Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
224 HANS J. MÜNK Realization: An example in this area is the creation of basic structures and mechanisms for the economy. The right incentives must be given so as to permit eco-social reform to progress under economically efficient conditions; it is very important to keep competitive distortions from occurring, especially at the international level. Moderation: Here the focus is on non-legislative activities, such as promotion of consensus and processes designed to bring about acceptance. This task also includes the state’s role as mediator of solutions negotiated between private parties (e.g. negotiations between environmental organisations and industrial associations). 12 5. Ethical Perspectives 5.1 Legitimation: In addition to the points already addressed regarding the ethical legitimation of a programme of sustainable development, a further point is deserving of special treatment, namely the rights of future generations. Of central concern here are all the natural resources which are required long term to assure a dignified human existence. I find that principles of justice are applicable in this case: Anyone who contributes to the destruction of the environment is in principle infringing on the rights of others. This may be legitimate, for instance if the party affected consents to it. Assuming basic equality of rights for the different generations, the manner in which one generation treats the environment – in particular, the condition in which the environment is left by a given generation – must be such that it 12 These five points are derived from: Heins, B., Die Rolle des Staates für eine Nachhaltige Entwicklung der Industriegesellschaft (Berlin: Analytica 1997), pp. 101-111.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A TASK OF THE STATE. ETHICAL ASPECTS 225 is principally acceptable to future generations. 13 The discursive ethical element recognisable in this line of thought is meant to be advocatory. Future generations rank as the weakest, most vulnerable part conceivable in this scenario. They have no chance to stand up for their own interests in the present, although their opportunities for development may be drastically and irreversibly compromised. A just approach would be to allow each generation the same rate of increase in environmental impact or deterioration in environmental conditions as the current generation. 14 It is commonly acknowledged that even fairly small increases in the rates of deterioration in the most problematic areas of ecology are, within the span of only a few decades, likely to lead to a situation in which we ourselves would not care to live. Principles of justice dictate that we do not leave nature in a poorer and/or more precarious state than that which we inherited. The thought that the earth and its fruits are the common property of all mankind, that is to say, of all generations, is familiar to theological social ethics (and is also apparent in some secular contexts) – it is a form of “capital”, the “interest” on which allows us to live our lives. In less picturesque terms one could say that our natural, ecological “capital” should not lose any of its value. This type of thinking is also the substrate of the “management rules” which have evolved from interpretation of the model of sustainable development. These rules demand that the sum of “natural” nature and artificial, technology-based equivalents allows comparable opportunities of life to future generations. In this requirement for justice lies the pivotal aspect of obligation – along with the theologically founded 13 Cf. Höffe, O., Moral als Preis der Moderne, p. 173. 14 The question of exactly how many generations are to be included in this comparison is not primary; O. Höffe argues for 100 generations; cf. Moral als Preis der Moderne, p. 184f. At present there is little doubt that the problem of resources alone (not to mention climate and ozone layer problems) forces us to think in substantially more narrow time frames; for an overview, cf. Lochbühler, W., Christliche Umweltethik. Schöpfungstheologische Grundlagen, Philosophisch-ethische Ansätze, Ökologische Marktwirtschaft (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1996) pp. 24-43.
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A TASK OF THE STATE. ETHICAL ASPECTS 225<br />
is principally acceptable to future generations. 13 The discursive<br />
ethical element recognisable in this line of thought is meant to<br />
be advocatory. Future generations rank as the weakest, most<br />
vulnerable part conceivable in this scenario. They have no<br />
chance to stand up for their own interests in the present,<br />
although their opportunities for development may be drastically<br />
and irreversibly compromised.<br />
A just approach would be to allow each generation the same<br />
rate of increase in environmental impact or deterioration in<br />
environmental conditions as the current generation. 14 It is<br />
commonly acknowledged that even fairly small increases in the<br />
rates of deterioration in the most problematic areas of ecology<br />
are, within the span of only a few decades, likely to lead to a<br />
situation in which we ourselves would not care to live. Principles<br />
of justice dictate that we do not leave nature in a poorer and/or<br />
more precarious state than that which we inherited. The thought<br />
that the earth and its fruits are the common property of all<br />
mankind, that is to say, of all generations, is familiar to<br />
theological social ethics (and is also apparent in some secular<br />
contexts) – it is a form of “capital”, the “interest” on which<br />
allows us to live our lives. In less picturesque terms one could<br />
say that our natural, ecological “capital” should not lose any of<br />
its value. This type of thinking is also the substrate of the<br />
“management rules” which have evolved from interpretation of<br />
the model of sustainable development. These rules demand that<br />
the sum of “natural” nature and artificial, technology-based<br />
equivalents allows comparable opportunities of life to future<br />
generations. In this requirement for justice lies the pivotal<br />
aspect of obligation – along with the theologically founded<br />
13<br />
Cf. Höffe, O., Moral als Preis der Moderne, p. 173.<br />
14<br />
The question of exactly how many generations are to be included in<br />
this comparison is not primary; O. Höffe argues for 100 generations; cf.<br />
Moral als Preis der Moderne, p. 184f. At present there is little doubt that the<br />
problem of resources alone (not to mention climate and ozone layer<br />
problems) forces us to think in substantially more narrow time frames; for<br />
an overview, cf. Lochbühler, W., Christliche Umweltethik. Schöpfungstheologische<br />
Grundlagen, Philosophisch-ethische Ansätze, Ökologische<br />
Marktwirtschaft (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1996) pp. 24-43.