortage of experienced labour, which has been recruited into <strong>the</strong><br />
army. The requisition of cars also continues.<br />
The local Polish refugees look for different ways to get out of Romania. The Envoy of a<br />
South American state told me that he was being bo<strong>the</strong>red by hundreds of Poles requesting<br />
visas. He also mentioned an occasion when a former officer of <strong>the</strong> Polish Army had shown him<br />
15 000 English pounds and asked for a permit to go to South America where he would engage in<br />
manufacturing. O<strong>the</strong>r Poles have also visited him and presented large amounts of money. It is<br />
pure mystery where <strong>the</strong>se people have got <strong>the</strong> money from. The poor live in camps with more<br />
or less free regime and receive 100 lei per day from <strong>the</strong> Romanian government. The Romanians<br />
in <strong>the</strong>ir turn get a part [of that money] from American aid organisations but <strong>the</strong> largest part of<br />
<strong>the</strong> expenses is to be covered from <strong>the</strong> money that earlier belonged to Poland and now is at <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians’ disposal or from <strong>the</strong> money that Poland would have had a substantiated claim for,<br />
such as <strong>the</strong> clearing-saldo for <strong>the</strong> goods and military items that Poland had supplied before <strong>the</strong><br />
war. Large amounts of money are also said to be coming from <strong>the</strong> military items, aircraft<br />
(approx. 300), cars (approx. 10 000) that had flowed into this country during <strong>the</strong> great flight in<br />
September, last year.<br />
About <strong>the</strong> Polish issue in Romania I will give you a separate report when I will have<br />
processed this matter more thoroughly and more comprehensively checked various rumours.<br />
It turns out that information about Beck’s illness that I mentioned in a couple of my earlier<br />
reports is not true. That about drinking is confirmed however. At present Beck with his family is<br />
1<br />
Pauls fon Hindenburgs (von Hindenburg; 1847–1934), Vācijas ģenerālfeldmaršals, valstsvīrs. 1916.–1918.g.<br />
Ģenerālštāba priekšnieks, 1925.–1934. g. Valsts prezidents.<br />
2<br />
István Csáky (1894–1941), Hungarian statesman. 1938 –1941 Minister of Foreign Affairs.
402 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
staying in Braşov, at <strong>the</strong> most luxurious hotel of <strong>the</strong> town. They say that <strong>the</strong>re truly “Polish”<br />
parties are held and revelling takes place like in <strong>the</strong> familiar story „Pir vo vremja chumi” 1 . Beck’s<br />
family is reported to be abusing <strong>the</strong> Romanians so that <strong>the</strong> entire hall can hear. That, too, is<br />
typically Polish.<br />
Recently I met former Romanian Envoy in Riga Stoica. Now, as we know, he is Ambassador<br />
in Ankara. We did not have <strong>the</strong> chance to talk much because Stoica was very busy, but he<br />
promised to have a more detailed discussion with me during his next trip to Bucharest. He said<br />
that Ankara was <strong>the</strong> place where all strands that concern <strong>the</strong> matters of Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe meet.<br />
[He remarked also that] <strong>the</strong> place of his residence (Ankara) was very nervous and much was<br />
about to happen in that region.<br />
Von Papen 2 has played his role <strong>the</strong>re to <strong>the</strong> end and lost. It deserves to be mentioned that<br />
Papen without uneasiness and sense of awkwardness 3 abuses <strong>the</strong> Russians – <strong>the</strong> Bolsheviks. He<br />
mentions Hitler only as „Herr Hitler” 4 , avoiding <strong>the</strong> word „Führer” 5 . They say that in Papen’s<br />
office and lounges Hitler’s portraits are nowhere to be seen but that <strong>the</strong>re are several<br />
Hindenburg‘s 6 and Gӧring’s photos <strong>the</strong>re instead. (I heard <strong>the</strong> latter version from a local<br />
colleague, o<strong>the</strong>r than Stoica, who was in Ankara recently).<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 24–25.<br />
170. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. g. 29. janv. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Ap Rumānijas petrolejas avotiem un piegādēm sāk briest nopietni strīdi. Pēdējā laikā vācieši<br />
nopirkuši 2 maznozīmīgas rumāņu petrolejas izmantošanas sabiedrības. Sakarā ar salu un<br />
Donavas aizsalšanu transporti uz Vāciju stipri samazinājušies. Arī dzelzceļu satiksmē ir stipri<br />
traucējumi. [..].<br />
Lai daudz maz ieviestu kārtību Rumānijas haotiskajā naftas saimniecībā, ir nodibināts<br />
petrolejas komisārs jeb petrolejas diktators, kā viņu te populārā valodā sauc. [..].<br />
Pēc šejienes baumām esot gaidāma ministru prezidenta G. Tataresku demisija, lai viņa vietā<br />
liktu populārāku personu A.Vaida-Voevodu (Nacionālās Atdzimšanas frontes prezidentu [..].<br />
Vaida-Voevods esot ģermanofils un būšot vāciešiem vairāk līferēt 7 mantas, neskatoties uz<br />
franču un angļu sašutumu [..].<br />
Blakus šīm tendencēm ir vērojama arī stipra angļu aktivitāte. Caur šejienes angļu<br />
tirdzniecības padomnieka rokām jāiet visiem rumāņu jūras transportiem un bez šī kunga (A. A.<br />
David) vīzas neviena rumāņu prece pa jūras ceļu pie Dardaneļiem ārā netiek. Vācieši ļoti<br />
sašutuši, ka arī viņu tranzītdarījumi tiek no šī Mr. [Mistera] Deivida revidēti un netiek<br />
Dardaneļiem cauri [..]. Rumāņi ir savā ziņā lielās spīlēs, jo ieturēt patiesu neitralitāti ir ļoti grūta<br />
lieta. Nosveroties uz vienu vai otru pusi, draud represijas no pretējās puses. Noskaņas šeit ir<br />
1<br />
Saying “Feast in time of plague” in Russian.<br />
2<br />
Franz von Papen (1879–1969), German statesman, diplomat. 1932 Chancellor, 1933–1934 Vice Chancellor, 1934 –<br />
1938 Ambassador to Austria, 1938 –1944 Ambassador to Turkey.<br />
3<br />
Here <strong>the</strong> author has used a dated slang Latvian word that means „to be shy, to avoid and answer” and comes<br />
from <strong>the</strong> French „gêne”.<br />
4<br />
Herr Hitler (German) – Mr. Hitler.<br />
5<br />
Führer (German) – <strong>the</strong> leader.<br />
6<br />
Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934), General Fieldmarschal of Germany, statesman. 1916 –1918 Chief of <strong>the</strong> General<br />
Staff, 1925–1934 President of Germany.<br />
7<br />
Liefern (vācu val.) – piegādāt, nodot, pārdot.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 403<br />
stipri labvēlīgas Antantei, bet netrūkst arī vācu draugu. Nav jāaizmirst, ka karalis ir<br />
Hoencollernu 1 ģimenes loceklis. Tomēr viņš cenšas būt neitrāls, jo būtu nepareizi viņam<br />
pierakstīt kaut kādas simpātijas “naci” režīmam. Viņš mēģina balansēt un valdīt tik labi, cik nu<br />
tas viņam iespējams pie diezgan sajukušiem apstākļiem un koruptīviem ļaudīm.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 28. lp.<br />
170. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 29 th January 1940<br />
Serious discords are beginning to swell around Romania’s kerosene sources and supplies.<br />
The Germans recently bought 2 minor Romanian kerosene processing companies. Due to <strong>the</strong><br />
bitter frost and <strong>the</strong> freezing over of <strong>the</strong> Danube shipments to Germany have considerably<br />
decreased. Railway traffic is also seriously disrupted [..] To set Romania’s chaotic oil industry<br />
more or less in order <strong>the</strong> position of a Kerosene Commissar or kerosene dictator, as he is called<br />
here in <strong>the</strong> popular language, has been established [..]<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> local rumours Prime Minister G. Tătărescu’s resignation is to be expected<br />
for him to be replaced by more popular person – A. Vaida-Voevod (President of <strong>the</strong> Front of <strong>the</strong><br />
National Revival) [..] Vaida-Voevod is described as a Germanophile and <strong>the</strong>y say that he will<br />
liefer 2 more commodities to <strong>the</strong> Germans in spite of <strong>the</strong> indignation from <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> French<br />
and English [..]<br />
Along with <strong>the</strong>se trends serious activity from <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> English is to be observed. All<br />
Romanian maritime transportation [shipments] has to go through <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> English<br />
trade councillor in this country and without this gentlemen’s (A. A. David’s) approval no<br />
Romanian commodity can get out along <strong>the</strong> maritime road through <strong>the</strong> Dardanelles [..] The<br />
Germans are very indignant about <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>ir transit deals, too, are inspected by this Mr.<br />
David and cannot get out through <strong>the</strong> Dardanelles [..] In a sense <strong>the</strong> Romanians are in a tight<br />
corner, because keeping real neutrality is a very difficult matter. Inclination towards one side<br />
threatens with repressions from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side. The mood here is very much in favour of <strong>the</strong><br />
Entente, however <strong>the</strong> Germans do not lack friends ei<strong>the</strong>r. One should not forget that <strong>the</strong> King is<br />
a member of <strong>the</strong> Hohenzollern 3 family. However, he tries to remain neutral because it would be<br />
wrong to ascribe to him any affinity for <strong>the</strong> “Nazi” regime. He tries to balance and to rule as well<br />
as it is possible in <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r chaotic circumstances and with ra<strong>the</strong>r corrupt persons.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 28.<br />
171. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 31. janvāra slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
A. Ārpolitikas lietas. Rumāņu manevrēšana un pūles ieturēt neitrālu līniju atduras arvien<br />
vairāk uz lielākām grūtībām. Pašreiz ir tāda fāze, ka Antantes valstis kurn un pa klusam draud.<br />
Iemesls: rumāņu piekāpības parādīšana iepretim vācu prasībām. Visa nelaime – nafta. Angļu –<br />
franču – amerikāņu kapitāla kontrolētās naftas sabiedrības naftu vāciešiem nepārdod. Vācieši<br />
spiež rumāņu valdību, ka tā nu neesot nekāda neitralitāte. Tāpēc tika iecelts petrolejas diktators<br />
1<br />
Hoencollerni (Hohenzollern) – Brandenburgas kūrfirstu (1415–1701), Prūsijas karaļu (1701–1918), Vācijas<br />
imperatoru (1871–1918) dinastija.<br />
2<br />
Liefern (German) – supply.<br />
3<br />
Hohenzollerns – a dynasty of Margraves of Brandenburg (1415–1701), King of Prussia (1701–1918) and German<br />
Emperors (1871–1918).
404 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
[komisārs]. Tam nu būšot jāpiespiež nepaklausīgās sabiedrības pārdot naftu arī vāciešiem.<br />
Rumāņi saka, ka eksporta politiku noteiks valdība, ne petrolejas komisārs. Saimniecības<br />
ministrs, nespēdams atkauties no spiedējiem un pretspiedējiem, atlicis visas audiences līdz 10.<br />
februārim. Pilsēta pilna vispretrunīgāko baumu. Runā ļoti daudz par vāciešu ierašanos bij. poļu<br />
Galīcijā (ap Ļvovu). Vācieši atsauc [šīs runas]. Lai tiktu pie Rumānijas petrolejas avotiem,<br />
jāokupē tikpat kā visa Rumānija. Galvenais petrolejas centrs Ploešti ir tikai 60 km no<br />
Bukarestes. Iekšējās un ārējās propagandas ziņā notiek liela sacensība starp vācu sūtniecību un<br />
tās iestādēm no vienas puses, un angļu – franču no otras puses. Noskaņas sabiedrībā vairāk<br />
Antantes pusē, bet netrūkst arī vācu draugu, sevišķi saimnieciskās lietās.<br />
Ar Balkānu konsolidēšanu neiet lāgā uz priekšu. Itāļu mēģinājums samierināt kaut<br />
pagaidām rumāņus ar ungāriem nav veicies. Ungāri lieto diezgan asu valodu pret rumāņiem.<br />
Rumāņi negrib nekādus solījumus dot attiecībā uz teritoriālām revīzijām. Bez tam atkal ungārus<br />
un bulgārus dabūt kopējā koncertā neizdosies. Parīt (2. februārī) sanāks Balkānu konference.<br />
Visi saka, ka sensāciju tur nebūšot. Turki izmēģināšot roku, vai šīs konferences laikā nevarēs<br />
rumāņus apstrādāt un piedabūt uz konsiliantāku 1 politiku. Ar Vāciju nonākt atklātā konfliktā<br />
neviens nevēlas, bet šaubas valda, vai ilgāk par pavasari izdosies šī balansēšana un manevrēšana<br />
starp diviem naidīgiem lēģeriem. Privātie ļaudis šogad labprāt vēlētos garāku ziemu, jo<br />
pavasaris nesola neko labu.<br />
Rumāņu dūša brīžiem ir ļoti laba un liela, bet mums, neitrāliem novērotājiem jāsaka, ka<br />
katrs lielāks atklāts konflikts beigtos šeit ar ātru katastrofu. Šeit nav Somija, nedz topogrāfiski,<br />
nedz organizatoriski, nedz arī pēc tautas rakstura. Zemnieku un strādnieku materiāls tomēr ļoti<br />
labs un, ja būtu arī laba vadība, šī zeme būtu spējīga lieliem spēkiem pretestību radīt.<br />
B. Iekšpolitikas lietas. Nemitās baumas par valdības pārkārtošanu. Nākošais cilvēks esot<br />
Aleksandru Vaida Voevods – Nacionālās Atdzimšanas Frontes 2 prezidents. Šis kungs esot vairāk<br />
vācu draugs. Opozīcija ar bij. zemnieku līderi Maniu turas nomaļus un, neskatoties uz<br />
vilinošiem aicinājumiem no F. R. N. organizatoru puses, šajā pārorganizētā vienīgi legālā<br />
politiskā organizācijā iekšā neiet. Negribot kļūt par „numuru” F. R. N. vadoņu rokās, negribot<br />
politiskā un sabiedriskā dzīvē kazarmas režīmu, negribot ar saviem vārdiem segt visu to, kas<br />
pēdējos pāris gados Rumānijā izdarīts. Tā man vēl vakar teica viens ļoti stiprs un ievērojams<br />
kungs no Maniu draugiem. Pats Maniu atrodas zem policijas uzraudzības, lai gan kustības<br />
brīvība viņam nav ierobežota. Jaunā politiskā organizācija (F. R. N.) ķēmojas pakaļ fašistiem un<br />
nacionālsociālistiem ar formām, fašistiskiem sveicieniem etc. Liekas, šejienes zemnieku tautā<br />
un žīdiskā veikalnieku pasaulē šīs lietas nevelk. Te, pēc maniem ieskatiem, politiskās<br />
organizācijas ēka sākta būvēt no jumta un štukatūras, nerūpējoties par pamatiem, sienām un<br />
sijām.<br />
Bet pašreiz visa noteikšana Rumānijā ir šīs organizācijas un karaļa rokās. Karalis parāda<br />
diezgan uzkrītoši savu varu un ļoti maz rēķinas ar saviem padomdevējiem. Varbūt, kad atkal<br />
laidīs pie vārda mēreno opozīciju ( bij. zemnieku vadoņus). „Dzelzs vilka” 3 ļaudis palikuši klusi.<br />
No tiem tos mērenākos F. R. N. organizācijai esot izdevies dabūt savā pusē. Tas varbūt drusku<br />
iespaidos arī politisko virzienu ārējās lietās un vācu sūtņa Dr. Fabriciusa nemitīgās pūles un<br />
aktivitāte var kļūt auglīgāka.<br />
1<br />
Domāts – samiernieciskāku (angļu val. conciliation – samierināšana).<br />
2<br />
F. R. N. – Frontul Renașterii Naţionale (rumāņu val.) – Nacionālās Atdzimšanas fronte.<br />
3<br />
Domāta Dzelzs gvarde.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 405<br />
Visu kopumā ņemot, varu ziņot, ka šinī rajonā tuvākās nedēļās briest jauni un smagi<br />
notikumi, kuriem nebūs maza loma Eiropas konflikta tālākā norisē.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 35.–36. lp.<br />
171. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 31 st January 1940<br />
A. Foreign policy matters. The Romanians’ manoeuvring and efforts to keep a neutral line<br />
stumble across increasing difficulties. In <strong>the</strong> current phase <strong>the</strong> Entente countries grumble and<br />
silently threaten. The reason: <strong>the</strong> Romanian concession to German demands. The root of all evil<br />
– oil. Oil companies controlled by <strong>the</strong> English–French–American capital do not sell oil to<br />
Germans. The Germans pressurize <strong>the</strong> Romanian government saying that it is no neutrality at<br />
all. For that reason <strong>the</strong> kerosene dictator was appointed. He is supposed to force <strong>the</strong><br />
disobedient companies to sell oil to <strong>the</strong> Germans, too. The Romanians say that <strong>the</strong> export policy<br />
will be dictated by <strong>the</strong> government ra<strong>the</strong>r than by <strong>the</strong> kerosene commissioner. The Minister of<br />
Economy, unable to ward off those who exert pressure and those who exert counter-pressure,<br />
has cancelled all audiences until 10 th February. The city is full of most contradictory rumours.<br />
Very much is talked about <strong>the</strong> arrival of <strong>the</strong> Germans in former Polish Galicia (around Lviv).<br />
The Germans deny [such intention]. In order to get access to Romania’s kerosene sources, one<br />
must occupy almost all of Romania. The main kerosene centre Ploiești is only 60 km away from<br />
Bucharest. In <strong>the</strong> field of internal and external propaganda a stiff competition is taking place<br />
between <strong>the</strong> German Legation and its institutions on one had and <strong>the</strong> English–French ones on<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. The public mood inclines more in favour of <strong>the</strong> Entente but <strong>the</strong> Germans also do not<br />
lack friends, especially in economic matters.<br />
The consolidation of <strong>the</strong> Balkans does not advance well. The Italian effort for <strong>the</strong> time being<br />
to reconcile at least <strong>the</strong> Romanians and Hungarians has failed. The Hungarians use a ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
harsh language against <strong>the</strong> Romanians. The Romanians do not want to give any promises<br />
concerning territorial revisions. Besides, it will be impossible to get <strong>the</strong> Hungarians and<br />
Bulgarians toge<strong>the</strong>r again in a joint concert. The day after tomorrow (on 2 nd February) a Balkan<br />
Conference will take place. Everybody says that no sensation is expected <strong>the</strong>re. The Turks, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
say, will try to work on <strong>the</strong> Romanians during <strong>the</strong> conference to persuade <strong>the</strong>m into a more<br />
conciliatory policy. Nobody wants to come into open conflict with Germany, but <strong>the</strong>re is doubt<br />
in <strong>the</strong> air whe<strong>the</strong>r such balancing and manoeuvring between two hostile camps will be possible<br />
beyond <strong>the</strong> coming spring. The ordinary people would prefer a longer winter this year because<br />
<strong>the</strong> spring bids nothing good.<br />
The Romanians’ courage sometimes is very good and great, but we, neutral observers, must<br />
admit that any open large-scale conflict would quickly end in a disaster here. This is not<br />
Finland, ei<strong>the</strong>r in topographic terms, or in terms of <strong>the</strong> people’s mentality. The peasants’ and<br />
workers’ stock is very good though and under a good government this country could be able to<br />
resist a great force.<br />
B. Domestic policy matters. The rumours about <strong>the</strong> reorganization of government do not<br />
cease. The next person in line is said to be Alexandru Vaida-Voevod – President of <strong>the</strong> Front of<br />
<strong>the</strong> National Revival. 1 This gentleman is reported to be friendlier to <strong>the</strong> Germans. The<br />
1<br />
F.R.N. – Frontul Renașterii Naţionale (Romanian.) – The Front of National Revival.
406 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
opposition with former Farmers’ leader Maniu 1 keeps aloof and, in spite of tempting offers from<br />
<strong>the</strong> part of F.R.N. organizers, <strong>the</strong>y do not join this over-organized sole legal political<br />
organization. They say that <strong>the</strong>y do not want to serve as a “ticket” [card] in <strong>the</strong> hands of F.R.N.<br />
leaders, that <strong>the</strong>y do not want to see <strong>the</strong> barrack-like order established in <strong>the</strong> political and<br />
social life, that <strong>the</strong>y do not want to sign under everything that has been done in Romania in <strong>the</strong><br />
couple of last years. This is what one very powerful and prominent gentleman from <strong>the</strong> circle of<br />
Maniu’s friends told me yesterday. Maniu himself is under police surveillance although his<br />
freedom of movement is not restricted. The new political organisation (F.R.N.) apes after <strong>the</strong><br />
Fascists and National Socialists with <strong>the</strong>ir uniforms, fascist salutes, etc. It seems that such<br />
things are not attractive to <strong>the</strong> peasant nation and Jewish business world of this country. Here,<br />
as I see it, <strong>the</strong>y have started to build <strong>the</strong> structure of <strong>the</strong> political organisation from <strong>the</strong> roof and<br />
plaster, without concern for <strong>the</strong> foundations, walls and beams.<br />
But at present all say in Romania is in <strong>the</strong> hands of this organization and <strong>the</strong> King. The King<br />
demonstrates his power in a ra<strong>the</strong>r striking manner and takes his advisors very little into<br />
consideration. Probably <strong>the</strong> moderate opposition (<strong>the</strong> former Farmers’ leaders) will again be<br />
admitted to power. The people of <strong>the</strong> “Iron Wolf” 2 have become very quiet. They say that F.R.N.<br />
organisation has managed to get <strong>the</strong> most moderate ones among <strong>the</strong>m on <strong>the</strong>ir side. It may also<br />
slightly influence <strong>the</strong> political orientation in <strong>the</strong> foreign affairs and <strong>the</strong> ceaseless efforts and<br />
activity of German Envoy Dr. Fabricius may become more fruitful.<br />
All in all, I can report that new and complicated developments are about to happen in this<br />
region in <strong>the</strong> coming weeks, developments that will play not a small role in <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r course<br />
of <strong>the</strong> European conflict.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 35–36.<br />
172. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 13. febr. slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Pasaules prese ir diezgan daudz tintes patērējusi par Balkānu valstu neseno konferenci.<br />
Fantāzija dažiem žurnālistiem diezgan bagāta. Arī mūsu laikraksti ir veltījuši šim jautājumam<br />
vairāk uzmanības, nekā tas pēc maniem ieskatiem ir vērts bijis. Kā es jau iepriekšējos ziņojumos<br />
rakstīju, Balkānu valstu konferencē nav nedz sensacionālu runu, nedz sensacionālu lēmumu. Es<br />
pieņemu, ka konferences komunikē Jums ir zināms no preses telegrammām un tāpēc sniegšu<br />
Jums tikai īsu raksturojumu pie šī komunikē 7 punktiem:<br />
1. Visu četru Balkānu valstu (Balkānu Antantē ietilpstošu) kopēja interese miera, kārtības<br />
un drošības uzturēšanā dienvidaustrumu Eiropā.<br />
Šī interese ir acīmredzama un te nav ko piebilst. Pretēja interese varētu būt tikai pie tiem<br />
valstu un varu nogrupējumiem, kam Balkānu tautu mierīgais darbs būtu traucēklis viņu plānu<br />
sasniegšanā.<br />
2. Balkānu valstu noteiktais lēmums ieturēt miermīlīgu politiku attiecībā uz pašreizējo<br />
konfliktu, lai pasargātu šo Eiropas apgabalu no kara grūtībām.<br />
1<br />
Iuliu Maniu (1873-1953) was one of <strong>the</strong> most widely respected Romanian political leaders. He played a key role in<br />
<strong>the</strong> unification of Transylvania with Romania, was President of <strong>the</strong> National Romanian and <strong>the</strong>n National Farmers<br />
(or Peasants) Party. President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1928-1930, 1932-1933).<br />
2<br />
The Iron Guard is meant here.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 407<br />
Drusku savādi skan šis punkts. Turcija ir Anglijas un Francijas sabiedrotā. Kā nu viņa varēs<br />
mierīgi noskatīties, ja angļi un franči zaudēs vienu pozīciju pēc otras šinī pat Balkānu frontē?<br />
Turcija pati var nonākt grūtībās. Savāds arī Rumānijas un Grieķijas stāvoklis. Abām šīm valstīm<br />
ir angļu un franču garantijas kabatā, bet abas šīs valstis par šīm garantijām nemīl runāt, sevišķi,<br />
ja runātāju sabiedrībā ir kāds no vācu lēģera [..]. Šejienes itāļu sūtnis ļoti simpātiska persona<br />
(Pellegrino Ghigi) un man vienā otrā jautājumā bijis izpalīdzīgs pie šejienes komplicēto<br />
“mezglu” atšķetināšanas.<br />
3. Balkānu Antantes valstu vēlēšanās palikt vienotām šajā organizācijā, kura nav vērsta ne<br />
pret vienu, bet kalpo tikai Balkānu valstu mērķiem (… qui ne poursuit que ses propres fins 1 ) un<br />
kopēji raudzīties, lai katras atsevišķas Balkānu Antantes valsts tiesības attiecībā uz neatkarību<br />
un nacionālo teritoriju tiktu respektētas.<br />
Tas ir ievērojams rumāņu panākums. Pirms konferences un konferences laikā netrūka<br />
baumu, ka Itālija un viņas uzdevumā Jugoslāvija centīsies panākt rumāņu piekāpību attiecībā uz<br />
simbolisku teritoriālu rektifikāciju 2 ungāriem un bulgāriem par labu, vai vismaz netiešu rumāņu<br />
piekrišanu runāt par šīm lietām pēc kara beigām. Rumāņu prese sevišķi pastrīpoja, ka Balkānu<br />
konference teritoriālās integritātes uzturēšanu atzinusi par sevišķi svarīgu. Šajā jautājumā<br />
rumāņi ar mieru atsaukties arī uz angļu un franču garantijām. Bija arī dzirdams, ka rumāņi ar<br />
mieru sabiedroties pat ar Vāciju, lai nodrošinātos pret ungāru un bulgāru revīzijas prasībām.<br />
(Šāda versija tomēr neapstiprinās un neatbilst šejienes noskaņām) [..].<br />
Vispārējās piezīmēs es varu pateikt īsi:<br />
Balkānu Antantes valstis, sevišķi Rumānija, par konferences rezultātiem ļoti apmierinātas.<br />
Teritoriālā neaizskaramība ir pagaidām nodrošināta. Bukarestē neapšaubāmi jūtams vispārēja<br />
saspīlējuma atslābums. Solidaritāte Balkānu valstu starpā ir demonstrēta. Nedz vācu, nedz<br />
franču–angļu intrigas nav neko taustāmu panākušas. Itālija arī rāda draudzīgu un apmierinātu<br />
izturēšanos. Ungāri “saskābuši”, lai gan būtu jocīgi kaut ko priekš viņiem no šiem status quo<br />
aizstāvētājiem cerēt. Saimnieciskā aktivitāte Balkānu valstu savstarpējās attiecībās redzamā<br />
kārtā pieaugusi. Rezultāti vēl miglā tīti.<br />
Spiediens no vācu puses pie rumāņiem pēdējās nedēļās ir smagi izjusts. Kungam Gafenku<br />
bijis, par piem[ēru], vēl īsi pirms Balkānu konferences vācu sūtnis jāpieņem pulkst. 1 naktī. Vācu<br />
sūtnis pats šo notikumu man atstāstīja, ka tomēr neērti esot traucēt augstus kungus nakts vidū<br />
un konferēt ar partneri pidžamas tērpā. Uz manu jautājumu vācu sūtnim, kā viņš šejienes<br />
stāvokli novērtē, atbilde pavisam skaidra un nepārprotama: Kamēr rumāņi “līferēs” mums<br />
benzīnu, kviešus, kukurūzu, kokus, celulozi un dažas nepieciešamās minerālrūdas, viss būs labi.<br />
Ja nē, … tad... “hier wird es keine 18 Tage dauern!” 3 (Nepārprotams norādījums uz Polijas 18 kara<br />
dienām!!) Ko lai nabaga rumānis šādos apstākļos dara? “Exportiere oder stirb!” 4 – es teiktu.<br />
***<br />
No mazāk oficiāla vācu avota (sarunā pēc dinejas) dzirdēju zīlēšanu, cik ilgs laiks vajadzīgs<br />
turkiem un Vegāna armijai, 5 lai nonāktu rumāņu ostā Konstancā. Spriedums diezgan<br />
vienprātīgs, ka priekš tā pietiktu ar 24 stundām. Konstanca no Bukarestes ir 4 stundu braucienā<br />
automobilī. No Bukarestes līdz Ploešti (galvenie petrolejas lauki) 1 stunda (64 klm.). Ar tankiem<br />
1<br />
Qui ne poursuit que ses propres fins (franču val.) – kas tikai īsteno savus mērķus.<br />
2<br />
Rectificatio (latīņu val.) – izlabošana, iztaisnošana.<br />
3<br />
Hier wird es keine 18 Tage dauern (vācu val.) – tas būs mazāk kā 18 dienās.<br />
4<br />
Exportiere oder stirb (vācu val.) – eksportēt vai mirt.<br />
5<br />
Domāta Francijas armija.
408 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
šīs distances tik ātri nevarētu nobraukt, ar lidmašīnu atkal daudz ātrāk. Vāciešiem esot grūtāk<br />
līdz Ploešti tik ātri nokļūt. Pa Slovākiju vien nekā liela nevar iesākt. Jāmaršē būtu cauri<br />
Ungārijai. Ko krievi par to visu teiktu? Nu ar krieviem viss esot labākā kārtībā. Kamēr rumāņi<br />
būs rātni, nekas nenotiks, citādi sekos stipri līdzīga akcija kā Polijā pag. gada septembrī.<br />
Dzīvosim, redzēsim. Pagaidām rumāņi dūšīgi pūlas ar preču “līferēšanu”.<br />
***<br />
Vācu, franču un itāļu sūtniecības ārkārtīgi pastiprinātas personāla ziņā. Oficiālā<br />
diplomātiskā korpusa listē vāciešiem ir 20, angļiem 15, frančiem 12 un itāļiem 11 oficiālu locekļu<br />
sūtniecības personālā. Bez šiem oficiāliem padomniekiem, sekretāriem, atašejiem ir liels<br />
daudzums neoficiālo un konsulāra dienestā novietoto aģentu un darbinieku. Cīņa ļoti spraiga.<br />
Tikai angļi un franči arī šinī diplomātisko cīņu frontē piemēro to pašu Rietumu frontes taktiku:<br />
cīnās ar biļeteniem. Nauda gan arī šeit ne no vienas, nedz otras puses netiek žēlota. Ļauni ļaudis<br />
melš, ka ar naudu vien šeit visu ko varot panākt. Bet ja nauda cīnās ar naudu un meklē sev<br />
piemērotu novietošanos, tad parasti uzvar tā puse, kurai naudas vairāk. Zināma veiklība arī<br />
tomēr nepieciešama, un šinī ziņā vācieši pagaidām rāda acīmredzamu pārākumu.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 44.–46. lp.<br />
172. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 13 th February 1940<br />
The world press has spent ra<strong>the</strong>r much ink on <strong>the</strong> recent conference of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states.<br />
Some journalists do have a ra<strong>the</strong>r rich imagination. Our newspapers, too, have dedicated more<br />
attention to this issue than in my opinion it has been worth. As I already wrote in my reports,<br />
nei<strong>the</strong>r sensational speeches were said nor sensational decisions made in <strong>the</strong> Balkan states<br />
conference. I assume that you are familiar with <strong>the</strong> conference’s communiqué from press<br />
telegrams and thus I will give you only a brief description of <strong>the</strong> 7 paragraphs of <strong>the</strong><br />
communiqué:<br />
1. Joint interest of all four Balkan states (members of <strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente) in ensuring<br />
peace, order and security in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe.<br />
This interest is obvious and <strong>the</strong>re is nothing to add to it. Only those countries and groups of<br />
powers, for whom peaceful work of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states would be an obstacle on <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own goals, could have a contrary interest.<br />
2. The determination of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states to pursue peaceful policy with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />
ongoing conflict in order to keep this region of Europe safe from <strong>the</strong> difficulties of war.<br />
This paragraph sounds a little strange. Turkey is an ally of England and France. How would<br />
it be able to stand by quietly if <strong>the</strong> English and French lost position after position in this very<br />
Balkan front? Turkey may run into trouble itself. The situation of Romania and Greece is also<br />
strange. Both <strong>the</strong>se countries have English and French guarantees in <strong>the</strong>ir pockets, but both<br />
<strong>the</strong>se countries do not like to talk about <strong>the</strong> guarantees if <strong>the</strong>re is somebody from <strong>the</strong> German<br />
camp in <strong>the</strong> audience [..] The Italian Envoy to this country, a very attractive person (Pellegrino<br />
Ghigi), has been very helpful to me in resolving <strong>the</strong> complicated „knots“ of this place.<br />
3. The wish of <strong>the</strong> states of <strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente to remain united in this organisation,<br />
which is not targeted against anyone, but serves only <strong>the</strong> goals of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states (… qui ne
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 409<br />
poursuit que ses propres fins 1 ) and toge<strong>the</strong>r to ensure that <strong>the</strong> rights of each member of <strong>the</strong><br />
Balkan Entente to independence and national territory are respected.<br />
It is a noteworthy achievement of <strong>the</strong> Romanians. Before and during <strong>the</strong> conference <strong>the</strong>re<br />
was no lack of rumours that Italy and Yugoslavia in <strong>the</strong> former’s behalf would try to persuade<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanians into pliancy to symbolic territorial rectification in favour of <strong>the</strong> Hungarians and<br />
Bulgarians or at least to achieve indirect Romanians‘ agreement to talk about <strong>the</strong>se matters<br />
after <strong>the</strong> war. The Romanian press specially underlined that <strong>the</strong> Balkan conference had<br />
recognised <strong>the</strong> safeguarding of territorial integrity as being particularly important. With regard<br />
to this issue <strong>the</strong> Romanians are willing to refer also to <strong>the</strong> English and French guarantees. It was<br />
also heard that <strong>the</strong> Romanians were willing to join hands even with Germany only to ensure<br />
itself against <strong>the</strong> Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionist claims. (This version is however not<br />
confirmed and it does not comply with <strong>the</strong> mood in this country) [..]<br />
By way of a general comment I can briefly say <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
The states of <strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente, Romania in particular, are very satisfied with <strong>the</strong> result of<br />
<strong>the</strong> conference. Territorial immunity is secured for <strong>the</strong> time being. The relaxation of allembracing<br />
tension is clearly felt in Bucharest. Solidarity of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states has been<br />
demonstrated. Nei<strong>the</strong>r German, nor French – English plots have achieved anything tangible.<br />
Italy, too, demonstrates friendly and satisfied attitude. The Hungarians have got „sour“,<br />
although it would have been weird for <strong>the</strong>m to expect something from <strong>the</strong>se supporters of<br />
status quo. Mutual economic activity among <strong>the</strong> Balkan states has grown visibly. The result is<br />
still wrapped in mystery.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> last few weeks <strong>the</strong> Romanians have felt heavy pressure from <strong>the</strong> Germans. Shortly<br />
before <strong>the</strong> Balkan conference, for example, Mr. Gafencu had to receive <strong>the</strong> German Envoy at 1<br />
am. The German Envoy told me about this happening saying that he none<strong>the</strong>less felt<br />
embarrassed to disturb high-ranking officials in <strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong> night and that he had felt<br />
awkward talking to an interlocutor wearing pyjamas. To my question how he evaluated <strong>the</strong><br />
situation in this country <strong>the</strong> German Envoy gave a very clear and unambiguous answer: As long<br />
as <strong>the</strong> Romanians “liefer” [supply] us [Germany] with petrol, wheat, corn, timber, pulp and<br />
some required types of mineral ore, everything will be OK. If not [as soon as <strong>the</strong> supplies stop]...<br />
<strong>the</strong>n ... “hier wird es keine 18 Tage dauern!” 2 (A clear reference to <strong>the</strong> 18 days of <strong>the</strong> Polish war!!)<br />
What can <strong>the</strong> poor Romanian do in such circumstances? “Exportiere oder stirb!” 3 – I would say.<br />
***<br />
From a less official German source (in a discussion during a dinner) I heard people guessing<br />
how much time <strong>the</strong> Turks and Weygand’s Army 4 needed to arrive at <strong>the</strong> Romanian port<br />
Constanța. The verdict was ra<strong>the</strong>r unanimous that 24 hours would suffice for that. Constanța is<br />
4 hours drive from Bucharest by car. From Bucharest to Ploiești (<strong>the</strong> main kerosene fields) it is 1<br />
hour (64 km). Tanks would not make <strong>the</strong>se distances as fast, by aircraft on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand it<br />
would be much faster. They say that for <strong>the</strong> Germans it is more difficult to get to Ploiești so fast.<br />
Through Slovakia alone <strong>the</strong>y would not get very far. They would have to march through<br />
Hungary. What <strong>the</strong> Russians would say about all that? Well, with <strong>the</strong> Russians everything was<br />
1<br />
Qui ne poursuit que ses propres fins (French) – which pursues only its own goals.<br />
2<br />
Hier wird es keine 18 Tage dauern (German) – it will take less than 18 days here.<br />
3<br />
Exportiere oder stirb (vācu val.) – export or die!<br />
4<br />
The Army of France is meant here.
410 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
in <strong>the</strong> best possible order, <strong>the</strong>y say. As long as <strong>the</strong> Romanians behave, nothing will happen, but<br />
o<strong>the</strong>rwise an action very similar to that in Poland last September will follow. We will live and<br />
see. For <strong>the</strong> time being <strong>the</strong> Romanians exert vigorous effort to „liefern“ commodities.<br />
***<br />
The German, French and Italian Legations have greatly increased <strong>the</strong>ir staff. On <strong>the</strong> official<br />
list of <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps <strong>the</strong> Germans have 20, English – 15, French – 12 and Italians – 11<br />
official members of <strong>the</strong>ir embassy’s staff. Apart from <strong>the</strong>se official councillors, secretaries and<br />
attachés <strong>the</strong>re is a large number of agents and employees on <strong>the</strong> unofficial and consular service.<br />
The struggle is very tense. Only <strong>the</strong> English and French apply <strong>the</strong> same tactics as on <strong>the</strong><br />
Western front on this front of <strong>diplomatic</strong> battles, too: <strong>the</strong>y fight with bulletins. Money is not<br />
spared though by <strong>the</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r side. Evil tongues gossip that with money alone everything can be<br />
achieved here. But if money fights against money and looks for suitable dislocation <strong>the</strong>n usually<br />
<strong>the</strong> side, which has more money, wins. Never<strong>the</strong>less, certain skills are necessary, too, and for<br />
<strong>the</strong> time being <strong>the</strong> Germans demonstrate obvious superiority in this regard.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 44–46.<br />
173. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 112 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 23<br />
februarie 1940<br />
Falsa alarmă care a atras pentru câteva zile privirile asupra regiunii baltice poate fi<br />
considerată ca terminată. Ea a fost determinate, în primul rând, de interpretările date ultimului<br />
discurs al Președintelui Letoniei, Ulmanis, care a fost prezentat de presa internațională ca<br />
exprimând o hotărâre sau cel puțin o tendință de rezistență în fața unor noi exigențe sovietice<br />
ce ar fi fost adresate Statelor Baltice.<br />
Acest discurs a fost pus în legătură cu alte manifestații ca diferite vizite militare schimbate<br />
între Statele Baltice și convocarea simultană la Moscova a celor trei Miniștri sovietici acreditați<br />
în aceste state, manifestație în care se vedeau indiciile prevestitoare ale unei noi crize baltice.<br />
Se poate afirma acum că nu este vorba, cel puțin în acest moment, de vreo nouă importantă<br />
cerere sovietică. Conferința diplomaților de la Moscova ar fi destinată numai unui examen<br />
general al funcționării până în prezent a colaborării ruso-baltice. Rușii ar fi exprimat numai<br />
oarecare nemulțumire despre o pretinsă insuficientă discreție a presei baltice față de războiul<br />
finlandez și de dezinvoltura de care diferiți oameni politici fac dovadă în atitudinea lor față de<br />
Soviete. Sovietele n-ar reclama deci decât o ceva mai pronunțată obediență.<br />
Ambasadorul Statelor Unite la Moscova 1 , în trecere prin Riga, a declarat de altfel că ultimele<br />
conversații cu conducătorii sovietici i-au lăsat impresia că rușii nu plănuiesc nimic actualmente<br />
în regiunea baltică. Acești conducători i-au subliniat că prin atitudinea lor corectă față de<br />
Statele Baltice, Sovietele vor să dovedească buna lor credință internațională și respectul ce ele<br />
consacră tratatelor.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 5-6.<br />
1<br />
Laurence A. Steinhardt (1892-1950) a fost un diplomat american care a condus oficiile <strong>diplomatic</strong>e americane din<br />
Suedia, Peru și Turcia. A fost ambasadorul S.U.A. la Moscova (1939-1941).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 411<br />
173. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 112 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 23 rd February 1940<br />
The false alarm which has drawn <strong>the</strong> attention to <strong>the</strong> Baltic region for a few days can be<br />
considered ended. It has been determined primarily by interpretations given to <strong>the</strong> latest<br />
speech of Mr. Ulmanis, President of Latvia, who was presented by <strong>the</strong> international press as<br />
expressing a decision of or at least a tendency for resistance to some new Soviet requirements<br />
which were apparently addressed to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
This speech referred to o<strong>the</strong>r events such as various military visits exchanged between <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States and simultaneous summons in Moscow of <strong>the</strong> three Soviet Ministers accredited in<br />
<strong>the</strong>se states; this manifestation contained obvious signs predicting a new Baltic crisis.<br />
We can state now that at least at this point it is not about a new important Soviet request. It<br />
seems that <strong>the</strong> conference of <strong>the</strong> diplomats in Moscow is intended only for a general<br />
examination of <strong>the</strong> functioning of <strong>the</strong> Russian-Baltic cooperation so far. Russians expressed<br />
only some dissatisfaction about an alleged lack of discretion of <strong>the</strong> Baltic press with regard to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Finnish war and <strong>the</strong> detached attitude displayed by different politicians towards <strong>the</strong> Soviets.<br />
Therefore, <strong>the</strong> Soviets would not require more than a pronounced obedience.<br />
Passing through Riga, <strong>the</strong> US Ambassador in Moscow 1 said that, actually, his last<br />
conversations with <strong>the</strong> Soviet leaders gave him <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> Russians are not<br />
planning anything in <strong>the</strong> Baltic region currently. These leaders pointed out that, by <strong>the</strong>ir correct<br />
attitude towards <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, <strong>the</strong> Soviets want to prove <strong>the</strong>ir good international faith and<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir devotion to <strong>the</strong> treaties.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 5-6.<br />
174. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. g. 6. marta slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Eiropas dienvidaustrumi pēdējās nedēļās ir daudz mierīgāki, nekā to varētu spriest no<br />
starptautisko sensāciju kārās preses. Pēc Balkānu konferences februāra sākumā viss pagājušais<br />
mēnesis ir bijis piepildīts vairāk ar saimniecisku aktivitāti, nekā ar politiskām sensācijām.<br />
Diezgan forsēti notiek tuvināšanās ar Itāliju un Bulgāriju. Mazāk vērības piegriež ungāru<br />
pretenzijām un ungāru preses diezgan asiem “komplimentiem” pret Rumāniju. Iekšpolitiski<br />
Rumānijā cenšas konsolidēt un attīstīt jauno autoritāro režīmu un pamazām arī savest kārtībā<br />
vaļīgo iekšējo un ārējo saimniecisko sajukumu.<br />
Politiskā ziņā, jeb pareizāk, politisko baumu ziņā Bukareste laikam ir viena no ražīgākām<br />
baumu fabrikām Eiropā. Ko gan visu te nenākas dzirdēt!! Te būs dažas no šīm baumām, kurās<br />
varētu būt arī kāda kripatiņa faktu iekšā vai pamatā.<br />
1) Turki mobilizē. Laiduši spēkā savu izņēmuma stāvokļa aizsardzības likumu (tas, starp<br />
citu, ir taisnība). Pie Kaukāza robežas turkiem ar krieviem jau bijušas sadursmes. Pa priekšu<br />
kāds krievu pulks (varbūt bataljons) ienācis Turcijas teritorijā un nav gājis vairs ārā. Turki<br />
ziņojuši krieviem, lai ņem savus “tovariščus” 2 atpakaļ. Atjājis vesels pulks krievu kavalērijas, un<br />
1<br />
Laurence A. Steinhardt (1892-1950) was an American diplomat who led <strong>the</strong> U.S. <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions in Sweden,<br />
Peru and Turkey. He was US ambassador in Moscow (1939-1941).<br />
2<br />
Krievu val. – biedri (vispārēja uzrunas forma Padomju Savienībā). Šajā gadījumā vārds lietots kā izsmejošs<br />
apzīmējums PSRS pilsoņiem.
