Biosecurity Magazine – Pest species undaria in Fiordland - P. 26

OC 

TO 

BER 20 

10 

New approach 

at the Border 

Mutual 

Recognition 

Framework 

signed 

MAFBNZ, 

Customs, 

NZ Post 

partner up 

Accords 

signed with 

Waikato-Tainui

100 

Biosecurity magazine 

Biosecurity is published six times per year 

by MAF Biosecurity New Zealand. It is of 

special interest to all those with a stake in 

the protection of New Zealand’s economic, 

environmental and social assets from the 

dangers posed by pests and diseases. The 

articles in this magazine do not necessarily 

reflect government policy. 

For enquiries about specific articles, 

refer to the contact listed at the end 

of the article. 

General enquiries (e.g. circulation 

requests or information about 

MAF Biosecurity New Zealand): 

Biosecurity Magazine 

MAF Biosecurity New Zealand 

PO Box 2526 

Pastoral House, 25 The Terrace, 

Wellington, New Zealand 

Phone: 0800 00 83 33 

Email: info.biosecurity@maf.govt.nz 

Internet: www.biosecurity.govt.nz 

Editorial enquiries: 

Phone: 04 894 0774 

ISSN 1174 – 4618 

Production and printing management by 

City Print Communications in association 

with Tenpoint Ltd. 

4 14 

28 

CONTENTS 

Editorial 3 

New approach at the border 4 

Managing risk off-shore 6 

MAF trials new approach to empty sea containers 8 

Picking up hitchhikers 9 

G’day Mate – New Zealand, Australia sign agreement 10 

Mid-flight x-rays on the cards 11 

Disinsection clearance system breakthrough 12 

Border agencies share facilities 13 

Changes in border management 14 

History at the Border 14 

Stakeholder editorial: Stewart Milne CBC 15 

Profile: MAFBNZ Quarantine Inspection Wellington 16 

Staff profile: Geoff Gwyn 18 

MAFBNZ, Customs and NZ Post partner up 19 

Biological control agent introduction regulation and the compliance rationale 20 

Mirid bug in court 22 

Getting aggressive with Myrtle Rust 23 

Changing animal welfare for the better 24 

MAFBNZ, Iwi tackle marine pest 25 

Pest species Undaria in Fiordland 26 

Snake found in Auckland 28 

Environmental Profile 

Biosecurity magazine is printed on an 

environmentally responsible paper manufactured 

under the environmental management system 

ISO 14001 using elemental chorine free (EFC) pulp 

sourced from sustainable well managed forests. 

The plastic mailing wrap used is a biodegradable 

product that breaks down completely when exposed 

to moisture, heat and natural UV light. 

Waikato-Tainui Accords signed 28 

Six new detector dogs on the job 29 

Mobile x-ray unit a MAFBNZ first 29 

People in biosecurity 30 

Updates 30 

Directory 31

100 

Theresa Morrissey 

Intelligence at the Border 

EDITORIAL 

Between July 2009 and June 2010, 

4.79 million air passengers and 

crew arrived in New Zealand, 

a 3 percent increase on the 

previous year. 

Auckland International Airport 

(AIA) processed the majority 

of passengers arriving: 3.48 

million or 73 percent of all arriving 

passengers. Nationally over this period, 

MAFNZ inspectors seized 150,580 risk 

goods, up 19 percent from a year 

earlier. Thirteen percent of these 

seizures were undeclared. 

Even taking into account the recent 

global economic recession, passenger 

numbers arriving into New Zealand are 

predicted to increase over the coming 

years by 3.5 percent annually between 

2009 and 2016. MAF Biosecurity 

New Zealand (MAFBNZ) has finite 

resources to process these arriving 

passengers, and is constantly seeking 

smarter ways to manage biosecurity risk 

at New Zealand’s border. 

Currently MAFBNZ staff interact with 

every passenger and air crew member 

arriving here. While previously 

mandated by Government to inspect 

100 percent of luggage either physically, 

or through a range of tools such as x-ray 

and the use of detector dogs, MAFBNZ 

is now required to meet a compliance 

standard. 

The compliance satndard requires that 

98.5 percent of arriving passengers must 

be free of biosecurity risk items as they 

leave the airport. As part of this move 

away from 100 percent intervention 

MAFBNZ is increasingly targeting 

resources to risk, and exploring 

different ways of intervening with 

passengers. Almost all interventions are 

“visible” – the interventions that 

passengers physically come into contact 

with in the secondary processing area. 

“Behind the scenes” interventions such 

as electronic profiling can be used to 

identify high-and low-risk passengers. 

This change in the way MAFBNZ works 

presents our organisation with many 

challenges: not only efficiently 

managing biosecurity risk at the border, 

but also managing the expectations of 

both internal and external stakeholders 

- including MAF staff. 

Many organisations worldwide have 

recognised the importance intelligence 

plays in managing risk to their 

particular stakeholders or communities. 

Predominately, intelligence is seen as a 

tool utilised by law enforcement 

agencies, such as police, to combat 

crime though crime pattern analysis 

which feeds into intelligence-led 

policing initiatives. 

Both the New Zealand Police and 

New Zealand Customs Service (NZCS) 

adopt this approach to target criminal 

offending. This approach has not been 

used widely at MAFBNZ as most risk 

presenting at the border is not of a 

criminal nature. However many of the 

same skills can be used to target 

biosecurity risk. 

Historically MAFBNZ has enjoyed a 

close working relationship with our 

NZCS colleagues. This has resulted in 

MAFBNZ staff being permanently 

based in the NZCS Integrated Targeting 

and Operations Centre (ITOC), 

formerly known as the National 

Targeting Centre, to share information 

on risk passenger and other entities 

such as companies and importers. This 

process and system sharing has resulted 

in a huge leap forward in MAFBNZ’s 

ability to target risk passengers using 

intelligence. 

Individual passengers assessed and 

deemed as possibly presenting a higher 

biosecurity risk, can be segmented out 

of the normal passenger processing 

system and more closely scrutinised on 

arrival to mitigate the biosecurity risk 

they may pose. This can be based on 

shared intelligence between MAFBNZ 

and NZCS. 

This approach is predominately geared 

toward intentional offending, such as 

smuggling. MAFBNZ are taking a 

broader approach to the use of 

intelligence in the air passenger 

environment because we deal with a 

much broader range of risk, not just 

intentional offending, including 

forgetfulness or a lack of understanding 

of our border controls. 

Information is the key to efficient risk 

targeting through the use of intelligence. 

To prevent a risk item crossing the 

border into New Zealand, MAFBNZ 

needs to be proactive in its approach to 

that risk. The event needs to be 

predictable, and the only way to predict 

when or if an event will occur is by 

examining patterns or data. 

MAF holds a wealth of information on 

passengers, flights, companies and 

seizures which can be used to predict 

which passengers, or particular groups 

of passengers, are high-or low-risk. 

This intelligence can be used to segment 

arriving passengers into different risk 

groups, and differing levels of 

intervention. 

■ 

Theresa Morrissey, Director Passenger Clearance, 

MAFBNZ. theresa.morrissey@maf.govt.nz 

MAF BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND 3

100 CARGO AND PASSENGERS 

NEW APPROACH AT THE BORDER 

MAF Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) is transforming its approach to biosecurity risk 

management with a particular focus on its work through the border. 

The new approach is designed to 

ensure New Zealand’s already 

world-class biosecurity system 

continues to effectively manage the risks 

associated with harmful pests and 

diseases, while at the same time being 

more responsive to change, more 

cost-effective for users, and has 

everybody doing their bit to manage the 

risks. The aim is to achieve improved 

biosecurity risk management while 

minimising unnecessary impacts on 

trade and travel. 

The vision for the way the new system 

will work is set out in the Border 

Directions Statement 2010–15. This 

statement provides a high-level 

description of how the new system will 

work and outlines the core risk 

management processes and systems. 

The new approach recognises that the 

border is one part of a wider biosecurity 

system, and includes layers of protection 

that start at offshore locations, and 

extend to border verification and 

inspection, through to incursion 

response and pest management in 

New Zealand. 

The changes are based on four 

cornerstones: prioritisation and 

targeting; information; people; and rules 

and compliance. Together these 

cornerstones will contribute to the 

overall improved performance of the 

biosecurity system. 

With prioritisation and targeting, MAF 

Biosecrity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) 

Acting Director Cargo, Jeremy Lambert, 

says the aim is to allocate resources to 

the areas of greatest importance. 

“Simplified and transparent processes 

will ensure decisions are made using 

appropriate criteria and information, 

including pest significance, international 

obligations, industry impacts and 

compliance history. Effective targeting 

will mean we can achieve better 

biosecurity outcomes with less 

intervention on already compliant 

members of the supply chain, while those 

who consistently break the rules will 

receive greater attention through 

infringements and enforcement action.” 

Mr Lambert says the quality and 

timeliness of decisions affecting border 

biosecurity will be improved by the 

greater use of data, information and 

knowledge that will be captured, 

collated and provided to staff, 

stakeholders and the wider public. 

“Information will be used in all parts of 

the system to provide assurance around 

system performance, aid decisionmaking 

and to improve system 

responsiveness and communication. 

Using technology and electronic 

systems will enable us to process trade 

and travel documentation quickly, and 

in an increasing number of cases, prior 

to arrival. This approach will improve 

profiling and provide real benefits in 

terms of time and certainty to the 

supply chain and passengers alike.” 

4 MAF BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND

CARGO AND PASSENGERS 

100 

“The vision for the way the new system will work is set out in the 

Border Directions Statement 2010-15.” 

Crucial to this delivery of information 

will be new technological tools, 

including the Joint Border Management 

System (JBMS) – a joint MAF/ 

New Zealand Customs Service 

computer system to replace aging 

border clearance technologies. A 

Request for Proposal has gone out to the 

market for the design and development 

of this significant new system. 

“JBMS will deliver improved biosecurity 

risk management and a simplified 

process for our stakeholders. In a recent 

speech, Secretary for the Treasury, John 

Whitehead, said that JBMS will simplify 

and standardise how New Zealand 

businesses interact with the Government, 

bringing benefits in terms of biosecurity, 

reduced crime and reduced costs for 

industry and the public sector.” 

The “people” component of the change 

process focuses on ensuring that 

biosecurity risk is managed by those 

best placed to do so, and supporting 

them in their efforts. 

MAFBNZ is investing in its people 

ensuring they are well trained to 

support the new system. But the 

biosecurity border challenge is large, 

and MAF cannot and should not 

shoulder this alone. 

Greater use will be made of comanagement 

arrangements with 

industry (see page 13) where the 

responsibility for biosecurity risk 

management is shared. This will, 

however, only be undertaken where 

MAF has sufficient confidence in the 

systems developed by the industries or 

importers involved. An example of this 

is where MAFBNZ has approved an 

operator in Japan to treat used vehicles 

prior to shipment to New Zealand. The 

company involved is using a system to 

provide the same level of biosecurity 

protection as had previously been 

afforded through inspection by MAF 

staff. This use of a system that provides 

the same outcomes as MAF is known as 

“equivalence”. 

