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39
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF
CHINA’S RISE
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION
USAK Center for Asia-Pacific Studies
Selçuk Çolakoğlu
USAK REPORT NO: 39
March 2014

Turkish Perceptions of China’s Rise
USAK Center for Asia-Pacific Studies
Author
Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU
Researchers
Emre Tunç Sakaoğlu
Mehmet Hecan
Mehmet Güçer
USAK REPORT NO: 39
March 2014
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (USAK)

USAK Report No: 39
Editor of USAK Reports: Mehmet GÜÇER
Copyright © 2014 USAK
All Rights Reserved.
First Edition
Library Catalogue Reports
“Turkish Perceptions of China’s Rise”
This report contains graphs and tables with supplementary text
USAK Publications
ISBN: 978-605-4030-93-4
Graphic Design: Karınca Ajans Yayıncılık Matbaacılık
Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak No: 56/1 Kızılay/ANKARA
Phone: (0312) 431 54 83 • Fax: (0312) 431 54 84 • www.karincayayinlari.net
International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)
Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu
Ayten Sokak No: 21 Tandoğan/Ankara
Phone: (0312) 212 28 86-87 • Fax: (0312) 212 25 84
www.usak.org.tr - www.turkishweekly.net
www.usakanalist.com - info@usak.org.tr

İçindekiler
CONTENTS
Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................................7
Introduction .........................................................................................................................................9
I. THE SOCIALIST AND MAOIST VIEW OF CHINA..............................................................11
II. TURKISH NATIONALIST, UYGHUR DIASPORA AND POLITICAL
ISLAMIST VIEW OF CHINA.....................................................................................................15
A. Turkish Nationalist and Uyghur Diaspora View of China.........................................................15
B. The Political Islamist Understanding of China..........................................................................16
III. THE BUSINESS-ORIENTED VIEW OF CHINA.....................................................................19
IV. TURKISH BUREAUCRACY AND AKP GOVERNMENT LOOKS TO CHINA....................25
A. Turkish Bureaucracy Looks to China as a Balancer for Global Politics.......................................25
B. AKP Government’s China Policy...............................................................................................26
V. CHINESE CULTURE IN TURKEY............................................................................................33
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS..................................................................................................37

Tables and Graphs
Table 1. Uyghur Diaspora Organizations in Turkey................................................................................................... 16
Table 2. Turkey’s Trade with China............................................................................................................................ 19
Table 3. Confucius Institutes in Turkey..................................................................................................................... 33
Table 4. Chinese Language Departments at the Turkish Univeristies......................................................................... 33
Graph 1. Turkish Foreign Trade with China................................................................................................................ 20
Graph 2. Turkey’s Export to China for the First Ten Products ($) - 2013.................................................................... 21
Graph 3. Turkey’s Import From China for the First Ten Products ($) - 2013.............................................................. 21
Graph 4. Uyghur Diapora Communities around the World........................................................................................ 29
Graph 5. Direct Flights between Turkey and China.................................................................................................... 34
Graph 6. Number of Chinese Tourists Entering Turkey.............................................................................................. 35
Graph 7. Distribution of Chinese Restaurants in Turkish Cities.................................................................................. 35

Acronyms
AKP
C.I.A.
CPC
EU
MHP
NATO
ROC
PRC
SCO
TÜSİAD
UN
U.S.
Justice and Development Party of Turkey
Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S.
Communist Party of China
Euroepan Union
Nationalist Movement Party of Turkey
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Republic of China
People’s Republic of China
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Turkish Industry and Business Association
United Nations
United States

USAK CENTER FOR ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES (APAM)
The USAK Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (APAM) has been conducting research,
teaching, and doing outreach on political and economic issues in the Asia Pacific
region since 2009.
APAM provides a focal point where government officials, business leaders, and
policy-makers can converge to exchange ideas, and achieve a greater understanding of
the issues that shape the Asia-Pacific region. The Center is a rare resource in Turkey,
offering information on the increasingly complex interrelationships of economic,
political, and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. APAM’s activities include
research projects, conferences, seminars, graduate and undergraduate courses, and
exchange programs with Asia-Pacific institutions.
Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU Professor of International Relations, Vice
President of USAK, and Director of USAK Center for Asia-Pacific
Studies in Ankara, Turkey.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The perception of China among the Turkish public is near the
notion of a rising superpower. However, the Turkish public
does not perceive a direct peril stemming the “rising China”
that may affect Turkey.
Turkish intellectuals as well as the general public are divided about whether a “rising
China” poses a window of opportunity for Turkey or a growing threat to its values and
interests.
Intellectuals’ perceptions of China differ on a large scale based on their view on life and
their professional positions. For this reason, Turkish intellectual and public perceptions
of China will be investigated in several categories.
7
Marxist-socialist-Maoist groups exhibit one of the authentic approaches to China. The
common ground for these groups is their opposition to the capitalist system, the Western
world, and especially American imperialism. They are divided into two groups:
Universalists and national socialists. While universalists can be defined as socialists of
the Soviet tradition, Turkish nationalist elements are prominent among the Maoists.
Pan-Turkists have another approach to China. Turkish nationalists are distinguished
by their anti-communist attitude. These groups had a political stance against the Soviet
Union and communist China during the Cold War. Not only there was no anti-
Americanism among Turkish nationalists during the Cold War, but they leaned toward
pro-Americanism. The main priority of the pan-Turkists throughout the Cold War was
to free the “imprisoned Turkic World”. Turkestan (known as Central Asia today) was
occupied by communists. While West Turkestan was being persecuted by the Soviet
Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was occupying East Turkestan (Xinjiang).
Political Islamist intellectuals were against communist China during Cold War because
it was anti-religious. They viewed the Soviet Union and the PRC as domineering regimes
ruling over Muslims in Central Asia. For these reasons, both pan-Turkists and
Islamists had a negative opinions about communist China. The Uyghur and Kazakh
diaspora, which were originally from Xinjiang, had strong relations with Turkists and
Islamists groups.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

The “rising China” view of the business world is more focused on economic interests
than ideological perceptions. While business circles harmed by this new commerce are
reacting against China, the businessmen who have been able to profit from economic
opportunities in China support improving relations with Beijing.
The group defined as civil-military decision makers consists of three main sub-groups.
These are elected governments, the civilian bureaucracy led by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the military bureaucracy formed by the Turkish General Staff. Turkish
decision makers have adopted a truly pragmatic approach toward China. After PRC-
Turkey relations normalized in 1971, bureaucratic and political elites started to evaluate
China as an economic and political balancing factor. Moreover, since Turkey faces some
problems related to its Western allies and neighbors from time to time, Ankara should
improve its political relations with Beijing, a permanent member of the UN Security
Council and a country with growing influence over global politics. The general consensus
among the Turkish elite is that Turkey can best serve its national interests by maintaining
a delicate balance in its relations with the U.S., the EU, Russia, and China. In
return for political and economic cooperation with China, Turkish elites expect Beijing
to integrate the Uyghur community into China’s economic and political system nationwide,
instead of assimilating them.
8
There is a common anticipation that the rise of Asian nations, led by China, will beget
some sort of pan-Asianism with respect to international relations theory. In the face of
such a phenomenon, Turkish intellectual circles appear to be emphasizing Turkey’s Asian
identity in the post-Cold War period. Whereas Ankara politically identified Turkey as a
European country throughout the Cold War period, since the beginning of 1990s it has
begun to identify itself as a Eurasian country. The emergence of Turkic Republics in the
Caucasus and in Central Asia had a strong effect on this shift in conception.
All in all, the perception of China among the Turkish public is near the notion of a rising
superpower. However, the Turkish public does not perceive a direct peril stemming
the “rising China” that may affect Turkey and that requires a reflexive response. That is
primarily because Turkey and China are geographically far away, with a negligibly small
Chinese community currently residing in Turkey, and vice versa.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

