Democracy in Central Asia - The Alan Cordova Site

AlanR.Cordova,WiliamsColege

Preface
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Global democracy promotion has the potential to transform political systems
throughout the developing world. A phenomenon of the past half-century that has
intensified in the past decade, it has become a central element in American foreign
policy. 1 However, while democratization has defined the principles supported by global
organizations such as the United Nations and changed the ways in which states are
conceived by policymakers, has this sweeping force had any impact on the commonplace
people that its supporters seek to empower?
My thesis deals with this historic confrontation between ordinary people in
developing countries – merchants, farmers and businessmen – and international
democracy promotion programs that exercise global reach. Although the subject relates
to vastly divergent topics of inquiry, ranging from the ultimate objectives of American
foreign policy to cultural imperialism, my work will deal with none of them. The
question I ask is not why, but how, and I am interested not in the high-level dealings
between diplomats, but rather the substantive changes experienced by the millions of
impoverished people living in an area that has undergone extreme political upheaval in
the past century. Ultimately, it will be the latter group who will determine the destiny of
the nation in which they live. Moreover, it is my hope that the experiences of people
living in an oft-overlooked corner of the earth can shed light on the central challenges
facing practitioners of democracy promotion around the world.
Within the region, I selected Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia based on a set
of commonalities: their experience of being dominated by the Soviet Union, their
1 “Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy”
is the sixth primary objective in the 2002 National Security Strategy. Bush, G. W. et al (2002). "National
Security Strategy of the United States of America." Retrieved 3/27/06, 2006, from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
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Preface
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
resource poverty, low population and levels of urbanization and development, and their
use of traditional authority structures within kinship networks. The cases exemplify
standard democracy promotion practices taking place throughout the world. While
certain elements, such as their lack of security considerations, distinguish the three
countries from most others, this simplifies the range of factors influencing the political
climate: it is not sufficient for democratic governments simply to guarantee security; they
must also provide opportunities for political expression and dialog.
I will build my analytical framework by comparing the current state of democracy
in three developing countries with what it could become, rather than with advanced
Western states whose democracy is deeply rooted in their history. The goal for
democracy promotion in Central Asia cannot be the duplication of the American system
of governance – cultural and economic factors disallow it. Rather, although democracy
must develop into a means of popular participation, to the extent that the system upholds
this and other basic rights, significant flexibility in the nature and products of the
government exists.
While the central question – why democracy programs have failed to achieve their
objectives – has numerous answers, one is most certainly not that poor leadership within
the programs themselves doomed them. The people I quoted are faithful to their cause,
dedicated to their work and skilled in the art of nonprofit management. Their experiences
are quite representative of the much larger constellation of development agencies, and I
do not wish to imply that they bear exclusive responsibility for their program’s outcome.
Moreover, it is important to note that democracy promotion is often dangerous work: in
the year since my field research, one of my interviewees was thrown in jail and only
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
recently released. 2 Another was shot and almost killed by unknown assailants. 3
Given
these circumstances, rather than study individual actors’ strategic decisions, I focus
instead on the structure and philosophy of the system of democracy promotion that
shapes their situation.
This work results from my primary research conducted in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Mongolia in the summer of 2005, sponsored by Williams College’s Robert L.
Wilmers Travel Fellowship and Charles W. Hufford Fellowship. I spent ten weeks
interviewing foreign and local program officers, political analysts and non-elites. Most
were conducted in English (which many local NGO officers speak), but I employed
translators in each country when necessary (translated interviews will be thusly noted). 4
Also, I participated in several events surrounding the July 10, 2005 presidential election
in Kyrgyzstan; in describing them I draw on personal experiences recorded on my
weblog .
Many people provided critical assistance throughout the process. The genesis of
the project came from discussions with Professor William Darrow following his class on
Central Asia in the fall of 2004. Chnara Mamatova, Tom Powers and Jay M. Pasachoff
gave me initial contacts; Chnara and Asel Mamatova, Hussein Pirov and Renchin
Tsolmon were incredibly thoughtful and generous in helping me with the logistics and
giving me an introduction to their countries. I was able to use the facilities at the
American Center for Mongolian Studies in the National University of Mongolia and at
2 I refer to the ongoing case of Mukhtar Boqizoda, former editor of Tajikistan’s Nerui Sukhan. (2005)
Editor sentenced to hand over 20% of his income to the state for two years. Reporters Without Borders
Europe Press Releases Volume, DOI: and Kimmage, D. (2006) Tajik Court Suspends Opposition Editor's
Sentence. RFE/RL Newsline Volume, DOI:
3 Edil Baisalov of Kyrgyzstan’s Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society. (2006) Assassination Attempt
in Kyrgyzstan Underscores Slide Towards Instability. EurasiaNet Volume, DOI:
4 I would like to thank Asel Mamatova in Kyrgyzstan, Shavkat Musoev in Tajikistan and Enkhmunkh in
Mongolia for making possible my most fruitful interviews.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
the East-West Center for Research and Dialogue at the American University of Central
Asia. Gantuya Badamgarav and Lilia Kadyrberdieva-Kadybekovna helped me work
through local particularities. Kim Fassler and Chris Geissler read sections and offered
numerous improvements. Professor Cheryl Shanks supervised the first semester of the
thesis seminar and helped me assemble the divergent strands into a coherent argument.
However, the greatest thanks must be reserved for my readers, Professors Darel Paul and
Monique Deveaux and, most of all, my advisor, Professor James Mahon, who challenged
me to look beyond the easy answers and helped me sharpen my analysis. Their
dedication and expertise were invaluable throughout the writing process.
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PART I
Introduction………………………………………………………………………..……1
History through July 2005..……………….……………….……………………,……..9
Theory…………………………………….………….…………………………………22
PART II
Case Study Selection…..…….……………………………………………….…………50
Tajikistan………………….…………………………………………………………….52
Kyrgyzstan…………………………………………………………………………..…..68
Mongolia………………………………………………………………………………...81
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………........96
APPENDICES
List of Interviewees…………………………………………………………….…...…101
Bibliography………………………………………………………………..………….107

Introduction
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
On July 10, 2005, the five million citizens of the small ex-Soviet republic of
Kyrgyzstan, voted for their president. For international observers, the day marked the
mountainous nation’s entrance into the community of democracies, the first from Central
Asia, a vast expanse still largely ruled by former Soviet apparatchiks or the dictator who
had expelled them. 1
Newspapers broadcast images of Kyrgyz casting ballots and staining
their fingers purple, all thanks to funding primarily from the United States. 2
Turnout was
reported at 74.67%, 3 and on the day after the vote, the OSCE monitors noted that there
were “almost no discernable obstacles to campaigning except the availability of financial
resources of the candidates,” 4
and that the government followed through on a
commitment to make significant improvements 5 in the balloting process. 6
The report by
the International Republican Institute, a USAID contractor, echoed the optimism in the
air: “unprecedented voter education efforts and widespread distribution of candidate
information resulted in vast increases in the amount of information available to voters on
1 “Central Asia” most commonly refers to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (where Emomali Rahmonov has been
president since 1994), Uzbekistan (Islam Karimov, who became First Secretary in 1989), Turkmenistan
(Saparmurat Niyazov, who became General Secretary in 1985) and Kazakhstan (Nursultan Nazarbayev,
who became First Secretary in 1990). However, it can be expanded to include Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Georgia, Afghanistan, as well as sub-national divisions such as China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region and
various republics within the Russian Federation’s Southern, Volga, Urals and Siberian Federal Districts. I
argue that Mongolia can be compared with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
2 The State Department spent $15.4 million in FY 2005 on “Democracy Programs” in Kyrgyzstan. USAID
budgeted $7.2 million for “Democracy and Media.” (2005, 8/24/05). "United States Recaps Aid to Kyrgyz
Republic for Fiscal Year 2005." Retrieved 4/1/06, 2006, from
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfileenglish&y=2005&m=August&x=200508240959431CJsamohT0.1447216&t=eur/eur-latest.html.
and
(2005). "Overview of USAID's Focus in Kyrgyzstan." Retrieved 4/7/06, 2006.
3 (2005, 11/7/05). "OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report." Retrieved 3/10/06, 2006.
23.
4 Kopaj, Lubovir. OSCE Press Conference. Hyatt Regency, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 11 July 2005.
5 A previous OSCE report noted that “serious violations have been committed” during the period
surrounding the parliamentary elections of February 27, 2005 and March 13, 2005. Mambetaliev, K. J., A.
(2005). Elections - 2005 Monitoring of Media During Elections in the Kyrgyz Republic (Parliamentary
Elections). Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, OSCE: 74.
6 Kiljunen, Kimmo. OSCE Press Conference. Hyatt Regency, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 11 July 2005.
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Introduction
candidates, issues and electoral procedures.” 7
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
The winner received both the “mandate”
from the people and acclaim from the United States. 8
However, the result of the election revealed a suspicious result: Kurmanbek
Bakiev, the acting president since March 2005 protests ousted Askar Akaev, won 88.71%
of the vote, 9 a total common in de facto single-party states but rare in truly competitive
elections. 10
In seeking to understand why citizens overwhelmingly supported him, even
though he did not command a wide base of popular support, I found that voters were
poorly educated on the platforms, the importance of electing the best candidate and the
different ways to decide for whom to vote. Leaders of a local cooperative told me that
“many electors predicted that Bakiev would win, so people just voted for Bakiev.” 11
In
contrast to the optimistic reports released by international agencies, they said that the
election “just changed hats from blue to white” – in other words, there had been no
substantive change. Neither of the women, whose organization, received technical
support from Interbilim, a major Kyrgyz NGO (non-governmental organization), could
neither tell me about the platforms of the opposition candidates nor describe Bakiev’s
pledges in depth (instead noting that “we really believe that he would be able to do
something” and that “he doesn’t promise a lot to people” – in other words, he will be able
to keep his word). Although an estimated 60% of the population received the results of a
7 Gates, L. (2005, 7/10/2005). "IRI's Preliminary Statement on the July 10, 2005, Presidential Election in
the Kyrgyz Republic." Retrieved 7/11/05, 2005, from http://www.iri.org/07-11-05-KyrgyzRepEO.asp.
8 Chivers, C. J. (2005). Leader Wins 88% of Vote in Kyrgyzstan. The New York Times. New York: 3.
9 (2005, 11/7/05). "OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report." Retrieved 3/10/06, 2006.
23.
10 This is especially suspect because there were six candidates in total, with the possibility of a runoff.
None of the others received more than 4% of the vote.
11 Junusheva, Mairam & Argymbaeva, Aikam. Personal Interview (trans. Bermet Muratalieva). 11 July
2005.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
candidates’ questionnaire, 12 clearly many had not read it. The large turnout could be
explained by the fact that people were used to voting, but not to having a meaningful
choice. Having cast ballots during Soviet times, they understood the concept of voting
politicians into office. However, the anti-democratic tendencies of the past played a
factor: voters overlooked opposition candidates, instead voting for the best-publicized
candidate, who enjoyed control over state media 13 and ran the best-financed campaign.
While political stability was a legitimate concern, given the weakness of the
Kyrgyz state, I doubted that people understood that the government would not collapse if
the incumbent lost. Similarly, although their judgment of Bakiev as the most qualified
candidate in the race might have been accurate, they could not have logically arrived at it
without considering the others’ credentials. Finally, while the combination of
Presidential candidate Bakiev, from the south, and Prime Minister Felix Kulov, from the
north, represented sorely needed bipartisanship, many observers predicted a clash
between the two ambitious politicians, which would worsen the country’s divide. 14
International organizations had played a significant role in the run-up to the
election, training monitors and creating detailed posters that compared the candidates’
platforms and promoted voting. USAID even sponsored an American-style get-out-thevote
concert that filled Bishkek’s Ala-Too Square. 15
However, what must have happened
is that voters ignored them and continued the old Soviet practice of voting for the
12 (2005). Politicians Respond Positively to Civil Society’s New Role in Kyrgyzstan’s Presidential Election
– September 2005. Almaty, Kazakhstan, Counterpart Central Asia. 2006.
13 While Bakiev did not monopolize the media, OSCE observers remarked, he did have an unfair advantage.
Kopaj, Lubovir. OSCE Press Conference. Hyatt Regency, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 11 July 2005.
14 Saidazimova, G. (2005) Kyrgyzstan: Will Bakiev-Kulov Alliance Last? RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty
Volume, DOI:
15 Mikosz, D. W., Tom (2005) You Say You Want a Revolution? Democracy at Large Volume, DOI.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
incumbent. 16
The message that the election would not affect short-term economic
stability and instead represented a golden opportunity to choose between several
directions 17 never filtered down from national NGOs, and commonplace people, fearful
that a change in the administration could plunge the country into economic chaos, voted
for the only person able to guarantee stability. Although the population voted based on
its perceived interests (primarily, preserving a satisfactory level of material prosperity),
the election was not an example of truly democratic participation, in which individuals’
full range of interests and desires are considered, as well as the interests of the
community and the integrity of the political system. While the process lacked the
discrepancies and technical deficiencies that characterize a corrupt election, the people
chose their candidate based more on unrealistic fears than careful deliberation. Bakiev
successfully dominated the run-up to the election, using control of state media to saturate
campaign coverage. 18
The failure of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan to properly educate voters on the democratic
nature of the election and inspire them to consider the range of candidates highlights the
most significant deficiency of current democracy promotion programs. While they
successfully instituted a transparent electoral apparatus, the result of the election would
likely have been similar had no intervention occurred. 19
Although televised debates and
16 Soviet traditions became so thoroughly ingrained that they continue in the present day. Amy Schultz
described how the once-mandatory cleanups of city streets still enjoy widespread participation, particularly
from Bishkek’s elderly residents. Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview [DATE?]. This may explain the high
turnout.
17 What would have ideally taken place was that voters perceived the election through the logic of the
marketplace: “When outcomes do not take place with certainty, then economists typically assume that
individuals maximize expected utility.” Wittman, D. A. (1995). The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why
Political Institutions are Efficient. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. 38.
18 Kopaj, Lubovir. OSCE Press Conference. Hyatt Regency, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 11 July 2005. I also
noticed his posters all over Bishkek, compared with a sprinkling of one other candidate’s.
19 Askar Akayev won 74.49% of the vote in the 2000 presidential election, after which the OSCE noted
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
posters comparing the platforms seemed to promote rational political discourse and to
give citizens the opportunity to cast an informed vote, I found that they failed on both of
these because they seemed unable to engage the political perceptions of commonplace
people (villagers, merchants, farmers, etc.). Why would high-quality these media fail to
teach voters about the election? Either the people could not understand the political
discourse, I reasoned, or they chose to ignore it. As I began to realize, the answer was a
combination of both.
In each country, I found the vast difference between my interviews with elites and
non-elites 20
illustrative of the problems with contemporary democracy promotion.
Foreign development assistance had created a rarefied “NGO class” consisting of highly
educated and politically engaged individuals who could pursue employment outside the
government. While administering internationally-sponsored NGOs provided them access
to even the US House International Relations Committee, 21 it distanced them from the
ongoing and frequently nonpolitical needs of the commonplace people. Thus, human
rights and minority groups flourished while the economic assistance sector of the NGO
sphere remains underdeveloped. Nevertheless, in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia,
today’s NGO leaders could easily become tomorrow’s politicians, and the possibility
exists that they could one day command enough political capital to transform their
countries.
that “the elections did not reverse the negative trends identified during the parliamentary elections at the
beginning of this year and can therefore not be qualified as being equal, free and fair.” (2000). Kyrgyzstan -
2000 Presidential Election. Election Watch, Cable News Network. 2006. (2000). OSCE Chair disappointed
with presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan. Vienna, OSCE. 2006.
20 That is, between those inside and outside the network of NGOs, government agencies and large
businesses.
21 (2005). Statement by Edil Baisalov, President of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society
(Kyrgyzstan) House Committee on International Relations. Washington, DC, House of Representatives of
the United States: 5.
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Introduction
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Democracy promotion in Central Asia depends upon three strategies operating
simultaneously. First, the lack of capacity within the government must be addressed:
MPs must know how to draft laws by consensus rather than coercion and ministers to
delegate responsibility rather than creating a clientelistic hierarchy that depends on their
decisions. Second, the power of government and business must be checked by the third
sector, consisting of NGOs, associations and political movements. These organizations
protect groups and interests within the population and generate policies that move the
country forward. Third, however, it is of equal consequence that the people value both
well-functioning government and a third sector. Without popular engagement, even the
best structures will fall victim to complacence and corruption, leading to the present-day
situation in Central Asia: corruption, external dependency and inefficiency plague all
political institutions, further eroding public confidence in the beneficial nature of
democracy. Although the structures exist, they are completely hollow 22 – neither NGOs
nor the government serve the people, and although the dialog between them often
concerns important issues, there is usually no pressure from the public to act upon the
results to create change. Rather than drawing on the norms expressed by individuals,
they reproduce the top-down system perfected by the Soviet Union, whereby interestbased
groups (such as the infamous “unions”) became organs to promulgate an ideology
developed at the highest levels of power. While this structure, combined with the
powerful influence of international organizations, currently allows for the introduction of
important concepts, such as minority rights, into the public discourse, by privileging the
elite to the total exclusion of the vast majority of the population it acts against the
22 My favorite analogy was that the system is like a house that appears complete from the outside, but upon
entering you find that nothing works.
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Introduction
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
democratic ideal of popular engagement in political affairs. This system is highly
unsustainable in the long-term and will collapse when donors begin to scale back funding
as project managers lose constant sources of income.
What are the stakes of democracy promotion? The failure to secure institutions of
democratic governance sets a country on a path towards authoritarianism. Uzbekistan’s
Islam Karimov pulls the neighboring countries towards this dystopia both through
political pressure and by presenting a tenable model of political governance that appeals
to self-interested, clientelistic presidents. Karimov’s Ideology of National Independence,
a masterwork of authoritarian legitimation, uses through four theses – the “ideological
immunity thesis,” 23 the “reflection thesis,” 24 the “unification thesis,” 25 and “goal
orientation” 26 - to create the illusion that Uzbekistan could not exist without him. Thus,
he does not necessarily need to consistently deploy military forces to keep the population
under his thumb, although in several occasions he has done so to quash real threats to his
23 This thesis “rests on the foundational myth of the stability-craving Uzbek nation constantly beset by one
alien ideological threat after another…all preventing the expression of ‘authentic Uzbek national
ideology.’” March, A. F. (2003). "From Leninism to Karimovism: Hegemony, Ideology, and Authoritarian
Legitimation." Post-Soviet Affairs 19(4): 311.
24 “The basic argument of the reflection thesis is that a true national ideology ought to ‘reflect’ or ‘express’
the interests, nature, character, desires, policy-preferences, and culture of the organic nation rather than be
instrumental in forming or transforming them.” March, A. F. (2003). "From Leninism to Karimovism:
Hegemony, Ideology, and Authoritarian Legitimation." Post-Soviet Affairs 19(4): 312.
25 “the assertion of national unity: there is one authentic and authoritative expression of national interests,
values, and aspirations…‘irrespective of the diversity of existing views and life positions, aspirations, and
hopes of the various social groups prevailing in our society…a single ideology is called upon to unite these
groups and individuals around a single national banner and to secure the priority of the higher interests and
goals of the nation and the state.’” March, A. F. (2003). "From Leninism to Karimovism: Hegemony,
Ideology, and Authoritarian Legitimation." Post-Soviet Affairs 19(4): 313., quoting (trans. March) Karimov,
I. (1999). Ideologiya - eto ob"yedinyayushchiy flag natsii, obshchestva, gosudarstva (Ideology is the
unifying banner of the nation, society and state)". Stovo budushcheye my stroim svoimi rukami (We are
constructing our future with our own hands). Tashkent, Uzbekistan. 7. 88.
26 “Karimov and his collaborators are quite explicit in declaring that the strong goal orientation of their
ideology is designed ‘to reduce all political processes to a common denominator.’” March, A. F. (2003).
"From Leninism to Karimovism: Hegemony, Ideology, and Authoritarian Legitimation." Post-Soviet
Affairs 19(4): 315, quoting (trans. March) Tadzhiyev, K. (1999). Teoreticheskiye i metodologicheskiye
voprosy natsional'noy ideologn (The theoretical and methodological questions of national ideology).
Tashkent, Uzbekistan. 37.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
political power. Even the mahallas (village councils) have become co-opted by
Tashkent. 27
The police state he has created denies all opportunity for political expression.
Autocrats command immense control over every level of governance articularly when the
government becomes strong enough to operate without the financial support of
international organizations. Institutions must be designed and maintained to safeguard
against the tendency towards authoritarian slippage.
However, in order to properly support these institutions, democracy promotion
programs must emphasize three elements of popular political engagement: the grassroots
development of civil society, the expansion of civic education and the promotion of
democratic norms. These three factors give individuals the means to collaborate locally
and voice their perspectives on a larger scale, supporting non-governmental efforts by
pressuring the government through mass movements such as opposition campaigns and
protest movements.
To a great extent, the commonplace people of Central Asia share a singular
priority: to provide for themselves and their family. Currently, they perceive, quite
accurately, that their governments are obstacles to achieving this end, and they avoid
political engagement at all costs, even returning to nomadic existence in order to
completely exit the responsibilities of citizenship. While evading the government might
have worked when the Soviet Union provided generous subsidies for health care and
education, in today’s age of market economics, when everything must be purchased,
people can no longer afford to remain disengaged if they wish to rise above a minimal
level of material prosperity.
27 The Uzbek state has engaged in a broad crackdown of those who practice Islam yet refuse to toe the
government line. The campaign and the human rights abuses committed are documented in (2004).
Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan. New York, Human Rights Watch.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
The history of Central Asia shapes its modern character and explains the
tendencies and preferences expressed by its people.
Unlike Western Europe,
representative democracy is a largely foreign concept. Although certain elements were
present during certain periods, 1 the history of Central Asia is largely one of tyranny and
empires.
Like layers of ash left by successive eruptions of distant volcanoes, the presentday
region is a complex set of identities, norms and beliefs, inconsistently distributed and
variously upheld. Although the region changed hands and was only briefly unified in its
two-millennia history, certain common experiences and socioeconomic characteristics
provide the basis for comparison between its people.
For seventy years Moscow dominated Mongolia and the Central Asian Soviet
Socialist Republics, 2 whose borders were drawn by Stalin with little regard for natural
geography 3 or history. Power was centralized in the new capitals, which lacked the
historical significance of longtime economic hubs, 4 forcing local Soviets to depend on
Moscow’s military dominance for their authority and legitimacy. 5
USSR-wide
1 Namely, the Pax Mongolica following the conquests of Genghis Khan, in military power projected
throughout the vast empire allowed people to focus on concerns other than security. Like Hobbes’s
Leviathan, the state guaranteed protection (albeit at great cost), creating de facto peace (or at least until the
empire was divided between feuding inheritors).
2 The original Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was divided in 1924 and 1936 into Soviet
Socialist Republics corresponding to the present-day countries.
3 The natural economic corridor and Silk Road route of the Ferghana Valley, for example, was trisected by
the highly contentious (and currently militarized) Tajikistan-Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan
borders. One could say, more precisely, that Stalin thoroughly considered geography and designed the
republics so that all were dependent on Moscow and that no ethnic group could rally kin and create trouble
in the Near Abroad.
4 While the Ferghana Valley cities of Osh, Kyrgyzstan, Andijan, Uzbekistan and Khujand, Tajikistan
contributed significantly to their countries’ economy, the Soviets privileged cities located outside this area,
most likely in an attempt to minimize its political significance. As Daniel Prior remarks, “a true
appreciation of Bishkek should start with the realization that the most notable and powerful emperor to ever
set foot here was…Leonid Brezhnev.” Prior, D. (1994). Bishkek Handbook: Inside and Out. Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan, Literary Kyrgyzstan. 5.
5 Thus, Tashkent ruled over the ancient capitals of Khiva, Bukhara and Samarkand; Bishkek governed Osh
and Jalalabad in the economically powerful Ferghana Valley, and Dushanbe controlled Khujand.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
monoculture 6 left Central Asia highly dependent on Soviet infrastructure and economic
coordination: Politically, “not a single decision of the Central Committee of the Council
of Ministers demonstrated interest in the economic development of non-Slavic national
republics, or in the republics’ broader social-economic development.” 7
Nevertheless,
the USSR thoroughly modernized the region, bringing health care, education,
transportation, and communication systems that had never before existed in the area. The
positive legacy is still visible today in the unusually high rates of literacy compared with
other countries in similar states of economic development. 8
Gorbachev’s perestroika allowed the first hints of political openness, and the
beginnings of economic liberalism challenged the leadership of the Central Asian SSRs. 9
With the August Putsch in 1991 heralding the crumbling of the USSR, the republics were
thrown into multiple institutional crises, 10 and the ways in which the new governments
resolved them has largely shaped the countries’ subsequent political development. Olcott
noted five stresses variously facing the new republics (as well as Russia): “the enduring
battles between presidents and parliaments; the struggles for local autonomy; separatist
6 Fierman, W. (1991). The Soviet 'Transformation' of Central Asia. Soviet Central Asia: The Failed
Transformation. W. Fierman. Boulder, CO, Westview Press: 20-21.
7 Rumer, B. Z. (1989). Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment". Boston, Unwin Hyman. 163.
8 “Bourgeois sociologists predicted a gloomy future for Kirghizia: poverty, ignorance and gradual physical
extinction. In reality, however, the problem of universal literacy was solved in Kirghizia within the
lifetime of one generation.” Omurkulov, K. (1987). Kirhizia. Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing
House. 5.
9 Rumer, B. Z. (1989). Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment". Boston, Unwin Hyman. 177.
10 “A a result of the USSR’s collapse, Central Asia has found itself as a civilization-scale junction, at the
epicenter of conflicts between…the need to dismantle the Communist power structure and the impossibility
of doing so without incurring devastating upheavals…the social structure implanted from above and
Islamic traditionalism rising from below…the need for modernization and the task of safeguarding
stability…national revival, complete with the construction of a nation state, and the preservation of
society’s multi-ethnic character…the need to distance the new state from Russia and the need for Russia’s
assistance.” Kulchik, Y. (1995). Central Asia After the Empire: Ethnic Groups, Communities and
Problems. Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change. R. Z. E. Sagdeev, Susan. Chevy Chase, MD,
Center for Post-Soviet Studies Press. 104.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
movements; inter-ethnic conflicts; and the jostling between advocates of democracy and
defenders of national or religious privilege.” 11
MONGOLIA
Long the pendulum of the Sino-Soviet axis, Mongolia’s emergence from
communism’s long shadow began in earnest in December 1989, when hundreds of people
gathered in Sükhbaatar Square 12 to protest against the food shortages, elite privilege and
lack of sociopolitical reform, 13 and for perestroika and glasnost. 14 Moderates’ rhetoric of
nonviolence 15 set the tone and encouraged the government, which had long used violence
to purge the country of its enemies, 16 to instead listen to the demands articulated by the
nascent Mongolian Democratic Movement. 17
The deadlock in the parliament between
reformers and traditionalists within the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
(MPRP 18 ) motivated the swift proliferation of opposition movements, 19 the resignation of
11 Olcott, M. B. (1994). "Democracy and Statebuilding in Central Asia; Challenges for U.S. Policymakers."
Demokratizatsya 2(1): 41.
12 Named after Damdiny Sükhbaatar, Mongolia’s first Communist ideologue. Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern
Mongolia: From Khans to Commisars and Capitalists. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. 6.
Notably, his statue still stands in the middle of the square, and that of Khorloogiin Choibalsan, the Stalin to
Sükhbaatar’s Lenin, still stands on the opposite side of the Khural, in front of Building 1 of the National
University of Mongolia.
13 Akiner, S. (1991). Mongolia Today. New York, Kegan Paul International. xxii.
14 Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commisars and Capitalists. Berkeley, CA,
University of California Press. 2.
15 Namely, Sanjaasürengiin Zorig. Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commisars and
Capitalists. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. 4.
16 Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commisars and Capitalists. Berkeley, CA,
University of California Press. 6.
17 “This submission was in and of itself remarkable, because it was the first such citizens’ manifesto
publicly presented to the communist leadership.” Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From Khans to
Commisars and Capitalists. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. 11.
18 The Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (Монгол Ардын Хувьсгалт Нам) was the exclusive
political party from 1921-1990. Although many authors attach the appellation “ex-communist,” I have
tried to avoid doing so in order not to pigeonhole the party.
19 Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commisars and Capitalists. Berkeley, CA,
University of California Press. 16-17.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
all MPs and the repeal of the constitutional article declaring Mongolia a one-party state. 20
Under new leadership, the parliament held the country’s first multiparty election in July
1990, leading to the formation of a constitutional convention. 21 The new Mongolian
leaders opened their country to the West, 22 opening the doors to international aid and
development organizations, ranging from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the
International Republican Institute (IRI) to Christian missionary groups. 23
Subsequently,
the presidency and control of the Khural switched between the MPRP and its opposition.
However, “the abysmal lack of knowledge about democratic government and rise of a
childlike desire for instant gratification” 24 that revealed itself during the constitutional
process continued to plague Mongolian politics in subsequent years. 25 The 2004 election
yielded an even split, requiring a compromise under which Democrat Tsakhiagiyn
Elbegdorj became prime minister and the cabinet ministries were split evenly between the
two groups. 26
20 Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commisars and Capitalists. Berkeley, CA,
University of California Press. 23.
21 Kristof, N. (1992). Mongolia Ex-Communists Said to Win Vote. New York Times. New York: 7.
22 Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commisars and Capitalists. Berkeley, CA,
University of California Press. 36.
23 Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commisars and Capitalists. Berkeley, CA,
University of California Press. 40-41.
24 Hulan, H. (1996). “Mongolia’s New Constitutional Regime: Institutional Tensions and Political
Consequences.” The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs. 3:46.
25 Even fifteen years later, I found many people complaining that this characteristic is quite common in the
country’s national politics.
26 Tuya, N. (2005). "Mongolia in 2004: Testing Politics and Economics." Asian Survey 45(1): 65-70.
12