Finally, in the rules and compliance 

area, the focus of the new system will be 

on improving the levels of compliance 

with rules by ensuring they are clear, “fit 

for purpose”, and reward voluntary 

compliance while creating disincentives 

for non-compliance. 

“Ultimately we will see those with clean 

biosecurity records requiring less costly 

intervention, and those with a history of 

flouting the rules and creating risk being 

penalised by a greater level of inspection.” 

Mr Lambert says in future it will be 

easier to find out and understand what’s 

required for those who work with MAF 

to import goods. 

“Where there is an Import Health 

Standard (IHS) for a risk good, then all 

the information about its biosecurity 

import requirements will be readily 

available on the biosecurity website. 

That information will be written in 

language that’s easier to understand and 

grouped together with other similar 

commodities. 

“Where IHS’s are required and don’t 

exist, we also plan to improve our 

prioritisation processes in the 

development of new IHS’s to ensure 

resources are allocated to areas of 

highest risk and greatest overall benefit 

to New Zealand, taking into account 

New Zealand’s international obligations. 

We will be transparent about where we 

are focusing our efforts and why.” 

The future biosecurity system will also 

work wherever possible to push risk 

offshore. An example of this is the Sea 

Container Hygiene System which has 

been successfully established in Papua 

New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and 

Samoa whereby containers are cleaned 

prior to shipment to New Zealand. This 

system (see page 6) has been proven to 

effectively reduce our intervention levels 

and in turn decrease compliance costs 

for industry. 

“We plan to increase our efforts to 

manage risks from the export location 

of goods through greater use of bilateral 

arrangements with the relevant 

authorities in exporting countries, and 

arrangements with supply chain 

participants. We have already started to 

work towards this goal,” Mr Lambert 

says. 

This will see an extension of the current 

offshore programme beyond the current 

10 agreements operating in six countries. 

Ultimately, biosecurity protection is 

of fundamental importance to 

New Zealand. Sound biosecurity 

protects our critical primary industries 

and tourism. It also lays a foundation 

for food exports that make up a third of 

New Zealand’s real gross domestic 

product and it protects the unique 

environment and native species that 

New Zealanders value so dearly. 

MAFBNZ is charged with preventing 

harmful organisms from crossing our 

borders, and reducing the harm caused 

by organisms that do establish in 

New Zealand, by ensuring all 

New Zealanders are informed and 

involved participants in the biosecurity 

system. 

“In order to succeed at this, our border 

risk management must be forwardlooking, 

adaptable, cost-effective for 

both users and government and involve 

everybody. The change programme 

aims to achieve this.” 

The Border Directions Statement 2010-15 is 

available at: http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/ 

files/biosec/sys/border-direction-statementfinal.pdf 

■ 

Jeremy Lambert, Acting Director Cargo, MAFBNZ. 

jeremy.lambert@maf.govt.nz 


100 


MANAGING RISK OFF-SHORE 

Biosecurity happens at all stages and it’s a system of actions that connect. 

A 

few years ago an industry 

representative stated MAF 

was part of the supply chain 

and not just an observer; the reverse 

is true also in that industry is part of 

the biosecurity system and not just an 

observer. Only by working together 

can all parties achieve their desired 

outcomes, whether it is the faster 

movement of goods or ensuring they 

are free from pests. 

For any system to function properly, 

you need the right people with the right 

resources, who know what is expected 

of them. The system must be flexible so 

it can change at the right time in 

response to external or internal factors, 

such as changes in demand or supply. 

The biosecurity system is no different 

to any other system: it is dependant on 

the people involved, the rules and 

agreements that apply and it must be 

flexible enough to respond to 

change. 

Such a system involves everyone 

from the person growing, making 

or supplying the product (for 

example the US field worker pruning 

grape vines) through to response and 

pest management people in New 

Zealand. At all points it is dependant 

on how those involved interact with 



100 

“For any system to function properly, you need the right people with the right 

resources, who know what is expected of them.” 

each other and with the movement of 

the goods or conveyances. 

One example of a highly functioning 

system is the Sea Container Hygiene 

System (SCHS). The requirements are 

simple, but it is the people involved 

that make the system work, whether 

that be the Papua New Guinean port 

worker or the New Zealand Biosecurity 

inspector verifying the containers on 

arrival here, as well as everyone in 

between. 

The Sea Container Hygiene System has 

been operating successfully since 2006. 

It relies on the actions carried out prior 

to export to ensure containers are 

cleaned, stored and shipped properly 

to reduce contamination. 

■ 

Paul Hallett, Team Manager, Operational Standards 

and Facilities, Border Standards, MAFBNZ. 

paul.hallett@maf.govt.nz 

Background to the Sea Container Hygiene System: 

In 2006, following multiple containerrelated 

invasive ant incursions and 

frequent interceptions of Giant African 

Snails in Tauranga and Napier, 

MAFBNZ and importer, Swire Shipping, 

introduced a scheme to better manage 

sea container contamination offshore. 

The system involves thoroughly 

cleaning containers, treating them 

with pesticide, and controlling pest 

populations at key container processing 

and storage areas in Papua New Guinea 

and the Solomon Islands, backed up by 

a quality management system. 

MAF’s Port of Auckland Acting Wharf 

Manager, Grant Weston, says the system 

has been a success, with shipping 

lines from Samoa now joining what is 

arguably the world’s best practice in sea 

container biosecurity risk management. 

The programme is owned and operated 

by a number of different shipping 

lines and implemented by their agents 

and container cleaning facilities, 

with specialist help from pest control 

consultants. 

MAFBNZ’s continuing role is to expand 

and develop these industry-led offshore 

systems, by providing resources to 

assist with set up, stakeholder liaison 

and auditing systems to ensure pest 

populations are suppressed and cleaned 

containers can’t be re-contaminated. 

Once the containers arrive in 

New Zealand, MAFBNZ also co-ordinates 

inspections nationally. 

Participating companies have an 

incentive to make it work. A history of 

consistently clean containers enables 

MAF to progressively reduce the number 

of container inspections conducted, 

providing significant savings to 

shippers. Other benefits are long-term 

reductions in the number of fumigations 

and New Zealand-based container 

washes, reduced port congestion, and 

increased efficiency of the supply chain. 

Mr Weston says most importantly, these 

offshore systems reduce the number of 

costly incursions of biosecurity pests. 

Denis Speyer, of Swire Shipping, says 

his company is keen to maintain these 

systems and is exploring the development 

of new options in other major ports. 

Where next for the Sea Container Hygiene System? 

The Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) is looking at adopting the system for containers entering Australia. In 

August 2010 AQIS staff visited the PNG operation with MAFBNZ staff to gain a first-hand perspective and will start accepting 

SCHS containers once they establish the systems in Australia. 

This is a significant step forward, as a large volume of containers entering Australia are currently subject to 100 percent 

inspection. Receiving containers that have been through the SCHS will mean less inspection on arrival, quicker movement 

out of ports, and added confidence that clean containers are being received. 


100 


MAFBNZ trials new approach to 

empty sea containers 

MAFBNZ is phasing in a new approach to managing the biosecurity 

risk posed by empty sea containers arriving in New Zealand. 

The new process will meet 

requirements set out in the 

recently revised Sea Container 

Import Health Standard (IHS), and 

ultimately will see MAF focus on 

verifying that empty containers 

comply with biosecurity requirements, 

rather than inspecting to 

mitigate biosecurity risk. 

Actual inspection rates of empty sea 

containers will vary over time as 

compliance is demonstrated. 

The move fits within a five-year 

programme to improve management 

of biosecurity risk through the border. 

The new system places greater 

emphasis on the use of data, 

information and technology to enable 

effective risk profiling and the 

targeting of resources to areas of 

greatest risk. This approach will not 

reduce biosecurity protection, but will 

focus attention on the areas of 

greatest need. 

In July 2009, MAF issued a revised 

IHS for sea containers from all 

countries. Since then, a period of 

voluntary compliance has operated to 

allow all parties to comply with the 

increased biosecurity requirements. 

The revised sea container IHS 

requires shipping lines to provide 

advance information on container 

condition. Under the revision, 

non-compliant containers, that is, 

those without documentation 

submitted within the 12 hours prior 

to arrival, will be subjected to 

six-sided and internal inspections. 

MAF recognises that implementing 

these new requirements has the 

potential to create logistical issues, 

including delays and congestion at 

ports if documentation is not 

submitted and large numbers of 

inspections are required. 

MAFBNZ Senior Operations Adviser, 

Kirsty Gray, says MAFBNZ has 

worked closely with industry to 

identify the best way to implement 

the new requirements. 

“We know the new system will affect 

a range of stakeholders, and we 

agreed we needed to trial the 

proposed approach to ensure the 

logistics and workload are 

manageable,” Ms Gray said. 

An operational trial was run 

throughout September at the ports of 

Auckland, Tauranga, Lyttelton 1 and 

Otago. Five percent of empty sea 

containers from all countries and 

shipping lines, excluding Pacific 

Islands and Sea Container Hygiene 

System participants, were inspected 

by MAF staff. 

All Biosecurity Authorisation 

Clearance Certificates (BACCs) were 

processed centrally over this time. 

Information provided by shipping 

lines was used to identify the 

containers for inspection in advance of 

their arrival, minimising unnecessary 

movements and disruption at the ports 

involved in the trial. 

MAFBNZ also gathered data on the 

level of risk posed by empty containers 

to better determine the best way to 

provide incentives for improved 

compliance with the Standard. 

The 5 percent verification regime will 

be fully introduced at all ports in 

December and, as information on 

compliance is built up, will move to a 

performance based verification 

regime in July next year. 

■ 

For more information contact Kirsty Gray, Senior 

Operations Adviser, MAFBNZ. 

kirsty.gray@maf.govt.nz. 

Up to it: inspecting a container. 

1 Note: the trial was cancelled at Lyttelton following 

the Canterbury earthquake. 



100 

PICKING UP HITCHHIKERS 

MAFBNZ’s Import Risk Analysis: Vehicle and Machinery document released in February 2007, revealed the 

potential for a range of high impact organisms to arrive here as ‘hitchhiker’ pests on imported vehicles 

and machinery. 

While the document 

identified their frequency as 

low, it also identified the 

mobile organisms are in a high-volume, 

high-risk segment often difficult to 

detect in structurally complex vehicles 

and machinery. 

With import volumes of such risk 

commodities increasing, MAF 

Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) 

needed to find alternatives to visual 

vehicle and machinery inspection. 

The new Import Health Standard (IHS) 

for Vehicles, Machinery and Tyres 

- VEHICLE-ALL - released in October 

2009 offered industry three options to 

address biosecurity risk in this area. 

One option, which enables MAFBNZ 

to implement IHS requirements to 

detect concealed contaminants, is 

physical inspection followed by the use 

of a videoscope. 

This provides specific assurance that 

there are no hidden live contaminants 

in inaccessible, enclosed areas of 

vehicles and machinery. 