412 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
tas savukārt atkal palicis Turcijā. Turki saka, ka vienīgā viņu karaspēka kustība bijusi tā, lai<br />
nomainītu Anatolijā kopš zemestrīces katastrofas turp nosūtītās karaspēka vienības pret citām.<br />
2) Rumāņu robežai visapkārt izbūvēta fantastiski stipra aizsardzības līnija. Stiprāka par<br />
Mažino, par Zigfrīda un par Mannerheima līnijām. 1 Bez betonētajiem cietokšņiem esot vēl<br />
kanāls, kuru piepildīšot uzbrukuma gadījumā ar petroleju un pielaidīšot uguni klāt. Būsim tad<br />
mēs Bukarestē kā Jāņu laikā no ugunskuriem ap robežu aizsargāti no vāciešiem, boļševikiem un<br />
citiem ļauniem gariem. Fakti ir tādi, ka rumāņi patiešām dūšīgi strādā pie savas robežas<br />
nostiprināšanas, bet pie visas naftas bagātības, tās tomēr nav tik daudz, lai veselus kanālus un<br />
grāvjus piepildītu. Dikti grūti ir jau tās 110 000 tonnas mēnesī priekš vāciešiem sadabūt un,<br />
galvenais, nosūtīt.<br />
3) Marta beigās rumāņu armija būšot 2 miljonu vīru stipra. “Klusa mobilizācija” gan visu<br />
laiku turpinās un katrai Bukarestes darbnīcai, ja tā nav laikā pagatavojusi pasūtījumu, galvenā<br />
atvainošanās vienmēr ir tā, ka darbinieki mobilizēti. Tanī pašā laikā ir nācies dzīvus piemērus<br />
redzēt, ka mobilizētais zaldāts pēc pāris nedēļu prombūtnes atkal ir savā civilā nodarbībā<br />
atpakaļ! Panāk to ar pāris tūkstots lejām. Ja var un grib ziedot vairāk, varot dabūt “balto biļeti”<br />
(pilnīgu atbrīvošanu no kara dienesta) arī bez sevišķi lielām grūtībām.<br />
4) Viens no grandiozākiem Dienvideiropas valstu iekarošanas “plāniem” ir sekojošais:<br />
Krievi kopā ar vāciešiem pamazām caur bulgāru ostām (Varna un Burgasa) ar bulgāru<br />
piekrišanu okupēšot Bulgāriju. Rumānija tad būtu no visām pusēm ielenkta un darīšot visu, ko<br />
tai pavēl vācieši un krievi. Ja nē, tad nogatavojies ābols iekritīšot iekarotājiem klēpī bez asins<br />
izliešanas un, galvenais, bez petrolejas avotu demolēšanas, kas notiktu, ja Rumānija būtu<br />
jāiekaro, no robežas iesākot. Lai to izvestu, esot bijusi jāmaina bulgāru valdība, kas jau nu ir<br />
noticis. Bet liekas, ka jaunā bulgāru valdība taisni meklē saprašanos ar Rumāniju un citām<br />
Balkānu Antantes valstīm un krievu–vācu iekarošanas plāni katrā ziņā nav aktuāli. Vismaz tik<br />
ilgi nē, kamēr rumāņi līdīs no ādas ārā, lai pildītu piegādes vāciešiem. Šeit petrolejas un citu<br />
derīgu mantu piegādi Vācijai uzskata par kara laika tribūtu 2 un filozofē tā: labāki maksāt tribūtu<br />
bez kara, nekā pēc kara un zem vācu vai krievu okupācijas<br />
[..].<br />
Bukarestē galveno aktivitāti attīsta vācieši. Vācu sūtniecībai ir pirmklasīgs sastāvs un bez<br />
tam simtiem papildu darbinieku neoficiāli. Tāpēc arī klusajā saimnieciskajā un propagandas<br />
cīņā Vācija šeit gūst redzamus panākumus. Franču sūtniecībā ir viens otrs aktīvs kungs, sevišķi<br />
militāro pārstāvju vidū, bet pats vēstnieks Edriens Tjerī, kura kundze esot miljardos franku<br />
vērtējama (žīdiete), šeit nespēlē nekādu lomu, jo turas pārāk augstprātīgi un aroganti, kas<br />
rumāņiem neimponē, un rumāņu diplomāti saka, ka Francijai šeit tikpat kā neesot pārstāvja.<br />
Lielbritānijas sūtnis Sers Ridžinalds Hours atstāj pusaizmiguša iespaidu. Kundze interesējas<br />
tikai par aviāciju un intrigue 3 pilnā Bukarestes sabiedriskā dzīve, liekas, angļu sūtniecībai nav<br />
gluži pa prātam. Rumāņu vērtējums, ka arī šī sūtniecība ir par vāju reprezentēta, lai paralizētu<br />
vācu veiklo un enerģisko aktivitāti šinī galvaspilsētā un rajonā.<br />
No Padomju Krievijas sūtniecības arī neko nedzird. Sūtniecības sekretārs Kukuļevs (Chargé<br />
d’Affaires a[mata] i[zpildītājs]) ievilcies jaunajā milzīgajā sūtniecības pilī, kas aizņem veselu<br />
1<br />
Runa ir par t. s. Francijas Mažino, Vācijas Zigfrīda un Somijas Mannerheima aizsardzības līnijām.<br />
2<br />
Tribute (angļu val.) – nodeva.<br />
3<br />
Intrigue (angļu val.) – intriga.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 413<br />
kvartālu un gaida laikam labākus laikus, jeb kad šo pili apsaimniekos īsts sūtnis, par kāda<br />
ierašanos gan neko nedzird.<br />
***<br />
Mūsu vecs paziņa – rumāņu līdzšinējais vēstnieks Vasils Stoika atsaukts no Ankāras un<br />
iecelts par propagandas viceministru. Grūti teikt, ka šī pārmaiņa būtu paaugstinājums Stoikam,<br />
bet iemesli būs drīzāk meklējami sieviešu lietās (cherchez la femme 1 ), jo Stoika kundze, kuras<br />
vietā agrākais vēstnieks esot atradis jaunāku, būs caur saviem sakariem palīdzējusi “nozāģēt”<br />
savu agrāko vīru [..].<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 58.–60. lp.<br />
174. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 6 th March 1940<br />
In <strong>the</strong> last few weeks <strong>the</strong> situation in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe has been much quieter than one<br />
would assume from <strong>the</strong> press, which is greedy for international sensations. After <strong>the</strong> Balkan<br />
conference in early February <strong>the</strong> whole of <strong>the</strong> last month was more filled with economic activity<br />
than with political sensations. The approaching of Italy and Bulgaria takes place in a ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
forced manner. Less attention is attributed to <strong>the</strong> Hungarian claims and <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r harsh<br />
“compliments” in <strong>the</strong> address of Romania in <strong>the</strong> Hungarian press. In Romania’s domestic policy<br />
efforts are exerted to consolidate and develop <strong>the</strong> new authoritarian regime and gradually to<br />
straighten out <strong>the</strong> loose internal and external chaos.<br />
In political terms or ra<strong>the</strong>r in terms of political rumours Bucharest probably is one of <strong>the</strong><br />
most productive rumour factories in Europe. The things that one gets to hear here! Here are<br />
some of <strong>the</strong> rumours, which could have also a grain of truth in <strong>the</strong>m or at <strong>the</strong>ir base.<br />
1) The Turks mobilize. They have enforced <strong>the</strong>ir law on defence in a state of emergency<br />
(it, by <strong>the</strong> way, is true). The Turks have already had clashes with <strong>the</strong> Russians at <strong>the</strong> Caucasian<br />
border. At first a Russian regiment (or maybe a battalion) entered <strong>the</strong> territory of Turkey and<br />
refused to leave it. The Turks demanded <strong>the</strong> Russians to take <strong>the</strong>ir “tovarishchi” 2 back. A whole<br />
Russian cavalry regiment came and in its turn remained in Turkey. The Turks say that <strong>the</strong> only<br />
movement that <strong>the</strong>ir troops have made is <strong>the</strong> replacement of <strong>the</strong> military units that had been<br />
sent to Anatolia after <strong>the</strong> earthquake with o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
2) A fantastically strong defence line has been built around <strong>the</strong> entire Romanian border.<br />
Stronger than Maginot, than Siegfried and Mannerheim Lines. 3 Apart from concrete fortresses<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is also a moat which, in case of an attack, will be filled with kerosene and set on fire. Then<br />
we in Bucharest will be protected from <strong>the</strong> Germans, Bolsheviks and o<strong>the</strong>r evil spirits by fires,<br />
like at Midsummer. The fact is that <strong>the</strong> Romanians indeed vigorously work at <strong>the</strong> fortification<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir border, but in spite of <strong>the</strong>ir wealth of oil, <strong>the</strong>re is still not that much oil as to fill entire<br />
channels and moats. It is already very difficult to get those 110 000 tons per month for <strong>the</strong><br />
Germans and even more difficult – to ship <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
3) They say that by <strong>the</strong> end of March <strong>the</strong> Romanian Army will be 2 million men strong. “A<br />
silent mobilisation” indeed continues all <strong>the</strong> time and <strong>the</strong> mobilisation of staff is <strong>the</strong> main<br />
1<br />
Sakāmvārds: Cherchez la femme (franču val.) – meklējiet sievieti.<br />
2<br />
Comrades (Russian) (a general form of address in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union). Here <strong>the</strong> word is used as a derisory<br />
reference to <strong>the</strong> citizens of <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />
3<br />
Here are meant <strong>the</strong> French Maginot, German Siegfried and Finnish Mannerheim defence lines.
414 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
excuse for each workshop in Bucharest whenever it has failed to fulfil an order in time. At <strong>the</strong><br />
same time living examples have been seen of <strong>the</strong> mobilised soldier to return to his civilian<br />
duties after <strong>the</strong> absence of a couple of weeks! It is achieved with a couple of thousand lei. They<br />
say that if one can and wants to sacrifice more, a “white ticket” (complete dispensation from<br />
military service) can also be obtained without much difficulty.<br />
4) One of <strong>the</strong> most grandiose “plans” for <strong>the</strong> conquest of <strong>the</strong> countries of Sou<strong>the</strong>ast<br />
Europe runs as follows: <strong>the</strong> Russians toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Germans through <strong>the</strong> Bulgarian ports<br />
(Varna and Burgas) and with <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> Bulgarians will little by little occupy Bulgaria.<br />
Then Romania would be surrounded by all <strong>the</strong> sides and would do everything that <strong>the</strong> Germans<br />
and Russians will order it to. If it would not, <strong>the</strong>n a ripe apple will fall into <strong>the</strong> conquerors’ lap<br />
without any bloodshed and, what is most important, without damaging <strong>the</strong> kerosene sources<br />
that would have happened if Romania was to be conquered, starting from its border. In order to<br />
carry this plan out, <strong>the</strong> Bulgarian government had to be replaced that has already happened.<br />
However, in fact it seems that <strong>the</strong> new Bulgarian government tries to come to an agreement<br />
with Romania and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries of <strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente and anyway <strong>the</strong> Russian–German<br />
conquest plans are not topical. At least as long as <strong>the</strong> Romanians go out of <strong>the</strong>ir way to fulfil <strong>the</strong><br />
deliveries to <strong>the</strong> Germans. Here <strong>the</strong> delivery of kerosene and o<strong>the</strong>r valuable goods to Germany<br />
is regarded as a wartime tribute and <strong>the</strong> argument runs as follows: it is better to pay tribute<br />
without a war than to be under <strong>the</strong> German or Russian occupation after war [..]<br />
In Bucharest <strong>the</strong> greatest activity comes from <strong>the</strong> Germans. The German Legation has a first<br />
class staff and apart from that – hundreds of unofficial additional employees. For that reason in<br />
<strong>the</strong> silent economic and propaganda war here Germany enjoys visible success. In <strong>the</strong> French<br />
Embassy <strong>the</strong>re is an active gentleman or two, especially among <strong>the</strong> military representatives, but<br />
Ambassador Adrien Thierry, whose spouse is said to be worth billions of francs (a Jewish<br />
woman), plays no role whatsoever here because he behaves too haughtily and arrogantly that<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanians do not find attractive and <strong>the</strong> Romanian diplomats say that it is almost like<br />
France does not have any representative here at all.<br />
The British Envoy Sir Reginald H. Hoare, in his turn, leaves an impression as if he is halfasleep.<br />
His spouse is interested only in aviation and <strong>the</strong> English Legation seems to dislike <strong>the</strong><br />
plot-filled public life in Bucharest. The Romanians consider this legation, too, to be too poorly<br />
represented to be able to paralyze <strong>the</strong> skilful and vigorous German activities in this capital and<br />
<strong>the</strong> region.<br />
Nothing is heard from <strong>the</strong> Legation of Soviet Russian ei<strong>the</strong>r. Legation’s secretary Kukulev<br />
(acting charge d’affaires) has moved into <strong>the</strong> huge Legation’s palace, which occupies an entire<br />
block, and apparently waits for better times or <strong>the</strong> time when <strong>the</strong> palace will be run by a real<br />
envoy, about <strong>the</strong> arrival of whom nothing is however heard.<br />
***<br />
Our old acquaintance – Romanian Envoy Vasile Stoica has been recalled from Ankara and<br />
appointed Propaganda Vice-Minister. It is difficult to call this change a promotion for Stoica,<br />
one should ra<strong>the</strong>r look for <strong>the</strong> reasons in female matters (cherchez la femme 1 ), because Mrs.<br />
Stoica, in whose place <strong>the</strong> former Envoy has found a younger woman, through her contacts has<br />
most likely helped to “saw off” her ex-husband [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 58–60.<br />
1<br />
French phrase: Cherchez la femme – Look for <strong>the</strong> woman.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 415<br />
175. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 173 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 13 martie<br />
1940<br />
Poziția Statelor Baltice față de partida între tendința germană de a impune o soluție pacifică<br />
în Finlanda și tendința contrară a Aliaților, partidă ce s-a terminat ieri la Moscova prin succesul<br />
tezei germane, s-ar putea defini precum urmează.<br />
Statele Baltice își dau pe deplin seama că prelungirea războiului finlandez ar fi condus în<br />
mod inevitabil la extinderea în Nord a conflictului european. Ele recunosc de asemenea că, fiind<br />
date posibilitățile de rezistență ce asistența sovietică oferă Germaniei, o acțiune aliată contra<br />
Rusiei, care ar paraliza funcționarea acestei asistențe, a devenit pentru Puterile Occidentale un<br />
element necesar al conducerii războiului în contra Germaniei.<br />
Aceste state sunt în sfârșit viu interesate de succesul unei asemenea acțiuni antiruse care ar<br />
corespunde intereselor lor naționale atât prin ea însăși, cât și prin faptul că ea constituie o etapă<br />
către o soluție a conflictului care nu ar abandona Europa Orientală expansiunii germano-ruse.<br />
Pe de altă parte, însă, o extindere a conflictului finlandez cu participarea Suediei alături de<br />
aliați, ar fi avut consecințe imediate și funeste pentru interesele regiunii baltice. Aviația Aliată<br />
nu ar fi lipsit de a ataca comunicațiile germano-ruse prin porturile statelor baltice și bazele<br />
navale sovietice din aceste state, fapt ce ar fi [determinat] o sporire a contingentelor sovietice<br />
sau chiar o adevărată ocupație militară. Rusia ar fi putut reclama o asistență militară ceea ce ar<br />
fi pus într-o situație tragică Statele Baltice pentru care victoria Aliaților și protecția lor în<br />
momentul reconstrucției Europei constituie singura șansă de a-și consolida în mod definitiv<br />
independența.<br />
Rezultanta acestor sentimente contradictorii este că Statele Baltice se felicită de soluția<br />
pacifică a conflictului finlandez și ele ar saluta cu entuziasm o acțiune aliată împotriva Rusiei,<br />
cum ar fi o ofensivă în Caucaz, care ar împrumuta o altă cale de acces decât cea scandinavă.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 16-17.<br />
175. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 173 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 13 th March 1940<br />
The position of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States towards <strong>the</strong> game between <strong>the</strong> German tendency to impose<br />
a peaceful solution in Finland and <strong>the</strong> contrary tendency of <strong>the</strong> Allies, game which ended<br />
yesterday in Moscow with <strong>the</strong> success of <strong>the</strong> German tenet, could be defined as follows.<br />
The Baltic States fully realize that <strong>the</strong> prolongation of <strong>the</strong> Finnish war would have inevitably<br />
led to <strong>the</strong> expansion of <strong>the</strong> European conflict to <strong>the</strong> North. They also admit that, given <strong>the</strong><br />
possibilities of resistance offered by <strong>the</strong> Soviet assistance to Germany, an Allied action against<br />
Russia, which would paralyze <strong>the</strong> functioning of this assistance, has become to <strong>the</strong> Western<br />
Powers a necessary element for leading <strong>the</strong> war against Germany.<br />
These states finally show a lively interest in <strong>the</strong> success of such an anti-Russian action that<br />
would correspond to <strong>the</strong>ir national interests both in itself and by <strong>the</strong> fact that it is a step<br />
towards a solution to <strong>the</strong> conflict which would not abandon Eastern Europe to <strong>the</strong> German-<br />
Russian expansion.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, however, an extension of <strong>the</strong> Finnish conflict involving Sweden on <strong>the</strong><br />
side of <strong>the</strong> Allies would have had immediate and disastrous consequences for <strong>the</strong> interests of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic region. Allied aircraft would not have hesitated to attack <strong>the</strong> German-Russian
416 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
communications through <strong>the</strong> ports of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> Soviet naval bases in <strong>the</strong>se<br />
countries, which would have [caused] an increase in Soviet contingences or even a real military<br />
occupation. Russia could have claimed military assistance, which would have been tragic for <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic States, for which <strong>the</strong> victory of <strong>the</strong> Allies and <strong>the</strong>ir protection at <strong>the</strong> time of Europe’s<br />
reconstruction is <strong>the</strong>ir only chance to finally consolidate <strong>the</strong>ir independence.<br />
The result of <strong>the</strong>se contradictory feelings is that <strong>the</strong> Baltic States congratulate <strong>the</strong>mselves for<br />
<strong>the</strong> peaceful solution of <strong>the</strong> Finnish conflict and <strong>the</strong>y would welcome enthusiastically an Allied<br />
action against Russia, such as an offensive in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus, which would give ano<strong>the</strong>r gateway<br />
than <strong>the</strong> Scandinavian one.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 16-17.<br />
176. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 15. marta ziņojums ārlietu ministram<br />
V. Munteram<br />
Satiksmes retums un relatīva nedrošība ar svešiem “stafetes” kurjeriem atņem iespēju sniegt<br />
ziņojumu ar vēlamo ātrumu un regularitāti. Tomēr viena otra lieta, kas attālajos Eiropas stūros<br />
nāk zināma, var Jums noderēt. Tāpēc es ar zināmu rezignāciju, un apzinoties, ka visam tam, ko<br />
es te saklausos, ir pavisam maza (vairāk teorētiska) nozīme priekš Jums, turpinu ziņojumu<br />
rakstīšanu, lai gan iepriekšējais no 6. marta vēl guļ šepat manā seifā.<br />
Kā visur pasaules galvaspilsētās, pēdējās dienās visas valodas un zīlēšanas grozījās ap Somijas<br />
jautājumiem. Šeit Bukarestē, kuriem ir tas pats austrumu kaimiņš, kā mums un somiem, somu<br />
karš bija liels pakalpojums, jo tas katrā ziņā divus agrāk neskaidrus punktus ir noskaidrojis: a)<br />
krievi ir gatavi arī karot ja nevar panākt ar diplomātiskiem līdzekļiem savu mērķu sasniegšanu<br />
un b) karošana ar krieviem nav nemaz tik trakoti bīstama, ja vien pretestība ir labi organizēta,<br />
karavīri apzinīgi un vadība pietiekoši veikla. Šeit jau nu klusībā bija vēlēšanās, lai somi turētu<br />
krievus bijāšanā un tos nodarbinātu iespējami ilgāk, lai krieviem nenāktu sliktas domas galvā<br />
par Besarābiju, rumāņu un bulgāru ostām Melnajā jūrā. Tagad nu iet minēšana pilnā sparā vaļā<br />
par to, ko nu darīs krievi pēc somu afēras bēdīgā noslēguma (sevišķi priekš somiem)? Viena daļa<br />
prominentu Bukarestes ārzemnieku domā, ka krievi nelikšot nemaz pārāk ilgi gaidīt un, ļaujot<br />
drusku zemei apžūt, šeit sākšoties vēl lielāks „ļembasts”, nekā nupat ziemeļos nobeigtais [..].<br />
Fakti ir tādi, ka rumāņi un turki ir stipri gatavojušies katru varbūtību atvairīt, ja nepieciešams,<br />
ar militāru spēku. Par turkiem esmu dzirdējis labas atsauksmes, par rumāņiem – dalītas. Liekas,<br />
ka Rumānijā un Melnās jūras rajonā vispārīgi pie militāro komplikāciju rašanās jārēķinās ar<br />
pavisam citādu vispārējo situāciju. Petrolejas un citu no Rumānijas nepieciešamo preču<br />
saņemšanas vajadzība, man liekas, pie krievu–rumāņu komplikācijām tūlīt spiestu arī Vāciju<br />
piedalīties aktīvi. Par to man nācies dzirdēt šad un tad kompetentu ļaužu ieskatus.<br />
Visus novērojumus un dzirdēto kopā ņemot, es ar relatīvu drošību varu teikt, ka šinī rajonā<br />
vēl labu laiku izdosies saglabāt mieru, jo rumāņi un pārējie balkānieši stipri pūlas apmierināt<br />
vācu un arī sabiedroto saimnieciskās vajadzības. Mieru šeit varētu traucēt enerģiskāka franču–<br />
angļu uzstāšanās. Bet pēc līdzšinējiem novērojumiem sabiedrotie vēl nav iegājuši īsti aktivitātes<br />
stadijā un šinī ziņā viņiem daudz priekšā ir vācieši un arī itāļi.<br />
Interesanti ir atzīmēt, ka jau apmēram mēnesi atpakaļ man šejienes vācu sūtnis paredzēja<br />
somu–krievu kara izbeigšanos pēc tam, kad krievi būs guvuši viņiem absolūti nepieciešamās<br />
kaut kādas sekmes. Nu tās sekmes bija sasniegtas un karš arī izbeidzās. No angļu–franču lēģera<br />
dzirdu asus pārmetumus zviedriem un norvēģiem [..].
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 417<br />
Saimnieciskā ziņā šeit pēc ārpolitiskās nomierināšanās arī iet drusku labāk. Likumi un jauni<br />
rīkojumi no jaunās Ārējās tirdzniecības ministrijas nāk ārā diezgan strauji. Man pat liekas, to<br />
likumu par daudz un tiem daudzas acīmredzamas nepilnības, kuras nāksies drīzumā labot.<br />
Labas gribas šejienes kungiem netrūkst, tikai valdāmā un kārtojamā sabiedrība, sevišķi<br />
tirdzniecībā un rūpniecībā un tāpat arī zemniecībā, nepadodas tik viegli jauninājumiem, un<br />
lielrūpnieka Aušnita sensacionālais process rāda diezgan atbaidošu ainu par šejienes tikumiem.<br />
Rumānija gribot pārslēgt visus savus tirdzniecības līgumus un, kur vien iespējams,<br />
atbrīvoties no klīringiem [..].<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. lp., 62.–63. lp.<br />
176. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 15 th March 1940<br />
Infrequency and relative unreliability of traffic by foreign “relay-race” couriers deprive me of<br />
<strong>the</strong> chance to provide reports with <strong>the</strong> desirable speed and regularity. However some pieces of<br />
news that become known in <strong>the</strong> remote corners of Europe may be useful to you. Thus with a<br />
certain resignation and awareness that everything that I hear here has very little (and ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>the</strong>oretic) importance for you, I continue writing reports, although <strong>the</strong> previous one, dated with<br />
6 th March still lies here in my safe.<br />
[Here,] like in all o<strong>the</strong>r world capitals in <strong>the</strong> recent days all talk and prognostication has<br />
centred on <strong>the</strong> issues of Finland. Here, in Bucharest, where <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> same eastern<br />
neighbour as we and <strong>the</strong> Finns, <strong>the</strong> Finnish war has done a great service because it has at least<br />
clarified two issues, which had been uncertain before: a) <strong>the</strong> Russians are ready to make war if<br />
<strong>the</strong>y cannot reach <strong>the</strong>ir goals by <strong>diplomatic</strong> means and b) warring against Russians is not at all<br />
that dangerous if resistance is well organised, soldiers are dutiful and government skilful<br />
enough. Desire was secretly cherished here for Finns to inspire awe in <strong>the</strong> Russians and to<br />
engage <strong>the</strong>m as long as possible so that bad thoughts about Bessarabia and about Romanian<br />
and Bulgarian ports in <strong>the</strong> Black Sea do not come into <strong>the</strong> Russian heads. Guesswork is in full<br />
swing now regarding what <strong>the</strong> Russians will do after <strong>the</strong> pitiful (especially for <strong>the</strong> Finns?) end of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Finnish affair. A part of prominent foreigners residing in Bucharest believe that <strong>the</strong> Russians<br />
will not keep us waiting long and after <strong>the</strong> land dries up a little a larger havoc will begin here<br />
than <strong>the</strong> one that has just finished in <strong>the</strong> north [..] The fact is that <strong>the</strong> Romanians and Turks<br />
have diligently prepared <strong>the</strong>mselves to withstand any probable development, with military<br />
force, if necessary. I have heard good things about <strong>the</strong> Turks while opinion about <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians is divided. It seems that in Romania and <strong>the</strong> Black Sea region in general <strong>the</strong>y have<br />
to reckon with a completely different overall situation should military complications occur<br />
here. It seems to me that in case of Russian – Romanian complications <strong>the</strong> need for <strong>the</strong> import<br />
of kerosen and o<strong>the</strong>r necessary goods from Romania would force Germany actively to engage<br />
[in <strong>the</strong> complications] right away. I have heard competent people expressing such an opinion<br />
now and <strong>the</strong>n.<br />
Putting all my observations and what I have heard toge<strong>the</strong>r, I may predict with relative<br />
confidence that peace will be preserved in this region for quite some time to come because <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Balkan nations try hard to meet <strong>the</strong> economic needs of <strong>the</strong> Germans<br />
and those of <strong>the</strong> Allies as well. What could disturb <strong>the</strong> peace here is more energetic behaviour<br />
of <strong>the</strong> French and English. According to <strong>the</strong> observations made so far, <strong>the</strong> Allies have not yet
418 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
quite entered <strong>the</strong> real activity phase and in this regard <strong>the</strong> Germans and also Italians are much<br />
ahead of <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
It is interesting to note that already approximately a month ago <strong>the</strong> German Envoy to this<br />
country predicted to me that <strong>the</strong> Finnish–Russian war would end as soon as <strong>the</strong> Russians have<br />
achieved at least some result, which <strong>the</strong>y absolutely needed. Some result was achieved and <strong>the</strong><br />
war ended indeed. From <strong>the</strong> English–French camp I hear sharp reproaches to <strong>the</strong> Swedes and<br />
Norwegians [..] After <strong>the</strong> foreign policy sphere calmed down here, <strong>the</strong> situation in <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
field also slightly improved. Laws and new instructions issue ra<strong>the</strong>r rapidly from <strong>the</strong> new<br />
Ministry of Foreign Trade. It even seems to me that <strong>the</strong>re are too many of those laws and <strong>the</strong>y<br />
have many obvious shortcomings, which will have to be rectified soon. The gentlemen here are<br />
not lacking good will but <strong>the</strong> society that <strong>the</strong>y have to govern and put in order, especially in <strong>the</strong><br />
fields and trade and industry and also <strong>the</strong> farmers do not yield to innovations that easy and <strong>the</strong><br />
sensational proceedings against industrialist Auschnitt paint a ra<strong>the</strong>r repulsive picture of <strong>the</strong><br />
local habits.<br />
They say that Romania wants to replace all of its trade agreements and, wherever possible,<br />
to get rid of clearings [..]<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 62–63.<br />
177. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 26. marta slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Ar drudžainu uzmanību šejienes politiskās aprindas vēro pagājušo nedēļu un dienu<br />
sensacionālās satikšanās Romā, Brennerā un citur. Būtu lieka minēšana un ar maz šansēm trāpīt<br />
visus īstos punktus Hitlera – Musolīni 1 sarunās, bet nav nevienam šeit šaubu, ka laba daļa<br />
pēdējā laika diplomātiskās aktivitātes attiecas uz Balkānu problēmām. Balkānu problēmas,<br />
novedot uz vienkāršiem reizinātājiem, ir: karš vai miers Balkānos. Paši balkānieši dara visu<br />
iespējamo, lai izvairītos no sarežģījumiem un mēģina laipot. Vācija savu saimnieciski – politisko<br />
spiedienu arvienu pastiprina un rumāņiem nākas taisīt visādas negaidītas locīšanās un ekstra<br />
tūres, lai šo „krokodilu” pabarotu, kas taisas pašu barotāju pie izdevīga momenta aprīt.<br />
Visvairāk šeit ir bailes no kombinācijas: Berlīne – Maskava – Roma. Vienu laiku par šādu jaunu<br />
autoritatīvo valstu trīssavienību dzirdēja bieži runājam. Ar lielām aizdomām rumāņi seko arī<br />
grāfa Pala Teleki 2 ceļojumam un viesošanās programmai Romā. Bailes, kad grāfs Teleki kaut ko<br />
neizkaulē Romā uz rumāņu rēķina. Tāpēc katrā vietā un arī nevietā rumāņi atgādina savu<br />
draudzību pie itāļiem. Puslīdz nenozīmīgā rumāņu jaunatnes vadītāja Sidorovici viesošanās<br />
Romā tagad jau divreiz oficiālās karaļa runās pieminēta kā svarīga politiska akcija.<br />
Daudz un dažādi zīlēts šejienes diplomātu aprindās par to, vai Itālija piedalīsies, vai<br />
nepiedalīsies karā. Domas sveras uz to pusi, ka bez angļu – franču – turku provokācijas nē, bet<br />
vai šī provokācija tomēr nenotiks, par to domas dalās. Otrā pusē Melnajai jūrai – Turcijā un<br />
Sīrijā, gatavošanās uz kaut ko notiek stipri drudžaini. Uz to norāda augstu virsnieku<br />
konferences, ceļojumi un zīmīgas intervijas. Viss tas tomēr vairāk diplomātiska kara fronte. No<br />
turku avotiem esmu dzirdējis tomēr, ka turki nebūšot piedabūjami uz kara provocēšanu.<br />
Turpretim, ja otra puse šādu provokāciju taisītu un kaut ko uzsāktu Balkānos, vai turku jūras<br />
1<br />
Benito Musolīni (Mussolini; 1883–1945), Itālijas valstsvīrs. 1922.–1943. g. Ministru prezidents (no 1926. g.<br />
diktators).<br />
2<br />
Pals Teleki de Šeks (Teleki de Szék; 1879–1941), Ungārijas valstsvīrs. 1920.–1921., 1939.–1941. g. premjerministrs.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 419<br />
šauruma (Dardaneļu) rajonā, Turcija bez vilcināšanās pildīšot savu pienākumu. Tādā gadījumā<br />
Turcija arī nevairītos arī revidēt savas attiecības pret Padomju Krieviju un neesot izslēgts, ka<br />
turku taisītās rezerves viņu līgumos ar frančiem un angļiem tiktu atsauktas. Bet nemaz vēl nav<br />
izslēgts, ka Padomju Krievija neatrod saprašanos ar angļu – franču koloniju – pagaidām klusu.<br />
Krievu pierobežas apgabalu apdraudēšana pie Kaspijas jūras, un iebrukšana Kaukāzā neesot<br />
nemaz tik grūta lieta. Turkiem esot arī daudz simpatizētāju Padomju Krievijā, sevišķi Kaukāzā<br />
un Turkestānā. Tas viss jāņemot vērā un Maskavas diriģenti to labi zinot.<br />
Attiecībā uz Itālijas aktīvu piedalīšanos karā, nesenās satikšanās nebūs neko grozījušas.<br />
Vienīgi Itālija laikam neuztrauksies, ja vācu spiediens uz Rumāniju vēl vairāk pastiprināsies.<br />
Līdzšinējā pēdējo dienu spiediena rezultātā mēs redzam sekojošus notikumus: a) rumāņu<br />
valdība un karalis ir izlīguši ar Vācijai draudzīgo „Dzelzs vilku” 1 (Garde de Fer) organizāciju. 114<br />
šīs organizācijas locekļi palaisti vaļā no apcietinājuma. Pagājušā rudeņa ģenerāļa Marinesku<br />
slaktēšana šīs organizācijas aprindās nu izrādās būs bijusi velta rumāņu asins šķiešana. Nesen<br />
vēl šī pati organizācija būtu bijusi gatava Karolu un viņa palīgus ar zobiem saplosīt, ja vien klāt<br />
tiktu. Tagad šī organizācija ar simtiem parakstu zvērē karalim uzticību un padevību. Viņas dzīvs<br />
palikušais idejiskais vadoņa vietnieks – no priekiem vai citādi – miris nupat ar sirds trieku.<br />
Runā, ka drīz kādu „Dzelzs vilku” pārstāvi uzņemšot valdībā. Valdības kungi to noliedz.<br />
b) Rumānijā, kur valsts gādība par zemnieku pavisam minimāla un, kur zemniekam nav<br />
iespējams savus ražojumus pārdot par pasaules tirgus cenām, nu ir ieviestas divas bezgaļas<br />
dienas nedēļā. Visi te runā, ka tas noticis uz Vācijas spiedienu, tāpat, kā savā laikā Ungārijā.<br />
Ministru prezidents gan plaši un sīki skaidro, ka tas notiekot aiz ekonomiskiem apsvērumiem,<br />
jo gaļu patērējot ļoti daudz tagad mobilizētā armija, lopi izkauti nepielaižamos daudzumos un<br />
laiks esot sākt ierobežoties patēriņā. Ļaunas valodas saka, ka drīz visapkārt Vācijai būšot visās<br />
zemēs „fleischlose Tage” 2 , tikai pašā Vācijā drīz varēšot visus ierobežojumus šajā ziņā atcelt. Es<br />
domāju, ka šais punktos a) un b) minētais būs tomēr noticis uz ārējā spiediena pamata.<br />
c) Ļoti intensīvi cirkulē baumas par jaunām vācu ultimatīvām prasībām, kas attiecas uz<br />
petrolejas eksporta aizkavēšanu sabiedroto angļu – franču vajadzībām. Grūts būs stāvoklis<br />
nesen uz Londonu aizbraukušai rumāņu saimnieciskā līguma pārslēgšanas delegācijai.<br />
d) Pēdējās dienas rumāņu valdošā grupa palikusi barga pret mēreno opozīciju – nacionālās<br />
zemnieku partijas ļaudīm. Pats līderis Maniu ļoti populārs un tam it kā nedrīkstot klāt ķerties.<br />
Toties Lieldienu vakarā uz klosteri (Bistrica) izsūtīja arī ļoti populāru Bukarestes sabiedrības<br />
kungu Virgilu Madgearu, kuru personīgi labi pazinu no Ženēvas konferencēm un Londonas<br />
ekonomisko konferenču laikiem. Izsūtītais Madgearu ļoti plaši grozījās diplomātiskā korpusa<br />
aprindās un bija ļoti derīgs informators. Ļoti žēl, ka viņam jādzīvo klosterī. Šī mērenā opozīcija<br />
bija un ir, starp citu, ļoti naidīgi noskaņota pret lielajām autoritatīvām 3 valstīm, sevišķi Vāciju.<br />
Arī pēdējo dienu represijās daži saskata svešus iespaidus. Pašu zemnieku partijas līderi Maniu<br />
valsts tiesa galīgi atraidīja no iespējas ieņemt senatora sēdekli, kas tam pēc konstitūcijas<br />
noteikumiem pienācās kā personīga tiesība. Maniu atteicies uzvilkt raibo F. R. N. uniformu un<br />
nodot zvērestu jaunai iekārtai un caur to senatora sēdeklis pagalam.<br />
1<br />
Dzelzs gvardes organizāciju L. Ēķis apzināti vai neapzināti dēvē par „Dzelzs vilka” organizāciju, kāda pastāvēja<br />
Lietuvā.<br />
2<br />
Fleischlose Tage (vācu val.) – bezgaļas diena.<br />
3<br />
Domātas autoritārās valstis.
420 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Rumāņu valdības kungi pēdējā laikā ir turējuši vairākas runas, kurās gan nekā jauna<br />
neatradu. Ministru prezidents Tataresku tēloja vispārējās frāzes tautas vienības un upurēšanas<br />
gatavības nozīmi, ka jābūt stipriem, ka viss jāziedo armijas stiprināšanai, ka jāuzņemas jaunas<br />
nastas un jāgādā, lai rumāņu zemes bagātības nenonāktu svešu iebrucēju rokās.<br />
Ārlietu ministrs Gafenku arī neko jaunu nepateica savā runā un atkal vispārējās frāzēs tēloja<br />
rumāņu gatavību aizstāvēt savas robežas. Runāja arī par draudzību ar itāļiem, bulgāriem un<br />
Balkānu sabiedrotiem.<br />
Pats karalis arī ir izlietojis izdevību deklarēties par iekšējo, ārējo un aizsardzības politiku,<br />
sakarā ar parlamenta sesijas atklāšanu (par to Jums ziņoju atsevišķi š. g. 7. marta ziņojumā Nr.<br />
d.2/390) un parlamenta delegācijas atbildes nodošanu karalim. Pamattēzes: ārējā politikā<br />
neitralitāte un draudzība ar Balkānu sabiedrotiem un Itāliju, labas attiecības ar Bulgāriju.<br />
Iekšējā politikā tautas vienības stiprināšana, kā to izprot F. R. N. (Nacionālās atdzimšanas<br />
fronte) organizācija. Aizsardzības politikā – stiprināt armijas un robežu nocietinājumus ar<br />
visiem līdzekļiem.<br />
Saimnieciskā politikā rumāņi cenšas savus apstākļus uzlabot ar savu reformu un projektu<br />
palīdzību. Zemkopības ministrs ir izstrādājis 5-gades plānu rumāņu lauksaimniecības<br />
pacelšanai. Šai programmā ir daudz labu lietu iekšā, tikai es neredzu, kā visu to vai ievērojamu<br />
daļu no programmas varēs realizēt pie zemnieku kūtruma un nabadzības un arī valsts līdzekļu<br />
trūkuma. Ko lai iesāk no dabas bagātīgi apveltītā zeme, kad tai jāpūlas pirmā kārtā uzlabot<br />
zemnieka minimālā pārtika, kas pavisam trūcīga un vienpusīga (kukurūza cilvēkam un lopam –<br />
vienīgais uztura līdzeklis)? Rumāņu zemnieks gadā strādājot tikai 90 dienas, pārējais laiks paiet<br />
slinkojot vai staigājot no viena strejgabala uz otru. Ražošana vienpusīga: labība un kukurūza.<br />
Tagad nu grib iemācīt zemnieku ražot arī rūpniecības augus, saknes un lopbarību. Nav lielu<br />
cerību, ka šie nodomi realizēsies, jo dzīves vadītāji ir atauguši nost no tautas un patiesībā tautas<br />
vajadzības nepārzin. Tie, kas šīs lietas labāki pārzin un saprot, ir atbīdīti nost opozīcijā (Maniu<br />
ar saviem ļaudīm). Politiski zemnieks ir indiferents un nabadzīgākie slāņi viegli pieejami<br />
ārējiem iespaidiem. Saimnieciski un finansiāli zemnieks un vispār lauksaimnieks ir pilsētu un<br />
pilsētiņu žīdu varā, tāpat, kā tirdzniecība un finanses pilsētās.<br />
Noslēdzot man jāsaka, ka mēs te ar lielu gaidīšanu gaidām tuvāko dienu un nedēļu<br />
notikumus. Zināt mēs te vēl neko precīzu un noteiktu nezinām, bet ir viena otra nojauta un<br />
netīši norādījumi, kas liek bažīties par straujāku notikumu norisi. Neskatoties uz oficiālo<br />
bramanību, te tomēr būs gatavi ieiet uz kompromisiem un padoties dažādiem spiedieniem, no<br />
kuras puses tie arī nenāktu.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 66.–68. lp.<br />
177. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 26 th March 1940<br />
With feverish attention <strong>the</strong> local political circles have followed <strong>the</strong> sensational meetings in<br />
Rome, Brenner and elsewhere in <strong>the</strong> last weeks. Guessing would be futile and <strong>the</strong>re is little<br />
chance to deduce all <strong>the</strong> issues that had indeed been addressed in Hitler–Mussolini 1 talks, but<br />
nobody here doubts that a considerable part of <strong>the</strong> resent <strong>diplomatic</strong> activities have been<br />
related to <strong>the</strong> Balkan issues. Reduced to simple factors <strong>the</strong> [essence of <strong>the</strong>] Balkan issue is<br />
following: war or peace in <strong>the</strong> Balkans. The Balkan peoples <strong>the</strong>mselves do <strong>the</strong>ir utmost to<br />
1<br />
Benitto Mussolini (1883–1945), Italian statesman. 1922–1943 Prime Minister (from 1926 dictator).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 421<br />
prevent complications and shift and shuffle. Germany consistently increases its economicpolitical<br />
pressure and <strong>the</strong> Romanians have to make unexpected manoeuvres and unplanned<br />
turns to feed this “crocodile”, which is going to swallow its feeder when it suits it. Most of all<br />
<strong>the</strong>y here fear <strong>the</strong> following combination: Berlin–Moscow–Rome. For a time such new trinity of<br />
authoritarian states was mentioned often. It is with great suspicion that <strong>the</strong> Romanians follow<br />
also <strong>the</strong> visit of Count Pál Teleki 1 to Rome and its programme. They fear lest Count Teleki<br />
wheedles something out in Rome at <strong>the</strong> Romanians’ expense. For that reason <strong>the</strong> Romanians<br />
mention <strong>the</strong>ir friendship with <strong>the</strong> Italians whenever it is appropriate and even when it is not.<br />
The visit of ra<strong>the</strong>r insignificant leader of <strong>the</strong> Romanian youth Sidorovici 2 to Rome has been<br />
already twice mentioned in <strong>the</strong> King’s official speeches as an important political step.<br />
The local <strong>diplomatic</strong> circles do much and various prognostication whe<strong>the</strong>r Italy will or will<br />
not take part in <strong>the</strong> war. The majority is inclined to think that it will not unless <strong>the</strong> English–<br />
French –Turks provoke it, but whe<strong>the</strong>r such provocation will not indeed happen, opinions<br />
divide. On <strong>the</strong> opposite coast of <strong>the</strong> Black Sea – in Turkey and Syria feverish preparation for<br />
something takes place. Conferences, visits and indicative interviews by high-ranking officers all<br />
point to that. However it is ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> front of <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> war. I have however heard from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Turkish sources that <strong>the</strong> Turks would not engage in any provocation. But if <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side<br />
made such a provocation and embarked upon something in <strong>the</strong> Balkans or in <strong>the</strong> region of <strong>the</strong><br />
Turkish strait (<strong>the</strong> Dardanelles), Turkey would fulfil its duty without hesitation. In such case<br />
Turkey would not shun also revising its <strong>relations</strong> with Soviet Russia and it could not be<br />
excluded that <strong>the</strong> reservations, which <strong>the</strong> Turks made in <strong>the</strong>ir agreements with <strong>the</strong> French and<br />
English, would be recalled. But is also could not be excluded at all that Soviet Russia would fail<br />
to find a common language with <strong>the</strong> English–French colony [camp] – silence about it for <strong>the</strong><br />
time being. They say that endangering of <strong>the</strong> Russian frontier districts at <strong>the</strong> Caspian Sea and<br />
invasion into <strong>the</strong> Caucasus was not at all that very difficult. They also say that <strong>the</strong> Turks have<br />
many supporters in Soviet Russia, especially in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus and Turkestan. It all should be<br />
taken into consideration and <strong>the</strong> conductors in Moscow are said to be well aware of that.<br />
The recent meetings are unlikely to have changed anything with regard to Italy’s active<br />
engagement in <strong>the</strong> war. It is only that Italy most likely will not worry if <strong>the</strong> German pressure on<br />
Romania increases fur<strong>the</strong>r. We see <strong>the</strong> following developments resulting from <strong>the</strong> existing<br />
pressure that has been exerted in <strong>the</strong> recent days:<br />
a) The Romanian government and <strong>the</strong> King have reconciled with <strong>the</strong> “Iron Wolves” 3 (Garde<br />
de Fer) organisation, which is friendly towards <strong>the</strong> Germans. 114 members of this organisation<br />
have been released from prison. The bloodbath that General Marinescu 4 launched among <strong>the</strong><br />
members of this organisation last autumn now turns out to have been a waste of <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
blood. Recently this very organisation was ready to tear Carol and his aides to pieces with <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
teeth, if <strong>the</strong>y could get hold of <strong>the</strong>m. Now with hundreds of signatures this organisation swears<br />
loyalty and obedience to <strong>the</strong> King. The deputy of its surviving ideological leader has just died<br />
from heart attack – out of joy or for some o<strong>the</strong>r reason. They say that a representative or two of<br />
1<br />
Pál Teleki de Szék (1879–1941), Hungarian statesman. 1920–1921, 1939–1941 Prime Minister.<br />
2<br />
Teofil Sidorovici was <strong>the</strong> leader of King Carol II’s youth organisation Straja Ţării (The Sentinel of <strong>the</strong><br />
Mo<strong>the</strong>rland) between 1937-1940.<br />
3<br />
Deliberately or unintentionally L. Ēķis calls it <strong>the</strong> “Iron Wolf” organization, after <strong>the</strong> name of an organisation in<br />
Lithuania.<br />
4<br />
Gabriel Marinescu (1886-1940) was a Romanian general and politician, a member of Carol II’s camarilla.