INTRODUCTION
Turkish intellectuals as well as the general public are divided
about whether a “rising China” poses a window of opportunity
for Turkey or a growing threat to its values and interests.
Intellectuals’ perceptions of China differ on a large scale based on their view on life and
their professional positions. For this reason, Turkish intellectual and public perceptions
of China will be investigated in several categories.
Marxist-socialist-Maoist groups exhibit one of the authentic approaches to China. The
common ground for these groups is their opposition to the capitalist system, the Western
world, and especially American imperialism. They are divided into two groups:
Universalists and national socialists. While Universalists can be defined as socialists of
the Soviet tradition, Turkish nationalist elements are prominent among the Maoists. To
properly differentiate this group from the rightist Turkish nationalists (Ülkücü), it will
be wise to define them as leftist nationalists (Ulusalcı).
9
Pan-Turkists have another approach to China. Turkish nationalists are distinguished
by their anti-communist attitude. These groups had a political stance against the Soviet
Union and communist China during the Cold War. Not only there was no anti-
Americanism among Turkish nationalists during the Cold War, but they leaned toward
pro-Americanism. The main priority of the pan-Turkists throughout the Cold War was
to free the “imprisoned Turkic World”. Turkestan (known as Central Asia today) was
occupied by communists. While West Turkestan was being persecuted by the Soviet
Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was occupying East Turkestan (Xinjiang).
Political Islamist intellectuals were against communist China during Cold War because
it was anti-religious. They viewed the Soviet Union and the PRC as domineering regimes
ruling over Muslims in Central Asia. For these reasons, both pan-Turkists and
political Islamists had negative opinions about communist China. The Uyghur and Kazakh
diaspora, which were originally from Xinjiang, had strong relations with Turkists
and Islamists groups. Indeed, Islamism and Turkism are very inter-related. Today’s Turkish
nationalists are proud of the fact that unlike Arabs, all Turks are Muslims and called
themselves the saviors and protectors of Islam throughout Seljuk and Ottoman history.
It will be investigated in detail how Turkists’ and Islamists’ perception of a “rising China”
was formed.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

The “rising China” view of the business world is more focused on economic interests
than ideological perceptions. While business circles harmed by this new commerce are
reacting against China, the businessmen who have been able to profit from economic
opportunities in China support improving relations with Beijing. Hence, it can be said
that business intellectuals have two distinct approaches to China. In the relevant section,
it will be evaluated whether Turkish intellectuals take the “Chinese development model”
as a precedent.
The group defined as civil-military decision makers consists of three main sub-groups.
These are elected government, the civilian bureaucracy formed by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the military bureaucracy formed by the Turkish General Staff. In the
Turkish political system, diplomats and generals have the ability to make decisions independently
of elected governments. Military and civilian bureaucracies gained strength
after succesive military coup and under weak coalition governments. But especially during
the last AKP (Justice and Development Party) governments, a strong governmentweak
bureaucracy trend can be observed to be gradually gaining prominence. It can
be seen that the government and the decision-making entities formed by the military
and civil bureaucracies have been acting with pragmatic motivations. After PRC-Turkey
relations normalized in 1971, bureaucratic and political elites started to evaluate China
as an economic and political balancing factor against the Western world with which
problems may occasionally arise.
10
This report will investigate the policies and perceptions about China of the AKP—a
center-right party with political Islamist roots that has been in power for the past eleven
years through some of the most powerful governments in modern Turkish history. Under
the rule of successive AKP governments between 2002 and 2014, has managed to
consolidate its political and economic ties with China to a great extent.
Also in this report, China’s cultural activities and soft power capacity in Turkey will be
examined. The conclusion will draw from all of these different views to investigate the
wide array of perspectives toward China that exist among the Turkish public and intellectual
circles along with the dynamics and processes with which they evolve.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

THE SOCIALIST AND MAOIST
VIEW OF CHINA
1Ideologically, the groups that lean toward China consist of
mostly Marxist-socialist-Maoist groups. According to their
perspective, China could have an important role in opposing
the Western world.
Especially after the Cold War, some socialists, particularly Maoists, are leaning towards
secular Turkish nationalism. This group, the leftist nationalists, thinks that Turkey is
being dominated by the U.S. and Western Europe through its membership in NATO,
and that it prioritizes Western interests over its own national interests. The people who
advocate a pro-NATO, pro-European Union (EU) policy are co-conspirators. According
to this group, Turkey should leave NATO and end its EU membership negotiations.
Turkey’s interest lay outside the Western world and Turkey should join the block that is
led by Russia and China, an “anti-imperialist” camp.
11
According to Erol Manisalı, Turkey is acting in accordance with the U.S., Israel, and the
EU, and gives all the necessary support for their regional politics. However, Turkey has
common strategic interests with Russia, China, and Iran. Ankara has started to establish
strategic relations with Beijing in Asia. Turkey’s improving relations with prominent
Asian powers—such as Russia, China, and Iran—are, all things being equal, a natural
outcome of the local dynamics of the region. On the contrary, Ankara’s relations with
the West has been a set of top-to-bottom developments based on political decisions. 1
According to Doğu Perinçek, the founding chairman of the Workers Party (İşçi Partisi)
and a prominent Maoist leader, Turkey is in danger of being divided and is not independent.
Ankara, under U.S. mandate, has been tied to the EU’s door. In this situation,
the mission is to free Turkey from the U.S. mandate and to ensure its national integrity.
This strategic mission can be achieved by allying with Syria (Assad government), Iraq
(Maliki government), Iran, and Azerbaijan, and by strengthening the back fence formed
by China and Russia. Nationalism, populism, revolutionism, and socialism all require
such a shift. In this context, the Turkish nationalists would befriend China and Russia
in order to get rid of the U.S. Turkey will inevitably be at the forefront of the emerging
Eurasian civilization. Ankara is a servant in Atlantic, but an equal partner in Eurasia. In
this strategic alliance, the U.S. is trying to disintegrate Turkey through the PKK, Russia
through Chechen militias, and China through so-called Uyghur separatism. Those who
1 Erol Manisalı, “Rusya, İran ve Türkiye’nin Önemi”, Cumhuriyet, 10 September 2012.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

support Uyghur terrorist activity, which is known to be C.I.A.-guided, are the United
States’ co-conspirators. 2
According to the leftist nationalists, Turkey should not only turn to East politically but
also develop defensive cooperation with Russia and China, as it collaborates in military
technology. In this perspective, the leftist nationalists met Turkey’s post-1997 defense
industry collaboration with China with excitement and support.
According to Aydınlık, the newspaper of the Workers Party, the U.S. Department of
Defense was troubled by the Sino-Turkish joint military drills which took place in 2010.
These drills, called the “Peace Mission 2010” and sponsored by the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), consisted of a joint air drill between China and Turkey in
the Turkish province of Konya. The Pentagon is also troubled by the high-level military
relations between China and Turkey. 3
12
According to the leftist nationalists, China is accommodating all of its peoples and ethnic
and religious groups peacefully under the dome of the PRC. The incidents involving
Uyghurs in Xinjiang is a game of American imperialism. The U.S., which does not want
to face a strong China, is using the C.I.A. to have Uyghurs to carry out operations in
the region. Aydınlık columnist Mehmet Ali Güller states that the fact that these forces,
which want to divide China, are now taking a role in Syria beside the U.S. and fighting
against the Assad regime is a clear indication of American imperialism. In this context,
it should be questioned why the separatist, “East Turkestan Government” is based in the
U.S. town of Oakton, Virginia. 4
According to Doğu Perinçek, the separatist terror in Xinjiang does not serve the freedom
and prosperity of the Uyghurs, but serves American imperialism. Supporting these
forces is neither in the interest of the Uyghurs nor in the interest of the Turkish nation
or any other ethnic Turks. As a matter of fact, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are coming out against separatist terrorism and they greatly
value their friendship with the PRC. The SCO is a Turkic-Russian-Chinese alliance. It
is where Turkey belongs. The Turkic Republics can only be united in the Eurasian Alliance.
Enmity towards Russia and China disadvantage all Turks. Friendship between
Turkey, China, and Russia is also beneficial to the Turkic people living in Russia and
China. Uyghurs and others thrive as equal and free citizens of their countries in the
Great Eurasian Union. Today, Turkey cannot extract any gains nor can it protect its own
territorial integrity by targeting the territorial integrity of China. 5
In contrast with this, a small group of Turkish socialists with universalist tendencies is
keeping their distance from nationalism. This group is uncomfortable about China becoming
the manufacturing base of the world capitalist system and the constant violation
of labor rights within China. According to these socialists, China has already become a
part of the capitalist system and social inequality is deepening against the laborers. Dur-
2 Doğu Perinçek, “Kürşat, Pekos Bill’in at uşağı olur mu?”, Aydınlık, 21 October 2012.
3 “ABD, Türk-Çin askeri ilişkilerinden rahatsız”, Aydınlık, 2 October 2011.
4 Mehmet Ali Güller, “Bölücü örgütler neden ABD’nin safında”, Aydınlık, 1 November 2012.
5 Doğu Perinçek, “Kürşat, Pekos Bill’in at uşağı olur mu?”, Aydınlık, 21 October 2012.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