The videoscope unit MAFBNZ intends 

to purchase for quarantine inspectors, 

has been trialled by MAFBNZ staff in 

Japan and will be used offshore during 

pre-inspection and in New Zealand 

while inspecting imported vehicles and 

machinery. 

A recent training workshop held in Osaka 

for Japan-based staff included a practical 

session in the use of the new tool, as well 

as guidance on the application of 

requirements of the new IHS. 

The MAFBNZ implementation plan for 

VEHICLE-ALL will ensure all staff 

involved in vehicle and machinery 

inspection are familiar with changes in the 

new standard, including videoscope tool 

use and newly introduced contaminant 

threshold levels. A training package 

currently under development will be 

delivered to staff before implementation. 

■ 

Sue Gould, Team Manager, Border Operations Central 

and Offshore, MAFBNZ. sue.gould@maf.govt.nz 

MAFBNZ staff recently held a training workshop in Osaka for Japan-based staff (L–R) Jevic site supervisor, Yusake Nakamura, Malcolm Proudlock, Sue Gould and Wayne Chittock. 


100 


New Zealand and Australia have signed an agreement which paves the 

way for increased trade facilitation and efficiency. 

New Zealand and Australia move closer. 

The Mutual Recognition 

Framework, signed in August 

by AQIS Executive Manager 

Quarantine Operations Division, 

Tim Chapman, and MAF Biosecurity 

NZ (MAFBNZ) Acting Director, 

Cargo, Jeremy Lambert, guides the 

development of mutual recognition 

operating arrangements between 

MAFBNZ and AQIS, and ensures 

arrangements are consistent and 

contribute to agreed outcomes for 

both countries. 

In this context, “mutual recognition” 

refers to the acceptance by one 

government agency of another 

government agency’s certification that 

an agreed standard has been met for 

systems, processes and interventions. 

For goods moving between Australia 

and New Zealand, mutual recognition 

means MAFBNZ would accept 

inspection results carried out by AQIS 

prior to the goods leaving Australia 

and vice versa. 

Agreement on how these arrangements 

are to be developed, trialled and 

implemented is the first step toward 

implementation of mutual recognition 

arrangements for specific types of 

cargo moving between the two 

countries. 

Benefits of mutual recognition 

arrangements include: 

• increased confidence biosecurity 

risks are being effectively addressed; 

• improved trade facilitation; 

• greater operational efficiencies, 

resulting in reduced costs; 

• closer trans-Tasman relationships 

across the supply chain; 

• alignment of import requirements 

and activities between Australia 

and New Zealand; 

• management of risk offshore. 

Mr Lambert said the Mutual 

Recognition Framework laid an 

important foundation for the work 

ahead. 

“This is an exciting opportunity for 

MAFBNZ and AQIS to continue to work 

together to realise benefits for biosecurity 

agencies and industry,” he said. 

■ 

Jeremy Lambert, Acting Director, Cargo MAFBNZ. 

jeremy.lambert@maf.govt.nz 



100 

Mid-flight x-rays on the cards 

Low risk trans-Tasman travellers may find they can get out of the airport quicker if a new x-ray image transfer 

initiative goes ahead. 

Currently, all checked-in bags 

are x-rayed for security 

reasons and given an 

individual identity tag before being 

loaded onto planes. 

With x-ray image transfer, biosecurity 

checks are made while planes are in the 

air, rather than on arrival at the airport. 

Under the system, images taken at 

check-in would be transferred 

electronically from Australia to 

New Zealand where MAFBNZ staff 

would screen them for biosecurity risk 

before planes land. 

Once in New Zealand, passengers 

would be able to claim their bags and 

proceed through the biosecurity area 

as normal. Bags that have been 

pre-screened and found to contain no 

risk items would be able to by-pass 

airport x-ray machines. 

The approach leverages off existing 

technology and uses it in innovative 

ways that are technically challenging, 

MAFBNZ Director Passenger 

Clearance, Theresa Morrissey, says. 

“During the last 12 months, Auckland 

and Wellington Airports introduced a 

differentiated clearance for passengers 

travelling on Australian and New 

Zealand passports with nothing to 

declare, and implementing the x-ray 

image transfer process will enable us to 

further enhance this,” she said. 

The x-ray transfer initiative would join 

other tools MAFBNZ continues to use 

to prevent biosecurity risks entering 

New Zealand, including risk profiling, 

physical searches, detector dogs, public 

education campaigns, amnesty bins, 

declaration cards and infringement 

fines. 

The feasibility of implementing x-ray 

image transfer is still being worked 

through. A request for proposals had 

been issued to the market and closed at 

the end of September 2010. If the 

project proceeds, it is anticipated this 

would be operational early next year. 

■ 

Kathy Dyer, Senior Communications Advisor, 

MAFBNZ. kathy.dyer@maf.govt.nz 

Eggs detected in luggage. 


100 


Disinsection clearance system 

breakthrough 

Aircraft disinsection: the process of using a low toxicity insecticide on inbound 

international aircraft to kill live insects. 

A 

new pre-clearance 

disinsection scheme 

introduced by MAFBNZ 

National Disinsection Manager, 

Doug Farr, is now operational for 

all international aircraft flying to 

New Zealand and Australia. 

The scheme involves pre-clearing 

incoming aircraft by reviewing a live, 

internationally available database to 

check planes have been sprayed to kill 

insect pests. 

Following a successful MAFBNZ trial 

with Emirates airline, MAFBNZ and 

AQIS worked together on an existing 

database to enable a joint release of the 

scheme late in 2009. 

Mr Farr says previously, aerosol 

disinsected aircraft had to wait until a 

quarantine inspector viewed on-board 

documentation - and checked aerosol 

spray cans were empty as proof the 

plane had been sprayed - before holds 

were opened and passengers could 

In 2009 MAFBNZ National Disinsection Manager, Doug Farr (L) received the inaugural Every Minutes Matters Award for 

his new disinsection scheme from Auckland Airport General Manager Retail and Commercial, Adrian Littlewood. 

disembark. Now once the aircraft is 

treated, disinsection data is entered onto 

a shared database, enabling details to be 

viewed before arrival. 

Under the new database system, 

inspectors no longer have to track 

aircraft from gate to gate to check 

compliance with disinsection 

requirements. 

“The new system allows staff to begin 

baggage and cargo unloading as soon 

as the aircraft is on blocks, saving five 

to eight minutes every flight. 

“Passengers can exit the aircraft as 

soon as the door is opened, and 

baggage is delivered to the carousel 

quicker,” Mr Farr said. 

All commercial airlines arriving in 

New Zealand, as well as all regular 

freighter aircraft, Royal New Zealand 

Air Force (RNZAF) and many 

corporate jets are using the new system. 

A new Schedule of Aircraft 

Disinsection Procedures on the AQIS 

website and linked to the MAF website, 

allows aircraft operators worldwide to 

comply with our disinsection 

requirements before arrival without 

entering into complex compliance 

agreements. It also ends “On-Arrival” 

disinsection unless there is noncompliance. 

Meanwhile, ongoing 

compliance work is carried out behind 

the scenes without delaying passengers. 

As well as time saving for all 

concerned, a full disinsection history 

for each aircraft is now recorded, 

meaning easier, more robust auditing. 

■ 

Doug Farr, National Disinsection Manager, MAFBNZ. 

doug.farr@maf.govt.nz 



100 

BORDER AGENCIES SHARE FACILITIES 

Closer working relations is a key aim of the Border Sector Governance Group (BSGG). 

Formed in 2007, made up of 

border agencies committed to 

securing our borders and 

strengthening our economy, the 

group’s primary focus is streamlining 

trans-Tasman travel and trade. 

As well as MAF Biosecurity 

New Zealand (MAFBNZ) and the 

New Zealand Food Safety Authority, 

BSGG members include the 

New Zealand Customs Service, 

Department of Labour, Department 

of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry 

of Transport. 

As a BSGG core member, one step for 

MAFBNZ in working closer with the 

wider border sector has been the move 

to co-locate MAF staff with Customs 

and other border agencies staff. 

While MAF and Customs remain two 

distinct agencies, moving in together 

is cost-effective as well as a 

convenient ‘one stop shop’ for the 

public and importers. 

MAF and Customs now share 

accommodation in several locations 

throughout the country, including: 

• Auckland Airport: 

MAFBNZ shares some facilities with 

Customs at Auckland Airport, 

including the Customs Border 

Briefing Room and the Customs 

Control Room. 

• Auckland Biosecurity Centre 

(ABC): 

Since the opening of MAF’s ABC in 

late 2006, about 10 Customs staff have 

been based at the site. A shared public 

counter area provides a common 

contact point for importers, customs 

brokers and the public at MAF’s hub 

site near Auckland Airport, saving 

clients having to travel to different 

locations around the area. 

• Customs’ National Targeting 

Centre, Airport Oaks area. 

Not long after Customs staff relocated 

to the Auckland Biosecurity Centre, 

about eight MAF Passenger Profiling 

team staff moved into Customs’ 

National Targeting Centre in the 

Airport Oaks area. 

• Downtown Auckland: 

By the end of this year, MAF and 

Customs staff based at the National 

Targeting Centre at Airport Oaks 

will be relocated downtown to the 

Auckland Customs building, where 

eventually about 30 MAF staff will 

be accommodated. 

In the future, the redeveloped space 

will house the new Integrated 

Targeting Operations Co-ordination 

Centre (ITOC) and include MAF, 

Customs, Department of Labour and 

Maritime New Zealand staff. 

• Regional areas: 

In Timaru, Invercargill, Nelson and 

Dunedin, MAF staff either work from 

Customs facilities, or vice-versa. 

Discussions are ongoing to find 

further areas to share facilities in both 

the North and South Islands. 

MAFBNZ (Cargo) and the New Zealand Customs Service Cargo 

Inspection team are to temporarily share office space in the 

MAFBNZ Building at Ports of Auckland. 

Currently based at The Strand, the Customs Cargo Inspection team 

will share office space with MAF until their new inspection and 

office complex near Auckland Port’s main gate is completed next 

March. 


100 


Changes in Border 

Management 

Several recent changes in Border Operations 

Management have enabled five MAF Biosecurity 

New Zealand (MAFBNZ) staff the opportunity to gain 

valuable experience at new worksites. 

Those involved included: 

• Craig Hughes: Group Manager, Detector Dog 

Programme - seconded to Group Manager (Acting), 

Auckland International Airport. 

• Sharon Tohovaka: Team Manager, Survey team - 

seconded to Team Manager (Acting), Auckland Air 

Cargo and Metro C. 

• Stuart Rawnsley: Team Manager, Northland and 

Auckland Port - seconded to Team Manager (Acting), 

Detector Dog Programme. 

• Grant Weston: Operational Advisor, Cargo Advisory 

Team - seconded to Team Manager (Acting), 

Northland and Auckland Port. 

• Mose Saseve: Team Manager Auckland Air Cargo 

and Metro C - seconded to Team Manager (Acting), 

Auckland International Airport. 