422 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
<strong>the</strong> “Iron Wolves” will soon be accepted into <strong>the</strong> government. The gentlemen from <strong>the</strong><br />
government deny it.<br />
b) In Romania where <strong>the</strong> care of <strong>the</strong> state for <strong>the</strong> farmer is quite minimal and where <strong>the</strong><br />
farmer does not have <strong>the</strong> chance to sell his produce for <strong>the</strong> world market prices, two meatless<br />
days a week have been introduced now. Everybody here says that it has happened on<br />
Germany’s pressure same as it was in Hungary. The Prime Minister however talks at length and<br />
in detail that it happens for economic considerations because <strong>the</strong> now mobilized army<br />
consumes meat in very large quantities, cattle have been slaughtered in excessively large<br />
numbers and it is time to start limiting consumption. Evil tongues say that soon <strong>the</strong>re will be<br />
„fleischlose Tage” 1 in all countries around Germany but in Germany itself it soon will be possible<br />
to lift all limitations in this regard. I however think that <strong>the</strong> developments described in<br />
paragraphs a) and b) are due to foreign pressure.<br />
c) Rumours spread very intensively about new ultimative demands from <strong>the</strong> Germans to<br />
hold back <strong>the</strong> export of kerosene to <strong>the</strong> Allies English and French. The Romanian delegation,<br />
which recently left for London to extend <strong>the</strong> economic agreement, will be in a difficult<br />
situation.<br />
d) In <strong>the</strong> recent days <strong>the</strong> governing Romanian group has become stern towards <strong>the</strong><br />
moderate opposition – people of <strong>the</strong> National Farmers’ Party. Its leader Maniu is very popular<br />
and <strong>the</strong>y say one must not tamper with him. To make up for it, very popular gentleman in<br />
Bucharest society Virgil Madgearu, whom I personally knew well from <strong>the</strong> times of Geneva<br />
conferences and London economic conferences, was deported to a monastery (Bistriţa) on<br />
Easter evening. Deported Madgearu moved very actively in <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps and was a very<br />
useful informer. It is a great pity that he has to live in a monastery. This moderate opposition,<br />
by <strong>the</strong> way, was and is very hostile towards <strong>the</strong> large authoritarian states, Germany in<br />
particular. Some see foreign influence also in <strong>the</strong> repressions of <strong>the</strong> recent days. The national<br />
court irrevocably deprived leader of <strong>the</strong> farmers’ party Maniu of <strong>the</strong> chance to take senator’s<br />
seat that according to <strong>the</strong> Constitution was a person’s right. Maniu refused to put on <strong>the</strong><br />
spotted F.R.N. uniform and to give an oath to <strong>the</strong> new system and with that his prospects of<br />
senator’s seat were gone.<br />
The gentlemen in <strong>the</strong> Romanian government lately have delivered several speeches, in<br />
which I found nothing new. Prime Minister Tătărescu in general phrases described <strong>the</strong><br />
importance of <strong>the</strong> people’s unity and readiness to bear sacrifices and said that [people] had to<br />
be strong and that everything had to be sacrificed for <strong>the</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning of <strong>the</strong> army, that new<br />
burdens had to be assumed and care had to be taken to ensure that <strong>the</strong> riches of <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
land do not come into <strong>the</strong> hands of foreign invaders.<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gafencu did not say anything new in his speech ei<strong>the</strong>r and again<br />
in general terms described <strong>the</strong> Romanians’ readiness to defend <strong>the</strong>ir borders. He also spoke<br />
about friendship with <strong>the</strong> Italians, Bulgarians and <strong>the</strong> Balkan allies.<br />
The King himself has also availed himself of <strong>the</strong> opportunity of <strong>the</strong> opening of <strong>the</strong><br />
parliament’s session (about which I reported to you separately in my report No. d.2/390 of 7 th<br />
March, this year) and of <strong>the</strong> handing of <strong>the</strong> reply by <strong>the</strong> parliamentary delegation to <strong>the</strong> King to<br />
speak on <strong>the</strong> domestic, foreign and defence policies. The main <strong>the</strong>sis [of his speech]: neutrality<br />
in foreign policy and friendship with <strong>the</strong> Balkan allies and Italy, good <strong>relations</strong> with Bulgaria. In<br />
1<br />
Fleischlose Tage (German) – meatless day.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 423<br />
domestic policy – streng<strong>the</strong>ning of <strong>the</strong> national unity <strong>the</strong> way F.R.N. (The Front of <strong>the</strong> National<br />
Revival) understands it. In defence policy – streng<strong>the</strong>ning of <strong>the</strong> army and border fortifications<br />
by all possible means.<br />
In economic policy <strong>the</strong> Romanians try to improve <strong>the</strong>ir situation with <strong>the</strong> help of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
reforms and projects. The Minister of Agriculture has elaborated a five-year plan for <strong>the</strong><br />
improvement of Romanian agriculture. This programme contains many good things but I do<br />
not see <strong>the</strong> possibility of implementing all or even a considerable part of <strong>the</strong> programme under<br />
<strong>the</strong> conditions of farmers’ inertia and poverty and also lack of state funds. What a country richly<br />
endowed by <strong>the</strong> nature can do if it first and foremost has to try to improve <strong>the</strong> farmer’s<br />
minimum subsistence consumption, which is very short and uniform (maize for <strong>the</strong> man and<br />
beast as <strong>the</strong> only type of food)? They say that <strong>the</strong> Romanian farmer works only 90 days a year<br />
and spends <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> time idling and walking from one plot of land to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Production is uniform: corn and maize. Now <strong>the</strong>y want to teach <strong>the</strong> farmer to grow also<br />
industrial cultures, root-plants and fodder. There is not much hope that this intention will<br />
succeed because <strong>the</strong> leaders of [public] life have grown away from <strong>the</strong> people and do not know<br />
<strong>the</strong> actual needs of <strong>the</strong> people. Those who know and understand <strong>the</strong>se matters better have been<br />
pushed aside into <strong>the</strong> opposition (Maniu with his people). In <strong>the</strong> political sense <strong>the</strong> farmer is<br />
indifferent and <strong>the</strong> poorest layers yield easily to external influence. In economic and financial<br />
terms <strong>the</strong> farmer and <strong>the</strong> agriculturist in general is in <strong>the</strong> power of city and town-dwelling Jews,<br />
same as trade and finances in cities.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> conclusion I have to say that we here are very much looking forward to <strong>the</strong> events of<br />
<strong>the</strong> coming days and weeks. We do not know anything concrete for certain yet, but <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
some premonitions and indirect hints, which give cause for concern about a faster course of<br />
events. In spite of <strong>the</strong> official bravado, <strong>the</strong>y here never<strong>the</strong>less will be ready to make<br />
compromises and to yield to various kinds of pressure, no matter which side it may come from.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 66–68.<br />
178. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 27. marta slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Es te nu darbojos kā prazdams no pag. gada oktobra. Politiskas informācijas par šo rajonu ir<br />
iespējams dabūt, bet grūti ir ko konkrētu dabūt ārā no rumāņu ārlietu ministrijas vīriem, kuri,<br />
starp citu, arī vāji informēti paši par sevi. Diplomātiskā korpusā ir viens otrs „spožāks” vīrs, bet<br />
caurmērā mediokrs 1 materiāls. Prese pilnīgi cenzūras žņaugos un velti tur meklēt kaut ko derīgu<br />
un interesantu. Ceru informatoru aprindas paplašināt nākotnē, lai gan viens otrs derīgs cilvēks<br />
pazudis pēdējā laikā (Madgearu). Nāks klāt Stoika (bij. sūtnis Rīgā un pēdējā laikā Ankārā), bet<br />
viņš esot ļoti sarūgtināts, ka viņa ģimenes lietu dēļ priekšniecība to atsaukusi no posteņa<br />
Ankārā. Stoikam trāpījusies pārāk smuka un jauka mašīnrakstītāja, kas izkonkurējusi drusku<br />
ekstravaganto Stoika kundzi, kurai tomēr stipri sakari rumāņu vadošās aprindās. Karalis Karols<br />
palicis pavisam nopietns un strādīgs. No senā vieglprātīgā dzīves veida neesot vairs ne vēsts, lai<br />
gan intīmāko padomdevēju vidū vēl savu lomu neesot izspēlējusi slavenā Lupesku kundze.<br />
Ļaudis saka, ka šī dāma esot trakoti gudrs sievišķis. Pa starpām esot gan bijušas arī citas skaistas<br />
favorītes, bet tās nu būs baumas vairāk nekā patiesība. Troņmantinieks Miķelis [Mihajs] –<br />
jauneklis kā ozols, bet daudz nopietnāks par tēvu jaunības gados. Drusku esot mantojis raksturā<br />
1<br />
Mediocre (angļu val.) – viduvējs.
424 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
no tēva tieksmi uz skaistām meitām, bet esot ļoti kautrīgs un neveikls vairāku smuku dāmu<br />
sabiedrībā. Lai kā arī nebūtu, karaļa nama rokās pašreiz ir visa vara Rumānijā. Politiķu vidū nav<br />
sevišķi spilgtu figūru, izņemot vienīgi Maniu, kas ir nobīdīts opozīcijā. Tik daudz par rumāņu<br />
lietām.<br />
Es būtu ļoti pateicīgs Jums, augsti godātais ministra kungs, ja Jūs atrastu par iespējamu man<br />
paziņot, kādas Jums būtu vēlēšanās attiecībā uz manu darbību šinī rajonā.<br />
Es esmu ļoti priecīgs par mana darbības rajona paplašināšanu ar Turciju, kurai ar Balkānu<br />
rajonu ir cieši sakari. Būtu arī Jums pateicīgs par norādījumiem, ko darīt gadījumā, ja šeit<br />
nākotnē būtu jāpiedzīvo līdzīgi notikumi kā pag. septembrī Varšavā. Es gan nedomāju, ka tā<br />
kaut kas stāvētu tuvākā nākotnē priekšā, bet laikmets ir pilns ar pārsteigumiem un galu galā<br />
nekas nav neiespējams. Ja šeit paliktu „par karstu”, vai virzīties Budapeštas vai Amerikas<br />
virzienā? Ja pārsteigumi būtu strauja rakstura, maz domājams, ka ceļš uz ziemeļrietumiem<br />
(Ungāriju) būtu brīvs. Es personīgi domāju, ka šādā (pagaidām maz paredzamā) gadījumā būtu<br />
jāpaliek uz vietas un jāgaida, par kādu caurumu varētu izkļūt laukā.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f. 4. apr., 7664. l., 71. lp.<br />
178. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 27 th March 1940<br />
I have worked here now to <strong>the</strong> best of my ability since October, last year. It is possible to<br />
obtain political information about this region, but it is difficult to get anything concrete out of<br />
<strong>the</strong> men in <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who, by <strong>the</strong> way, are also poorly informed<br />
about <strong>the</strong>mselves. In <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps <strong>the</strong>re is a “brighter” man or two, but on <strong>the</strong> average<br />
[<strong>the</strong>y are] a mediocre material. The press is under total oppression by <strong>the</strong> censorship and one<br />
would in vain search it for anything useful or interesting. I hope to broaden <strong>the</strong> range of my<br />
informers, although some useful persons (Madgearu) have disappeared lately. Stoica (former<br />
Envoy in Riga and lately in Ankara) will join <strong>the</strong> ranks, but he is said to be very disappointed<br />
that his superiors withdrew him from his post in Ankara due to his family matters. His typist<br />
had been too pretty and nice and has won in <strong>the</strong> competition with <strong>the</strong> somewhat extravagant<br />
Mrs. Stoica, who however has powerful contacts in <strong>the</strong> ruling Romanian circles. They say that<br />
King Carol has become thoroughly serious and works hard. There is no trace of <strong>the</strong> once<br />
frivolous lifestyle although among <strong>the</strong> most intimate advisors famous Mrs. Lupescu 1 has not yet<br />
played out her role. They say that this lady is an extremely smart woman. In between <strong>the</strong>re had<br />
been o<strong>the</strong>r beautiful favourites, but that must be rumour ra<strong>the</strong>r than fact. Heir to <strong>the</strong> throne<br />
Mihai – a young man [stately] like an oak tree 2 – but much more serious than his fa<strong>the</strong>r was at<br />
his age. They say that he has inherited some of his fa<strong>the</strong>r’s weakness for beautiful maidens, but<br />
that he is very shy and uncouth in <strong>the</strong> company of several pretty ladies. Be as it is, all power in<br />
Romania is now in <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong> King’s house. Among <strong>the</strong> politicians <strong>the</strong>re are no very<br />
striking figures, with exception of Maniu, who has been pushed into opposition. That much<br />
about <strong>the</strong> Romanian matters.<br />
1<br />
Elena Lupescu (1896-1977) was <strong>the</strong> mistress and late wife of King Carol II, one of <strong>the</strong> shadow members of king’s<br />
camarilla.<br />
2<br />
A Latvian phrase, describing a stately-built man; in Latvian it is traditional to compare stately men to oak-trees<br />
(same as well-built women to lime-trees) (translator’ note).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 425<br />
I would be very grateful if you, Mr. Minister, found it possible to inform me of your wishes<br />
with respect to my activities in this region.<br />
I am vey glad that <strong>the</strong> field of my activities has been enlarged to include Turkey, which has<br />
close contacts with <strong>the</strong> Balkan region. I would also be grateful for your indications what to do in<br />
case events similar to those that took place in Warsaw last September happened here at some<br />
time in <strong>the</strong> future. I do not think that anything like that is to be expected in <strong>the</strong> near future, but<br />
this time is full of surprises and after all nothing is impossible. If it becomes “too hot” here, shall<br />
I move towards Budapest or America? If surprises are fast developing, it is unlikely that <strong>the</strong> way<br />
to Northwest (Hungary) will remain free. I personally think that in such a (for <strong>the</strong> time being<br />
unlikely) case I should stay where I am and wait for a chance to get out through a hole.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 71.<br />
179. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 4. aprīļa slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Esmu pietiekoši ilgu laiku Bukarestē, lai varētu taisīt novērojumus par mūsu goda konsulu<br />
T. V. Orgidanu. Pašreiz viņš saslimis ar aklo zarnu un šinīs dienās taisīs operāciju.<br />
T. V. Orgidans savā laikā, resp., Rumānijas „demokrātijas laikmetā”, ir spēlējis diezgan<br />
ievērojamu lomu Bukarestē, bijis galvaspilsētas valdes padomnieks, Bukarestes tirdzniecības un<br />
rūpniecības kameras priekšsēdētājs un taisījis labus veikalus. Orgidans ir visu laiku pie<br />
Nacionālās zemnieku partijas līderiem un viņa labākais draugs esot Virgils Madgearu, bijušais<br />
finanšu ministrs un Nacionālās zemnieku partijas ģenerālsekretārs. Arī Maniu (Nacionālās<br />
zemnieku partijas priekšsēdētājs) savā laikā Orgidanu izlietojis kā veikalniecisku „rokas puisi”.<br />
Tagad nu visa tā godība un iespaidi stipri sašļukuši. Maniu ir nobīdīts opozīcijā un pie stingrā<br />
policejiskā režīma, kas te valda, ar maz izredzēm paredzamā nākotnē nokļūt pie varas. Ar pašu<br />
Maniu, kas tautā (zemniekos) esot ļoti populārs, arī tagadējās valdošās aprindas rēķinās un<br />
viņam tieši klāt neķeras, vienīgi ierobežo viņa aktivitāti un tiešā un netiešā ceļā izspiedušas no<br />
visiem posteņiem – politiskiem un saimnieciskiem. Orgidana „labāko draugu” V. Madgearu<br />
tomēr izsūtīja uz provinces klosteri – Bistricā. (Orgidans man saka: „Nez, ko viņš tur nabags<br />
iesāks, tas klosteris ir taču sieviešu klosteris).<br />
Caur šo politisko draugu iespaidu zušanu, mūsu Orgidans pats arī tā kā nobīdīts pie malas<br />
un pašreiz nekādu lielu lomu nedz sabiedrībā, nedz veikalos nespēlē. Viņam atstāts mazs<br />
sabiedrisks postenītis – Palestīnas–Rumānijas tirdzniecības kameras priekšnieks, bet arī šī<br />
posteņa dēļ Orgidanam bijis jānorij „krupis” jāatzīst F. R. N. (Nacionālās Atdzimšanas Fronte),<br />
bez kā nevienu valsts, pašvaldības vai sabiedrisku posteni ieņemt nevar. Orgidans man stāsta,<br />
ka tas bijis jādara un to ļaujot darīt arī Nacionālā Zemnieku partija, bet raibo F. R. N. uniformu<br />
gan viņš nevilkšot mugurā. Par Orgidana veikaliem esmu dzirdējis, ka tie arī nav nekādi spožie<br />
pēdējā laikā. Pats viņš jūsmo un lielās par savu vīna dārzu, kas esot lielisks, kuru vienmēr man<br />
solas rādīt, bet līdz šim vēl šo nodomu nav izdevies realizēt. Vīni un „cuika” (rumāņu šņabis), ko<br />
Orgidans ražo, nav labas kvalitātes, bet tādi jau nu visi te tie vīni, kurus, bez riska samaitāt<br />
iekšas, var dzert tikai ar ūdeni kopā. Tā manta te ir ļoti lēta un nekādu bagātību droši vien<br />
nenes. Tad Orgidans piedalās ar akcijām vairākos un dažāda rakstura veikalnieciskos<br />
uzņēmumos. Pa klusam laikam arī melnā biržā, kuras ziedu laiki sākt saplakt pēc jaunā ārējās<br />
tirdzniecības ministra enerģiskās un no rumāņu valsts interešu viedokļa vienīgi pareizās rīcības.<br />
Tad vēl Orgidans darbojas mūsu gumijas fabrikas „Quadrat” filiāles valdē. Bet galvenais saturs
426 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
un materiālais pamats ir Orgidana kundzes un kundzes ģimenes mājas un īpašumi Bukarestē<br />
un Sinaijā. Kundze, kā liekas, arī vispārīgi ir ar dziļāku inteliģenci nekā mūsu ģenerālkonsuls<br />
pats. Viņa galvenā sliktā īpašība ir lielīšanās bez mēra un malas. Caur to nu viņš šad un tad<br />
nonāk pavisam komiskās situācijās. Sākumā, kad es te ierados, Orgidans lielījās ar milzīgiem<br />
sakariem. Pat pie karaļa viņš varot iet un nākt kā pie veca pazīstama. Karalis ar viņu runājot<br />
stundām ilgi etc. Praksē nu ir izrādījies, ka augstākie rumāņu kungi Orgidanu nemaz lāgā<br />
nepazīst un par karaļa pazīšanu pavisam šaubas, vai viņš zina, ka tāds kungs Orgidans vispārīgi<br />
eksistē. Tā man Orgidans lielījās ar lielu pazīšanos un draudzību pie ļoti iespaidīgā Bukarestes<br />
pilsētas galvas ģenerāļa Dombrovska. Kad abi ar Orgidanu ieradāmies pie šī kunga vizītē,<br />
sarunā iznāca, ka ģenerālis Dombrovskis mūsu Orgidanu redz pirmo reizi un noturēja par<br />
manu darbinieku. Tāpat apmēram izgāja vizītē pie diktatoriskā Bukarestes [policijas] prefekta<br />
ģenerāļa Modreanu. Pēc šīm „neveiksmēm” mūsu Orgidans palicis pavisam kluss un atturīgs un<br />
lielīšanās vairāk koncentrējas uz labu cigāru pazīšanu un kavēšanos bijušo „labo laiku” atmiņās.<br />
Orgidans tomēr mūsu zemei ir savā laikā daudz pakalpojumu izdarījis un, pazīstot vietējās<br />
„metodes”, spēj panākt un nokārtot lietas, kas normālos ceļos ir ļoti grūti izdarāmas jeb prasa<br />
ļoti daudz laika. Arī tagad Orgidans un viņa ģimene ieņem cienījamu stāvokli Bukarestē un kā<br />
goda konsulārais pārstāvis [viņš] ir pilnīgi pieņemams un noderīgs.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 72.–73. lp.<br />
179. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 4 th April 1940<br />
I have been in Bucharest long enough to be in <strong>the</strong> position to make observations about our<br />
Honorary Consul T. V. Orghidan. At present he is ill with [<strong>the</strong> inflammation of] <strong>the</strong> blind gut<br />
and will undergo surgery in <strong>the</strong>se days.<br />
In his time, i.e. in <strong>the</strong> “age of democracy” in Romania T. V. Orghidan played a ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
significant role in Bucharest, he was councillor to <strong>the</strong> capital’s administration, Chairman of <strong>the</strong><br />
Chamber of Trade and Industry of Bucharest and made good business. All this time Orghidan<br />
has been among <strong>the</strong> leaders of <strong>the</strong> National Farmers’ Party and Virgil Madgearu, former<br />
Minister of Finance and Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> National Farmers’ Party is said to be his best<br />
friend. In his time Maniu (Chairman of <strong>the</strong> National Farmers’ Party), too, used Orghidan as a<br />
business-minded “henchman”. Now all that grandeur and influence have become greatly<br />
deflated. Maniu has been pushed into <strong>the</strong> opposition and under <strong>the</strong> strict police regime that<br />
rules here he has little hope to come to power in <strong>the</strong> predictable future. The ruling circles take<br />
into account Maniu, who is said to be very popular among <strong>the</strong> people (farmers), and do not<br />
directly tamper with him, but only restrict his activities and by direct and indirect means <strong>the</strong>y<br />
have pushed him out of all positions – both political and economic ones. Orghidan’s “best<br />
friend” V. Madgearu was never<strong>the</strong>less deported to a provincial monastery – in Bistriţa.<br />
(Orghidan said to me: “I wonder what that poor fellow will do <strong>the</strong>re, it is a women’s<br />
monastery).<br />
Through <strong>the</strong> disappearance of <strong>the</strong>se political friends our Orghidan himself, too, has been as<br />
if pushed aside and at present does not play any considerable role ei<strong>the</strong>r in society or in<br />
business. He has been left with a minor economic position – Chairman of Palestine–Romania<br />
Trade Chamber, but <strong>the</strong>y say that even for that position Orghidan has had to swallow “a toad” 1<br />
1<br />
Latvian idiom, meaning „to do or to reconcile with something extremely unpleasant” (translator’s note).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 427<br />
– to recognise F.R.N. (The Front of <strong>the</strong> National Revival), which is a necessary precondition to<br />
take any state, municipal or public office. Orghidan told me that he had to do it and that <strong>the</strong><br />
National Farmers’ Party allowed it, too, but that he would not wear <strong>the</strong> spotted F.R.N. uniform.<br />
As concerns Orghidan’s businesses I have heard that <strong>the</strong>y do not quite prosper lately. He<br />
himself admires and boasts with his vineyard, which according to him is excellent and which he<br />
keeps promising to show me, but so far this intention has not been carried out. Vines and<br />
“cuika” (Romanian brandy) that Orghidan makes is not of high quality but all those vines here<br />
are like that and without a risk to one’s digestion can be consumed only when diluted with<br />
water. That stuff is very cheap here and is very likely to bring huge profit. Then Orghidan also<br />
has shares in several business companies of various types. Covertly probably [he trades] also in<br />
<strong>the</strong> black exchange, whose high day has begun to set after <strong>the</strong> new Minister of External Trade<br />
took measures that from <strong>the</strong> perspective of <strong>the</strong> national interests was <strong>the</strong> only right way. Then<br />
Orghidan is also on <strong>the</strong> board of <strong>the</strong> affiliate of our rubber factory “Quadrat”. But <strong>the</strong> main<br />
substance and material base is Mrs. Orghidan’s and her family’s houses and properties in<br />
Bucharest and Sinaia. Mrs. Orghidan in general seems to be endowed with deeper intelligence<br />
than our General Consul himself. His major flaw is boasting without moderation or end.<br />
Through that he now and <strong>the</strong>n finds himself in very comic situations. At <strong>the</strong> beginning, when I<br />
arrived here, Orghidan boasted of having powerful contacts. He said he could even visit <strong>the</strong><br />
King at any time he liked like <strong>the</strong>y were old acquaintances. He said that <strong>the</strong> King conversed<br />
with him for hours etc. It turned out however that <strong>the</strong> most-high ranking Romanian gentlemen<br />
actually did not even quite know Orghidan and as concerns his acquaintanceship with <strong>the</strong><br />
King, <strong>the</strong>re is doubt that <strong>the</strong> latter even knows about <strong>the</strong> existence of such Mr. Orghidan. Thus<br />
Orghidan boasted to me of his close acquaintanceship and friendship with very influential head<br />
of <strong>the</strong> city of Bucharest General Dombrovski 1 . When Orghidan and I toge<strong>the</strong>r paid this<br />
gentleman a visit in <strong>the</strong> course of our discussion it turned out that General Dombrovski saw our<br />
Orghidan for <strong>the</strong> first time and thought he was a member of my staff. The situation was more<br />
or less similar on <strong>the</strong> occasion of our visit with dictatorial prefect of Bucharest [police] General<br />
Modreanu 2 . After <strong>the</strong>se “failures” our Orghidan has become quite silent and reserved and his<br />
boasting is focused more on his expertise in good cigars and his lingering in his memories of <strong>the</strong><br />
bygone “good times”.<br />
For all that in his time Orghidan has done much service for our country and through his<br />
knowledge of <strong>the</strong> local “methods” he is able to achieve and arrange things, which through <strong>the</strong><br />
normal ways would be difficult to do or would require much time. Orghidan and his family still<br />
enjoy a respectable status in Bucharest and as an honorary consular representative he is fully<br />
acceptable and useful.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 72–73.<br />
180. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. g. 13. apr. ziņojums ārlietu ministram V.<br />
Munteram<br />
Balkānu rajonā pēc līdz šim zināmiem Skandināvijas notikumiem 3 ir sekojošs noskaņojums:<br />
1<br />
Victor Dombrovski (1887-1969) was a Romanian general and mayor general of Bucharest (1938-1940).<br />
2<br />
General Rodrig Modreanu was Prefect of <strong>the</strong> Police of Bucharest and Mayor of Bucharest (1941).<br />
3<br />
Domāta Vācijas realizētā Norvēģijas militārā pakļaušana un Somijas–Padomju Savienības kara noslēgums.
428 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
a) Politiski diplomātiskās aprindās – liela nervozitāte un nezināšana. Attiecībās ar Vāciju<br />
nav acīmredzamu saspīlējumu, bet no vācu puses stingrāka nostāja un kategoriskākas prasības<br />
izpildīt visu, ko Vācija vēlas. Ar Krieviju attiecības man pats ārlietu ministrs raksturoja kā<br />
“méneçant” 1 no krievu puses. Armijas gatavība cīņai tiek strauji kāpināta. Austrumu pierobežas<br />
rajonos sperti tālejošas sagatavošanās soļi un dažās zonās pat izvestas cilviliedzīvotāju<br />
evakuācijas. Militārās prasības, rekvizīcijas etc. sāk jūtamā veidā traucēt ikdienišķo, līdz šim<br />
normālo dzīvi. Lauksaimniekiem atņemta apmēram puse zirgu. Lauku darbi, kas šinī laikā citus<br />
gadus Rumānijā būtu bijuši pilnā gaitā, tagad nemaz nav sākti. Vēlā pavasara, plūdu, bet arī<br />
darba roku trūkuma dēļ (patiesībā neorganizētā un haotiskā darba roku sadalījuma dēļ) un<br />
zirgu rekvizīciju dēļ. Armijā sliktās kopšanas dēļ ļoti liels procents zirgu aizgājis bojā.<br />
Sabiedroto aktivitāte arī pastiprinās, bet vairāk diplomātiskā laukā. Jaunus notikumus gaidām<br />
pēc sabiedroto sūtņu atgriešanās Balkānos. Baumas cirkulē, ka arī angļi uzstādot rumāņiem<br />
ultimatīvas prasības izšķirties, kurā lēģerī tie grib karu vest. Pilnīgu un neierobežotu vācu<br />
prasību izpildīšanu sabiedrotie turpmāk necietīšot. No citas puses dzirdams atkal, ka rumāņi<br />
taisoties tomēr strauji piegriezties sabiedroto pusē, ja vēl pašā pēdējā laikā mēģinājumi atrast<br />
Itālijā atbalstu un praktisku draudzību nevaiņagotos ar sekmēm. Rumānija tic, ka turki ir droši<br />
sabiedrotie. Par Dienvidslāviju šaubās, jo tur esot pavisam viss “nogājis no grauda” un iegrimis<br />
korupcijā un vācu–itāļu iespaidos [..].<br />
b) Saimnieciskās aprindas mēģina vēl “ieraut”, kamēr nav par vēlu. Cenas kāpj. Jaunie<br />
nodokļi jūtami skar apgrozījumus, bet rosība vēl nav atslābusi. Uz laukiem trūkums un lauku<br />
stāvoklis ir slikts. Paredzētai sējumu paplašināšanai (sevišķi eļļas augļu) nepārvarami šķēršļi<br />
sēklas trūkuma dēļ un zemnieku nabadzības un jebkāda lauksaimnieku kredīta trūkuma dēļ.<br />
Bukarestes “melnbiržnieki”, kas te funkcionē puslīdz atklāti, drusku iebiedēti un spekulācijas<br />
vairs tā neplaukst, kā pāris mēnešus atpakaļ. “Melnie kursi” valūtām stipri krituši, ko citi iztulko<br />
ar Rumānijas “samērā drošo stāvokli”.<br />
c) Dažādas ziņas. 1) Nesen šeit noticis gadījums, kas slēpj sevī nopietnu sarežģījumu<br />
dīgļus. Līdz ko Donavas ūdeņi atbrīvojās no ledus, sākās skriešanās ap Donavas baržām un<br />
velkoņiem. Daudzi no šiem ar zeltu sveramie Donavas satiksmes līdzekļi pieder grieķiem vai<br />
brauc zem grieķu flagas. Tā nesen kādi 4 kuģīši ieradušies pa Donavas izteku rumāņu Donavas<br />
ostu rajonos. Noslēpumainā kārtā sāktas pārlādēt kaut kādas aizdomīgas kastes uz baržām un<br />
citiem kuģīšiem, kas dodas ar Vācijai adresētam precēm pa Donavu augšup. Vācu sūtniecības<br />
“papildus darbinieki” tūliņ ziņojuši savam šefam par šo aizdomīgo transporta kustību. 2 kuģīši<br />
(viens ar kukurūzu, otrs ar labību), kas adresēti Vācijai, lielajos plūdu ūdeņos nogrimuši. Daži<br />
stāsta, ka uz šiem satiksmes līdzekļiem notikuši sprādzieni. Vācu sūtnis kategoriski prasījis<br />
pārmeklēt aizdomīgos, zem grieķu flagas braucošos kuģīšus. Rumāņi spirinājušies, bet zem<br />
pavisam nopietnu vācu draudu spiediena – beidzot kuģīšus pārmeklējuši. Atklājies, ka šos<br />
kuģīšus vadījuši 8 angļu jūras virsnieki un ka noslēpumainajās “pārtikas” kastēs atrasts liels<br />
daudzums dinamīta, ieroču un munīcijas. Vācieši prasījuši 8 angļu internēšanu, bet tie vēl laikā<br />
ar citu kuģīti paspējuši izsprukt Melnajā jūrā un pazust. Vācieši rūc un draud, ka pie līdzīgu<br />
gadījumu atkārtošanās Rumānijas valdībai jārēķinoties ar enerģiskākiem vācu soļiem savu<br />
interešu aizstāvēšanā. Rumāņi mēģina šo gadījumu tušēt un bagatelizēt 2 [..].<br />
1<br />
Méneçant (franču val.) – draudošas.<br />
2<br />
Domāts – padarīt nenozīmīgu.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 429<br />
2) Kādam mūsu tirgotājam, kas te pāris nedēļas meklē ceļus un iespējas tranzītam un citiem<br />
veikaliem Hoffu uzdevumā, Padomju Krievijas sūtniecība ieteikusi taisīties, cik vien ātri<br />
iespējams no Rumānijas projām un, saprotams, nepaskaidrojot iemeslus.<br />
3) Cirkulē baumas par gaidāmu drīzu rumāņu vispārēju mobilizāciju un, ka pēc dažām<br />
nedēļām arī Itālija piedalīšoties karā Vācijas pusē [..].<br />
Tādas izskatās Eiropas traģēdijas lietas, no Bukarestes raugoties un klausoties.<br />
Baltijas valstu stāvokli šeit novērtē samērā optimistiski, jo mēs esam puslīdz nodrošināti no<br />
tiešā kara posta, lai gan viss pie mums tagad atkarīgs no Krievijas tālākās nostājas. Bieži dzirdu<br />
jautājumu – ko darīs krievi? Es saku, ka krievi līdz nākošai kara fāzei nedarīs neko. Var rasties<br />
sarežģījumi ziemeļos, kur pie eventuāla sabiedroto vājāku spēku iebrukuma krieviem varētu<br />
rasties griba sasniegt Atlantijas okeāna krastus, bet tad vāciešiem pāris norvēģu ostas jāatdod<br />
krievu pārvaldīšanā. Otrais krievu aktīvas uzstāšanās mērķis var būt Besarābija, bet tad<br />
jārēķinās ar Balkānu uzliesmošanu visā plašumā un turku un sabiedroto pretakciju Kaukāzā un<br />
tajos pašos Balkānos.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l, 74. – 76. lp.<br />
180. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign Affairs V.<br />
Munters, 13 th April 1940<br />
After <strong>the</strong> developments in Scandinavia that are known so far 1 <strong>the</strong> mood in <strong>the</strong> Balkan region<br />
is following:<br />
a) In <strong>the</strong> political and <strong>diplomatic</strong> circles – great nervousness and uncertainty. In <strong>relations</strong><br />
with Germany <strong>the</strong>re are no visible tensions but <strong>the</strong> German side has adopted a stricter position<br />
and poses more categorical demands for all of its requirements to be fulfilled. Relations with<br />
Russia <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs personally described to me as “méneçant” 2 from <strong>the</strong><br />
Russian part. The Army’s combat readiness is being raised rapidly. In <strong>the</strong> eastern frontier<br />
districts far-reaching steps of preparation have been made and from several zones <strong>the</strong> civilians<br />
have even been evacuated. Military demands, requisitions etc. begin in a tangible way to<br />
hamper <strong>the</strong> daily life, which until now had been normal. Farmers have been taken away about<br />
half of <strong>the</strong>ir horses. Field work that would have proceeded at full speed in Romania at this time<br />
in o<strong>the</strong>r years, has not even been started yet. Due to <strong>the</strong> late spring, flood, but also due to <strong>the</strong><br />
lack of labour (but in fact due to unorganized and chaotic distribution of labour). In <strong>the</strong> Army a<br />
very large proportion of horses have died due to poor tendance. The Allies also increase <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
activity, but more so in <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> field. We expect new developments after <strong>the</strong> return of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Allies’ envoys to <strong>the</strong> Balkans. Rumours are afloat that <strong>the</strong> English, too, have presented<br />
ultimative demands to <strong>the</strong> Romanians to decide with which camp <strong>the</strong>y want to fight. The Allies<br />
are reported to have declared that <strong>the</strong>y would not tolerate any fur<strong>the</strong>r full and unlimited<br />
fulfilment of <strong>the</strong> German demands [by <strong>the</strong> Romanians]. O<strong>the</strong>rs say that <strong>the</strong> Romanians are<br />
never<strong>the</strong>less going to join <strong>the</strong> Allies’ side quickly if <strong>the</strong> efforts to find support and practical<br />
friendship in Italy do not bear fruit at <strong>the</strong> very last moment. In Romania <strong>the</strong>y believe that <strong>the</strong><br />
Turks are reliable allies. About Yugoslavia <strong>the</strong>re are doubts because <strong>the</strong>re everything has<br />
completely “run off <strong>the</strong> rails” and fallen into corruption and under German–Italian influence [..]<br />
1<br />
Here is meant <strong>the</strong> military subjugation of Norway by Germany and <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Finnish – Soviet war.<br />
2<br />
Méneçant (French) – menacing.