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KYRGYZSTAN
While the fall of Moscow’s hegemony took the Kyrgyz SSR by storm, the seeds
of political change had been sown much earlier, during Gorbachev’s perestroika. 27
Clubs such as the Demos discussion group (which began in 1987 as an affiliate of
Komsomol 28 ) allowed the first breath of free political expression, opening the door for
more openly politicized organizations in 1988. 29
Although the overall volume of the
political activism was quite low, 30
these groups made a significant impact: the Osh-
Aimagy movement’s mobilization of ethnic Uzbeks in the southern Osh province against
the perceived policy of favoring ethnic Kyrgyz forced a confrontation with the Soviet
government in June 1990, 31
which clearly illustrated Soviet authorities’ inability to
maintain order, one of the most basic charges of any political administration:
Siding with conservatives both in the republic and in Moscow, the head of the
Kyrgyz Communist Party, Absamat Masaliev, was unresponsive to the
protesters…In the eyes of the population, Masaliev had been discredited for
failing to address the country’s socioeconomic problems and ethnic tensions,
especially because he came from the south of the country himself. 32
27 Ukudeeva-Freeman, J. T. (2003). Collective Action Problem: Mobilization of National-Democratic
Movements in Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. Political Science. Riverside, CA, University of California at
Riverside. 83.
28 Communist Youth Union, a branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
29 Babak, V. (2004). Political Parties and Political Movements. Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim
Eurasia. Y. Ro'i. New York, Frank Cass. 144-145.
30 “Only 8% of the total population 353,892 people were reported by the local newspapers to participate in
some type of collective action promoting national interests in the period from 1986-1991.” Ukudeeva-
Freeman, J. T. (2003). Collective Action Problem: Mobilization of National-Democratic Movements in
Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. Political Science. Riverside, CA, University of California at Riverside. 89.
31 The origins of the conflict in the ethnic tensions of the Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley are well documented in
Elebayeva, A. B. (1992). "The Osh Incident: Problems for Research." Post-Soviet Geography 33: 78-86.
32 Spector, R. A. (2004). The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan. Berkeley Program
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series. Berkeley, California, University of California at
Berkeley. 6-7.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Askar Akayev, a physicist and political outsider, emerged as a “compromise
candidate,” 33 although his election was possible because “while there were fewer and less
powerful moderate groups, there were plenty of reformers who could and did negotiate
with radicals and engineered a compromise.” 34
Nevertheless, the process marginalized
the public:
The replacement of undemocratic regimes has been imposed from above by the
new political leaders and ruling elites, which are split between reformers and
conservatives who opposed change. Thus, these processes were not genuinely
democratic, since they were almost entirely controlled from above. 35
This lack of citizen involvement in government affairs allowed Akayev, once described
by Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott as the "Thomas Jefferson…of Central Asia," 36
to gradually consolidate power around himself, enacting decrees in 1994 and 1996 to
change the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan to restructure the processes for electing
parliamentarians to better suit his interests. Winning 1995 presidential election in a
landslide, he so thoroughly controlled the political sphere that “no constructive or
competent opposition surfaced by early 2000,” 37 when he was overwhelmingly reelected
and accompanied by a resounding (though internationally questioned) margin of victory
for his party in the parliamentary election.
While the exact causes of the ‘Tulip Revolution,’ as the Western media quickly
dubbed the uprising that filled Bishkek’s Alatoo Square on March 24, 2005, are a subject
33 Spector, R. A. (2004). The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan. Berkeley Program
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series. Berkeley, California, University of California at
Berkeley. 8.
34 Kiasapour, S. M. (1998). Regime Transition in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Cases of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. Political Science. Riverside, University of California at Riverside: 135-136.
35 Levitin, L. (2004). Liberalization in Kyrgyzstan: 'An Island of Democracy'. Democracy and Pluralism in
Muslim Eurasia. Y. Ro'i. New York, Frank Cass: 188.
36 Peterson, S. (2000). "Oasis of democracy shrinks Kyrgyz elections conjure visions of authoritarianism."
Christian Science Monitor: 7.
37 Levitin, L. (2004). Liberalization in Kyrgyzstan: 'An Island of Democracy'. Democracy and Pluralism in
Muslim Eurasia. Y. Ro'i. New York, Frank Cass: 205.
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of unresolved debate, the proximate spark that ignited the sociopolitical tinder was the
fraudulent parliamentary elections that returned the pro-government faction to power
despite its widespread unpopularity. Protests in the south precipitated a chaotic day in
which a large mass of people 38 filled the streets of Bishkek. 39
Eventually, Kurmanbek
Bakiev emerged from the negotiations, promising to restore order and leadership. 40
Akayev had vanished 41 , and “people in general were surprised at the government’s swift
surrender.” 42 With Akayev out of power, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a former prime minister
and leading opposition figure, became Interim President. International donors and NGOs
turned their attention towards funding local organizations such as the youth movement
KelKel in preparation for the July 10 presidential election. 43
TAJIKISTAN
The Persian-speaking oasis in an otherwise Turkic realm, the Tajiks drifted in and
out of power, becoming the subjects of the Emir of Bukhara, who was co-opted and
betrayed by Russian and Soviet, authorities. 44
The Soviets built the city of Stalinabad
38 One of the central mysteries is who exactly these people were. Photos in the Osmonalieva, as well as
those taken by wire services, show a largely youthful crowd, suggesting that they were university students
(perhaps organized by KelKel et al.), but others I spoke with speculated that they might be impoverished
peasants paid, like the counterprotestors, by an unknown actor to show up and cause trouble.
39 Osmonalieva, E. (2005). "A Very Unexpected Revolution." Index on Censorship 34(2): 6.
40 Osmonalieva, E. (2005). "A Very Unexpected Revolution." Index on Censorship 34(2): 12.
41 He ended up in Moscow, where he currently teaches mathematics at Moscow State University: (2005).
Akayev to Teach Math. Moscow Times. Moscow. No. 3222.
42 Osmonalieva, E. (2005). "A Very Unexpected Revolution." Index on Censorship 34(2): 12.
43 When I spoke with leaders from KelKel, they expressed surprise at the sudden interest in their group,
which had been founded on January 10, 2005 (source: http://www.kelkel-kg.org/eng/kelkel_en.php) but
had until March existed as an all-volunteer effort to organize and inform university students. Funding
provided by USAID and its contractors allowed KelKel to participate in the nationwide GOTV campaign,
though it is unclear what the current and future status of the group are.
44 Kunitz, J. (1935). Dawn Over Samarkand: The Rebirth of Central Asia. New York, Covici Friede
Publishers. However, as Kunitz narrates, history does not remember the Tajiks as the innocent victims; led
15

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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
next to the ancient village of Dushanbe and proceeded to modernize the country with
transportation and industrial infrastructure. 45
Independence hit Tajikistan particularly hard: the massive inflows of Soviet
capital dried up, 46 leaving people waiting for pensions that would no longer arrive, jobs
that no longer existed, and a centralized social service system that suddenly disappeared.
Although certain reformist groups, namely Rastokhez, an intellectual movement,
formed, “the Tajik organizations were more cultural and political even in their early
stages,” 47 pursuing cultural expression instead of economic equality. Moreover, within
the government, “Tajik reformers were overwhelmed by the strength of conservatives and
centrists in parliament and were purged from party and government positions.” 48 The
public sphere was flooded with small political associations: Rastokhez, 49 the Democratic
Party of Tajikistan, 50 the Islamic Revivalist Party 51
and the Communist Party 52 each
by Enver Pasha, the Basmachi revolt destabilized the region, allowing the Soviets to solidify military and
political control by dividing the rebels against each other before annihilating them.
45 Kunitz, J. (1935). Dawn Over Samarkand: The Rebirth of Central Asia. New York, Covici Friede
Publishers. 245-250.
46 “Transfers from the Soviet budget as a percent of total government revenues in 1991 for Tajikistan
amounted to 46.6% - the highest of all the republics.” Kiasapour, S. M. (1998). Regime Transition in Post-
Soviet Central Asia: The Cases of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Political Science. Riverside, University of
California at Riverside: 87.
47 Kiasapour, S. M. (1998). Regime Transition in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Cases of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. Political Science. Riverside, University of California at Riverside: 158.
48 Kiasapour, S. M. (1998). Regime Transition in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Cases of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. Political Science. Riverside, University of California at Riverside: 134
49 “We now wish to reach a democratic government, destroy the remnants of the totalitarian regime and
ensure the economic and cultural progress of society and the freedom of every individual.” Tadjbakhsh, S.
(1993). "The 'Tajik Spring of 1992'." Central Asia Monitor 2(21-9). 22.
50 “The main aim of the Democratic party is to lay the foundation for a popular civil society backed by law,
and to protect the freedom of people…” Tadjbakhsh, S. (1993). "The 'Tajik Spring of 1992'." Central Asia
Monitor 2(21-9). 24.
51 (quoting Mr. Abdullah Dodkhudo) “The only way to advertise Islam is to do it through a parliamentary
and democratic political system free of all superstitions or other non-Islamic ways. We are against forcing
people to accept our path but we will rely on any means to awaken them. The people have to be ready to
accept an Islamic regime.” Tadjbakhsh, S. (1993). "The 'Tajik Spring of 1992'." Central Asia Monitor 2(21-
9). 25.
52 ‘The Communist Party of Tajikistan was banned in September 1991 by the Supreme Soviet, then reelected
in December by a presidential decree. In January 1992, the Party registered officially once again at
the 22 nd Congress.” “Our aim is to build a civil society, to support the independence of Tajikistan, to settle
16

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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
demanded different systems of governance. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan or Mongolia, where
small demonstrations pressured elites to reform the structure and/or content of the
government, in Dushanbe a revolving door of prime ministers guaranteed government
instability during the critical period of transition 53 . Their inability to address reformers’
political demands polarized the polity, and heated conflict broke out between the
dominant group and the primary opposition:
In March 1992 a demonstration, mostly spontaneous, broke out in Dushanbe, and
turned into a face to face confrontation between the two camps…The
demonstration ended in the victory of the opposition, and on May 15, 1992 a
coalition government was born of the crisis. The coalition government contained
only 8 members of the opposition in a total of 24, but the presence of an important
personality of the Islamic Renaissance Party in a key position, such as ‘vicepresident,’
provided a pretext for the Communists to call the government
‘Islamic.’…On these pretexts, the Communists of Khujand (Leninabad region)
and Kulob refused to recognize the new government, and declared it illegal.
Therefore, these regions escaped from government control. 54
The subsequent Tajik Civil War, pitting the Khujand clan against their Kulyab
counterparts, “reveal[ed] a country ripped apart along clannish lines within artificially
drawn borders.” 55
The conflict spiraled beyond the control of the insignificant military
presence, 56 and was ended due to peace agreements, led by the UN, 57 with Russian and
the principles of social justice and democracy and to develop cooperation with other countries in the
world.” Tadjbakhsh, S. (1993). "The 'Tajik Spring of 1992'." Central Asia Monitor 2(21-9). 26.
53 Whitlock, M. (2002). Land Beyond the River: The Untold Story of Central Asia. New York, St. Martin's
Press. 147-165. Whitlock narrates the deterioration and fall of the independent government of Tajikistan
through the actions of its powerless leaders.
54 Dadmehr, N. (1998). "Tajikistan - Inevitable War? Inevitable Peace.." Central Asia Monitor 1(1). 2.
55 Rowe Jr., W. C. (2002). On the Edge of Empires: The Hisor Valley of Tajikistan. Political Science.
Austin, TX, University of Texas at Austin: 53.
56 Warikoo, K. (1995). Cockpit of Central Asia: Afghanistan Factor in Tajikistan's Crisis. Central Asia:
Emerging New Order. K. Warikoo. New Delhi, India, Ashok Gosain for Har-Anand Publications: 212-214.
57 For more information on UN involvement in ending the Tajik Civil War, a non-trivial accomplishment,
see: Brenninkmeijer, O. A. J. (1997). International Concern for Tajikistan: UN and OSCE Efforts to
Promote Peace-Building and Democratisation. Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence. M.-R. Djalili, Grare,
Frederic, & Akiner, Shirin. New York, St. Martin's Press: 180-215.
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Uzbek support, that defused the conflict and brought peace 58
thanks to the local
leadership of Kulyabi Emomali Rahmonov. 59
However, like a rock thrown in a pond,
the Tajik Civil War generated ripples in every sector and aspect of life. Among its effects
are: an increased presence of Russian troops, 60 a weakened central government, “the
criminalization of political and everyday life” 61 and “the gross erosion of the fabric of
society” that resulted in “tensions and stresses” that “create[d] an environment that
readily len[t] itself to exploitation by internal and external forces.” 62
Moreover,
subsequent “clan warfare ha[d] increased regional loyalties at the expense of the national
Tajik identity.” 63
With opposition movements unable to back single candidate,
Rahmonov easily carried the 1994 and 1999 elections. 64
However, without the resources
necessary to maintain basic measures of police, Tajikistan has since descended into a
“culture of lawlessness,” which, when combined with breathtaking material poverty,
creates immense incentives for political corruption, and seems to raise insurmountable
obstacles to any democracy promotion efforts. 65
58 Akiner, S. (2001). Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? London, Royal Institute of International
Affairs. 52-56.
59 Akiner, S. (2001). Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? London, Royal Institute of International
Affairs. 51-52.
60 Russia still exerts powerful control over many aspects of Tajik politics, particularly its foreign policy.
This is complicated by the fact that Russia perceives Tajikistan as a southern front on its war against
Afghan drugs and the large ethnic Tajik population living in Moscow that sends significant remissions back
home. Hancock, K. J. (2001). Surrendering Sovereignty: Hierarchy in the International System and the
Former Soviet Union. Political Science. San Diego, University of California at San Diego: 9.
61 Gretsky, S. (1995). Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments, and Prospects for Peace. Central
Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change. R. Z. E. Sagdeev, Susan. Chevy Chase, MD, Center for Post-Soviet
Studies Press. 224.
62 Akiner, S. (2001). Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? London, Royal Institute of International
Affairs. 76.
63 Kurbanov, E. R. (1998). Ethnic Identity and Intergroup Perceptions Among Post-Soviet Youth.
Sociology. College Park, MD, University of Maryland, College Park: 68.
64 Neither were clean or fair, the latter yielding turnout rates and a margin of victory in the upper nineties.
Akiner, S. (2001). Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? London, Royal Institute of International
Affairs. 58.
65 (2001). Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? London, Royal Institute of International Affairs. 72.
18

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PEOPLES OF CENTRAL ASIA
The effects of ethnicity in Central Asia are elusive at best. While some clear lines
can be drawn (Turkic-speaking Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Turkmen and Persian-speaking
Tajik 66 ) the region’s history of foreign invasions shaking up the distribution complicates
matters. In Kyrgyz, Mongolian and Tajik political cultures, local structures play a
dominant role in shaping the political outlook of ordinary (largely rural) people. For
example, “uruuchuluk…is the term for the Kyrgyz traditions of blood relationships.
Uruuchuluk has enabled the Kyrgyz to preserve their ethnic identity, together with the
stability of their primary social structures.” 67
In these associations, “the individual
peasant is linked through a network of dyadic relationships with members of his
immediate family, wider kin and community at large. Through this network the peasant
obtains his ‘resources’ that are indispensable to his existence: land, labour, water,
women, honor, prestige, moral and armed support. In addition to dyadic relationships
some peasants may be linked to socially and politically dominant patrons for whom
resources such as land, jobs, loans and legal and physical protection may be exchanged
for loyalty, deference, information, violence against ‘troublemakers’ and the like.” 68
While these associations often have overt political expressions, their fundamental
purpose is economic coordination to ensure mutual prosperity: in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan “priority is given to a clannish unit at a higher level – ‘avlod’ – a big family, a
66 Depending upon the source, Mongolians are either grouped with Turkic speakers in the broad Altaic
language family or are independent. I observed that Mongolians share some characteristics of Turkic
speech (for example, the pronunciation of “v” as “w”).
67 Levitin, L. (2004). Liberalization in Kyrgyzstan: 'An Island of Democracy'. Democracy and Pluralism in
Muslim Eurasia. Y. Ro'i. New York, Frank Cass: 191
68 Theobald, Robin. +Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment+. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1990. 8.
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tight union of several families. For centuries…the avlod [has] really possessed the main
means of production.” 69
Similarly, Mongolian khot ails, groups of herders, “constitute a
micro society, commonly responsible for socialization of children, for performing
familial ceremonies and other observances or feasts, for economic activities and for
leisure.” 70
For Mongols and Kyrgyz, the economics of nomadic pastoralism influence
many social characteristics, namely patrilineal inheritance, 71 kin-based tribalism, 72 and
the cohesion of extended families. 73
Although “pastoralism is likely to become more
similar to cattle ranching in the United States, a business with explicit standards of profit
and loss,” 74 certain structural features persist, and as long as the ‘nomadic alternative’
remains a powerful part of the Central Asian cultural identity, these social elements will
exert an influence over even the most urbanized of groups. 75
Similarly, the groups share a similar social psychology, “based on collective
forms of economic and social life.” 76
Specifically, one sociologist observed the
“persistent fear of the consequences of ethnic disorder, amounting almost to a ‘cult of
stability’ at any price.” 77
In Tajikistan, the fear is amplified by the perception that dissent
is tantamount to subversion and could potentially ignite another civil war. 78
As a USAID
official explained, “the mere word ‘democracy’ was compromised in popular opinion
69 Alimov, K. (1994). "Are Central Asian Clans Still Playing a Political Role?" Central Asia Monitor 4: 15.
70 Synkiewics, S. (1993). “Mongolia’s Nomads Build a New Society Again: Social Structures on the Eve of
the Private Economy.” Nomadic Peoples. 33:166.
71 Barfield, T. J. (1993). The Nomadic Alternative. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall. 15.
72 Barfield, T. J. (1993). The Nomadic Alternative. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall. 16.
73 Barfield, T. J. (1993). The Nomadic Alternative. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall. 144-147.
74 Barfield, T. J. (1993). The Nomadic Alternative. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall.176.
75 That is, essentially, nomads can essentially exit the political system, relinquishing taxpaying
responsibilities, in exchange for disconnecting themselves from all social services, including education,
communication, health care and political representation.
76 Alimov, K. (1994). "Are Central Asian Clans Still Playing a Political Role?" Central Asia Monitor 4: 14.
77 Olcott, M. B. (1995). Ethnic Violence in Central Asia: Perceptions and Misperceptions. Central Asia:
Conflict, Resolution and Change. R. Z. E. Sagdeev, Susan. Chevy Chase, MD, Center for Post-Soviet
Studies Press: 118.
78 Whitbeck, Kate. Personal Interview. 19 July 2005
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when the Democratic Party was part of the United Tajik Opposition [the civil war’s
opposition faction]…people remembered Soviet times when everything was peaceful and
in order.” 79
Given the primary concern of commonplace people on basic material
subsistence, nostalgia for the Soviet Union’s generous subsidies, and the corresponding
frustration with the perceived inability of democracy to deliver on promises of prosperity,
runs high in Central Asia.
79 US Embassy Official in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Personal Interview. 19 July 2005. Personal
Communication 16 May 2006.
21