ing the reign of Mao, although per capita income was very low, the working class and
villagers enjoyed much better conditions in terms of access to educational and health
services. 6
According to economics professor Korkut Boratav, a leading Turkish socialist, the transformation
initiated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the wake of Mao’s death
gained speed in the years following the end of the Soviet bloc. As a matter of fact, the
demise of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has deeply
affected the leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC), convincing them of the
superiority of the market mechanism and capitalist forms of management. 7
According to the “universalist socialists”, human rights violations in Xinjiang should
not be the sole purview of Islamist and nationalist groups in Turkey. The Uyghur issue
should be addressed in the same way as all other suppressed peoples. Censuring the anti-
Uyghur violence in China is generally left to racists and Islamists in Turkey. Whereas
all who see socialism as a freedom project or who claim to take global democratization
and human rights seriously should support the Uyghurs’ demands for democracy and
human rights. 8
13
6 Ahmet Devrim, “Kapitalist Çin’in ‘komünist’ yönetimi giderek zorlanıyor”, Birgün, 6 November 2012.
7 Korkut Boratav, “Çin Nereye?”, Birgün, 19 June 2012.
8 Tarık Günersel, “Kürtler, Uygurlar, İfade Özgürlüğü”, Birgün, 12 July 2009.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

TURKISH NATIONALIST,
UYGHUR DIASPORA AND
POLITICAL ISLAMIST
2VIEW OF CHINA
A. Turkish Nationalist and Uyghur Diaspora
View of China
The rightist Turkish nationalists usually consider the PRC to be a brutal state oppressing
and assimilating fellow Uyghur Turks. According to many Turkish nationalists, China
has been an enemy of the Turks since the early Turkic states were founded in what is
today Central Asia—and especially throughout the Middle Ages.
For this segment of nationalists, China has always been a devious state, undermining the
unity of the Turkic people and overrunning Turkic territories as it did in East Turkestan
(Xinjiang) in 1949. China still causes great anxiety and wields heavy influence over
Central Asian Turkic people.
According to Muzaffer Özdağ, a well-known Turkish nationalists, until the ninth century
the border between China and the historical Turkic homeland was the Great Wall
of China. Turks were forced to completely withdraw from East Asia and the Pacific;
and the east wing of the Great Hun and Göktürk states—which were historical Turkic
states—collapsed completely. From the second half of the eighteenth century to the
present, East Turkestan, occupied by successive Chinese invasions, has been in danger of
vanishing forever along with its Turkic heritage. 9
15
Turkish nationalist media tracks the developments on Xinjiang with sensitivity. According
to Mustafa İlbaş, a columnist of the Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) newspaper
Ortadoğu, Chinese are being moved to East Turkestan while Uyghurs are being
forcefully relocated for work in order to disrupt the demographics of the Uyghur region.
For instance, while the Han Chinese population in Urumqi was 4% fifty years ago,
now it is 80%. Kashgar was a 100% Turkic city and now it is 50% Han Chinese. Uyghur
Turks are being systematically assimilated and slaughtered while the ‘free world’ is
watching. China is exerting inhumane levels of suppression in East Turkestan while staring
the world in the face. Thirty million citizens of East Turkestan are trying to survive
as a deeply oppressed and strictly subjected ethnic minority in an environment where
they are deprived of basic human rights. China has turned millions of square kilometers
into an open-air prison. 10
9 Muzaffer Özdağ, Türk Dünyası ve Doğu Türkistan Jeopolitiği Üzerine, İstanbul, Doğu Türkistan Vakfı Yayınları, 2000,
pp.11-17.
10 Mustafa İlbaş, “Doğu Türkistan yanıyor dünya seyrediyor”, Ortadoğu, 13 July 2009.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

Table 1. Uyghur Diaspora Organizations in Turkey
Name of Uyghur Association or Foundation
Eastern Turkestan Culture and Solidarity Association
Eastern Turkestan Culture and Solidarity Association
Eastern Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association
Eastern Turkestan Foundation
Eastern Turkestan Immigrants Association
Uyghur Industrialists and Businessmen Association
Uyghur Islamic Culture and Solidarity Association
Source: USAK
City
Ankara (Branch)
Kayseri (Head Office)
Istanbul
Istanbul
Istanbul
Istanbul
Istanbul
According to Hamit Göktürk, who is the chairman of the East Turkestan Foundation in
Istanbul, all of East Turkestan’s rights have been wrested from it, even its very name. East
Turkestan is a bastion of Turkicness in the East. The existence of East Turkestan Turks
is reassuring to Central Asian and Anatolian Turks. China is doing the best it can to
ensure Turkish nationalism does not gain traction in the region. According to Göktürk,
the suppression exerted on East Turkestan by China has reached the scale of genocide. 11
16
Kürşat Zorlu, a columnist in Turkish nationalist Yeniçağ newspaper, claims that hundreds
of Uyghur Turks lost their lives in the massacre of July 5th, 2009 in East Turkestan
where thirty million people, mostly Muslims, are living. China interprets any tangible
action regarding East Turkestan, which it identifies as terrorism, as a threat to its internal
affairs. 12
B. The Political Islamist Understanding of China
Moreover, Turkish Islamists consider the PRC to be a communist and atheist state with
a record of brutal repression against the Uyghurs as well as the Hui Muslims. According
to political Islamists, the PRC is against Islam and religion—making it worse than
Western states which are “at least” more tolerant to Muslim practices.
According to political Islamist newspaper Yeni Akit columnist Ayhan Demir, East Turkestani
Muslims cannot freely exercise their traditions and religion. They are imprisoned
and tortured for getting a religious education, praying, and even for just mentioning
their religion. If they are government officers, they get laid off due to religious discrimination.
13 Another columnist of Yeni Akit, Mustafa Özcan states that East Turkestan has
become China’s Palestine. A policy of oppression to similar Israel’s in Palestine has been
carried out over East Turkestan by China. 14
The political Islamist Felicity Party’s (Saadet Partisi) newspaper, Milli Gazete, frequently
publishes articles criticizing China’s oppressive policy toward Muslims. According to
İbrahim Yetiş, “East Turkestan” is the name of the genocide that has been continuing for
11 Fatih Erboz, “Çin Zulmü Altındaki Doğu Türkistan”, Yeniçağ,10 July2009.
12 Kürşat Zorlu, “Doğu Türkistan’da Ramazan yasakları”, Yeniçağ, 21 July 2012.
13 Ayhan Demir,“Doğu Türkistan neyimiz olur?”, Yeni Akit, 10 April 2012.
14 Mustafa Özcan,“Sürgün Şehzade ve Doğu Türkistan”, Yeni Akit, 18 July 2009.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

about half a century. Once a cultural center, East Turkestan is now groaning under red
China’s exploitation. People are being snatched away from their material and spiritual
roots and are being assimilated in front of the whole world. The so-called autonomous
region named “Xinjiang”, which is imposed over what is historically East Turkestan,
does not have any autonomous features at all. In such an environment, red China is
increasing the pressure on East Turkestani Muslims in the sacred month of Ramadan.
A permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is conducting periodic massacres
through its invasive government while the four other members remain unresponsive.
15
Again, according to Milli Gazete’s news, China was using the terms “separatists” and
“extremists” to define the people of East Turkestan before 9/11. But after 9/11, Beijing
changed its definition of Uyghurs and started to label these people as “terrorists”. It even
characterized the innocent protests that took place in East Turkestan as terrorist acts. 16
17
15 İbrahim Yetiş, “Zulmün coğrafyası, Doğu Türkistan !”, Milli Gazete, 22 September 2012
16 “Doğu Türkistan, yitirilmiş Endülüs gibi olacak”, Milli Gazete, 1 April 2010.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