Although a relatively new concept at these levels, staff 

movement at the Quarantine Inspector level within 

Cargo worksites and between the Cargo and Passenger 

Directorates has been in formal operation for the past 

three years. 

The length of time staff stay in seconded roles is 

dependent on resourcing requirements, and can vary 

from the short to the longer term, which occasionally 

exceeds two months in duration. 

Moving staff between worksites has increased the 

organisation’s ability to respond to the ebb and flow of 

workloads by reallocating staff to where they are most 

needed. 

A great example of staff moving between the Cargo and 

Passenger Directorates is the working relationship of the 

International Mail Centre (IMC) and the ITB Auckland 

Airport, where Team Leaders manage routine exchange 

of resources to best respond and address peak workload 

periods at their respective worksite. 

Within the Cargo Directorate, moving staff is an everyday 

occurrence as Team Leaders monitor resourcing needs 

versus the resourcing availability amongst the four 

Auckland Cargo worksites of Metro, IMC, Auckland Port 

and Auckland Air Cargo. 

New eyes bring a new perspective on every day processes 

and functions. The staff movement mechanism is one 

of the key components that promotes innovation from 

the grassroots, encourages and enables continuous 

improvement by challenging the status quo. 

One of the benefits for staff is increased exposure to 

other worksites within the organisation. Experience 

there brings the opportunity to meet and work alongside 

the wider MAFBNZ team. We learn and appreciate 

environmental drivers that are unique to each worksite, 

hone existing skills, learn new skills and increase 

appreciation of the operational biosecurity system. 

■ 

Mose Saseve, Team Manager, ITB Passenger Directorate, 

Auckland MAFBNZ. mose.saseve@maf.govt.nz 

History at the Border 

A new history of New Zealand’s border biosecurity inspection was 

recently launched by MAF Director General, Murray Sherwin, at a 

function at Wellington’s Pastoral House. 

Quarantine! Protecting New Zealand at the Border is available from booksellers 

at 

a recommended d retail price of $45. 

Believed to be the world’s first Alexander Turnbull Library – with 

national quarantine history, 

“Quarantine! Protecting 

New Zealand at the Border” tells the 

story of New Zealand’s biosecurity 

border inspection since 1840. 

A product of the MAFBNZ History 

Project initiated in 2006 before the 

merger of the MAF Quarantine Service 

and Biosecurity New Zealand, and 

researched and co-authored by 

Ministry for Culture and Heritage 

historians, Gavin McLean and Tim 

Shoebridge, the book is published by 

Otago University Press. 

It incorporates 21 interviews – 

subsequently deposited in the 

serving quarantine inspectors, 

managers and retired staff with 

quarantine backgrounds from both 

MAF and the Ministry of Forestry. It 

also includes numerous other archival 

sources and the results of several field 

visits to various sites. 

The result is a unique mixture of policy 

information, personal stories and 

illustrations - a gem to be treasured by 

anyone who has worked protecting 

New Zealand from the entry of exotic 

animals and plants, diseases and pests, 

which threaten our primary industrybased 

economy and environment. 

■ 

Jaimie D Baird, Quarantine Inspector, MAFBNZ. 

jaimie.baird@maf.govt.nz 


NEWS 

100 

Stakeholder editorial: 

Stewart Milne 

Increases in international 

passenger numbers and imported 

goods add pressure to streamline 

our border processes to keep the 

supply chain of goods and people 

moving. 

These increases are accompanied 

by a significant diversification 

in the country of origin for 

both cargo and passengers. 

These changes are occurring at the 

same time as we are becoming more 

conscious of the need to protect our 

country from the biosecurity risks 

these imports of people and goods 

present. 

The challenge is to improve facilitation 

while at the same time ensure our 

biosecurity systems remain robust. 

My background is in shipping, public 

service (marine and general transport), 

as well as aviation (Board of Airline 

Representatives) and I have the 

opportunity to provide a supply chain 

perspective as a member of the 

Biosecurity Ministerial Advisory 

Committee (BMAC). Membership of 

the committee has opened my eyes to 

the number of biosecurity issues that 

New Zealand faces, as well as the 

measures that MAF Biosecurity 

New Zealand (MAFBNZ) is taking to 

provide the protection that is needed. 

At this point, I am bound to say that I 

am not satisfied that the transport and 

logistics (supply chain) industry is 

sufficiently cognisant of the risks, and 

of their responsibilities to work with 

MAFBNZ to ameliorate those risks. 

Do airlines sufficiently emphasise 

biosecurity messages to inbound 

passengers? Some do, but not all. I 

wonder whether they all realise that if, 

for example, foot and mouth disease 

broke out in New Zealand, quite apart 

from the devastating effect on our 

primary industry, the tourist industry 

and consequently the airline sector 

would take a major hit. 

Do cargo carriers and handlers 

(particularly shipping companies, 

ports, transitional facility operators 

and importers) realise the risks 

associated with the biosecurity 

contamination material all too 

frequently found on the exterior and 

interior of shipping containers, and in 

the innermost parts of vehicles and 

machinery coming here? 

Again, I am satisfied that some do but 

alas, there are others who consider 

biosecurity requirements an 

imposition to their primary goal of 

achieving the speedy movement of 

goods and minimising the costs 

involved. 

MAFBNZ staff are under pressure to 

do “their job” without adding delays 

and costs to the supply chain. However, 

the twin goals of improving facilitation 

and biosecurity can only be achieved 

when it is fully accepted that it is “our 

job” - with MAFBNZ and industry 

working together. I am of the view that 

industry will only play its part if: 

(i) participants understand the risks 

for New Zealand Inc and for their 

own livelihood if they do not 

play their part (ie, it is not just a 

responsibility for MAFBNZ) 

(ii) MAFBNZ takes firm enforcement 

action against those who do not 

comply with the requirements. 

Stewart Milne CBE. 

Certainly tourism and trade must be 

facilitated, but: 

• incoming passengers need to be 

made fully aware of items they must 

not bring into New Zealand; 

• incoming containers and other 

cargo units must not leave ports of 

entry with exterior contamination 

of biosecurity risk material, and 

must be unpacked at transitional 

facilities where those involved are 

appreciative of their biosecurity 

responsibilities; 

• yacht owners, shipping companies 

and those bringing oil rigs and 

barges into New Zealand waters, 

must play their part in ensuring 

they are not harbouring biosecurity 

risk material. 

We can maintain our country’s relative 

freedom from the most harmful 

biosecurity imports, but only with a 

dedicated and coordinated joint 

MAFBNZ/industry effort. 

Let us continue to work toward that. 

■ 

Stewart Milne CBE is a former Secretary for 

Transport, past president of the International 

Chartered Institute of Transport and a former 

Executive Director of the Board of Airline 

Representatives of New Zealand (BARNZ). 


100 PROFILE 

PROFILE: MAFBNZ QUARANTINE INSP 

Working in Wellington means MAF Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) 

staff face a variety of challenges. 

New Zealand’s capital city is a 

fully rotational site where 

everyone on the MAFBNZ 

roster works at several locations, both 

in Wellington and further afield as 

required. 

Work rosters commonly involve six 

weeks at Wellington Airport and six 

weeks in town at the Port of 

Wellington, and because Wellington is 

a hub for Gisborne, Napier, New 

Plymouth and Palmerston North, staff 

are responsible for covering absences 

in these ports. 

The work incorporates risk screening, 

face-to-face interaction with clients, 

cargo and produce inspection, vessel 

risk screening, and empty container 

and vehicle inspections. 

With changes in daily tasks understood 

to be business as usual for our site, it’s 

expected every officer will be able to 

do any type of inspection. 

It’s is not unusual for a Wellington 

officer to begin the week doing cargo 

inspections, then be moved to the 

airport and end the week on shipping, 

or covering at another port. 

In the past two years, management and 

staff have worked to increase staff 

knowledge and experience in wharf 

and shipping areas to better equip the 

team. 

This inevitably, has also brought 

exposure to a wider range of work 

tasks, and Wellington staff now have 

the breadth of knowledge and skills to 

cover a wider range of inspections at 

these smaller ports. As well, ever 

increasing numbers of staff now have 

knowledge of local importers and are 

able provide a more substantive service 

to our regional stakeholders. 

■ 

Sarah Peters, Acting Team Leader, MAFBNZ. 

sarah.peters@maf.govt.nz 


PROFILE 

100 

ECTION WELLINGTON 

At-A-Glance: MAFBNZ CentrePort staff facts and figures, including the Port and Wellington Airport: 

CentrePort – 

• 24 fulltime quarantine inspectors 

• Four fulltime and eight permanent 

part-time quarantine assistants 

• Two team leaders 

• One team manager (also manages 

quarantine inspectors in Gisborne, 

Napier, New Plymouth and 

Palmerston North). 

Saturn House, Wellington – 

• one trainer 

• two biosecurity officers 

• two detector dog handlers 

• one admin support officer. 

• MAFBNZ longest serving quarantine 

inspector has been in the job 38 

years. 

• Three longest serving staff have more than 80 

years combined experience with MAF. 

• Wellington staff have undertaken offshore 

inspections in areas such as the Gulf, Timor 

Leste, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu with the 

New Zealand military. 

• Staff have also been called on to inspect cars in 

Japan and Singapore, grapes in Australia and 

the United States, and clear cruise ships. 


100 NEWS 

Staff Profile: 

Geoff Gwyn 

MAF Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) Group Manager, Border Operations Central and Offshore, Cargo Clearance. 

Is there any crossover between your previous work 

and what you’re doing at MAFBNZ? 

The new Border Directions Statement involves moving to 

interventions based on intelligence-led prioritisation, meaning 

a shift in process design and information management, as well 

as cultural change. Plus, it requires our people developing new 

capabilities. Interestingly, police went through a similar 

process and I helped lead people through a change to 

intelligence-led work prioritisation. 

If you had to describe the new environment in 25 

words or less, what would you say? 

The most succinct phrase I’ve heard to explain the shift is 

“moving from an organisation that stops everything at the 

border and then clears it to an organisation that clears 

everything - unless there’s a good reason to stop it”. 

How would this play out in MAFBNZ daily work? 

Geoff Gwyn in an Afghani orphanage. 

You’ve been with MAFBNZ since 1 July this year – 

where were you previously? 

Previously, I’ve spent 25 years with the New Zealand Police, 

initially mainly in frontline positions and specialist tactical 

squads, including the Armed Offenders Squad dog section. 

I’ve also trained police in East Timor and Afghanistan. Later, 

I worked in several leadership roles including National 

Performance Manager, and most recently as Lower Hutt 

Operations Manager. 

Where are you based and what does your new role 

entail? 

I’m based in Pastoral House in Wellington with responsibility 

for North Island border operations south of Auckland. The 

main ports for me are CentrePort, Tauranga, New Plymouth, 

Palmerston North, Rotorua, Napier, Hamilton, and Gisborne, 

plus I oversee all MAFBNZ offshore inspection. 