430 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
b) The economic circles still try “to rake in” [money] before it is too late. Prices are<br />
climbing. The new taxes affect turnover in a tangible way, but activity has not subsided yet. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> countryside <strong>the</strong>re is poverty and <strong>the</strong> situation is bad. The planned extension of sowings<br />
(those of oil cultures in particular) has met with insurmountable obstacles of lack of seed,<br />
poverty of farmers and lack of any loans for agriculturalists. “The black exchange” jobbers who<br />
function <strong>the</strong>re partially openly, have been slightly intimidated and <strong>the</strong> black market does not<br />
flourish so much as it used to a couple of months ago. “The black rates” of currencies have fallen<br />
considerably, which fact is ascribed by some to Romania’s “relatively secure situation”.<br />
c) Various news. 1) Something happened here recently that hides <strong>the</strong> seeds of serious<br />
complications. As soon as <strong>the</strong> Danube waters broke free, race for <strong>the</strong> Danube barges and tugboats<br />
began. Many of <strong>the</strong>se means of transport on <strong>the</strong> Danube that are worth <strong>the</strong>ir weight in<br />
gold are owned by <strong>the</strong> Greeks or sail under <strong>the</strong> Greek flag. Thus recently about 4 boats arrived<br />
along <strong>the</strong> Danube source to <strong>the</strong> district of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Danube ports. Mysteriously <strong>the</strong>re<br />
began <strong>the</strong> reloading of some suspicious boxes [from <strong>the</strong>se vessels] to barges and o<strong>the</strong>r boats,<br />
which sail upstream <strong>the</strong> Danube with cargos that are due for Germany. The “auxiliary staff” of<br />
<strong>the</strong> German Legation immediately reported this suspicious transport movement to <strong>the</strong>ir boss. 2<br />
boats (one carrying maize, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r – grain) due for Germany were sunk in <strong>the</strong> great flood<br />
waters. Some say that explosions took place on <strong>the</strong>se vessels. The German Envoy in categorical<br />
terms demanded <strong>the</strong> search of <strong>the</strong> suspicious boats that sail under <strong>the</strong> Greek flag. The<br />
Romanians kicked against it but under <strong>the</strong> pressure of quite serious German threat have finally<br />
searched <strong>the</strong> ships. It turned out that <strong>the</strong>se ships were commanded by 8 English marine officers<br />
and a large amount of dynamite, weapons and ammunition was found in <strong>the</strong> mysterious “food”<br />
boxes. The Germans demanded interning of <strong>the</strong> 8 Englishmen, but <strong>the</strong> latter managed in time<br />
to escape to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea on a different ship and to disappear. The Germans grumble and<br />
threaten that Romania’s government has to reckon with more energetic measures from <strong>the</strong><br />
German side in <strong>the</strong> protection of <strong>the</strong>ir interests in case something similar happens again. The<br />
Romanians try to hush up and to trivialize this incident [..]<br />
2) The Legation of Soviet Russia recommended a businessman of ours, who had been<br />
staying here for a couple of weeks in order on behalf of <strong>the</strong> Hoffs to look for ways and<br />
possibilities of transit and o<strong>the</strong>r business here, to get out of Romania as quickly as possible,<br />
without giving <strong>the</strong> reasons, of course.<br />
3) Rumours are spreading that soon a general mobilisation of Romanians will begin and that<br />
in a few weeks Italy, too, will engage in <strong>the</strong> war on Germany’s side [..]<br />
This is how <strong>the</strong> matters of <strong>the</strong> European tragedy look and sound like from <strong>the</strong> vantage point<br />
of Bucharest.<br />
The situation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States is regarded here in a relatively optimistic light because we<br />
are more or less shielded from <strong>the</strong> direct misery of <strong>the</strong> war although now everything in our<br />
country depends on <strong>the</strong> position that Russia will take. I am often asked: what are <strong>the</strong> Russians<br />
going to do? I respond that until <strong>the</strong> next phase of <strong>the</strong> war <strong>the</strong> Russians will do nothing.<br />
Complications may arise in <strong>the</strong> north, where in case of an eventual invasion by a weaker allies’<br />
force <strong>the</strong> Russians may develop a desire to reach <strong>the</strong> Atlantic coast, but in that case <strong>the</strong><br />
Germans would have to give a couple of Norwegian ports to <strong>the</strong> Russians to govern. The second<br />
target of active Russian measures could be Bessarabia, but in that case one has to reckon with
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 431<br />
<strong>the</strong> entire Balkans bursting into flames and with counter-measures by <strong>the</strong> Turks and Allies in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Caucasus and in <strong>the</strong> Balkans.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 74–76.<br />
181. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 22. aprīļa slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
1. Ārējās lietas. Nervozitāte un nezināšana par rītdienu būtu īsos vārdos pareizais<br />
raksturojums. Gatavošanās aizstāvēties tiek kāpināta ļoti straujā tempā. Angļu sūtnis ir<br />
atgriezies no savām apspriedēm Londonā un visi nu gaidām, kas nu notiks. Tā kā vispārējā<br />
pārliecība valda, ka kaut kam jānotiek, bet kam īsti, to neviens nezin. Oficiālajām deklarācijām<br />
par miera uzturēšanas pūlēm pavisam maza vai pat nekāda nozīme.<br />
Bez sabiedroto (angļu – franču) tiešas provokācijas tuvākās nedēļās no vācu, krievu vai itāļu<br />
puses militārās akcijas negaidām. Neesam tomēr skaidrībā, vai šīs sabiedroto provokācijas<br />
tomēr nenotiks. Tā saucamās labi informētās aprindās (Ārlietu ministrija, diplomātiskais<br />
korpuss, žurnālisti un politizējošie privātie ļaudis) ieskati dalās: a) vieni saka, ka vācu<br />
uzbrukums būs vistuvākā laikā, jo vāciešiem pēc ne visai labi izdevušās akcijas ziemeļos<br />
nepieciešamas jaunas, viegli sasniedzamas sekmes; b) otra daļa saka, ka vācieši un itāļi neko<br />
negribēšot riskēt, pirms nav pilnīgi nodrošinājuši savas pozīcijas Norvēģijā un Skandināvijā<br />
vispārīgi.<br />
Krievu Chargé d’Affaires man draudzīgā sarunā pateica apmēram sekojošo: Padomju<br />
Savienībai zemes gabali nav vajadzīgi. Tā tāpēc nesāks karu Besarābijas dēļ. Rumāņiem<br />
Molotovs 1 savā runā ir pateicis skaidri un gaiši, ka Besarābijas okupāciju neatzīst un tāpēc<br />
rumāņiem esot jāatrod iespēja un veids šo lietu nokārtot. Krievi vēl šodien velti gaidot uz<br />
rumāņu priekšlikumiem šajā ziņā. Bet, ja šinī rajonā kaut kas notiktu, tad gan Padomju Krievija<br />
nepalikšot „ar rokām kabatās” mierīga novērotāja lomā. Diezgan skaidrs viedoklis. Par rumāņu<br />
militārām lietām mans padomju kolēģis runāji stipri negližējoši 2 : „Ar ko tad nu šie (rumāņi)<br />
domā aizstāvēties? Vai ar dzīvu gaļu pret tēraudu un dzelzi, kā poļi to darīja?” Vairāk kā<br />
izmocītu zemnieku miesas rumāņiem slavenajā Karola līnijā neesot nekā ko pretim stādīt labi<br />
apbruņotajiem spēkiem. Krievu kolēģis arī domā, ka esot sagaidāmas angļu provokācijas un tad<br />
„tā lieta iešot vaļā” arī šeit. Starp citu, krievu Chargé d’Affaires neskopojās ar komplimentiem<br />
mums, ka mēs pratuši savu stāvokli nodrošināt un izbēgt no kara briesmām. Viņš un viņa<br />
valdība bieži norādot citiem (laikam arī rumāņiem) uz mūsu piemēru. Rumānijas propagandas<br />
ministrs Giuresku Itālijā, kā liekas, uzņemts diezgan vēsi. Nav bijušas audiences nedz pie<br />
Musolīni un pat ne pie ārlietu ministra Čano. Toties viņš bijis audiencē pie pāvesta un ticies ar<br />
itāļu kultūras darbiniekiem. Nekas nav arī dzirdēts, kāpēc izputējis domātais vai gribētais<br />
ārlietu ministra Gafenku brauciens uz Romu.<br />
Bukarestē dzirdam runājam, ka rumāņi taisīšot apslēptu (?) pagriezienu uz angļu – franču<br />
pusi. Tam lāgā neticu, jo tas izsauktu stingru vācu nostāju un tūlītēju pretakciju, bet šejienes<br />
politikas „A” un „Z” ir locīšanās starp abiem lēģeriem.<br />
Kā visur apsveiktu pozitīvu soli varu atzīmēt Donavas valstu vienošanos par Donavas<br />
kuģniecības brīvības uzturēšanu visiem līdzekļiem. Ar angļu sabotāžas mēģinājumu, ko laikā<br />
1<br />
Vjačeslavs Molotovs (1890–1986), Padomju Savienības valstsvīrs. 1930.–1941. g. Tautas Komisāru Padomes<br />
priekšsēdētājs, 1939.–1949. g. ārlietu tautas komisārs.<br />
2<br />
Domāts – nicīgi.
432 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
atklājuši vācu spiegi, (pļāpīgā angļu Secret service dāma starplaikā gan vienā viesnīcā atrasta<br />
beigta) ir tomēr jārēķinās kā ar faktu, ko nu jau vairs nenoliedz rumāņu oficiālās iestādes. Tāpēc<br />
arī ir ievesti ļoti stingri ārzemnieku kontroles noteikumi, par kuriem ziņoju atsevišķi<br />
ģenerālsekretāram. Tagad papildus dzirdu, ka jau atrasti vairāki simti vācu „tūristi”, kuru bagāžā<br />
atrastas militāras uniformas, ieroči un munīcija. Tā laikam atkal vācu pretakcija angļu<br />
neveiklajam mēģinājumam spridzināt Donavas upes krasta klintis un slīcināt šaurākās vietās<br />
kuģus un baržas, lai neviens vāciešiem domāts sūtījums vairs pa Donavu nevarētu papeldēt.<br />
2. Iekšējās lietas. Pirmās šķiras notikums ir karaļa un valdošās grupas izlīgšanas mēģinājums<br />
ar latento opozīciju: a) bij. Dzelzs gvardistiem un b) Nacionālo Zemnieku partiju. Abi šo<br />
organizāciju nominālie līderi saņēmuši Kroņa padomnieku titulus un, tos akceptējot, netieši<br />
izlīgšanas mēģinājumam un priekšlikumam piekrituši. Konkrēti par šīm lietām esmu sniedzis<br />
atreferējumus ģenerālsekretāram. Sabiedrībā šī akcija tomēr nav atstājusi gaidīto<br />
nomierināšanos, bet pat radījusi nervozitātes kāpinājumu un „pilsonis uz ielas” tagad tikai gaida<br />
gan iekšējus, bet jo sevišķi ārējus sarežģījumus. Viss tas bremzē normālo dzīves gaitu, kas arvien<br />
vairāk rāda nemieru un priekšā stāvošās nepārvaramās grūtības.<br />
3. Saimnieciskas lietas. Ar kviešu (un pārējās labības) eksporta aizliegumu oficiāli ir gribēts<br />
nodrošināt pašas Rumānijas iekšējās vajadzības. Neoficiāli cirkulē baumas, ka tas darīts, lai<br />
izpaliktu sabiedrotiem un nobremzētu eksportu uz Vāciju. Tuvākā nākotnē esot gaidāma<br />
pārtikas kartiņu ieviešana. Pagaidām gan vēl ne mazākā trūkuma šinīs mantās nemanām.<br />
LVVA, 2575. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 78.–79. lp.<br />
181. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 22 nd April 1940<br />
1. Foreign affairs. Nervousness and uncertainty about tomorrow would be <strong>the</strong> most<br />
appropriate description formulated in a few words. Defence readiness is being raised on a very<br />
rapid speed. The English Envoy has returned from his meetings in London and now we all are<br />
waiting what will happen. The dominating belief is that something must happen, but nobody<br />
knows what exactly. The official declarations about peace-keeping efforts have very little or<br />
even no significance at all.<br />
Without a direct provocation from <strong>the</strong> Allies’ (English–French) part, we do not expect<br />
military action from <strong>the</strong> German, Russian or Italian side to take place in <strong>the</strong> coming weeks. We<br />
are however uncertain whe<strong>the</strong>r such Allies’ provocations will not take place. In <strong>the</strong> so-called<br />
well-informed circles (in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps, among<br />
journalists and politically active private persons) opinion is divided: a) some say that <strong>the</strong><br />
Germans will attack in <strong>the</strong> very near future because after a not very successful campaign in <strong>the</strong><br />
north <strong>the</strong> Germans need a new easy-won achievement; b) o<strong>the</strong>rs say that <strong>the</strong> Germans and<br />
Italians will not take any risk before <strong>the</strong>y have completely secured <strong>the</strong>ir positions in Norway<br />
and Scandinavia in general.<br />
In a friendly discussion <strong>the</strong> Russian Chargé d’Affaires told me approximately <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
The Soviet Union does not need plots of land. Thus it will not wage war for Bessarabia. Molotov 1<br />
in his speech told <strong>the</strong> Romanians loud and clear that he did not recognize <strong>the</strong> occupation of<br />
Bessarabia and for that reason <strong>the</strong> Romanians had to find a possibility and a way to settle this<br />
1<br />
Vyacheslav Molotov (1890–1986), Soviet statesman. 1930–1941 Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of Peoples’ Commissars,<br />
1939–1949 Minister of Foreign Affairs.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 433<br />
issue. The Russians are still waiting in vain for <strong>the</strong> Romanians to make proposals in this regard.<br />
But if something happens in this region, Soviet Russia will not idly remain a peaceful observer<br />
“twiddling its thumbs”. A ra<strong>the</strong>r unambiguous view. About <strong>the</strong> Romanian military matters my<br />
Soviet colleague spoke in a ra<strong>the</strong>r scornful manner: “What are <strong>the</strong>y (Romanians) going to<br />
defend <strong>the</strong>mselves with? Are <strong>the</strong>y going to put living meat against steel and iron, like <strong>the</strong> Poles<br />
did?” [He said that] apart from <strong>the</strong> flesh of haggard peasants <strong>the</strong> Romanians had nothing else to<br />
put in <strong>the</strong> famous Carol’s line against well-armed forces. The Russian colleague also thinks that<br />
English provocations are to be expected and <strong>the</strong>n “things would get on <strong>the</strong> loose here as well”.<br />
By <strong>the</strong> way, <strong>the</strong> Russian charge d’affaires lavished praise on us for our skill to secure our position<br />
and to avoid <strong>the</strong> perils of war. He said that he and his government often mentioned us as a<br />
paragon for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs (most likely for <strong>the</strong> Romanians, too). Romania’s Propaganda Minister<br />
Giurescu, it seems, was met with a ra<strong>the</strong>r cool reception in Italy. He has had no audience ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
with Mussolini or even with Minister of Foreign Affairs Ciano. However, he has had an<br />
audience with <strong>the</strong> Pope and met Italian cultural figures. Nothing is known about <strong>the</strong> reasons<br />
why <strong>the</strong> planned and desired visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Gafencu to Rome went up in<br />
smoke.<br />
There are talks afloat in Bucharest that <strong>the</strong> Romanians will do a covert (?) turn towards <strong>the</strong><br />
English–French. I do not really believe in it because it would provoke <strong>the</strong> Germans to take a<br />
strict position and would trigger an immediate counter-reaction, but <strong>the</strong> “A” and “Z” of <strong>the</strong><br />
politics of this country is writhing between <strong>the</strong> two camps.<br />
As a positive step, which is welcomed by everybody, is <strong>the</strong> agreement among <strong>the</strong> Danube<br />
countries on safeguarding of freedom of shipping in <strong>the</strong> Danube by all possible means.<br />
However, one has to reckon with an English attempt at sabotage, [<strong>the</strong> like of] which was<br />
disclosed by <strong>the</strong> German spies (meanwhile <strong>the</strong> indiscreet lady from <strong>the</strong> English secret service<br />
has been found dead in a hotel) like it was a fact and it is no longer denied by <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
authorities. For that reason very strict regulations on <strong>the</strong> monitoring of foreigners have been<br />
introduced that I reported about to Secretary General individually. In addition to that I heard<br />
that several hundred German “tourists” with military uniforms, weapons and ammunition in<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir luggage have already been found. It is probably a German counter-action to <strong>the</strong> clumsy<br />
English attempt to blow up <strong>the</strong> rocks on <strong>the</strong> Danube coast and to drown ships and barges in <strong>the</strong><br />
most shallow places so that no cargo due for <strong>the</strong> Germans could be shipped along <strong>the</strong> Danube<br />
any longer.<br />
2. Domestic matters. A first-class event is <strong>the</strong> attempted reconciliation of <strong>the</strong> King and <strong>the</strong><br />
ruling group with <strong>the</strong> latent opposition: a) with <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> former Iron Guard and b)<br />
with <strong>the</strong> National Farmers’ Party. The nominal leaders of both <strong>the</strong>se organisations have<br />
received <strong>the</strong> titles of <strong>the</strong> Crown’s advisors and by accepting <strong>the</strong>m have indirectly accepted <strong>the</strong><br />
attempt at and proposal of reconciliation. I have reported details about <strong>the</strong>se matters to<br />
Secretary General. This campaign however has not achieved <strong>the</strong> expected calming down of <strong>the</strong><br />
public but instead even caused <strong>the</strong> increase of nervousness and <strong>the</strong> “citizen from <strong>the</strong> street”<br />
now expects only domestic and especially external complications. It all hinders <strong>the</strong> normal<br />
course of life, which increasingly shows anxiety and <strong>the</strong> insurmountable difficulties that lay<br />
ahead.<br />
3. Economic matters. The prohibition of export of wheat (and o<strong>the</strong>r types of grain) officially<br />
meant to ensure <strong>the</strong> domestic needs of Romania itself. Unofficially rumours are afloat that it
434 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
has been done to please <strong>the</strong> Allies and to suspend exports to Germany. They say that<br />
introduction of food cards is to be expected in <strong>the</strong> nearest future. For <strong>the</strong> time being, however,<br />
not <strong>the</strong> slightest scarcity of <strong>the</strong>se commodities can to be felt.<br />
SHAL, f. 2575, d. 4, file 7664, s. 78–79.<br />
182. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 27. aprīļa slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
1. Kopš mana pēdējā 22. aprīļa ziņojuma No. S1.2/605, šeit nekas nav grozījies vispārējā<br />
situācijā un noskaņās. Noslēgusies atkal viena sērija vācu – rumāņu saimniecisko sarunu.<br />
Pagaidām tuvāk nekas nav zināms, kas tur sarunāts. Galvenā kārtā lieta grozoties ap<br />
maksāšanas noteikumiem. Pieņemu, ka ir mēģināts atkausēt Vācijā „iesalušās” summas un<br />
adaptēt līdzšinējos maksāšanas noteikumus jaunai rumāņu ārējās tirdzniecības un devīzu 1<br />
politikai.<br />
2. Rumāniju turpina pārpludināt „tūristi”, galvenā kārtā no Vācijas. Netrūkst arī „tūristu” no<br />
Rietumu Eiropas valstīm. Jaunie ārzemnieku kontroles noteikumi nav vēl sākuši iedarboties un<br />
dažu noteikumu piemērošana (fotoaparātu, ieroču un munīcijas atdošana) atlikta līdz 5.<br />
maijam.<br />
3. Rumānija jau ar šīs nedēļas vidu sāka svinēt ortodoksālās Lieldienas. Tās svin pamatīgi.<br />
Iestādes paliek ciet veselu nedēļu. Pat Ārlietu ministrijā neko vairāk nevar satikt, kā dežurējošos<br />
atašejus un sekretārus.<br />
4. Uztraucošas baumas tomēr turpina cirkulēt un vācu spēku koncentrācija Slovākijā un ap<br />
Jugoslāvijas robežu man no vairākām pusēm ir apstiprināta, tā kā tur droši vien militārās<br />
pārgrupēšanās notiek.<br />
5. Sabiedroto (angļu – franču) gaidītā rosība vēl nav sevi likusi just. Aizdomīga liekas 2<br />
Donavas kuģu sadursme Donavas deltā, kur galvenais ceļš uz Melno jūru esot aizbloķēts, jo<br />
rumāņiem neesot vajadzīgo ceļamo ierīču, lai kuģīšus izceltu un atbrīvotu ceļu. Vairākās<br />
Donavas ostās satiksme ir traucēta arī nepārstājušos plūdu dēļ. Bukarestē pašā un apkārtnē ir<br />
kopš vairākām dienām jau tīri dienvidnieciskas temperatūras (turas tā starp 20º – 30º).<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 90. Lp.<br />
182. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 27 th April 1940<br />
Since my report No. S1.2/605 of 22 nd April nothing has changed in <strong>the</strong> overall situation and<br />
mood here.<br />
1. Ano<strong>the</strong>r episode of <strong>the</strong> German–Romanian economic talks has come to an end. For <strong>the</strong><br />
time being no details of what <strong>the</strong>y have discussed <strong>the</strong>re are known. They say that <strong>the</strong> focus has<br />
been on <strong>the</strong> payment provisions. I assume that an attempt was made to defreeze <strong>the</strong> sums,<br />
which had been “frozen” in Germany and to adapt <strong>the</strong> existing payment provisions to <strong>the</strong> new<br />
Romanian policy of foreign trade and devises [currency] 2 .<br />
2. “Tourists”, mostly from Germany, continue to flood Romania. “Tourists” from o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Western European countries are not lacking ei<strong>the</strong>r. The new regulations on <strong>the</strong> monitoring of<br />
1<br />
Domāta valūtas politika (franču val. devise – valūta).<br />
2<br />
Currency policy is meant here (French: devise – currency).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 435<br />
foreigners have not yet started to have effect and <strong>the</strong> enforcement of some regulations<br />
(surrendering of cameras, weapons and ammunition) has been postponed till 5 th May.<br />
3. Already around <strong>the</strong> middle of this week Romania began to celebrate <strong>the</strong> Orthodox Easter.<br />
They celebrate it well here. Institutions remain closed for a whole week. Even in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs nobody apart from <strong>the</strong> attachés and secretaries on duty can be met.<br />
4. Alarming rumours never<strong>the</strong>less continue to spread and I have received confirmation from<br />
several sources about <strong>the</strong> concentration of <strong>the</strong> German troops in Slovakia and around<br />
Yugoslavia’s border, thus military re-grouping is most likely taking place <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
5. The expected Allies’ (English–French) activity cannot be felt yet. I find suspicious <strong>the</strong><br />
collision of 2 Danube ships in <strong>the</strong> Danube delta, where as <strong>the</strong>y say <strong>the</strong> main road to <strong>the</strong> Black<br />
Sea has been blocked because <strong>the</strong> Romanians do not have <strong>the</strong> necessary hoisting equipment to<br />
lift <strong>the</strong> boats and free <strong>the</strong> road. In several Danube ports traffic is also disrupted by <strong>the</strong> ceaseless<br />
flood. In Bucharest and environs <strong>the</strong> temperatures are very sou<strong>the</strong>rly (<strong>the</strong>y keep between 20º –<br />
30º).<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 90.<br />
183. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 289 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Grigore Gafencu, 2 mai<br />
1940<br />
Evenimentele din nord sunt considerate de cercurile baltice cu un calm relativ care<br />
contrastează cu neliniștea pe care aceleași cercuri o manifestau față de eventualitatea extinderii<br />
conflictului în regiunea scandinavă înainte de lichidarea războiului ruso-finlandez.<br />
Această deosebire este explicabilă prin schimbarea intervenită în poziția Sovietelor. Înainte<br />
de lichidarea conflictului finlandez, extinderea războiului în nord ar fi pus Rusia în stare de<br />
beligeranță cu Puterile Occidentale, iar aliații baltici ai Sovietelor ar fi putut fi atrași în acest<br />
conflict. Cu Sovietele neutre și decise ca să facă totul pentru a rămâne neutre, acest pericol nu<br />
mai este iminent pentru Statele Baltice. Cercurile baltice cred într-adevăr că Rusia nu va<br />
participa la conflictul nordic decât în caz de absolută necesitate. Cazul s-ar putea prezenta în<br />
ipostaza în care o eventuală instalare definitivă a Aliaților în Scandinavia ar stimula sentimentul<br />
de revanșă finlandez. Asemenea reacție din partea Finlandei este însă considerată aici prea<br />
puțin probabilă.<br />
În aceste condiții, singura consecință de care Statele Baltice ar avea să se teamă în cazul<br />
instalării Aliaților în Scandinavia, ar fi tulburarea navigației în Marea Baltică, navigație care, prin<br />
porturile Statelor Baltice, constituie una din principalele căi de comunicație pentru schimburile<br />
germano-ruse.<br />
Subliniez dorința fermă de neutralitate pe care observatorii baltici o atribuie politicii<br />
sovietice, deoarece ea ar comporta consecințe interesând în cel mai înalt grad regiunea baltică.<br />
În nord această dorință de neutralitate este determinată de teama Sovietelor de a veni în<br />
conflict cu Puterile Occidentale. În Balcani și față de România de considerații analoage, și<br />
anume de teama de a veni în conflict cu Turcia și armata aliată din Orient.<br />
Afirmarea solidarității balcanice, în general, și a celei româno-turce, în special, este deci pe<br />
plan <strong>diplomatic</strong> unul din mijloacele cele mai indicate de a combate veleitățile sovietice în<br />
direcția Balcanilor.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 26-28.
436 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
183. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 289 to Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, 2 nd May 1940<br />
The events in <strong>the</strong> North are considered by <strong>the</strong> Baltic circles quite calmly, which contrasts<br />
<strong>the</strong> anxiety manifested by <strong>the</strong> same circles towards <strong>the</strong> possibility of <strong>the</strong> conflict expansion to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Scandinavian region before <strong>the</strong> settlement of <strong>the</strong> Russo-Finnish war.<br />
This difference is explained by <strong>the</strong> change intervened in <strong>the</strong> Soviets’ position. Before closing<br />
<strong>the</strong> Finnish conflict, <strong>the</strong> expansion of <strong>the</strong> war to <strong>the</strong> north would have placed Russia in a state<br />
of belligerence to <strong>the</strong> Western powers and <strong>the</strong> Baltic allies of <strong>the</strong> Soviets could have been drawn<br />
into this conflict. Given <strong>the</strong> Soviets’ neutrality and <strong>the</strong>ir determination to do everything<br />
necessary to remain neutral, this danger is no longer imminent for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. The Baltic<br />
circles really believe that Russia will only participate in <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn conflict if it is strictly<br />
necessary. The case could be presented in <strong>the</strong> hypostasis in which a possible final installation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Allies in Scandinavia would stimulate <strong>the</strong> feeling of Finnish revenge. Such a reaction from<br />
Finland is however considered improbable here.<br />
Under <strong>the</strong>se circumstances, <strong>the</strong> only consequence that <strong>the</strong> Baltic States could fear in <strong>the</strong><br />
event <strong>the</strong> Allies settle in Scandinavia, would be <strong>the</strong> disturbance of <strong>the</strong> navigation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
Sea, which is one of <strong>the</strong> main ways of communication for <strong>the</strong> German-Russian trade through<br />
<strong>the</strong> ports of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
I emphasize <strong>the</strong> strong desire for neutrality which <strong>the</strong> Baltic observers attribute to <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
policy, as it would involve consequences presenting <strong>the</strong> highest interest for <strong>the</strong> Baltic region. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> north, this desire for neutrality is determined by <strong>the</strong> Soviet fear of coming into conflict with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Western Powers. In <strong>the</strong> Balkans and in relation to Romania by similar considerations,<br />
namely <strong>the</strong> fear of conflict with Turkey and <strong>the</strong> Allied army in <strong>the</strong> East.<br />
The affirmation of <strong>the</strong> Balkan solidarity in general and of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Turkish one, in<br />
particular, is <strong>the</strong>refore at <strong>diplomatic</strong> level one of <strong>the</strong> most appropriate means of fighting against<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet ambitions in <strong>the</strong> Balkans.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 26-28.<br />
184. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 14. maija slepenais ziņojums ārlietu<br />
ministram V. Munteram<br />
Vakareiropas dramatisko notikumu atskaņas šinī rajonā ir smagu pārdomu, klusu izteiktu<br />
bažu un konsternācijas 1 pilnas. Šur un tur pazib prieks un apmierinājums, ka mūsu rajons<br />
(dienvidi) nav bijis tas, kuru „ņemtu priekšā” kā nākošo numuru pēc Skandināvijas. Pirms 10.<br />
maija taisītais troksnis pa Vidusjūru un Balkāniem bija tikai maskēšanās īstajiem nodomiem, lai<br />
gan nevarētu teikt, ka pārsteiguma moments šoreiz būtu bijis tik pilnīgs, kā 9. aprīlī. Sajūta šeit<br />
tomēr ir tāda, ka agrāku vai vēlāku, bet, ka arī šeit nāks tie paši pārbaudījumi. Es esmu pēdējās<br />
dienās runājis ar daudziem ļaudīm rumāņu un vietējā diplomātiskā korpusa aprindās. Visu<br />
kopā saņemot, es varu Jums attēlot sekojošu ainu.<br />
1. Ārpolitiski – militārais stāvoklis. Kāds ļoti augsts rumāņu Ārlietu ministrijas darbinieks<br />
man teica, ka viņi uzskatot notikumu gaitu Eiropā vispārīgi un šeit dienvidaustrumos, atsevišķi<br />
ņemot, par ļoti nopietnu. Jāsagaidot visļaunākais. Visā neskaidrībā viena lieta esot tomēr<br />
pavisam skaidra, t. i., ka Rumānija cīnīsies kaut arī pret pārspēku un fronti uz divām pusēm. Ja<br />
1<br />
Consternation (angļu val.) – satraukums, nemiers, bažas.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 437<br />
arī būtu pēc zaudētas cīņas jāpanes okupācija, tad šinī ziņā Rumānijai ir savi piedzīvojumi, bet<br />
rumāņu noteicošās aprindās nav lielu šaubu par pašreizējā Eiropas kara gala iznākumu. Lai arī<br />
Vācija guvusi un vēl gūs ļoti iespaidīgas uzvaras, tās tālu nenozīmējot sabiedroto uzvarēšanu un<br />
galu galā visas lietas, kuras cilvēku spēkos būšot labot, tikšot arī izlabotas.<br />
No Balkānu Antantes paplašināšanas un kopējas aizstāvēšanas, zināma bloka radīšanas pret<br />
uzbrucējiem, diemžēl nekas prātīgs neiznākot. Rumānija, Dienvidslāvija, Grieķija un Turcija<br />
zināmos apstākļos turēšoties kopā. Bulgārija un Ungārija cerot no Eiropas katastrofas sev ko<br />
iegūt un tāpēc visas pūles esot veltas tās dabūt to valstu orbītā, kas ar līdzšinējo Eiropas stāvokli<br />
bijušas apmierinātas un no kara nekā necer iegūt. No otras puses, Rumānija darīšot visu<br />
iespējamo viņas spēkos, lai uzturētu absolūtu neitralitāti un, lai izvairītos no bruņotas<br />
sadursmes. Cerību, ka tas varētu izdoties, esot maz. Bet tomēr jāmēģina esot. Rumāņu Ārlietu<br />
ministrijā ir pārliecināti, ka Vācijai nav izdevīgi pašreiz iesākt karu arī dienvidos. Sabiedrotie<br />
pārāk aizņemti ar fronti rietumos un bažām par Itālijas nostāju, lai varētu to atļauties to<br />
greznību un izsaukt arī šeit tīšu prātu sarežģījumus. Turki esot pietiekoši stipri, lai atsistu<br />
uzbrukumus viņiem un sabiedroto armijas neesot zemu vērtējamas Sīrijā, Ēģiptē un vēl citās<br />
vietās.<br />
Sakarā ar pēdējo dienu, vai pat stundu, notikumiem Beļģijā un Holandē šeit valda liela<br />
nervozitāte. Dienvidslāvijā noskaņojums esot panisks. Vācu robeža esot slēgta un vācieši<br />
aizbraucot. Arī Turcijā esot trauksmes gatavībā un kuru katru dienu sagaida, ka tai vajadzēs<br />
iejaukties aktīvi sabiedroto pusē. Prātīgi politiķi man saka, ka pēc pāris mēnešiem droši vien<br />
nebūšot nevienas zemes Eiropā, kura nebūšot šā vai tā iejaukta karā. Pastāv ieskati, ka itāļi<br />
varbūt pirmo akciju uzsākšot taisni Balkānos un mēģināšot tikt sabiedrotiem priekšā Salonikos<br />
iekšā. Grieķi esot ļoti delikātā stāvoklī un esot jūtama tā kā šaubīšanās, kuru pusi ieturēt. Par<br />
Itālijas „mīklu” arī šeit šodien vēl nav skaidrības. Versija, ka Itālija darīs visu iespējamo, lai<br />
atbalstītu Vāciju tikai morāliski un propagandistiski, saistot pēc iespējas vairāk sabiedroto<br />
spēkus Vidusjūrā un ap to, nav gluži atmesta, lai gan šaubas ar katru stundu paliek lielākas, vai<br />
tomēr Itālija neieies karā Vācijas pusē jau pēc dažām dienām. Vai tas beigtos ar sabiedroto<br />
katastrofu, jeb ar Itālijas sakaušanu, bez šaubām neviens nevar paredzēt un visa diplomātisko<br />
salonu „stratēģija” nav vairāk vērta, kā kafejnīcu klačas visās zemēs.<br />
Attiecības ar krieviem nav izgājušas no diezgan saspīlēta stāvokļa, kāds pastāvēja kādu laiku<br />
pēc Molotova 29. marta runas. Molotovs gan esot rumāņu sūtnim Maskavā drusku mīkstinājis<br />
padomju valdības nostāju attiecībā uz Besarābiju, bet fakts esot, ka rumāņu sūtnis Maskavā<br />
tiekot „tretēts” 1 diezgan vēsi. Viņam un rumāņu Ārlietu ministrijai esot pavisam vājš kontakts ar<br />
krieviem. Drusku uzlabojušās attiecības ar ungāriem. Ungāru prese nelamājot tik traki<br />
rumāņus, kā tas bijis jau pierasts pēdējā laikā. Arī saimnieciskās lietās esot panākta zināma<br />
vienošanās, kas došot iespēju ar laiku arī politiskās attiecības uzlabot, ja šeit izdotos mieru<br />
saglabāt ilgākam laikam.<br />
2. Iekšpolitiskā „fronte”. Iekšpolitika arī stipri saistās ar ārējām lietām. Pāris dienas atpakaļ<br />
notika valdības reorganizācija. Kādi 4 ministri tika apmainīti. Aizgāja valsts saimniecības<br />
ministrs Angelesku un viņa vietā nāca Cančikovs. Aizgāja arī tieslietu ministrs Istrate Mikesku<br />
un viņa vietā iecelts A. Bentoiu. Līdzšinējais ārlietu II. ģenerālsekretārs A. Krekianu ir iecelts par<br />
ārlietu vice-ministru un kļuvis valdības loceklis. Pārejās pārmaiņas vice-ministru posteņos<br />
maznozīmīgas, kādas patiesībā ir arī pārejās pārmaiņas, jo politikā pagaidām nekas negrozās un<br />
1<br />
Domāts – traktēts (angļu val. treat – izturēties, apieties).
438 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
zemnieku partijas (Maniu un Mihalahe) pārstāvju un „Dzelzs vilku” [gvardes] atlieku<br />
uzņemšana vēl nav nobriedusi. Nervozitāti šeit kāpina baumu jaukšanās ar patiesi dažām<br />
alarmejošām 1 ziņām. Vācu propaganda ir pieņēmusi jau pārlieku plašus apmērus un daudzi<br />
rumāņu paputējuši inteliģences pārstāvji vienkārši par naudu taisa vāciem nepieciešamo<br />
politiku un apstrādā jaunatni un naivākos rumāņu sabiedrības locekļus. „Piektās kolonnas”<br />
avangardi šeit ir ieņēmuši jau ļoti stipras pozīcijas un, ja vienreiz te piedzīvosim militāras<br />
darbības sākumu, tad šie iekšējie spēki vācu dienestā šeit spēlēs ļoti lielu lomu, ja vien ne<br />
izšķirošo. Cīņa ar „tūristiem” tiek vesta, bet nepārliecinoši. Tagad gan uz šosejām sāk kontrolēt<br />
automobiļus un vispār palikuši stipri bargi pret ārzemniekiem, bet efektus vēl neredzam, un<br />
vācu valoda skan diezgan plaši Bukarestes ielās, kafejnīcās un visās vietās, kur ļaudis grozās.<br />
Klusā mobilizācija turpinās, bet par rumāņu bruņojumu reti kad nākas dzirdēt labas<br />
atsauksmes. Trūkstot tanku, aviācija pavisam nenozīmīga, bet kājnieku apbruņojums esot<br />
arhaisks un trūkstot pat drēbju un zābaku, ar ko mobilizētos zemniekus ieģērbt. 10. maijā<br />
Rumānijai ir nacionālie svētki un, lai gan šogad traģiskā starptautiskā stāvokļa dēļ militārā<br />
parāde bija pavisam mazā „stilā”, tad varējām vērot arī labi apbruņotas daļas, ar visiem<br />
moderniem kara rīkiem, jaunus lielgabalus, prettanku un pretaviācijas ieročus u. t. t. Kareivji<br />
bija ietērpti jaunos mundieros, gluži jaunos zābakos, pat zirgiem visi iejūga un sedlošanas<br />
piederumi, kā no darbnīcas nākuši. Provincē tomēr ir nācies redzēt pavisam noplīsušus<br />
kareivjus un žandarmērijas korpusa seržanti ir redzami pastalās, ar getrās aptītiem lieliem. Bet<br />
tas esot te parasta parādība, kā man stāsta kolēģi, kas te jau ilgāku laiku dzīvo.<br />
3. Dažādas ziņas. Rumāņu sabiedrībā vēl arvien dzirdu ļoti negatīvas atsauksmes par bij.<br />
poļu ārlietu ministra Beka dzīves veidu. Brašovas viesnīcā „Aro”, kur Beka ģimene apmetusies,<br />
šis bijušais Polijas valsts vīrs svaidoties ar naudu, dzerot dienām un naktīm, kad tai pašā laikā<br />
simtiem un tūkstošiem poļu bēgļu trūkstot mazākās eksistences iespējas. Arī Smiglijs-Ridzs<br />
Krajovā vedot „maršalam” „piemērotu” dzīvi – ar adjutantiem, daudziem sulaiņiem etc. Liela<br />
daļa poļu bēgļu tomēr no Rumānijas pazudusi. Kara dienestam derīgie (izņemot militārās<br />
formācijās internētie) pamazām ir izfiltrējušies uz Franciju. Civilie ļoti plašos apmēros<br />
pārcēlušies uz Itāliju un citām Balkānu valstīm. Viena liela daļa tikusi arī pāri okeānam un<br />
aizbraukusi uz Ameriku.<br />
Saimnieciskā dzīvē, kādu to redzam ikdienas gaitās, nav nekas grozījies. Dārdzība turpina<br />
celties, bet citādi Rumānijā netrūkst nedz ārzemju, nedz iekšzemes preču. Ir šad un tad<br />
sastrēgumi gaļas tirgū, kas izsaukti ar divu bez gaļas dienu ievešanu. Ļaudis runā, ka šis solis<br />
nav samazinājis gaļas patēriņu, bet pat pavairojis, jo 4 gaļas dienās nedēļā visi cenšas iepirkt<br />
gaļu vairāk, nekā tiem normāli vajadzīgs. Baumu veidā dzirdētās restrikcijas attiecībā uz<br />
benzīna un dažu pārtikas vielu racionēšanu vēl nav ievestas un nav arī trūkuma šais mantās.<br />
Ar Vidusjūras nedrošību šeit tikai īstās saimnieciskās grūtības sāksies, bet Rumānijā un<br />
Balkānos, pusmiera apstākļiem paliekot, šīs grūtības nebūs pārlieku smagas, jo liela daļa<br />
izejvielu ir atrodamas uz vietas un pie kaimiņiem.<br />
Par eventuālu Latvijas tranzīta noorganizēšanu vēl nevar sniegt noteiktas ziņas. Tās man<br />
solītas no Ārlietu un Satiksmes ministrijām, bet jautājuma pētīšana prasa laiku. Es tikai baidos,<br />
ka visa tā pētīšana var izrādīties lieka, ja Vidusjūrā sāktos aktīvas kara flotes un gaisa spēku<br />
darbība, ko ar bažām šeit tomēr sagaida ne visai tālā nākotnē.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7664. l., 92.–93. lp.<br />
1<br />
Domātas satraucošas ziņas.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 439<br />
184. Confidential report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Minister of Foreign<br />
Affairs V. Munters, 14 th May 1940<br />
In this region <strong>the</strong> repercussion of <strong>the</strong> dramatic events in Western Europe is full of heavy<br />
reflection, silently voiced concern and consternation. One gets an occasional glimpse of joy and<br />
satisfaction about <strong>the</strong> fact that this region (<strong>the</strong> south of Europe) was not <strong>the</strong> next one to be<br />
“grabbed by <strong>the</strong> throat” after Scandinavia. The noise made before 10 th May in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean<br />
[region] and <strong>the</strong> Balkans had been only a disguise for <strong>the</strong> actual intentions, although one<br />
cannot say that this time surprise was as total as it was on 9 th April.<br />
Yet <strong>the</strong>re is general awareness here that sooner or later this region will face <strong>the</strong> same trial. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> recent days I have talked to many people in <strong>the</strong> Romanian and foreign <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps. All<br />
summed up, I can draw <strong>the</strong> following picture for you.<br />
1. Foreign policy – military situation. A very high-ranking official of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry<br />
of Foreign Affairs told me that <strong>the</strong>y regarded <strong>the</strong> course of events in Europe in general and here<br />
in its south–eastern part in particular as very serious. One should be prepared for <strong>the</strong> worst. In<br />
all that uncertainty one thing was never<strong>the</strong>less absolutely clear, i.e. that Romania would fight<br />
even against superior force and in two fronts. Even if after a lost battle occupation had to be<br />
endured, Romania has had its own experience in this regard, but in <strong>the</strong> dominating Romanian<br />
circles <strong>the</strong>re is no much doubt about <strong>the</strong> final outcome of <strong>the</strong> ongoing European war. Although<br />
Germany has reaped and will still reap very impressive victories, <strong>the</strong>y say that it far from means<br />
<strong>the</strong> Allies’ defeat and all things that are in human power to rectify, eventually will be put right.<br />
They say that regretfully nothing good is coming out of <strong>the</strong> enlargement and collective<br />
defence of <strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente, of creating a kind of a bloc against <strong>the</strong> invaders. Under certain<br />
circumstances Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey will keep toge<strong>the</strong>r. They say that<br />
Bulgaria and Hungary hope to gain something from <strong>the</strong> European catastrophe and thus all<br />
effort to get <strong>the</strong>se countries into <strong>the</strong> orbit of those states, which have been satisfied with <strong>the</strong><br />
existing situation in Europe and do not hope to get anything from <strong>the</strong> war, was in vain. On <strong>the</strong><br />
o<strong>the</strong>r hand Romania will do its utmost to safeguard absolute neutrality and to avoid armed<br />
collision. There is little hope that it will be possible. But one should try never<strong>the</strong>less. They in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are confident that <strong>the</strong> moment is not right for<br />
Germany to launch war in <strong>the</strong> south as well. The Allies are too busy with <strong>the</strong> front in <strong>the</strong> west<br />
and with concern about Italy’s position to be able afford <strong>the</strong> luxury of deliberately asking for<br />
complications here as well, <strong>the</strong>y say. The Turks are strong enough to ward off attacks on<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves and <strong>the</strong> Allies’ armies in Syria, Egypt and o<strong>the</strong>r places should not be<br />
underestimated.<br />
Owing to <strong>the</strong> events that have transpired in Belgium and Holland within <strong>the</strong> last days or<br />
even hours, <strong>the</strong>re is great nervousness here. The mood in Yugoslavia is said to be panicky. They<br />
say that <strong>the</strong> German border is closed and <strong>the</strong> Germans are leaving. Turkey, too, is in alert state<br />
and any day expects that it will have actively to intervene on <strong>the</strong> Allies’ side. Wise politicians tell<br />
me that in a couple of months <strong>the</strong>re most likely will not be a single country in Europe not<br />
involved in <strong>the</strong> war in some way. There is a view that it may be <strong>the</strong> Balkans where <strong>the</strong> Italians<br />
will launch <strong>the</strong>ir first campaign and try to get into Thessalonica ahead of <strong>the</strong> Allies. They say<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Greeks face a very sensitive situation and <strong>the</strong>re is a kind of doubt among <strong>the</strong>m, which<br />
side to cling to. About Italy’s “puzzle” <strong>the</strong>re is no real clarity yet here ei<strong>the</strong>r. The possibility that
440 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Italy will do its utmost to support Germany only in moral and propaganda aspects and by<br />
engaging as much of <strong>the</strong> Allies’ force as possible in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean and around it has not<br />
been altoge<strong>the</strong>r discarded although suspicion is increasing hour by hour that Italy may enter<br />
<strong>the</strong> war on Germany’s side in a few days already. Whe<strong>the</strong>r it would end in a disaster for <strong>the</strong><br />
Allies or in Italy’s defeat, no doubt, nobody can predict and <strong>the</strong> entire “strategy” of <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />
salons is worth not more than gossip in cafes in any country is.<br />
Relations with <strong>the</strong> Russians have not developed beyond <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r tense situation that<br />
existed for some time after Molotov’s speech of 29 th March. They say that in a discussion with<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian Envoy in Moscow Molotov has however slightly watered down <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
government’s position vis-à-vis Bessarabia, but <strong>the</strong> fact remains that <strong>the</strong> Romanian Envoy is<br />
treated ra<strong>the</strong>r coldly in Moscow. They say that he and <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
have quite poor contacts with <strong>the</strong> Russians. Relations with <strong>the</strong> Hungarians have slightly<br />
improved though. They say that <strong>the</strong> Hungarian press no longer abuses <strong>the</strong> Romanians as much<br />
as it used to lately. In economic matters, too, a certain agreement has been reached that will<br />
give <strong>the</strong> possibility in <strong>the</strong> course of time to improve <strong>the</strong> political <strong>relations</strong> as well, if it will be<br />
possible to maintain peace for a longer period of time.<br />
2. The domestic policy “front”. Domestic policy is very much interconnected with foreign<br />
affairs. A few days ago <strong>the</strong> re-organisation of <strong>the</strong> government took place. Some 4 ministers were<br />
replaced. Minister of Economy Angelescu 1 left and Cancicov 2 came into his place. Minister of<br />
Justice Istrate Micescu also left and A. Bentoiu 3 was appointed in his place. II Secretary General<br />
of Foreign Affairs A. Cretzianu 4 has been appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and has<br />
thus become a member of <strong>the</strong> government. The o<strong>the</strong>r changes in vice-ministerial positions are<br />
insignificant, in fact like <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> changes because for <strong>the</strong> time being nothing changes in<br />
politics and <strong>the</strong> acceptance of <strong>the</strong> representatives of <strong>the</strong> Farmers’ Party (Maniu and Mihalache 5 )<br />
and remains of <strong>the</strong> “Iron Wolves” [Guard] has not ripened yet. Nervousness is increased here by<br />
a mixture of rumours and a few truly alarming pieces of news. The German propaganda has<br />
already taken too broad scope and for money many partially bankrupt intellectuals simply<br />
make <strong>the</strong> policy as necessary for <strong>the</strong> Germans and brainwash <strong>the</strong> youth and <strong>the</strong> naivest<br />
members or <strong>the</strong> Romanian society. The avant-gardes of <strong>the</strong> “Fifth Column” have already taken<br />
very strong positions here and if military activity is indeed launched here, <strong>the</strong>se internal forces,<br />
which are in <strong>the</strong> German service, will play a very great if not <strong>the</strong> decisive role here. Struggle<br />
against “tourists” does take place, but without commitment. Never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>the</strong>y have started to<br />
inspect cars on highways and in general have become very stern towards <strong>the</strong> foreigners, but we<br />
do not see any effect yet and <strong>the</strong> German language can be heard ra<strong>the</strong>r frequently in Bucharest<br />
streets, cafes and everywhere where people get around.<br />
1<br />
Constantin Angelescu (1883-1950) was a lawyer, economist and politician. Minister for Public Labour (1938),<br />
Minister of Economy (1939-1940), Governor of <strong>the</strong> National Bank (1931-1934). He died in Communist political<br />
prison.<br />
2<br />
Mircea Cancicov (1885-1951) was a financier and politician. Finance Minister (1936-1937, 1938-1939, 1940), Minister<br />
of Justice (1938), Minister of National Economy (1940-1941). He died in Communist political prison.<br />
3<br />
Aurelian Bentoiu (1892-1962) held various ministerial positions during <strong>the</strong> reign of King Carol II. He died in<br />
Communist political prison.<br />
44<br />
Alexandru Cretzianu (1895-1979) was a Romanian diplomat, Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Foreign<br />
Ministry (1940-1941), Minister of Romania in Turkey (1943-1945), prominent member of <strong>the</strong> Romanian exile.<br />
5<br />
Ion Mihalache (1882-1963) was a agrarian politician, founder and president of <strong>the</strong> Peasantry (Farmers) Party,<br />
President of <strong>the</strong> National Peasantry (Farmers) Party (1933-1937). He held several ministerial portofolios. He died in<br />
Communist political prison.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 441<br />
The silent mobilisation continues, but opinion about <strong>the</strong> Romanians’ armament is rarely<br />
good. They say that <strong>the</strong>re is a shortage of tanks, aviation is quite insignificant, but <strong>the</strong> infantry’s<br />
military equipment is archaic and even clothing and footwear for <strong>the</strong> mobilized farmers are<br />
lacking. 10 th May is Romania’s National Day and although due to <strong>the</strong> tragic international<br />
situation this year <strong>the</strong> military parade was held in a very moderate “style” [scale], we saw also<br />
well-armed units with all <strong>the</strong> latest military equipment, new cannons, anti-tank and antiaircraft<br />
weapons, etc. Soldiers were wearing new uniforms and brand-new boots, even all <strong>the</strong><br />
items of horses’ harness and saddling looked like just from <strong>the</strong> workshop. In <strong>the</strong> province<br />
however I have come across quite ragged soldiers and sergeants of <strong>the</strong> gendarmerie corps can<br />
be seen wearing pieces of lea<strong>the</strong>r on <strong>the</strong>ir soles 1 with <strong>the</strong>ir calves wrapped in gaiters. But my<br />
colleagues who have lived here for a longer period of time say that it is common here.<br />
3. Various news. In <strong>the</strong> Romanian public I still hear very negative opinions about <strong>the</strong> lifestyle<br />
of former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck. They say that in hotel “Aro” in Braşov,<br />
where Beck’s family is staying, this former statesman of Poland is throwing money around and<br />
drinks for days in a row while hundreds and thousands of Polish refugees lack minimum means<br />
of existence. Rydz-Śmigły is also said to be leading in Craiova a life as befits a “marshal”: with<br />
aides-de-camp, many butlers etc. They say that a large part of Polish refugees have never<strong>the</strong>less<br />
disappeared from Romania. Those who are fit for military service (except those who had been<br />
interned into military formations) have gradually filtered out to France. The civilians have in<br />
large numbers moved to Italy and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Balkan states. A part have managed to get across<br />
<strong>the</strong> ocean and go to America.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> economic life <strong>the</strong> way we see it in our daily activities, nothing has changed. Prices<br />
continue to rise but apart from that nei<strong>the</strong>r foreign, nor domestic goods are lacking in<br />
Romania. Now and <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re are congestions in <strong>the</strong> meat market caused by <strong>the</strong> introduction<br />
of two meatless days [a week]. They say that this measure has not decreased <strong>the</strong> consumption<br />
of meat, but ra<strong>the</strong>r increased it as during <strong>the</strong> 4 meat days of <strong>the</strong> week everybody tries to buy<br />
more meat than <strong>the</strong>y would normally need. Restrictions with regard to petrol and rationing of<br />
some food products that had been mentioned by way of rumour have not been introduced yet<br />
and <strong>the</strong>re is no shortage of <strong>the</strong>se items ei<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
With insecurity in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean, here <strong>the</strong> real economic difficulties will only begin, but<br />
under <strong>the</strong> conditions of partial peace in Romania and <strong>the</strong> Balkans [in general] <strong>the</strong>se difficulties<br />
will not be too hard because a large part of raw materials are found here in this or neighbouring<br />
countries.<br />
About <strong>the</strong> eventual organisation of Latvian transit concrete details cannot be provided yet. I<br />
have been promised <strong>the</strong>se details from <strong>the</strong> Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Transportation, but<br />
<strong>the</strong> research into <strong>the</strong>se issues requires time. I am only afraid that all that research may turn out<br />
to be in vain if active operation of <strong>the</strong> military fleet and air forces begins in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean<br />
that <strong>the</strong>y here with concern expect to happen in not very distant future.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7664, s. 92–93.<br />
1<br />
The Envoy calls this type of footwear „pastalas”, which was a traditional Latvian footwear, worn by peasants<br />
(translator’s note).