THE BUSINESS-ORIENTED
VIEW OF CHINA
3Turkish businessmen’s perceptions of China vary between notions
of risk and opportunity. For some Turkish businessmen,
China, the second largest economy in the world and a rapidly
growing center of financial attraction, offers many economic
opportunities. They believe Turkey shouldn’t hesitate to get its
piece of the Chinese pie.
According to national financial newspaper Dünya, China, the world’s factory, is also
turning into a giant consumer market. By the year 2015, there will be twelve cities with
over 2.5 million middle-class and wealthy residents. China’s wealthiest city, Shanghai,
has a population of 20 million and a per capita income of $23,000—the same level as
oil-rich Saudi Arabia. In other words, in a very short time Shanghai will single-handedly
possess a market as big as Saudi Arabia, a country of 28 million people. In an era where
the power of the global economy is shifting from West to East, Turkish firms need to
anlayze China very well. 17
19
Table 2. Turkey’s Trade with China
Export ($ million) Import ($ million) Total ($ million) Balance ($ million)
1990 37 246 283 -209
1995 67 539 606 -472
2000 96 1,345 1,441 -1,249
2005 550 6,885 7,435 -6,336
2010 2,269 17,181 19,450 -14,912
2013 3,602 24,686 28,288 -21,084
Source: Turkish Ministry of Economy
At the Eurasia EXPO in September 2012 Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan,
who is directing the economic policies of the AKP government, expressed his satisfaction
over the fact that Urumqi has become China’s opening to Central Asia and beyond.
Babacan stated that they are targeting an increase in the bilateral trade volume to $50
billion by 2015 and $100 billion by 2020. 18
17 Hakan Güldağ, “Türkiye, yeni Çini doğru okumalı”, Dünya, 20 November 2012.
18 “Çin hedefi 100 milyar dolar”, Dünya, 2 September 2012.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

According to one of Turkey’s leading businessman, Hüsnü Özyeğin, China-Turkey relations
bear very high potential in the business world. Özyeğin does not see Turkey’s trade
deficit with China as a negative factor. Turkey’s imports from China is generating a implicit
current surplus, as they are cheaper than imports from other countries. If you buy
a $30 million crane from China instead of a $40 million crane from Germany, you generate
a $10 million surplus. Hence, importing from China costs the Turkish economy
less than importing from third countries. 19
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) Chairwoman Ümit Boyner emphasizes
that China is getting more and more integrated into the global economy and
it has become more open to foreign investors. Boyner believes that at this time there are
important opportunities for Turkish firms to invest in and do business with China. 20
On the other hand, China is a source of concern for some business circles in Turkey, as
they calculate that the relative might of the Chinese economy represents a severe danger
rather than an opportunity. In particular, the idea of Chinese products invading Turkish
markets and the fear of intensified competition between Turkey’s light industry and a
wide range of imports from China generates deep concerns for some Turkish producers
in various sectors. An invasion by Chinese products in the Turkish market means profit
losses for Turkish companies and, consequently, job losses for Turkish workers.
20
The major complaint of Turkish financial circles is that Turkey has a big trade deficit
with China. According to Dünya, in 2011 18.2% of the $105.9 billion foreign trade
deficit originated from the trade with China alone. 21 This type of news about the bilateral
trade deficit has been appearing more and more in Turkish media and has contributed
to the common opinion that China is a financial threat.
Graph 1. Turkish Foreign Trade with China
30,000
U.S. Dollars (million)
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
Turkish Imports
from China
5,000
Turkish Exports
to China
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: Turkish Ministry of Economy
19 “Hüsnü Özyeğin arsa alma konusunda neleri önerdi?”, Ekonomik Ayrıntı, 5 January 2013, http://www.ekoayrinti.
com/news_detail.php?id=113704 (13.01.2013).
20 “TÜSİAD Çin’i anlamak için Pekin’e gidecek”, Ekonomik Ayrıntı, 11 September 2012, http://www.ekoayrinti.com/
news_detail.php?id=107188 (13.01.2013).
21 “Dış ticaret açığının beşte biri Çin’den”, Dünya, 12 February 2012.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

Graph 2. Turkey’s Export to China for the First Ten Products ($) - 2013
Metallic ores, slag and ash 1,362,730,373
Salt, sulphur, earths and stones,
plastering materials, lime and cement
1,091,499,156
Inorganic chemicals, organic or
inorganic compounds
Boilers, machineries and mechanical
appliances, parts thereof
Cotton,cotton yarn and cotton textiles
95,202,278
68,622,506
288,516,847
Man-made fibres (discontinuous)
63,579,343
Carpets, mats matting and tapestries
46,644,578
Copper and articles thereof
Furskins and artificial fur
manufactures thereof
Articles of iron and steel
46,450,621
45,128,164
36,306,273
Source: TurkStat
21
Graph 3. Turkey’s Import From China for the First Ten Products ($) - 2013
Man-made filament 547,481,695
Vehicles other than railway or
tramway rolling-stock, parts thereof
Non knitted and
crocheted goods and articles thereof
Organic chemicals
552,181,420
563,139,764
599,445,480
Optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring checking, precision
Articles of iron and steel
611,465,767
687,673,783
Furniture
688,837,138
Plastic and articles thereof
1,019,692,764
Boilers, machineries and
mechanical appliances, parts thereof
Electrical machinery and
equipment, parts thereof
6,018,133,167
6,696,923,072
Source: TurkStat
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

The fact that Turkey’s export to China consists mainly of raw materials and semi-products
is causing Turkish economists to worry that China is gathering all the added value.
One of the main export materials of Turkey to China, marble, is being exported as a
raw material and this is an everlasting discussion topic within Turkish business circles.
For example, Burdur’s signature “beige marbel” is in high demand from China and India.
Since Turkey lacks the necessary technology, efficiency, and cheap energy, Burdur’s
marble is being sold in blocks. The Chinese buy the raw marble from the province of
Burdur, process it, and sell it to the U.S. and EU. 22
There is a view among the Turkish public that Chinese products are cheap, but thirdrate.
For instance, a 2012 regulation mandates commercial vehicles to use winter tires,
leading thousands to purchase Chinese-made tires at half price. According to news reports
that appeared in the Turkish media, Chinese-made tires caused many accidents
during the first snowfall of the year. 23
22
Moreover, the notion that Chinese food products are threatening Turkish agriculture
is starting to emerge. The most obvious example of this can be observed between Chinese-produced
garlic and Turkish-produced garlic. The village of Taşköprü is the biggest
garlic producer in Turkey. The president of its Chamber of Agriculture in Kastamonu
province, Murat Çelik, stated that whenever Chinese garlic is imported, the price of
Taşköprü garlic goes down significantly and producers cannot make a profit. Furthermore,
people get sick from the unhealthy Chinese garlic. Turkish garlic producers want
the government to cease Chinese garlic imports and enable the Turkish public to consume
healthy Taşköprü garlic. 24
Another sector that is competing with China is the textile industry. Turkey exports approximately
$3 billion in textiles making it one of the top three textile-exporting countries.
Turkish textile firms export more than half of their products to European markets,
which require a very high quality of production. Bursa-based Özdilek Holding’s Board
Chairman Hüseyin Özdilek said that Turkey is competing with China and India, which
are global actors in the textile industry. The Turkish textile industry is trying to integrate
itself into world markets more strongly in order to survive. 25
While the “Chinese development model” is being discussed, very few people claim that
it would be applicable to Turkey. Firstly, China is an incomparably larger country in
terms of population and geography. Accordingly, it is very difficult to compare the two
countries’ economic parameters. Besides, Turkey is a more advanced country than China
in the sense of its GDP per capita and income equality. 26
Furthermore, the fact that the CPC rules China single-handedly does not make it a
model favored by the Turkish general public. From this point of view, Joseph S. Nye’s
22 Gila Benmayor, “Çinli Burdur’a neden gelir?”, Hürriyet, 21 September 2012.
23 Metin Can, “Kar değil Çin çarptı”, Sabah, 21 December 2012.
24 “Üretici Çin sarımsağından şikayetçi”, Hürriyet, 27 December 2012.
25 Oktan Erdikmen, “Ev tekstil Fuarı açıldı”, Post, 9 January 2013, http://postgazetesi.com/2013/01/09/ev-tekstilfuari-acildi/
(14.01.2013)
26 Attila Sönmez, Doğu Asya Mucizesi ve Bunalımı, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2001.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

statements about the limits of China’s soft power are accepted by Turkish intellectuals.
Despite China’s economic success, the regime’s strict identity, its poor record on democracy
and human rights, and oppressive policies towards minorities are not recognized
outside as an attractive model. 27 Moreover, China is a long way from having a free and
people-based political system, which is very popular in many countries and a descriptive
vision that explains how economies should be structured. 28
From this perspective, the democratic development experiences of Japan and South
Korea are important. South Korea’s development experience, with which Turkey has
had close political relations since the Korean War, is attracting more attention in Turkish
public opinion. Both countries have had a democratization process with highs and lows,
and in the Cold War era both countries started a development process under free market
conditions and within the Western alliance. Furthermore, Turkish public opinion has
followed South Korea’s attainment of a technological manufacturing capacity and its
successful transition to social welfare government with admiration. 29
23
27 Joseph S.Nye, “Why China is Weak on Soft Power”. New York Times, 17 January 2012.
28 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Soft Power”, The Diplomat, 25 March 2011.
29 Hee-Chul Lee, Siyasi, Ekonomik, Askeri ve Kültürel Açıdan Türkiye-Kore İlişkileri, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu
Yayınları, 2007.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