There’s many examples across our directorate where staff 

engage in “high-volume, low-risk” inspections. They’re well 

aware this consumes significant amounts of time and limits 

their effectiveness. Shifting to a risk-targeted approach based 

on segment profiles will enable us to make informed decisions 

about where, and how, to intervene to manage biosecurity risk. 

There’s also many opportunities to co-manage risk with 

importers. A great example is our used-car programme in 

Japan where we’ve worked alongside industry to establish 

decontamination systems to help move biosecurity risk 

offshore. This has the added benefit to us of enabling a move 

from 100 percent inspection and compliance to audit and 

verification of systems, thereby reducing the number of 

inspections required. 

What are the benefits you see in the new approach? 

Put simply, many of our industry stakeholders go to great lengths 

to comply with our requirements and although their motivations 

may be different to ours, the end result is often the same. 

Importers who clean fresh produce to extend shelf life and make 

it more attractive to buyers, also remove pests and contaminants. 

The new approach will see us more able to reward compliant 

importers with reduced inspections and compliance costs. 

Alternatively, we will also be able to better identify and target 

non-compliant importers and work with them to improve their 

biosecurity processes - or take enforcement action. 


NEWS 

100 

MAFBNZ, Customs and NZ Post partner up 

Collaboration and innovation drive a new partnership between MAF 

Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ), the NZ Customs Service (NZCS) and 

NZ Post at Auckland’s International Mail Centre (IMC). 

Commencing in June this year, 

the International Mail Centre 

Process Alignment Project 

has seen MAFBNZ, NZ Post and the 

New Zealand Customs working 

together to improve international mail 

processing systems. 

The project’s key objectives include: 

• establishing a shared understanding 

of the agencies’ respective business 

activities, goals and drivers 

• defining risk management levels 

and developing joint intervention 

strategies using common 

terminology 

• providing recommendations 

for a future-state, “world class” 

international mail processing system 

• establishing processes to support 

continuous improvement 

• developing and implementing a 

system to streamline movement of 

compliant goods for commercial 

traders 

• identifying opportunities for NZCS 

and MAFBNZ to share resources 

and more closely align systems and 

processes. 

The project team, made up of 

representatives from all three agencies, 

has identified several opportunities to 

deliver improvements to the system 

during Phase One, which ends next 

month. 

Initiatives already underway include: 

• reviewing agency rosters to better 

align deployment times and breaks 

• developing a joint information and 

staff induction package to increase 

understanding border agency risks 

and cross-agency business 

• streamlining movement of 

compliant trade and “high-volume – 

low risk” mail 

• introducing a combined border 

agency screening effectiveness survey. 

With the project team focused on 

implementing changes, that improve 

the mail processing system overall, 

MAFBNZ IMC Team Manager, Paul 

Ruttley, says it is important for him to 

take off his MAFBNZ cap when 

working with this team. 

“This project is a great opportunity for 

the team to understand the issues and 

drivers for all three agencies and to use 

a holistic view of the overall system to 

identify opportunities for improvement,” 

he said. 

It’s a sentiment echoed by NZCS Air 

Cargo Manager, Cliff Russell, who says 

Customs sees the project as an ideal 

way to demonstrate a united approach 

to border management. “It’s a unique 

opportunity to ensure a world class 

mail processing system that manages 

the risks of contraband and moves the 

mail efficiently,” he said. 

NZ Post project team representatives, 

led by Brigitta Wassenaar, are also 

enthusiastic about opportunities 

presented by the joint initiative. “We’re 

excited to be involved in this unique 

project, working with NZ Customs and 

MAF to do our part to protect New 

Zealand’s border through 

implementing best practice processes 

and delivering great service to our 

customers”, Ms Wassenaar said. 

Outcomes from the project extend 

beyond process improvements. “This 

project also provides a platform from 

which we can positively change the 

culture of our people at the IMC. The 

aim is to create a culture that fosters a 

collaborative relationship between all 

the agencies responsible for managing 

the international mail pathway”, Mr 

Ruttley says. 

In alignment: (L – R) Ken Parker (NZCS), Paul Ruttley (MAFBNZ) and Brigitta Wassenaar (NZ Post). 

■ 

Kirsty Gray, Senior Operations Adviser, Cargo 

Directorate, MAFBNZ. kirsty.gray@maf.govt.nz 


100 NEWS 

Biological control agent introduction 

regulation and the compliance rationale 

In the following article AgResearch scientist and leading biocontrol researcher, Barbara Barratt, discusses this 

regulatory framework and its importance to New Zealand’s biosecurity. 

Dr Barbara Barratt. 

An introduction to biological control: 

Biological control can be defined as the 

deployment of natural enemies 

(predators, parasitoids or diseases) to 

suppress populations of pests such as 

insects and weeds. When pests arrive 

from overseas they often come without 

the suite of natural enemies which 

would normally keep them in check in 

their natural range. As a result they 

sometimes undergo periods of 

population outbreak before existing 

natural enemies adapt to them, or 

before pest management strategies, 

including biological control can be 

developed. Researchers usually look 

for potential biological control agents 

in the country of origin of the pest, and 

select those that are likely to be safe 

and to succeed in New Zealand. 

Biological control includes release of 

organisms with the intention of 

establishing permanent populations for 

pest management (classical biological 

control); release of organisms that 

cannot survive the winter in 

New Zealand but that are released in 

high numbers to achieve control over a 

short period (for example glasshouse 

crop pests), or which are able to build 

up quickly in the field during the 

warmer seasons (augmentative 

biological control). Enhancement of 

naturally occurring organisms is 

known as conservation biological 

control. 

The benefits of biological control in 

New Zealand: 

Not all biological control programmes 

in New Zealand have been successful, 

but many are playing a critical role in 

keeping pests and weeds below 

damaging levels and contributing to 

reduction in the use of pesticides. In 

classical biological control the agents 

are released into the environment with 

the expectation that they will 

reproduce and disperse naturally, 

helping to reduce pest density and 

hence damage to crops or natural 

ecosystems in a sustainable and natural 

way. Other than these clear benefits, 

classical biological control usually 

involves little or no input or ongoing 

costs for growers or land managers, 

provides a long-term if not permanent 

contribution to pest management, and 

represents no health risks to producers 

or the public. 

The earliest biological control agent 

introduction into New Zealand was the 

ladybird Coccinella undecimpunctata, a 

predator released in 1874 to attack 

aphids. Since then over 500 biological 

control agents have been introduced 

against 126 target pests (Ferguson et al. 

2009). Some of the biological control 

successes in New Zealand have been 

parasitoids for weevil forage pests, 

several aphid species, cabbage white 

butterfly, Sirex wood wasp, and weed 

biological control agents for ragwort, 

St John’s wort, mist flower, nodding 

thistle and others. 

Biological control is not usually 

considered to be the “silver bullet” for 

managing pests, but it is an important 

component of the suite of pest 

management options along with others 

such as plant resistance or tolerance of 

pests, cultivation methods, timing of 

sowing or harvesting to avoid weeds 

and pests, and strategic use of 

pesticides if needed. 

Potential risks of biological control 

agents: 

New Zealanders are very aware of 

some of the ill-considered 

introductions of the past such as gorse, 

possums and rabbits. While these were 

not biological control agents, examples 

like these have made us aware of the 

risks of introducing new organisms 

that could be environmentally, socially 

or economically damaging, and have 

served to encourage caution in our 

approach to deliberate introductions. 

The potential risks from biological 

control introductions can come from 

either direct effects on non-target 

species or indirect effects on the 

ecosystem into which the new species 

arrives. Direct effects include attack on 

species other than the target pest, 

which can occur especially if there are 

species in New Zealand that are closely 

related to the target pest. Depending 

upon how host-specific the biological 

control agent is species which occur in 

or near the habitats where the target 

host is found can potentially be at risk. 

Predatory insects that consume their 

prey are usually less host specific than 

parasitoids that have evolved to survive 

within the tissues of their hosts. 

Indirect effects can be much more 

difficult to predict, but include 

displacement of a native natural enemy 

by an introduced biological control 

agent; hybridisation of the biological 

control agent with closely related 

native species; food web effects 

resulting from population changes 

within an ecosystem. Direct and 


NEWS 

100 

“The earliest biological control agent introduction into 

New Zealand was the ladybird Coccinella undecimpunctata…” 

indirect effects of proposed biological 

control agents clearly need to be 

considered on a case-by-case basis. 

The purpose of the HSNO Act 1996: 

The introduction of new organisms 

into New Zealand is regulated under 

the Hazardous Substances and New 

Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO) which is 

implemented by the Environmental 

Risk Management Authority (ERMA 

New Zealand) [http://rangi.knowledgebasket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text/1996/ 

an/030.html]. The HSNO Act 

stipulates that a cautious approach 

should be taken to the introduction of 

new organisms and a framework has 

been developed for a consistent process 

of assessment and approval of 

applications to import, conditionally 

release or release, micro-organisms, 

plants, and animals (ERMA 

New Zealand 1998). Clearly, biological 

control agents that are new to New 

Zealand are subject to the HSNO Act. 

The purpose of the Act is to protect the 

environment, and the health and safety 

of people and communities by 

preventing or managing the adverse 

effects of hazardous substances and new 

organisms. Principles to be recognised 

and provided for in the legislation 

include safeguarding the life-supporting 

capacity of air, water, soil and 

ecosystems. In its decision-making role, 

ERMA New Zealand must take into 

account the sustainability of all native 

and valued introduced flora and fauna, 

intrinsic value of ecosystems, public 

health, relationship of the Maori people 

with the biophysical state, economic 

and related benefits and costs, and 

New Zealand’s international obligations. 

One of the most important aspects of 

the HSNO Act that applicants need to 

address, in their risk analyses for 

biological control agents, are Section 

36: “Minimum Standards”. 

The Act states that the Authority must 

decline the application, if the new 

organism is likely to cause any 

significant: displacement of any native 

species within its natural habitat; 

deterioration of natural habitats; adverse 

effects on human health and safety; 

adverse effect to New Zealand’s inherent 

genetic diversity; or cause disease, be 

parasitic, or become a vector for human, 

animal, or plant disease. 

As well as the HSNO Act, applicants 

wanting to introduce new biological 

control agents need to comply with the 

Biosecurity Act 1993. This provides 

rules for the exclusion, eradication, and 

effective management of pests and 

unwanted organisms in New Zealand. 

In the context of biological control, the 

Biosecurity Act is mostly concerned 

with the prevention of importing 

organisms that might be associated 

with the biological control agent such 

as parasites, pathogens and contaminant 

organisms. The Biosecurity Act also 

regulates containment facilities where 

imported biological control agents 

need to be housed once ERMA New 

Zealand have approved an organism 

for entry into containment and while 

efficacy, biosafety and other testing is 

carried out. 