Theory
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Promoting democracy in Central Asia borders on the quixotic; transplanting a
system of governance developed elsewhere over the course of centuries into countries
that have yet to truly experience it presents overwhelming difficulties. In order to make
this feat realistic, it is important to highlight several features of a democratic state that
can serve as long-term goals for the countries’ political evolution. While the distinction
between democracy and autocracy is hardly black and white, these features allow for an
analytical distinction between a hypothetical democratic state and what currently exists
after fifteen years of democracy promotion.
However, as will be discussed, these institutions depend largely on public support
for their maintenance. With the weakness of the governments vis-à-vis mass protests, if
people organized around a specific agenda (as in the ousting of Askar Akaev), they are
quite capable of forcefully demanding change. An engaged citizenry will be able to
perceive the value of quality government and NGO institutions because they will be able
to reach across the elite/non-elite divide that segregates the political sphere in all three
countries.
CURRENT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
For better or worse, the two-pronged strategy adopted by current democracy
promotion programs has influenced the current composition of the political sphere in
each of the three countries. By seeking to simultaneously improve the government
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Theory
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
institutions and build a non-government sector, international democracy promotion
programs have created opportunities for a diverse elite-level political discourse. 1
Some organizations focus on strengthening the capacity of the government to
perform basic functions, such as public opinion surveys and transparent ministerial
administration, enabling it to more effectively perform the responsibilities incumbent
upon it. While in theory direct assistance could be the most effective, because
international norms of sovereignty proscribe direct external interference in the affairs of a
government, these programs must take a laissez faire approach, limited to providing
technical assistance (most often through trainings by ‘parachutists’ 2 ) and material
support. 3
Legislative reform programs, in which international experts advise MPs, have
created the capacity for deliberative democratic 4
lawmaking. Judicial trainings have
given the courts the technical and political capability of becoming independent from the
other branches.
Other international organizations support non-governmental groups, following the
philosophy that this third sector will have the both the financial and political freedom to
embrace progressive concepts and the power within the sphere of national politics to
influence the government. International involvement ranges from support on single
issues, such as the involvement of the World Wildlife Foundation, to the broad assistance
1 While this is threatened in Tajikistan, the political oppression is nowhere near as severe as in neighboring
Uzbekistan. This accomplishment is quite significant considering the highly authoritarian style of
Communist governance employed in all three countries.
2 That is, specialists on a particular aspect of democratic governance (constitutions, party-building, etc.)
who are brought in for a limited period of time to share their expertise. Because they are thematic, rather
than regional experts, they are envisioned as ‘parachuting’ from the clouds into a local context of which
they have little prior knowledge.
3 In the 2005 Kyrgyz presidential election, everything from the pre-election ‘League of Women Voters’-
style brochures to glass ballot boxes was paid for with the generous assistance of international donors.
4 In using “democratic” here I refer to the use of specialized committees to draft legislation before
introducing it to the general legislative body, rather than simply rubber-stamping everything sent in by the
executive branch.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
given to a wide range of national organizations by IREX’s Civil Society Support Centers
in Tajikistan. This support consists largely of small grants and trainings, designed,
respectively, to advance particular concepts (independent media, human rights) and to
give organizations the capacity to mount substantial domestic campaigns, establish a
track record 5
and survive past the end of the initial grants or intimidation by the
government. Civil society strengthening programs have spawned a constellation of
national non-governmental organizations proficient in monitoring threats to human and
civil rights.
Tension arises from this divergence within institutionalism, between the intragovernment
and the extra-government approaches. However, while the danger of
strategies conflicting with each other certainly exists, 6
practitioners of democracy
promotion in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia face two primary challenges:
pervasive corruption and the threat of state capture by antidemocratic forces such as elite
business interests. The countries’ paucity of political participation removes the most
powerful check against these dangers – the ability of citizens to demand government
reform:
Without a civil society to nourish engaged citizens, politicians turn into
‘professionals,’ out of touch with their constituencies, while citizens are reduced
to whining antagonists or turn into ungrateful clients of government services they
readily consume without being willing to pay for. 7
5 That is, to demonstrate that organizations possess the administrative and financial infrastructure to meet
strict international standards for assistance, which require sophistication in reporting and accounting far
beyond what could otherwise be expected of NGOs in Central Asia.
6 For example, if a media assistance program enables a newspaper to publish a muckraking story exposing
the corruption in a parliamentary committee that is working with another program, thereby undermining the
committee’s public legitimacy, polarizing politics, and creating
7 Barber, B. R. (1996). Three Challenges to Reinventing Democracy. Reinventing Democracy. P. K. Hirst,
Sunil. Cambridge, MA, Blackwell Publishers: 148.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Because people are not fully engaged in the political process, they are unable to
effectively respond to political changes that politicians arbitrarily impose and are more
likely to tolerate corruption as a part of the status quo. Individuals’ perception of their
political powerlessness inclines them to defer to political authorities.
Keeping ordinary citizens in a prisoners’ dilemma 8 writ large allows politicians to
perpetuate the Soviet myth that the role of government is to organize society in order to
coordinate the workforce. Widespread cheating has instilled in the general populace a
fear of betrayal, leading people to prefer strong leaders, whom they see as uniquely
capable of cracking down on the robber-barons of their society. However, like a classic
self-fulfilled prophecy, this fear-driven preference for authoritarianism, and a
corresponding disengagement from politics, has forced individuals to tolerate great
hardships simply because “it could be worse.” International organizations have been
unable to change the stakes of this game, and virtually each year the cheating reaches
new lows.
At the same time, international donors’ institutional approach has allowed them to
become convinced by state rhetoric, even when the government lacks any will to back it
up. In the early 1990’s, the three republics swiftly adopted democratic structures of
governance, drafting a constitution, creating a popularly-elected parliament open to
contestation and signing agreements with global institutions such as the World Bank. At
their inception, these reforms allowed politicians to bask in the triumph of formal
legalism. However, in the subsequent fifteen years, pervasive corruption weakened their
financial and administrative support, and the wealth of socioeconomic services they once
8 As described in a standard economics textbook: Osbourne, M. J. (2004). An Introduction to Game Theory.
New York, NY, Oxford University Press. 14-15.
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guaranteed to all citizens rotted away. Although the elements of government initially
fulfilled their purposes quite effectively, even providing a source of hope, today ordinary
citizens place little faith in them. Indeed, many perceive them as facades protecting the
plutocratic politicians as they plunder the system. 9
However, this is often the reality: in
“capture economies,” high levels of corruption create opportunities for the illegal
privatization of public services, where firms coerce officials to act against the public
interest, exploiting structural deficiencies in order to extract personal profit. 10
Moreover,
while graft is an inescapable reality of daily life in Central Asia (and to a certain extent,
the developing world), the wealth introduced by donors has turned many scrupulous
political actors into dodgy entrepreneurs. Examining a decade of post-Soviet
development assistance, Wedel notes:
…had donors designed aid more thoughtfully and grasped the importance of
taking into account the legacies of communism – its mindsets and political
institutional frameworks – they might have structured aid differently…The broad
strokes of policy typically failed to incorporate the particulars of
implementation. 11
Unlike Eastern Europe, Central Asia enjoyed no economic magnet pulling them towards
market liberalization and democratic governance. While development assistance helped
the countries’ economies recover from the shock of the end of the USSR, its poor
conditioning exacerbated corruption by condoning politicians’ exploitation of the lack of
9 Many of my interviewees in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan communicated this sentiment, but it was strongest
in Mongolia, where corruption has poisoned a once-robust two-party parliamentarian government. In each
place, ordinary people tried to distance themselves from government as much as possible, not only avoiding
taxes but bribing their way through bureaucracies, thereby subverting the administrative system in order to
take care of their personal business.
10 Hellman, J. S. J., Geraint; Kaufman, Daniel (2000). 'Seize the State, Seize the Day'; State Capture,
Corruption, and Influence in Transition. Policy Research Working Papers. Washington, DC, World Bank
Institute; Governance, Regulation and Finance Division; Europe and Central Asia Region Public Sector
Group: 33.
11 Wedel, J. R. (1998). Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-
1998. New York, St. Martin's Press.185.
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oversight and punitive mechanisms. Echoing the old Central Asian precept that those in
power deserve it, these unscrupulous leaders have helped normalize the popular
perception of kleptocratic governance. The deepening government corruption and the
lowering of public opinion and expectation constitute a devastating cycle that supports
the authoritarian consolidation of power practiced by Askar Akaev, Emomali Rahmonov
and their more autocratic counterparts.
Unfortunately, this problem plagues also non-governmental organizations. Many
begin with a highly specialized focus (judicial reform, media, etc.) but eventually end up
undertaking tangential assignments as grants are offered in other areas. Like a ministry
that starts in the business-regulation business and eventually becomes another arm of the
government’s tax collection apparatus, local NGOs often try to do everything in order not
only to expand their staff but also to compete in the marketplace of legitimacy in the eyes
of foreign donors. However, this “mission creep” is frequently accompanied by a
“creepy mission” – where the group’s objective is eclipsed by the outsized personality of
its leader. Although NGOs might outwardly push for democratic reforms, internally they
can be quite authoritarian and prone to “capture” by external interests. 12 For example,
because no newspaper in Central Asia can recoup its expenses, all rely upon patronage by
wealthy businessmen who enjoy seeing their name in print.
The fall of Soviet authority in Central Asia created an executive power vacuum
that the survivors of the furious internecine power struggles of the late 1980s were all too
willing to fill. With the precedent of authoritarianism effectively laid by seven decades
12 Hadenius, A. (2001). Institutions and Democratic Citizenship. New York, NY, Oxford University Press.
33.
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of central state planning, strong dictators 13
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
asserted a political philosophy “built
around…consensus [rather than consent], unity [rather than community], goal orientation
[rather than procedure], and authenticity [rather than voice or contestation].” 14
Creating
a system of governance that reinforced their power by forcing both citizens and civil
servants to depend on them allowed the dictators to quickly fuse charismatic and legalrational
authority. Asserting that,
the existence of a wide-ranging, expansive, and extensive pre-political consensus
that goes far beyond the procedural consensus of democratic constitutions…takes
off the political table virtually all important social and political issues, leaving for
the actual political sphere relatively inconsequential matters or the problem of
execution. 15
However, in weak states such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia, 16 authoritarians
can afford to remain in absolute power only for a finite period of time. Although they
can easily amend the constitution to permit themselves infinite reelections, they risk
building up a deep well of public unpopularity, which, when filled to capacity, can erupt
in a violent popular uprising that abruptly leads to their ouster.
However, as the less-than-satisfactory aftermath of Kyrgyzstan’s revolution
illustrates, simply expelling the dictator is not enough to rid the country of his political
scourge. While bold executive leadership can rally a population to achieve social
progress, the underlying factor driving mass movements is awareness of democratic
norms and the perception that the current regime is failing to implement them. While
leaders can articulate and emphasize particular norms, the population wields the ability to
13 Here I refer specifically to Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Niyazov, Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov and
Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev, who openly practiced authoritarianism.
14 March, A. F. (2003). "From Leninism to Karimovism: Hegemony, Ideology, and Authoritarian
Legitimation." Post-Soviet Affairs 19(4): 310.
15 March, A. F. (2003). "From Leninism to Karimovism: Hegemony, Ideology, and Authoritarian
Legitimation." Post-Soviet Affairs 19(4): 309.
16 That is, countries where only a small number of people is required to topple the government, as happened
in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005.
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violently eject the leader given sufficient provocation. 17
While such mass protests
depend on skilled coordination by dedicated leadership, as the failed anti-corruption
campaign in Mongolia will illustrate, more is required to mobilize a populace.
HOW DEMOCRACY PROMOTION WORKS
While the structure of the government directly affects its processes, it must meet
basic requirements in order to qualify as a democracy. Thus, for example, although
Mongolia’s unique parliamentarian system produced two parties, it still suffers from the
same intrinsic corruption and underperformance that afflict the other countries.
Dahl’s criteria for a polyarchic state provide a useful rubric for measuring state
functionality: (1) elected representatives, (2) free, fair and frequent elections, (3) freedom
of expression, (4) alternative information, (5) associational autonomy, (6) inclusive
citizenship. 18
However, the democratic process of decision-making, he further expounds,
must exhibit “effective participation,” 19 “voting equality at the decisive stage,” (that is,
the vote), 20 “enlightened understanding,” 21 “control of the agenda,” 22 and
17 I would like to make clear that this option does not exist in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the
government possesses the superiority of force. This is also true in Kazakhstan, with several notable
exceptions, such as the Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement, where the government was
ambivalent towards the protestors’ position.
18 Dahl, R. A. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. 90.
19 “Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity,
and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final outcome. They must have
adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for
endorsing one outcome or another.” Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT, Yale
University Press. 109.
20 “At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen must be ensured an equal opportunity to
express a choice that will be counted as equal in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen. In
determining outcomes at the decisive stage, these choices, and only these choices, must be taken into
account.” Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. 109.
21 “Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and validating (within the
time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the
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“inclusiveness.” 23
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Second, Benjamin Barber’s three metaphors for civil society (private
sector, 24 the community, 25 and the space between government and the market 26 ) provide
strategic flexibility - each country’s civil society does not need to be a carbon copy of
the others’ in order to have true democracy.
However, democratic governance cannot survive on its own without a base of
support. Even when it is created in its entirety, as in the case of Mongolia, where a new
government completely replaced the old, corruption and inefficiency represent constant
threats to its integrity. The key to making democracy permanent is widespread popular
participation in regional and national levels of political discourse, which facilitates the
creation and evolution of common identities and principles. Although particular elements
of Central Asian culture favor democratic institutions on a village level, they often work
against attempts to nationalize democratic processes. For example, “in Tajikistan, like
the other Central Asian republics, political loyalties are in part based on geographic
citizen’s interests.” Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
112.
22 “The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed on the agenda of
matters that are to be decided by means of the democratic process.” Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its
Critics. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. 113.
23 “The demos must include all adult members of the association except transients and persons proved to be
mentally defective.” Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
129
24 “civil society is a synonym for the private market sector, a domain of free individuals who associate
voluntarily in various economic and social groupings which are contractural in nature” Barber, B. (1998).
A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong. New York, Hill and Wang. 17.
25 “civil society as a complex welter of ineluctably social relations that tie people together, first of all into
families and kinship associations like clans, and then to clubs, neighborhoods, communities, congregations,
and more extended social hierarchies.” Barber, B. (1998). A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and
Democracy Strong. New York, Hill and Wang. 23.
26 “This strong democratic perspective on civil society distinguishes public and private realms – a state
sector occupied by government and its sovereign institutions, and a private market sector occupied by
individuals and their contract associations in the ‘market’ – and presumes a third domain between them,
sharing the virtues of each. This third, independent sector is defined by its civic communities – their
plurality is its essence – which are membership associations that are open and egalitarian enough to permit
voluntary participation.” Barber, B. (1998). A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy
Strong. New York, Hill and Wang. 34-35.
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origin known as mahalger’y or mestnichestvo (localism).” 27
While these networks
provide the basis for political identity and allow for local governance with a limited
degree of liberalism, they have often enabled powerful clan leaders to manipulate the
post-independence discourses, eliminating competitors and cementing a stranglehold of
the national government. 28
Although clientelism “may be characterized as an initial stage
of popular organization,” 29 it more frequently inhibits the development of an egalitarian
political realm. If everyone, from the paupers to the president, is obligated to privilege
personal connections above the interests of the public, the system will inherently
discriminate against the disenfranchised and disempowered. Although patronage
constitutes a central element in the republics’ proud heritage, it creates a barrier to the
development of a functional market economy, which would dramatically improve the
situation of the commonplace people.
In working toward a “consolidated democracy,” 30 “there is no better engine for
change than the inner dynamics of a nation’s people.” 31
Corruption in the government
and NGO sectors prevents them from driving political reform. Rather, the public must
exercise control, either with direct lobbying or through elections, over those in power.
Until poverty is eliminated, the commonplace people will not lose sight of their goal of
achieving prosperity, and given the proper tools of political participation, will be able to
judge politicians by it.
27 Kiasapour, S. M. (1998). Regime Transition in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Cases of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. Political Science. Riverside, University of California at Riverside: 73.
28 Akbarzadeh, S. (1996). "Why Did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?" Europe-Asia Studies 48(7): 1113-
1116.
29 Hadenius, A. (2001). Institutions and Democratic Citizenship. New York, NY, Oxford University Press.
54.
30 That is, when it becomes “the only game in town,” as defined in: Linz, J. J.; S., Alfred (1996). "Toward
Consolidated Democracies." Journal of Democracies 7(2): 14-33.
31 Geran Pilon, J. (1998). "Democratic Transition in Central Asia." SAIS Review 18(2): 89-103.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Three interconnected elements of civic engagement enable a populace to increase
the strength of democratic governance and culture in their country: a grassroots structure
of civil society, the use of civic education and the promotion of liberal democratic norms.
They support the creation of social capital, a powerful resource for the formation and
implementation of policy 32 at both a local and national level.
First, democracy programs must encourage the grassroots growth of civil society.
This institution, comprising the interpersonal networks linking individuals, preserves
trust while not being so contingent on particular actions or beliefs that its development
fragments a community. 33
In other words, while civil society permits (and even
encourages) organizing around a common identity, these groups should be inclusive of
different categories and focused on a single interest. 34
Real civil society begins with
local mobilization toward interests shared by
organizations [that] also have a role as meeting-places and arenas. It is this latter
role – the arena function – that [Hadenius has] in mind when [he] claim[s] that
organizational structures have a socializing and fostering import, in the sense that
they develop collective resources and leave their imprint on the preference
systems of the participating actors. 35
Community-driven civil society development enables a diversity of voices to emerge
while preserving local administrative structures that still largely shape individuals’
political identities. However, because these micro-governments often reinforce historical
prejudices (such as the exclusion of women or ethnic minorities), 36
it is insufficient
32 Montgomery, J. D. (2001). Social Capital as a Policy Resource. Social Capital as a Policy Resource. J. D.
I. Montgomery, Alex. Norwell, MA, Kluwer Academic Publishers: 238-240.
33 Granovetter, M. S. (2003). The Strength of Weak Ties. Networks in the Knowledge Economy. R. P.
Cross, Andrew; Sasson, Lisa. New York, NY, Oxford University Press: 109-129.
34 For example, an interest group should be either Kazakh (vis-à-vis Mongolian) or pro-MDU (vis-à-vis
pro-MPRP), but not both, maximizing the possibility for cultural or ideological diversity.
35 Hadenius, Axel. Institutions and Democratic Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 36.
36 Earle, L. (2005). "Community Development and the Civil Society Strengthening Agenda in Central
Asia." Central Asian Survey 24(3): 256-257.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
simply to rely on them exclusively to bring about the pluralistic political sphere that will
properly nurture liberal democracy. Without additional elements, local authorities will
fall into the trap of returning to what has always been done, which will not yield a form
of local democracy that will enable political and economic participation. Grassroots
organizations formed to channel popular sentiment will more effectively pursue change
than today’s elite NGOs.
Second, civic education, teaching commonplace people how to be citizens,
prepares them for the shift in mindset necessary to enter a globalized marketplace. 37
For
example, while the Soviet political philosophy taught the concept of political party and
included elections, the Communists’ outright monopoly meant that former Soviet citizens
lacked an understanding of how a political party properly functioned. 38
While civic
education is a lengthy and expensive process, lasting for generations and highly
contingent upon local commitment to the process, 39 it is necessary to provide a basic
foundation for meaningful political participation. Modernizing and strengthening 40
public civic education would not only open up new economic opportunities, but it would
also change the perception of citizenship. For example, teaching concepts of government
37 However, “pressures toward globalization were not straightforward. While global influences shaped
national efforts to raise quality across the five study countries, [which included Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan]
those influences were mediated and somewhat modified by different, though overlapping, national
concerns. At least with respect to efforts to raise educational quality, national governments appeared less
oriented toward adopting the shape of an idealized, international system as they were in recreating elements
(but not all elements of the system they had previously shared in common as part of the Soviet Union.”
Chapman, D. W. W., John; Cohen, Marc; Mercer, Malcolm (2005). "The Search for Quality: A Five
Country Study of National Strategies to Improve Educational Quality in Central Asia." International
Journal of Educational Development 25: 527.
38 Geran Pilon, J. (1998). "Democratic Transition in Central Asia." SAIS Review 18(2): 89-103.
39 Buying books year after year is not feasible unless the community is behind it. See: Harford, T. (2006).
Why Poor Countries Are Poor. Reason. 37: 32-40.
40 For example, replacing the Soviet educational archetype of nonstop lecturing with discussions and
seminars that place greater responsibility on the shoulders of the student. I have avoided analysis of
stronger states because additional factors, such as the state’s ability to bully its citizens into submission and
complicity, factor into the strategic calculus of non-state political actors.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
from the perspective of the individual, quite antithetical to the Soviet style, would enable
students to interpret tenets of democracy through their own experience, a critical step in
understanding the necessity of universal law and rights: 41
Instead of being something that an action or state of affairs or a category of these
is when it is accordance with law,” rights are “seen…as something a person has.
The concept becomes ‘subjectivized’, centered on the person: it is a power the
person has, as such it is also called the moral quality of the person.” 42
However, the realities of moral pluralism require the capacity for discourse and
compromise to ensure equitable representation of interests. 43
Teaching these skills will
enable students to better articulate their beliefs and to reach a balance between selfinterest
and collective action. Beyond informing citizens of the governance structures
under which they live and of the opportunities for redressing violations of rights, civic
education helps them understand not only the nature of their freedom to exercise choices
but also the consequences of their actions. While existing programs are beginning to
address the vast information deficit plaguing Central Asia, they are not integrated into
other democracy promotion efforts. Many are often limited, as in the case of study tours,
to elite students. Because education is difficult to appreciate unless one has received it,
promoting it will be an opportunity for elite NGOs to work directly with smaller local
counterparts in designing curricula and pressuring the government for funding.
Third, international democracy programs must design projects that teach
democratic values, such as the importance of trust, and skills, such as consensus-building.
If effectively implemented, they will help build a sense of stakeholdership, the awareness
41 That is, a system of complete juridical equality in great contrast to what currently passes for justice,
where the wealthy can bribe or intimidate their way into and out of just about anything.
42 Haakonssen, K. (1996). Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment.
New York, Cambridge University Press. 240.
43 Moon, J. D. (1993). Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts. Princeton, NJ,
Princeton University Press. 98-99.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
that each individual possesses a right to fair representation and service by the government.
However, unlike passive Soviet stakeholdership, the democratic version requires action
on the part of citizens:
Democracy is never a gift of one people to another, but the hard-won fruit of
costly local struggle. It is something to be taken, not given. Moreover, while
there are universal ideas that undergird the struggle everywhere, democracy’s
forms are as various as the struggles through which they are won. 44
The 2002 protest in Aksy, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, in which poor farmers rallied in support
of their MP, an outspoken critic of Askar Akaev, “was accomplished through the
strategic coordination of unofficial village leaders who utilized the structure of village
government and networks of personal relationships, which worked to solidify the
movement and draw people into participation in demonstrations.” 45
In this case, villagers,
frustrated with the inaction of the federal government and angered at its persecution of
one of their own, organized unprecedented numbers with a message of populist outrage. 46
While confrontation with established authorities is not the exclusive path to liberal
democracy, a country’s notion of citizenship must feature mechanisms to allow
individuals to engage their elected government on issues of socioeconomic reform and
progress. The goal of encouraging stakeholdership is an equilibrium between the
“parochial,” 47
“subject” 48 and “participant” 49 “political orientations in which political
44 Barber, B. R. (1996). Three Challenges to Reinventing Democracy. Reinventing Democracy. P. K. Hirst,
Sunil. Cambridge, MA, Blackwell Publishers: 144-145.
45 Radnitz, S. (2005). "Networks, Localism and Mobilization in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan." Central Asian Survey
24(4): 406.
46 “…in the more active villages, where support for Beknazarov [the MP] became a near-obsession, many
otherwise indifferent people had to participate to maintain their reputations or out of fear.” Radnitz, S.
(2005). "Networks, Localism and Mobilization in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan." Central Asian Survey 24(4): 420.
47 In parochial societies “there are no specialized political roles…and for members of these societies the
political orientations to these roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations. A
parochial orientation also implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the
political system.” Almond, G. A. V., Sidney (1965). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy
in Five Nations. Boston, Little, Brown and Company. 17.
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activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality,
and commitment to parochial values.” 50
The grassroots creation of civil society institutions, the expansion of civic
education and the development of project teaching democratic norms will empower the
populace to mobilize around particular stances on specific issues will affect the
development of democracy far more than the specific structure of national government or
the particular rights inscribed in the national constitution. Even a malfunctioning
administration can be reformed through active engagement and vocal lobbying by public
interest organizations. However, individuals simply do not enter politics and accept such
norms, which potentially weaken traditional sources of power such as paternalism, at face
value. They must first perceive that adopting political engagement and faith in
democracy will serve their personal interests, which in Central Asia, as elsewhere in the
developing world, are defined economically. 51
Just as the political involvement of the
British working classes in the late nineteenth century opened the doors of opportunity for
non-elite representation in government, grassroots associations will enable the lowermiddle
classes in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia – the merchants, farmers and
businessmen – to enter the political scene.
48 “The subject is aware of governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it…and he evaluates it
either as legitimate or as not. Bu the relationship is toward the system on the general level, and toward the
output, administrative, or ‘downward flow’ side of the political system; it is essentially a passive
relationship…” Almond, G. A. V., Sidney (1965). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in
Five Nations. Boston, Little, Brown and Company. 17-18.
49 In the participant culture “the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a
whole and to both the political and administrative structures and processes: in other words, to both the input
and output aspects of the political system.” Almond, G. A. V., Sidney (1965). The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Boston, Little, Brown and Company. 18.
50 Almond, G. A. V., Sidney (1965). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.
Boston, Little, Brown and Company. 30.
51 Rueschemeyer, D. S., Evelyne Huber; Stephens, John D. (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy.
Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. 59.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
At the basic level of relationships between individuals, mutual trust forms the
basis for creating political awareness and the political evolution of a community. It
creates incentives for economic and social cooperation by raising the severity of the
consequences that individuals must endure when they cheat on each other. The process
of constructing connections of trusting relationships beyond the existing kinship networks
helps to generate a community identity, replete with particular norms shared by all groups,
regardless of class or ethnicity. For example, stock markets function due to an incredible
level of trust between investors and corporations that the information they are sending
and receiving is accurate. However, just as the stock market is a powerful engine of
economic advancement, trust between individuals strengthens their stake in the
community and their belief in common human and material resources as shared assets to
be employed where collective action is necessary. In the aforementioned Aksy protest,
“prevalent in the villages was talk of trust, solidarity and close relations. ‘We all help
and support each other’ was a common refrain.” 52
The trust that underscores
stakeholdership provides a powerful mechanism of support for political engagement.
Such democratic consolidation often occurs at times of great crisis, as the example of
Mongolia’s Ongi River Movement will show. The challenge, then ,for democracy
promotion programs is how to simulate the preconditions for the emergence of trust and
stakeholdership without precipitating a real economic or political crisis that could
jeopardize lives.
This sentiment of interdependence addresses the primary weakness of relating
political engagement to self-interest: the individual’s sense of powerlessness.
52 Radnitz, S. (2005). "Networks, Localism and Mobilization in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan." Central Asian Survey
24(4): 420.
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Democratic participation requires confidence in the political system. Citizens must
believe that the structure of government will be able to survive attempts by their elected
officials to co-opt it for personal gain. 53
There should be “no contradiction between
saying that people’s view of the issues and of candidates is shaped by local circumstances
and self-interest and saying that voters may still be interested in picking the best man for
the job, not just for themselves.” 54
In deciding upon their preferred ticket, each voter
must balance consideration of the candidate most capable of addressing potential future
issues with the opportunity to voice local sentiment. Critical to this process is the ability
to judge an incumbent’s record; throughout Central Asia and the developing world
corrupt politicians are reelected because the public willfully ignores their past inequities,
most often because they dazzle voters with fantastic promises that can never be fulfilled.
In the vocabulary of Weberian typology, while traditional and charismatic authority
provide a candidate great legitimacy and enable him to connect with the voting public, it
must be his rational-legal authority that provides the strongest support. 55
Thus, a
necessary prerequisite for a democratic populace is a strong belief in the supremacy of
the law – no matter how stratospheric an elected politician’s popularity level, he must
step down upon reaching the agreed-upon end of his term.
Thus, while participation takes place at many levels of political engagement, it
must always abide by specific norms - inclusivity, valuing information, respectful of
minorities and yearning for consensus/compromise – that are adopted by the majority of
53 This is, perhaps, the most difficult hurdle that Central Asians will encounter; the history of each republic
since at least the imposition of Bolshevik rule provides strong support for the belief that politicians can and
will exploit the political system for personal gain to the greatest extent of their power.
54 Surowiecki, J. (2004). The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many are Smarter than the Few and how
Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. New York, NY, Doubleday. 265.
55 In other words, while there is always room for voting for a candidate based on personality or privilege,
these cannot be the exclusive considerations, and voters must take into account the effect on the overall
system.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
the population. Without them, political participation is subject to influence by predemocratic
behaviors, as happened during the 2005 Kyrgyzstan presidential election, in
which casting a ballot was well-understood while choosing from amongst a set of
candidates was not. Simply casting a ballot is insufficient – it is too easy for entrenched
authorities to coerce the population into submission or to manipulate the system to nullify
dissenting voices. Intelligent participation, inspired by robust civic education initiatives,
will lead to greater popular demand for a diversity of political actors and voices at the
elite level. As Askar Akaev discovered, there is great power in mass movement, and by
ignoring a truly mobilized populace the government risks its own downfall.
Thus, encouraging and enabling political participation by commonplace people
erodes the plutocrats’ stranglehold on political power and creates opportunities for new
groups to enter the national political sphere. Although this polyarchy can emerge as a
result of either the top-down or the bottom-up diversification, the latter protects against a
situation in which voters must decide between a menu of poor candidates, as is the
frequent case of Mongolia. Because elite interests are rarely dissimilar, even an
ideological difference between candidates will not produce an electoral competition that
accurately reflects the country’s political composition. The most democratic of elections,
which minimize the obstacles to entry and provide opportunities for third-party
contestation, allow non-elites contest political positions.
Whether we define civil society as the business sector, 56 small associations, 57 or
simply the space between government and the market, 58 it must comprise of political
56 “civil society is a synonym for the private market sector, a domain of free individuals who associate
voluntarily in various economic and social groupings which are contractural in nature” Barber, B. (1998).
A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong. New York, Hill and Wang. 17.
57 “civil society as a complex welter of ineluctably social relations that tie people together, first of all into
39