TURKISH BUREAUCRACY AND
AKP GOVERNMENT LOOKS TO
4CHINA
A. Turkish Bureaucracy Looks to China as a
Balancer for Global Politics
Traditionally, there are two influential institutions in Turkish foreign policy. The first
one is obviously the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the second is the Turkish General Staff.
In practice, Turkish diplomats evaluate a “rising China” as diplomatic leverage for Turkey,
in case Turkey experiences friction or conflicts of interest with its Western allies. 30
By this means, Turkey can reduce its political dependency on the U.S. and the EU by
improving its relations with other big powers like Russia and China. 31
From the military bureaucracy’s point of view, China offers a defense industry that is an
alternative to that of the West. The Turkish General Staff started to consider China as
a cheap, alternative weapons manufacturer, especially in the second half of the 1990s.
China-Turkey military collaboration has gained momentum since then Chief of General
Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı’s visit to China in 1997. 32 Leftist nationalist soldiers,
in particular, consider this military and defensive cooperation between China and Turkey
to be a political balancer against NATO and the EU. According to retired General
Tuncer Kılınç, who was the general secretariat of the National Security Council between
2001 and 2003, after the end of the Cold War the presence of Turkish Armed Forces in
NATO has not been very beneficial. NATO’s leader, the U.S., is trying to use NATO
to achieve its own goals hence NATO membership is not so advantageous for Turkey
anymore. 33
25
30 “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Beijing Büyükelçisi Murat Salim Esenli”, China Radio International, 20 February 2012,
http://turkish.cri.cn/862/2012/02/20/1s138410.htm (29.12.2012).
31 Kutay R. Karaca, Dünyadaki Yeni Güç Çin, İstanbul, IQ Yayıncılık, 2003.
32 “CIA’nin Kızıl Elması”, Aydınlık, 27 Ekim 1996.
33 “Orgenaral Tuncer Kılıç 28 Şubat devam edecek”, Aydınlık, 13 March 2012.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

B. AKP Government’s China Policy
Turkey’s China policy during the AKP (Justice and Development Party) era has rested
upon its currently pragmatic political and economic expectations.
On the other hand, as the AKP’s center-right politics evolved out of the former political
Islamist tradition and bears the influence of Turkish nationalists, it is sensitive to the
Uyghur minority. The AKP’s perspective regarding China is filtered through the lens
of political and economic pragmatism and Turkish-nationalist reflexes combined with
Islamism. While the AKP’s long-term China policy is shaped by political and economic
rationalism, on moral grounds it emphasizes that the Uyghurs play a key role in bridging
the gap in developing friendly relations between the two countries.
26
At this point, Beijing’s gesture to allow the Turkish president, prime minister, and other
ministers to visit Xinjiang, was greeted with great enthusiasm by the AKP leadership.
These are considered developments in line with Ankara’s official stance declaring the
Uyghur community a bridge of friendship for further developing Turkey-China bilateral
relations. Since AKP officials believe that the political and economic conditions of
the Uyghur community will be enhanced only during times of thriving Sino-Turkish
relations, they refrain from establishing contacts with dissident Uyghur movements.
The only way for this AKP-formulated China policy to be maintained successfully is if
Xinjiang stays free of major social unrest. Eruptions such as the one that occurred on
July 5th, 2009 in Urumqi may lead to a rupture in diplomatic relations.
Indeed, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, a former prime minister,
former foreign minister, and the current president (all during AKP governments)
both entered politics in the 1990s as members of the political Islamist Welfare Party
(Refah Partisi) led by Necmettin Erbakan. While Gül served as a minister of state under
the Welfare Party-led coalition government, Erdoğan was serving as Istanbul’s Metropolitan
Mayor. The Welfare Party was closed down in the second half of the 1990s due
to political pressure from secularist military cadres.
In this period, the Welfare Party, which was pursuing a political Islamist line, was in
overall inclined to believe that Muslims in Xinjiang were subjected to communist Chinese
suppression and was generally sympathetic toward the Uyghur people. In this vein,
during Erdoğan’s 1994-1998 term as the Metropolitan Mayor of Istanbul, a park in the
city was named after pro-independence Uyghur leader İsa Yusuf Alptekin who lived in
Turkey from his exile from Xinjiang in 1954 until his death in 1995. In his speech during
the park’s inauguration ceremony Erdoğan indicated that he was more than pleased
by the naming of the park after East Turkestan’s greatest leader, and that Alptekin’s 95
year lifespan was spent not only for the sake of East Turkestan but for the benefit of the
whole Turkic world. President Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, and
Speaker of Parliament Mustafa Kalemli delivered congratulatory messeges on the occasion.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

On the other hand, Wu Koming, China’s erstwhile ambassador to Ankara, protested
Erdoğan’s August 1995 move to name a park in Istanbul after Alptekin. 34 The Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, due to the intense diplomatic efforts of the Chinese authorities,
requested that the park be closed, the flag of East Turkestan hauled down, and the
Memorial for East Turkestan Martyrs demolished. Mayor Erdoğan said that changing
the name of the park would humiliate not only Turkey but Turks all around the world
as well. 35
However, during Erdoğan’s term as Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan City, Turkish foreign
policy was generally inclined toward supporting Turkic people in Central Asia. The
emergence of Turkic states in Central Asia due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 caused a stir in the Turkish public. This led to the false expectation that PRC, too,
would be dismembered like the Soviet Union, as both were communist, multi-national
“empires”. 36
Nonetheless, Ankara was not so successful in its unilateral opening to the region. Therefore,
Turkey developed a new strategy in the second half of 1990s by further emphasizing
cooperation with Russia and China in Central Asia. In 1997 a senior Turkish diplomat
who refrained from giving his name explained that Turkey wishes to improve friendly
relations with China and is not aligning with the separatist movements throughout Xinjiang.
Wo Koming, China’s ambassador to Ankara, gave a statement in February 1997
announcing that Sino-Turkish relations were moving forward in an excellent fashion. 37
As an indicator of the improvement in relations, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz issued
a memorandum in December 1998 that imposed severe restrictions on the activities of
East Turkestan organizations in Turkey. 38 After the prime ministerial memorandum,
many East Turkestan associations relocated to the United States or to western European
countries where they could conduct their activities more freely. Thus, the center of gravity
of Uyghur opposition moved out from Turkey to Western countries. 39
27
Erdoğan and Gül were among the reformists leaders who left the political Islamist Virtue
Party (Fazilet Partisi) in 2001. Afterwards, they renounced their political Islamist
background and announced that they had adopted a conservative democratic worldview
instead. They have defined the AKP as a center-right political entity with the aim of
EU membership. The AKP, which was found in 2001, came to power with the general
election of 2002 due to its promise to bring stability in the aftermath of a deep financial
crisis in the Turkish economy. The AKP then adopted the carefully generated policy
developed by previous Turkish governments to maintain friendly relations with China,
and has followed it continuously since 1997.
34 Orhan Tokatlı, ‘Tayyip Erdoğan’a Çin Protestosu’, Milliyet, 7 August 1995.
35 Stefano Allievi and Jorgen Nielsen, Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, Leiden-
Boston, Brill Publishing, 2003, pp.303-305.
36 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, ‘Türkiye’nin Doğu Asya Politikası’, Demokrasi Platformu, Vol.1, No.4, Fall 2005, p.213.
37 ‘Çin’de CIA Kışkırtması’, Aydınlık, 16 February 1997, pp.8-9.
38 ‘Başbakanlıktan Gizli Doğu Türkistan Genelgesi’, Hürriyet, 4 February 1999.
39 Rabia Kadir, ‘Mülakat’, Konuşan: Erkin Emet, Türkiye Günlüğü, Number 98, Summer 2009, pp.30–33.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