The risk analysis process: 

Biological control researchers need to 

conduct a risk analysis to identify and 

assess as far as possible the likelihood 

of adverse impacts from release of the 

biological control agent, and the 

magnitude or consequences if they 

occur. For example, for direct effects 

such as attack on non-target species 

mentioned above, the applicant must 

consider how likely is it that a nontarget 

species will be attacked by the 

proposed biological control agent, and 

if it did occur what would be the 

severity of environmental or other 

consequences. Evidence can be based 

on experimental data from 

containment testing, information from 

other sources such as overseas 

experience with the same organism, 

host specificity in its native range, 

biosafety of related biological control 

agents etc. A degree of uncertainty will 

always remain since behaviour of an 

organism in a new environment cannot 

be completely inferred from laboratory 

studies and other available 

information, and this needs to be 

balanced against benefits. While 

ERMA New Zealand is required to 

adopt a precautionary approach to 

decision-making, it is accepted that 

zero risk is not possible to achieve, but 

that benefits should outweigh risk. 

Applicants are required to prepare a 

cost-benefit analysis in which 

environmental, economic and social 

benefits to New Zealand are presented 

for ERMA New Zealand to take into 

account during the decision-making 

process. The applicant is also advised 

to consult fully with community 

groups, Maori and stakeholders. Once 

the applicant has submitted the 

application, ERMA New Zealand 

conducts an evaluation and review 

process, calls for and considers public 

and stakeholder submissions, often 

conducts hearings where evidence is 

presented, and then on the basis of all 

the evidence, make a decision. 

The cost of compliance: 

The current fee for an application to 

release a biological control agent is 

NZ$16,875. If the application is for a 

conditional release (release with 

controls) then this needs to be 

negotiated with ERMA New Zealand. 

The fee structure has been reduced 

considerably in recent years, partly to 

encourage compliance, and also 

Continued on next page ❯ 


100 

NEWS 

❯ Continued from previous page 

Mirid bug in court 

because the process has become 

streamlined as a result of improved 

information provision by applicants, 

the lack of need for a public hearing for 

some applications, and improved 

efficiencies in the processing of 

applications by ERMA New Zealand. If 

extra information or expert advice is 

required, there can be additional costs. 

However, if the applicant has consulted 

fully with ERMA New Zealand and 

stakeholders during the preparation of 

their application, these costs can be 

minimised or avoided. 

Risks to New Zealand of non compliance: 

Having a clearly defined, transparent 

and consultative process and a 

standard methodology for regulators 

encourages good practice in biological 

control and ensures consistent 

consideration by experienced 

evaluators. In comparison with other 

countries, the system in New Zealand 

is considered to be closest to a “flawless 

democratic and complete process” 

(Sheppard et al. 2003), and is the envy 

of many biocontrol researchers 

throughout the world for the 

consultative nature of the relationship 

between applicant and regulator, and 

the comparatively short timeframe 

within which decisions are made. 

Given this, and the relatively modest 

costs currently required for processing 

an application, the risks associated 

with non-compliance are significant. 

The environmental risks of noncompliance 

are potential risks to native 

and valued flora and fauna. While 

there will inevitably remain an element 

of risk in all new organism 

introductions, these risks can be 

minimised by undertaking a robust 

risk analysis, which is reviewed and 

evaluated in a transparent and 

consistent manner. In cases where 

retrospective analyses of previous 

biological control introductions have 

been carried out, experience has shown 

that predictions of environmental 

safety made after a thorough 

environmental impact assessment have 

generally been realised post-release. 

Importance is placed upon the 

opportunity for public involvement in 

the process because people’s values or 

quality of life may be affected by the 

decisions taken. It is in the interests of 

all involved in biological control to 

endeavour to engage the public and 

stakeholders in discussion about 

biological control as an effective tool in 

pest management, to contribute to 

public education and generally to build 

confidence in this technology. So the 

social risks of non-compliance are 

alienation of the public, loss of 

confidence and support for science in 

this area, and damage to New Zealand’s 

reputation as a responsible custodian 

of our unique biota. 

The economic risks of non-compliance 

are associated with both environmental 

and social risks. New Zealand trades 

successfully on the reputation we have 

for maintaining a high quality 

experience for eco-tourists, and 

similarly for the unspoiled 

environment from which our 

agricultural products are exported. 

Furthermore, we also have a very high 

profile internationally for our 

biosecurity system and the rigour with 

which we protect our productive and 

natural environments, and our unique 

heritage. 

References: 

ERMA New Zealand, 1998. Annotated Methodology for the 

consideration of applications for hazardous substances and 

new organisms under the HSNO Act 1996. Pp. 28. ERMA 

New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand 

Ferguson, C.M., Moeed, A., Barratt, B.I.P., Hill, R.L. and Kean, 

J.M., 2009 BCANZ - Biological Control Agents introduced to 

New Zealand. http://www.b3nz.org/bcanz 

Sheppard, A.W., Hill, R.L., DeClerck-Floate, R.A., McClay, 

A., Olckers, T., Quimby, P.C. and Zimmermann, H.G., 

2003. A global review of risk-benefit-cost analysis for the 

introduction of classical weed biological control agents 

against weeds: a crisis in the making? Biocontrol News and 

Information 24: 91N-108N 

Mirid bug (Macropholus pygmaeus) 

Earlier this year, two companies and a 

horticultural scientist pleaded guilty in 

Pukekohe District Court to charges relating to 

the illegal importation and sale of the Mirid 

bug (Macropholus pygmaeus) for biocontrol 

purposes. Sentencing included a total of 

$40,000 in fines, four months community 

detention and 120 hours of community 

service. 

In sentencing, the Judge indicated it was 

not for individuals to decide what is best 

for New Zealand’s environment, and that a 

regulatory framework intended to safeguard 

our environment is in place. 


NEWS 

100 

GETTING AGGRESSIVE WITH MYRTLE RUST 

Myrtle rust (Uredo rangelii), a fungal pathogen part of the guava rust disease group, has caused severe 

economic damage to the plant family Myrtaceae in many parts of the world. 

Earlier this year, Australian 

officials reported myrtle rust 

had been detected for the first 

time on three species of Myrtaceae at 

five commercial cut flower nurseries 

within a few kilometres of each other 

in New South Wales. 

Initially, Australian officials opted for a 

management approach as they did not 

believe eradication of the rust was 

possible. However, a decision has since 

been made to take a more aggressive 

approach and in July this year an 

Interim Response Plan, described as 

suppression with a view to eradication, 

was put in place. Under this plan, 

Australia will carry out host 

destruction, spore trapping, diagnostic 

research and host testing. 

Information obtained so far has 

expanded the number of detections by 

five additional host plants. Of the eight 

plant species now affected by myrtle 

rust, the most severe infestation has 

been reported on Australian natives 

Agonis, Tristania, and Austromyrtus. 


(MAFBNZ) is seeking detailed 

information from Australian officials 

regarding these new detections. 

MAFBNZ currently prohibits, or is in 

the process of prohibiting, importation 

of host material from Australia in line 

with known hosts from other areas 

with guava rust. The number of export 

shipments of Myrtaceae cut flowers 

and plants (for planting) from 

Australia to New Zealand has been 

small over the past decade, so changes 

to the import requirements for 

Australia will have a limited effect 

on trade. 

If the rust spores build to sufficiently 

high levels in Australia, they could 

arrive here via various pathways, 

including wind currents. A number of 

other rusts are believed to have arrived 

in New Zealand in this manner. Early 

detection of myrtle rust here would be 

difficult due to the widespread nature 

of the numerous hosts, and the 

difficulty of predicting where exactly 

any windborne rust spores may land. 

Any impact on New Zealand flora and 

fauna will depend on which species 

here become infected, as both the host 

range and impacts of this rust complex 

are highly variable and currently 

unpredictable making forward 

planning difficult. 

New host genera within Myrtaceae are 

often discovered only when the rust 

has spread to a new location. A 

number of species significant to 

New Zealand are either known to be, 

or are, potential hosts for this rust 

complex. Two New Zealand species of 

Metrosideros (pohutukawa and 

Kermadec pohutukawa) have already 

been infected by guava rust in Hawaii. 

New Zealand has one native species in 

the highly susceptible genus Syzygium, 

plus four other Myrtaceae genera, 

including Leptospermum (manuka). 

Apart from eucalypts and native species, 

ornamental plantings in New Zealand 

are likely to be infected by the rust. 

Feijoa is a reported host and Agonis 

flexuosa, one of the species affected in 

Australia. 

While the likelihood of the entry of 

myrtle rust within the next five years is 

high, so too are uncertainties about host 

range and species impact. MAFBNZ 

officials are closely monitoring the 

Australia situation to decide on the most 

appropriate preparedness steps for 

New Zealand. 

Newly formed bright yellow pustules of myrtle rust on Agonis flexuosa cv. Afterdark. Photo: Lowan Turton. 

■ 

Dan Fieselmann, Senior Advisor Plant team, MAFBNZ. 

dan.fieselmann@maf.govt.nz 


100 ANIMAL WELFARE 

FOUR LEGS GOOD 

Everyone taking responsibility for the welfare of animals is the vision behind a new Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) led initiative. Photo: Courtesy of The Southland Times. 

Improving New Zealand’s animal welfare compliance over the next five years is 

the aim of the new Safeguarding our animals – Safeguarding our reputation 

initiative and, although the farming sector will be the initial focus, companion 

animals are also within the compliance plan’s scope. 

MAF consulted extensively 

with stakeholders including 

vets, animal welfare 

organisations and industry groups to 

gather feedback and agreement on 

priority areas when developing the plan. 

Co-operation, co-ordination, and 

achieving voluntary compliance 

through education and awareness 

rather than simply increasing 

enforcement efforts are the plan’s key 

features. 

The preferred approach is to utilise 

existing initiatives where possible, use 

people and organisations best placed to 

provide support, and reduce 

duplication of time and effort at every 

opportunity. 

The programme will not limit current 

MAF animal welfare investigation and 

prosecution activity. However, with 

producer sector and the veterinary 

profession support, it is expected there 

will be a shift towards tackling serious 

and repeat offending as the project 

progresses and less serious offending 

diminishes. 

The compliance plan itself is built 

around three fundamental expectations: 

• integration: all participants in the 

plan understand their roles and 

responsibilities in improving animal 

welfare, and work toward common 

goals 

• compliance: voluntary compliance 

is encouraged through education 

and awareness raising, and by 

intervening when voluntary 

compliance is not forthcoming 

• tools and resources: participants 

have the right equipment to fulfil 

their roles. This does not mean 

simply providing farmers with 

glossy brochures, but finding ways to 

positively engage with communities. 

It may also mean looking at the law 

governing animal welfare in 

New Zealand, and identifying 

new ways to tackle animal welfare 

offending. 

A Programme Manager responsible for 

leading implementation of the plan was 

appointed on 11th August and five new 

roles within the MAF Enforcement 

Directorate are currently being recruited. 

■ 

View the compliance plan on www. 

biosecurity.govt.nz/regs/animal-welfare 

Lisa Gibbison, Senior Communications Advisor 

MAFBNZ. lisa.gibbison@maf.govt.nz 


NEWS 

100 

MAFBNZ, iwi tackle marine pest 

MAF Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) and Far North iwi have teamed up to clear a 

marine pest from some of Northland’s most culturally significant coastal sites. 