442 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
185. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 376 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Ion Gigurtu, 3 iunie 1940<br />
După informațiile Statului Major leton, Sovietele ar fi efectuat importante concentrări de<br />
trupe atât în regiunea frontierei basarabene cât și în cea a fostei frontiere româno-polone. După<br />
aceleași informații nici o activitate militară nu ar fi fost observată în ultimul timp în regiunea<br />
caucaziană.<br />
Dacă aceste măsuri ar reflecta intenții ostile ale Sovietelor față de țara noastră, atunci<br />
concluzia s-ar impune că Rusia consideră că eventuala realizare a acestor intenții nu ar fi<br />
susceptibilă de a determina nicio reacție din partea Turciei și că securitatea regiunii caucaziene<br />
nu ar fi astfel amenințată. Posibilitatea unei intervenții italiene, care solicită atenția Turciei și a<br />
forțelor aliate din Orient în direcția Mediteranei, ar justifica poate o asemenea concepție<br />
sovietică a situației.<br />
Pe de altă parte, însă, dată fiind evoluția din ultimul timp a politicii sovietice, evoluție ce<br />
face obiectul telegramei acestei Legații nr. 361 din 29 Mai, cercurile baltice sunt convinse că<br />
Rusia ar adopta o politică de neutralitate relativ binevoitoare cauzei Aliaților, în cazul când o<br />
intervenție italiană ar determina o extindere a conflictului în sud-est. S-ar părea deci puțin<br />
probabil ca Sovietele să ia inițiative de natură a slăbi, prin repercusiunile lor, coeziunea și<br />
posibilitățile de rezistență ale Statelor din Balcani și din sud-est în cazul unei extinderi a<br />
conflictului în această direcție. Mai mult, prin consecințele lor, inițiativele ar putea constitui o<br />
adevărată primă pentru extinderea conflictului în această regiune, extindere care este departe<br />
de a fi pe placul politicii sovietice.<br />
Bineînțeles însă că, în cazul când jocul consecințelor unei intervenții italiene ar provoca o<br />
acțiune germană în direcția Balcanilor prin România, este posibil ca Sovietele să repete politica<br />
din Polonia, încercând să ocupe teritorii asupra cărora ele au revendicări și care reprezintă<br />
pentru ele un interes special. Aceasta nu ar împiedica ca neutralitatea sovietică să poată<br />
împrumuta ulterior, după împrejurări, o nuanță defavorabilă Germaniei.<br />
Așa fiind, în măsura în care sensul lor poate fi rezonabil descifrat, pregătirile militare<br />
sovietice în chestiune – mai mult decât a reflecta intențiile agresive autonome ale Sovietelor –<br />
par a reprezenta mai degrabă măsuri de precauție pentru ipoteza extinderii conflictului în sudest,<br />
extindere la care este probabil că politica sovietică se va abține de a contribui ea însăși prin<br />
diferite inițiative.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 44-46.<br />
185. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 376 to Foreign Minister Ion Gigurtu, 3 rd June 1940<br />
According to <strong>the</strong> information of <strong>the</strong> Latvian General Staff, <strong>the</strong> Soviets carried out major<br />
troop concentration both in <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian border area and in <strong>the</strong> former Romanian-Polish<br />
border area. According to <strong>the</strong> same information, no military activity was noticed lately in <strong>the</strong><br />
Caucasian region.<br />
If <strong>the</strong>se measures reflected hostile intentions of <strong>the</strong> Soviets towards our country, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
conclusion would be that Russia considers that <strong>the</strong> possible achievement of <strong>the</strong>se intentions<br />
would not be likely to cause any reaction from Turkey and <strong>the</strong> security of <strong>the</strong> Caucasian region<br />
would not be threatened in this way. The possibility of an Italian intervention, calling <strong>the</strong>
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 443<br />
attention of Turkey and of <strong>the</strong> Allied forces in <strong>the</strong> East towards <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean, would<br />
justify maybe such a Soviet perception of <strong>the</strong> situation.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, however, given <strong>the</strong> recent evolution of <strong>the</strong> Soviet policy, which is <strong>the</strong><br />
subject of this Legation’s telegram no. 361 from May 29 th , <strong>the</strong> Baltic circles are convinced that<br />
Russia would adopt a relatively benevolent policy of neutrality for <strong>the</strong> cause of <strong>the</strong> Allies, in case<br />
an Italian intervention determined an extension of <strong>the</strong> conflict in <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>ast. It seems<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore unlikely that <strong>the</strong> Soviets take initiatives likely to weaken, by <strong>the</strong>ir repercussions, <strong>the</strong><br />
cohesion and <strong>the</strong> resistance possibilities of <strong>the</strong> Balkan and <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>ast States in <strong>the</strong> event of<br />
an extension of <strong>the</strong> conflict in that direction. Moreover, by <strong>the</strong>ir consequences, <strong>the</strong> initiatives<br />
could represent a real bonus for extending <strong>the</strong> conflict in this region, which is far from pleasing<br />
<strong>the</strong> Soviet policy.<br />
But of course that when <strong>the</strong> consequences of an Italian intervention would provoke a<br />
German action in <strong>the</strong> Balkans via Romania, it is possible for <strong>the</strong> Soviets to repeat <strong>the</strong> policy<br />
from Poland, trying to occupy territories over which <strong>the</strong>y have claims and which are of great<br />
interest to <strong>the</strong>m. This would not prevent <strong>the</strong> Soviet neutrality from adopting, according to<br />
circumstances, a nuance unfavourable to Germany.<br />
That being <strong>the</strong> case, to <strong>the</strong> degree in which <strong>the</strong>ir meaning can be reasonably deciphered, <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet military preparations in question - ra<strong>the</strong>r than reflecting <strong>the</strong> autonomous aggressive<br />
Soviet intentions - seem to be more likely precautions for <strong>the</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>sis of <strong>the</strong> expansion of <strong>the</strong><br />
conflict in <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>ast, to which <strong>the</strong> Soviet policy may refrain from contributing through<br />
various initiatives.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 44-46.<br />
186. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 387 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Ion Gigurtu, 13 iunie 1940<br />
Ministrul de Război leton a sosit ieri la Riga întorcându-se din vizita oficială la Moscova. În<br />
același timp a trecut prin Riga primul ministru lituanian în drum spre Kaunas și venind de<br />
asemenea de la Moscova. Declarațiile făcute de ambii diferitelor personalități cu care au venit în<br />
contact sunt concordante. Ei afectează de a nu se fi găsit în fața unor noi cereri sovietice precise<br />
și imediate, ci mai degrabă în fața unor deziderate de ordin general cu privire la oportunitatea,<br />
în condițiile actuale, a întăririi pozițiilor militare sovietice în Statele Baltice. Mulți se întreabă<br />
dacă oamenii de stat baltici și ruși nu joacă o comedie concertată destinată a disimula, pentru<br />
diferite motive, preparativele militare sovietice deja în curs de efectuare, mai cu seamă în<br />
Lituania.<br />
Cei doi miniștri au avut impresia că Guvernul sovietic a dorit să sondeze dispozițiile<br />
Balticilor, în urma situației creată prin succesele germane în Occident, pentru a se asigura dacă<br />
nu au intervenit oarecare fluctuații în politica Statelor Baltice față de Soviete.<br />
În această privință se poate afirma că Sovietele au primit cele mai formale asigurări. Statele<br />
Baltice rămân într-adevăr, în împrejurările actuale, sincer atașate politicii de alianță cu<br />
Sovietele, care le-a adus până în prezent avantaje incontestabile. Puțini se pot într-adevăr îndoi<br />
că fără tratatele de asistență mutuală cu Rusia, regiunea baltică – care reprezintă pentru<br />
Germania o aspirație permanentă și o cucerire ușoară – ar fi avut deja soarta Danemarcei și<br />
Norvegiei. Pe de altă parte, pentru orice observator imparțial, constituie o datorie de bună<br />
credință de a recunoaște că tratatele de asistență mutuală au funcționat până în prezent într-un
444 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
mod pe deplin satisfăcător, și că viața internă a Statelor Baltice nu s-a resimțit întru nimic de<br />
colaborarea militară cu Sovietele.<br />
Astfel se explică declarația făcută recent de domnul Munters unui șef de misiune acreditat la<br />
Riga că Letonia „este dispusă a accepta orice propunere de natură a contribui la întărirea<br />
pozițiilor militare sovietice în statele baltice, întărire care constituie pentru aceste state un<br />
factor suplimentar de securitate.”<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 52-53.<br />
186. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 387 to Foreign Minister Ion Gigurtu, 13 th June 1940<br />
The Latvian War Minister arrived yesterday in Riga, returning from an official visit to<br />
Moscow. At <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian Prime Minister also went through Riga on his way<br />
from Moscow to Kaunas. The statements made by both of <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> different personalities<br />
with whom <strong>the</strong>y came into contact are consistent. They pretend <strong>the</strong>y are not dealing with new<br />
precise and immediate Soviet demands, but ra<strong>the</strong>r with general goals concerning, under <strong>the</strong><br />
current circumstances, <strong>the</strong> opportunity to streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Soviet military positions in <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States. Many people wonder whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Baltic and Russian statesmen play a concerted<br />
comedy intended to dissimulate, for different reasons, <strong>the</strong> ongoing Soviet military preparations,<br />
especially in Lithuania.<br />
The two ministers were under <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> Soviet government wanted to explore<br />
<strong>the</strong> state of mind of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, following <strong>the</strong> situation created by <strong>the</strong> German successes in<br />
<strong>the</strong> West, to make sure no fluctuations interfered in <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviets.<br />
In this respect we can say that <strong>the</strong> Soviets received <strong>the</strong> most formal assurances. The Baltic<br />
States remain indeed, in <strong>the</strong> present circumstances, honestly attached to <strong>the</strong> policy of alliance<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Soviets, which has brought <strong>the</strong>m undeniable advantages so far. Few can really doubt<br />
that, without <strong>the</strong> mutual assistance treaties with Russia, <strong>the</strong> Baltic region - which is to Germany<br />
a permanent aspiration and an easy conquest – had already had <strong>the</strong> fate of Denmark and<br />
Norway. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, to any impartial observer, it is a duty of good faith to acknowledge<br />
that mutual assistance treaties have worked so far in an entirely satisfactory way and that <strong>the</strong><br />
internal life of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States did not affect in any way <strong>the</strong> military cooperation with <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviets.<br />
This explains <strong>the</strong> statement Mr. Munters has made recently to a Head of Mission accredited<br />
in Riga, according to which Latvia "is willing to accept any proposal likely to contribute to <strong>the</strong><br />
streng<strong>the</strong>ning of <strong>the</strong> Soviet military positions in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, which is an additional factor<br />
of safety to <strong>the</strong>se states.”<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 52-53.<br />
187. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 399 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Ion Gigurtu, 14 iunie 1940<br />
Ca urmare la telegrama acestei legații nr. 376 din 3 iunie.<br />
Precizez că după informațiile Statului Major leton trupele concentrate de Soviete la frontiera<br />
română se ridică în total la 33 de divizii, din care 22 în regiunea frontierei basarabene și restul în<br />
regiunea fostei frontiere româno-polone.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 445<br />
Date fiind relațiile existente între armata sovietică și cea letonă cred că aceste indicații pot fi<br />
considerate ca o sursă de informații demnă de oarecare considerație.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 54.<br />
187. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 399 to Foreign Minister Ion Gigurtu, 14 th June 1940<br />
Follow-up to this legation’s telegram no. 376 from June 3 rd .<br />
I mention that according to <strong>the</strong> information of <strong>the</strong> Latvian General Staff, <strong>the</strong> troops<br />
concentrated by <strong>the</strong> Soviets at <strong>the</strong> Romanian border amount to a total of 33 divisions, out of<br />
which 22 in <strong>the</strong> region of <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian border and <strong>the</strong> rest in <strong>the</strong> region of <strong>the</strong> former<br />
Romanian-Polish border.<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> existing relation between <strong>the</strong> Soviet and <strong>the</strong> Latvian armies, I believe that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
directions can be considered as a source of information worthy of some consideration.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 54.<br />
188. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 402 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Ion Gigurtu, 18 iunie 1940<br />
„Manifestațiile de simpatie” cu care presa și posturile de radio sovietice nu vor lipsi de a<br />
anunța că au fost primite primele elemente motorizate rusești sosite ieri la Riga au fost făcute<br />
de vreo câteva sute de comuniști mobilizați de agenții Legației sovietice și amestecați printre<br />
mulțimea curioșilor, în diferite puncte ale orașului, pe parcursul trupelor. Populația letonă<br />
manifestă un sentiment în care prevalează resemnarea și curiozitatea.<br />
După marșul prin Riga, tancurile sovietice s-au postat – nimeni nu știe pentru ce – în fața<br />
diferitelor autorități, unde ele au fost înconjurate de o mulțime de curioși, ceea ce da orașului<br />
un aspect de pitorească dezordine.<br />
Dezordini mai serioase au fost foarte rare. Ele au fost provocate de comuniștii locali care au<br />
profitat de ocazie pentru a ataca poliția letonă ce asigură ordinea și cu care aveau de reglat vechi<br />
socoteli. Ar fi doi morți și câțiva răniți. Ordinea este complet restabilită. Nu există încă nicio<br />
indicație cu privire la noul guvern.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 58-59.<br />
188. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 402 to Foreign Minister Ion Gigurtu, 18 th June 1940<br />
"The demonstrations of sympathy" by means of which <strong>the</strong> Soviet press and radio stations<br />
will announce that <strong>the</strong> population received <strong>the</strong> first motorized Russian elements arrived<br />
yesterday in Riga, were given by a few hundreds of Communists mobilized by <strong>the</strong> agents of <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet Legation and mixed in <strong>the</strong> curious crowd, in different parts of <strong>the</strong> city, on <strong>the</strong> way of <strong>the</strong><br />
troops. The Latvian population evince a feeling of resignation and curiosity.<br />
After <strong>the</strong> march through Riga, <strong>the</strong> Soviet tanks were positioned - nobody knows why - in<br />
front of <strong>the</strong> different authorities, where <strong>the</strong>y were surrounded by a crowd of curious people,<br />
which gives <strong>the</strong> city an aspect of picturesque mess.<br />
More serious disturbances were very rare. They were caused by <strong>the</strong> local Communists who<br />
seized <strong>the</strong> opportunity to attack <strong>the</strong> Latvian police who ensure <strong>the</strong> order and with whom <strong>the</strong>y
446 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
had to settle old accounts. There seem to be two dead and several injured people. Order is fully<br />
restored. There is still no clue regarding <strong>the</strong> new government.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 58-59.<br />
189. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 406 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Ion Gigurtu, 21 iunie 1940<br />
Noul guvern leton desemnat de Vicepreședintele Consiliului Comisarilor Poporului,<br />
Vîșinski 1 , venit în acest scop la Riga, pare a anunța, după compunerea lui, o politică moderată.<br />
Primul Ministru și Ministru al Afacerilor Străine ad-interim 2 , este un savant bacteriolog care s-a<br />
ținut până în prezent departe de politică. Singura persoană suspectă este Subsecretarul de Stat<br />
la Interne și Șef al Poliției, un obscur învățător.<br />
Guvernul este bine primit în general de opinia publică care consideră cu îngrijorare<br />
eventualitatea unui guvern cu tendințe socialiste, revoluționare și începutul unei ere de reforme<br />
sociale care, printr-un proces de alunecare progresivă, ar fi condus la bolșevizarea țării.<br />
Rămâne de văzut dacă actuala combinație ministerială va dura sau dacă ea nu va fi decât un<br />
scurt provizorat și o formulă de tranziție spre un guvern mai extremist. Sub impresia actualei<br />
situații europene, Sovietele sunt în acest moment în mod exclusiv preocupate de preparativele<br />
lor militare în Statele Baltice și de a unei colaborări cât mai eficace cu forțele armate ale acestor<br />
state, în vederea unor eventualități externe considerate din ce în ce mai probabile și mai<br />
apropiate. În aceste condiții, impresia generală este că Sovietele se vor abține deocamdată de a<br />
da semnalul unei politici de reforme și de conflicte sociale care ar însemna pentru aceste țări un<br />
element de dezordine și de slăbiciune.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 61-62.<br />
189. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 406 to Foreign Minister Ion Gigurtu, 21 st June 1940<br />
The new Latvian government appointed by <strong>the</strong> Vice-Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong><br />
People's Commissaries, Vyshinsky 3 , who came to Riga to this purpose, seems to announce a<br />
moderate policy, after its composition. The Prime Minister and <strong>the</strong> interim Minister for Foreign<br />
Affairs is a bacteriologist scholar 4 who has stayed away from politics up to <strong>the</strong> present. The only<br />
suspect is <strong>the</strong> Under-Secretary of State for <strong>the</strong> Interior and Chief of Police, a noteless teacher.<br />
The Government is generally well received by <strong>the</strong> public opinion, who is worried about <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility of a government with socialist, revolutionary tendencies and <strong>the</strong> beginning of an era<br />
of social reform which, through a process of progressive slip, would have led to <strong>the</strong><br />
Bolshevization of <strong>the</strong> country.<br />
1<br />
Andrei Ianuarevici Vîșinski (1883-1954) a fost jurist, om politic și diplomat sovietic, procurorul general care a<br />
instrumentat procesele politice intentate de Stalin la Moscova în timpul Marii Epurări, reprezentantul sovietic în<br />
timpul procesului de la Nürnberg și delegatul sovietic care a supervizat sovietizarea Letoniei și a României.<br />
Adjunct al Ministrului de Externe (1940-1949), Ministru de Externe (1949-1953).<br />
2<br />
Augusts Kirhenšteins.<br />
3<br />
Andrey Januarevich Vyshinsky (1883-1954) was a Soviet lawyer, politician and diplomat, attorney general who<br />
handled <strong>the</strong> political processes initiated by Stalin during <strong>the</strong> Great Purge, <strong>the</strong> Soviet representative during <strong>the</strong><br />
Nuremberg trials and Soviet delegate who oversaw <strong>the</strong> Sovietization of Latvia and Romania. Deputy Foreign<br />
Minister (1940-1949), Foreign Minister (1949-1953).<br />
4<br />
Augusts Kirhenšteins.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 447<br />
It remains to be seen whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> present ministerial combination lasts or if it is only a<br />
short-time interim and a transition formula towards a more extremist government. Under <strong>the</strong><br />
impression of <strong>the</strong> current European situation, <strong>the</strong> Soviets are at present exclusively concerned<br />
with <strong>the</strong>ir military preparations in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and with <strong>the</strong> efficient collaboration with <strong>the</strong><br />
armed forces of <strong>the</strong>se countries, in view of some external contingencies considered increasingly<br />
likely and imminent. Under <strong>the</strong>se circumstances, <strong>the</strong> general impression is that <strong>the</strong> Soviets will<br />
abstain for now from signalling a policy of reforms and social conflicts, which would mean to<br />
<strong>the</strong>se countries an element of disorder and weakness.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 61-62.<br />
190. Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1940. gada 4. jūlija ziņojums Ārlietu ministrijas<br />
ģenerālsekretāram M. Nukšam<br />
Pagodinos Jums pielikumā nosūtīt izgriezumu no „Le Moment” 1 š. g. 5. jūlija numura ar<br />
rīkojuma tekstu franču valodā par jauniem drošības soļiem, ko spērusi Bukarestes militārā<br />
komandantūra, sagatavojoties uz karu. Īsumā noteikumi satur aizliegumu turēt iedzīvotājiem<br />
ieročus, munīciju un sprāgstvielas; stingri jāievēro pasīvās aizsardzības noteikumi pret gāzu un<br />
gaisa uzbrukumiem; pilsoņiem uz pieprasījumu jānovieto kareivji, armijas satiksmes līdzekļi un<br />
lopi; visi restorāni un izpriecu vietas slēdzamas pl. 23.00; visi publiski lokāli un klubi, kuros<br />
izklāsta, kolportē, izplata vai diskutē par armiju un valsts aizsardzību, tiek galīgi slēgti; noliegtas<br />
sapulces bez atļaujas; noliegta jebkāda veida propaganda par labu ienaidniekam, nemieru<br />
radīšana tautā un kaitēšana militārām operācijām; noliegta musinoša propaganda, sabotāža,<br />
trauksmes radīšana, varas darbi, izvairīšanās no rekvizīcijas un nodokļu maksāšanas; noliegts<br />
vienalga kur un kādā veidā sniegt jebkādas ziņas, arī ne dibinātas, par visu, kas vien attiecas uz<br />
armiju; ārzemniekiem noliegts ceļot vai pārvietoties bez personības dokumentiem; noliegts<br />
dedzināt atklātās vietās ugunskurus un apgaismot mājas līdz ko izziņota ienaidnieka lidmašīnu<br />
tuvošanās; militārām iestādēm jāpaziņo par katru ārzemnieku vai militārpersonu, ko uzņem pie<br />
sevis; uz pieprasījumu militārās un parastās policijas aģentiem un virsniekiem jāpierāda sava<br />
personība; katram nekavējoties jāziņo par ienaidnieka lidmašīnu vai parašūtistu parādīšanos;<br />
katrai militārpersonai, nenogaidot sevišķu rīkojumu, nekavējoties jāuzstājas pret parašūtistiem,<br />
pie kam visiem iedzīvotājiem jāsniedz viņai palīdzība, tāpat jāmēģina arī atklāt spiegus; bez<br />
vajadzības vai arī, ja tiek pārkāpti attiecīgi rīkojumi, aizliegts uzturēties kazarmās, slimnīcās,<br />
kara noliktavās un uzņēmumos, stacijās, vilcienos, uz peroniem, ostās, lidostās, nocietinājumos,<br />
militāros konvojos vai kolonnās, fabrikās un visur citur, kur noliegts, vai minēto vietu tuvumā;<br />
vajadzīga militāriestāžu atļauja radioraidītājiem, telegrāfam un baložiem; noliegts pārnest<br />
privātpersonu korespondenci; noliegts arī bez ļauna nodoma radīt paniku civiliedzīvotājos vai<br />
armijā; izpildāms katrs valsts vai militāriestāžu uzdevums.<br />
Šo noteikumu pārkāpēji, arī nolaidības dēļ, un visi, kas sniedz palīdzību vai protekciju<br />
pārkāpējiem, tāpat arī līdzzinātāji, slēpēji un ierosinātāji, sodāmi ar pārmācības namu no 1–2<br />
gadiem un bez tam pēc sodu likuma 25. panta. Par uzturēšanos augstāk minētās noliegtās vietās<br />
ar fotoaparātiem vai filmām [kinokamerām], plānu instrumentiem, zīmēšanas dēļiem utml.,<br />
noteikumu pārkāpēji sodāmi ar spaidu darbiem no 5–25 gadiem un tiesību zaudēšanu no 3–10<br />
gadiem. Nodevības, spiegošanas un valsts iekšējās un ārējās drošības apdraudēšanas līdzzinātāji,<br />
slēpēji un ierosinātāji sodāmi ar tādiem pašiem sodiem kā paši min. noziedzību izdarītāji, t. i. ar<br />
1<br />
Le Moment – Francijas laikraksts.
448 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
cietumu no 2 mēnešiem līdz spaidu darbiem uz visu mūžu un naudas sodu no lejām 2.000–<br />
100.000 (=Ls 30–1.500). Šis naudas sods priekš rumāņiem var būt visai jūtams, jo nabadzība<br />
izplatīta un caurmērā iedzīvotāju ienākumi niecīgi. Salīdzināšanai varētu minēt, ka lejas 100.000<br />
atbilst Ministru prezidenta mēnešalgai.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7456. l., 14. lp.<br />
190. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Secretary General of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs M. Nukša, 4 th July 1940<br />
I have <strong>the</strong> honour hereby to send to you in <strong>the</strong> attachment a clipping of newspaper’s „Le<br />
Moment” 1 issue of 5 th July, this year that contains <strong>the</strong> new security regulations in <strong>the</strong> French<br />
language version issued by <strong>the</strong> military commandant’s office of Bucharest in preparation for<br />
war. To put it briefly, <strong>the</strong> regulations contain a prohibition for <strong>the</strong> population to hold weapons,<br />
ammunition and explosives; <strong>the</strong> regulations of passive defence against gas attacks and air raids<br />
must be strictly observed; on request <strong>the</strong> citizens must provide shelter to soldiers, army’s<br />
vehicles and cattle; all restaurants and entertainment facilities must be closed by 23.00; all<br />
public night clubs and clubs, in which information about <strong>the</strong> army or state defence is<br />
explicated, hawked, disseminated or discussed are to be closed altoge<strong>the</strong>r; unsanctioned<br />
meetings are prohibited; all kinds of propaganda in favour of <strong>the</strong> enemy, incitement of unrest<br />
among <strong>the</strong> people and harming military operations are prohibited; seditious propaganda,<br />
sabotage, causing of alarm, acts of violence, avoidance of requisition and tax avoidance are<br />
prohibited; it is prohibited in any place and in any way to provide any information, even<br />
incorrect, about anything that concerns <strong>the</strong> army; foreigners are prohibited to travel or move<br />
around without having identity <strong>documents</strong> with <strong>the</strong>m; it is prohibited to burn fires in open<br />
areas and to light homes after <strong>the</strong> approach of <strong>the</strong> enemy’s aircraft has been announced;<br />
military authorities must be informed of any foreigner or military whom <strong>the</strong> respective person<br />
receives in his/her house; on demand one’s identity must be proved [ID presented] to agents<br />
and officers of <strong>the</strong> military and ordinary police; everyone who has seen an enemy’s aircraft or<br />
parachuters must immediately report about it; each military must immediately take measures<br />
against parachuters without awaiting a special instruction and all residents must help him and<br />
likewise must try to disclose spies; without a particular need or else if <strong>the</strong> relevant instructions<br />
are violated 2 it is prohibited to enter or approach quarters, hospitals, military warehouses and<br />
companies, terminals, trains, platforms, ports, airports, fortifications, military convoys or<br />
columns, factories and all places where access is prohibited; to use radio broadcasters, telegraph<br />
and pigeons a permit from military authorities is required; it is prohibited to carry private<br />
persons’ correspondence; it is prohibited to cause panic among <strong>the</strong> civilians or in <strong>the</strong> army even<br />
without a bad intention; each instruction of <strong>the</strong> state or military authorities must be obeyed.<br />
Those who violate <strong>the</strong>se regulations, even due to neglect, and all those who provide<br />
assistance or protection to such violators, same as accomplices, concealers or initiators of such<br />
violations are to be punished with 1–2 years in penitentiary plus penalty as stipulated in clause<br />
25 of <strong>the</strong> law on penalties. Entering of <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned prohibited sites with photo or film<br />
cameras, tools that allow drawing plans, drawing boards etc. is punishable with forced labour<br />
1<br />
Le Moment – French newspaper.<br />
2<br />
The meaning of <strong>the</strong> latter phrase is not clear, <strong>the</strong> translation provides <strong>the</strong> exact wording of <strong>the</strong> original text<br />
(translator’s note).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 449<br />
for 5–25 years and deprivation of rights for 3–10 years. Accomplices, concealers or initiators of<br />
treason, spying and causing threat to <strong>the</strong> internal and external security of <strong>the</strong> state are to be<br />
punishable with <strong>the</strong> same penalties as those who commit <strong>the</strong>se crimes, i.e. with penalties<br />
starting from imprisonment for 2 months to forced labour for life or fine of 2 000–100 000 lei<br />
(=Ls 30–1500). The Romanians may find such fines very tangible because poverty is wide-spread<br />
and <strong>the</strong> average incomes are very low here. For comparison it could be mentioned that 100 000<br />
lei correspond to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister’s salary.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7456, s. 14.<br />
191. Sūtņa L. Ēķa 1940. g. 5. jūl. ziņojums ministru prezidentam A. Kirhenšteinam 1<br />
Nosūtu Jūsu informācijai Rumānijas jaunās valdības sastāvu, kāds tas publicēts vakar vakarā<br />
un šodienas laikrakstos. Par valdības orientāciju un politikas galvenām līnijām var pa daļai<br />
spriest no valdības deklarācijas, kuru franču tulkojumā še klāt pievienoju.<br />
Pa pastu sūtāmā ziņojumā diemžēl nevaru pieskarties tuvākam raksturojumam, ko ceru<br />
izdarīt vēlāk.<br />
Kā dzirdu, tad debates rumāņu parlamenta Ārlietu komisijā par Besarābijas un Ziemeļu<br />
Bukovinas atdošanu PSRS bijušas ļoti vētrainas, jo ir viena daļa politiķu, kas domāja, ka būtu<br />
bijis jāturās padomju karaspēkam pretī.<br />
PSRS atstāto provinču evakuācija notikusi visumā labā kārtībā. Turpretim uz Besarābiju<br />
braucošos ešelonos (šīs provinces piederīgie pārējās Rumānijas daļās) izcēlušies nemieri, pēc<br />
rumāņu oficiālas versijas aiz tā iemesla, ka uz Besarābiju braucošie negribējuši gaidīt vilcienu<br />
sastādīšanu un izrādījuši agresīvas tieksmes pret rumāņu policiju un karaspēku. Esot izcēlušās<br />
Galacā nopietnas sadursmes, kur abās pusēs ir kritušie un ievainotie. Baumas gan stingri<br />
apkaro, bet tomēr baumu ir bezgala, kas norāda uz zināmu nervozitāti iedzīvotājos. Tagad nu<br />
rumāņu politiskā orientācija taisa strauju pagriezienu “ass valstu” virzienā un cer caur to glābt,<br />
kas glābjams. Varam gatavoties vēl uz visādiem pārsteigumiem un jaunām pārmaiņām.<br />
LVVA, 2574. f., 4. apr., 7456. l., 1. lp.<br />
191. Report by Envoy L. Ēķis to Prime Minister A. Kirhenšteins 2 , 5 th July 1940<br />
For your information I am hereby sending <strong>the</strong> list of <strong>the</strong> new government’s members as it<br />
was published in newspapers yesterday evening and today. The orientation of <strong>the</strong> government<br />
and <strong>the</strong> main lines of its policy can be partially deduced from <strong>the</strong> government’s declaration,<br />
which I hereby attach in translation into French.<br />
In a report, which has to be sent by mail, I regretfully cannot provide more detailed<br />
description, which I hope to do later.<br />
As I heard, debates in <strong>the</strong> Foreign Affairs Commission of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Parliament on<br />
ceding of Bessarabia and North Bukovina to <strong>the</strong> USSR have been very stormy because a part of<br />
politicians believed that <strong>the</strong> Soviet troops had to be resisted.<br />
1<br />
Augusts Kirhenšteins (1872–1963), Latvijas mikrobiologs, politiķis–kolaborants. 1940. g. jūn. iecelts par PSRS<br />
pārstāvniecības izveidotās valdības Ministru prezidentu. Pēc aneksijas Padomju Savienībā 1940.–1952. g. Latvijas<br />
PSR Augstākās Padomes priekšsēdētājs.<br />
2<br />
Augusts Kirhenšteins (1872–1963), Latvian microbiologist, politician – collaborant. In June 1940 appointed Prime<br />
Minister of <strong>the</strong> government formed by <strong>the</strong> USSR <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Riga. After Latvia’s annexation into <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet Union 1940–1952 Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Council of <strong>the</strong> Latvian SSR.
450 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
On <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>the</strong> evacuation of <strong>the</strong> provinces ceded to <strong>the</strong> USSR has taken place in good<br />
order. However, riots have broken out in trains due for Bessarabia (among those from o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
parts of Romania who belong to this province [and are returning home because of <strong>the</strong>se events-<br />
E.J.]), according to <strong>the</strong> official Romanian version it was because those who were due for<br />
Bessarabia did not want to wait for <strong>the</strong> trains to be assembled and demonstrated aggression<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Romanian police and troops. They say that serious clashes have taken place in Galați<br />
with dead and wounded on both sides. Rumours are being strongly combated, yet <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
end to rumours which fact points to certain nervousness in <strong>the</strong> population. Now <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
political orientation is making a sharp turn towards <strong>the</strong> “axis countries” and through that hopes<br />
to salvage what <strong>the</strong>re is to salvage. We may prepare ourselves for all kinds of new surprises and<br />
changes.<br />
SHAL, f. 2574, d. 4, file 7456, s. 1.<br />
192. Notă de conversație dintre Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail<br />
Manoilescu 1 și Ministrul Letoniei la București Ludvigs Ēķis, 10 iulie 1940, ora 11.30<br />
Mi-a arătat că noua situație care s-a creat Statului Leton prin ocuparea lui completă de către<br />
Rusia este datorită exclusiv dorinței Rusiei de a lua poziție împotriva Germaniei pentru războiul<br />
apropiat.<br />
Este convins că Rusia va ataca curând și Finlanda.<br />
Nu poate spune precis dacă războiul germano-sovietic va fi anul acesta sau anul viitor în<br />
primăvară. Totul depinde de cât de repede se va termina campania împotriva Angliei. Din<br />
punct de vedere politic totul ar împinge ca războiul să se facă chiar anul acesta; din punct de<br />
vedere militar depinde însă de data la care nemții vor avea mâinile complet libere.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />
Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 167.<br />
192. Note of Conversation between <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Mihail<br />
Manoilescu and <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Bucharest Ludvigs Ēķis, 10 th July 1940 hour<br />
11.30<br />
He told me that <strong>the</strong> new situation created to <strong>the</strong> Latvian State by its complete occupation by<br />
Russia is due exclusively to Russia’s wish of taking a stand against Germany for <strong>the</strong> imminent<br />
war.<br />
He is convinced that Russia will soon attack Finland as well.<br />
It is not a known fact whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> German-Soviet war will take place this year or in <strong>the</strong><br />
spring of next year. It all depends on how fast <strong>the</strong> campaign against England ends. From a<br />
political point of view, everything points to <strong>the</strong> war taking place this very year; from a military<br />
point of view, it depends on <strong>the</strong> date when Germans are completely available.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 167.<br />
193. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 439 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail Manoilescu, 11 iulie<br />
1940<br />
1<br />
Mihail Manoilescu (1891-1950) was a Romanian engineer, scientist and politician. Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />
(1940). He died in political prison.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 451<br />
Ieri seară a expirat termenul de depunere a candidaturilor pentru alegerile în vederea noului<br />
Parlament leton. Nu au fost înregistrate decât listele blocului muncitoresc, organizație al cărei<br />
schelet principal îl constituie partidul comunist și pe listele căreia candidează și membrii<br />
actualului guvern. Ceilalți fie că s-au abținut din teamă de a fi denunțați ca „plutocrați” sau<br />
„dușmani ai poporului”, fie că au fost împiedicați invocându-se diferite vicii de formă cum este<br />
cazul cu listele fostului Ministru de Război, Generalul Balodis.<br />
Programul blocului muncitoresc este de o moderație dintre cele mai suspecte al cărui scop<br />
este dezarmarea și adormirea suspiciunilor opiniei publice.<br />
Aceasta nu va împiedica bineînțeles ca, odată alegerile făcute, noul parlament, care va fi o<br />
adunare constituantă, să introducă toate reformele pe care Moscova le va socoti oportune. Un<br />
punct pare însă (lipsă text) 1 intangibilitatea proprietății țărănești. Acest principiu corespunde de<br />
altfel cu evoluția însăși a ideilor în Rusia sovietică. Partidul comunist respinge de altfel, fără prea<br />
multă energie, acuzația că ar dori să impună o uniune cu Rusia sovietică. El declară că asupra<br />
acestui punct se va pronunța în mod liber poporul leton însuși.<br />
Impresia generală este însă că, în cazul când evenimentele externe nu vor veni să se<br />
interfereze cu dezvoltarea normală a procesului declanșat prin intrarea trupelor sovietice în<br />
Statele Baltice, rezultatul final al acestui proces va fi alipirea în fapt, într-un timp ce rămâne de<br />
determinat, a acestor state la Uniunea Sovietică în sânul căreia ele vor putea însă beneficia de o<br />
oarecare autonomie.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 71-72.<br />
193. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 439 to Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu, 11 th July 1940<br />
Yesterday evening <strong>the</strong> deadline for <strong>the</strong> submission of applications for <strong>the</strong> elections for <strong>the</strong><br />
new Latvian Parliament expired. Only <strong>the</strong> lists of <strong>the</strong> workers’ block were registered, an<br />
organization whose main skeleton is <strong>the</strong> communist party and on whose lists <strong>the</strong> members of<br />
<strong>the</strong> current government also candidate. The o<strong>the</strong>rs ei<strong>the</strong>r abstained for fear of being denounced<br />
as "plutocrats" or as "enemies of <strong>the</strong> people" or <strong>the</strong>y were prevented from it, different formal<br />
defects being invoked such as <strong>the</strong> case with <strong>the</strong> lists of General Balodis, <strong>the</strong> former Minister of<br />
War.<br />
The programme of <strong>the</strong> workers’ block is dubiously moderate, and its purpose is to disarm<br />
and extinguish <strong>the</strong> suspicions of <strong>the</strong> public opinion.<br />
This will not prevent of course, once <strong>the</strong> choices made, <strong>the</strong> new parliament, which will be a<br />
constituent assembly, from introducing all <strong>the</strong> reforms that Moscow deems timely. However, a<br />
point seems to be (missing text) 2 <strong>the</strong> intangibility of <strong>the</strong> peasant property. As a matter of fact,<br />
this principle corresponds to <strong>the</strong> evolution of ideas in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong><br />
Communist Party rejects, without too much energy, <strong>the</strong> charge according to which <strong>the</strong>y would<br />
want to impose a union with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia. It states that <strong>the</strong> Latvian people will be <strong>the</strong> one<br />
to decide freely on this issue.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> general impression is that, if <strong>the</strong> external events do not come to interfere with<br />
<strong>the</strong> normal development of <strong>the</strong> process triggered by <strong>the</strong> entry of <strong>the</strong> Soviet troops in <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States, <strong>the</strong> final outcome of this process will actually be <strong>the</strong> joining, during a period that<br />
1<br />
Mențiune în original.<br />
2<br />
Mention in <strong>the</strong> original document.