Erdoğan visited China in January 2003 as the Chairman of AKP. He did not violate the
limits of Ankara’s foreign policy toward Beijing and concentrated his energy in improving
bilateral political and economic cooperation. 40 During his visit, the Chinese press
highlighted and appreciated Erdoğan’s remarks setting the Turkish government against
Uyghur separatism. 41 Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül also visited China in February
2005 to discuss bilateral economic relations with his counterparts. 42
However there was stagnancy in bilateral relations until 2009 (the seventh successive
year of AKP rule) due to Turkey’s expectations of China remaining unfulfilled. One of
the major reasons why Turkey was eager to approach China was that Turkish businessmen
wanted to benefit further from the economic opportunities emerging all across
China. However, Turkey was facing a great foreign trade deficit at the same time. Again,
contrary to its initial expectations, Ankara could not benefit satisfactorily from the security
cooperation it initiated with Beijing. At this juncture, Ankara was looking forward
to reducing its dependency on arms imports from Western countries through military
cooperation with China, including technology transfers. 43
28
Regarding political support in the international arena, Turkey was deprived of China’s
backing on the majority of relevant issues. In fact, China acted in stark contrast
to Turkey’s stance in the disputes over Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, and
Nagorno-Karabakh. 44 While Turkey was having problems with the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) in Iraq right after the American invasion of Iraq began in 2003, the
Chinese administration established close contacts with the KRG. This alone precipitated
confidence problems in bilateral relations. 45 Beijing also articulated that it was against
the June 2007 military operation conducted by Turkish Armed Forces in northern Iraq
to hamper the PKK’s terrorist activities. The same Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spokesman conspicuously left unanswered questions asking if China considers the PKK
a terrorist organization. 46
China’s negative attitude toward Turkey becoming either a full member or at least an
observer in the SCO is also remarkable. Despite Russia—the other major power within
the SCO—leaning in favor of Turkey joining the SCO as an observer 47 , China was not
enthusiastic about the prospect. 48
President Abdullah Gül’s visit to China in June 2009 was conducted under such circumstances.
Developing economic and political cooperation in a balanced manner was
discussed during the visit. In the field of political cooperation, seeking as much common
ground as possible in regional and international issues was high on the Turkish
40 İsmail Küçükkaya, ‘Yasak Kentte Bir Yasaklı Lider’, Akşam, 17 January 2003.
41 ‘Çinliler ‘Uygur’ tavrını beğendi’, Hürriyet, 21 January 2003.
42 ‘Gül, Çin’le yakın temasta’, Radikal, 2 February 2005.
43 Eyüp Ersoy, Turkish-Chinese Military Relations, Ankara, USAK Press, 2008, pp.160–168.
44 Nuraniye Hidayet Ekrem, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Dış Politikası (1950–2000), Ankara, ASAM Yayınları, 2003,
pp.175–178.
45 Mehmet Ali Birand, ‘Çin’in de Kürt politikası değişiyor’, Hürriyet, 28 February 2006.
46 ‘China officially objects to incursion into Iraq’, Today’s Zaman, 30 June, 2007.
47 Nerdun Hacıoğlu, ‘Türkiye, Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü’ne girmek istiyor’, Hürriyet, 13 January 2005.
48 İlyas Kamalov, ‘Şangay Örgütü, Rusya-Çin Mücadelesi ve Türkiye’nin Durumu’, Hürriyet, 17 Agust 2007.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

delegation’s agenda. In the course of President Gül’s contacts in Beijing and in Urumqi
remarks made at the highest level underlined the necessity of the Uyghur community
operating as a bridge between China and Turkey, amicably binding the two countries. 49
Moreover, that was the first time a Turkish President had visited Xinjiang, an event of
utmost symbolic value for both sides. President Gül expressed Turkey’s gratitude to the
highest-level Chinese officials for China’s support regarding Turkey’s 2009-2010 nonpermanent
membership in the UN Security Council. 50
Nonetheless, the incidents in Urumqi on 5 July 2009, just six days after President Gül
left the city on June 29 th , was a hit to the bilateral relationship’s achilles heel. Public
and governmental responses to the Urumqi riot were stronger in Turkey than in any
other country. Apart from the ruling party and opposition parties, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) held the Chinese administration responsible for the incidents in
Urumqi and condemned the brutal suppression of the protests by the Chinese police.
The riots and consecutive incidents in Urumqi became top news on Turkish media
outlets. Prime Minister Erdoğan gave the harshest response of any leader, describing the
incidents with the phrase “almost genocide”. 51
Graph 4. Uyghur Diapora Communities around the World
Turkey, 15,000
Central Asia, 1,500,000
29
Australia, 7,000
Canada, 5,000
Middle East, 3,000
United Kingdom, 100
France, 500
Germany, 1,500
Netherlands, 2,000
Scandinaves, 2,000
United States, 2,000
Japan, 1,500
Source: Dilnur Reyhan, “Uyghur Diaspora and Internet”, Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, April, 2012.
49 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, ‘Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün Çin Ziyaretinden İzlenimler’, USAK Gündem, 31 July 2009, http://
www.usakgundem.com, (20.08.2012).
50 China Radio International, ‘Çin’in Ankara Büyükelçisi Gong: ‘Abdullah Gül’ün Çin ziyareti birçok alanda ilişkileri
en üst düzeye çıkaracak’, 23 June 2009, http://turkish.cri.cn/882/2009/06/23/1s116202.htm (20.08.2012).
51 Mesut Er, ‘Bu Vahşet Son Bulmalı’, Sabah, 9 July 2009.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