Internationally the sea squirt, Pyura 

(Pyura praeputialis, has been an 

aggressive invader of rocky 

shorelines MAFBNZ Senior Marine 

Adviser, Katherine Walls, says. 

Since it was first detected at remote 

Twilight Beach, near Cape Maria van 

Diemen, MAFBNZ surveys have found 

the native Australian species at a number 

of other Far North coastline sites. 

The species’ ability to smother and 

displace native green shell mussels was 

confirmed by surveys showing Pyura 

growing over mussels in several 

Northland locations, prompting the 

decision to test the effectiveness of 

removal techniques. 

“Also taken into consideration was the 

presence of this introduced species in 

areas of high value to Maori,” Ms Walls 

said. 

MAFBNZ had determined that full 

eradication of the sea squirt was not 

feasible. 

“However, there was such a high level 

of interest in the local community that 

we considered there was merit in 

trying to remove the species from 

some sites where population numbers 

were relatively low,” she said. 

“A pilot treatment programme at a 

couple of sites will tell us whether it’s 

worthwhile attempting to manage 

Pyura at other places where numbers 

are low.” 

A four-day programme in August 

included a workshop on Pyura biology 

and treatment measures. Ngati Kuri 

and Te Aupouri members joined a field 

team, including a marine scientist 

engaged by MAFBNZ, to clear all 

visible Pyura from two locations at the 

Bluff at 90 Mile Beach and from 

Whareana Bay. They were assisted by 

Ngai Takoto and Te Rarawa iwi 

members. 

While excellent progress was made at 

the sites, MAFBNZ returned at the 

beginning of September to clear 

additional Pyura found at another area 

of the Bluff. 

As well as these two locations, a 

scientific control trial was undertaken 

treating a population at the entrance to 

Parengarenga Harbour. One area had 

all visible specimens removed, while 

another area was left to allow results to 

be compared in future. 

The programme will be repeated in six 

months, at which time it will be 

Clearing Pyura on 90 Mile Beach. 

possible to evaluate the effectiveness of 

the removal treatment. Ultimately, 

communities involved will determine if 

they wish to continue management of 

the sea squirt. 

“This teamwork is an exciting 

development which supports 

MAFBNZ’s goal of enabling 

communities to lead long-term 

management of pest incursions, raising 

local awareness of biosecurity issues 

and preparing communities ahead of 

any future marine biosecurity events,” 

Ms Walls said. 

■ 

Katherine Walls, Senior Adviser, Marine MAFBNZ. 

Katherine.walls@maf.govt.nz 


100 

NEWS 

PEST SPECIES UNDARIA IN FIORDLAND 

Fragile Fiordland is at risk from introduced marine pests and diseases. 

Beneath the pristine waters of 

Fiordland National Park lies a 

unique marine world. Deluged 

with New Zealand’s highest annual 

rainfall, numerous rivers and streams 

pour a layer of tannin-stained brown 

freshwater into the fiords. Less dense 

than seawater, this fresh influx lies on 

Undaria on mooring rope in Sunday Cove. 

Photo: K. Blakemore, DOC. 

the water’s surface, varying from five 

centimetres to more than 10 metres in 

depth. 

Tea-coloured, the freshwater layer 

reduces significantly the amount of 

light able to penetrate into fiords’ 

depths, producing a marine flora 

and fauna unlike any other in 

New Zealand, or the world. This fragile 

environment could be heavily 

impacted by introduced marine pests 

and diseases. 

Each year hundreds of boats from all 

over New Zealand and around the 

world enter the fiords for recreation or 

commercial purposes. Each boat has 

the potential to bring with them 

unwanted, hitchhiking organisms. 

Once established these can become 

pests, quickly spreading in new 

locations and seriously affecting 

marine habitats, food chains, fish 

stocks, recreational activities and 

commercial fishing activities. 

In April this year, a joint-agency 

surveillance and compliance exercise 

was carried out in Fiordland involving 


(MAFBNZ), Environment Southland, 

Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) and the 

Department of Conservation (DOC). 

While conducting a biosecurity 

inspection, staff found a specimen of 

the invasive seaweed Undaria on a rope 

running from a barge to the shoreline 

of Sunday Cove in Breaksea Sound. 

Tim Riding of Environment Southland 

says the barge has been in Sunday Cove 

for about 25 years, but recreational, 

commercial and charter vessels 

regularly moor up to it when 

replenishing freshwater supplies. 

The plant found was reproductively 

mature but badly eroded, suggesting it 

was at the end of its lifecycle. As 

Undaria typically has a life span of 6-9 

months, it is likely to have been 

recently introduced. Given the plant’s 

life stage, it is likely to have reproduced 

in the surrounding environment. 

However, no other plants were found 

nearby at the time. 

“We don’t know for sure, but we 

suspect that Undaria arrived in 

Fiordland as bio-fouling on a vessel 

hull, or by transferral on other marine 

equipment, rather than from ballast 

water,” Mr Riding says. 

A joint-agency response has been 

established involving Environment 

Southland, MAF, and DOC (with 

Environment Southland taking the 

26 MAF BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND

NEWS 

100 

Black coral and butterfly perch. Photo: Steve Wing. 

lead role). To assess the extent of 

Undaria in Sunday Cove, a delimiting 

survey was conducted in July and 

involved an intensive search of Sunday 

Cove and surrounding areas by divers, 

including the barge where it was 

initially found and the nearby seabed. 

Searches were also carried out at other 

high risk sites in Breaksea, Dusky and 

Dagg Sounds, including Stevens Cove, 

Luncheon Cove, and Beach Harbour. 

“So far we have been very lucky. 

Undaria was only found in Sunday 

Cove in moderately low numbers. 

There were around 250 plants on the 

mooring lines of the barge, and a small 

patch of around 80 plants on the 

seabed approximately 45 metres from 

the barge,” Mr Riding said 

All visible plants of less than 15mm 

were removed and contained. To 

eliminate the risk of microscopic stages 

continuing to grow, the response team 

replaced all mooring lines and other 

redundant rope from the barge. An 

attempt to kill any as yet invisible 

plants from the patch on the seabed 

was made by applying granulated 

chlorine and covering it with plastic 

tarpaulins. 

Those covers remained in place until a 

second survey was completed in 

August to assess the development and 

further spread of Undaria in Sunday 

Cove. A further 55 mature plants were 

found on the substrate in three 

locations, with the majority found next 

to the patch treated during the 

previous inspection. 

All plants were manually removed and 

the area adjacent to the initial patch 

treated by applying chlorine and 

covering. This new patch covered 

approximately 65m 2 , much larger than 

the original patch in July of 12m 2 . 

On the next trip in late September, staff 

checked and treated any new growth 

found. 

“We are trying new methods to treat 

Undaria in situ, due to the remote 

location and the associated logistical 

challenges,” Mr Riding says. “This 

method has been tried successfully 

overseas with a different seaweed pest, 

Caulerpa taxifolia, and so far it is proving 

to be successful here with Undaria.” 

This approach extends the treatment 

period to ensure even coverage and 

good penetration of chlorine into the 

substrate, where microscopic stages 

may be lying dormant. 

“By covering the area with tarpaulins, 

elevated chlorine levels in combination 

with reduced light levels should kill all 

the life stages of the plant,” Mr Riding 

says. 

The goal for the response team is to 

eliminate Undaria from Fiordland. If 

allowed to spread, it could have 

detrimental effects on the major 

industries in the area including 

tourism and fisheries, as well as having 

unknown, but potentially heavy 

impacts on native species. 

Malcolm Lawson, Chair of the 

Fiordland Marine Guardians (a group 

of community representatives who 

advise central and local government on 

managing the Fiordland marine 

environment), says the find was hugely 

disappointing. 

“Fiordland has a unique marine 

environment and a lot of effort by 

various agencies has gone into 

protecting the area from the 

introduction of marine pest species. 

We were lucky in catching Undaria 

early on and have a real chance of 

eliminating it from the area, so this has 

to be the goal. 

“In the meantime, we continue to ask 

those taking vessels into Fiordland to 

ensure boat hulls are clean and well 

anti-fouled to avoid further 

introductions of pest species into this 

special environment,” Mr Lawson said. 

■ 

Adrienne Henderson, Assistant Communications 

Co-ordinator, Environment Southland. 

adrienne.henderson@es.govt.nz 


100 NEWS 

SNAKE FOUND IN AUCKLAND 

MAFBNZ Port of Auckland staff, checking a container of nursery plants from 

Guatemala, recently discovered a stowaway snake on board. Photo NZ Herald. 

A 

common species of Boa constrictor, widespread in 

Central America was recently found in a container 

at the Port of Auckland. MAFBNZ Auckland Port 

Team Manager, Grant Weston, said the young, 50cm red 

tailed boa constrictor, was quickly caught and euthanized 

humanely by a vet following MAFBNZ guidelines. 

Mr Weston said snakes were common carriers of disease and 

New Zealand’s biodiversity laws prevented them from being 

kept in captivity here. 

Any business which handled shipping containers had trained 

staff who alerted authorities if pests were found, Mr Weston 

said. 

■ 

Helen Corrigan, Senior Communications Advisor, MAFBNZ. 

helen.corrigan@maf.govt.nz 

Waikato-Tainui Accords signed 

Agriculture, Forestry and Biosecurity Accords have been signed between 

Waikato-Tainui, the Hon David Carter, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 

Biosecurity and Murray Sherwin, Director-General, Ministry of Agriculture 

and Forestry (MAF). 

The Accords reflect a joint commitment to the restoration and protection 

of the health and wellbeing of the Waikato River for future generations. 

They are part of the process of implementing the Deed of Settlement for 

the Waikato River through which Waikato-Tainui and the Crown agreed to 

enter a new age of co-management over the Waikato River. 

The Accords provide for: 

• annual meetings between Waikato-Tainui, the Minister and Director- 

General 

• Waikato-Tainui to be engaged as early as practicable in policy 

development, research, standards setting and operational activities 

• Waikato-Tainui to participate in the evaluation panel for any MAF 

research related to the health and well-being of the Waikato River and 

its catchment 

• Waikato-Tainui to be notified of other relevant MAF research or 

contracts for service due to take place in the Waikato Region and 

be involved in planning, as appropriate. 

• Waikato-Tainui to be advised about future appointment 

opportunities on the boards and advisory groups administered by 

the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 

• the development of projects of mutual interest 

• mutual information sharing and support for training and 

development activities. 

Other portfolio specific accords have been signed with the Department 

of Conservation (October 2008); Ministries of Fisheries (October 

2008); Ministry of Culture and Heritage (February 2009); Te Puni 

Kokiri (November 2009), Department of Internal Affairs (June 2010), 

Land Information New Zealand (June 2010), Ministry of Economic 

Development (June 2010) and Ministry for the Environment (June 

2010), and their respective Ministers. 

■ 

A copy of the Agriculture, Forestry and Biosecurity Accords can be found on 

MAF’s website: www.maf.govt.nz. 