Theory
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
actors directly accountable to private individuals who possess common interests. A
grassroots civil society will generally support democratic processes, such as competitive
elections and petitioning of government, regardless of the specific arrangements of the
instruments of power.
Party competition must emerge only after certain groups have staked out a place
in the political landscape, articulating a well-defined platform and respond effectively to
changing political conditions.
However, putting parties before participation on the
democracy promotion agenda easily precipitates a political mess similar to Mongolia,
whose two party systems has become a farce: two organizations, the MPRP and MDU,
while fiercely contesting nearly every race, have become utterly co-opted by business
elites and have lost integrity as parties. This scenario illustrates how corruption
demolishes the dominant theory of party competition, in which “even parties that are
rivals in elections and that disagree on many issues of public policy need to realize that
they will, to some significant extent, sink or swim together.” 59
Self-interested elites must
be forced to perceive democracy as their only option because they need to appeal to a
significant percentage of the populace in order to maintain political legitimacy. They
must, however, be constrained not by rules such as term limits, but rather by the force of
public opinion. While political stability is of unquestionable consequence, flexibility and
families and kinship associations like clans, and then to clubs, neighborhoods, communities, congregations,
and more extended social hierarchies.” Barber, B. (1998). A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and
Democracy Strong. New York, Hill and Wang. 23.
58 “This strong democratic perspective on civil society distinguishes public and private realms – a state
sector occupied by government and its sovereign institutions, and a private market sector occupied by
individuals and their contract associations in the ‘market’ – and presumes a third domain between them,
sharing the virtues of each. This third, independent sector is defined by its civic communities – their
plurality is its essence – which are membership associations that are open and egalitarian enough to permit
voluntary participation.” Barber, B. (1998). A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy
Strong. New York, Hill and Wang. 34-35.
59 Melia, T. O. (2000). Political Parties: Catalysts or Obstacles to Democratic Reform? World Forum on
Democracy, Warsaw, Poland, Stefen Batory Foundation. 5.
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Theory
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
responsiveness are equally important; elites cannot take full responsibility for keeping
parties consistent with contemporary ideas and accountable to the public. Rather than
letting the political process happen to them, the people must be both empowered to
perceive the capacity for change in their government and encouraged to undertake a
campaign or mobilize a group to achieve it.
HOW DEMOCRACY PROMOTION DOES NOT WORK
At the root of the failure of democracy promotion is the over-reliance by
international donors on elite local non-governmental groups to respond to the needs of
the public and represent interest and identity groups. The creation and employment of
these groups draws on the political philosophy that “democracy, in short, is not the
product of social and economic forces only…it is also, and to a yet greater extent, the
consequence of prevailing institutional conditions.” 60
Providing “assistance to groups or
business interests outside government…is seen as the best way of stimulating economic
pluralism and of altering the former imbalance between a strong state and a weak civil
society.” 61
However, USAID policy describing non-governmental organizations prescribes
not popular representation but rather that organizations should address a diversity of
issues. 62
For example, its Guide to Technical Services puts forth as ‘work areas’ for civil
60 Hadenius, Axel. Institutions and Democratic Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 128.
61 Jones, S. F. (2000). "Democracy from Below? Interest Groups in Georgian Society." Slavic Review
59(1): 46.
62 (2005). Fragile States Strategy. Washington, DC, U.S. Institute for International Development: 28.
41

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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
society “institutional capacity building,” 63 “sectoral support,” 64 “networking” 65 and
“independent media.” 66
While certain issues, such as women’s rights, require this topdown
approach, many others would have emerged much more naturally from local
political discussions. Besides civil society, the concepts of rule of law,
elections/processes and governance 67 echo international donors’ focus on creating nongovernmental
organizations rather than on inspiring popular participation. 68 In meeting
these objectives, the immense funding has paid off – all three countries possess a far
larger network of non-governmental organizations than at any previous time. However,
as studies focusing on Eastern Europe demonstrate, 69
such strategies stand on shaky
historical ground: while non-governmental organizations in theory check government
63 “(a) to strengthen and/or build the institutional and managerial capacity of civil society organizations
(CSOs); and (b) to improve the overall capacity of USAID Missions and bureaus to plan, manage and
evaluate…the programs and projects that strengthen civil society.” DCHA/DG Guide to Technical Services.
Washington, DC, United States Agency for International Development: 29.
64 “to increase the capacities and roles of CSOs in monitoring government policy formation and
implementation…as initiators of democratic reforms, and as participants in the formation and
implementation of public policy.” DCHA/DG Guide to Technical Services. Washington, DC, United States
Agency for International Development: 29.
65 “to increase cross-fertilization, dialogue, and greater cooperation between and among indigenous, U.S.,
and international CSOs.” DCHA/DG Guide to Technical Services. Washington, DC, United States Agency
for International Development: 29.
66 “to strengthen independent print and broadcast media, which are critical elements of a vibrant, pluralistic
civil society.” DCHA/DG Guide to Technical Services. Washington, DC, United States Agency for
International Development: 29.
67 DCHA/DG Guide to Technical Services. Washington, DC, United States Agency for International
Development: 2.
68 Note the language employed by Ambassador James Collins in 1996 to describe progress in Kyrgyzstan:
“We continue to assist in the area of building democracy. Out assistance programs have emphasized the
importance of democratic reform and promoted the growth of non-governmental organizations…We have
welcomed democratic achievements in the area, such as Kyrgyzstan’s election…”
(http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/Collins.html)
69 “Western NGOs have had little impact on how the institutions they helped to create actually operate. In
every case looked at in the Columbia study, the institutions function poorly and have extremely weak links
to their society.” Mendelson, S. E. (2001). "Unfinished Business: Democracy Assistance and Political
Transition in Eastern Europe and Eurasia." Problems of Post-Communism 48(3): 20. See also the book
resulting from the Columbia study: Mendelson, S. E. G., John K., Ed. (2002). The Power and Limits of
NGOs : A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. New York, NY, Columbia
University Press.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
power, 70 in practice, they fail to engage the population sufficiently in defining the public
interest and shaping the government’s agenda.
Too often democracy promotion programs perceive the process of governance in
the framework of legal formalism, believing that the primary hurdles consist in the
establishment of quality institutions, such as a full-fledged legislature or modern judiciary;
they ignore the reality that they must be publicly financed in order to function properly. 71
International institutions’ focus on elections illustrates this discrepancy. For the OSCE,
a genuine democratic election process presupposes respect for freedom of
expression and free media; freedom of association, assembly, and movement;
adherence to the rule of law; the right to establish political parties and compete for
public office; non-discrimination and equal rights for all citizens; freedom from
intimidation; and a range of other fundamental human rights and freedoms… 72
However, as the example of the 2005 Kyrgyzstan presidential election illustrates, clean
elections can take place even amidst the absence of nearly all of the OSCE’s presupposed
preconditions. The presence of observers and the other accoutrements of modern
elections have “become the sine qua non of internationally acceptable elections, and the
only way towards loosening the purse-strings of donors and creditors.” 73
Although
observation is a necessary element of ensuring a government’s fulfillment of its pledge of
democracy, it is not a sufficient reflection of the degree of a country’s liberalism. Like
other elements of democratic governance, clean elections should be effects, rather than
causes, of active political participation. Unless ordinary citizens routinely demand
70 Carothers, T., 1956- (c2004). Critical mission : essays on democracy promotion / Thomas Carothers.
Washington, D.C. :, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 115.
71 Although Central Asian governments can, in various degrees, get away with relying upon revenue
generated by natural resource extraction to fill the state coffers, taxation is an essential element in a proper
give-and-take relationship between a government and its citizens.
72 (2005). “Election Observation Handbook.” 5 th . Retrieved 1/25/06. 11. <
http://www.osce.org/item/14004.html?ch=240>
73 Geisler, G. (1993). "Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do with It? Vagaries of Election Observations and
Democratic Standards." The Journal of Modern African Studies 31(4): 614
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
transparent voting, a self-interested government will inevitably pursue ways of bending
the rules in its favor.
Moreover, while the privileging of political elites, even those outside the spheres
of government authority, may address political uncertainties during the transition
immediately following the fall of an authoritarian regime, it limits the range of the
political discourse, marginalizing important constituencies such as the vast economic
underclass. 74
While elite-level negotiations ensured a successful outcome in Mongolia’s
1990-92 constitutional convention, the current bickering between the successors of the
original democrats has imposed severe political stagnation. Similarly, while the
construction of a robust network of non-governmental organizations diversifies the elite
political discourse, their inability to meaningfully reach down across class boundaries to
acquire a grassroots membership-based constituency 75
creates obstacles to their
becoming agents of the public interest. Just as elections can be made to appear
democratic, 76 “paper NGOs” can easily create the façade of public interest by creating
projects to address invented social needs. The inherent difficulty of monitoring allows
dishonest leaders to falsify financial and administrative documentation while
perpetuating the myth of the project’s necessity.
In theory, non-governmental organizations check the extent of administrative
authority through press releases, lobbying and activist mobilization. Unfortunately, the
current model of NGO-driven development, in which donors help local groups specialize
74 Gill, G. (2000). The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process. New
York, NY, St. Martin's Press. 45.
75 I discovered this disconnect when I asked my non-elite interviewees to name local non-governmental
organizations (other than the one they were working with, if applicable) – none were able to do so.
76 See: Glosemeyer, I. (1998). "Winner Takes All: Eight Ways to Make Elections Risk-Free: A Regime's
Guide to Successful Elections," Middle East Report(209): 19.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
by giving targeted grants, 77 fails on a practical level. The technical requirements for
establishing a local non-profit, including financial accountability measures and the need
for regular authoring of performance evaluations, have dramatically raised the bar for
receiving foreign funding. The result: funding has been diffused through a network of
international contractors, such as IFES, the National Democratic Institute and the
International Republican Institute, both of which manage smaller grants to local nongovernmental
organizations. However, this stratification makes it difficult for grassroots
organizations to define objectives and pursue funding outside of the requests for
proposals submitted by both USAID and its contractors. As a result, the civil society
organizations in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia are largely top-down institutions,
consisting mainly of large, well-funded operations located in the capitals with diffuse
networks of regional offices. Agendas are driven by decisions made in the headquarters,
and the availability of funding plays an inevitable role in local NGOs’ strategic calculus.
Moreover, the institutional focus of international democracy promotion programs
requires significant investments of time and money to achieve even marginal progress. In
Kyrgyzstan, a lobbying campaign coordinated by local NGOs and international
organizations forced Kurmanbek Bakiev to hold Kyrgyzstan’s first free and fair vote in
July 2005, 78 although because his election was a foregone conclusion, his consent was a
small concession. Subsequently, the elected administration failed to follow through on its
promise to inaugurate an era of transparency, 79 despite ongoing criticism from vocal non-
77 Scott, J. M. W., Kelly J. (2000). "Supporting the Wave: Western Political Foundations and the Promotion
of a Global Democratic Society." Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 14(2):
237-257.
78 (2005, 7/8/05). "Q&A: Kyrgyzstan votes." BBC Monitoring Retrieved 4/10/06, 2006, from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4664827.stm.
79 “However corrupt the system may have been under Akayev, there had been an element of predictability.
Since the [March 2005] revolution, concerns have persisted about chaos and instability resulting from a
45

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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
governmental organizations regarding the degree of public confidence. 80
Only the
nation’s public can successfully address these issues of corruption and underperformance,
either by engaging the government in reform processes or voting out the culpable
politicians.
Democracy promotion by foreign governments frequently involves playing a
diplomatic carrot-and-stick game with the national government. External negotiations
and the potential for aid and investment can compel a government to institute reforms, as
was the case for Kyrgyzstan, which became the international community’s most favored
CIS republic by reaching out and embracing economic liberalization. 81
However, while
“the prospect of membership, whether in a ‘club of states,’ NATO, or the European
Union, can be a powerful incentive for a state to change its behavior,” 82 organizations
and agreements that Central Asian states are eligible to join set the bar for membership
quite low. For example, while the transparency of elections is often employed as a
convenient metric of democracy and political openness, international organizations have
not imposed significant penalties based on well-documented transgressions of
international standards. 83
Alternately, the country joining the agreement may have
unreasonable expectations of the benefits which membership confers. 84
However, the
perceived vacuum and about whether the new government really represents a true break with the past.”
(2005). Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State. Asia Report. Brussels, International Crisis Group: 25.
80 Shenker, S. (2006, 3/23/06). "Kyrgyz uprising 'no revolution'." BBC News Retrieved 4/11/06, 2006,
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4836916.stm.
81 Olcott, M. B. A., Anders & Garnett, Sherman W. (1999). Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation in the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
123-125.
82 Robertson, A. E. (2003). Should We Stay or Should We Go? State-Building via Political Discourse.
Political Science, Columbian College of Arts and Sciences. Washington, DC, The George Washington
University: 112.
83 Kurtov, A. (2002). "Presidential Elections in Central Asia." Central Asia and the Caucasus: Journal of
Social and Political Studies 6(18): 25-32.
84 For example: “Amongst the first to sign the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992,
Mongolia’s leaders boldly proposed that the entire nation be nominated as a ‘World Biosphere Reserve.’”
46

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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Millennium Challenge Account, for which Mongolia is eligible and Kyrgyzstan a
threshold candidate, 85 could change this trend.
The nature of the promotion itself introduces two supplementary problems that
complicate attempts to inculcate democratic norms and encourage participation. The first
is a problem with procedures: because American policymakers lack common ground
upon which to build a single strategy for democracy promotion, each practitioner in the
field is entitled to his or her understanding of the process. For example, in the space of
two weeks, American officials presented fundamentally different visions for
democratization. While Ambassador to Tajikistan Richard Hoagland articulated a causal
connection between economic prosperity and democratic politics, 86
U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher perceived the need for
institutional transformation. 87
Second, program designs are often shaped by the fact that
it is easier for foreigners to work with national elites in the capital than to seek out local
power-brokers in isolated villages. However, the resulting “low-interest democracy”
disenfranchises popular leaders in favor of those inclined to support American policy
Sadoway, D. T. (2002). Searching for Antidotes to Globalization: Local Institutions at Mongolia's Sacred
Bogd Khan Mountain. Resource Management. Burnaby, BC, School of Resource and Environmental
Management, Simon Fraser University: 1-2.
85 See the MCA sites pertaining to Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan, respectively:
http://www.mca.gov/countries/eligible/mn/index.shtml and
http://www.mca.gov/countries/threshold/kg/index.shtml.
86 “I am convinced prosperity will continue to grow. Prosperity is a “fertilizer” for democratic
evolution. In the end, prosperity and democracy will be the twin guarantors of Tajikistan’s long-term
stability.” Hoagland, R. (2006, 3/31/06). "Tajikistan a Remarkable Success Story, U.S. Ambassador Says."
Retrieved 4/10/06, 2006, from http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfileenglish&y=2006&m=March&x=20060331142946MVyelwarC0.4332849&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html.
87 “‘We are also working on the political process and democratic reform,’ he said. ‘Kyrgyzstan has an open
media, has a strong civil society, has a lot of things going for it, but there is obviously more to do, and so
we have been trying to work with the government to promote constitutional reform and reforming the
judiciary and [there's] a serious fight against corruption. I know there is a lot of disappointment in some of
those areas. People think that it hasn't moved as fast as it should have, and I think we are, frankly, very
interested in regaining the momentum on those issues.’” Pannier, B. (2006) Kyrgyzstan: U.S. Official
Urges Greater Democratic Reforms. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Volume, DOI:
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objectives. 88
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
The divide between financed actors (government politicians and
internationally-sponsored NGO officials) and the vast majority of the population, which
lacks any access to means of political expression, condones action without representation
and blocks the creation of actors’ dependence on a base of popular support. If ministers,
parliamentarians and non-governmental leaders can get away with writing off the lower
classes as ill-informed or unenlightened, the resulting oligarchy would eliminate the
majority of the populace from the public sphere, creating a thoroughly antidemocratic
polity.
With Soviet largesse now a distant memory, democracy is the only form of
governance that will enable Central Asians to effectively apply their resources towards
economic development. However, it will not simply appear one day; it must be attained
through the formation of associations that teach individuals what democratic citizenship
and community mean:
By acting as a conceptual lens, political beliefs and values become ‘mediating
orientations’ that influence behavior by shaping how individual citizens respond
to situations and by limiting the number of viable alternatives. Therefore, beliefs,
values, and perceptions that constitute a political culture lay the foundation for
democratic consolidation. For democracy to succeed, change must occur on this
level. 89
Democracy is more than simply a description of a style of governance; it encompasses a
mode of sociopolitical existence that acknowledges diversity of opinion, recognizes a
contractual relationship between individuals and authority and embraces mass
participation in the decision-making and implementation processes.
88 Robinson, W. I. (1996). Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony. New York,
Cambridge University Press. 4.
89 Chull Shin, D. W., Jason (2005). "Is Democracy the Only Game in Town?" Jounral of Democracy 16(2):
90.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Democracy promotion in Central Asia must begin at the source of social
structures, the basic community unit. In nomadic Kyrgyz and Mongolian society, for
example, the aul/ayil camp group, which is “composed of patrilineal relatives” and
“could supply all of the labor needed to maximize herding without having to regularly
hire outsiders” 90
While the conical hierarchy of pre-Russian times has been lost, 91 the
importance of kinship survived and, in a time of economic uncertainty, has taken on
added importance. Traditional institutions can mediate between the externalities of
macroeconomic conditions and state policy and the internal realities of an individual’s
particular situation. Only local leaders capable of commanding the trust of the
community can take the steps necessary to integrate it into larger economic networks.
However, the distribution of the types of authority (legal-rational, charismatic, and
traditional) shapes the overall process. Ideally, legal-rational authority would dominate,
allowing for true popular representation – a poor leader can be removed without any
challenge. In addressing these networks, the goal of democracy programs should be to
open up a “civic space” that encourages discourse and dissent. 92
While it will inevitably
involve short-term policy trade-offs – perhaps fewer election observers or party trainings
– it will lay the foundation for the emergence of a more stable system of democratic
governance.
90 Barfield, T. J. (1997). The Nomadic Alternative. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall. 145-146.
91 Barfield, T. J. (1997). The Nomadic Alternative. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall. 147-149.
92 “It is in this civic space that people are ‘public’ beings, and in that sense civil society shares with
government a sense of the public sphere and a regard for the general good and the common weal, but unlike
government it makes no claims to exercise a monopoly on legitimate coercion.” Lehning, P. B. (1998).
Towards a Multi-Cultural Civil Society: The Role of Social Capital and Democratic Citizenship. Civil
Society and International Development. A. H. Bernard, Henny & Lehning, Percy B. Paris, Development
Center of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development: 28.
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Case Study Selection
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Why did Mongolia’s Ongi River Movement successfully bring together disparate
people in order to hammer out an unlikely compromise while other projects failed to
achieve their predetermined objectives? The case studies of my thesis highlight not only
the central tenet, that only popular participation can give civil society institutions the
requisite political capital for working with the government, but also the intricacies and
contradictions inherent in democracy promotion. In exploring the non-governmental
organizations involved with the July 2005 Kyrgyzstan presidential election, I question
how much of their product will reach the commonplace people. A similar question is
addressed to advocacy programs in Tajikistan, where overt political dissent is frowned
upon and occasionally met with imprisonment. 1
Readers might conclude that the difference separating one from the others is the
intensity of the problem: while Tajiks do not necessarily perceive an urgency for the
development of advocacy programs, whereas the Mongolians living along the river faced
dire consequences if they failed. Yet this condition – desperate exchange – should have
produced the opposite results: those who did not need a service should have been able to
bargain for it, while the greatest needs should have forced the greatest degree of
concession to the dominant power. However, the perception of danger emboldened the
disenfranchised Mongolians, allowing them to more effectively mobilize the resources at
their disposal: “Social psychologists have found that what seems to drive these
(participatory) processes, and to give them their extraordinary energy, is that, in the
breakout of democracy, conflict works. It generates cohesion, it causes people to reevaluate
their preferences and needs, and it brings about consensus.” 2
However, conflict
1 As was the case for Muktor Boqizoda, the former editor of the independent newspaper Nerui Sukhan.
2 Blaug, R. (1999). Democracy: Real and Ideal. Albany, NY, State University of New York Press. 137.
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Case Study Selection
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
seems to be an extreme case in the context of the study; while security plays a significant
role in people’s political calculus, the sense of confrontation that energizes a bipartisan
clash in the United States is absent in Central Asian affairs. Moreover, using conflict as a
necessary prerequisite for democratic transition creates an untenable policy situation – for
example, international organizations cannot instigate conflict in order to bring about
political transformation. Rather, the psychology of conflict vis-à-vis the traditional
communitarian conception of the relationship between the people and the government
proves a driving force in the Ongi River case and a sorely needed element of political
advocacy programs.
51