Despite the lack of similarly harsh reactions in the West and the rest of the Islamic world,
China reacted to Turkey’s firm stance with a softer tone. Zhai Jun, China’s Deputy Foreign
Minister, criticized Prime Minister Erdoğan for his “irresponsible statements”, and
emphasized that the Chinese side gave importance to rectifying the deteriorating state
of affairs with Turkey. 52
Ankara took Beijing’s conciliatory attitude into account, and began intensifying its contacts
with China once more, particularly after the strength of the initial public reactions
to the incidents in Urumqi began to diminish. Ankara’s chief concern at this point was
being the only country whose bilateral relations with Beijing deterioriated due to the incidents
in Urumqi. Furthermore, if Turkey undermined its own bilateral relations with
China, Chinese authorities might become suspicious of external actors playing a part
in “provoking” the incidents, therefore make things even more difficult for the Uyghur
people. 53 Murat Salim Esenli, Turkey’s Ambassador to Beijing, highlighted over and over
again that Turkey had no intention of interfering in China’s domestic affairs and that it
sincerely wished to build up bilateral ties. In addition, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu held a phone conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, to
discuss normalizing the two countries’ strained relations. 54
30
The process of normalization was initiated on the basis of economic relations. Minister
of Economy Zafer Çağlayan met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing as Prime
Minister Erdoğan’s special representative on 29 August 2009. Afterwards, Çağlayan attended
the International Urumqi Fair in Xinjiang, where the incidents had taken place
the preceding month. 55
Çağlayan returned to China in September 2009 for the meeting organized by the Turkey-China
Joint Economic Council and signed various agreements with Chinese Minister
of Commerce Chen Deming. Çağlayan emphasized during his meeting with Vice
Premier Wang Qishan that the Turkish government will always pursue the “One China”
policy and will not interfere in China’s domestic affairs. 56
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi had visited İstanbul on the occasion of attending
a meeting on Afghanistan in January 2010, and came together with his Turkish counterpart
Ahmet Davutoğlu. The two ministers concurred on bilateral strategic cooperation
regarding several subjects such as Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, global financial
crisis and climate change. 57 Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertuğrul Günay
and Chinese Deputy Minister of Culture Li Hong Feng attended the Shanghai Expo
in June 2010, and during the visit the two agreed to declare 2012 “the Year of Chinese
Culture in Turkey” and 2013 “the Year of Turkish Culture in China”. 58
52 Can Ertuna, ‘Çin: ‘Soykırım’ ifadesi sorumsuzca bir açıklama’, NTV, 23 July 2009, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/
id/24985655/ (20.08.2009).
53 Matti Nojonen and Igor Torbakov, ‘China-Turkey and Xinjiang: a frayed relationship’, Open Democracy, 5 August
2009, http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/48431/pdf (25.08.2012).
54 Güneri Civaoğlu, ‘Bu küçük dalgayı aşarız’, Milliyet, 25 July 2009.
55 Hüseyin Likoğlu, ‘Bakan Zafer Çağlayan’a Urumçi’de ‘Uygur’ eziyeti’, Yeni Şafak, 2 September 2009.
56 ‘Zafer Çağlayan: ‘Tek Çin’ politikasını izliyoruz’, China Radio International, 27 September 2009, http://turkish.cri.
cn/781/2009/09/27/1s119570.htm.
57 ‘Türkiye ile Çin Stratejik Çalışma Grubu Oluşturuyor’, Zaman 28 January 2010.
58 ‘Çin’de Türkiye, Türkiye’de Çin yılı düzenlenecek’, Zaman, 16 June 2010.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who had come to Turkey in September 2010, signed agreements
lifting bilateral relations up to the level of “strategic partnership”. Cooperation
in the field of energy (especially nuclear energy) was agreed upon, while another paper
signed during Wen’s high-level meetings established the Chinese Yuan and the Turkish
Lira as the currencies of bilateral trade. The 2015 target for bilateral trade volume was
set at $50 billion, with $100 billion targeted for 2020. 59 Also among the agreements
was a joint project to construct a “silk railroad” between Kars and Edirne—Turkey’s
easternmost and westernmost cities, respectively. 60
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu paid a follow-up visit to China in October 2010 to discuss
the bilateral agreements signed in September 2010. After stopping by Beijing, Shanghai,
and Xian, Davutoğlu was invited to and accompanied during a visit to Urumqi and
Kashgar in Xinjiang—which was interpreted as a gesture on the part of the Chinese
side. 61
During the Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s February 2012 visit to Turkey, largescale
projects came to the fore, with nuclear energy and railroad construction topping
the agenda. Turkey is planning to allow Chinese firms to construct a 5,000-kilometer
railroad network in this field, including high-speed train projects. 62
Prime Minister Erdoğan paid an important return visit to China in April 2012 right
after Xi Jinping’s visit to Turkey in February of the same year. Erdoğan had meetings
in Beijing and Shanghai, although his first stop was in Urumqi and he made high-level
contacts there as well. Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız was also
part of the delegation that negotiated the construction bid for a nuclear reactor in Sinop,
Turkey. 63 A divergence of opinions on various issues (the Syrian civil war being foremost)
related to the Arab Spring were also addressed during the visit. Although no compromise
was reached regarding the Arab Spring, it was firmly decided to keep bilateral
relations intact by separating the divergences in opinion from the many convergences
in several fields.
31
Finally, NATO member Turkey was granted dialogue partner status in the SCO at the
Beijing summit in June 2012. 64 Prime Minister Erdoğan has publicly stated that he has
discussed the possibility of abandoning Turkey’s EU membership candidacy in return
for full membership in the SCO. However, the majority of Turkish political experts
consider this statement to be a reaction to the EU slowing down full-membership negotiations
with Turkey. 65 Nevertheless, some Turkish experts believe that Erdoğan’s lashing
out was no coincidence indeed, and it symbolizes the axis shift in Turkish foreign policy
59 ‘Çin ile Türkiye ticarettedolarıdevredışıbıraktı’, Takvim, 09 October 2010.
60 ‘Edirne’den Kars’a hızlı tren’, Sabah, 15 October 2010.
61 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, ‘Dışişleri Bakanı Davutoğlu’nun Çin Ziyareti,’USAK Stratejik Gündem, 9 November 2010.
62 Engin Özpınar, ‘Türkiye-Çin ilişkilerinde yeni dönem’, Olay, 23 February 2012.
63 ‘Erdoğan Çin’de ikinci santrali görüşecek’, Radikal, 8 April 2012.
64 ‘SCO accepts Afghanistan as observer, Turkey dialogue partner’, People’s Daily Online, 7 June 2012, http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7839137.html (28.01.2013)
65 Marcus Benath, ‘Erdogan: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation an alternative to EU’, Europolitics, 28 January 2013,
http://www.europolitics.info/external-policies/erdogan-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-an-alternative-to-euart347569-41.html
(28.01.2013)
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

toward the East. Erdoğan’s idea about joining the SCO instead of the EU does not just
represent abandoning the Western world and Western values altogether; it also connotes
a Turkey that adheres to the values of an Islamic civilization that is part of the Eastern
world and Asia. 66
The AKP government has been rapidly developing Ankara’s relations with Beijing since
2009. The various dimensions of Sino-Turkish relations are no longer only bilateral;
they have a global aspect. Turkey and China, both G-20 members, are in full agreement
on the need to maintain international peace and stability developed in the last decade,
and to ensure balanced and fair economic development across the world. Therefore,
news related to Sino-Turkish relations has begun to receive wide-spread media coverage—even
by Western media.
32
However, some differences of opinion on global issues have started to appear since 2011.
China, seeing the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria as phenomenon
that destabilized those countries, preferred supporting the incumbent Arab
regimes. Conversely, Turkey advocated non-violence and soft power and supported the
democratic demands of the Arab people. As demonstrated by the latest events, rather
than escalating global tension Turkey is acting in line with NATO countries, but China
and Russia have been coming out against Western policies. If Turkey and China develop
completely opposite policies in the post-crisis global context they may be prevented
from developing strategic cooperation. Therefore, Turkey and China should take
substantial economic and political steps in order to carry their relations to the level of
“strategic partnership”. 67
66 Cengiz Çandar, ‘Şanghay’a giderken demokrasiden olur muyuz?’, Radikal, 28 January 2013.
67 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, ‘Turkey-China Relations: Seeking A Strategic Partneship’, The Journal of Turkish Weekly,17 April
2012.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

CHINESE CULTURE IN TURKEY
5The influence of Chinese culture in Turkey is very limited.
The spread and popularization of East Asian culture in Turkey
was pioneered by an interest in Japanese culture in the
1970s. 68
Koreans followed the Japanese experience from the 1990s onward.6869 However, China’s
cultural visibility in Turkey lagged far behind that of Japan and Korea. China has begun
gaining political, cultural, and economic visibility in Turkey only since the 2000s. The
first Confucius Institute in Turkey was established at Middle East Technical University
(METU) in Ankara in 2008. The second one was established at Boğaziçi University
in Istanbul the same year. In 2012 the third Conficius Institute was founded at Okan
University in Istanbul. 70
Table 3. Confucius Institutes in Turkey
Name of Institute University City
Confucius Center Middle East Technical University Ankara
Confucius Institute Boğaziçi University Istanbul
Confiucius Institute Okan University Istanbul
Source: USAK
33
Table 4. Chinese Language Departments at the Turkish Univeristies
Name of University City Department Admissions (2013/2014)
Ankara University Ankara Sinology 22
Erciyes University Kayseri Chinese Language and Literature 47
Fatih University İstanbul Chinese Language and Literature Admissions not started yet
Girne American University Girne/Northern Cyprus Chinese Language and Literature 35
Istanbul University Istanbul Chinese Language and Literature Admissions not started yet
Karamanoglu Mehmet Bey
University
Karaman Chinese Language and Literature Admissions not started yet
Okan University Istanbul Chinese Translation and Interpreting 30
Source: osym.gov.tr
68 A. Mete Tuncoku, Güneşin Doğduğu Adalardan Mektup Var: Bir Türk Öğrencinin Japonya İzlenimleri, Ankara, Türk-
Japon Üniversiteliler Derneği, 2001.
69 Selçuk Çolakoğlu and Bengü Emine Çolakoğlu, Kore Toplumu, Kültürü, Siyaseti, Ankara, Orion Kitapevi, 2008.
70 ‘Konfüçyüs Enstitülerinde hedef 500’, CRI Online, 9 October 2012, http://turkish.cri.cn/882/2012/10/09/1s143527.
htm (17.01.2013)
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

