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Powerline Plan and Environ. Assessment Jan. 2013 - Flood Control ...

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<strong>Powerline</strong> <strong>Flood</strong> Retarding Structure<br />

Pinal County, AZ<br />

Draft Supplemental Watershed <strong>Plan</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Environ</strong>mental <strong>Assessment</strong><br />

Alternative 1 – No Action: In this alternative the <strong>Powerline</strong> FRS <strong>and</strong> IDSM would remain in place<br />

<strong>and</strong> would continue to provide flood protection up to the 100-year event, given assumed future<br />

conditions on the upstream watershed to be the same as existing conditions, until year 2017 (end of<br />

design life). The <strong>Powerline</strong> FRS would not meet all of the st<strong>and</strong>ards set by ADWR <strong>and</strong> the NRCS<br />

for public safety <strong>and</strong> reliability. The previously described inadequacies in dam foundation, central<br />

filter, auxiliary spillway capacity, <strong>and</strong> embankment cracking would remain. At the end of the<br />

design life period, the Sponsors would continue to operate <strong>and</strong> maintain the dam until such time<br />

that available construction funding becomes available to replace the dam. Therefore, Alternative 1<br />

is not acceptable to the Sponsor <strong>and</strong> local community as a viable solution since it does not meet the<br />

purpose <strong>and</strong> need to reduce the risk of loss of life due to catastrophic dam failure. The structures<br />

would continue to have safety <strong>and</strong> performance deficiencies <strong>and</strong> continue to pose a significant risk<br />

of catastrophic failure until eventual rehabilitation or replacement of the structures.<br />

Alternative 2 – Decommissioning: The alternative eliminates impoundment by the <strong>Powerline</strong> FRS<br />

so that it will no longer need to conform to dam safety criteria or performance st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

Alternative 2 provides a new channel that replaces the <strong>Powerline</strong> FRS. The channel will convey<br />

floods up to the 100-year event to the Vineyard Road FRS. Therefore, Alternative 2 meets the<br />

project purpose <strong>and</strong> the Sponsor’s formulation goals.<br />

6.2.1 RISK AND UNCERTAINTY<br />

A variety of factors contribute to the potential for flood control structure failure, including storm<br />

event intensity, control structure construction materials <strong>and</strong> techniques, <strong>and</strong> operation <strong>and</strong><br />

maintenance activities. These uncertainties described below will be addressed during the design<br />

phase of the project.<br />

Under Alternative 1 – No Action, the Sponsor (District) would continue to operate <strong>and</strong> maintain the<br />

dam in its present condition <strong>and</strong> in accordance with the current Emergency Action <strong>Plan</strong>. The<br />

<strong>Powerline</strong> IDSM is an interim measure (design life of 15 years) to mitigate the potential for an<br />

earth fissure near or under the <strong>Powerline</strong> FRS. The alignment/location of the IDSM is based on<br />

current investigations <strong>and</strong> analyses for projected future earth fissure risk zones. The District will<br />

continue the on-going monitoring program at <strong>Powerline</strong> FRS for indications of further subsidence<br />

<strong>and</strong> potential of earth fissure development.<br />

The dam would continue to have structural inadequacies in auxiliary spillway capacity. As a result,<br />

there is a risk of dam break until the FRS is decommissioned.<br />

Current hydrologic analytical results indicates the FRS <strong>and</strong> auxiliary spillway is not capable of<br />

passing the planning 6-hr PMF (for both existing <strong>and</strong> future l<strong>and</strong> use conditions), which overtops<br />

the dam by 0.6 foot. The dam experiences no flow in the auxiliary spillway for any of the existing<br />

conditions multi-frequency (2-year through 500-year) events. The future conditions l<strong>and</strong> use for<br />

<strong>Powerline</strong> FRS results in auxiliary spillway flow only during the 500-year, 24-hour storm event at a<br />

depth of 0.5 ft.<br />

The erosion analysis using the SITES model indicates that the auxiliary spillway erodes during the<br />

stability design hydrograph <strong>and</strong> breaches during the existing <strong>and</strong> future conditions freeboard design<br />

hydrographs. As a result there remains a risk of breach of the auxiliary spillway.<br />

USDA- NRCS Page 6-6 <strong>Jan</strong>uary <strong>2013</strong><br />

Kimley-Horn <strong>and</strong> Associates, Inc.

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