452 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
remains to be determined, of <strong>the</strong>se states to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, within which <strong>the</strong>y may however<br />
benefit from some autonomy.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 71-72.<br />
194. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 441 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail Manoilescu, 15 iulie<br />
1940<br />
După toate probabilitățile, uniunea cu Rusia Sovietică va fi anunțată de noile Parlamente ale<br />
Statelor Baltice în primele zile după constituirea lor. Încă de la formarea lor, noile guverne ale<br />
Statelor Baltice au fost de altfel abia mai mult decât un spectacol de marionete manevrate de<br />
legațiile sovietice respective și de Vicepreședintele Consiliului Comisarilor Poporului, Vîșinski,<br />
care se găsește la Riga și care este adevăratul deținător al frâielor puterii în aceste state. Cât<br />
despre alegerile la care nu au fost acceptate decât candidaturi comuniste, ele constituie o<br />
comedie, care în nici un caz nu poate atesta în fața istoriei că popoarele baltice doresc<br />
introducerea regimului comunist și unirea la Rusia sovietică.<br />
S-ar fi decis ca semnalul unirii să fie dat de Lituania pentru a se observa reacția Germaniei.<br />
În cazul când nu s-ar produce o asemenea reacție celelalte State Baltice vor urma imediat. După<br />
toate aparențele însă cei care cred în posibilitatea unei reacții germane energice și în izbucnirea<br />
eventuală a actualului conflict latent germano-rus din inițiativa Germaniei și pe tema protecției<br />
Statelor baltice își iau speranțele drept posibilități. Oricât de neplăcută i-ar fi încorporarea<br />
Statelor Baltice la U.R.S.S., este puțin probabil ca, în împrejurările actuale, atâta vreme cât<br />
conflictul cu Anglia este pendinte, Germania să forțeze situația pentru a precipita intervenirea<br />
unei alianțe anglo-ruse, alianță care este actualmente de domeniul posibilităților și pe care<br />
Anglia se întrebuințează în mod activ la Moscova a o provoca.<br />
Adaug că călătorii (sic!) sosiți în ultimul timp din Germania au observat mari mișcări de<br />
trupe în Prusia Orientală. Faptul este însă suficient explicabil prin concentrările sovietice pe<br />
frontierele germane, concentrări despre importanța cărora se poate judeca după amploarea<br />
preparativelor militare din sectorul baltic.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 75-76.<br />
194. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 441 to Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu, 15 th July 1940<br />
In all likelihood, <strong>the</strong> union with Soviet Russia will be announced by <strong>the</strong> new Parliaments of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Baltic States during <strong>the</strong> first days after <strong>the</strong>ir formation. From <strong>the</strong>ir very beginning, <strong>the</strong> new<br />
governments of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States were, however, barely more than a puppet play manipulated<br />
by <strong>the</strong> respective Soviet legations and by Mr. Vyshinsky, Vice-Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong><br />
People's Commissaries, who is in Riga and is <strong>the</strong> true holder of <strong>the</strong> power in <strong>the</strong>se countries. As<br />
for <strong>the</strong> elections in which only communist applications were accepted, <strong>the</strong>se are but comedy,<br />
which in any case cannot attest to history that <strong>the</strong> Baltic peoples want <strong>the</strong> institution of <strong>the</strong><br />
communist regime and <strong>the</strong>ir union with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia.<br />
It seems to have been decided that <strong>the</strong> signal of union should be given by Lithuania in order<br />
to see <strong>the</strong> reaction of Germany. If such a reaction did not occur, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States will<br />
follow immediately. In all likelihood, however, those who believe in <strong>the</strong> possibility of an<br />
energetic German reaction and in <strong>the</strong> possible outbreak of <strong>the</strong> current latent German-Russian
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 453<br />
conflict initiated by Germany regarding <strong>the</strong> protection of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, <strong>the</strong>y take <strong>the</strong>ir hopes<br />
for possibilities. No matter how unpleasant Germany found <strong>the</strong> incorporation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
States by <strong>the</strong> USSR, in <strong>the</strong> present circumstances, as long as <strong>the</strong> conflict with England is<br />
pending, it is unlikely for Germany to cause <strong>the</strong> situation to precipitate <strong>the</strong> emergence of an<br />
Anglo-Russian alliance, which is currently possible and which England is making active efforts<br />
in Moscow to provoke.<br />
I add that <strong>the</strong> travellers recently arrived from Germany have noticed important movements<br />
of troops in East Prussia. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> fact is sufficiently explained by <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
concentrations at <strong>the</strong> German borders, concentrations whose importance can be judged<br />
according to <strong>the</strong> extent of military preparations in <strong>the</strong> Baltic sector.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 75-76.<br />
195. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 442 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail Manoilescu, 16<br />
iulie 1940<br />
Mai mulți agenți sovietici însoțiți de Ministrul de Interne leton s-au prezentat ieri la locuința<br />
de țară a fostului Ministru al Afacerilor Străine, Munters, notificându-i că urmează a fi condus<br />
în Rusia împreună cu soția și cei doi copii și dându-le o oră pentru pregătirile de plecare.<br />
Faptul este cu atât mai extraordinar cu cât domnul Munters păstra relațiile cele mai bune cu<br />
cercurile sovietice. Am putut constata personal acest fapt nu mai departe decât cu o zi mai<br />
înainte în timp ce petreceam weekendul în societatea familiei fostului ministru și când în<br />
prezența mea domnia sa a primit vizita mai multor membri ai legației sovietice, vizită ce s-a<br />
desfășurat în modul cel mai cordial.<br />
Fi-va domnul Munters chemat a răspunde acuzației de a fi încheiat cu celelalte State Baltice<br />
un pact secret îndreptat în contra Sovietelor? Inutil de spus că această acuzație nu conține nici<br />
un grăunte de adevăr și că ea a fost invocată numai ca un pretext pentru a justifica acțiunea<br />
sovietică față de Statele Baltice.<br />
După cum se vede, G.P.U. 1 -ul nici nu a așteptat decizia de unire a Letoniei cu Rusia pentru<br />
a-și începe sinistra sa activitate. Se pare că și alte personalități ale fostului regim leton au<br />
împărtășit soarta domnului Munters.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 77.<br />
195. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 442 to Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu, 16 th July 1940<br />
Yesterday, several Soviet agents accompanied by <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister for <strong>the</strong> Interior<br />
appeared at <strong>the</strong> country residence of Mr. Munters, <strong>the</strong> former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and<br />
informed him that he would be taken to Russia toge<strong>the</strong>r with his wife and two children, giving<br />
<strong>the</strong>m one hour for <strong>the</strong> departure preparations.<br />
The fact is even more amazing as Mr. Munters maintained <strong>the</strong> best <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />
circles. I could personally notice this fact no sooner than <strong>the</strong> day before, while I was spending<br />
<strong>the</strong> weekend in <strong>the</strong> society of <strong>the</strong> former minister’ family and he was visited – in my presence –<br />
by several members of <strong>the</strong> Soviet legation in <strong>the</strong> most cordial manner.<br />
1<br />
Administrația Politică de Stat, serviciu de informații sovietic. Devenit ulterior Administrația Centrală a Securității<br />
Statului.
454 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Will Mr. Munters be held liable for having signed a secret pact with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Soviets? Needless to say that this accusation does not contain a grain of truth and<br />
that it was only invoked as a pretext to justify <strong>the</strong> Soviet action against <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />
As it can be seen, <strong>the</strong> GPU 1 did not even wait for <strong>the</strong> decision on <strong>the</strong> union of Latvia and<br />
Russia before starting its sinister activity. It also seems that o<strong>the</strong>r figures of <strong>the</strong> former Latvian<br />
regime shared <strong>the</strong> fate of Mr. Munters.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 77.<br />
196. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 446 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail Manoilescu, 19<br />
iulie 1940<br />
Ieri a avut loc o manifestație a comuniștilor din Riga pentru a celebra „succesul” în alegeri al<br />
Blocului muncitoresc, organizație care – după cum se știe, a fost singura autorizată să prezinte<br />
candidaturi. Tema acestei manifestații a fost introducerea unei constituții comuniste și unirea la<br />
U.R.S.S. Secretarul General al Partidului Comunist leton 2 a luat cuvântul pentru a constata<br />
aceste cereri „formulate de poporul leton” și pentru a da asigurarea că ele „vor fi luate în<br />
considerație” de noul parlament.<br />
Parlamentul este convocat pentru ziua de 21 iulie. Sunt toate șansele ca unirea cu U.R.S.S. să<br />
fie pronunțată încă în cursul săptămânii viitoare. Nu există nicio indicație cu privire la termenul<br />
ce va fi acordat Corpului Diplomatic pentru lichidarea diferitelor afaceri înainte de a părăsi<br />
Letonia. După toate probabilitățile, rușii nu vor îngădui împuternicirea de Consulate la Riga<br />
decât țărilor cărora nu le vor putea opune un fine de neprimire 3 , adică țărilor în care Sovietele<br />
însele întrețin consulate.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 78.<br />
196. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 446 to Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu, 19 th July 1940<br />
Yesterday <strong>the</strong>re was a Communist manifestation in Riga to celebrate <strong>the</strong> elective "success" of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Workers' Block, which was, as we know, <strong>the</strong> only organization authorized to submit lists of<br />
candidates. The object of this manifestation was <strong>the</strong> institution of a Communist constitution<br />
and <strong>the</strong> union with <strong>the</strong> USSR. The General Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Communist Party 4 took <strong>the</strong><br />
floor to ascertain <strong>the</strong>se applications "formulated by <strong>the</strong> Latvian people" and to assure that <strong>the</strong>y<br />
"will be taken into consideration" by <strong>the</strong> new parliament.<br />
The Parliament is assembled on July 21 st . It is most likely that <strong>the</strong> union with <strong>the</strong> USSR be<br />
decided next week. There is no indication regarding <strong>the</strong> deadline that <strong>the</strong> Diplomatic Corps will<br />
be given to settle different affairs before leaving Latvia. In all likelihood, <strong>the</strong> Russians will allow<br />
1<br />
The State Political Directorate, Soviet intelligence agency. The full name of <strong>the</strong> agency in 1940 was <strong>the</strong> Main<br />
Directorate of State Security.<br />
2<br />
Probabil autorul se referă la Jānis Kalnbērziņš (1893-1986), aflat în fruntea Partidului Comunist Leton în perioada<br />
1940 (25 august)-1959.<br />
3<br />
Mijloc de apărare ce urmărește respingerea acțiunii contestând părții adverse dreptul de a acționa în temeiul<br />
anumitor fapte ca lipsa calității, interesului, expirarea termenului de introducere a acțiunii etc. El poate fi invocat<br />
în orice fază a procesului.<br />
4<br />
Probably <strong>the</strong> author refers to Jānis Kalnbērziņš (1893-1986), at <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Communist Party between<br />
1940 (25 august) -1959.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 455<br />
Consulates in Riga only of <strong>the</strong> countries to which <strong>the</strong>y cannot deny admissibility 1 , namely to <strong>the</strong><br />
countries in which <strong>the</strong> Soviets <strong>the</strong>mselves maintain consulates.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, 78.<br />
197. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 449 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail Manoilescu, 21<br />
iulie 1940<br />
Ordinea de zi a Parlamentului care se găsește actualmente în ședință comportă patru puncte<br />
și anume:<br />
- proclamarea Letoniei ca republică sovietică<br />
- soluționarea admiterii Letoniei în U.R.S.S<br />
- exproprierea marilor proprietăți rurale și<br />
- naționalizarea marilor întreprinderi<br />
Deciziile asupra primelor două puncte vor interveni chiar în cursul zilei de astăzi.<br />
Ședința a fost montată conform scenariului revoluționar clasic. După constituirea<br />
Parlamentului, delegații ale diferitelor corporații în cap cu delegația armatei au solicitat a fi<br />
admise a-și expune revendicările. Toate au cerut introducerea regimului comunist și<br />
încorporarea la U.R.S.S.. Discuțiile sunt constant întrerupte de ovații la adresa lui Stalin și de<br />
sunetele „Internaționalei”.<br />
Parlamentul a admis a se prelungi puterile actualului guvern până la noi dispoziții, Primul<br />
Ministru asumând și funcțiile de Președinte al Republicii în locul domnului Ulmanis.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 79.<br />
197. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 449 to Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu, 21 st July 1940<br />
The Agenda of <strong>the</strong> Parliament currently in session involves four points, namely:<br />
- <strong>the</strong> proclamation of Latvia as a Soviet republic<br />
- <strong>the</strong> settlement of <strong>the</strong> admission of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> USSR<br />
- <strong>the</strong> expropriation of <strong>the</strong> large rural properties and<br />
- <strong>the</strong> nationalization of large enterprises<br />
The first two points will be decided upon later today.<br />
The meeting was set according to <strong>the</strong> classic revolutionary scenario. Following <strong>the</strong><br />
establishment of <strong>the</strong> Parliament, delegations of different corporations led by <strong>the</strong> military<br />
delegation itself asked to be allowed to put forward <strong>the</strong>ir demands. All of <strong>the</strong>m requested <strong>the</strong><br />
institution of <strong>the</strong> communist regime and <strong>the</strong> incorporation in <strong>the</strong> USSR. The discussions were<br />
constantly interrupted by applause to Stalin and by <strong>the</strong> sounds of <strong>the</strong> "International".<br />
The Parliament allowed <strong>the</strong> extension of <strong>the</strong> validity of <strong>the</strong> current government, until<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r notice, <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister assuming also <strong>the</strong> functions of President of <strong>the</strong> Republic<br />
instead of Mr. Ulmanis.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 79.<br />
1 A means of defense which aims at rejecting <strong>the</strong> action by contesting <strong>the</strong> right of <strong>the</strong> opposing<br />
party to act in accordance with certain facts such as <strong>the</strong> lack of quality, interest, <strong>the</strong> expiry of <strong>the</strong><br />
deadline for filing actions etc. It can be invoked in any stage of <strong>the</strong> trial.
456 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
198. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 448 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail Manoilescu, 21<br />
iulie 1940<br />
Statele Baltice au trăit. Ultimul act al comediei care se cheamă liberarea de către armata<br />
roșie a popoarelor baltice de tirania regimurilor lor plutocratice și adeziunea liberă și spontană<br />
a acestor popoare recunoscătoare la Rusia sovietică s-a consumat azi când Parlamentul din<br />
Riga, ales sub baionetele rusești, a decis a solicita încorporarea Letoniei în U.R.S.S.. În celelalte<br />
capitale baltice o decizie similară a fost luată probabil în același timp sau va fi luată la un scurt<br />
interval.<br />
Efemera existență a acestor state constituie o condamnare vie și elocventă a regimului<br />
comunist. Desprinse din corpul vechii Rusii, pornite după războiul mondial de la același punct<br />
de plecare ca și Rusia sovietică, câtă diferență în rezultatele respective obținute nu atestă cei<br />
douăzeci de ani de viață separată. Deși lipsite de bogății naturale, Statele Baltice, printr-o<br />
muncă tenace organizată în cadrul unor regimuri de ordine au reușit să obțină progrese<br />
economice și sociale și un nivel de viață care le pun în rândul popoarelor cele mai civilizate. În<br />
același timp, cu toate imensele resurse, Rusia sovietică nu poate oferi decât un spectacol de<br />
mizerie, de suferință și de teroare.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 80-81.<br />
198. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 448 to Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu, 21 st July 1940<br />
The Baltic States have passed away. The last act of <strong>the</strong> comedy which is called <strong>the</strong> liberation<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Red Army of <strong>the</strong> Baltic peoples from <strong>the</strong> tyranny of <strong>the</strong>ir plutocratic regimes and <strong>the</strong> free<br />
and spontaneous adherence of <strong>the</strong>se grateful peoples to Soviet Russia was consumed today<br />
when <strong>the</strong> Parliament in Riga, elected under Russian bayonets, decided to seek <strong>the</strong><br />
incorporation of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> USSR. In <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic capitals, a similar decision was probably<br />
taken at <strong>the</strong> same time or will be taken in a short while.<br />
The ephemeral existence of <strong>the</strong>se states is a vivid and eloquent condemnation of <strong>the</strong><br />
communist regime. Though <strong>the</strong>y detached from <strong>the</strong> body of <strong>the</strong> old Russia and started after <strong>the</strong><br />
World War from <strong>the</strong> same starting point as Soviet Russia, <strong>the</strong>ir twenty years of separate life<br />
made such a difference. Although lacking in natural resources, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, managed – by<br />
means of tenacious work organized under certain order regimes – to achieve economic and<br />
social progress and a standard of living which place <strong>the</strong>m among <strong>the</strong> most civilized peoples.<br />
While Soviet Russia, with all its immense resources, displays only a show of misery, suffering<br />
and terror.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 80-81.<br />
199. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 452 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail Manoilescu, 26<br />
iulie 1940<br />
Unirea Statelor Baltice cu Rusia va fi proclamată oficial probabil la 1 august de către Sovietul<br />
Suprem căruia delegațiile celor trei state îi vor prezenta cererile formulate de parlamentele<br />
respective de încorporare în Uniunea Sovietică ca republici federate. Termenul ce va fi acordat<br />
Corpului Diplomatic pentru a părăsi Riga va fi după toate probabilitățile de două săptămâni.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 457<br />
Rușii doresc a îndepărta cât mai repede orice prezență inoportună din aceste regiuni<br />
prezentând un mare interes din punct de vedere militar.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 82.<br />
199. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 452 to Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu, 26 th July 1940<br />
The union of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States with Russia will be probably officially proclaimed on August 1 st<br />
by <strong>the</strong> Supreme Soviet to whom <strong>the</strong> delegations of <strong>the</strong> three states will submit <strong>the</strong> respective<br />
parliaments’ applications of incorporation in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union as a federal republic. The<br />
deadline which will be granted to <strong>the</strong> Diplomatic Corps to leave Riga will be, in all likelihood,<br />
two weeks. The Russians want to remove any undesired presence of great military interest from<br />
<strong>the</strong>se regions as soon as possible.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 82.<br />
200. Telegrama Ministerului Afacerilor Străine al României nr. 49733 semnată Vasile<br />
Grigorcea către însărcinatul cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești, 12<br />
august 1940<br />
Având în vedere noua situație din Letonia vă încunoștințez că sunteți rechemat pe ziua de<br />
20 august în Administrația Centrală.<br />
Înainte de a părăsi Riga, rog luați măsuri pentru arderea cifrului și arhivei politice și secrete,<br />
aducând la Minister numai arhiva administrativă și de contabilitate, precum și registrele.<br />
Apuntamentele Domniei Voastre și ale personalului, pe întreaga lună august, au fost<br />
ordonanțate și le veți primi ca de obicei.<br />
Rog telegrafiați dacă doamna Blau și omul de serviciu au dreptul la un preaviz conform<br />
legilor locale și cât anume pentru ca Ministerul să dispună în consecință.<br />
Contractul de închiriere pentru locuința Domniei Voastre personală expirând la 1 octombrie,<br />
iar chiria fiind plătită până la aceea dată, nu veți avea nicio altă obligație față de proprietar.<br />
Contractul de închiriere pentru Cancelarie putând fi denunțat cu preaviz de 3 luni, rog să-l<br />
denunțați la 15 august și să achitați restul chiriei de la 1 octombrie până la 15 noiembrie, adică<br />
450 de lați, din încasări.<br />
Veți lua măsuri pentru transportul la București a întregului inventar al legației. În ceea ce<br />
privește mobilierul Domniei Voastre personal, îl veți depune la o casă de expediție, deoarece nu<br />
este încă hotărât dacă nu veți fi transferat în curând într-un alt post în străinătate.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 86-87.<br />
200. The telegram of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania no. 49733 signed by<br />
Vasile Grigorcea to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești, 12 th August 1940<br />
Given <strong>the</strong> new situation in Latvia, I inform you that you are re-summoned to <strong>the</strong> Central<br />
Administration on August 20 th .<br />
Before leaving Riga, please take <strong>the</strong> necessary measures to burn <strong>the</strong> cipher and <strong>the</strong> political<br />
and secret archives, bringing to <strong>the</strong> Ministry only <strong>the</strong> administrative and accounting archives as<br />
well as <strong>the</strong> records.
458 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Your wages and those of your staff for <strong>the</strong> entire month of August were authorized and you<br />
will receive <strong>the</strong>m as usual.<br />
Please let us know by wire if Mrs. Blau and <strong>the</strong> janitor are entitled to a notice and <strong>the</strong><br />
extension of <strong>the</strong> same under local laws, so that <strong>the</strong> Ministry should order accordingly.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> lease agreement for your personal dwelling expires on October 1 st and <strong>the</strong> rent is paid<br />
to that date, you will have no fur<strong>the</strong>r obligation to <strong>the</strong> owner.<br />
As it is possible to terminate <strong>the</strong> lease contract for <strong>the</strong> Chancellery with a 3-month notice,<br />
please denounce it on August 15 th and pay <strong>the</strong> remaining rent from October 1 st until November<br />
15 th , meaning 450 Latsfrom <strong>the</strong> receipts.<br />
You will take <strong>the</strong> necessary measures for <strong>the</strong> transportation of <strong>the</strong> entire inventory of <strong>the</strong><br />
legation to Bucharest. As far as your personal furniture is concerned, you will place it in a<br />
freight company, as it has not been decided yet whe<strong>the</strong>r you are transferred soon to ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
post abroad.<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 86-87.<br />
201. Decret nr. 50077 din 13 august 1940 al Regelui Carol al II-lea de rechemare a<br />
diplomatului Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti din calitatea de însărcinat cu afaceri al<br />
României la Riga<br />
Carol al II-lea<br />
Prin graţia Lui Dumnezeu şi voinţa naţională Rege al României<br />
La toţi de faţă şi viitor Sănătate<br />
Asupra raportului Ministrului Nostru Secretar de Stat la Departamentul Afacerilor Străine<br />
sub No. 50076<br />
Am decretat şi decretăm:<br />
Art. I Domnul Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti, Secretar de Legaţie Cl. a II a, Însărcinat cu Afaceri<br />
pe lângă Legaţia României din Riga, este rechemat pe ziua de 20 august 1940, în Administraţia<br />
Centrală a Ministerului de Afaceri Străine.<br />
Art. II- Ministrul Nostru Secretar de Stat la Departamentul Afacerilor Străine este însărcinat<br />
cu executarea acestui decret.<br />
Dat în Bucureşti, la 13 august 1940.<br />
*<br />
AMAE, fond Cazierul 77, Litera N, Nr. 37, 1930, Niculescu-Buzeşti, Grigore<br />
201. Decree no. 50077 of King Charles (Carol) II of recalling diplomat Grigore<br />
Niculescu-Buzeşti from <strong>the</strong> position of Romania’s Charge d’affaires in Riga, 13 th August<br />
1940<br />
Carol II<br />
By <strong>the</strong> grace of God and national will King of Romania<br />
Wish Health to all present and to <strong>the</strong> future ones<br />
On <strong>the</strong> report of our Minister Secretary of State at <strong>the</strong> Department of Foreign Affairs having<br />
no. 50076
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 459<br />
We decreed and decree:<br />
Art. I Mister Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti, Secretary of Legation Cl. II a, Charge d’affaires to <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanian Legation to Riga is recalled on 20 August 1940 to <strong>the</strong> Central Administration of<br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<br />
Art. II Our Minister Secretary of State at <strong>the</strong> Department of Foreign Affairs is responsible for<br />
<strong>the</strong> execution of this decree.<br />
Given in Bucharest, August 13, 1940.<br />
DARMFA, f. 77, N 37, 1930, Niculescu-Buzeşti, Grigore<br />
202. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Grigore Niculescu-<br />
Buzești nr. 486 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Mihail Manoilescu, 21<br />
august 1940<br />
Un mare număr de personalități reprezentative ale fostului regim sau ale vieții naționale<br />
letone a fost deportat în Rusia. Fostul Președinte al Republicii, Ulmanis, fostul Vicepreședinte al<br />
Consiliului de Miniștri, Balodis, și alți membri ai fostului guvern au împărtășit deja această<br />
soartă. Deportările și arestările continuă de altfel a fi practicate pe o scară foarte întinsă.<br />
Prin aceste măsuri politica sovietică urmărește să lichideze orice nucleu care ar putea<br />
întreține flacăra vieții naționale letone. În aceeași ordine de preocupări se înscrie și lichidarea<br />
probabilă și apropiată a armatelor Statelor Baltice. Oamenii vor fi trimiși pentru serviciu militar<br />
în Rusia, iar în Statele Baltice vor fi trimise contingente rusești. Ofițerii ce vor fi preluați în<br />
armata roșie vor fi repartizați în diferite garnizoane din Rusia.<br />
S-ar părea de altfel că cel puțin unele din persoanele expediate în Rusia se bucură de un<br />
regim destul de clement. Rușii nu urmăresc vreun proces personal în contra persoanelor în<br />
chestiune, ci decapitarea Statelor Baltice de elita lor conducătoare în jurul căreia s-ar putea<br />
grupa aspirațiile naționale.<br />
AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 94-95.<br />
202. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Riga Grigore Niculescu-Buzești<br />
no. 486 to Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu, 21 st August 1940<br />
A large number of representative personalities of <strong>the</strong> former regime or of <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />
national life were deported to Russia. Mr. Ulmanis, <strong>the</strong> former President of <strong>the</strong> Republic, Mr.<br />
Balodis, <strong>the</strong> former Vice-Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers, and o<strong>the</strong>r members of <strong>the</strong><br />
former government have already shared this fate. O<strong>the</strong>rwise, deportations and arrests continue<br />
on a very large scale.<br />
By <strong>the</strong>se measures, <strong>the</strong> Soviet policy seeks to liquidate any nucleus that might keep <strong>the</strong><br />
flame of <strong>the</strong> Latvian national life burning. The same list of concerns also included <strong>the</strong> probable<br />
and close liquidation of <strong>the</strong> armies of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. People will be sent to Russia for military<br />
service and Russian contingents will be sent to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. The officers who are taken by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Red Army will be sent to different garrisons in Russia.<br />
Moreover, it seems that at least some of <strong>the</strong> persons sent to Russia enjoy a fairly clement<br />
regime. The Russians’ objective is not a personal trial against <strong>the</strong> persons in question, but <strong>the</strong><br />
beheading of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States from <strong>the</strong>ir ruling elite around which national aspirations might<br />
be grouped.
460 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 94-95.<br />
203. Bijušā Latvijas sūtņa Bukarestē L. Ēķa 1942. g. 23. dec. raksts no Vašingtonas<br />
Latvijas diplomātiskā dienesta vadītājam K. Zariņam.<br />
[..]<br />
Rumānija. Ungārija un Rumānija bija Varšavas sūtniecības blakus jeb satelītu sūtniecības.<br />
Ungārijā es akreditējos 1938. gada 24. septembrī, bet Rumānijā 1939. g. 18. oktobrī. Pēc Varšavas<br />
man lielākā vērība bija jāpiegriež Ungārijai, jo pēdējā izrādīja dziļu interesi par Latviju. Sāka<br />
attīstīties diezgan rosīga savstarpēja satiksme un draudzīga iepazīšanās gan saimniecisku<br />
darbinieku, gan studējošās jaunatnes starpā, gan oficiālās valdības un izglītības un kulturāli–<br />
mākslinieciskā laukā. Rumānijā mana ierašanās bija gadījuma diktēta, jo Bukarestē mēs<br />
atradāmies gandrīz vai viss Varšavas diplomātiskais korpuss. Lielākā tiesa drīz vien aizbrauca.<br />
Man mūsu ārlietu ministrs uzdeva palikt pagaidām Bukarestē, bet gatavoties uz pārcelšanos uz<br />
Budapeštu. 1940. g. sākumā man direktors Anševics 1 rakstīja ministra uzdevumā, ka mana<br />
uzturēšanās Dienvidaustrumu Eiropā neesot paredzēta ilgākam laikam. Mani esot paredzēts<br />
pārcelt uz Maskavu vai uz Berlīni. Lai es pats aizrakstot ministram. Es aizrakstīju un lūdzu<br />
vismaz pagaidām man ļaut drusku “atvilkt elpu” puslīdz mierīgos Budapeštas un Bukarestes<br />
apstākļos. Pēc tam pienāca priekšlikums akreditēties arī Turcijā.<br />
Šo ievadu sniedzu tamdēļ, lai Tev rādītu, ka Rumānija nemaz ar nebija domāta kā<br />
sūtniecības sēdeklis, un tāpēc es tur lielāko tiesu no nepilniem 6 mēnešiem pavadīju viesnīcā un<br />
vēlāk mēbelētā dzīvoklī. Mana sūtniecība bija “automobilī”, jo man vairākkārt bija jābrauc uz<br />
Budapeštu (kur mums bija lielāks modernu ieroču pasūtījums) dažādas konkrētas lietas kārtot.<br />
Līdz 1940. g. pavasarim Bukarestē bija tiešām ērta un patīkama dzīvošana. Rumāņi ir ļoti<br />
interesanta un inteliģenta tauta. Sevišķi tur, kur tā palikusi tīra un nesajaukta, jeb kur redzams<br />
un jūtams vairāk Rietumeiropas iespaids. (Karpatu pakalnēs, par piemēru, un Transilvānijā).<br />
Bukareste bija pilna daždažādu ziņu un intrigue un es dabūju daudz ko dzirdēt un arī ziņot<br />
priekšniecībai Rīgā. Rezultāts tam bija tas, ka manu pagaidu sēdekli atstāja Bukarestē.<br />
Tai laikā, kad pār mūsu dzimteni un mūsu kaimiņu zemēm pacēlās bargie sarkanā negaisa<br />
mākoņi un draudi mūsu patstāvībai un tautas brīvībai, es biju Turcijā. Uz pieprasījumu<br />
Munteram par notikumiem Lietuvā un pie mums, saņēmu ļoti optimistisku atbildi. Šai sakarībā,<br />
man šķiet, nebūtu lieki atgādināt, ka mūsu valdības un prezidenta viedoklis bija nepretošanās<br />
krievu boļševiku iebrukumam [..].<br />
Lai gan Muntera šifrētā telegramma bija ļoti optimistiska, es tomēr manu sākumā domāto<br />
garāku apciemojumu Turcijā 1940. gada maijā un jūnijā saīsināju un 9. jūnija vakarā 1940. g.<br />
atgriezos Bukarestē. Ziņas no mājām un sevišķi no Lietuvas un no Rietumu frontes pienāca ļoti<br />
sliktas. Rumānijā notika valdības maiņa un jaunais kU.R.S.S. pilnīgi un atklāti iestūrēja “ass<br />
valstu” ūdeņos. 10. jūnijā 1940. g. Itālija pieteic karu Francijai un Anglijai. 14. jūnijā vācieši bez<br />
cīņas ieņem un okupē Parīzi. 15. jūnijā krievu nota – ultimāts Lietuvai. 16. jūnijā Lietuvas pilnīga<br />
okupācija no krievu sarkanarmijas. 16. jūnijā krievu ultimāts Latvijai un Igaunijai. 17. jūnijā<br />
Latvijas okupācija no krievu sarkanarmijas un Latvijas patstāvības beigas – līdz turpmākam.<br />
1940. gada 17. jūnijā visi Eiropas radiofoni un arī prese Bukarestē ziņoja par Latvijas<br />
okupāciju. Es mēģināju sazināties ar Rīgu, kas man arī izdevās ap plkst. 12 naktī. Pie telefona<br />
1<br />
Teodors Anševics (1900–1942), Latvijas diplomāts. No 1939. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Administratīvā departamenta<br />
direktors. Gājis bojā padomju ieslodzījumā.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 461<br />
(Arminis 1 ) bija Rusmanis. 2 Neko citu viņš pateikt nevarot, kā vienīgi to, lai klausoties radiofonu.<br />
Vecais ministru kabinets atkāpies. Rītu droši vien būšot jaunas ziņas. Plkst. 2 naktī būšot<br />
speciāls radījums pārstāvībām. Lai klausoties. Sazinājos arī ar Krieviņu 3 Berlīnē un manu igauņu<br />
kolēģi Budapeštā, J. Markusu. Plkst. 22.10 noklausījos prezidenta K.Ulmaņa runu. Viss kas<br />
notiekot, notiekot ar valdības ziņu, ar valdības piekrišanu. Prezidents vēloties tādēļ, lai krievu<br />
karaspēku sagaidītu ar draudzību, bez traucējumiem, bet lai ierobežojot lieku ziņkārību.<br />
Valdība atkāpusies, bet ministri paliek savos amatos, kamēr būs jauna valdība. Visiem palikt<br />
savās vietās, tas nepieciešams Latvijas un mūsu tautas interesēs. Notikumi ienesot traucējumus<br />
mūsu dzīves ritmā. Tas jāpanes. Draudzīgas attiecības ar Padomju Savienību esot apliecinājuši.<br />
Rodoties daudz jaunu, steidzamu prasību un grūtību. Visiem tomēr jāejot darbā. Rīkojumi būs<br />
bargi un stingri. Mūsu sirdis strauji pukst. “Es palikšu savā vietā un jūs paliekiet savās!”,<br />
nobeidza savu runu prezidents.<br />
Laiks starp 1940. g. 17. jūniju un 21. jūliju pagāja vienā nervozā satraukumā, ziņu vākšanā pa<br />
pilsētu, preses lasīšanā un radiofona klausīšanā līdz agrām rīta stundām. Jāpiezīmē, ka Rīgas un<br />
Madonas radiofonus es Bukarestē un Budapeštā (vēlāki) varēju saklausīt pavisam skaidri un bez<br />
mazākiem traucējumiem. P. Reinhards 4 bieži ar telegrammu paziņoja, kad lai klausos<br />
radiofonu. Saņēmu parasto rutīnas korespondenci un arī vairākas reizes kurjerpaciņas ar<br />
rumāņu vai ungāru kurjeru starpniecību. Saņēmu arī dažreiz tiešas droši necenzētas ziņas no<br />
maniem draugiem Rīgā caur franču sūtniecības laipnu starpniecību un vienreiz caur vācu<br />
sūtniecības starpniecību. Galvenais, ko man šādā veidā ziņoja Rīgas draugi, bija tas, lai es ne<br />
zem kādiem apstākļiem neriskējot mājās braukt. Mani uz vietas apcietināšot. Otrs galvenais<br />
punkts visos ziņojumos no Rīgas bija tas, ka tautā un zināmās inteliģences daļas (kalpakieši un<br />
korporeļi) 5 pārstāvjos valdīja liels sašutums par Ulmaņa – Muntera “pildīšanas politiku”<br />
boļševikiem iepretīm un par hermētisku robežu noslēgšanu tiem, kam palikšana Latvijā bija<br />
līdzīga nāves spriedumam.<br />
22. jūlijā 1940. g. dabūju dzirdēt par Latvijas (un mūsu kaimiņvalstu Igaunijas un Lietuvas)<br />
jaunā boļševistiskā “parlamenta” lēmumu pievienoties Padomju Krievijai, kā pēdējās sastāvdaļa.<br />
Tai pašā dienā ķēros pie protesta notu izstrādāšanas, lai reaģētu uz brēcošo netaisnību un<br />
boļševiku melu propagandu, kas iespiedās presē, un bija smags, nepamatots apvainojums mūsu<br />
tautai. 22., 23. un 24. jūlijā es apmeklēju visus man tuvāki un draudzīgāki noskaņotos ārvalstu<br />
sūtņus. Tāpat apmeklēju arī rumāņu Ārlietu ministrijas darbiniekus ar vecāko ģenerālsekretāru<br />
Gregorkea priekšgalā. Ar pēdējo arī vēlāk visas manas darīšanas tika kārtotas un viņš bija<br />
pilnvarots runāt sava ministra vārdā. Viņš bija man arī savā ziņā kolēģis, jo bija pēdējais rumāņu<br />
vēstnieks Polijā un kopā ar mums citiem taisīja cauri visas grūtās strapāces un bēguļošanas pa<br />
Poliju.<br />
1<br />
„Arminis” – Latvijas diplomātiskā dienesta korespondencē lietots apzīmējums Ārlietu ministrijai.<br />
2<br />
Aleksandrs Rusmanis (1890–1963), Latvijas diplomāts. 1933.–1940. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Austrumu nodaļas I šķiras<br />
sekretārs. 1949.–1956. g. izsūtījumā Amūras apgabalā, miris Latvijā.<br />
3<br />
Edgars Kurts Pēteris Krieviņš (1884–1971), Latvijas diplomāts. 1932.–1935. g. sūtnis Vācijā (no 1933. g. arī Austrijā<br />
un Nīderlandē) ar sēdekli Berlīnē, no 1935. g. Igaunijā, no 1938. g. Vācijā un Nīderlandē ar sēdekli Berlīnē. Miris<br />
Vācijā.<br />
4<br />
Pauls Jēkabs Reinhards (1903–1990), Latvijas diplomāts. No 1934. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Konsulārās, no 1936. g. –<br />
Rietumu nodaļas vadītājs. 1936.–1939. g. Tautu Savienības komisijas administrators Spānijā, 1939.–1940. g. Ārlietu<br />
ministrijas Preses nodaļas vadītājs. Miris Lielbritānijā.<br />
5<br />
Domāti Latvijas Pagaidu valdības bruņoto spēku 1. latviešu atsevišķā bataljona (pirmais komandieris Oskars<br />
Kalpaks) karavīri Neatkarības kara laikā 1918.–1919. g. (šeit – simboliski) un studentu korporāciju locekļi.
462 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
25. jūlijā piesūtīju sīki izstrādātas protesta notas Rumānijas, Ungārijas un Turcijas ārlietu<br />
ministriem. Bukarestē notu nodevu personīgi ģenerālsekretāram Grigorkea. Uz Budapeštu un<br />
uz Ankāru nosūtīju telegrammas, pieteicot notas un memorandu pa pastu jeb caur viņu<br />
vēstniecību vai sūtniecību starpniecību [..]. Šie dokumenti paši par sevi runā skaidru valodu par<br />
maniem ieskatiem attiecībā uz boļševiku iebrukumu Latvijā un šie dokumenti ir arī lūgums un<br />
protests neatzīt Latvijas inkorporāciju Padomju Savienībā, jo viss tas ir noticis ar rupjas, brutālas<br />
varas u neveiklu melu un falsifikāciju palīdzību. Norakstus no šiem dokumentiem es piesūtīju,<br />
resp., personīgi nonesu arī Amerikas sūtnim Frenklinam Motam Gunteram, mūsu labam<br />
draugam – zviedru sūtnim Patrikam de Reitersvērdam 1 un dažiem rumāņu man labi un<br />
draudzīgi noskaņotiem politiķiem. Ar Amerikas sūtni, starp citu, runāju arī, vai viņš nevarētu<br />
pieņemt vismaz daļu mana arhīva un valsts mantas glabāšanā. Viņš atteicās to darīt, bet solīja<br />
manu protesta notu un memorandu tekstus darīt zināmus savai valdībai. Zviedru sūtnis<br />
izlīdzēja man citādi – palīdzot manu personīgo arhīvu pārdabūt pār robežām un pieņemot<br />
glabāšanā arī manus personīgos līdzekļus. Valsts mantu arī viņš atteicās pieņemt, jo, ja kaut kā<br />
boļševiki to dabūtu saost, tad viņu likvidētu. Te vēl jāatzīmē, ka pēc šo notu iesniegšanas mana<br />
kustēšanās pa Bukaresti palika bīstama. Ap sūtniecību ložņāja šaubīgi tipi (jāzin arī, ka mans<br />
mēbelētais dzīvoklis un pagaidu sūtniecības sēdeklis atradās apm. vienu bloku no boļševiku<br />
vēstniecības, kas ieņēma veselu kvartālu Bukarestes lepnajā šosejā Kisleff), un kolēģi un arī tas<br />
pats Ārlietu ministrijas ģenerālsekretārs mani brīdināja būt uzmanīgam. Ārlietu ministrija un<br />
prefektūra gan gādāšot par manu drošību (manu rezidenci dienu un nakti apsargāja divi<br />
rumāņu policisti), bet man pašam jābūtot ļoti piesardzīgam. Uz vairākām dienām aizbraucu<br />
kalnos un atgriezos Bukarestē augusta pirmajās dienās, kad dzirdēju par Latvijas (un kaimiņu)<br />
oficiālu pievienošanu Padomijai.<br />
7. augustā 1940. g. man bija garāka saruna ar ģenerālsekretāru Grigorkea. Atgādināju viņam<br />
manu 23. jūlija notu un memorandu. Prasīju, vai varu cerēt uz Rumānijas valdības atbalstu un<br />
uz to, ka viņi neatzīs ar varu un viltu latvju tautai uzspiestu pievienošanos Padomijai? Vai es<br />
varēšu palikt kā Latvijas sūtnis Bukarestē? Uz to man savas valdības uzdevumā ģenerālsekretārs<br />
atbildēja, ka viņi diemžēl esot spiesti atzīt Rīgā esošo valdību. Par Latvijas pievienošanos<br />
Padomijai viņiem esot savas domas, kuras neesot tālu no tām, kas izteiktas manā 23. jūlija notā.<br />
Viņi tomēr man pozitīvu atbildi, t. i. solīt mani turpināt atzīt par Latvijas sūtni, gadījumā, ja<br />
Rīgas valdība mani atsauktu vai atceltu, dot nevarēšot. Nesen, par piemēru, Igaunijas Ārlietu<br />
ministrija pieprasījusi agrément 2 kādam citam un atsaukusi Markusu. Neesot iemesla Rumānijai<br />
šo pārmaiņu neatzīt. Tad vienu laiku runājām neoficiāli un Grigorkea neslēpa savu sašutumu<br />
pret krieviem. Viņa lauku īpašums Moldāvijā (netālu no Černauti) paņemts un izlaupīts no<br />
krieviem. Ko lai darot? Skaidrs esot arī viņiem, ka krievi mani neatstās mierā. Tāpēc viņš<br />
suģestējot man sekojošo: 1. Lai es atsakoties pats pirms atcelšanas un likvidēšanas no savām<br />
funkcijām un paziņojot viņiem to. 2.Rumānijas Ārlietu ministrija tad pārņemšot manus<br />
nedaudzos arhīvus un īpašumus glabāšanā līdz turpmākam (viņš pats vēl nodiktēja tekstu, kā<br />
man to derētu izteikt). Lai visu iezēģelējot ne visai lielās kastēs un viņi tad redzēšot, ko darīt,<br />
bet boļševiki tos nedabūšot. 3) Man personīgi viņi došot laiku “pour preparer le départ” 3 un tajā<br />
1<br />
Patriks Karls Reinholds Reitersvērds (Reuterswärd; 1885–1963), Zviedrijas diplomāts. 1928.–1935. g. sūtnis Latvijā,<br />
pēc tam – Rumānijā.<br />
2<br />
Agrément (franču val.) – piekrišana.<br />
3<br />
Pour preparer le départ (franču val.) – priekš sagatavošanās izbraukšanai.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 463<br />
laikā es būšot baudīt eksteritorialitāti. Šo laiku viņi man nolikšot labi garu, tā starp 9 mēnešiem<br />
vai 2 gadiem. 4) Mūsu pases viņi atzīšot tāpat kā atzīstot citu okupēto valstu dokumentus. 5)<br />
gadījumā, ja es arī kā privātpersona paliktu Rumānijā, es būšot baudīt vienmēr viņu aizsardzību<br />
un draudzību. 6) Gadījumā, ja es atrastu kādu nodarbošanos, man nekādā ziņā nebūšot liegt<br />
ārzemniekiem nepieciešamas atļaujas.<br />
Es vēl vairākkārt noprasīju, vai varu ar to rēķināties, ka viss solītais tiks pildīts un ka man<br />
beigās tomēr neiznāk darīšanas ar krieviem? Atkal ģenerālsekretārs apliecināja, ka viss būšot<br />
vislabākā kārtībā, un lai es vēl pārdomājot visu un viņu lai informējot. Tikai lai es sargoties un<br />
esot ļoti uzmanīgs, ka krievi man “nepiesienot” kādu kriminālapvainojumu, par mantu, naudas<br />
etc. piesavināšanos etc. Viņi, t. i. rumāņi, jau nu mani nekādos apstākļos krieviem neizdotu, bet<br />
kas šinīs laikos lai nosaka, kad un kur krievi ar savu GPU 1 var aizsniegties.<br />
Domāju un plānoju ko darīt apaļas trīs dienas. Pēc visas skaidrošanās Ārlietu ministrijā un<br />
pēc informācijas no citām Eiropas galvaspilsētām bija skaidrs, ka krievi neatstās neko nedarītu,<br />
lai panāktu Baltijas sūtniecību un konsulātu likvidēšanu un arhīvu un mantu pārņemšanu. Lai<br />
gan materiālā iztikšana būtu bijusi visērtākā un lētākā Bukarestē, es interesējos par citām<br />
sūtniecībām, vai būtu iespējams pārcelties uz a) Šveici, b) Ungāriju vai c) Ameriku. Izrādījās, ka<br />
Rumānijā daudz maz kādu eksistenci nodrošināt vai darbu atrast varētu, vienīgi pielabinoties<br />
vāciešiem. To kāds vācu baņķieris no Varšavas laikiem man pazīstams pavisam atklāti pateica.<br />
Arī vācu sūtnis, kad pie tā biju informēties, ko viņš saka uz visu notiekošo un vai viņš man<br />
privātā kārtā varētu likt manīt, ka mēs, Baltijas tautas, varētu arī cerēt uz kādām pārmaiņām,<br />
pieminēja iespēju iestāties kādas vācu lielbankas dienestā Bukarestē, bet ka mūsu politiskā<br />
situācijā gan nekas negrozīšoties un tas esot mūsu “Pech”, 2 ka mēs, t. i. latvju tauta, atrodoties<br />
tajā stūrī pie Baltijas jūras, kas esot Krievijas interešu sfērā. Es neko citu labāku tajā brīdī<br />
neaptvēru izdarīt, kā strauji piecelties un pateikt “Auf Wiedersehen!” 3 Sūtnis Fabriciuss arī<br />
piecēlās un izstiepis savu roku gaisā, noteica: “Heil Hitler!” 4 Tā bija mana pēdējā saruna ar manu<br />
bij. vācu kolēģi Bukarestē. Bet bija arī caur to skaidrs, ka Bukarestes gaiss ir par “biezu” priekš<br />
manis un ģimenes. Tātad neapšaubāmi un negrozāmi, Bukarestē palikt nevarēšu. Šī lēmuma<br />
pieņemšanu vēl steidzināja nemitīgās baumas par krievu tālāku virzīšanos uz rietumiem,<br />
vismaz līdz Karpatu kalniem, kas nozīmētu arī Bukarestes ieņemšanu. To gan, starp citu, vācu<br />
sūtnis noteikti dementēja kā absolūtu neiespējamību. No citu ļaužu piedzīvojumiem, no cilvēku<br />
pazušanas etc. man nebija tomēr šaubu, ka Bukareste dotos apstākļos priekš manīm un manas<br />
ģimenes ir par nedrošu. Tā pienāca 9. augusta 1940. g. diena. Manas atbūtnes laikā bija<br />
vairākkārt zvanījuši no krievu boļševiku sūtniecības un lūguši pēc manīm. Sekretārs V.<br />
Āboltiņš 5 teica, ka zvanītājs bijis 1. sekretārs Mihailovs. Uz to es nodevu sekretāram Āboltiņam<br />
zīmīti franču valodā ar lūgumu to nolasīt, ja krievi atkal zvanītu. Ap plkst. 6.30 pēc pusdienas<br />
krievi zvanīja atkal un lūguši satikšanos noteikt starp Padomju sūtni un mani, jo esot ļoti<br />
svarīgas un steidzamas lietas pārrunājamas. Sekretārs Āboltiņš manā uzdevumā nolasīja tekstu.<br />
1<br />
GPU – Glavnoje Politicheskoje upravlenije (krievu val.) – PSRS Galvenās Politiskās pārvaldes nosaukuma<br />
abreviatūra.<br />
2<br />
Pech (vācu val.) – piķis; pārnestā nozīmē neveiksme, nelaime.<br />
3<br />
Auf Wiedersehen (vācu val.) – uz redzēšanos.<br />
4<br />
Heil Hitler (vācu val.) – Sveiks, Hitler! Vācu nacionālsociālistiskās strādnieku partijas sveiciens.<br />
5<br />
Voldemārs Āboltiņš (1914 – pēc 1950), Latvijas diplomāts. No 1940. g. maija sekretārs sūtniecībā Bukarestē. No<br />
1950. g. dzīvojis Austrālijā.
