Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

252 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
of two possible traps: the tendency to mentally divide the world
into two competing groups who speak different moral
languages, and trying to decide which of the two is superior; 52
and the tendency to discount the data by classifying those who
present it as ideological feminists or representatives of a macho
culture, 53 thereby psychologically and emotionally negating the
validity or the relevance of the empirical facts that their research
reveals. Avoidance of the first responds to the demands of
equality, avoiding the second responds to the demands of equity.
By way of this mutual respect for the two perspectives, we are
able to see how the distinctions between comparative or
noncomparative justice in terms of equity and equality can mix
in such a way that justice and injustice easily become confused.
Care is humanitarian, and it is particular. It is relational and
person-oriented. It is noncomparative. The just thing to do is to
meet the needs of this person here and now without comparing
his needs to others, or taking into account whether he/she is
deserving of or has earned the right to this care. But care can
also exercise itself in comparative justice. Sometimes the caring
thing to do can only be determined by comparing the needs of
this person with those of others who also need to be cared for.
Universal equity claims to be noncomparative as well. All are to
be treated equally and impartially on the basis of their
individual acts, and this precludes judging on the basis of
comparison. I should receive what I deserve regardless of
whether others around me are receiving what they deserve. On
52
Before we can begin to make any such type of inference, “We need to
know more about many things, including the precise nature and extent of
the gender differences, the social causes of these differences, content effects,
the fine-grained features of the ethic of care, the role of the competency it
makes use of in justice reasoning, and the plausibility of carving morality
into only two voices.” O. FLANAGAN and K. JACKSON, “Justice, Care, and
Gender,” in M. J. LARRABEE, An Ethic of Care, pp. 83-84.
53
While not wishing to exaggerate this tendency, it has been my
experience that books dealing with gender difference studies in psychology
are difficult to find in Roman theological libraries, and even in those
libraries which have them, they are often catalogued under the heading of
“feminist literature” rather than being afforded the status of moral
psychology.