Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 253
the other hand, universal justice must often be comparative,
because rights and claims of justice inhere in individuals, and
each individual is different from every other, exists in a nexus of
interpersonal relationships, and in this real situation certain
rights of specific people do take precedence over others. The
distinction between the two perspectives really lies within the
domain of moral application, and the domain of moral
application is specified by both broader humanitarian concerns
and the demands of the particular moment in which the
application must be made. The moral domain must be
coordinated to the requirements of the other domains operative
in the specific social-moral situation. 54
Gender differences in the use of comparative and
noncomparative justice, of equity and equality concepts, relate
the question of injustice to the broader social domains in which
actions are assessed by way of humanitarian definitions. The
two types of justice are tied to the way in which an individual
constructs his or her self-concept, relative to others inside and
outside of one’s group. Dianne Margolis distinguishes two types
of self-construct which correspond typically to differing social
groups structured in two distinct ways. The obligated self, typical
of an individual socialized within a more traditional
hierarchically role-stratified social structure, operates more
within the domain of the relational moral perspective. The
exchanger self, typical of the contemporary market based and
more loosely organized egalitarian social structure prevalent in
the economically developed world, operates more within the
realm of the individual and act centered perspective. In the
former, one defines one’s identity and worth as a person in terms
of having fulfilled one’s role obligations and in terms of the
relationships one has with respect to other people in the social
54
As Turiel and Smetana argue, “The variance in the application of
moral concepts suggests that social situations can be multidimensional,
requiring the individual to coordinate (perhaps with varying degrees of
success), different social components and goals … Morality is only one
component, however, in situations that include more than one goal. In
weighing moral and organizational goals, individuals will sometimes
subordinate one to the other.” E. Turiel and J. Smetana, “Social Knowledge
and Action: The Coordination of Domains,” p. 272.