NEWS 

100 

SIX NEW DETECTOR DOGS ON THE JOB 

Four Beagles and two Labrador crosses joined the MAF Biosecurity workforce in August. 

Zane and Yogi: now at work at Christchurch Airport. 

Six new dogs have joined fellow 

graduates of MAF Biosecurity 

New Zealand’s (MAFBNZ) famed 

Auckland Detector Dog Training 

Centre eight-week training course to 

work at Auckland and Christchurch 

Airports, the Auckland International 

Mail Centre and cargo facilities and 

ports. 

Alongside their Biosecurity Inspector 

handlers, they’ll join other detector 

dogs to work a four days on, four days 

off work roster, 24-hour a day, seven 

days a week. 

MAFBNZ Detector Dog Programme 

Manager, Stuart Rawnsley, says both 

Zeta and Zuma: stationed at Auckland Airport. 

“passive” response dogs like Beagles, 

with natural scenting ability and high 

interest in food, and “active”, often 

mixed-breed dogs keen on play and 

retrieving were trained to sniff out 

meat, plants, seeds, live animals 

including snakes, and animal products 

as well as fruit and vegetables 

prohibited from entering New Zealand. 

Since New Zealand introduced its dog 

detector programme in 1996, Beagles 

had become a familiar sight checking 

bags at our international airports. At 

the same time “active” response dogs 

checked goods and mail behind the 

scenes at Auckland’s International Mail 

Ebby and Demi: work at Auckland’s International Mail 

Centre, cargo facilities and ports. Newsflash: Demi gave 

birth to 11 puppies in early October. 

Centre, air cargo companies and the 

country’s ports. Work by the dogs 

complemented other MAFBNZ tools, 

such as x-ray machines. 

Mr Rawnsley said active response dogs 

were often obtained from dog pounds or 

the SPCA aged around 18 months. 

‘Finds’ were rewarded with a pat and 

praise, a biscuit, or the chance to play 

with a favourite toy. New Zealand’s 

detector dogs had become world famous, 

with graduates of the MAFBNZ breeding 

programme currently protecting borders 

in Argentina, Canada, Hawaii and 

Australia. 

■ 

Helen Corrigan, Senior Communications Adviser, 

MAFBNZ. helen.corrigan@maf.govt.nz 

Mobile x-ray unit a MAFBNZ first 

MAF Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) cargo directorate’s new x-ray unit is a homegrown resource. 

The original specifications and 

design brief for MAFBNZ’s 

new mobile X-ray unit – as 

well as its concept, design and final fit 

– were closely supervised by MAFBNZ 

National x-ray technician, Wayne Grant. 

A first for MAFBNZ, the unit utilises an 

existing x-ray unit mounted on a 

bespoke trailer. Designed to be self 

contained, it includes delivery and exit 

roller beds, and built-in diesel generator, 

lighting and full resources box. The unit 

is designed to allow fast deployment to 

any location and can be used in a 

variety of screening scenarios. 

Information gained from risk 

identification and interventions will be 

fed back to risk screening and profiling 

teams to ensure data captured is 

quickly disseminated. 

Following staff driver training 

including reversing, manoeuvring and 

basic vehicle maintenance, the unit was 

handed over to the Cargo Directorate 

in August to operate at express mail 

and personal effects facilities. 

Positive feedback on the trailer’s 

graphics design suggests the unit could 

double as a public relations tool. 

■ 

Ian Stratton, National x-ray trainer, MAFBNZ. 

ian.stratton@maf.govt.nz 


100 

Jane Bowden has joined the Pest Management 

Group as an Adviser to co-ordinate the Didymo Long 

Term Management Programme. Over the last year 

Jane worked in the MAFBNZ Project Office, 

supporting the Future of Pest Management Project 

and MAF Communications programme. She 

previously worked as a Technical Officer at Taranaki 

Regional Council, where her role included 

co-ordinating Didymo advocacy work, and has 

worked as an assistant for a US ecological study 

programme. Jane has a BSc in geology and a 

diploma in freelance journalism. 

Liz Clayton has joined the Post Border Directorate 

as a Senior Adviser in the Pests and Pathways 

team. In sales and marketing roles with a large 

pharmaceutical company in Australia and 

New Zealand before returning to university, Liz 

completed a PhD in cell and molecular biosciences 

while based at Wallaceville Animal Research 

Centre. More recently she was a senior business 

manager with the Foundation for Research, Science 

and Technology and a key account manager with 

the Agriculture ITO. 

Melanee Wakelin has recently joined MAF 

Biosecurity New Zealand as an Executive 

Co-ordinator in the Systems Design Group, 

providing support for Clifton King, Systems 

Design Manager. She recently returned to 

New Zealand after being overseas for four years, 

travelling and working. She has a strong 

background in administration roles and is 

enjoying the variety that MAFBNZ has to offer. 

Simon McDonald has joined the Surveillance 

Group (Post-Border Directorate of MAFBNZ) as a 

Senior Adviser Marine Surveillance. Simon 

arrives at MAF from the Ministry of Fisheries 

(MFish) where he held several roles including 

adviser in the Aquaculture Team, analyst and 

facilitator in the Customary Fisheries 

Management Team and a coordinator in the 

Inshore Fisheries Team. Prior to working for 

MFish, he was involved in two marine-based 

science projects for the Department of 

Conservation. He has an MSc in Marine Science 

from the University of Otago. 

UPDATES 

IHS for importation and clearance of fresh fruit and 

vegetables 

Minor amendment - 152.02: Importation and Clearance of Fresh Fruit & 

Vegetables into New Zealand. This import health standard is dated 30 July 

2010. The revised import health standard is available on the MAFBNZ website: 

■ 

http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/ihs/152-02.pdf 

This standard replaces the version dated 29 July 2010, and includes a minor 

editorial change to the standard. The following is a summary of the change: 

Section 4.4 

“A sample shall* be taken from each lot as specified in the appropriate 

sampling plan detailed below.” 

*Note: Exception of Green/French Beans from Australia, which are subject to a 

variable verification process. 

Section 4.9 

“All* consignments of fresh fruit and vegetables which are not inspected 

immediately (i.e.within 4-6 hours of arrival in New Zealand), shall be stored in 

a transitional facility until such time as they are inspected.” 

*Note: Exception of Green/French Beans from Australia, which are subject to a 

variable verification process. 

IHS for importation of nursery stock 

The import health standard 155.02.06: Importation of Nursery Stock was 

amended to include changes to the schedule for Allium. 

The standard is dated 13 September 2010, and replaces that dated 6 July 2010. 

The standard can be viewed at: www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/ihs/155-02-06.pdf 

■ For further information, email plantimports@maf.govt.nz or phone 04 894 5541. 

IHS for MEACASIC: EEC 

As part of the consultative process in the development of the import 

health standard for MEACASIC.EEC MAF has distributed the following draft 

documents for public consultation and comment: 

Submissions on these draft documents should be forwarded to MAF by close 

of business on 4 November 2010. Depending on the results of consultation, it 

is anticipated that the new requirements will be in place by. MAF encourages 

respondents to forward comments electronically to the email address below. 

However, should you wish to forward submissions in writing, please send them 

to the address that follows: 

■ Biosecurity New Zealand, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, PO Box 2526, 

Wellington, NEW ZEALAND, Fax: +64 4 498 9888, Email: charlotte.richmond@ 

maf.govt.nz 

■ 

Please see the MAF Biosecurity New Zealand website for additional information 

on ‘Making a submission’: http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/consultation. 

htm#submission 

IHS for Sand Tiger Sharks (Carcharias taurus) from all 

countries (FISSHARIC.ALL) 

This is a new import health standard developed from a risk analysis, for the 

purpose of importing sand tiger sharks for viewing in a public aquarium. 

The standard has been issued, and is available from the website at: 

http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/imports/animals/standards/fissharic.all.htm 

The standard is dated 7 September 2010. 

The New Zealand Biosecurity Summit, originally planned to be held in Wellington in November, has been cancelled. Once the 

amalgamation of MAF and NZFSA has been completed, and a new Director General appointed, we will look forward to hosting 

a quality Summit event. 


DIRECTORY 100 

Pest watch: 24 June 2010 – 25 August 2010 

Biosecurity is about managing risks – protecting the New Zealand environment and economy from exotic pests and diseases. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand devotes much of its 

time to ensuring that new organism records come to its attention, to follow up as appropriate. The tables here list new organisms that have become established, new hosts for 

existing pests and extensions to distribution of existing pests. The information was collated between 24 June and 25 August 2010. The plant information is held in the Plant Pest 

Information Network (PPIN) database. Wherever possible, common names have been included. 

ANIMAL KINGDOM RECORDS 

Validated new to New Zealand reports 

No validated new to New Zealand records during this period. 

Significant find reports 

No significant find records during this period. 

New host reports 

No new host records during this period. 

New distribution reports 

No new distribution records during this period. 

■ 

If you have any enquiries regarding this information please contact surveillance@maf.govt.nz. 

PLANT KINGDOM RECORDS 

Validated new to New Zealand reports 

Organism Host Location Submitted by Comments 

Spencermartinsia viticola 

(fungus: no common name) 

Colletotrichum horii 

(fungus: no common name) 

Pseudomonas argentinensis 

(bacteria: no common name) 

Pseudomonas syringae pv. morsprunorum 

(bacteria: no common name) 

Significant find reports 

No significant finds this period. 

New host reports 

Morus alba 

(white mulberry) 

Diospyros kaki 

(persimmon) 

Solanum lycopersicum 

(tomato) 

Prunus avium 

(cherry) 

Whanganui 

Bay of Plenty 

Auckland 

Central Otago 

IDC 

(General Surveillance) 

IDC 

(Research Project) 

IDC 


IDC 



Botryosphaeria parva 

(fungus: botryosphaeria rot) 

Strepsicrates macropetana 

(insect: eucalyptus leafroller) 

Extension to distribution reports 

Magnolia grandiflora 

(magnolia) 

Eucalyptus bosistoana 

(Bosisto’s box) 

Auckland 

Marlborough 

Scion 

(MAF High risk site survey) 

Scion 

(Special Survey) 


Originally identified as Diplodia mori. 

D. mori is not considered to be present in 

New Zealand. 

Samples collected both recently and in the 

1970s have been confirmed as P. syringae 

pv. morsprunorum. 

Tessaromma undatum 

(insect: velvet eucalypt longhorn beetle) 

Eucalyptus nitens 

(eucalyptus, shining gum, silvertop) 

North Canterbury 

Scion 


Uraba lugens 

(insect: gum leaf skeletoniser) 

Eucalyptus leucoxylon 

(white iron bark) 

Hawke’s Bay 

Scion 


■ 

If you have any enquiries regarding this information please email surveillance@maf.govt.nz. 


MAF general enquiries: 0800 00 83 33 

Exotic disease and pest emergency hotline: 0800 80 99 66 

www.biosecurity.govt.nz

Biosecurity Magazine – Pest species undaria in Fiordland - P. 26

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