Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
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THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 259<br />
can complement each other if they are able to speak as equals<br />
and in mutual respect. Justice is often blind. If blind, it needs to<br />
rely on hearing. If it is also deaf to the voice of half the people in<br />
the world, the face of justice is distorted into “the madness a<br />
dying soul,” and justice becomes “no respecter of persons.” The<br />
voice of the ethic of care of women may remove the blindfold<br />
from men’s eyes, just as the voice of the ethic of justice may<br />
remove the blindfold from women’s. True equity requires caring<br />
and conformity, true equality requires principled reflection and<br />
rational deliberation. It has taken us a while to realize this, but<br />
it is the justice that Jesus both taught and practiced.<br />
Beyond gender differences, the psychological data also<br />
reveals a fundamental difference in the way people understand<br />
and use justice concepts depending upon the type of social<br />
situations in which decisions are made and actions carried out.<br />
In the course of a week, most people will find themselves<br />
making moral decisions within and across many different moral<br />
domains. 62 These moral situations are in part outlined or<br />
delineated by two factors, the nature of the objective<br />
relationship that the actor has with others in the action<br />
opportunity (the parameters of which are offered by the moral<br />
domain), and the inner reasoning processes at work in the actor<br />
which relates his knowledge of the relevant principles and rules<br />
to their applicability in the concrete action situation. This twofold<br />
division roughly corresponds to the classical distinction<br />
between objective and subjective morality, between the concerns<br />
of phronesis and deontology. What unifies these two activities or<br />
directions are principles of morality. As Agnes Heller reminds<br />
us, there are in fact distinguishable social and moral clusters in<br />
which justice concepts may mean different things, and make<br />
different demands upon people. There are also transclusteral<br />
aspects of justice which help the individual to integrate and<br />
make sense of all of the others. Separating these, and properly<br />
ordering them is part of the work of individual conscience in its<br />
relationship to legitimate authority. 63<br />
62<br />
A. MACINTYRE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp. 1-2.<br />
63<br />
A. HELLER, General Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 39-44; 106-<br />
113.