Even though China’s visibility from a socio-cultural perspective increased considerably
throughout the 2000s when compared with previous eras, China’s impression in the eyes
of the wider Turkish public is still weak. According to a research conducted in 2012,
43.7% of job positions within the Turkish business community require competence in
a foreign language—which means in English. Despite the requirement for a second foreign
language being limited to a small percentage of vacant positions for employment,
the distribution of demand for second foreign language among the whole employment
sector is as follows: German 6.6%, Arabic 2.8%, French 2.7%, Russian 2.6%, Spanish
1.8%, Italian 0.6%, Chinese 0.2%, Persian 0.2%, Japanese 0.1%, and Korean 0.1%. 71
This means that only two out of every thousand positions within the Turkish business
circle require Chinese as a second foreign language.
Another problem for Turkey is that Korean, Japanese, and Chinese cultures are still confused
with one another. Therefore, there is no independent perception regarding China
in the eyes of the Turkish public with respect to movies, sports, music and other cultural
fields. Such “misperception” and confusion extends even to the intelligentsia. 72
Graph 5. Direct Flights between Turkey and China
34
Istanbul
Urumqi
3 (weekly),
China Southern Airlines
Beijing
Daily,
Turkish Airlines
Shanghai
Daily, Turkish
Airlines
Guangzhou
Daily,
Turkish Airlines
Source: Turkish Airlines and China Southern Airlines
71 Ayten Genç, ‘Foreign Language Demand of Turkish Business World,’ H.U. Journal of Education, No.42, 2012,
pp.179-180.
72 Selçuk Çolakoğlu and Bengü Emine Çolakoğlu, Kore Toplumu, Kültürü, Siyaseti, Ankara, Orion Kitapevi, 2008,
p.19.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

Graph 6. Number of Chinese Tourists Entering Turkey
5500
6952
8052
114582
10243
11515
12715
11591
11047
21570
25295
31951
27557
35339
44077
56323
68252
61882
69336
77142
96701
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism
Besides, the experiences of East Asian cuisines struggling to get a foothold in Turkey
have been total failure. Previously attempted by the Japanese and Koreans, the Chinese
have had great difficulty bringing East Asian cuisine to the Turkish market. Chinese
restaurants in Turkey are limited to cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and some
coastal towns where most foreigners in the country reside, and there are only a few of
these restaurants in total. Chinese restaurants struggle to vie with their rivals by preparing
Korean and Japanese dishes as well. The reason behind this is the great difference
between Turkish and Chinese palates. Besides, during the Ottoman era Turkish cuisine
historically and gradually evolved into a regional mix of Black Sea, Mediterranean, and
Middle Eastern dishes; hence it offers a vast and satisfying variety to the domestic consumer.
Therefore Turks mostly prefer restaurants which serve traditional Turkish cuisine—cuisine
that the majority of the Turkish people consider cheaper and tastier than
any foreign food. 73
35
Graph 7. Distribution of Chinese Restaurants in Turkish Cities
1Adana
1 9 2
Alanya Ankara Bodrum
Source: yemeksepeti.com
1 66 6
Fethiye Istanbul Izmir
73 Abdullah Doğan, Uzak Doğunun İncisi: Kore, Istanbul, Kariyer Yayıncılık, 2007, pp.29-31.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

The widely acknowledged Turkish perception is that the Chinese consume the meat of
every sort of animal—including all kinds of butchery meat and bushmeat. This perception
elicits disgusting and frightening connations for the unaccustomed. 74 Most Turks
who visit China do not even visit a single Chinese restaurant before they return to their
country, as they have concerns over hygiene, the lack of regard towards Islamic standards,
requirements about consuming a limited variety of meat, and are of course, totally
unaccustumed to the taste and smell of the food they would encounter. 75 Moreover,
no Turkish cities have special districts belonging to foreign residents of a certain origin,
like the world’s Chinatowns. As a result, it is too early to claim that Chinese culture is
penetrating Turkey efficiently and independently through the appropriate channels.
36
74 ‘Köpek eti yoksa çöp şiş akrep yeriz’, Radikal, 23 July 2008.
75 ‘Çin lokantaları ve Çin yemekleri’, Haber Blog, http://www.aliayvaz.com/2009/09/cin-lokantalar-ve-cin-yemekleri.
html (15.01.2013).
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
6Turkey has adopted a truly pragmatic approach toward China.
This approach regards China as a country that cannot be
economically ignored by any state in the world.
Therefore, Turkey, just like other countries, should maintain and develop its economic
relations with China in a balanced manner. Moreover, since Turkey faces some problems
related to its Western allies and neighbors from time to time, it should improve its
political relations with China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a
country with growing influence over global politics. The general consensus among the
Turkish elite is that Turkey can best serve its national interests by maintaining a delicate
balance in its relations with the U.S., the EU, Russia, and China. In return for political
and economic cooperation with China, Turkish elites expect Beijing to integrate the
Uyghur community into China’s economic and political system nation-wide, instead of
assimilating them.
37
The perception of China among the Turkish public is near the notion of a rising superpower.
China is an assertive state in the new world order but it is not expected to cause
a radical change to the current paradigm of international relations. Nevertheless, there is
a common anticipation that the rise of Asian nations, led by China, will beget some sort
of pan-Asianism with respect to international relations theory. In the face of such a phenomenon,
Turkish intellectual circles appear to be emphasizing Turkey’s Asian identity
in the post-Cold War period. Whereas Ankara politically identified itself as a European
country throughout the Cold War period, since the beginning of 1990s it has begun to
identify itself as a Eurasian country. The emergence of Turkic Republics in the Caucasus
and in Central Asia had a strong effect on this shift in conception. The Asian origins of
Turks began to be emphasized more often and developments in Asia were given greater
priority. In the 2000s Foreign Minister Davutoğlu took it a step even further by describing
Turkey’s multiple identity policy within a wider framework that considered Turkey
an Afro-Eurasian country: as much as Turkey was European in terms of its political,
historical, and cultural identity, it was Asian and African to the same extent. 76
Turkish intelligentsia, business circles, and statesmen have thus begun to put more
emphasis on Turkey’s relationship with Asian values while redefining Turkey’s political
identity in the post-Cold War. China was the foremost of Asian countries to cooperate
76 Bülent Aras, ‘Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy’, SETA Policy Brief, No:32, May 2009.
TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

with Turkey. There are two basic factors minimizing any perceptions among the Turkish
intelligentsia of “China’s rise” posing a political threat. Firstly, for the last two centuries,
Sino-Turkish relations have been built on an understanding defined by a “common fate”
and “political equality”. While the Ottoman Empire was regarded as the “sick man of
Europe”, China was being referred to as the “sick man of Asia”. When Ottoman emperors
established contacts with their Chinese counterparts, both sides’ main priority
was to counter Western imperialism to defend their respective domains. Again, when
the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of China initially reached out to each other in
1925, their utmost priority was to gain a respectable and dignified position within the
international system for their newly established, modern republics. 77
From this point forth, it can be stated clearly that a commonality of fates underlies the
history of modern Turkish-Chinese relations. The story of official bilateral relations is
one of mutual sympathy and solidarity. In a world where China is prospering the Turkish
public does not perceive a direct peril stemming from China that may affect Turkey
and that requires a reflexive response. That is primarily because Turkey and China are
geographically far away, with a negligibly small Chinese community currently residing
in Turkey, and vice versa.
38
77 Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, ‘Openining the Closed Window to the East: Tuerkey’s Relations with East Asian Countries’,
İdris Bal (eds.), Turkish Foregn Policy in Post Cold War Era, Boca Raton, Brown Walker Press, 2004, pp.410-411.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

USAK
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC
RESEARCH ORGANIZATION
Established in 2004, the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) has
gained wide recognition as Turkey’s foremost source of independent and balanced
information and research on a broad range of issues affecting Turkey and its region.
Focusing particularly on issues of security and cooperation, USAK is one of Turkey
and the world’s leading organizations for the analysis of global issues, satisfying a
need in Turkey, its region and the world for a body of informed opinion on these
issues.
USAK works to stimulate debate and research on international relations and
security issues through a dynamic program of seminars, conferences, workshops,
publications, educational activities and media relations. The organization aims to
encourage greater public awareness of national and international developments
and to help individuals and organizations to understand an ever-changing and
increasingly complex world. USAK enhances the basis for informed choice by the
Turkish public and its leaders and serves as one of the focal points for research in
Turkey. The organization welcomes visitor applications from academics at other
national or international institutions, advanced doctoral research students, and
those with a professional or academic interest in international relations. A nonpartisan,
non-profit and non-governmental research organization (NGO), USAK is
not intended to be a forum for single-issue advocacy or lobbying.
The Director of USAK is Ambassador (R) Özdem Sanberk.
Core Research Areas
* Area Studies (Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, Balkans, Asia-Pacific, etc.)
* Ethnic Studies
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* International Law
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* Sociology
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www.usak.org.tr
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