464 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
No šī teksta ir neapšaubāmi skaidrs, ka es, vērā ņemot Latvijas aneksiju no Padomijas, nevaru<br />
turpināt un atsakos ielaisties jebkādās darīšanās ar Padomijas sūtni.<br />
10. augustā pa manu privāto telefonu piezvanīja Padomju sūtniecības līdzšinējais Chargé<br />
d’Affaires un lūdza privātu sarunu. Es to vīru biju daudzreiz saticis Bukarestes sabiedrībā,<br />
diplomātiskā korpusa un valdības pieņemšanās. Es esot licis paziņot iepriekšējā vakarā tik ļoti<br />
dusmīgu atbildi sūtnim Lavrentjevam. Sūtnis Lavrentjevs turpretim gribējis ar mani personīgi<br />
parunāties, šo un to paskaidrot sakarā ar pēdējā laika notikumiem. Es pateicu, ka manu oficiālo<br />
atbildi viņi ir saņēmuši no mana sekretāra un man tur nav nekā ko grozīt, un es savu kāju viņu<br />
sūtniecībā nesperšu, kamēr Latvija nebūs atkal brīva. Bet vai es arī personīgi, privāti negribot<br />
runāt ar Lavrentjevu? Es teicu, ka nevaru iedomāties, kas Lavrentjevam varētu būt sakāms<br />
privāti, bet, ja viņš pēc visa tā, ko esmu paziņojis, grib ar mani privāti runāt, lai tad ierodas<br />
manā privātā dzīvoklī otrā rīta plkst. 11. Es uzklausīšu, kas viņam sakāms un varbūt, ka arī man<br />
būs kas sakāms. Pēc kāda laika tas pats tips, bij. Chargé d’Affaires Kukoļevs zvana atkal un lūdz<br />
sava šefa uzdevumā, vai es nevarot viņu pieņemt vēl tai pašā vakarā. Es brīdi padomāju un<br />
atbildēju, labi, lai nāk pēc vakariņām, plkst. 9 vakarā. Saprotams, ka es būtu varējis noraidīt<br />
boļševiku sūtņa uzmācību un “privāto” izrunāšanos, bet es iedomājos, ka nemaz tik slikti nebūs<br />
dzirdēt no tāda vīra, kas viņam sakāms, bet galvenais, ka man ar to ir radusies izdevība pateikt<br />
labu daļu no tā sašutuma un sāpēm, ko izjūt latvju tauta bez kā jebkādam būtu iespēja brīvi un<br />
neatkarīgi boļševikiem acīs pateikt, ka mēs viņu šķidro viltus spēli un varmācības, liekulību,<br />
līgumu laušanu un t. t. skaidri redzam un saprotam. Šis nolūks (un arī tas tika izpildīts) vienīgi<br />
bija par iemeslu tam, kamdēļ es krievu sūtni ielaidu mana dzīvokļa darba istabā un mana<br />
sekretāra klātbūtnē izteicu visu, ko vien varēju iedomāties par boļševikiem nepatīkamu un kas<br />
mūsu tautai tai laikā sāpēja. Es runāju par 22 gadu darba augļu sabrukumu, par nežēlīgu<br />
iznīcināšanu visu to, kas latvju tautai svēts un dārgs, par svešas armijas ielaušanos mūsu zemē,<br />
par svešas, bargas kārtības ievešanu, par svešas varas un gribas uzspiešanu un pretendēšanu, ka<br />
to dara latvju tauta no brīva prāta. Visu izšķir rupjš spēks un tas, ko raksta mūsu avīzes un ko<br />
saka krievu radiofons, nav latvju tautas brīva griba. Lai izvāc kaut uz vienu dienu sarkano armiju<br />
un tad lai notur vēlēšanas, tad jūs, Maskavas kungi, pabrīnīsieties, kur ir jums 97,7%<br />
“piekrišana”. Latvija nu ir kļuvusi atkal par krievu “guberņu” zem ļoti bargas diktatūras (svešas<br />
pie tam) valdības. Asinis un asaras plūdīs straumēm. Pavisam nevietā teikt, ka Latvija tagad<br />
“vienlīdzīga” ar Krieviju. (Tā, kaut ko oponēt mēģinādams, iebilda Lavrentjevs). Es teicu, ka te ir<br />
kas līdzīgs kāzām starp ziloni un peli. Lai tik nu viņš neiedomājas, ka latvju tauta tiešām ir<br />
“laimīga” zem viņu varmācības jūga. Bet strādniekiem būšot labāki! Strādniekiem? Es teicu, ka<br />
tiešām nožēlojami viņi ir savas nezināšanas dēļ, cerēdami, ka viņi Latvijas strādniekiem ar<br />
sarkano okupāciju atnes uzlabojumu. Bet es arī nemaz nezinot, cik trakoti jauki ejot krievu<br />
strādniekiem! Es atbildēju, ka man ir tā iedomība, ka es zinu par krievu strādnieku grūtībām un<br />
nožēlojamo dzīvi daudz vairāk, nekā viņš par tagad izvarotās kaimiņzemes Latvijas strādnieku<br />
un visas tautas labklājību. Es uzskaitīju visus tos pārkāpumus, ko krievi pret mums atļāvušies,<br />
neskatoties uz mūsu ļoti piekāpīgās valdības gatavību līdz neiespējamībai iet krievu prasībām<br />
pretī. Ja militārā situācija un krievu bailes no vāciešiem šos soļus diktējušas, tad vajadzēja mums<br />
to pateikt, varēja atrast kopīgu sadarbības bāzi, kā pag. gadā (t. i., 1939. g. rudenī), bet tagad<br />
nekas cits nav saskatāms, kā vienkārša varaskāre un prastas zortes imperiālisms. Ja tādi jūs esiet<br />
“mazo tautu aizstāvji”. Mans nelūgtais, uzbāzīgais viesis svīda un sarka. Mēģināja vairākas reizes<br />
mani pārtraukt, bet es reti kad laidu viņu pie vārda. No piedāvātās kafijas un konjaka neatteicās,
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 465<br />
bet nedzēra to un lūdza kalponei glāzi ūdens…Tad piecēlās un jautāja, vai es esmu saņēmis<br />
kādas instrukcijas attiecībā uz sūtniecības nodošanu viņam? Es atbildēju, ka neesmu nekādas<br />
instrukcijas saņēmis un tāpēc arī neko viņam nenodošu. Bet ja es saņemšot, ko tad darīšot. Nu,<br />
kad saņemsim, “togda posmotrim” 1 , es atbildēju. “Kak eto, posmotrim?” 2 , jautāja man mans<br />
ciemiņš. “Nu posmotrim, chto tam skazanno budet! 3 ”, es atbildēju. Vai es taču braukšot mājās<br />
pēc sūtniecības likvidācijas!. “Es, mājās”?? – es pārjautāju, izbrīnījies. Kamēr mūsu zemē būs<br />
svešs karaspēks un sveša policija, es gan tur nebraukšu un labāki savu maizi pelnīšu kā ielas<br />
bruģētājs vai ielas slaucītājs svešās zemēs, bet jūs mani savā varā gan dzīvu nedabūsiet! Es esot<br />
pārāk ass un netaisns savos spriedumos pret viņiem, gan viss būšot labi beigu beigās. Jā, es arī<br />
uz to ceru, ka viss būs labi beigu beigās, bet ne tā, kā jūs to domājiet. Viņam esot jāejot, jo mēs<br />
abi acīmredzot, viens otru nekad nepārliecināšot un nesapratīšot. Es atbildēju, ka man arī tā<br />
liekas. Visa šī saruna notika mana sekretāra klātbūtnē. Krievam arī bija līdz tas man agrāk<br />
pazīstamais Chargé d’Affaires Bukarestē Kukuļevs. Tāda bija mana pēdējā saruna ar boļševiku<br />
sūtni Bukarestē. Sekretārs izvadīja vēlos “viesus”, jo durvis bija noslēgtas un rumāņu policistam<br />
piekodināts nevienu cilvēku nelaist nedz iekšā, nedz ārā, ja to nepavada sekretārs Āboltiņš. Aiz<br />
mūsu dzelzs sētas stāvēja sarkano auto ar trīs “razbainieciski” izskatīgiem šoferiem un to<br />
palīgiem.<br />
Tai pašā naktī apmēram 4 no rīta pienāca telegramma no Rīgas par sūtniecības likvidēšanu<br />
un rīkojums visu ko nodot krievu pārstāvībai Bukarestē. Paraksts Jablonskis. 4 Nu vairs nevarēju<br />
tālāk “domāt” un vilcināties ar izšķiršanos. Nolēmu rīkoties pēc 1. augustā norunātā, resp., man<br />
no rumāņu Ārlietu ministrijas suģestētā plāna. Rumānijā Latvijai sūtniecība nekad nebija bijusi<br />
pirms mana gadījuma, resp. piespiedu ierašanās, bēgot no sagrautās Polijas 1939. g. rudenī.<br />
Rumānijai Latvijas brīvības atgūšanā nevar būt nekādas sevišķas nozīmes. Citiem vārdiem<br />
runājot, mana domāšanas gaita virzījās tai virzienā, ka Latvijai ir un arī priekšā stāvošā cīņā par<br />
brīvības atgūšanu būs absolūti vienaldzīgi, ko domā un ko lemj Rumānija. Rumānija gan cīņā ar<br />
krieviem ir un varētu būt kā mūsu frontes plašākā nozīmē (frontē no Somijas līdz Melnai jūrai<br />
ieskaitot) dienvidu enkurs un dienvidos loma, līdzīga Somijai ziemeļos. Rumānija ir arī bagāta<br />
zeme un miera laikos būtu pavisam derīgi ar viņu tuvākās attiecībās nonākt, jo iespējama ir<br />
plaša tirdzniecība pie daudzmaz asprātīgāki nokārtotiem satiksmes apstākļiem. Īsi sakot: nav<br />
nozīmes man cīnīties par palikšanu Rumānijā.<br />
Tāpēc arī saziņā ar manu sekretāru Voldemāru Āboltiņu un, informējoties par apstākļiem<br />
Berlīnē, Stokholmā, nolēmu no sūtņa pilnvarām Rumānijā (bet ne Polijā, Ungārijā un Turcijā!)<br />
atteikties un par to paziņot Rumānijas ārlietu ministram. Legālais pamats algas izmaksai<br />
sekretāram un man arī bija radīts ar mūsu bij. resora telegrammu par sūtniecības likvidēšanu,<br />
jo, vērā ņemot rumāņu brīdinājumu par sargāšanos no visa kā, kur kaut kā varētu piesiet<br />
kriminālvajāšanu, mums bija jābūt ļoti uzmanīgiem visās lietās un katrs solis jāpamato ar kādu<br />
Latvijas likumu. 10. augustā 1940. g piesūtīju Rumānijas ārlietu ministram notu par manu<br />
pilnvaru nolikšanu. Notas otrā un trešā rindkopas ir rediģētas pēc Rumānijas Ārlietu ministrijas<br />
ģenerālsekretāra G. Grigorkea diktēta, resp., apmēram tā suģestēta teksta, 7. aug. 1940. g.<br />
1<br />
Togda posmotrim (krievu val.) – tad redzēsim.<br />
2<br />
Kak eto, posmotrim? (krievu val.) – tas ir kā, tad redzēsim?<br />
3<br />
Nu posmotrim, chto tam skazanno budet (krievu val.) – nu apskatīsimies, kas tur būs pateikts.<br />
4<br />
Andrejs Jablonskis (1880–1951), komunistiskās pagrīdes dalībnieks cariskajā Krievijā un Latvijā. Pēc valsts<br />
okupācijas 1940. g. jūl. – aug. ārlietu ministra biedrs, pēc tam Latvijas PSR tieslietu tautas komisārs.
466 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Tai pašā dienā izdarīju vēl otru “grēku” [..] un nosūtīju Ārl[ietu] ministrijai Rīgā telegrammu,<br />
t. i., ka es nekādām pavēlēm nepadodos un nedaudzās mantas, ko Rīga prasīja atdot krieviem,<br />
es solu nodot “rumāņu iestāžu gādībā”.<br />
Pasūtīju vajadzīgās kastes un nākošo mēnešu laikā mēs abi ar sekretāru Āboltiņu domājam<br />
gatavoties priekš “départ" 1 un starplaikā baudīsim rumāņu viesmīlību un aizsardzību, pa klusam<br />
meklējot arī kādu nodarbību, lai izvilktu dzīvības līdz labākiem laikiem.<br />
Bet izrādās, ka mūsu 10. augusta vakara “viesis” ar turku “pirti” manā dzīvoklī nebija<br />
samierinājies un rīkoja īstu “Russkuju bāņu” man un nabaga rumāņiem. Mans jautājums<br />
debatēts Ministru kabinetā, tad ministrijā etc. Izrādījās, ka savu interešu dēļ un, lai tiktu galā ar<br />
krievu stingro uzmācību un draudiem un, laikam, arī uz vācu spiediena, mani rumāņu draugi<br />
lauza dotos man solījumus caur ģenerālsekretāru 7. augustā.<br />
Vēl man jāatzīmē, ka boļševiku sūtniecība vēlreiz gribēja ar mani runāt. Tas bija 12. augustā.<br />
Caur sekretāru es liku paziņot, ka es esmu kopš 10. augusta privātpersona un man vairs nav<br />
nekādu funkciju un man nav un nevar būt nekādu darīšanu ar padomju pārstāvniecību.<br />
16. augustā mani izsauca uz Ārlietu ministriju ģenerālsekretārs G. Grigorkea. Ministra<br />
uzdevumā, kas pats esot ļoti, ļoti aizņemts. Man pūlēšanās pēc tam piekļūt pie ministra<br />
Manoilesku palika bez sekmēm. Grigorkea jutās ļoti neveikli, jo viņam bija uzdots man nodot<br />
rumāņu valdības negatīvu atbildi uz manu 10. augusta notu, t. i. negatīvo tanī ziņā, ka viņiem<br />
neesot iespējams pārņemt manus un ģenerālkonsulāta arhīvus. Krievi briesmīgi spiežot uz<br />
viņiem, un rumāņu Ārlietu ministrija neredzot citas izejas, kā man esot jānodod sūtniecība<br />
krieviem. Es teicu, ka es galu galā tagad (16. augustā) esmu privāta persona un man nav nekāda<br />
daļa gar sūtniecības arhīvu nodošanu kādai svešai pārstāvībai. Viņš taču man solīja aizsardzību,<br />
kur nu tā paliek? Jā, viņi jau mani būšot aizsargāt, bet lai taču es netaisot tādas milzīgas grūtības<br />
viņiem. Es taču esot viņam reiz teicis, ka man tur nekā liela neesot ko nodot, jo ar vienu auto es<br />
taču ar viņu reizē atbēdzis no Polijas. Viņam, par piemēru, arī viss pagalam gan Varšavā, gan<br />
viņa muižā pie Černautiem. Es teicu, daudz vai maz, bet te spēlē lomu princips. Ar krieviem, kas<br />
manā zemē ielauzušies, kas manus radus un draugus tagad spaida un spīdzina varbūt, es<br />
nekādās darīšanās neielaidīšos, nekā tiem nenodošu, un lai viņi un rumāņi dara, ko grib. Man<br />
taču būšot nepatīkami, ja viņiem būšot jālūdz [policijas] prefektūras palīdzība pie manu<br />
nedaudzo nenozīmīgo arhīvu nodošanas? Lai taču es pārdomājot, ka nav vērts skandālu taisīt.<br />
Ar to taču es savai nelaimīgai zemei neko nepalīdzēšot, ja es taisīšot grūtības viņiem<br />
(rumāņiem) un uz krievu biezām ādām mana eventuālā pretošanās arī nekādu iespaidu<br />
neatstāšot. Mana bravūras rādīšana neko nenozīmēšot. Viņi pat avīzēm nevarēšot ļaut to<br />
aprakstīt. Lai es atrodot kādu ceļu, kā visu to ar godu nobeigt. Labāki, lai es atstājot rīcību par<br />
arhīvu nodošanu sekretāram un labāki priekš manis būšot, ja es drusciņ pazustu uz kādu laiku,<br />
kamēr tas akūtais laikmets pārejot. Tā!?, es jautāju. Vai jau lietas tik tālu? Nē, nē, lai es<br />
nepārprotot, viņš nedomājot, ka man kādas briesmas draud, bet lai es Rumānijas skaisto kalnu<br />
un dabas mierā drusku atpūšoties. Viņš arī to vēloties pēc visa tā, kas te notiekot ap mums un ar<br />
mums. Solījos viņam manu lēmumu paziņot pa telefonu. Mēģināju dabūt audienci pie paša<br />
ministra, lai gan sevišķi arī nepastāvēju, kad redzēju, ka ministram neērti ar mani runāt.<br />
Pārrunājot stāvokli ar [sūtniecības] sekretāru, kurš brīžiem arī tā savādi izrunājās par mājās<br />
braukšanu, par to, ka viņa tēvs (kādreiz bija finanšu viceministrs) viņam licis priekšā, lai šis<br />
pārejot pie krieviem dienestā) teica arī, ka man būšot nepatikšanas, ja es aizturēšot Varšavas<br />
1<br />
Départ (franču val.) – izbraukt.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 467<br />
sūtniecības pussadegušos, bet Bukarestē izlabotos galda sudrabus, mēs nācām pie slēdziena, ka<br />
tiešām nebūs vērts Bukarestē skandālu taisīt ar krieviem un rumāņiem. Viss tas būs tukša<br />
bramanība, kura nekā pozitīva nedos. Tāpēc es liku sekretāram piezvanīt rumāņu Ārlietu<br />
ministrijai un pateikt, lai apmierinās, jo es sūtniecības telpas atstāju un nodošu visu sekretāram<br />
V. Āboltiņam. Viņš tad tālāk izpildīs to, kas nepieciešams. Starp citu, es saņēmu arī informāciju,<br />
ka Berlīnē un Stokholmā kolēģi bija rīkojušies tāpat, kā mēs ar Āboltiņu nolēmām un kā rumāņi<br />
vēlējās.<br />
18. augustā 1940. g. es sūtniecības pavisam nedaudzās lietas nodevu pēc atsevišķa akta<br />
sekretāram V. Āboltiņam un ar to manas oficiālās funkcijas un oficiāli arī visa atbildība par<br />
tālāko izbeidzās. Tātad ar šī akta parakstīšanu 18. augustā 1940. g. manas funkcijas kā Latvijas<br />
sūtnim pie rumāņu valdības izbeidzās. 19. augustā es atstāju sūtniecības telpas un arī manu<br />
privāto dzīvokli tai pašā namiņā un pārgāju uz viesnīcu. 27. augustā es ar ģimeni atstāju<br />
Rumāniju, lai dotos uz Budapeštu, kur biju sev nodrošinājis uzturēšanās un dzīvošanas tiesības<br />
un ungāru gatavību mani aizsargāt ar visiem viņu rīcībā esošiem līdzekļiem, ja man draudētu<br />
krievu boļševiku vajāšanas. Man vēl jāpiezīmē, ka es lielu daļu mana privātā arhīva, tad visu,<br />
kam sakars ar šifriem, tad slepeno saraksti, kur kaut kas nozīmīgs bija iekšā, iznīcināju, to<br />
sadedzinot, vai caur draudzīgu citu diplomātu palīdzību pārdabūju pāri uz manu jauno azīla 1<br />
valsti, Ungāriju. Liela daļa oriģināldokumentu glabājas pie kāda mana laba drauga Budapeštā<br />
vēl tagad, kas kādreiz būs varbūt no svara atpakaļ saņemt.<br />
Vēl varu ziņot, ka, pirmām kārtām, atstājot Rumāniju, es biju domājis pārcelties uz Šveici.<br />
Mans labs draugs Šveices sūtnis Bukarestē, Monsieur René de Weck, bija briesmīgi nelaimīgs, ka<br />
viņa valdība liegusi man uzturēšanās vīzu Šveicē. Es vīzu pieprasījis esot pāris dienas par vēlu,<br />
kopš pieņemts principiāls Šveices valdības lēmums nevienam Baltijas valstu diplomātam<br />
uzturēšanās vīzas neizsniegt. Arī kolēģa Feldmaņa 2 kunga pūliņi palika bez sekmēm. Pēdējais<br />
gan mani brīdināja, ka Šveicē būtu bijis ārkārtīgi grūti eksistenci izvilkt. Apmēram to pašu man<br />
(vēlāk gan) ziņoja kolēģis Bīlmanis 3 no Amerikas, uz kurieni es taisījos braukt, ja neko derīgu<br />
nevarēšu iesākt Eiropas dienvidaustrumos.<br />
Mana steidzīgā aizbraukšana uz Ungāriju no Rumānijas bija arī kā protests pret rumāņu<br />
solījumu laušanu un par piedraudējumu manas bij. sūtniecības arhīvu nodošanu krieviem<br />
panākt ar Bukarestes prefektūras palīdzību.<br />
Kad 27. augustā 1940. g. mans vilciens pārbrauca pāri Karpatu kalniem, es sajutu lielu<br />
atvieglojumu, jo Budapeštā un Ungārijā vispārīgi bija pavisam cita, mierīgāka un drošības<br />
pilnāka atmosfēra [..].<br />
Latvijas Ārlietu ministrijas arhīvs, Londonas arhīvs, 490. kaste.<br />
203. Note by Latvia’s former Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Head of Latvia’s<br />
<strong>diplomatic</strong> service K. Zariņš, Washington, D.C., 23 rd December 1942<br />
[..]<br />
Romania. Hungary and Romania were side or satellite legations of <strong>the</strong> Legation in Warsaw.<br />
In Hungary I was accredited on 24 th September, 1938 and in Romania – on 18 th October, 1939.<br />
1<br />
Domāts – patvēruma (angļu val. asylum – patvērums).<br />
2<br />
Jūlijs Johans Frīdrihs Feldmanis (1889–1953), Latvijas diplomāts. No 1930. g. pastāvīgais delegāts Tautu Savienībā<br />
Ženēvā, no 1932. g. arī sūtnis Šveicē, no 1939. g. arī sūtnis Dānijā, paliekot iepriekšējos amatos. Miris ASV.<br />
3<br />
Alfreds Bīlmanis (1887–1948), Latvijas diplomāts. No 1920. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Preses nodaļas vadītājs, no 1932.<br />
g. sūtnis Padomju Savienībā, no 1935. g. – ASV. Miris ASV.
468 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Second to Warsaw I had to focus on Hungary, because <strong>the</strong> latter demonstrated deep interest in<br />
Latvia. Between <strong>the</strong> two countries <strong>the</strong>re started to develop ra<strong>the</strong>r active mutual traffic and<br />
friendly acquaintance between economic actors, students and official governments as well as in<br />
<strong>the</strong> fields of education and culture-arts. My arrival in Romania was accidental, as almost <strong>the</strong><br />
entire <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps of Warsaw went to Bucharest. The majority soon left. Our Minister of<br />
Foreign Affairs instructed me for <strong>the</strong> time being to stay in Bucharest and to prepare for moving<br />
to Budapest. In <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> year 1940 Director Anševics 1 wrote to me on behalf of <strong>the</strong><br />
Minister that my stay in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe was not intended to last long. It was planned to<br />
transfer me to Moscow or Berlin. He told me to write to <strong>the</strong> Minister personally. I did and asked<br />
him to allow me to “take a breath” in more or less peaceful conditions of Budapest and<br />
Bucharest at least for <strong>the</strong> time being. After that came a proposal for me to become accredited in<br />
Turkey, too.<br />
This introduction is meant to show you 2 that Romania was not at all meant to become <strong>the</strong><br />
seat of a legation and for that reason for most of <strong>the</strong> less than 6 months I stayed in a hotel and<br />
later in a furnished apartment. My legation was in a “car” as I had to go to Budapest (where we<br />
had made a large order of modern weapons) several times to deal with various concrete affairs.<br />
Until <strong>the</strong> spring of 1940 life in Bucharest was indeed comfortable and pleasant. The<br />
Romanians are a very interesting and intelligent people. Particularly where it [<strong>the</strong> people] has<br />
remained pure and unmixed or where <strong>the</strong> influence of Western Europe is seen and felt most<br />
(for example, on <strong>the</strong> Carpathian slopes and in Transylvania). Bucharest was full of most<br />
different kinds of news and intrigues and I got much to hear and to report to my superiors in<br />
Riga. As a result my temporary seat was left in Bucharest.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> time when over our mo<strong>the</strong>rland and our neighbours <strong>the</strong>re rose <strong>the</strong> severe clouds of<br />
<strong>the</strong> red thunderstorm and threats to our sovereignty and <strong>the</strong> people’s freedom, I was in Turkey.<br />
On my inquiry about <strong>the</strong> events in Lithuania and in our country, I received from Munters a very<br />
optimistic reply. In this regard, I do not deem it unnecessary to remind you that <strong>the</strong> position of<br />
our government and <strong>the</strong> President was non-resistance to <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik invasion [..]<br />
Although Munters’ telegram in cipher was very optimistic, I shortened my visit to Turkey in<br />
May and June that earlier was meant to last longer and in <strong>the</strong> evening of 9 th June, 1940 returned<br />
to Bucharest. The news that came from home and particularly from Lithuania and <strong>the</strong> Western<br />
front were very bad. In Romania a change of government took place and <strong>the</strong> new course fully<br />
and openly steered into <strong>the</strong> waters of <strong>the</strong> “axis states”. On 10 th June, 1940 Italy declared war on<br />
France and England. On 14 th June <strong>the</strong> Germans took and occupied Paris without a fight. On 15 th<br />
June – <strong>the</strong> Russian note-ultimatum to Lithuania. On 16 th June – full occupation of Lithuania by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Russian Red Army. On 16 th June – <strong>the</strong> Russian ultimatum to Latvia and Estonia. On 17 th June<br />
– occupation of Latvia by <strong>the</strong> Russian Red Army and <strong>the</strong> end of Latvia’s sovereignty – for <strong>the</strong><br />
time being.<br />
On 17 th June, 1940 all Europe’s radio centres and <strong>the</strong> press in Bucharest, too, reported about<br />
<strong>the</strong> occupation of Latvia. I tried to contact Riga and succeeded around midnight. There was<br />
1<br />
Teodors Anševics (1900–1942), Latvian diplomat. From 1939 Director of Administrative Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Perished in Soviet imprisonment.<br />
2<br />
Unlike in all previous cases <strong>the</strong> author addresses <strong>the</strong> addressee informally – in <strong>the</strong> second person singular form,<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than in <strong>the</strong> polite and formal second person plural form (translator’s note).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 469<br />
Rusmanis 1 on <strong>the</strong> line (in <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 ). He said that he could say nothing<br />
else but that I should listen to radio. On <strong>the</strong> next day <strong>the</strong>re most likely would be new pieces of<br />
news. At 2 am a special broadcast for [<strong>diplomatic</strong>] missions was planned. He told me to listen to<br />
it. I also contacted Krieviņš 3 in Berlin and my Estonian colleague J. Markus’ in Budapest. At<br />
22.10 I listened to President K. Ulmanis’ speech. Everything that was taking place was taking<br />
place with <strong>the</strong> government’s consent, with <strong>the</strong> government’s approval, he said. For that reason<br />
<strong>the</strong> President wanted <strong>the</strong> Russian troops to be met with friendship, without inconveniencing<br />
<strong>the</strong>m, but unnecessary curiosity should be restricted though. The government had resigned but<br />
<strong>the</strong> ministers remained in <strong>the</strong>ir positions until a new government would be formed. Everybody<br />
should stay in his/ her place, it was required by Latvia’s and our people’s interests. Events were<br />
intruding with <strong>the</strong> rhythm of our daily life. It had to be endured. Friendly <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong><br />
Soviet Union had been confirmed. Many new and urgent demands and difficulties were<br />
emerging. For all that everybody should go to work. Stern and strict orders would be issued.<br />
Our hearts were beating fast. “I will stay in my place and you stay in yours!” said <strong>the</strong> President<br />
in <strong>the</strong> conclusion of his speech.<br />
The period between 17 th June and 21 st July, 1940 passed in ceaseless nervous alarm, in<br />
ga<strong>the</strong>ring information in <strong>the</strong> city, in reading press and listening to radio until early hours. It<br />
should be noted that <strong>the</strong> broadcasts from Riga and Madona could be heard in Bucharest and<br />
Budapest (later) very clearly and without <strong>the</strong> slightest intrusions. P. Reinhards 4 often by<br />
telegram told me that I should listen to radio. I received <strong>the</strong> usual routine correspondence and<br />
several times also parcels via Romanian or Hungarian couriers. Sometimes I also received direct<br />
and surely uncensored news from my friends in Riga through <strong>the</strong> kind mediation of <strong>the</strong> French<br />
Embassy and once through <strong>the</strong> German Legation. The main message that my friends from Riga<br />
sent me through <strong>the</strong>se channels was that under no circumstances I should take <strong>the</strong> risk of going<br />
home. I would be arrested on <strong>the</strong> spot. The second main message in all reports from Riga was<br />
that among <strong>the</strong> people and in certain intellectual circles (Kalpaks’ group and students corps) 5<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was great indignation about Ulmanis – Munters‘ “policy of fulfilment [of obligations]”<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> Bolsheviks and about <strong>the</strong> hermetic closure of borders to those for whom staying in<br />
Latvia was equal to a death sentence.<br />
On 22 nd July, 1940 I heard about <strong>the</strong> decision of <strong>the</strong> new Bolshevik „parliament“ of Latvia<br />
(and those of our neighbours Estonia and Lithuania) to join Soviet Russia as its part. On <strong>the</strong><br />
very same day I started elaborating notes of protest in order to react to <strong>the</strong> flagrant injustice and<br />
<strong>the</strong> Bolshevik lying propaganda, which found its way into <strong>the</strong> press and was a heavy, unjustified<br />
1<br />
Aleksandrs Rusmanis (1890–1963), Latvian diplomat. 1933 –1940 Secretary of <strong>the</strong> First Class [First Secretary] in <strong>the</strong><br />
Eastern Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1949–1956 in deportation in Amur region, died in Latvia.<br />
2<br />
In this and o<strong>the</strong>r letters by Latvia’s diplomats <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs is called by an informal and in <strong>the</strong><br />
official vocabulary non-existing name „Arminis”, which is a blending of <strong>the</strong> words that make up its official name;<br />
in English it would be something like „Formin” (translator’s note).<br />
3<br />
Edgars Kurts Pēteris Krieviņš (1884–1971), Latvian diplomat. 1932–1935 Envoy to Germany (from 1933 – also to<br />
Austria and Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands) with seat in Berlin, from 1935 Envoy to Estonia, from 1938 – to Germany and<br />
Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands with seat in Berlin. Died in Germany.<br />
4<br />
Pauls Jēkabs Reinhards (1903–1990), Latvian diplomat. From 1934 Head of <strong>the</strong> Consular Department of <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1936 Head of <strong>the</strong> Western Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1936–<br />
1939 Administrator of <strong>the</strong> Commission of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations in Spain, 1939–1940 Head of <strong>the</strong> Press Department<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Died in Great Britain.<br />
5<br />
Oskars Kalpaks was <strong>the</strong> first Commander of <strong>the</strong> First Separate Latvian Battalion of <strong>the</strong> Provisional government of<br />
Latvia during <strong>the</strong> Independence War. Here <strong>the</strong> former envoy means soldiers of this battalion in general.
470 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
insult to our people. On 22 nd , 23 rd and 24 th July I visited all foreign envoys who were closer and<br />
friendlier disposed to me. I also visited officials of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
starting with senior Secretary General Grigorcea. It was with <strong>the</strong> latter that subsequently all my<br />
matters were regulated and he was authorised to speak on behalf of his minister. In a way he<br />
was also my colleague as he had been <strong>the</strong> last Romanian Ambassador to Poland and toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />
with <strong>the</strong> rest of us went through all <strong>the</strong> difficulties and fleeing through Poland.<br />
On 25 th July I sent minutely elaborated notes of protest to <strong>the</strong> Ministers of Foreign Affairs of<br />
Romania, Hungary and Turkey. In Bucharest I handed <strong>the</strong> note personally to Secretary General<br />
Grigorcea. To Budapest and Ankara I sent telegrams announcing <strong>the</strong> notes and memorandum<br />
by mail or through <strong>the</strong>ir legations [..] These <strong>documents</strong> by <strong>the</strong>mselves speak a clear language<br />
about my views with regard to <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik invasion into Latvia and <strong>the</strong>se <strong>documents</strong> are also<br />
a request not to recognize Latvia’s incorporation into <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and a protest against <strong>the</strong><br />
annexation because it all had happened with <strong>the</strong> help of rough, brutal might and awkward lies<br />
and falsifications. I sent, i.e. personally handed copies of <strong>the</strong>se <strong>documents</strong> to America’s Envoy<br />
Franklin Mott Gun<strong>the</strong>r and our good friend, Swedish Envoy Patrick de Reuterswärd 1 and some<br />
Romanian politicians who are well and friendly disposed towards me. With America’s Envoy<br />
among o<strong>the</strong>r things I also discussed <strong>the</strong> possibility of depositing with him at least a part of my<br />
archives and state possessions. He refused to take <strong>the</strong>se items in his charge, but promised to<br />
make <strong>the</strong> texts of my note of protest and memoranda known to his government. The Swedish<br />
Envoy helped me out in a different way – by helping to get my personal archive across <strong>the</strong><br />
border and by taking in his charge also my personal funds. He, too, refused to take state<br />
possessions, because if <strong>the</strong> Bolsheviks somehow nosed it out, he would have been removed. It<br />
should also be noted here that after handing in <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned notes my movement in<br />
Bucharest became dangerous. Shady characters were sneaking around <strong>the</strong> Legation (it should<br />
also be made known that my furnished apartment and <strong>the</strong> temporary Legation’s residency were<br />
located about one block from <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik Embassy, which occupied an entire block on<br />
sumptuous Kisleff highway in Bucharest) and my colleagues and <strong>the</strong> mentioned Secretary<br />
General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned me to be careful. The Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs and <strong>the</strong> [Police] Prefecture would take care of my safety, <strong>the</strong> latter said (my residency<br />
was guarded by two Romanian policemen day and night), but I should be very cautious myself.<br />
I left for <strong>the</strong> mountains for several days and returned to Bucharest in <strong>the</strong> first days of August,<br />
when I heard about <strong>the</strong> official annexation of Latvia (and neighbours, too) into Sovietia 2 .<br />
On 7 th August, 1940 I had a lengthy discussion with Secretary General Grigorcea. I reminded<br />
him of my note and memorandum of 23 rd July. I asked him if I could hope for support from<br />
Romania’s government and its non-recognition of <strong>the</strong> annexation [of Latvia] into Sovietia that<br />
had been imposed on <strong>the</strong> Latvian people with force and deceit. Will I be allowed to stay in<br />
Bucharest as Latvia’s Envoy? On behalf of his government <strong>the</strong> Secretary General replied that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y regretfully were forced to recognize <strong>the</strong> existing government in Riga. About Latvia’s<br />
annexation into Sovietia he had his personal opinion, which did not differ much from <strong>the</strong> one<br />
voiced in my note of 23 rd July. However, he would not be able to give me a positive reply, i.e. to<br />
1<br />
Patrick Carl Reinhold Reuterswärd (1885–1963), Swedish diplomat. 1928–1935 Envoy to Latvia, after that – to<br />
Romania.<br />
2<br />
The closest English language version of <strong>the</strong> slightly derisory and short colloquial form for <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union in <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian language (Padomija) (translator’s note).
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 471<br />
promise to continue recognizing me as Latvia’s Envoy in case <strong>the</strong> government in Riga recalled<br />
or dismissed me. Recently, for example, Estonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had requested<br />
approval of somebody else and recalled Markus. Romania had no reason not to accept this<br />
change, he said. Then for a while we talked unofficially and Grigorcea did not hide his<br />
indignation against <strong>the</strong> Russians. His countryside property in Moldavia (not far from Cernăuţi)<br />
had been taken and looted by <strong>the</strong> Russians. What could he do? It was also clear to <strong>the</strong>m [<strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians], he said, that <strong>the</strong> Russians would not leave me alone. For that reason he suggested<br />
<strong>the</strong> following options to me: 1) I should resign from my functions before I am dismissed or<br />
removed and should announce it to <strong>the</strong>m; 2) Then Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs would<br />
take my few archives and possessions in its charge until fur<strong>the</strong>r notice (he himself dictated <strong>the</strong><br />
text that I should write). He advised me to pack everything in sealed boxes, not too big, and<br />
<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>y would think what to do [with <strong>the</strong>m], but <strong>the</strong> Bolsheviks would not get <strong>the</strong>m. 3) To<br />
me personally <strong>the</strong>y would give time “pour preparer le depart” 1 and during that time I would have<br />
<strong>the</strong> chance to enjoy exteritoriality 2 . They would make this term very long, let’s say between 9<br />
months and 2 years. 4) They would recognize our passports same as <strong>the</strong>y recognized <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>documents</strong> of o<strong>the</strong>r occupied states. 5) In case I stayed in Romania as a private person, I would<br />
always have <strong>the</strong> chance to enjoy <strong>the</strong>ir protection and friendship. 6) In case I found a job, I<br />
would by no means be denied <strong>the</strong> permit required for foreigners.<br />
I asked several times if I could reckon that all <strong>the</strong> promises would be kept and that<br />
eventually I never<strong>the</strong>less would not have to deal with <strong>the</strong> Russians. The Secretary General<br />
reconfirmed that everything would be in <strong>the</strong> best possible order and recommended me to think<br />
everything over and let him know. Only I should watch out and be very cautious not to give <strong>the</strong><br />
Russians any chance of “laying” on me any criminal offence about misappropriation etc. of any<br />
property, money etc. They, i.e. <strong>the</strong> Romanians would under no circumstances extradite me to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Russians, but who could say <strong>the</strong>se days when and how far <strong>the</strong> Russians through <strong>the</strong>ir GPU<br />
may reach 3 .<br />
I spent three whole days thinking what to do and planning. After all that explication in <strong>the</strong><br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and judging from information received from o<strong>the</strong>r European capitals<br />
it was clear that <strong>the</strong> Russians would not leave a stone unturned to achieve <strong>the</strong> abolition of <strong>the</strong><br />
Baltic legations and consulates and taking over of <strong>the</strong>ir archives and possessions. Although in<br />
Bucharest material subsistence would have been <strong>the</strong> most comfortable and cheapest, I inquired<br />
also in o<strong>the</strong>r legations about <strong>the</strong> possibilities of moving to a) Switzerland, b) Hungary or c)<br />
America. It turned out that in Romania earning of some livelihood or finding a job would have<br />
required worming myself into <strong>the</strong> Germans’ favour. A German banker whom I knew from<br />
Warsaw times completely openly told me that. The German Envoy, whom I visited to learn his<br />
opinion on <strong>the</strong> current events and to inquire if he could hint me privately if we, <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />
peoples had a reason to hope for any changes, also mentioned <strong>the</strong> opportunity of me joining<br />
<strong>the</strong> staff of a large German bank in Bucharest but said that nothing would change in our<br />
political situation and that it was our “Pech” 4 and that we, i.e. <strong>the</strong> Latvian people were living in<br />
that particular corner at <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, which was in <strong>the</strong> sphere of interests of Russia. At that<br />
1<br />
Pour preparer le départ (French): for preparation for departure.<br />
2<br />
This word is of <strong>the</strong> author’s own choosing (translator’s note).<br />
3<br />
GPU – Glavnoje Politicheskoje upravlenije (Russian) – Abbreviation for <strong>the</strong> USSR Main Political Authority.<br />
4<br />
Pech (German) – trouble, mess.