What’s the Matter With Tajikistan?
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Tajikistan, once the USSR’s lonely Persian outpost, now faces an uphill battle to
achieve a democratic political sphere. International organizations have pursued
institutionalist strategies for over a decade, focusing on developing a diverse nongovernmental
sector. While this proximate objective has been accomplished, Tajikistan’s
NGOs are not fulfilling the role of an institution of civil society – to channel public
interest and engage it with the organs of government power. Although several
explanations exist for donors’ reluctance to abandon their focus on institutional capacity
building, at the root of the emergent problem is that the programs have failed to reach
commonplace Tajiks, either by designing projects incapable of transcending the narrow
elite political sphere or by not providing the correct tools and incentives to encourage the
natural outgrowth of grassroots organization.
While the most immediate obstacle to democracy might be the dominance of
President Emomali Rahmonov, the winner of a decade of warlord politics, 1 the structural
elements supporting his regime are quite weak – if a large enough group of people really
wanted to oust him, it probably could, as the state security service would be either
unwilling or unable to violently suppress mass protests (Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, in
comparison, has neither the qualms nor the shortage of force). Instead, Rahmonov has
remained atop the grand heap of corruption precisely because people want him to stay in
power: they perceive his strengths as theirs; when he speaks at the United Nations or
1 “A warlord in Tajikistan is not a mere bandit or a selfish politician with an organized military force. A
warlord is a protector and provider who is accepted by a community under pressure from unrepresentative
government as a legitimate leader.” Nourzhanov, K. (2005). "Saviors of the Nation or Robber Barons?
Warlord Politics in Tajikistan." Central Asian Survey 24(2): 126.
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What’s the Matter With Tajikistan?
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
chats up Vladimir Putin, the people perceive that he is putting them at last on the world
stage. 2 However, the inability to successfully appeal to the international community for
debt relief (like his Kyrgyz counterpart Askar Akaev) has hamstrung Tajikistan’s
economy with an unfavorable GDP-to-debt ratio. This weakness imposes a check on the
“personal rulership,” 3 and creates an odd situation in which the country is both quite open
to change and breathtakingly oppressive. After a brutal civil war tore the republic apart
following the dissolution of the patrimonial USSR, the UN-mediated peace process
consisted of elite-level bargaining and the extension of international guarantees. 4
Since
then, the Rahmonov has administration employed nationalist rhetoric and the invocation
of generalized threats to intimidate potential opponents and instill a fear of change in the
general populace. 5
Complicating matters, the power of external influence is particularly
weak, but this is the product of more than government obstinacy:
Admittedly, the UN and World Bank argue that they exert diplomatic pressure for
the rule of law and observation of human rights, but in the crucial test of the 2003
referendum on constitutional amendments, international institutions and foreign
states failed to protest. They even pressured opposition parties not to protest. 6
2 It’s an open question whether people want Emomali Rahmonov specifically or whether they simply want
the same person to stay in power indefinitely. While I would venture to guess that the latter prevails
because of the greater perceived need for political stability (and the fact that Rahmonov has played up
regional tensions by appointing fellow Kulyabis), it would be hard to design a survey to answer the
question, as Tajiks would probably find it difficult to imagine a world without Rahmonov.
3 A type of patrimonialism “on the basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique
personal qualification, but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards.” Roth, G. (1968).
"Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in New States." World Politics 20(2): 194.
4 The oft-mentioned Dartmouth Conference on “Sustained Dialogue” that brought together leaders from the
disparate sides. Zartman, J. K. (2004). Prospects for Stability in Tajikistan. International Association for
Conflict Management - 17th Annual Conference. Pittsburgh, PA. 2.
5 Tadjbakhsh, S. (1996). "National Reconciliation: The Imperfect Whim." Central Asian Survey 15(3/4):
330.
6 Zartman, J. K. (2004). Prospects for Stability in Tajikistan. International Association for Conflict
Management - 17th Annual Conference. Pittsburgh, PA. 4.
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What’s the Matter With Tajikistan?
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Democracy promotion programs in Tajikistan do not enjoy the higher degree of aid
conditioning, 7
Rahmonov. 8
are less coordinated and are effectively kept at arm’s length by
Having abandoned direct institutional work with the Tajik government,
they have turned to the non-government sector as the vehicle for democracy promotion
efforts: “Once foreign donors got involved, they kept the model – giving small grants to
small organizations rather than large grants to iffy governments.” 9
However, I found that
many NGOs suffer from the same systematic deficiencies that afflict government
agencies – underperformance, mission creep/creepy mission, corruption and, most
importantly, apathy or even antipathy to the interests and needs of the population. 10
Combined with the use of “models based on international experience” 11 rather than local
knowledge and the short-term nature of many assignments, I found the dedication to
long-term change that international development organizations must exhibit surprisingly
lacking in Tajikistan.
7 “International donors come in without strict criteria, and they work with people without criteria. NGOs
[have become] contractors for international organizations.” Whitbeck, Kate. Personal Interview. 19 July
2005
8 The best example of this, in my experience, was the insistence by Stanley Currier of the United Nations
Office of Tajikistan Peace-Building, that the UN was in the country only at the invitation of the Tajik
government. It was not exactly where I expected to encounter the most enthusiastic pro-sovereignty
argument. Currier, Stanley. Personal Interview. 28 July 2005.
9 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 22 July 2005.
10 A former Counterpart International discussed some NGOs’ serious transgressions: “NGOs thought that
anyone could work in certain areas – street children or women [for example] – and they thought that they
were competent in two or three weeks.” “There were cases of corruption among NGOs, and there is a lack
of transparency when the head of the NGO is responsible for everything and the accountants were not
independent of the organization.” However, he also noted that “My first observation about the quotes is
that they somehow generalize the situation with the NGOs in Tajikistan. One after reading these particular
quotes might get an idea that all the NGOs were not competent, corrupt etc, while I was talking about some
NGOs, or a number of NGOs who were not fulfilling their mission properly. These kind of NGOs existed
in the beginning of the NGO activity in Tajikistan in the 90-s, and many of them didn’t have sufficient
knowledge or expertise on NGO management at the time. At the same time, there were many NGOs who
contributed to solving social problems and to NGO development in general.” Bokiev, Farhod. Personal
Interview. 27 July 2005. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
11 Rakhimbekov, Nurul. Personal Interview. 20 July 2005.
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Speaking with a variety of leaders, I discovered several factors contributing to
elite NGOs’ inability to connect with the populace and non-elite NGOs’ failures to attain
membership in Tajikistan’s third sector. First, organizations that sought to exceed the
government’s narrow ideological boundaries were effectively bullied into submission or
shut down. Muhtor Bokizoda, the former editor of the independent newspaper Nerui
Sukhan, 12 faced intimidation and outright persecution by the Tajik government for his
outspoken opposition. However, beyond filing an official complaint, 13 there was little
that American government or international organizations would do, as “the government
didn’t listen to Internews.” 14
By strong-arming independent media, ignoring
international NGOs, and appealing to claims of sovereignty in the face of international
objections, the Tajik government effectively maintains its control over all information
and opinion, creating an aura of invincibility and omniscience.
This control sustains the second factor dividing NGOs from the right people: the
citizens of Tajikistan are unwilling to confront their government despite volumes of
contrary evidence presented by the third sector. 15
“People worry that participation will
12 The paper began printing on July 7, 2005, after having its press closed by orders of the tax authorities.
(Kimmage, D. (2005). Embattled Tajik Newspaper Manages Issue. RFE/RL Newsline, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty. 2006: Internet news article.) However, it was banned on July 9, 2005, and a
criminal case opened against Mr. Bokizoda. ((2005). Editor Wants Tajik Independent Weekly to Resume
Publication. Daily News Bulletin. Moscow, Russia, Interfax. 2006: Wire feed.) He was arrested in August
2005 on charges of stealing electricity. (Pannier, B. (2005). Tajikistan: Crisis Of Independent Media Sparks
International Criticism. Prague, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2006: Internet news article.) The Tajik
Supreme Court suspended his sentence in February 2006. (Kimmage, D. (2006). Tajik Court Suspends
Opposition Editor's Sentence. RFE/RL Newsline, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2006: Internet news
article.)
13 (2005). U.S. Expresses Regret over Closing of Independent Tajik Newspaper. Vienna, Austria,
Department of State. 2006: Press Release.
14 Bokizoda, Muhtori. Personal Interview (trans. Shavkat Musoev) 27 July 2005.
15 At the very least, they are willing to take the government at its (frequently dishonest) word and buy into
Rahmonov’s divisive rhetoric because they are afraid that their disagreement will bring trouble upon them
personally (Tajikistan is a remarkably small country – particularly in the echelons of power everyone
knows someone).
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cause trouble, and they withdraw.” 16 It is plausible, for example, that Nerui Sukhan went
under because it lacked a constituency to defend it from government onslaught. The
“mentality of the past of the government doing everything” is still quite common. 17
While citizens’ devotion to higher authority might be a carryover of Soviet times, the
current administration goes to great length to ensure its continuance. The rhetoric of
Rahmonov echoes Karimov’s “authoritarian legitimation,” referring to the post-Soviet era
as the “period of recognizing friends from enemies and the period of reaching to
understanding, unity and national reconciliation.” 18
By speaking in the vocabulary of
clans (‘friends from enemies’), he successfully isolates his primary political competitors
(namely, the waning Khujandi and Kurgan-Tyube clans 19 ) and sets up the classic devil’s
deal: “The government shall be responsible for making the people united and creating a
political culture that could comply with the necessities of civil society.” 20 As a researcher
explained, there is “no public policy – except for the president, no leaders or politicians
announce their own opinion – they say that whatever Rahmonov says is
correct.” 21 Drawing on the Soviet maxim that the role of government is to arrange and
coordinate the economically productive elements of society, he accuses those who
question his authority of treason; in his argument, the command system of authority, the
antithesis of lasses-faire of Smithian capitalism, is absolutely essential to his conception
16 Rakhimbekov, Nurul. Personal Interview. 20 July 2005.
17 Bokiev, Farhod. Personal Interview. 27 July 2005.
18 Rahmonov, E. (1997). Speech at the Ceremony for the 6th Anniversary of Independence of Tajikistan.
Tajik People in the Reflection of History. A. A. Salimzadeh, Salimeh. Dushanbe, TJ, Ministry of Culture of
the Republic of Tajikistan: 3.
19 Dubnov, A. (1994). "When a bonesetter undertakes to treat an abscess: Emomali Rahmonov became the
second Tajik President." New Times International: 41-43.
20 The next sentence is classic Rahmonov: “This is a point to be properly understood by all those who are
interested in the interests of their motherland.” Rahmonov, E. (1997). Tajikistan In the Threshold of
Tomorrow. Tajik People in the Reflection of History. A. A. Salimzadeh, Salimeh. Dushanbe, TJ, Ministry
of Culture of the Republic of Tajikistan. 16.
21 Olimov, Dr. Muzaffar. Personal Interview. 21 July 2005.
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of democratic governance. While to the American reader Rahmonov’s rhetoric rings
hollow, the commonplace merchants and farmers of Tajikistan have no way of
recognizing that an alternate philosophy of democratic governance is possible, and
without vocal organizations expressing this, they will have no other choice but to buy
into his political philosophy and, consequently, his claim to absolute power. “After the
Bishkek [March 2005 revolution], people supported Rahmonov because they were afraid
of another person as president and they don’t know anyone except Rahmonov.” 22
These
elements of anti-democratization and anti-capitalism are largely borne out by survey
data. 23
Until the population divorces itself of beliefs such as the incorrigibility of
government or the supremacy of politicians (even over the law), it will be impossible for
NGOs to work towards developing a public sphere for political discussion.
According to IREX’s Joshua Abrams, the origins of the current democracy
promotion strategy lie in the perception of a generally successful series of political
transitions in the former Soviet Union due to “the civic action of perestroika – protesting
for rights and a nationalist movement – the peaceful protest paradigm” 24 followed by
groups such as Kazakhstan’s Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement.
Encouraging these groups “seemed like a very viable way of promoting
democracy…people assumed that what was happening in Prague was happening in
22 Olimov, Dr. Muzaffar. Personal Interview. 21 July 2005.
23 “More Tajikistanis are satisfied with the state of their country than in 1996. A majority of Tajikistanis
(65%) say that they are satisfied with the overall situation in the country. By contrast, only a quarter (26%)
were satisfied…A majority of six in ten (60%) Tajikistanis say the current economic situation is good or
very good…Yet a large percentage of Tajikistanis are only meeting their basic needs…A little more than a
third (36%) of Tajikistanis prefer a market-based economic system with limited state control…only a little
more than a third of Tajikistanis (36%) express at least moderate interest in politics…” (2004). Public
Opinion in Tajikistan 2004. Washington, DC, IFES. 2.
24 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 22 July 2005.
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What’s the Matter With Tajikistan?
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Uzbekistan,” 25 but the Tajik Civil War quickly shattered the nascent civil society and
drove intellectuals from the public sphere. “Political development is very embryonic
here - until there is stronger political opposition, it will be difficult for people to see that
it is valid to have a different view.” 26
Yet even today the same institutionalism anchors democracy promotion in
Tajikistan: 27
for example, in a speech, Ambassador Hoagland outlined three
“fundamental institutions of democracy”: “an independent election commission,”
“independent mass media” and “an independent judiciary.” 28
However, these very
institutions are greatly compromised: a 2004 law, for example, requires parties to make a
large deposit before the election, effectively reducing opposition blocs into their
constituent squabbling clans. 29
“Legal nihilism,” 30 in which not even the judges know
the laws, paralyzes courts. Clearly, these institutions require repair, but only the people
of Tajikistan have a sufficient stake in reform to be able to see it through.
International democracy promotion programs focus on building a strong nongovernment
sector, which can, in turn, lobby the legislature directly. Yet while the
number of local non-governmental organizations has increased, 31 there has not been a
corresponding rise in the level of inter-sectoral engagement. Heightened competition
between NGOs forces their leaders to invest time in showy projects that might not
25 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 22 July 2005.
26 Wilson, Andrew. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
27 The State Department’s FY2007 Mission Performance
28 Hoagland, R. E. (2004, 3/2/04). "Democracy and Tajikistan: United States Ambassador Richard E.
Hoagland Speech at the Tajik National University." U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe - Press Release Retrieved
4/19/05, 2005, from http://dushanbe.usembassy.gov/sp_03022004.html.
29 Ozodi, D. (2005) The Fight for Power Among Tajik Clans. New Times Volume, DOI:
30 Khaidarova, Mukhtar. Personal Interview. 20 July 2005.
31 (2004). "Tajikistan." NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia Retrieved
4/10/06, 2006. 153.
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address the actual needs of the local population, 32 and the rise of “paper NGOs,” 33 which
don’t paying taxes and maintain a low profile to avoid harassment by a law enforcement
that they perceive to be corrupt, 34 threatens the legitimacy of the sector. Moreover, in the
same time period, organizational capacity decreased as NGOs continued to work under a
single charismatic leader rather than broaden their focus. 35
Although international
organizations can assist local NGOs by advocating their cause to Tajik government, 36 this
external intervention is rare, and even with legal assistance from other organizations, they
are not strong enough to defend themselves. 37
While democracy promotion in Tajikistan has built an impressive network of elite
non-governmental organizations operating principally out of Dushanbe offices, it has
failed to lay the social foundation upon which grassroots associations can grow. The
result of the current strategy is a bifurcated civil society whose structures are largely
constructed from the top down and serve the political goals of donors rather than of the
populace.
First, the “infinite trainer problem” 38
exemplifies the disparity of engagement
between the elite NGO community and the general populace. “Because NGOs did not
come out of the civic body, basic concepts such as how to operate an organization are
32 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 20 July 2005.
33 Bokiev, Farhod. Personal Interview. 27 July 2005.
34 The perception is far from inaccurate - I can report having personally witnessed policemen accepting
bribes in broad daylight on multiple occasions. Muhidov, Abdurahim. Personal Interview. 19 July 2005.
35 (2004). "Tajikistan." NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia Retrieved
4/10/06, 2006. 244-245.
36 Muhidov, Abdurahim. Personal Interview. 19 July 2005.
37 Muhidov, Abdurahim. Personal Interview. 19 July 2005.
38 A term I coined for the problem in which an NGO would hold a training on a certain subject, such as
political activism, then the students would return to their homes and, rather than engaging in political
activism using their new skills, turn around and teach others so that everyone eventually has a vague idea of
what political activism is in the abstract, but nobody ever does it.
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lacking.” 39
Constant trainings dilute the message to the point where when an assistant to
the U.S. Embassy’s Democracy Commission attended a meeting and asked the trainer
about monitoring compliance and progress, he was simply told “do monitoring” without
any further elaboration on how it was supposed to happen. 40
Second, rather than delivering the services that they thought were most important,
I found that local NGOs exhibited a willingness to go along with whatever international
donors recommended. For example, the NGO ‘Zan Va Zamin’ (‘Women and Earth’) uses
the strategy of its partner international organization, ACT Central Asia, which moved the
group away from ecological issues and towards agricultural work. 41
This close work
could make it difficult for them to connect with their constituency – poor farmers - which
comprises the majority of the population of Tajikistan: “there are some NGO concepts
that it is difficult for them to be adopted here. One of them is USAID and other donor’s
requirement to have a board of directors consisting of outside people to govern the
NGO,” as the concept of a conflict of interest is still new to Tajikistan. 42
The leader of
an NGO support organization admitted that “in general, NGOs always ask [her] first how
to get money” and that “NGOs often change their mission just to get grants.” 43
Whether
elite or grassroots, NGOs that look to international organizations for their policies and
strategies will never be able to properly represent a constituency, jeopardizing their very
purpose as a civil society institution. International organizations, explained a former
Counterpart International staffer, try to distinguish between the Soviet ‘public
39 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 20 July 2005.
40 Kadirov, Abdumalik. Personal Interview. 25 July 2005.
41 Mamdalieva, Muhabbat. Personal Interview (trans. Shavkat Musoev). 22 July 2005.
42 Bokiev, Farhod. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
43 Pirnazarovna, Muhabat. Personal Interview. 28 July 2005.
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associations,’ which functioned as arms of the CPSU, 44
and democratic NGOs that
maintain constituencies. 45
However, just as the public associations looked to Dushanbe
and Moscow for their cues, grant-dependent NGOs often do as much as is necessary to
maintain the image of legitimacy and compliance with donors’ directives. However,
leading an NGO has become a profession in Tajikistan. It “In the absence of significant
economic investment and appropriate higher education programs, one of donor
organizations' best assets is that they are able to create a professional class that would be
able, more or less, to move into other sectors as they really begin to develop.” 46
Nevertheless, the local groups that are created may not last once foreign donors leave.
Moreover, although “anything that is not controlled by a single entity is good because
there is a balance of interests,” 47
Finally, organizations with a greater focus on political advocacy, such as Dilsuz
(Dushanbe Society of the Disabled), found that it was “impossible to lobby the
government to make changes,” and that “international organizations don’t pay for
political activities…just for concrete programs.” 48
As a result, rather than lobbying the
government to administer services for the disabled, such as special schools and education
against discrimination, Dilsuz ends up providing them. As a veteran of development in
Tajikistan commented, “when you turn too much power over to NGOs, they can do a
great deal of harm by doing the wrong thing.” 49
Moreover, there is a pervasive
perception that “outside international organizations, people don’t care whether they are
44 Each profession had a public association that functioned, in theory, like a union. In reality, they were
another vehicle for Communist surveillance and propaganda.
45 Bokiev, Farhod. Personal Interview. 27 July 2005.
46 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
47 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 22 July 2005.
48 Zikrhudov, Asadulo. Personal Interview (trans Shavkat Musoev). 27 July 2005.
49 Burniske, Andrea. Personal Interview. 27 July 2005.
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effective – they just work for the paycheck,” 50 following the customs developed during
Soviet times. As a program officer remarked: “any opposition politics – you’re looking to
get beat up – the government here is really jumpy – organizations have gotten really
cautious about what they do.” 51
The Civic Advocacy Initiative Program, according to its director, Joshua Abrams,
seeks to “teach NGOs about what NGOs do” 52 – that is, to teach them how to act as
advocates for underrepresented groups. Unfortunately, “‘advocacy’ doesn’t translate into
Russian or Tajik.” Many leaders of local NGOs did not understand that they needed to
represent a particular constituency or a particular policy. When Mr. Abrams sought to
motivate NGOs to enter into political dialog he encountered a great deal of reticence
(“some wanted to teach advocacy rather than do it”) and resistance (“any kind of
opposition politics…you’re looking to get beat up…the government here is really jumpy
and [has] gotten cautious about what organizations do” 53 ). Successful groups, such as
“NGO Umed, in Isfara… put together a coalition of local businesses, government, and
citizens to help the city's blind community attain economic self-sufficiency. Employers
agreed to reserve a certain number of vacancies for employees with vision impairments,
and local government agreed to help other businesses develop similar practices.” 54
As
other successful local NGOs will demonstrate, the key to the Union’s success was its
ability to give each negotiator something he wanted and convinced him that consensusdriven
participation was superior to confrontational politics (protests, civil disobedience,
etc.). By convincing the government that reform was in their interest (principally
50 Edwins, John. Personal Interview. 26 July 2005.
51 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 20 July 2005.
52 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 20 July 2005.
53 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 20 July 2005.
54 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
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because tax revenues would increase as nonpayment declined), the Union moved the
mountain of corrupt post-Soviet bureaucracy.
Media organizations encounter a similar set of difficulties in an environment
where information is a tool of political control. Politics in Tajikistan, Internews director
Troy Etulain explained to me, is like chess – moves take place one at a time, and the art is
in their interpretation. Consequently, “nearly two-thirds of all Tajikistanis…say they do
not have enough information to make a wise choice” and “more than a third of
Tajikistanis could not say what it means to live in a democratic system.” 55
However, underneath political struggle between the government and nongovernment
sectors, the Tajik society in general neither expects quality journalism nor
perceives the benefit of having independent and objective sources of information: “sixtyfive
percent of Tajikistanis strongly or somewhat agree that the state-run media in the
country provides objective coverage of social and political developments.” 56
The
convergence of three factors – information asymmetry, stoicism and pessimism – creates
an atmosphere antithetical to the important social elements which sustain democratic
systems: optimism for the future (even if it is the sentiment of ‘better luck next time’) and
trust in the integrity and legitimacy of critical systems of governance (electoral,
legislative, judicial, etc.). First, “people don’t know what the government is and how it
works.” 57
Much of the information vacuum 58 arises because the market for sales and
advertising is too small to sustain newspapers without assistance from wealthy
55 (2004). Public Opinion in Tajikistan 2004. Washington, DC, IFES. 3.
56 (2004). Public Opinion in Tajikistan 2004. Washington, DC, IFES. 7.
57 Musoev, Shavkat. Personal Interview. 29 July 2005.
58 Dikaev, for example, describes how the minister of culture and information was assassinated on
September 8, 2001, but the news did not become public until two days later, when the subscription-only
Asia-Plus reported it. Throughout the two days, Tajik television only broadcast the independence day
anniversary celebrations. Dikaev, T. (2001). "Without Any Daily Newspaper, Tajik Public Deprived of
Essential News." Central Asian Media Electronic List 19. 1.
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benefactors – ordinary people simply do not have the money to afford a subscription.
However, the government certainly does its part to project bureaucratic opacity, 59 and its
effectiveness can be measured by the ease with which people decide to pay a bribe to
instantly eliminate their problems. The paucity of legal knowledge, not only by ordinary
citizens but also by poorly trained judges, engenders “legal nihilism.” 60
Second, Mr. Etulain described how the “mentality here is one of acceptance of
fate rather than advocacy and action,” 61
which echoed comments from another
international NGO official that one of the major obstacles to the development of a vibrant
civil society was that “people tend to lack critical or creative thinking skills, because the
Soviet system did not encourage this.” 62
Moreover, it was “not in the culture to make
harsh decisions.” 63
Critical news stories “have more an effect of shaming the
government” rather than inspiring constructive dialog. 64
However, self-censorship, a
“fingerprint” of the civil war, 65
in conjunction with low professionalism, makes the
construction of critical discourses unfavorable. 66
Although the government makes an
effort to ensure that the truth is not told, “there is a great deal of self-censorship” –
“journalists consider their personal fate when writing stories.” 67
Third, an atmosphere of
pessimism pervades Tajikistan: “Democracy could not work here,” an analyst told me,
“because society is not ready for it – democracy is for an industrial level [of economy]
59 Which I personally experienced in the Monty Pythonesque games I had to play to get my single-entry
visa converted into a double entry (to say nothing of the border crossing, which offers enough absurdity for
several sketches).
60 “Either a person doesn’t know his rights or he knows his rights but doesn’t protect them.” Khaidarova,
Muatar. Personal Interview 20 July 2005.
61 Etulain, Troy. Personal Interview. 21 July 2005.
62 Burniske, Andrea. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
63 Etulain, Troy. Personal Interview. 21 July 2005.
64 Etulain, Troy. Personal Interview. 21 July 2005.
65 Kadirov, Abdumalik. Personal Interview. 21 July 2005.
66 Loersch, A. (2000). Report on the Media Situation in Tajikistan. Geneva, Switzerland, CIMERA. 13-14.
67 Etulain, Troy. Personal Interview. 21 July 2005.
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and must have civil society.” 68
Moreover, as my translator told me, only “2-3% of
students want to create a better future for Tajikistan” 69 – the others try to leave.
Unfortunately, the current system of donor-driven political development has so
far failed to effect real change. It is “not well understood by donors” that “meanings are
interpreted through the cultural mentality.” Worse, “international development reinstates
those in power and empowers those who are good at tricking international organizations,”
leading to an “artificial level of democratic activity created by ‘shiny’ businessmen who
are good at tricking aid organizations.” A former staffer noted that “foreigners just want
to complete their project and go home.” 70 InterNews has been constrained politically by
being “first on the list of organizations that are a danger to [the government’s] control
over the country and control over information.” 71
Corruption remains the government’s
primary tool for maintaining the status quo: although an anticorruption law was enacted
in January 2005, seven months later “people don’t know about it [and] are unwilling to
work against it.” 72
Among the population, widespread pessimism contrasts with the optimistic image
of progress communicated by diplomats and government ministers, providing a bleak
backdrop to the activity of non-governmental organizations: “The attitude of the majority
of the people…toward government officials who embody the reform activity of the state”
is anything but positive. 73
On a more existential level, commentators have found “the
68 Baqozoda, Qahramon. Personal Interview (trans. Zakhidov Otchil). 28 July 2005.
69 Musoev, Shavkat. Personal Interview. 29 July 2005.
70 Bokiev, Farhod. Personal Interview. 27 July 2005.
71 Etulain, Troy. Personal Interview. 21 July 2005.
72 Abduvohed, Shamolov. Personal Interview (trans. Shavkat Musoev) 29 July 2005.
73 “It is generally believed that the government must perform general tasks in the public interest. It must
listen to public opinion and evaluate the impact of all of its activities…otherwise, power becomes an end in
itself and its potential for doing good can be lost.” Abdukholikov, Y. (2000). "Problems and Prospects for
Democracy in Post-Conflict Tajikistan." Central Asia Monitor(5): 2-3
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appearance of a spiritual vacuum in the consciousness of the Tajik people after the
collapse of the USSR” 74
– where the ideologies of communism once gave youth
something to cling to amidst grinding poverty, market capitalism has brought only
increased corruption, inequality and unemployment, leading to “the negative reaction to
democratic reforms.” 75
Another traced the root of NGO stagnation to the “mentality of
the Tajik people – they respect any government or supervisors...[and] don’t understand
that government should work for them and make life better.” 76
What is the solution to the Tajik dilemma? According to Joshua Abrams, “with
development and education, more is possible where people have enough gumption to
actually do things.” 77
However, answers may lie in the specific nature of Tajik political
culture. According to a university professor, “Tajiks have a civic spirit and values of
community – many democratic things, but not connected to outside society…[it is] very
inward-looking.” 78
There is also a “tradition of mutual assistance within kin-based
networks.” 79
As a survey notes, “lack of knowledge does not mean lack of interest…nor
does lack of knowledge translate into complete disengagement. A majority of
Tajikistanis (58%) say they have attended at least one community or mahalla meeting in
the last five years.” 80
“Change will only come from people over time,” one international
officer remarked, “international organizations can not impose their ways of doing things
74 “A low level of national self-consciousness – or rather, its total absence – has replaced the ephemeral
notion of being part of the ‘Soviet people’ and beneficiaries of the ‘achievements’ of Soviet scientific
communism.” Abdukholikov, Y. (2000). "Problems and Prospects for Democracy in Post-Conflict
Tajikistan." Central Asia Monitor(5): 3.
75 “The price the people must pay for democratic freedom has proved to be high in comparison with the
easy enjoyment of the so-called ‘Soviet achievements.’” Abdukholikov, Y. (2000). "Problems and
Prospects for Democracy in Post-Conflict Tajikistan." Central Asia Monitor(5): 1.
76 Whitbeck, Kate. Personal Interview. 19 July 2005.
77 Abrams, Joshua. Personal Interview. 22 July 2005.
78 Abdullaev, Kamol. Personal Interview. 2 August 2005.
79 Abdullaev, Kamol. Personal Interview. 2 August 2005.
80 (2004). Public Opinion in Tajikistan 2004. Washington, DC, IFES. 3.
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based on their Western cultural contexts, but they can provide tools, and teach people
how to find new approaches and ideas.” 81
Perhaps the future lies in the hands of the
network of young NGO officers who can band together to overcome Rahmonov’s
tyranny and corruption: “Democracy requires leaders who dedicate themselves to popular
values – if everyone desires only to get things for himself – it will be mauradering.” 82
While the realities of Tajikistan present a difficult scenario for international
development, the structural and institutional approach taken by organizations including
(but by all means not limited to) IREX and Internews limits their ability to access the
power of indigenous structures of authority that truly shape individuals’ sense of place
and self and can act as vehicles for progress and development. The economic situation
makes progress towards political objectives more difficult: as a former NGO worker
notes, “When talking to these people after the trainings, they said the training was good
but they needed something that could directly benefit their lives, like a microfinance
project. The majority of those people were poor people.” 83 However, some projects offer
hope for Tajikistan, particularly those which employ methods such as Community-Driven
Development 84 and Community-Based Development. 85 Both recognize the potential
resources hidden within communities and explore opportunities for horizontal networking
across traditional barriers.
81 Burniske, Andrea. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
82 Muhidov, Abdurrahim. Personal Interview. 19 July 2005.
83 Bokiev, Farhod. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
84 See: de Soto, H. N., Gisele (2003). Tea House Rules: A Key to Tajik Women's Empowerment. Regional Project
Sites Assessment for Empowering Women in Post-Conflict Tajikistan. Washington, DC, World Bank ECSSD: 48.
85 See: McNeil, M. K., Kathleen (2004). Assessing Capacity for Community-Based Development: A Pilot Study in
Tajikistan. Capacity Enhancement Needs Assessment Series. Washington, DC, World Bank Institute: 97.
67

