Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

229
StMor 38 (2000) 229-263
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER C.Ss.R.
THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE
AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE
PART ONE:
I suspect that we are all in agreement as theologians that
questions of justice and injustice are of central concern to moral
theology. My suspicion is also that we sometimes disagree
radically about the proper way in which the boundaries which
delineate justice and injustice are to be drawn. This is partially
due to the very nature of justice itself. There is an intellectually
slippery quality to it.
Moral theology is not alone in dealing with this problem.
Moral psychology as well struggles with the search for a
definition which will enable it to design consistent and useful
research strategies in the study of how people make judgements
concerning issues of justice. Lawrence Kohlberg years ago wrote
that:
Justice is not a rule or a set of rules, it is a moral principle.
By moral principle we mean a mode of choosing which is
universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt
always in all situations… A moral obligation is an obligation to
respect the right or claim of another person. A moral principle is
a principle for resolving competing claims, you versus me, you
versus a third person. There is only one principled basis for
resolving claims: justice or equality. Treat every man’s claim
impartially regardless of the man. A moral principle is not only
a rule of action but a reason for action. As a reason for action
justice is called respect for persons. 1
1
L. KOHLBERG, “Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the
Platonic View” in Sizers, eds., Moral Education (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 1970), pp. 79-80.