472 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
moment I could not think of anything better to do than to rise abruptly and say “Auf<br />
Wiedersehen!” 1 Envoy Fabricius rose, too and with his hand stretched said: “Heil Hitler!” 2 It was<br />
my last discussion with my former German colleague in Bucharest. But it had made it clear that<br />
<strong>the</strong> air of Bucharest was too “thick” for me and my family. Thus beyond doubt and irrevocably –<br />
I would not be able to stay in Bucharest. The making of such a decision was also accelerated by<br />
ceaseless rumours about <strong>the</strong> [eventual] westward advance of <strong>the</strong> Russians, at least as far as <strong>the</strong><br />
Carpathian Mountains which would also have meant <strong>the</strong>ir taking of Bucharest. The German<br />
Envoy, by <strong>the</strong> way, has denied such a probability as absolutely impossible. The experience of<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r people, disappearance of people, etc. have however left me with no doubt that under <strong>the</strong><br />
given circumstances Bucharest was too unsafe for me and my family. So came 9 th August, 1940.<br />
During my absence several calls had come from <strong>the</strong> Russian Bolshevik Embassy asking for me.<br />
Secretary V. Āboltiņš 3 said that <strong>the</strong> caller had been First Secretary Mikhailov. Reacting to that, I<br />
gave a note with a text in <strong>the</strong> French language to Secretary Āboltiņš asking him to read it out<br />
for <strong>the</strong> Russians should <strong>the</strong>y call again. Around 6.30 p.m. <strong>the</strong> Russians called again and asked<br />
for an appointment between <strong>the</strong> Soviet Envoy and me saying that <strong>the</strong>re were very important<br />
and urgent matters for us to discuss. Secretary Āboltiņš read out <strong>the</strong> text, as I had asked him to.<br />
This text made it very clear that, considering <strong>the</strong> annexation of Latvia by Sovietia, I could not<br />
continue and refused to have anything to do with <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Sovietia.<br />
On 10 th August <strong>the</strong> former charge d’affaires of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Embassy called me on my private<br />
telephone number and asked for a private meeting. I had met that man many times in<br />
Bucharest society and in <strong>the</strong> receptions of <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> corps and <strong>the</strong> government. He<br />
remarked that I had delivered such an angry reply to Envoy Lavrentjev <strong>the</strong> previous evening.<br />
Envoy Lavrentjev had however wanted to have a personal discussion with me and to give me<br />
some explanations with regard to <strong>the</strong> latest developments. I said that <strong>the</strong>y had already received<br />
my official reply from my secretary and that I had nothing to add to it and that I would not set<br />
my foot in <strong>the</strong>ir embassy until Latvia becomes free again. But do I refuse to talk to Lavrentjev<br />
personally, in private, too? I said that I could not imagine what <strong>the</strong>re was for Lavrentjev to say<br />
to me in private but if after everything that I had announced he did want to talk to me in<br />
private, he should come to my private apartment at 11 a.m. on <strong>the</strong> next morning. I would listen<br />
to what he had to say and probably I would have something to say, too. After some time <strong>the</strong><br />
same fellow, former Chargé d’Affaires Kukolev called me again and on behalf of his boss asked if<br />
I could receive him on that very evening. I thought for a while and replied, ok, let him come<br />
after dinner at 9 p.m. Of course, I could have swept aside <strong>the</strong> obtrusion of <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik Envoy<br />
and refused to listen to his “private” talk, but I thought that it would not be too bad to hear<br />
what a man like him had to say and that it gave me an opportunity to express a good part of <strong>the</strong><br />
indignation and pain that <strong>the</strong> Latvian people were feeling without anyone having a chance<br />
freely and independently to say it to <strong>the</strong> Bolheviks’ face that we clearly saw and understood<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir thin game of deceit and violence, hypocrisy, breaking of agreements etc. This intention<br />
(and it was carried out) was <strong>the</strong> sole reason why I let <strong>the</strong> Russian Envoy into <strong>the</strong> office room of<br />
my apartment and in <strong>the</strong> presence of my secretary told him everything that I could imagine<br />
1<br />
Auf Wiedersehen (German) – good bye.<br />
2<br />
Heil Hitler (German) – Hail, Hitler! The salute of <strong>the</strong> German National Socialist Worker’s Party.<br />
3<br />
Voldemārs Āboltiņš (1914 – after 1950), Latvian diplomat. From May 1940 Secretary in Legation in Bucharest.<br />
From 1950 lived in Australia.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 473<br />
Bolsheviks would find unpleasant to hear and that was hurting our people at that time. I spoke<br />
about <strong>the</strong> ruin of <strong>the</strong> fruits of 22 years of work, about ruthless annihilation of everything that<br />
was sacred and dear to <strong>the</strong> Latvian people, about an alien army’s breaking into our land, about<br />
enforcement of rigorous order, about imposing of alien rule and will and claiming that it was<br />
being done by <strong>the</strong> Latvian people on <strong>the</strong>ir free will. Everything was decided by brutal force and<br />
what our newspapers wrote and what <strong>the</strong> Russian radio centres said was not <strong>the</strong> free will of <strong>the</strong><br />
Latvian people. Withdraw <strong>the</strong> Red Army at least for one day and <strong>the</strong>n hold elections and <strong>the</strong>n<br />
you, <strong>the</strong> gentlemen from Moscow, would wonder where your 97.7% “approval” would be. Latvia<br />
had now again become a Russian “gubernia” under a very rigid dictatorial government (and<br />
foreign at that). Blood and tears would flow in streams. It was completely out of place to say<br />
that Latvia was now “equal” with Russia (Lavrentjev remarked something like that, in trying to<br />
oppose me). I said that it was something like a marriage between an elephant and a mouse. Let<br />
him not even imagine that <strong>the</strong> Latvian people were indeed “happy” under <strong>the</strong> yoke of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
violence. But it would be better for <strong>the</strong> workers! [<strong>the</strong> Russian Envoy remarked]. For <strong>the</strong><br />
workers? I said that <strong>the</strong>y were really deplorable for <strong>the</strong>ir ignorance if <strong>the</strong>y hoped that <strong>the</strong>y with<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir red occupation brought improvement for <strong>the</strong> workers of Latvia. But I did not know [<strong>the</strong><br />
Russian Envoy said] how awfully nice was <strong>the</strong> life of <strong>the</strong> Russian workers now! I replied that I<br />
had <strong>the</strong> presumption to think that I knew much more about <strong>the</strong> Russian workers’ difficulties<br />
and miserable life than he knew about <strong>the</strong> welfare of <strong>the</strong> workers and <strong>the</strong> entire nation of <strong>the</strong><br />
now raped neighbouring Latvia. I listed all <strong>the</strong> offences that <strong>the</strong> Russians had ventured against<br />
us in spite of <strong>the</strong> readiness of our very compliant government to meet <strong>the</strong> Russian demands<br />
more than it was possible. If <strong>the</strong>se steps had been dictated by <strong>the</strong> military situation and <strong>the</strong><br />
Russians’ fear of Germans, <strong>the</strong>y should have told us so, a common base of co-operation could<br />
have been found, like it was <strong>the</strong> last year (i.e. in <strong>the</strong> autumn of 1939), but now nothing else can<br />
be made out of it than a simple lust for power and imperialism of a course kind. That is <strong>the</strong> kind<br />
of <strong>the</strong> “advocates of <strong>the</strong> small nations” that you are [I said]. My uninvited, importunate guest<br />
was sweating and blushing. Several times he tried to interrupt me but I rarely gave him <strong>the</strong><br />
floor. He did not reject <strong>the</strong> offer of coffee and cognac, but did not drink it and asked <strong>the</strong> maid<br />
for a glass of water... Then he stood up and asked if I had received any instructions with regard<br />
to <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong> Legation to him. I replied that I had received no instructions and for that<br />
reason would not transfer anything to him. But if I received, what would I do [<strong>the</strong> Russian<br />
Envoy inquired]? Well, when we received <strong>the</strong>m [instructions], “togda posmotrim” 1 , I replied.<br />
“Kak eto, posmotrim?” 2 , my guest inquired. “Nu posmotrim, chto tam skazanno budet! 3 ”, I<br />
replied. I would go home after <strong>the</strong> closure of <strong>the</strong> legation, should not I? [<strong>the</strong> Russian envoy<br />
inquired] “Me, home??” – I retorted, amazed. As long as <strong>the</strong>re were foreign troops and foreign<br />
police on our soil, I would not go <strong>the</strong>re and would ra<strong>the</strong>r earn my living paving or sweeping<br />
streets in foreign countries, but you would not get me under your power alive! I was being too<br />
harsh and unjust in my views of <strong>the</strong>m, eventually everything would be OK [<strong>the</strong> Russian Envoy<br />
said]. Yes, I also hoped that everything eventually would be OK, but not <strong>the</strong> way you expected [I<br />
retorted]. He had to go because we both saw that we would never be able to persuade and<br />
understand each o<strong>the</strong>r [<strong>the</strong> Russian Envoy said]. I replied that I also thought so. The entire<br />
1<br />
Togda posmotrim (Russian) – Then we shall see.<br />
2<br />
Kak eto, posmotrim? (Russian) – How is that, we shall see?<br />
3<br />
Nu posmotrim, chto tam skazanno budet (Russian) – Well, we shall see what is written <strong>the</strong>re.
474 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
conversation took place in <strong>the</strong> presence of my secretary. The Russian had with him that charge<br />
d’affaires in Bucharest Kukulev, whom I knew earlier. It was my last conversation with <strong>the</strong><br />
Bolshevik Envoy in Bucharest. The secretary showed <strong>the</strong> late “guests” out, because <strong>the</strong> door was<br />
locked and <strong>the</strong> Romanian policeman was told not to let anyone in or out unless accompanied<br />
by Secretary Āboltiņš. Behind our iron fence <strong>the</strong>re stood a red car with three “rowdy” looking<br />
drivers and <strong>the</strong>ir aides.<br />
That night at about 4 a.m. a telegram arrived from Riga declaring <strong>the</strong> closure of <strong>the</strong><br />
Legation and instructing me to deliver everything to <strong>the</strong> Russian mission in Bucharest. Signed<br />
Jablonskis. 1 I could no longer “think” and delay my decision. I decided to act in compliance with<br />
<strong>the</strong> plan agreed on, i.e. suggested to me by <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before my<br />
case, i.e. before my forced arrival when I fled <strong>the</strong> wrecked Poland in <strong>the</strong> autumn of 1939 Latvia<br />
never had a [residing] legation in Romania. Romania cannot play any significant role in<br />
achieving <strong>the</strong> restoration of Latvia’s freedom. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, my train of thought led into <strong>the</strong><br />
direction that for Latvia it does not and in <strong>the</strong> forthcoming struggle for <strong>the</strong> restoration of its<br />
freedom will not matter at all what Romania thinks or decides. Never<strong>the</strong>less in <strong>the</strong> struggle<br />
against <strong>the</strong> Russians Romania is and could be <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn anchor of our front in <strong>the</strong> broadest<br />
sense (<strong>the</strong> front that stretches from Finland to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea and includes it) and play a role in<br />
<strong>the</strong> south, similarly as Finland does in <strong>the</strong> north. Romania is also a rich country and in<br />
peacetime it would be quite useful to establish closer <strong>relations</strong> with it because under more<br />
reasonably arranged transportation conditions extensive [bilateral] trade is possible. In o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
words: <strong>the</strong>re was no sense for me to fight for staying in Romania.<br />
For that reason in communication with my Secretary Voldemārs Āboltiņš and having<br />
inquired about <strong>the</strong> situation in Berlin and Stockholm, I decided to relinquish my authority as<br />
Envoy to Romania (but not to Poland, Hungary and Turkey!) and to announce it to <strong>the</strong> Minister<br />
of Foreign Affairs of Romania. The legal base for paying salary to <strong>the</strong> secretary and me, too, was<br />
created by <strong>the</strong> telegram from our former department about <strong>the</strong> closing of <strong>the</strong> Legation because,<br />
heeding <strong>the</strong> Romanians’ warning to avoid anything that could give a ground for criminal<br />
prosecution, we had to be very careful in all matters and each our step had to be based on a law<br />
of Latvia. On 10 th August, 1940 I sent a note to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania about<br />
relinquishing my authority. The second and third paragraphs of <strong>the</strong> note are based on <strong>the</strong> text<br />
dictated, i.e. recommended by Secretary General of Romania’ s Ministry of Foreign Affairs G.<br />
Grigorcea on 7 th August, 1940.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> very same day I committed ano<strong>the</strong>r “sin” [..] by sending a telegram to For[eign<br />
Affairs] Ministry in Riga saying that I would not obey any orders and <strong>the</strong> few possessions that<br />
Riga demanded to be handed over to <strong>the</strong> Russians I promised to deliver “under <strong>the</strong> charge of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanian authorities”.<br />
I ordered <strong>the</strong> necessary boxes and toge<strong>the</strong>r with Secretary Āboltiņš we planned to spend <strong>the</strong><br />
coming months in preparation for “départ" 2 and meanwhile to enjoy <strong>the</strong> Romanian hospitality<br />
and protection, quietly also looking for an occupation in order to keep our bodies and souls<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r until better times.<br />
1<br />
Andrejs Jablonskis (1880–1951), member of <strong>the</strong> Communist underground in tsarist Russia and Latvia. After <strong>the</strong><br />
occupation of Latvia in July-August 1940 deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, after that <strong>the</strong> Latvian SSR People’s<br />
Commissar of Justice.<br />
2<br />
Départ (French) – depart, here meaning “departure”.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 475<br />
But it turned out that our “guest” of <strong>the</strong> evening of 10 th August had not reconciled himself<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Turkish “bath” in my apartment and was preparing a real “Russkaya banya” 1 for me and<br />
<strong>the</strong> poor Romanians. My case was discussed in <strong>the</strong> Cabinet of Ministers, <strong>the</strong>n in <strong>the</strong> Ministry,<br />
etc. It turned out that due to <strong>the</strong>ir own interests and in order to cope with [get rid of] <strong>the</strong><br />
determined Russian obtrusion and threat and probably also under German pressure my<br />
Romanian friends broke <strong>the</strong> promises, which had been given to me through Secretary General<br />
on 7 th August.<br />
I should also mention that <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik Embassy wanted to talk to me again. It was on 12 th<br />
August. I had <strong>the</strong>m informed through my secretary that as of 10 th August I was a private person<br />
and had no functions whatsoever any longer and that I did not and could not have anything to<br />
do with a Soviet mission.<br />
On 16 th August I was summoned to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Secretary General G.<br />
Grigorcea. On behalf of <strong>the</strong> Minister, who himself was said to be very very busy. My subsequent<br />
efforts to have an audience with Minister Manoilescu were unsuccessful. Grigorcea felt very<br />
uneasy because he had been assigned to convey to me a negative reply from <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />
government to my note of 10 th August, i.e. negative in <strong>the</strong> sense that [it said that] <strong>the</strong>y found it<br />
impossible to take over my and <strong>the</strong> General Consulate’s archives. The Russians were making a<br />
horrible pressure on <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw no alternative to<br />
me handing <strong>the</strong> Legation over to <strong>the</strong> Russians [said Grigorcea]. I said that now (on 16 th August)<br />
I was a private person after all and that I had nothing to do with <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong> Legation’s<br />
archives to a mission of a foreign country. He had promised me protection, where was it now?<br />
Yes, <strong>the</strong>y would indeed protect me [Grigorcea said], but would I please not cause <strong>the</strong>m so<br />
enormous difficulties. I had told <strong>the</strong>m once that I had nothing much <strong>the</strong>re to hand over<br />
because I had fled with it [<strong>the</strong> archives] from Poland in one car. He [Grigorcea], too, for<br />
example, had lost everything both in Warsaw and in his estate near Cernăuţi. I said that little or<br />
much, but it was a matter of principle. I would have no business with and would hand over<br />
nothing to <strong>the</strong> Russians who had invaded my country and probably now were oppressing and<br />
torturing my relatives and friends and let <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong> Romanians do whatever <strong>the</strong>y pleased.<br />
[Grigorcea said that] it would however be unpleasant for me if <strong>the</strong>y would have to ask <strong>the</strong><br />
Prefecture’s assistance with <strong>the</strong> handing over of my few [and] insignificant archives? Would I<br />
please think it over, it was not worth a scandal. I would not in any way help my poor country by<br />
creating difficulties to <strong>the</strong>m (<strong>the</strong> Romanians) and my eventual resistance would leave no impact<br />
on <strong>the</strong> thick Russian skins. The demonstration of my bravado would mean nothing. They would<br />
not even be able to allow newspapers to write about it [Grigorcea thus tried to reason with me].<br />
I should find a way to finalize it all with dignity. I should better leave <strong>the</strong> procedure of handing<br />
over <strong>the</strong> archives to my secretary and it would be better for me if I slightly disappeared for a<br />
while until <strong>the</strong> acute period was over [so Grigorcea]. Was that so!?, I asked. Are things gone that<br />
far already? No, no, I should not misunderstand him, he did not think that I was in any danger,<br />
but I should take a little rest in <strong>the</strong> tranquillity of <strong>the</strong> beautiful mountains and nature of<br />
Romania [said Grigorcea]. He would also have liked to do that himself after all that was<br />
happening around us and to us. I promised to let him know my decision by telephone. I tried to<br />
get an audience with <strong>the</strong> Minister himself, although I was not very insistent when I saw that it<br />
would be awkward for <strong>the</strong> Minister to talk to me. Having discussed <strong>the</strong> situation with <strong>the</strong><br />
1<br />
Russian steam bath.
476 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
[Legation’s] secretary, who at times also said strange things about going home and that his<br />
fa<strong>the</strong>r (former Vice-Minister of Finance) had recommended him to enter <strong>the</strong> Russian service<br />
and that I would be in trouble if I impounded <strong>the</strong> half-burnt silver tableware from Warsaw<br />
Legation that had been mended in Bucharest, we came to conclusion that making a scandal<br />
with <strong>the</strong> Russians and Romanians in Bucharest was indeed not worth <strong>the</strong> while. It all would<br />
have been futile bravado that would not have given anything positive. Thus I had my secretary<br />
call <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tell that <strong>the</strong>y should relax because I was<br />
leaving <strong>the</strong> Legation’s premises and handing everything over to Secretary V. Āboltiņš. He would<br />
<strong>the</strong>n do everything that was necessary. By <strong>the</strong> way, I also received information that my<br />
colleagues in Berlin and Stockholm had acted in a similar way as I and Āboltiņš decided and as<br />
<strong>the</strong> Romanians wanted us to.<br />
On 18 th August, 1940 by a special act I handed over <strong>the</strong> very few Legation’s possessions to<br />
Secretary V. Āboltiņš and with that my official functions and officially also all my responsibility<br />
for what was to follow ended. Thus, with <strong>the</strong> signing of this act on 18 th August, 1940 my<br />
functions as Latvia’s Envoy with <strong>the</strong> Romanian government expired. On 19 th August I left <strong>the</strong><br />
Legation’s premises and also my private apartment in <strong>the</strong> same house and moved to a hotel. On<br />
27 th August I with my family left Romania for Budapest, where I had acquired a living and<br />
residence permit and <strong>the</strong> Hungarian government’s readiness to protect me with all means at<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir disposal in case <strong>the</strong> Russian Bolshevik persecutions threatened me. I also have to note that<br />
I destroyed by burning or with help of o<strong>the</strong>r friendly diplomats got across [<strong>the</strong> border] to my<br />
new country of asylum, Hungary a large part of my private archive and everything related to<br />
ciphers and secret correspondence, which had anything important in it. A large part of original<br />
<strong>documents</strong>, which probably once would be important to recover, are still stored with a good<br />
friend of mine in Budapest.<br />
I can also report that, as I was leaving Romania, my first intention was to move to<br />
Switzerland. My good friend Envoy of Switzerland in Bucharest Monsieur René de Weck was<br />
very unhappy about his government’s rejection of my application for a residence visa of<br />
Switzerland. I had requested <strong>the</strong> visa a few days too late, after <strong>the</strong> government of Switzerland<br />
had made a principal decision not to issue residence visas to any diplomat of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />
[he said]. The efforts of my colleague Mr. Feldmanis 1 did not bear fruit ei<strong>the</strong>r. The latter warned<br />
me though that in Switzerland it would have been very difficult to make <strong>the</strong> ends meet. My<br />
colleague Bīlmanis 2 wrote me approximately <strong>the</strong> same (though later) from America where I<br />
intended to go if I found nothing useful to do in Sou<strong>the</strong>ast Europe.<br />
My hurried departure from Romania to Hungary was also meant as a protest against <strong>the</strong><br />
Romanians’ breaking of <strong>the</strong>ir promises and threatening to achieve <strong>the</strong> transfer of <strong>the</strong> archives of<br />
my former Legation to Russians with <strong>the</strong> help of Bucharest Prefecture.<br />
When on 27 th August, 1940 my train crossed <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Mountains I felt great relief<br />
because in Budapest and in Hungary in general atmosphere was quite different, more peaceful<br />
and secure [..]<br />
Archives of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, London Archive, Box No. 490.<br />
1<br />
Jūlijs Johans Frīdrihs Feldmanis (1889–1953), Latvian diplomat. From 1930 permanent delegate in <strong>the</strong> League of<br />
Nations in Geneva, from 1932 also Envoy in Switzerland, from 1939 Envoy in Denmark, preserving also <strong>the</strong><br />
previous positions. Died in USA.<br />
2<br />
Alfreds Bīlmanis (1887–1948), Latvian diplomat. From 1920 Head of <strong>the</strong> Press Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs, from 1932 Envoy to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, from 1935 Envoy to USA. Died in USA.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 477<br />
204. Nota de conversație între tovarășul P. Babuci și tovarășul Nicolaev, Consilier la<br />
Ambasada U.R.S.S. în ziua de 26 august 1957 (înregistrată cu numărul 47917 din 27 august<br />
1957)<br />
Tovarășul Nicolaev:<br />
Face cunoscut că a fost adoptată o hotărâre cu privire la reglementarea între U.R.S.S. și R.<br />
Cehoslovacă a pretențiilor reciproce referitoare la republicile Lituaniană, Letonă și Estonă, pe<br />
calea renunțării reciproce a părților la aceste pretenții.<br />
Roagă să se comunice guvernului român dorința U.R.S.S. de a reglementa pretențiile<br />
reciproce în modul arătat mai sus, prin semnarea unui protocol corespunzător. Textul<br />
proiectului de protocol va fi comunicat după ce guvernul român își va da acordul său la<br />
propunerea U.R.S.S.<br />
Tovarășul Babuci<br />
Întreabă dacă există deja o înțelegere între U.R.S.S. și R.C.S. în legătură cu această problemă.<br />
Tovarășul Nicolaev:<br />
Spune că nu cunoaște nici un amănunt.<br />
Tovarășul Babuci<br />
Spune că va transmite problema mai departe.<br />
AMAE, Problema 214, U.R.S.S. 5, nepaginat.<br />
204. Note of Conversation between Comrade P. Babuci and Comrade Nicolaev,<br />
Counsellor at <strong>the</strong> USSR Embassy on 26 th August 1957 (under no. 47917 from August 27 th<br />
1957)<br />
Comrade Nicolaev:<br />
He informs that a resolution regarding <strong>the</strong> regulation between <strong>the</strong> USSR and <strong>the</strong> Republic of<br />
Czechoslovakia of <strong>the</strong> mutual claims regarding <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian republics,<br />
meaning <strong>the</strong> mutual waiver of <strong>the</strong>se claims was adopted.<br />
He requests that <strong>the</strong> Romanian government be informed of <strong>the</strong> wish of <strong>the</strong> USSR of<br />
regulating <strong>the</strong> mutual claims in <strong>the</strong> above shown manner, by signing an appropriate protocol.<br />
The text of <strong>the</strong> protocol project will be communicated after <strong>the</strong> Romanian government<br />
approves <strong>the</strong> USSR proposal.<br />
Comrade Babuci<br />
He asks whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re is already an agreement between USSR and <strong>the</strong> Czechoslovak<br />
Republic related to this issue.<br />
Comrade Nicolaev:<br />
He says that he does not know any details.<br />
Comrade Babuci<br />
He says he will communicate fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> issue.<br />
DARMFA, f. 214 USSR 5, without pagination.<br />
205. Protocol semnat la Moscova între Guvernul Republicii Populare Române și<br />
Guvernul Uniunii Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste privind reglementarea pretențiilor<br />
reciproce referitoare la Lituania, Letonia și Estonia, 7 martie 1958<br />
Guvernul Republicii Populare Române și Guvernul Uniunii Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste<br />
conduse de dorința de a reglementa complet și definitiv toate problemele patrimoniale și
478 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
financiare legate de intrarea Republicilor Lituania, Letonia și Estonia în Uniunea Republicilor<br />
Sovietice Socialiste, au convenit asupra celor ce urmează:<br />
Articolul 1<br />
Guvernul Republicii Populare Române și Guvernul Uniunii Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste<br />
renunță reciproc la toate pretențiile care se referă la Republicile Lituania, Letonia și Estonia,<br />
existente în momentul intrării acestor republici în Uniunea Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste.<br />
Articolul 2<br />
Odată cu încheierea prezentului protocol se consideră reglementate definitiv și complet<br />
stinse toate pretențiile patrimoniale și financiare ale organelor de stat și ale persoanelor juridice<br />
ale unei părți față de organele de stat și persoanele juridice ale celeilalte Părți (decurgând din<br />
bunuri, circulația mărfurilor, credite, impozite și alte obligații și de asemenea din diversele<br />
feluri de decontări), existente în momentul intrării Republicilor Lituania, Letonia și Estonia în<br />
Uniunea Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste.<br />
Articolul 3<br />
Prezentul Protocol intră în vigoare în ziua semnării. Întocmit în orașul Moscova la 7 Martie<br />
1958, în două exemplare fiecare în limba română și rusă, ambele texte având aceeași valabilitate.<br />
AMAE, Problema 214, U.R.S.S. 5, nepaginat.<br />
205. Protocol signed in Moscow between <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Popular Republic of<br />
Romania and <strong>the</strong> Government of Union of <strong>the</strong> Socialist Soviet Republics Regarding <strong>the</strong><br />
Regulation of <strong>the</strong>ir Mutual Claims Related to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, 7 th March<br />
1958<br />
Willing to regulate completely and finally all <strong>the</strong> patrimonial and financial issues related to<br />
<strong>the</strong> inclusion of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Republics in <strong>the</strong> Union of <strong>the</strong> Socialist<br />
Soviet Republics, <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Popular Republic of Romania and <strong>the</strong> Government of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Union of <strong>the</strong> Socialist Soviet Republics agreed <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
Article1<br />
The Government of <strong>the</strong> Popular Republic of Romania and <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Union of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Socialist Soviet Republics wave mutually all <strong>the</strong>ir claims with regard to <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian,<br />
Latvian and Estonian Republics existent at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> inclusion of <strong>the</strong>se republics in <strong>the</strong><br />
Union of <strong>the</strong> Socialist Soviet Republics.<br />
Article 2<br />
Once <strong>the</strong> present protocol is signed, all <strong>the</strong> patrimonial and financial claims of <strong>the</strong> state<br />
bodies and of <strong>the</strong> legal entities of one party to <strong>the</strong> state bodies and <strong>the</strong> legal entities of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
Party (deriving from goods, merchandise circulation, credits, taxes and o<strong>the</strong>r obligations as well<br />
as different manners of clearing), existing at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> inclusion of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian, Latvian<br />
and Estonian Republics in <strong>the</strong> Union of <strong>the</strong> Socialist Soviet Republics are deemed finally<br />
regulated and completely extinguished.<br />
Article 3<br />
This protocol comes into force on <strong>the</strong> day it is signed. Drawn-up in Moscow city on March<br />
7 th 1958, in two copies, each of <strong>the</strong>m in Romanian and Russian, both of <strong>the</strong>m having <strong>the</strong> same<br />
validity.<br />
DARMFA, f. 214 USSR 5, without pagination.
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 479<br />
Document 3:Moscow Protocol, Russian original
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES<br />
A<br />
Āboltiņš, Voldemārs, 463, 465, 472, 474, 476<br />
Albats, Hermanis, 128, 158<br />
Angelescu, Constantin, 440<br />
Anševics, Teodors, 460, 468<br />
Antonescu, Ion, 362, 363<br />
Antonescu, Victor, 316, 320, 321, 327<br />
Antonov-Ovseyenko, Vladimir, 226<br />
Arciszewski, Mirosław, 114, 115, 140, 143, 167,<br />
168, 223, 227<br />
Auschnitt, Max, 384, 418<br />
B<br />
Bader, Carol, 88<br />
Baldwin, Stanley, 278, 281<br />
Balodis, Antons, 96, 98, 99, 100, 107, 108, 110,<br />
249, 250, 253, 318, 451, 459<br />
Bangerskis, Rūdolfs, 88<br />
Barthou, Louis, 260, 261, 274, 277, 278<br />
Beck, Józef, 242, 258, 274, 287, 288, 297, 309,<br />
323, 324, 325, 327, 337, 338, 339, 340, 352,<br />
356, 357, 401, 402, 441<br />
Beneš, Edvard, 287, 288, 347<br />
Bentoiu, Aurelian, 437, 440<br />
Besjadovsky, Grigory, 88<br />
Bīlmanis, Alfreds, 467, 476<br />
Blau. employee at Romanian Legation, 457<br />
Bļodnieks, Ādolfs, 215, 219, 236, 241, 243<br />
Blücher, Vasili Konstantinovici, 279, 282<br />
Boris III, King of Bulgaria, 399<br />
Briand, Aristide, 174, 175<br />
Brodovski, Stepan, 211, 212, 213, 216, 227, 255<br />
Bujoiu, Ion, 341, 343<br />
C<br />
Čakste, Jānis, 90, 91, 92<br />
Cancicov, Mircea, 440<br />
Carol II, King of Romania, 126, 304, 395, 458<br />
Cădere, Victor, 225, 287<br />
Celmiņš, Gustavs, 110, 112, 120, 123, 140, 143,<br />
348, 349<br />
Cesianu, Constantin (Dinu), 165<br />
Christu, Ion, 343<br />
Ciano, Galeazzo, 355, 356, 357, 401, 433<br />
Cielēns, Fēlikss, 95, 96, 177, 197, 198, 201, 237,<br />
273<br />
Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 349<br />
Cretzianu Alexandru, 440<br />
Csáky, István, 399, 401<br />
D<br />
Davtjan, Jakov, 338, 340<br />
Dăianu, Ioachim, 126, 127, 128<br />
Dimitrescu, Ion Gr., 76, 343<br />
Dombrovski, Victor, 427<br />
Duca, I.G., 61, 63, 73, 74, 75, 79, 85, 89, 95, 96,<br />
228<br />
E<br />
Eden, Anthony, 286, 288, 331<br />
Ēķis, Ludvigs, 328, 351, 352, 356, 364, 371, 376,<br />
379, 383, 387, 390, 393, 395, 398, 401, 403,<br />
405, 408, 413, 417, 419, 420, 421, 424, 426,<br />
429, 432, 434, 439, 448, 449, 450, 467<br />
F<br />
Fabricius, Wilhelm, 385, 387, 388, 406, 472<br />
Feldmanis, Jūlijs Johans Frīdrihs, 467, 476<br />
Ferdinand I, King of Romania, 54, 64, 79, 82, 89,<br />
92<br />
Filality, Gheorghe, 97, 158<br />
Filodor, Nicolae N., 74, 75<br />
Florescu, Alexandru G., 40, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 79,<br />
80, 82<br />
G<br />
Gafencu, Grigore, 127, 128, 354, 356, 358, 359,<br />
360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368,<br />
369, 371, 375, 376, 396, 397, 409, 410, 411,<br />
415, 422, 433, 435, 436<br />
Ghica, Dimitrie I., 145, 146, 148, 151, 155, 157,<br />
158, 159, 160, 173, 174, 176<br />
Goga, Octavian, 344, 345, 346, 347<br />
Göring, Hermann Wilhelm, 306, 308<br />
Grigorcea, Vasile, 97, 343, 457, 470, 471, 474,<br />
475<br />
Grīnbergs, Gustavs Jēkabs, 88, 89<br />
Grosvalds, Oļģerds, 117, 120, 123, 129, 131, 138,<br />
139, 173, 225, 393<br />
H<br />
Hartmanis, Mārtiņš, 41<br />
Hindenburg, Paul von, 401, 402<br />
Hitler, Adolf, 191, 192, 217, 222, 225, 237, 291,<br />
367, 368, 369, 384, 400, 402, 420, 463, 472
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 481<br />
Hodža, Milan, 345, 347<br />
Hohenzollern, dynasty, 54, 403<br />
Holsti, Eino Rudolf Woldemar, 99, 102, 321<br />
I<br />
Iacovaky, Alexandru, 79, 82, 85, 89, 95<br />
Igenbergs, Ēriks Pauls Arvīds, 290, 291, 343<br />
Indans, Janis, 126, 127<br />
Ionescu, Take, 44, 45, 49, 50<br />
Iorga, Nicolae, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 174<br />
Isakov, Hovhannes Stepani, 376, 377<br />
Jablonskis, Andrejs, 465, 474<br />
Joffe, Adolph Abramovich, 196<br />
Kalnbērziņš, Jānis, 454<br />
Kalniņš, Brūno (Bruno) Haralds, 240, 244<br />
Kalniņš, Pauls, 201, 207, 240, 241, 250, 257<br />
Kalpaks, Oskars, 461, 469<br />
Kampe, Andrejs, 325, 326, 348<br />
Ķeniņš, Atis, 40, 45, 46, 204, 210<br />
Kennard, Howard William, 307, 308<br />
Kirhenšteins, Augusts, 446, 449<br />
Klūge, Eduards, 296<br />
Krieviņš, Edgars Kurts Pēteris, 461, 469<br />
Krofta, Kamil, 345, 346, 347<br />
Kviesis, Alberts, 123, 126, 140, 143, 228, 253,<br />
303, 304<br />
Laretei, Heinrich, 263, 264<br />
Lattik, Jaan, 140, 143<br />
Laval, Pierre, 278, 281<br />
Laže, Jānis, 350, 351<br />
Libicki, Konrad, 140, 143<br />
Lipa, Yaroslav, 199, 200<br />
Litvinov, Maksim M., 140, 141, 143, 147, 148,<br />
152, 161, 167, 168, 174, 180, 225, 226, 242,<br />
247, 248, 262, 263, 277, 278, 279, 282, 284,<br />
327<br />
Lozoraitis, Stasys, 277, 280, 330<br />
Lukasiewicz, Eugeniu<br />
Lucasiewicz, 107, 109, 116<br />
Lupescu, Elena, 424<br />
J<br />
K<br />
L<br />
M<br />
Madgearu, Virgil, 122, 125, 222, 225, 419, 422,<br />
423, 424, 425, 426<br />
Mameli, Giorgio Francesco, 253, 254<br />
Maniu, Iuliu, 404, 406, 419, 420, 422, 423, 424,<br />
425, 426, 438, 440<br />
Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf Emil, 263, 265, 413<br />
Manoilescu, Mihail, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454,<br />
455, 456, 457, 459, 475<br />
Marinescu, Gabriel, 421<br />
Markus, Hans Johan, 324, 325, 339, 340, 469,<br />
471<br />
Martius, Georg, 194, 195, 202<br />
Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 317, 320<br />
Meierovics, Zigfrīds Anna, 40, 43, 48, 72, 79, 80,<br />
81, 82, 88, 89, 292<br />
Menders, Fricis, 201, 207, 240<br />
Micescu, Istrate, 346, 347, 440<br />
Mihai, King of Romania, 125, 126<br />
Mihalache, Ion, 440<br />
Mīlbergs, Gotfrīds, 241, 244<br />
Mironescu, Gheorghe G., 98, 101, 104, 106, 107,<br />
109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118,<br />
119, 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 135,<br />
138, 139, 194, 195<br />
Mitilineu, Ion, 96<br />
Modreanu, Rodrig, 426, 427<br />
Molotov, Vyacheslav, 366, 367, 368, 432, 440<br />
Monson, Edmound St. John Debonaire John,<br />
328, 332<br />
Mościcki, Ignacy, 112, 113, 323<br />
Munters, Vilhelms, 227, 253, 260, 261, 263, 274,<br />
275, 279, 282, 283, 289, 291, 292, 293, 294,<br />
295, 296, 297, 303, 307, 309, 311, 314, 316,<br />
317, 323, 324, 327, 328, 329, 336, 338, 339,<br />
340, 341, 346, 350, 352, 356, 359, 360, 361,<br />
364, 371, 376, 379, 383, 387, 390, 393,<br />
398,401, 403, 405, 408, 413, 417, 420, 424,<br />
426, 429, 432, 434, 439, 444, 453, 468, 469<br />
Mussolini, Benitto, 357, 418, 420, 433<br />
N<br />
Negulescu, Demetru, 118<br />
Nicolae, Prince of Romania, 123, 124, 126<br />
Nicolaescu, colonel, 106<br />
Niculescu-Buzeşti, Grigore, 362, 363, 364, 365,<br />
366, 367, 368, 369, 371, 375, 376, 396, 397,<br />
410, 411, 415, 435, 436, 442, 443, 444, 445,<br />
446, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457,<br />
458, 459<br />
Noël, Léon, 336, 337
482 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />
Nukša, Mārtiņš, 54, 55, 56, 59, 72, 81, 88, 89, 95,<br />
96, 98, 126, 301, 325, 326, 341, 343, 346, 448<br />
O<br />
Olavs, Vilis, 316, 318<br />
Orghidan, Theodor, 68, 75, 76, 125, 127, 302,<br />
326, 341, 343, 344, 348, 426, 427<br />
P<br />
Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 317, 320<br />
Papen, Franz von, 400, 402<br />
Patek, Stanisław, 160, 167, 168, 169<br />
Päts, Konstantin, 230, 232, 240<br />
Păclianu, Mihail M., 43<br />
Pełczyński, Tadeusz, 114, 115<br />
Pennescu, Dimitrie C., 127, 128<br />
Piip, Ants, 48, 49<br />
Piłsudski, Józef, 174, 175, 313, 315<br />
Plesnilă, Dimitrie, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52,<br />
53<br />
Plymouth, Ivor Miles Windsor-Clive, 2nd Earl<br />
of, 321, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 339, 340<br />
R<br />
Rācenis, Herberts Leo, 41, 42, 43<br />
Radziņš, Pēteris, 41<br />
Reinhards, Pauls Jēkabs, 461, 469<br />
Reuterswärd, Patrick Carl Reinhold, 462, 470<br />
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 355, 356, 357, 367,<br />
368<br />
Richmond, Sir Herbert William, 328, 332<br />
Rusmanis, Aleksandrs, 461, 469<br />
Rydz-Śmigły, Edward, 323, 324, 441<br />
S<br />
Salnais, Voldemārs, 204, 217, 222, 225, 234, 236<br />
Sandler, Richard, 321, 339, 340<br />
Scortzescu, Theodor, 157, 158, 176, 211, 214,<br />
228, 257, 291, 293, 295, 303<br />
Sēja, Ludvigs Kārlis, 45, 46<br />
Seljamaa, Julius, 239, 261, 263<br />
Sidorovici, Teofil, 418, 421<br />
Simon, John Allsebrook, 286, 288<br />
Skirmunt, Constantin, 99, 102<br />
Skujenieks, Marģers, 163, 164, 250, 328<br />
Slávik, Juraj, 314, 315<br />
Smetona, Antanas, 108, 110, 330<br />
Stalin, Joseph, 125, 212, 279, 282, 446, 455<br />
Stauning, Thorvald August Marinus, 321, 322<br />
Stegmanis, Artūrs, 360, 362<br />
Steinhardt, Laurence A., 410, 411<br />
Stoica, Vasile, 39, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 327,<br />
351, 353, 354, 402, 414, 424<br />
Stomoniakov, Boris Spiridonovici, 161, 162,<br />
166, 167, 168, 174, 181, 184, 186<br />
Strandman, Otto August, 111, 112, 113, 140,<br />
143<br />
Sturdza, Mihail R., 98, 101, 104, 106, 110, 111,<br />
113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122,<br />
125, 126, 132, 135, 138, 140, 142, 145, 146,<br />
148, 151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163,<br />
164, 165, 166, 174, 180, 181, 184, 185, 187,<br />
191, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 234,<br />
236, 239, 240, 247, 249, 252, 255, 260, 261,<br />
262, 265, 270, 273, 274, 275, 276, 283, 289,<br />
292<br />
Sviderski, Aleksei, 177, 179, 216<br />
Svinhufvud, Pehr Evind, 176, 178<br />
Szék, Pál Teleki de, 418, 421<br />
Tardieu, André Pierre Gabriel, 173, 174<br />
Tătărescu, Gheorghe, 311, 390, 391, 393, 403,<br />
422<br />
Titulescu, Nicolae, 96, 97, 185, 186, 187, 191,<br />
193, 194, 197, 198, 201, 211, 214, 225, 226,<br />
227, 228, 234, 236, 239, 240, 247, 249, 252,<br />
255, 257, 260, 261, 262, 265, 270, 273, 274,<br />
275, 276, 283, 289, 291, 292, 293, 295, 297,<br />
303, 305, 308, 309, 311, 312, 314, 324, 325,<br />
327, 340, 346<br />
Tõnisson, Jaan, 196, 197<br />
Tripier, Jean, 253, 255<br />
Tūbelis, Juozas, 108, 109, 330<br />
T<br />
U<br />
Ulmanis, Kārlis, 95, 139, 140, 215, 229, 241, 249,<br />
250, 252, 253, 261, 273, 277, 287, 297, 303,<br />
304, 316, 317, 318, 328, 410, 455, 459, 469<br />
Urbšys, Juozas, 271, 272<br />
Vaida-Voevod, Alexandru, 180, 403, 405<br />
Vailée, Alexandre Paternotte de la, 310, 312<br />
Valdmanis, Alfrēds, 360, 361<br />
Valters, Miķelis, 273, 286, 287, 296, 307, 311,<br />
314, 323, 324, 327, 336, 338, 339, 350<br />
Văllimărescu, Constantin, 297, 298, 303, 305,<br />
309, 343<br />
Verne, Jules, 383, 384<br />
Vinogradov, Boris, 338, 340<br />
V
THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 483<br />
Voldemaras, Augustinas, 98, 108, 109, 294<br />
Volmārs, Jānis, 341, 343<br />
Vyshinsky, Andrey Januarevich, 15, 446<br />
Witte, Sergei, 186, 187<br />
W<br />
Y<br />
Yrjö-Koskinen, Aarno Armas Sakari, 176, 178<br />
Z<br />
Zamfirescu, Alexandru Duiliu, 323, 337<br />
Zariņš, Kārlis Reinholds, 43, 44, 46, 48, 53, 159,<br />
173, 186, 467<br />
Želigovskį, Lucjan, 90, 99, 267<br />
Zemgals, Gustavs, 100, 103, 111, 112<br />
Zimmerman, Alexandre Percy von, 316, 318<br />
Zyndram, Marian Kościałkowski, 307, 309