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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Askar Akaev’s flight from Bishkek on March 24, 2005 culminated a massive
protest movement, coordinated by a well-developed network of non-governmental
organizations. Supported by international organizations, 1 “civil society played a strong
role” in the campaign. 2
While USAID was not involved with funding any of the protests,
it had supported many of the key groups in the past: “the strategy ten years ago was to
create as many civil society organizations as possible.” 3
These groups, by recognizing
the legitimacy of protestors’ claims, accelerated the decline of the Akaev regime but
provided reassurance to political elites that the vertically-dependent structures of
government would not disappear with the ensuing administrative decapitation:
The fact that the Kyrgyz were able to organize a popularly supported protest that
led to the largely peaceful ouster of their president is testament to the success of
long-term capacity-building…Rather than destabilizing the government these
organizations helped channel popular dissatisfaction in a peaceful fashion, and the
civic awareness that they helped sponsor went a long way toward the rapidity
with which order was restored both in Osh and in Bishkek after crowds stormed
the government buildings. 4
1 For example, Counterpart International, a USAID grantee, assists 75 local NGOs. Kasybekov, Erkinbek.
Personal Interview.
2 Dukenbaev, Askat. Personal Interview.
3 Note that the definition of “civil society” employed here is that of programs, denoting non-government
organizations such as media outlets and lobby groups, rather than a broader theoretical version which
extends to loose social networks. Apanasevich, Ivan; Tupitsyn, Igor; Roberts, Sean. Personal Interview. 14
July 2005. Mr. Apanasevich further explains: “10 years ago we saw our goal in building viable NGO
community here as NGOs were pretty new phenomena in Central Asia. The objectives included spreading
out info about the third sector, training activists in basics of NGO activity, exposing them to basic NGO
techniques, and supporting NGOs with grants. As we had money for seed grants, we tried to suppor tmany
NGOs in different sectors so to help building NGO community in Central Asia. Later, we focused more on
support most advanced NGOs doing projects in the area of social partnership, human rights, consumer
protection, advocacy and supported NGO networking and civil society support centers. I left this filed in
1999 and moved to other activities.” Apanasevich, Ivan. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006..
4 Olcott, M. B. (2005). Central Asia's Second Chance. Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. 240.
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Indecision 2005: Kyrgyzstan Votes
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While these organizations proved
highly effective as vehicles for
opposition, they were largely unable to
switch gears after accomplishing their
proximate goal and begin the process
of reconstituting democratic
institutions under new ideals and new
leadership. While they vociferously
rallied against the corruption of Askar
Akaev, the groups allowed interim
president Kurmanbek Bakiev to
quickly fill the power vacuum that he
had left, 5 appointing a new cabinet 6
and setting the date for a presidential
election 7 with little involvement from
the non-governmental sector. The
myriad Kyrgyz and international
NGOs quickly moved into pre-election
planning, moving up their timetables
and drawing on previously allocated
Kyrgyzstan: yurts, steppes and mountains
5 (2005). Kyrgyz Deputies Appoint Interim President, Government. RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service/agency
reports. Bishkek, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2006.
6 Saidazimova, G. (2005). Kyrgyzstan: 'New' Leadership Drawn From Old Guard. Prague, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty. 2006: Internet news article.
7 Initially June 26, it was later moved to July 10. Peuch, J.-C. (2005). Kyrgyzstan: Legislators Set New
Date for Elections. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2006: Internet news article.
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resources. 8
USAID’s contractors implemented different programs to improve procedural or
institutional elements of the election process. I did not interview any that encouraged
popular engagement in politics beyond civic education programs, which had limited
constituencies.
The International Republican Institute, which works with political parties to
design campaigns, provided trainings to the candidates. The goal of party-building is
“building capacity, expressing people to ideas like having a message in the campaign.” 9
However, “a combination of a lack of competitive elections (and, therefore, comparison
between candidates) along with Kyrgyz tribalistic tendencies (the idea that one supports
one’s family or clan rather than the candidate with the best/most innovative ideas) means
that voters don’t chose ‘rationally’ in the way that Americans think.” 10
While the March
revolution was an expression of “no más,” there is a large disconnect over what needs to
be done: “normal people just want a better standard of living; the abnormal people are in
politics. Message development is communication between the two.” 11
However,
political parties in Kyrgyzstan are still quite weak and dysfunctional: for a training for
partisan election observers 12 in a regional center that I attended, Kurmanbek Bakiev’s
Bishkek headquarters neglected to call their local chapter to make sure the trainees were
sent over. While some practitioners feel that “now is the time that parties are ready to
8 There had been a presidential election scheduled for the fall of 2005, but the March revolution forced the
government to move it earlier in order to gain a measure of legitimacy through fair election.
9 Lilley, Jeffrey. Personal Interview.
10 Lilley, Jeffrey. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
11 Lilley, Jeffrey. Personal Interview. The ‘abnormality of political engagement’ stems from the fact that a
minority of politically involved types, those who read a newspaper a day, are considered ‘abnormal’ when
compared to those who get up, go to work and don’t care about politics. Polls have been done to show what
a small percent of people read a newspaper a day. Lilley, Jeffrey. Personal Communication. 16 May 2006.
12 In addition to the non-partisan observers required for each polling station, parties may voluntarily place
observers at any polling station, provided that they are trained and follow the rules.
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discuss public support based on preferences,” 13 it would seem as though they in fact have
a long way to go before they can consolidate around particular ideologies. 14
For common
there is the “fear that joining a political party will mean that candidates will demand
things of them, like June 17.” 15
However, despite efforts at coalition- and constituency-building, political parties
in Kyrgyzstan remain extremely weak, “centered on a single leader – it is impossible to
determine left, right and center.” 16
While structural weaknesses in the distribution of
power 17
privilege the president, and “obstacles to [the consolidation of] a national
identity, such as ethnic categories and regional and parochial identification,” 18 make the
formation of ideological parties 19 more difficult, they do not indicate that the prospects
for democracy in Kyrgyzstan are hopeless. In fact, Kyrgyz have had elements of
democracy, particularly with the “nomadic culture,” which included what he called
“tribal democracy,” 20
in which the “society must elect a leader” and the “leader is
dependent on the constituents.” 21
This structure supports strong regionalism in
Kyrgyzstan’s political realm, a factor confirmed by several of my interviewees, survey
13 Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview.
14 In fact, no party in Central Asia, other than the explicitly pro-government parties, has reached this level
of ideological consolidation.
15 The date refers to a minor skirmish in Bishkek between police and supporters of disqualified presidential
candidate Urmatbek Baryktabasov. The implication is that Baryktabasov had a hand in organizing the
protestors. This also illustrates how much even rural citizens can learn about events in the capital in the
space of three weeks. Junusheva, Mairam & Argymbaeva, Aikam. Personal Interview (trans. Bermet
Muratalieva). 11 July 2005.
16 Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview.
17 Koldys, G. (1997). "Constraining Democratic Development: Institutions and Party Formation in
Kyrgyzstan." Demokratizatsiya 5(3): 351-375.
18 Lilley, Jeffrey. Personal Interview
19 That is, in the sense of a “left” vs. “right” or, more specifically, communitarian vs. libertarian.
20 Kashkaraev, Dr. Nurlan. Personal Interview.
21 Kashkaraev, Dr. Nurlan. Personal Interview.
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data, 22 and even “a popular joke current in Kyrgyzstan [that] goes: ‘We used to build
communism, now we build keminism’ (the Kemin region being the birthplace of
President Akayev).” 23
At this very local level democracy can thrive within the politics of
the clan structures. However, this social Balkanization of the country makes the
transition to national politics difficult: “youth from villages are easily manipulated and
have tribal and regional affiliations,” the former of which are nothing more than
“prejudices and lack of information.” 24
Moreover, they can lead individuals into a
conflict of interest, a scenario that is often accepted at face value rather than challenged
as a legal or ethical transgression.
An interesting counterexample to this trend is a new force in Kyrgyz politics, the
KelKel Youth Movement, which began on January 15, 2005 and emerged as a significant
public voice after the fraudulent February 2005 parliamentary ballot. Originally an
association of university students, it began to organize around “having a democratic and
transparent parliamentary election and to protest violations.” 25
While it was inspired by
youth movements in other countries, such as Serbia’s Otpor, Georgia’s Kmara and
Ukraine’s Pora, it began as an unregistered organization without any financial
resources. 26
After the March revolution, the group’s fortunes changed as they took a
central role in restoring order after Akaev’s ousting: 27 “Before the revolution, KelKel
was not taken seriously by NDI and other international organizations; afterwards, even
22 McGlinchey, E. M. "Contours of Discontent? Demographics and Perceptions of Governance in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan." Journal of Central Asian Studies 5(1): 14-30.
23 Alimov, K. (1994). "Are Central Asian Clans Still Playing a Political Role?" Central Asia Monitor(4): 15.
24 “In reality, there is no conflict between the south and the north – people are manipulated by elites for
their own interest.” Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
25 “Кел-Кел” means “new epoch” in Kyrgyz. Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
26 Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
27 According to Ms. Umetbaeva, KelKel “gathered items looted from the [government palace]” and
“organized groups of volunteers to protect the city.” Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
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Indecision 2005: Kyrgyzstan Votes
the local politicians took an interest.” 28
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
The leaders are committed to keeping the
organization nonpartisan – “if KelKel joins political parties or the government, the main
principle of educating youth will not be achieved.” 29
However, even after Bakiev has all
but secured his position as Prime Minister, my interviewee, who was inspired to join
KelKel out of a personal desire for democratic governance, commented that “nothing has
changed – only the people.” 30
This sentiment of perpetual corruption was echoed by
non-elites with whom I spoke on the day after the election. While KelKel performs the
difficult task of bridging the gap between the realm of elite NGOs and that of popular
movements, its limited scope might prevent it from becoming a major political force in
the future. Nevertheless, just as the participants in the 1990 Mongolian pro-democracy
protests subsequently entered national politics, members of KelKel may be inspired by
their experience to one day run for office. “The new generation born after the ‘70’s,” of
which my interviewee was a member, are “more ambitious” and “want to do what is best
in the national interest.” 31 The “youth want to join the private sector.” 32 They are
“critical of the government” and “reform-minded” and exhibit “individualism, liberalism,
and pro-Western ideas.” 33
In the future, one expert predicts, there “will be many clashes
between fathers and sons” with the “revision of many values.” 34
In this spirit, the leaders
of KelKel, the Kyrgyz youth organization, wanted, as one articulated “to do something
for your country.” 35
However, on from an economic perspective most of KelKel’s
28 KelKel was even “invited to an organizing committee of a national forum, supported by the Soros
Foundation’s [Open Society Institute] and the OSCE.” Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
29 Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
30 Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
31 Kashkaraev, Dr. Nurlan. Personal Interview.
32 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
33 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
34 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
35 Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
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members, as university students, represent an elite demographic among the population of
Kyrgyzstan. Their interests (presumably, for example, lowered tuition and/or increased
higher education funding) might not correlate with those of the general population – how
could an impoverished herder be expected to recognize the highly indirect way in which
universities benefit him? Although by itself KelKel might not have the strength to
transform Kyrgyzstan, it provides a strong example for identity-based bottom-up
grassroots mobilization that other economic groups, such as bazaar merchants, could
follow.
While study tours can help such budding activists become the country’s most
active agents of social change, 36
for the most part, international organizations have
viewed democracy promotion as a top-down enterprise in Kyrgyzstan. According to one
program officer, this strategy reflects the Kyrgyz mentality: “the bottom-up concept [of
political organizing] doesn’t exist – it’s completely top-down, [and one] must develop
programs to match thinking patterns.” 37
The get-out-the-vote campaign, USAID’s
primary focus throughout the run-up to the election, 38 followed this model: volunteers
were mobilized to distribute pamphlets, a web site was launched, 39 and a lavish concert
series, co-sponsored by IFES, the OSCE and the US Embassy. 40
Officials saw quality
elections as critical to the democratization process: “elections, other than war, are the
36 Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview 2.
37 Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview 2.
38 Monolbaev, Ruslan. Personal Interview.
39 www.2005.kg was administered by the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society with the assistance of
Counterpart International (2005, 6/9/05). "Civil Society for Transparent and Unbiased Presidential
Elections in Kyrgyzstan." Retrieved 4/22/06, 2006, from http://www.cpart.kz/att/pressrelease_9_June_05.pdf.
40 (2005, 8/12/05). "Youth shows in support of the elections to be hosted in large cities of Kyrgyzstan."
Retrieved 9/22/05, 2005, from http://eng.gateway.kg/cgi-bin/page.pl?id=28&story_name=doc9395.shtml.
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Indecision 2005: Kyrgyzstan Votes
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single largest deployment [of resources/personnel] a country does.” 41
Moreover, as a
USAID official emphasized, “elections are a gauge for how competitive a system is and
how much authorities allow.” 42
“Elections are good if people understand what they will
get after they vote for a candidate – if they know what it is for.” 43
IFES, “a free-floating
bureaucracy, providing resources that governments can’t” such as the technical expertise
to run a proper election, 44 was largely responsible for fulfilling this objective. The key to
their work is “cooperation with stakeholders,” such as NGOs and the government. 45
According to them, “democracy must grow up organically,” and “IFES can help inform
about international best practices,” that is, examples from other similar countries that can
apply to the local situation. They spoke of the importance of “cooperation with
stakeholders” such as NGO’s and the government. 46
However, they emphasized that “it
is not our job to prepare mentalities, but to prepare for the future.” 47
Their “job is to
present what works elsewhere and show why it is a good idea.” 48
As country director
noted, “it’s not our job to prepare mentalities, but to prepare for the future.” 49
41 Mikosz, Dr. David & Wood, Tom. Personal Interview. 6 July 2005.
42 Croft, Jennifer. Personal Interview. 15 July 2005.
43 Tretiakova, Dr. Tatiana. (trans. Ivan Zadorojny) Personal Interview.
44 Mikosz, Dr. David & Wood, Tom. Personal Interview. 6 July 2005.
45 Mikosz, Dr. David & Wood, Tom. Personal Interview. 6 July 2005.
46 Mikosz, Dr. David & Wood, Tom. Personal Interview. 6 July 2005.
47 Mikosz, Dr. David & Wood, Tom. Personal Interview. 6 July 2005.
48 Mikosz, Dr. David & Wood, Tom. Personal Interview. 6 July 2005
49 Mikosz, Dr. David. & Wood, Tom. Personal Interview. 6 July 2005.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Kyrgyz public space: Osh Bazaar in Bishkek
However, despite a massive effort to educate the public on how to prudently
select a political candidate, “in the end, people voted for peace and stability” in electing
Bakiev. 50
“People,” after all, “are very much for stability – nobody but Bakiev could
offer that.” 51
There is still a “low level of trust on an individual basis – nobody will go
outside their family, and people don’t trust the state.” 52
On a basic level, the conception
of community membership and shared stakeholdership is not well understood: “people
steal public goods like manhole covers to sell off.” 53
I found this sentiment well
represented by two women whom I interviewed on the day after the election. The
managers of Public Foundation ‘Nur Robolo’ of Ivanovka Station, which works with the
local NGO Interbilim, they noted that “the election was weak, and people were
passive.” 54
The massive get-out-the-vote campaign seemed unnecessary: voting was a
well-established tradition dating back to Soviet times. What was needed (but not
provided) was a campaign to inspire people to pay attention to the candidates and select
50 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview. 15 July 2005.
51 Jeenbayeva Jamilya. Personal Interview. 15 July 2005.
52 Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview.
53 Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview.
54 Junusheva, Mairam & Argymbaeva, Aikam. Personal Interview (trans. Bermet Muratalieva). 11 July
2005.
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the best candidate rather than the most popular, to dissuade them that nothing bad would
happen on election day if they did not reelect the incumbent, and that the government
would not collapse if an unexpected outcome took place. While some literature carried
this message, I did not get the sense that people took the time to thoughtfully read the
widely distributed flyers, and the election web site was inaccessible to the vast majority
of the populace. Top-down democracy promotion, in this instance, failed to instill the
value of careful selection of candidates among the general populace.
Part of this lack of popular engagement derives from the fact that “there is no
identification in particular – the idea of citizenship is in suspension, and it has only come
to mean the legalistic definition – there is no patriotism or civic duty – it [citizenship] is
not thought or expressed.” 55
Similarly, in economics, “people don’t have a concept of
ownership of their own money – everything can be taken, and people pay for services
they don’t receive.” 56
“Everything is bribed; people pay for everything and collect where
they can.” This behavior is “unconscious and automatic” and justified by reasoning that
the recipient, too, has a family and will spend the money towards caring for them. 57
Despite these low-level considerations, democracy promotion programs have long
focused on elite government and non-government institutions: “Foreign aid created a
burden for the government with different systems and reporting requirements – there
were high transaction costs,” 58 which, combined with poor tracking, 59
has meant that
“foreign aid helped increase corruption.” 60 Similarly, there are “many projects targeted at
55 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
56 Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview 2.
57 Schultz, Amy. Personal Interview 2.
58 Bedelbaeva, Aisuluu. Personal Interview.
59 Bedelbaeva, Aisuluu. Personal Interview.
60 Bedelbaeva, Aisuluu. Personal Interview.
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launching NGOs,” 61 and, as a result, there are a “large number of NGOs set up.” 62
According to an OSCE official, it is “difficult to make NGOs understand that they cannot
take money and prepare something at the end – people are not used to reporting” 63 – that
is, they have little experience monitoring ongoing progress. “Many NGOs are repeating
other groups’ work.” 64
“‘Paper NGOs’ are a big problem – NGOs are grant-driven,
rather than needs-driven.” 65 According to a local professor, the “Coalition and others
were quite crucial” – “they gave an image of impartiality” and as “a movement driven for
broader social change.” 66 This “perception made it clear that it [the NGO community] is
more than a few personalities.” 67
Although “society now accepts NGOs,” it “lacks a
participatory culture” 68
because there has been only “passive speculation for many
decades.” 69
“Because people are less educated, they are easily manipulated by the
elites.” 70 Yet “the vitality of the NGOs depends on the mentality of the people.” 71 Yet
international NGOs, according to a local professor, are “not completely aware of what
they do” 72 – that is, the consequences of their actions. They “think models work in a
Western way” 73 and “do not admit failures,” 74 in part due to the “competition among
donors and overlapping mandates – if other donors develop programs in an area, it
61 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
62 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
63 Dmitrieva, Marina. Personal Interview.
64 Dmitrieva, Marina. Personal Interview.
65 Konurbaeva, Kumushkan. Personal Interview.
66 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
67 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
68 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
69 Juraev, Emil. Personal Interview.
70 Umetbaeva, Damira. Personal Interview.
71 Dmitrieva, Marina. Personal Interview.
72 Kashkaraev, Dr. Nurlan. Personal Interview.
73 Kashkaraev, Dr. Nurlan. Personal Interview.
74 Kashkaraev, Dr. Nurlan. Personal Interview.
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becomes more competitive.” 75
“Experts treat the Kyrgyz like Africans or Latin
Americans.” 76
While at times, such as KelKel’s mobilization of university students, elite NGOs
can be effective vehicles for communicating democratic values, in general the ability of
the current top-down institutionalism to effect political change is quite limited, as the
examples of IRI’s political party work and IFES’s get-out-the-vote campaign illustrate. I
found that in my time in Kyrgyzstan the latter two still dominated the agendas at all
levels of administration, reflective of the dominant philosophy of institutionalism as
articulated by the example of a recent scholarly report: While “the pathologies of
corruption, lawlessness, and the intangibility of the concepts of democratic development
have common roots: feeble state institutions and the devaluation of social moral
foundations,” 77
the second factor, a decidedly non-institutional one, is not mentioned
again: “The pathologies we have mentioned are generally rooted in the same problem: the
weakness, incompetence or corruption in state administration and institutions.” 78
To
reiterate, these institutional changes will not come about or become permanent until the
public steps up and demands them and takes steps to ensure that they are not reneged
upon.
Now, however, the fate of the country “depends on the will of the Kyrgyz
government – it depends on the sector.” 79
Foreign organizations, including Russia,
75 Konurbaeva, Kumushkan. Personal Interview. Aisuluu Bedelbaeva expressed similar sentiments.
76 Kashkaraev, Dr. Nurlan. Personal Interview.
77 Koichumanov, T. O., Joomart & Starr, S. Frederick (2005). Kyrgyzstan: The Path Forward. Occasional
Papers Series of the Joint Center. S. E. Cornell. Washington, D.C., Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & the
Silk Road Studies Program: 18.
78 The rest of the report focuses on strategies for administrative reform. Koichumanov, T. O., Joomart &
Starr, S. Frederick (2005). Kyrgyzstan: The Path Forward. Occasional Papers Series of the Joint Center. S.
E. Cornell. Washington, D.C., Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & the Silk Road Studies Program: 20
79 Croft, Jennifer. Personal Interview. 15 July 2005.
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China, 80 the OSCE 81 and the American embassy 82 extended rhetorical and institutional
support to the new government, and although such diplomatic pressure has some effect,
as “Kyrgyzstan wants to look good,” 83 though it will never be powerful enough to singlehandedly
force change. Unfortunately, as the women of Ivanovka Station predicted,
“everything has come back to what happened during Akaev’s time.” 84
In order to make
itself relevant and engage the people in shaping the country’s political and economic
progress, the government will need to appeal to them based on their interests, namely
escaping the downward spiral of rural poverty that has engulfed much of the country
since the disappearance of the USSR’s agricultural subsidies. 85
80 (2005). Russia, China will aid stabilization in Kyrgyzstan. Moscow, Interfax. 2006: Internet news article.
81 (2005). Foreign Envoys in Bishkek Offer Support, Assistance, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2006:
Internet news article.
82 (2005). U.S. Contact with Interim Leader of Kyrgyzstan. Daily Press Briefing. Washington, DC,
Department of State. 2006: Question taken at March 25, 2005 Daily Press Briefing.
83 Kashkaraev, Dr. Nurlan. Personal Interview.
84 Junusheva, Mairam & Argymbaeva, Aikam. Personal Interview (trans. Bermet Muratalieva). 11 July
2005.
85 Howell, J. (1996). "Poverty and Transition in Kyrgyzstan: How Some Households Cope." Central Asian
Survey 15(1): 59-74.
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Morning in Mongolia?
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Beneath the façade of seemingly functional democratic institutions, Mongolia
faces similar challenges to other Central Asian states. For example, although the
government does not censor the media, newspapers’ inability to survive without external
sponsorship forces most to defer to the preferences of their patrons, primarily wealthy
businessmen with an interest in controlling the flow of information. While this diversity
often avoids the echo chamber common to tightly controlled states, it can foster the
opposite extreme, in which newspapers become tools for wealthy businessmen to wage
war upon each other’s reputation. While the Constitution of 1992 established three
relatively independent branches, 1
there are numerous measures preventing each from
fulfilling its full capability: 2 branches competing for power, 3 underfunding and, as one
ministry official admitted, a Soviet authoritarianism that still influences present-day
politicians’ conception of governance. 4 “The rule of law doesn’t work in Mongolia –
government ministers make arbitrary decisions.” 5
Moreover, its competitive two-party
system, evidence of the country’s emergence into the realm of democratic states, 6
is
breaking down as the weak liberal-conservative coalitions within both the MPRP and the
1 Ms. Taivankhuu ALTANGEREL. Personal Interview. 5 August 2005.
2 For example, members of parliament perceive themselves not as representatives of the people, but “as a
part of the state administration,” and any visits to their constituencies “should be an ‘ideological’ campaign
to make people understand democratic values.” ELBEGSAIKHAN, J. Personal Interview. 22 August
2005.
3 I spoke with Tsogt Tsend, a judge on the General Council of Courts of the Ulaanbaatar Administrative
Court, the appellate court used by people taking up cases against the government. He noted that during the
2004 formation of the Administrative court, the “main problem was in the judiciary – the executive branch
didn’t want to lose power to the judicial branch – before, the Minister of Justice was the Council of the
Court, although he was the head of a policymaking body.” Mr. TSOGT Tsend. Personal Interview. 24
August 2005.
4 Ms. Taivankhuu ALTANGEREL. Personal Interview. 5 August 2005.
5 Ayurzana, Ariuntuya. Personal Interview (trans. Achbold Battogtokh). 7 August 2005.
6 “The political system that has been established meets most of the minimal and procedural criteria for
democracy outlined by democracy analysts (Diamond 1999; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi
2002), has a competitive and developed political party system and has maintained peaceful and regular
transfers of power over five successive parliamentary elections (1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004) and four
presidential elections (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005)” Landman, T. L., Marco & McElvoy, Claire (2005). State
of Democracy in Mongolia: A Desk Study. Essex, UK, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex: 46.
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Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Mongolian Democratic Party dissolve into factional intra-party squabbling. 7
Mongolia
exhibits the same lack of quality participation in elections that I discovered in Kyrgyzstan
– while turnout was high, 8 there were problems with the process, particularly with
candidates making outlandish promises in order to attract votes. 9
The result is that
relatively few checks exist on administrative power, and “government leaders think they
can do anything.” 10
However, these aspects of dysfunction pale in comparison to the most dangerous
threat: corruption. A 2005 USAID report noted “a profound blurring of the lines between
the public and private, sector brought about by endemic and systemic conflict of interest
at nearly all levels,” opacity of information, weak non-government sector, limited
political will and weak internal control mechanisms. 11
While the Mongolian government
has made “rudimentary efforts” 12 at fighting corruption, it has so far been overwhelmed:
“Mongolians cannot fight it,” 13
one official conceded. On a social level, “petty
corruption is becoming a way of life, of getting things done; people are getting used to
