Powerline Plan and Environ. Assessment Jan. 2013 - Flood Control ...
Powerline Plan and Environ. Assessment Jan. 2013 - Flood Control ...
Powerline Plan and Environ. Assessment Jan. 2013 - Flood Control ...
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<strong>Powerline</strong> <strong>Flood</strong> Retarding Structure<br />
Pinal County, AZ<br />
Draft Supplemental Watershed <strong>Plan</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>Environ</strong>mental <strong>Assessment</strong><br />
Rittenhouse FRS<br />
The central filter installed in the Rittenhouse FRS in 1979 extends from Stations 80+00 to<br />
210+00; a filter was not installed in the southern 5,000 feet of the embankment between Stations<br />
30+00 <strong>and</strong> 80+00. The filter was designed to extend 12 feet below the crest of the dam, except<br />
where deeper cracks were observed in the trench by an onsite NRCS representative during<br />
installation of the filter. In areas where cracks extended beyond a depth of 12 feet, the filter was<br />
deepened until there was no further evidence of the presence of the crack.<br />
4.2.3. Existing Filter Potential Failure Modes<br />
4.2.3.1. FUNCTION OF EXISTING FILTERS<br />
S<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> gravel filters are used to prevent internal erosion or piping of soil through cracks in<br />
embankments or foundations of hydraulic structures. Properly graded filters designed in<br />
accordance with NEH-633, Chapter 26 criteria are capable of sealing cracks. As described in<br />
above central filters were installed to varying degrees in each of the PVR structures. Since the<br />
installation of these filters, studies have revealed potential concerns about the suitability of the<br />
soils in which the filters were founded <strong>and</strong> the depth of filter penetration. These concerns, which<br />
are documented in the Final Failure Mode Analysis Report, Structures <strong>Assessment</strong> Program –<br />
Phase 1 have led to an evaluation of the potential installation of new filter systems to mitigate the<br />
known failure modes.<br />
4.2.3.2. POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES<br />
To evaluate the need for an updated filter system, an underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the potential failure modes<br />
associated with partial penetrating filters <strong>and</strong> embankment cracking was developed. There are<br />
five likely potential failure modes related to the existing filter conditions at the PVR structures.<br />
The mechanism for failure in each case is internal erosion. Due to the relatively short<br />
impoundment duration anticipated at each of the PVR structures, the development of conditions<br />
leading to a potential dam failure are considered most likely to occur over time through a series<br />
of flood events <strong>and</strong> are considered unlikely to occur during a single flood event. The five<br />
potential failure modes are summarized as follows.<br />
Failure Mode 1 (FM-1) – Internal erosion through transverse cracks in the embankment<br />
<strong>and</strong> a defect in the central filter.<br />
• Desiccation cracking creates voids within the embankment allowing moisture to reach the<br />
central filter. Defects in the central filter, cementation <strong>and</strong> cracking or improper filter<br />
matching, allow for embankment material to migrate downstream ultimately leading to<br />
breach failure.<br />
Failure Mode 2 (FM-2) – Internal erosion along the interface between the foundation <strong>and</strong><br />
erodible soils beneath the central filter at the embankment-foundation interface (not in the<br />
embankment).<br />
• Desiccation cracking or upstream buried channels of more permeable material allows<br />
moisture to reach the foundation-Holocene interface. Since the central filter is only a<br />
partially penetrating filter, moisture is able to migrate downstream along the<br />
embankment-foundation (embankment-soil) interface, ultimately leading to a breach<br />
failure.<br />
USDA- NRCS <strong>Jan</strong>uary <strong>2013</strong><br />
Kimley-Horn <strong>and</strong> Associates, Inc. Page 23