7 Sarlagtay, Mashbat O. Personal Interview. 12 August 2005.
8 Over 80% in all national elections. Landman, T. L., Marco & McElvoy, Claire (2005). State of
Democracy in Mongolia: A Desk Study. Essex, UK, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex: 46.
8 Sarlagtay, Mashbat O. Personal Interview. 12 August 2005. 34.
9 One interviewee told me that at a campaign rally she asked a local candidate “‘whether the 10000₮
promise was true, how she can believe it, what she can tell her children.’ The politician said that he would
not tell a lie, but he was lying.” Altanching, D. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh) 24 August 2004.
The “10000₮ promise” refers to “promises by the MPRP of 100,000 tugrik (about USD 100) for each
newborn baby and 500,000 tugrik (or USD 500) for each newly wed couple and of the MDC of 10,000
tugrik (or USD 10) per child per month [which] threaten to bust the budget.” Slutz, P. J. (2004, 10/17/04).
"United States-Mongolia Relations: “A Comprehensive Partnership Based on Shared Values and Common
Strategic Interests”." Retrieved 4/22/06, 2006.
10 “Enkhbayar [the Prime Minister from 2000-2004] made a secret agreement with the Chinese to build a
bridge across the border through a protected area. Environmentalists became angry, and the government
said that the project was stopped. A week ago [August 2005], the government announced that the project
was happening.” OYUNBILEG Basanjav. Personal Interview 16 August 2005.
11 Casals & Associates, I. (2005). Assessment of Corruption in Mongolia. Washington, DC, United States
Agency for International Development: 1.
12 Casals & Associates, I. (2005). Assessment of Corruption in Mongolia. Washington, DC, United States
Agency for International Development: 2.
13 Ms. Taivankhuu ALTANGEREL. Personal Interview. 5 August 2005.
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it.” 14
Moreover, because of the nature of bilateral assistance, “the ‘levers’ that donors
have to push are relatively few.” 15 Combined with Mongolia’s high level of per-capita
annual aid (around $110 16 ), the government’s inability to enforce laws makes democracy
promotion by the external carrot-and-stick diplomacy all but impossible. Rather,
“fighting corruption is an issue of fighting organized crime.” 17
While high incentives for
cheating and few penalties for getting caught create opportunities for cheating the system,
unfortunately, the problem extends far beyond a series of nefarious networks – corruption
is ingrained into the mentality, and “receiving bribes is just a kind of tool to reach another
end.” 18
The U.S.’s new Millennium Challenge Account, which requires the
implementation stringent anti-corruption laws and enforcement mechanisms prior to any
disbursement, 19 might present an incentive strong enough to compel the government to
clean up its act. However, given the pervasiveness of corruption and the legislative
deadlock following the 2004 election, it seems highly unlikely that the government will
ever be capable in the near future of single-handedly accomplishing such a feat.
Moreover, the high perception of corruption 20 has added to the public expectation that
politicians and civil servants are open to accepting bribes. 21
In order to effectively
14 Bayartsetseng, J. Personal Interiview. 7 August 2005.
15 Casals & Associates, I. (2005). Assessment of Corruption in Mongolia. Washington, DC, United States
Agency for International Development: 35.
16 As was previously noted, increased levels of development assistance often correspond to increased levels
of corruption. (2003). USAID/Mongolia Strategic Plan, 2004-2008. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, United States
Agency for International Development: 21.
17 ELBEGSAIKHAN, J. Personal Interview. 22 August 2005.
18 ELBEGSAIKHAN, J. Personal Interview. 22 August 2005.
19 Scherer, Jay. Personal Interview [DATE?] For more information, see
.
20 Landman, T. L., Marco & McElvoy, Claire (2005). State of Democracy in Mongolia: A Desk Study.
Essex, UK, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex: 31.
21 As a boot-maker I interviewed noted, “there are two kinds of opinion about politicians: first, that they are
worse people than herself – they give promises just to be in parliament and members of government, and
second, they are people who are able to follow up on promises, but the people under them do not work
correctly.” Altanching, D. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh) 24 August 2005.
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combat corruption, Mongolia will need non-governmental organizations capable of both
issue-specific political advocacy and acting as an interface between the government and
the public. 22
While the parliament has the potential to enact laws to create powerful safeguards
against corruption, “implementation is a central concern.” 23
In human rights, for
example, “Mongolia signs on to every treaty and thinks it’s done.” 24 Radical oscillations
in policy have resulted from the government’s attempt to balance Socialist principles with
the expectations of international donors. 25
To achieve its strategic objective of “more
effective and accountable governance,” 26 USAID has moved from the “‘supply’ side of
the democracy equation” 27 to the demand, focusing on the enactment of legal reforms
and the improvement of the political process. 28
As one NGO leader commented, “NGOs
are a role model for the government, helping [administrators] lose this [Socialist]
mentality.” 29
However, they have a mixed record, inspiring Mongolia’s leading pollster
to note that “the golden age of NGOs is in the past…NGOs are not prestigious…people
are frustrated in NGOs, parties, etc.” 30
“The media sees NGOs as a business getting
22 This argument is echoed in Casals & Associates, I. (2005). Assessment of Corruption in Mongolia.
Washington, DC, United States Agency for International Development.
23 (2003). USAID/Mongolia Strategic Plan, 2004-2008. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, United States Agency for
International Development: 38.
24 Jaske, Kelly. Personal Interview. 16 August 2005.
25 Steiner-Khamsi, G. S., Ines (2004). "Decentralization and Recentralization Reform in Mongolia: Tracing
the Swing of the Pendulum." Comparative Education 40(1): 29-53.
26 (2003). USAID/Mongolia Strategic Plan, 2004-2008. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, United States Agency for
International Development: 37.
27 That is, building a strong legislature, judiciary, etc. (2003). USAID/Mongolia Strategic Plan, 2004-2008.
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, United States Agency for International Development: 38.
28 “Legal reform” includes improving the efficiency of the court system and instituting new anti-corruption
prosecutorial offices. “Political process improvement” includes assisting the evolution of political parties
and improving the transparency of the parliament. (2003). USAID/Mongolia Strategic Plan, 2004-2008.
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, United States Agency for International Development: 40-44.
29 Ayurzana, Ariuntuya. Personal Interview (trans. Achbold Battogtokh). 7 August 2005.
30 Luvsandendev SUMATI. Personal Interview. 23 August 2005.
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foreign funding.” 31
Moreover, there is the perception by non-elites that the groups are
not doing anything to improve the economic status of the massive lower-middle class. 32
As the experience of the Mongolian anti-domestic violence coalition illustrates,
even in a favorable political environment, the orientation of advocacy NGOs towards the
government affects the outcome. In 1995, an informal coalition of NGOs formed to
lobby the Mongolian parliament to draft a domestic violence law after leaders went to
trainings in Western countries and wanted to introduce the concept into Mongolian
laws. 33
CEDAW Watch, NCAV 34 and LEOS (Liberal Women’s Brain Pool), a NED
grantee, 35 which began by organizing professional women and providing them trainings
on leadership, sought to “speak for women’s rights from a human rights perspective
[because] the capacity of NGOs does not allow us to know about every individual’s
problems in every case.” 36
This tactical decision appears to have been of great
consequence: by employing the language of the well-educated elite, 37 they gained access
to both legislators and international organizations, but it may have cost them access to
31 OTGONCHIMEG, Altangerel. Personal Interview. 16 August 2005.
32 One factory owner noted that “although there are many associations, they don’t do anything for the
Mongolians.” Chimedtuya S. Personal Interview. (trans. Enkhmunkh) 24 August 2005.
33 Amarsanaa, Khongorzul and Khurelbaatar, Mankzal. Personal Interview. 10 August 2005.
34 The National Center Against Violence. See:
35 LEOS is Mongolian for Liberal Emegteichuudiin Oyuny San. NED is the National Endowment for
Democracy, which does not operate in either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. It gave LEOS $34000 in 2000 and
2002, $64000 in 2001 and $35000 in 2003 and 2004. Tsend, Enkhtuya & Purvsuren, Baigalmaa. Personal
Interview. 5 August 2005. (11/3/03). "Description of 2000 Grants." Annual Report Retrieved 4/14/06,
2006, from http://www.ned.org/publications/00annual/grants-asia.html. (2002, 8/3/03). "Description of
2001 Grants." Annual Report Retrieved 4/14/06, 2006, from
http://www.ned.org/publications/01annual/grants-asia.html.(2003, 3/23/05). "Description of 2002 Grants."
Annual Report Retrieved 4/12/06, 2006, from http://www.ned.org/grants/02programs/grantsasia.html.(2004,
6/20/05). "Description of 2003 Grants." Annual Report Retrieved 4/12/06, 2006, from
http://www.ned.org/grants/03programs/grants-asia.html.(2005, 11/18/05). "Description of 2004 Grants."
Annual Report Retrieved 4/12/06, 2006, from http://www.ned.org/grants/04programs/grants-asia04.html.
36 Jurmed, Zanaa. Personal Interview. 11 August 2005.
37 Speaking of the 1990 pro-democracy campaign that toppled Communism, Ms. Jurmed of CEDAW
Watch noted that “in the movement, there were many people educated in Europe or Russia…[and] got the
idea of human rights from international conventions.” These activists, such as Tsakhiagiyn Elbegdorj, have
been in and around the government ever since then. Jurmed, Zanaa. Personal Interview. 11 August 2005.
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local authorities whose support was necessary to building a broad base of support within
the government: “2000 people have been trained” by CEDAW “but very few have
committed to working with it.” 38 The coalition researched sympathetic and antipathetic
MPs, launched media campaigns and collected signatures, but “everyone was afraid of
the word ‘violence’…Mongolia is very patriarchal and they think that NCAV is working
against them.” 39
LEOS also suffered from members’ partisan affiliation: “Women don’t
like to say that they are members of LEOS; people assume that they are members of the
Democratic Party.” 40
However, advocacy has been difficult: “usually, the Mongolian
government does not collaborate with NGOs,” and “parliament members have been men,
so they do not change – they say that they want to implement changes but they never take
action.” 41 Ultimately, UNICEF and UNIFEM, 42 with whom the coalition partnered,
“pressured the government to pass the law quickly, so it came out vague rather than
sophisticated as NCAV wanted.” 43
After almost a decade, 44 the law has yet to be fully
implemented by the government, and NGOs have largely taken over the responsibility.
Why did the domestic violence movement fail to achieve its goal of a
comprehensive law criminalizing the practice? Apathy on sociopolitical is highly
unlikely - according to the country’s leading pollster, Mongolians are quite opinionated:
it is “not difficult to conduct surveys in the countryside – rural people appreciate it
38 Jurmed, Zanaa. Personal Interview. 11 August 2005
39 They added that NCAV is called the “Organization Against Men” behind their backs. Amarsanaa,
Khongorzul and Khurelbaatar, Mankzal. Personal Interview. 10 August 2005.
40 Tsend, Enkhtuya & Purvsuren, Baigalmaa. Personal Interview. 5 August 2005.
41 This comment was not meant to be sexist; rather, it was meant to point out that since all but a few MPs
are male, it is difficult for NGOs to overcome apathy and get enough together to put womens’ issues on the
agenda. Tsend, Enkhtuya & Purvsuren, Baigalmaa. Personal Interview. 5 August 2005.
42 United Nations Fund for Children and the United Nations Development Fund for Women
43 Amarsanaa, Khongorzul and Khurelbaatar, Mankzal. Personal Interview. 10 August 2005.
44 The law was passed in 2004. (2004). "Mongolia: The new Law Against Domestic Violence, including the
date it came, or will come, into force; the text as passed by the Mongolian government; any relevant news
about its implementation." Retrieved 4/21/06, 2006, from http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsddocview.html?tbl=RSDCOI&id=42df613d20.
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because nobody ever asks their opinion.” 45
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Rather, the challenge facing the movement
was how to organize the country’s women to pressure politicians to enact change. To
achieve their objective, popular movements need only to command enough of the
population that the government perceives a threat: As illustrated by the 1990 prodemocracy
movement, successful only due to massive turnout at protests, when unified
the public is capable of effecting political change – like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the
government does not command enough material resources to enable them to suppress a
popular uprising.
Yet while popular protests are not uncommon in Mongolia, they have always
focused on stopping current policies rather than advocating for new ones. This strategy
allows the government to appeal to the populace’s Soviet-inspired fear of change in order
to undermine support for the protest. For example, the Healthy Society Movement’s 46
March 2005 campaign against corruption, which “makes people poor” and is “an
injustice,” 47
faltered because organizers were unable to inspire broad public support.
Though buoyed by students’ enthusiasm, it collapsed in the face of the government’s
determination to maintain the status quo – the Prime Minister met with the protestors,
abolished a law prohibiting demonstrations, (thereby accomplishing an intermediate goal)
but did nothing more. 48
Although the Healthy Society Movement’s campaign both
represented a necessary step for the country and reflected broad public sentiment, their
45 SUMATI, Luvsandendev. Personal Interview 23 August 2005.
46 The group is known by a variety of names, including the Just Society Civic Movement (and various
iterations thereof). I am using the translation supplied by the group’s leader, Jalbasuren BATZANDAN.
Personal Interview. 19 August 2005.
47 Mr. Batzandan alleged that the current president, Nambaryn ENKHBAYAR, “admitted that,” when he
was the speaker of parliament (8/20/2004-6/24/2005), “people came to his office to pay 500,000 ₮ (Tugrik
– approximately $420)...but he would not name the people, and later he said that it was a joke.” Mr.
Jalbasuren BATZANDAN. Personal Interview. 19 August 2005.
48 Ms. Taivankhuu ALTANGEREL. Personal Interview. 5 August 2005.
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first protest’s relatively small size 49 and the ease with which counterprotestors interfered
with a follow-up protest 50
highlight the difficulties facing organizers of popular
movements, namely the problem of establishing legitimacy and public wariness of
confrontational politics. 51
By failing to specifically address the lingering preference for
authoritarianism in present-day Mongolian society, 52
the Healthy Society Movement
failed to convert the deep public resentment of politicians into outrage.
While the anti-domestic violence movement faced the additional challenge of
changing the public conception of domestic violence, this might have been less difficult
in Mongolia than in more paternalistic societies, 53 as women represent the vase majority
of university graduates, are often heads of households 54 and, as I discovered, ran the
majority of NGOs. However, despite strong networks between NGO leaders, they were
unable to reach out to non-elite women who could have provided the grassroots support
necessary for compelling the government to enact strong legislation: neither of the two
49 1,000 people at its maximum, approximately 0.1% of the population of Ulaanbaatar. (2005, 2/11/05).
"Over 1,000 Protest Against Corruption." Retrieved 4/20/06, 2006, from
http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/homenews.php?subaction=showfull&id=1108103927&archive=&start_from
=&ucat=1&.
50 Although the anti-corruption protestors outnumbered the counterprotestors, clearly the latter were
successful in creating the appearance of dissension. Gun-Uyanga, S. (2005, 3/3/05). "Second Anti-
Corruption Protest Countered by MPRP Protest." Retrieved 4/20/06, 2006, from
http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/homenews.php?subaction=showfull&id=1109831330&archive=&start_from
=&ucat=1&.
51 The counterprotestors were not advocating for corruption per se, but rather a more conciliatory stance,
claiming that the Healthy Society Movement slandered Enkhbayar by accusing him of corruption. (2005,
2/11/05). "Over 1,000 Protest Against Corruption." Retrieved 4/20/06, 2006, from
http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/homenews.php?subaction=showfull&id=1108103927&archive=&start_from
=&ucat=1&.
52 Analyzing 2002-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys, Shin and Wells articulate Mongolians’ high degree
of attachment to civilian nondemocratic regimes and lack of faith in democratic regimes and processes
relative to other East Asian nations. Chull Shin, D. W., Jason (2005). "Is Democracy the Only Game in
Town?" Jounral of Democracy 16(2): 92-93.
53 This is due in part to the Soviet promotion of gender equality and to nomadic gender roles – the women
carried out necessary tasks while men were away herding.
54 Whewell, T. (2000, 7/28/00). "Women steppe out in Mongolia." Crossing Continents Retrieved 4/21/06,
2006, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/asia/854144.stm.
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businesswomen I spoke with was aware of the campaign. 55
Top-down civic engagement,
where an NGO recruits volunteers to assist with its campaign, is difficult when they are
asked to take a political risk in order to achieve an abstract objective that might not end
up providing them any benefit. For example, a leader of a local government oversight
project found that it was “hard to ask people to participate – people depend all their life
on the governor – it is risky to even ask about the budget. The local governor is allpowerful
in the soum (sub-province) – like a king.” 56
The primary challenge for democracy promotion programs is teaching
commonplace people who have retreated from politics how to pursue solutions to the
problems they perceive around them, gradually building up civil society from the bottom
so that organizations are responsive to the needs of the populace. Part of engaging people,
however, involves educating them on the proper relationship between the public and the
government. As one MP commented, “people haven’t learned how to be responsible
citizens – they look to leaders to solve their problems – [the people] are frustrated
because [the leaders] hear a lot but are not acting.” 57
In general, the lack of social
entrepreneurship at the local level impedes socioeconomic progress: “People are good at
identifying the causes of poverty, but there are no small steps [to address it] like setting
up a small business forum – Mongolians must take the trainings and do something.” 58
Social change must begin from the bottom, not from national NGOs who look to
international donors for grants – and agendas – and last only as long as their funding.
“Projects undermine the ability of NGOs to represent constituencies,” one program
55 Altanching, D. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh). 24 August 2005. and Chimegtuya, S. Personal
Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh). 24 August 2005.
56 NARANGAREL Rinchin. Personal Interview. 22 August 2005.
57 OYUN, Sanjaasurengiin. Personal Interview. 18 August 2005.
58 Vijh, Vineet. Personal Interview. 17 August 2005.
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officer noted, “and people think that NGOs are a bunch of highly educated women who
have learned to write project proposals – all they do is research and meetings.” 59
On a broad scale, part of the difficulty in establishing grassroots advocacy
movements is the lack of quality information. As an Open Society Forum official
remarked, “citizens should be informed – informed citizens can have quality participation
such as constructive dialog.” 60
Although “in Mongolia there is more opportunity to
criticize the government without fear,” 61 “censorship exists in many forms…state owned
the state-owned broadcasting favors the ruling party” and “self-censorship [by]
journalists afraid of imprisonment” precludes quality investigative journalism. 62
“Corruption,” for example, “is a taboo topic, and papers don’t think it’s their
responsibility to expose it.” 63
“Although there are no restrictions on freedom of speech,
it is still subdued because people don’t know any better.” 64
In other words, the quality of
the media will not improve until people begin to demand it by patronizing better
newspapers. However, this requires an appreciation for excellent journalism, a norm
currently lacking in the general public: while people generally believe that the
government is corrupt, their inability to use media sources to demonstrate it conclusively
is not of great concern. Moreover, recent surveys show a tendency to support
authoritarian practices, such as censorship. 65
Fortunately, however, this destructive cycle of apathy and corruption is not
universal. Examples of grassroots mobilization exist in Mongolia, illustrating how the
59 Marhy, Badamdash D. Personal Interview. 7 August 2005.
60 Bayartsetseng, J. Personal Interiview. 7 August 2005.
61 Bayartsetseng, J. Personal Interiview. 7 August 2005.
62 Naranjargal, H. Personal Interview. 9 August 2005.
63 Vijh, Vineet. Personal Interview. 17 August 2005.
64 Vijh, Vineet. Personal Interview. 17 August 2005.
65 Shin, D. C. W., Jason (2005). "Is Democracy the Only Game in Town?" Journal of Democracy 16(2): 88-
101.
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culture of nomadic society can support consensus-driven political progress. After
scientists determined that a gold mine’s diversion of water was responsible for drying up
a lake and pushing near extinction the Ongi River, 66 locals in the watershed began to
mobilize around saving their livelihood. The organizers of the Ongi River Movement
relied on traditional associations which brought nomads together in times of crisis. 67
According to the head of the organization, the local public and administrative officers
comprised the initial group. 68
Rather than leaving the area, however, locals decided to
organize and solve the problem, meeting in small meetings to share ideas. “60000 people
living along the river understood that it will be very difficult to live without the river and
that the problem was the fault of people, not of nature.” 69
While bringing journalists to
the river brought the problem to the attention of national policymakers and provided them
access to affected parties (local government, mining company administrators, miners, and
locals), the Ongi River Movement was able to attain its goal because it conducted regular
interviews with ordinary citizens and held seven roundtable meetings in the past four
years: “we make plans together and do conclusions together – people are very interested
because they are participating in the movement.” 70
These meetings built trust between
the disparate groups, helping the government and the mine to overcome the temptation to
cheat on the locals, which would have resulted in great environmental damage and loss of
life. By creating a forum for effective communication, the Movement forced local
administrators to recognize the political power of a unified and empowered constituency:
66 Онги гол, located in the south-central Övörhangay Province (Өвөрхангай аймаг).
67 Otgonbayar, M. Y. (1997). Nomadic Civilization and Mongolia. Mongolia: Tryst with Change and
Development. R. C. Sharma. New Delhi, India, Vision & Venture: 227.
68 MUNKHBAYAR, Tserenbat. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh). 29 August 2005.
69 MUNKHBAYAR, Tserenbat. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh). 29 August 2005.
70 MUNKHBAYAR, Tserenbat. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh). 29 August 2005.
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locals expected scrupulous governance, and their grassroots network gave them the
power to enforce it by voting out corrupt officials. Having reached an agreement on the
steps necessary to protect the river, the Ongi River Movement has since turned its focus
towards pressing the government (both local and national) to fulfill its part of the bargain
by drafting and enforcing more stringent environmental protection laws, “a test” to see if
the government can “correct corruption in Mongolia to save their life and nature.” 71
Unlike the constellation of NGOs in Ulaanbaatar, the Movement has worked with
international organizations only indirectly: they “helped solve problems with the budget”
and “invited people to give advice.” 72
However, unlike the anti-domestic violence
movement, they did not play a role in the initial phases, when plans were outlined and
strategies formulated. The lack of funding meant that Mr. Munkhbayar relied on
volunteers, who had a stake in the outcome, rather than paid employees, for bringing in
new members and organizing meetings.
The Ongi River Movement illustrates how grassroots civil society enables
ordinary people to engage in politics. Its meetings focused on consensus rather than
confrontation, and its local focus enabled participants to gain an understanding and
appreciation of a participatory process. Without certain elements, such as the use of
information (geology research demonstrating the source of the drought) to prove their
case, locals would not have been able to successfully forge a partnership with the
government. However, the key to the movement’s success was its devotion to a specific
objective - saving the river – that allowed it to consider options other than appealing to
the government to intervene, which many other social service NGOs attempt. By staying
71 MUNKHBAYAR, Tserenbat. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh). 29 August 2005.
72 MUNKHBAYAR, Tserenbat. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh). 29 August 2005.
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out of national politics, it could work on the level of individuals rather than institutions,
building interpersonal connections that made cheating socially unfavorable. 73
Interestingly, the programs most successful at promoting democratic norms are
those not explicitly focused on political reform. Just as the Ongi River Movement is
essentially an environmental movement, 74 the GER Initiative, 75 sponsored by USAID
and operated by CHF International, has instilled an appreciation for particular democratic
norms by teaching business skills to enable lower-middle class entrepreneurs in
Ulaanbaatar’s peri-urban ger districts to achieve financial and, therefore, political
independence. The Initiative’s most important activity, providing conditioned microloans
to businesspeople with interest rates far below the astronomical levels charged by
local banks, gives them the capital necessary to expand their enterprises. However,
speaking with several clients, I noticed a certain tendency towards the libertarian ideal of
“rugged individualism” 76 – except for essential services, they were relatively independent
of the government, no longer relying upon it for employment (as during Socialist times)
or protection: 77 a garage owner says that owning his business has given him a sense of
independence and responsibility for managing income and expenditures. 78 A boot-maker
remarked that she “has never gone to the government and doesn’t think that the
73 In other words, if a local administrator decided to sell out a community by signing away mining rights,
he would be cheating people whom he knew personally, rather than nameless peasantry.
74 In other words, their exclusive focus is on preserving the river, and political engagement is simply a
means to that end.
75 GER is another excellent morsel from the government alphabet soup: Growing Entrepreneurship
Rapidly.
76 Hoover, H. (1929). "The Philosophy of Rugged Individualism." Retrieved 4/22/06, 2006, from
http://www.civics-online.org/library/formatted/texts/hoover_individualism.html.
77 That is, there is not a widespread fear of government-sponsored persecution (random shakedowns,
closing of businesses, etc.) that is prevalent (often for good reason) in other countries, such as Tajikistan.
78 Byambasuren. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh) 25 August 2005.
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government could help her.” 79
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
This disenchantment from national politics has forced
businesspeople to focus on the micro-political situation around her: a factory owner will
meet with the district (sub-municipal) leader, who can tell people at higher levels. 80
She
believes that “when I gather a lot of people together, it is possible to make change.” 81
Although these businesspeople had little understanding of more abstract democratic
principles frequently discussed at elite levels, 82 the project gave them the financial means
to engage in market transactions and build a firm, thereby working towards liberal
democratic practice through the medium of free-market capitalism. The GER Initiative
worked because, like the Ongi River Movement, individuals were presented with a
specific economic objective whose pursuit would teach them democratic norms.
How does this difference reflect on democracy promotion programs? As the GER
country director noted, the “whole point is letting people organize the way they want to
organize – if you tell people they need a leadership, they will check the box” 83 and go
through the motions of organization without taking a personal interest in it. Involvement
beyond funding is minimal: although technical and organizational assistance is provided
when needed, “the most empowering thing we can do is introduce our successful clients
to other successful clients.” 84
Similarly, the Asia Foundation, which supports the Ongi
River Movement, does not pursue a specific set of political objectives: “Asia
Foundation’s fundamental program philosophy is that it responds to the requests and
desires of Asians – what Asians want…It has no canned programs sitting on the shelf for
79 Altanching, D. Personal Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh) 24 August 2005.
80 Of course, she is also able to meet with Member of Parliament Sanjaasurengiin OYUN, who happens to
be her relative. Chimedtuya S. Personal Interview. (trans. Enkhmunkh) 24 August 2005.
81 Chimedtuya S. Personal Interview. (trans. Enkhmunkh) 24 August 2005.
82 “I don’t know exactly, but I think it’s important to respect human rights.” Byambasuren. Personal
Interview (trans. Enkhmunkh) 25 August 2005.
83 McCullagh, Neil. Personal Interview. 18 August 2005.
84 McCullagh, Neil. Personal Interview. 18 August 2005.
94

Morning in Mongolia?
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
democracy…The approach is to go in and speak to the people.” 85
This philosophy of
sustained engagements has allowed the Asia Foundation to play a key role in Mongolia’s
democratic development from the beginning, allowing it to establish and maintain strong
contacts with both government and NGOs while not becoming a source of blank checks.
It provided the financial support for the Ongi River Movement to expand its operations,
but not before, allowing it to emerge as a truly citizen-led organization. This example of
organizations leading donors, as opposed to the far more common opposite scenario,
exemplifies a different model for international democracy promotion that could
complement institutional work by building a base of public support for governance
reform and anti-corruption programs.
85 Severinghaus, Dr. Sheldon R. Personal Interview. 29 August 2005.
95

Conclusion
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
For better or worse, the two-pronged strategy adopted by current democracy
promotion programs has influenced the current composition of the political sphere in
each of the three countries. By seeking to simultaneously improve the government
institutions and build a non-government sector, international democracy promotion
programs have created opportunities for a diverse elite-level political discourse. 1
Legislative reform programs, in which international experts advise MPs, have created the
capacity for deliberative democratic 2 lawmaking. Judicial trainings have given the courts
the technical and political capability of becoming independent from the other branches.
Civil society strengthening programs have spawned a constellation of national nongovernmental
organizations proficient in monitoring threats to human and civil rights.
Ultimately, however, democracy promotion programs have created a hollow
artifice, a façade of a democratic system that is expected to function, like a perpetual
motion machine, independent of public support and engagement. At their most
dysfunctional, they can drain donors’ resources and divert the public attention from
critical issues with internal debates and inconsequential projects. Conversely, if they
become too efficient at delivering services and setting policies, they risk becoming coopted
by powerful elite interests. 3
Rather than pursuing a medium between the two
extremes, which risks devolving into paternalism, 4 both NGOs and the governments must
1 While this is threatened in Tajikistan, the political oppression is nowhere near as severe as in neighboring
Uzbekistan. This accomplishment is quite significant considering the highly authoritarian style of
Communist governance employed in all three countries.
2 In using “democratic” here I refer to the use of specialized committees to draft legislation before
introducing it to the general legislative body, rather than simply rubber-stamping everything sent in by the
executive branch.
3 An example is Weimar Germany, whose downfall was precipitated by its strong civil society network,
according to: Berman, S. (1997). "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic." World Politics
49(3): 401-429.
4 In other words, leaders start making claims (which I sometimes heard) that the general populace does not
know what they want (or need) and is not qualified to make political decisions.
96

Conclusion
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
instead work towards greater accountability and representation. Lowering the bar for
public participation by creating local discussion forums and lifting pressure on news
media will enable popular sentiment, expressed through norms and ideals promulgated by
grassroots associations, to guide policymaking.
Only when the three sectors
(government, business, NGO) are configured to serve the public will the three states be
truly democratic.
Rather than beginning at the top, democracy promotion programs must work from
the bottom by seeking to inspire demand for better governance and NGO representation
among the populace. This process begins with providing incentives for economic
collaboration, which builds trust by demonstrating the benefits of collective action. For
example, if a group of farmers gather together to purchase a shared truck for transporting
produce, each incurs the risk that another member of the group will cheat on everyone,
selling the truck for himself or using it outside its purpose. However, by minimizing
transport costs, the truck might allow everyone to make extra profit. On a larger scale,
authorities are necessary to enforce compliance and to establish policies that promote
trust. Moving from local politics to the regional and national level requires a sense of
stakeholdership – the belief that a government exists to serve the needs of ordinary
people and, in turn, that they have the ability to petition it for services and policies. 5
Given strong leadership, grassroots associations can coalesce around particular interests,
as the example of Mongolia’s Ongi River Movement illustrated, beginning to demand
reforms and new policies from the government.
While this process is neither simple nor intuitive, several intermediate objectives
for creating this interpersonal trust allow international democracy programs to work
5 While this might seem obvious to Americans, this sentiment is not at all intuitive in the post-Soviet world.
97

Conclusion
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
through it sequentially. Principally, social capital can enable ordinary individuals and
small groups to solve problems more effectively than either formal institutions or state
agencies. 6
Second, community-based organizations, separate from customary
authorities, can disseminate ideas about the nature of citizenship, particularly among
traditionally marginalized populations, and develop strategies for equitable collective
action. 7
Third, economic development institutions, such as microfinance banks, can
absorb the risk incurred by making a collective purchase. In order to pursue these
objectives international organizations must build “community capacity.” 8
Several
models for achieving this feat provide different structures and incentives to allow
individuals to embrace democratic political engagement 9 as a legitimate method of local
problem-solving. One framework is “Participatory Reflection and Action,” in which
individuals within a community take on complete responsibility for planning and
implementing development projects, involving outsiders only to import specific tools. 10
Critical to this process is that foreign development organizations must be open-minded
about the types of groups with which they partner. Each community has its own set of
6 Aberg, M. (2000). "Putnam's Social Capital Goes East: A Case Study of Western Ukraine and L'viv."
Europe-Asia Studies 52(2): 313.
7 Simonia, N. A. (1992). Synthesis of Traditional and Modern in the Evolution of Third World Societies.
Westport, CT, Greenwood Press. 68-69.
8 “Community capacity is the interaction of human capital, organizational resources, and social capital
existing within a given community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve or
maintain the well-being of that community. It may operate through informal social processes and/or
organized efforts by individuals, organizations, and social networks that exist among them and between
them and the larger systems of which the community is a part.” Chaskin, R. J., Brown, Prudence,
Venkatesh, Sudhir & Vidal, Avis (2001). Building Community Capacity. New York, Aldine de Gruyter. 7.
9 That is, working through a mixture of consensus and majoritarian practices (voting, referenda, etc.), rather
than relying exclusively on the decisions made by the local or national government.
10 “The essence of PRA is changes and reversals – of role, behaviour, relationship and learning. Outsiders
do not dominate and lecture; they facilitate, sit down, listen, watch and learn. Outsiders do not transfer
technology,; instead they share methods which local people can use for their own appraisal, analysis,
planning, action, monitoring and evaluation.” Blackburn, J. H., Jeremy, Ed. (1998). Who Changes?
Institutionalizing Participation in Development. London, Intermediate Technology Publications, Ltd. xiv.
98

Conclusion
organizations, and no two are alike. 11
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
Success depends on a delicate balance between
implementation and research. 12 Another strategy, Asset-Based Community
Development, bases development projects on the “assets, capacities and abilities” within
a population, rather than the needs. 13
This strategy relies on mapping the available
resources in order to conceptualize thematic or structural connections between
organizations, ideas, and interests. Finally,
Community Driven Development…recognizes that poor people are prime actors
in the development process…In CDD, control of decisions and resources rests
with community groups who may often work in partnership with demandresponsive
support organizations and service providers, including elected local
governments, the private sector, NGOs, and central government agencies. 14
All three strategies rely heavily upon the integrity of community-based organizations
(CBOs), comprised of locals and frequently connected with an elite or semi-elite NGO.
While such a link potentially threatens the CBO’s ability to represent the townspeople, if
the relationship is structured properly (bottom-up not top-down), then the skills provided
by the NGO could prove beneficial without necessarily incurring the costs of becoming
part of a non-government hierarchy. For example, the NGO could operate an asset
mapping program, addressing what is often a devastating deficiency in developing
villages: information asymmetry. In rural areas of developing countries, information
about resources is rarely available to local villages, creating a formidable obstacle for the
sociopolitical institutions required for economic development. Without a community-
11 Eylers, H. F., Reiner (1998). Taking on the Challenge of Participatory Development at GTZ: Searching
for Innovation and Reflecting on the Experience. Who Changes? Institutionalizing Participation in
Development. J. H. Blackburn, Jeremy. London, Intermediate Technology Publications: 100-107.
12 Thompson, J. (1998). Participatory Social Assessment in an Economy in Transition: Strengthening
Capacity and Influencing Policy in Estonia. Who Changes? Institutionalizing Participation in Development.
J. H. Blackburn, Jeremy. London, Intermediate Technbology Publications, Ltd.: 40-46.
13 Kretzmann, J. P. M., John L. (1993). Building Communities from the Inside Out: A Path Towards
Finding and Mobilizing a Community's Assets. Chicago, IL, ACTA Publications. 5.
14 Gillespie, S. (2004). Scaling Up Community-Driven Development: A Synthesis of Experience. FCND
Discussion Papers. Washington, DC, International Food Policy Research Institute: 1.
99

Conclusion
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
level system of gathering, organizing and disseminating this knowledge, individuals will
remain inclined to keep it to themselves in order to achieve relative gains. When
individuals lack the means for working with their neighbors, they turn to kinship
networks that, while socially significant and culturally meaningful, are inherently
inefficient economically. The inherent lack of trust within a community hinders the
collaboration that could lead to absolute gains in material progress. For example,
purchasing a truck to transport the village’s produce to a market requires faith that the
owner will not betray others by selling it for personal profit.
Gathering community-level resource information provides a powerful tool for
creating trust and assisting the development of representative leadership, which facilitate
social and economic micro-entrepreneurship, such as the purchase of collective
equipment or the establishment of a rotating credit organization. Equipping traditionally
marginalized groups within a community with resource information enables them to more
effectively participate in decision-making processes; because they are equally or better
informed than others, leaders seeking to further local interests cannot afford to ignore
them.
100

Appendix 1: Interviewees
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
United States
• Robert Tinsley, Program Coordinator, International Center for Journalists
• Kathleen Samuel, Senior Program Officer for Eurasia, National Democratic
Institute
• Katia J. Bennett, Mongolia Desk Officer, State Department
• Dorothy Miller, Assistant, Asia Division, International Republican Institute
• Dr. Muriel Atkin, Professor of History, The George Washington University
• Dr. Svante E. Cornell, Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
• John Knaus, Program Officer for Asia, National Endowment for Democracy
• Timothy Alexander, Central Asia Desk Officer, United States Agency for
International Development
• Patricia Davis, Central Asia Officer, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, State Department
• Eileen Pennington, Assistant Director, Asia Foundation
• Grant Smith, Former United States Ambassador to Tajikistan
• Jay Scherer, Program Officer, Millennium Challenge Corporation
• Ganzorig GOMBOSUREN, Former Mongolian Supreme Court Justice
• George C. Papagiannis, Director of Media Development, Internews Network
• Irene Lasota, President, Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe
• Chnara Mamatova, Williams College Center for Development Economics Class
of 2005
Kyrgyzstan
• Erkinbek Kasybekov, Kyrgyzstan Country Team Leader, Counterpart
International
• Avtar Singh, Editor-in-Chief, Bishkek Observer
• Artem Petrov, Editor of ‘Communication’ Bulleting, Internews Network
• Nicholas Ebnother, Kyrgyzstan Country Director, Internews Network
• Dr. Larisa Gagarina, Professor of Political Science, Kyrgyz-Slavonic University
• Oksana Semeniak, Research Assistant, Kyrgyz-Slavonic University
• Dr. Nurlan Kaskaraev, Kyrgyz-Russian University
• Askat Dukenbaev, Local Consultant, TACIS Program of the European Union
• Emil Juraev, Professor of International and Comparative Politics, American
University in Central Asia
• Marina Dmitrieva, Public Relations/Media Officer, OSCE Center in Bishkek
• Olga Grebennikova, Public Affairs Officer, United Nations Development
Program
• Dr. Bohdan Krawchenko, Dean, Graduate Program School of Development,
University of Central Asia
• Kumushkan Konurbaeva, Senior Program Officer, Kyrgyz Republic Office,
Eurasia Foundation
• Aisuluu Bedelbaeva, Donor Coordination Specialist, World Bank
101

Appendix 1: Interviewees
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
• Ruslan Monolbaev, Democracy and Media Assistant, United States Agency for
International Development
• Amy Schultz, Country Director, National Democratic Institute
• Aida Suyundueva, Program Manager, National Democratic Institute
• Dr. Tatiana Tretiakova, Director, Institute of Human Projecting, Kyrgyz-Russian
Slavonic University (Ivan Zadorojny, translator)
• Damira Umetbaeva, KelKel Youth Movement
• Jeff Lilley, Country Director, International Republican Institute
• Dr. Elina Karalaeva, Senior Instructor of Business Administration, American
University of Central Asia
• Azamat Yusupov, Law and NGO Support Program Coordinator, Soros
Foundation – Krgyzstan
• Jamilya Jeenbaeva, Long-Term Expert, TACIS Program of the European Union
• Edil Baisalov, President, Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society
• Nurjan Kasygulova, IFES
• Dr. Oskar Lehner, International Project Management Advisor, United Nations
Development Program
• Rafael Perez, Assistant Public Affairs Officer, Embassy of the United States in
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
• Munara Munduzbaeva, Public Affairs, Embassy of the United States in Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan
• Lira Jumadilova, Public Affairs, Embassy of the United States in Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan
• Ruslan Yakhtanigov, Project Assistant, Freedom House Kyrgyz Printing Press
Project
• Asiya Sasykbaeva, Director International Center ‘Interbilim’
• Bermet Montaeva, Project Manager, Alavida Alliance for Volunteer Initiative
• Erkina Chinasuidova, Project Manager, Alavida Alliance for Volunteer Initiative
• Temirlan Moldogaziev, Deputy Director, OSCE Academy
• Stuart Kahn, Program Director, Human Rights Defender Support Project,
Freedom House
• Tom Wood, Program Officer, IFES
• Dr. David Mikosz, Country Director, IFES
• Mairam Junusheva, Public Foundation ‘Nur Robolo’ of Ivanovka Station (trans.
Asel Mamatova)
• Aikan Argynbaeva, Public Foundation ‘Nur Robolo’ of Ivanovka Station (trans.
Asel Mamatova)
• Raya Kadyrova, President, Foundation for Tolerance International
• Alexander Balkunov, Executive Director, Public Association of Economics
Teachers of Kyrgyzstan
• Gulmira Berdalieva, Public Association ‘Legal Assistance to Rural Citizens’
• Aner Orozbaeva, Executive Director, Hospitality Kyrgyzstan
• Jennifer Croft, Democracy Specialist, United States Agency for International
Development
• Keneshbek Sainazarov, Civic Education Project Manager, IFES
102

Appendix 1: Interviewees
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
• Emil Kalmatov, Program Officer, OSCE Center in Bishkek
• Tursunai Tynalieva, Public Relations Specialist, Association for Civil Society
Support Centers
• Kareem al-Bassam, Former Program Officer, National Democratic Institution
Kazakhstan
• Elena Karaban, External Affairs Officer, Central Asia Regional Office, World
Bank
• Ivan Apanasevich, Democracy and Media Officer, United States Agency for
International Development Central Asian Republics Office
• Igor Tupitsyn, Democracy and Media Officer, United States Agency for
International Development Central Asian Republics Office
• Sean Roberts, Democracy and Media Officer, United States Agency for
International Development Central Asian Republics Office
• Abakhon Sultonazarov, Program Coordinator, Institute for War and Peace
Reporting
• Edward Poletaev, Kazakhstan Director, Institute for War and Peace Reporting
• Tatyana Narchayeva, Program Officer, Public Sector, Eurasia Foundation Almaty
Regional Office
Tajikistan
• Dale Dunivan, Food Security Program Manager, Counterpart International
• Nasiba Saidova, Grant Coordinator, Counterpart International
• Kate Whitbeck, Civil Society Support Initiative Country Director, IREX
• Mairam Symanowicz, National Policy Resident Advisor, Central Asian Republics
Local Government Initiative, Urban Institute
• Nurul Rakhimbekar, Program Director, National Democratic Institute
• Joshua Abrams, Civil Society Support Initiative Director of Civic Advocacy
Initiative, IREX
• Andrew Wilson, Country Representative, ACT Central Asia
• Muatar Khaidarova, Senior Legal Consultant, International Center for Not-for-
Profit Law
• Sunatullo Jonboboev, Assessment Coordinator, Aga Khan Humanities Project
• Abdumalik Khadirov, Democracy Commission Assistant, Embassy of the United
States in Dushanbe, Tajikistan
• Dr. Muzaffar A. Olimov, Director, ‘Sharq’ Research Center
• Troy Etulain, Country Director, Internews
• Diana Ismailova, Program Manager, European Initiative for Democracy and
Human Rights, TACIS Program of the European Union
• Muahabat Mamadulieva, Director, ‘Zan va Zamin’ NGO (trans. Shavkat Musoev)
• Igor Bosc, Deputy Resident Representative, United Nations Development
Program
• Gary R. Burniske, Country Director, Mercy Corps
103

Appendix 1: Interviewees
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
• Alinazar Tirandozov, NGO Training and Support Center
• Katherine Mueller, Country Director, IFES
• Dr. John Hayward, Director, English Language School, Society in Tajikistan for
Assistance and Research
• Ruth Sykes, Teacher, English Language School, Society in Tajikistan for
Assistance and Research
• Farhod Bokiev, Former Staff Member, Counterpart International
• Andrea Burniske, Technical Advisor, Social Development Group
• Yuri Skuchilov, Executive Director, YouthEcoCenter NGO
• Asadullo Zikrikhudoev, Chairman, Republic of Tajikistan Society of Disabled
People (trans. Shavkat Musoev)
• Muhtori Bokizoda, Former Editor, Nerui Sukhan and Director, Law Protection of
Journalists NGO (trans. Shavkat Musoev)
• Mukhabbat Pirnazarova, Director, Dushanbe Civil Society Support Center
• Jabbor Fattoev, Program Coordinator, Dushanbe Civil Society Support Center
• Stanley Currier, Associate Political Affairs Officer, United National Tajikistan
Office of Peace-Building
• Qahramon Baqozoda, Director, Zerkalo Center (trans. Zanhidov Otchil)
• Farzona Tilanova, Executive Director, National Association of Civil Society
Support Centers of the Republic of Tajikistan (trans. Parviz Halimov)
• Shavkat Musoev, Tajik university student
• Zarona Ismailova, Associate Director, Eurasia Foundation
• Shamolov Abduvohed, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the National
Strategic Department of the President and Economic and Social Programs (trans.
Shavkat Musoev)
• Kamol Abdullaev, Visiting Assistant Professor, Ohio State University
Mongolia
• Taivankhuu ALTANGEREL, Head, Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs,
Foreign Relations and Corporate Division
• ENKHTUYA Tsend, Chairperson, LEOS (Liberal Women’s Brain Pool)
• BAIGALMAA Purevsuren, Executive Director, LEOS (Liberal Women’s Brain
Pool)
• ARIUNTUYA Ayurzana, Executive Director, Liberty Center
• ENKHTUYA, Nichibuu, Lawyer
• Jigmeddash BAYARTSETSEG, Manger, Open Society Forum
• BADAMDASH D. Marhy, Program Officer, Asia Foundation
• Budee MUNKHTUYA, Member of the State Great Khural of the Mongolian
Democratic Party
• Damba GANBAT, Executive Director, Political Education Academy
• Hashuu NARANJARGAL, Director, Globe International
• Chultem MUNKHTSETSEG, Administrative Program Officer, Asia Foundation
• OYUNGEREL Tsedevdamba, Advisor to the Prime Minister
• Tamir, Teacher, National Center for Legal and Judicial Research
104

Appendix 1: Interviewees
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
• Munkhbaat, Researcher, National Center for Legal and Judicial Research
• Zaya, Researcher, National Center for Legal and Judicial Research
• ZOLJARGAL Gantumur, Public Relations Officer, National Human Rights
Commission of Mongolia
• Silas Everett, Program Officer, Mercy Corps
• ZANAA Jurmed, Director, CEDAW Watch Network Center
• Tserennadmid OSORPUREV, Executive Director, Zorig Foundation
• Guido Verboom, Alliance of Religion and Conservation
• OTGONCHIMEG Altangerel, Director, Amnesty International Mongolia
• Kelly M. Jaske, Volunteer Attorney, Amnesty International Mongolia
• John H. Poepsel, Resident Program Director, International Republican Institute
• OYUNBILEG Baasanjav, Former Staff Member, Asia Foundation
• Nadine Kreisberger, Advisor to S. OYUN, Member of the State Great Khural
• Losolsuren BARHAS, Governance Specialist, United Nations Development
Program
• Undarya TUMURSUKH, Advisor, International Civil Society Forum for
Democracy
• Jeff Goodson, Senior Program Manager, United States Agency for International
Development
• Robert La Mont, Chief of Party, Mongolian Judicial Reform Program, National
Center for State Courts
• Mashbat O. Sarlagtay, Researcher, Institute of Strategic Studies
• T. Layton Croft, Executive Vice President for Corporate Affairs, Ivanhoe Mines
• Sanjaasuren OYUN, Member of the State Great Khural of the Civil Will Party
• Jalbasuren BATZANDAN, President, Healthy Society Movement
• Steve Zimmerman, Country Director, Mercy Corps
• Ariunzayat Yunren, International Secretary, Mongolian Democratic Party
• UYANGA Sukhbaatar, Political Officer for the International Relations Office,
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
• NARANGEREL Rinchin, Director, Center for Citizenship Education
• Jargalant ELBEGSAIKHAN, NPM National Integrity System Enhancement
• Luvsandendev SUMATI, Director, Sant Maral Foundation
• Joachim Nahem, International Advisor, ICNRD Follow-up Project
• Jim Dwyer, Vice President, North America-Mongolia Business Council
• Ganbat BILGUUN, Administrative Assistant, U.S. Agriculture Sector Promotion
Project (U.S.Ag PROMO)
• ALTANCHIMEG, D., Boot-maker and GER Initiative Client (trans.
ENKHMUNKH)
• CHIMEGTUYA, S., Owner, ‘Bat Bum Uran Uils’ Sewing Factory and GER
Initiative Client (trans. ENKHMUNKH)
• Temujin, Lawyer (trans. ENKHMUNKH)
• Tsogt TSEND, Judge, General Council of Courts, Ulaanbaatar Administrative
Court
• Undral GOMBODORJ, Director, Democracy Education Center
105

Appendix 1: Interviewees
Democracy in Central Asia – Alan R. Cordova
• Dash-Onolt DUGERJAV, Vice Director in Charge of Administration and Human
Resources, Institute of Finance and Economics
• Byambasuren, Garage Owner and GER Initiative Client (trans. ENKHMUNKH)
• BEKHBAT Sodnom, Director, Memorial Museum of Victims of Political
Persecution
• NARANGEREL Sodovsuren, Dean, School of Law of the National University of
Mongolia (trans. ENKHMUNKH)
• Oidov ENKHTUYA, General Secretary, Secretariat of the National Council for
the Millennium Challenge Account
• Erdene SODNOMZUNDUI, State Social Insurance General Office Chairman and
Mongolian Democratic Union Chairman (trans. ENKHMUNKH)
• Tserenbat MUNKHBAYAR. Director, Ongi River Movement
• BATBOLD, President, People’s Control Association and General Secretary,
Mongolian National Party (trans. ENKHMUNKH)
• Biryaagiyn CHIMED, Former Secretary of the Little Khural
• Dr. Sheldon Severinghaus, Former Country Director, Asia Foundation
106

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