Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
208 M. B. RAMOSE and the Serbs living together in Kosovo is the question of title to territory. The deeper philosophical meaning of this is the question of identity. It is an attempt by each side to answer the question: who and what am I? For each side being the bearer of title to Kosovo territory is an ineradicable attribute of their identity. Does the territory of Kosovo, and thus sovereignty over it, belong by right to the ethnic Albanians or the Serbs? Each population group answers the question affirmatively but in its favour. Whether or not the basis for the answer is mythical or historically justified appears to be a secondary consideration in the light of the fact that each group is convinced about the truth of its claim. 28 For the Serbs the conviction that Kosovo belongs to them contains a religious dimension underlined by the battle of Kosovo (Kossovo). 29 On this basis the loss of Kosovo to the ethnic Albanians would be in breach of God’s will that Kosovo should remain their eternal possession. Since the death of God is unthinkable for the Serbs it follows that sovereignty over Kosovo may be ceded to the ethnic Albanians only when the Serbs no longer exist. In this sense for the two groups the struggle for Kosovo is a matter of life and death. In the more than six hundred years of this struggle blood has been shed periodically. 30 Again in the second half of the 1990’s there was constitutional engineering 31 designed to balance the conflicting claims. Intermittent bloodshed was also a feature of the struggle for Kosovo. The latter gradually escalated into brutal inhuman “ethnic cleansing” verging on the genocidal. It even took the form of cruel and forced massive exodus of the ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. The nature, kind and the scale of Serb cruelty and inhumanity towards the ethnic Albanians was unreasonable and thoroughly out of proportion to the declared aims pursued by Belgrade. It had undoubtedly assumed the character of gross violation of human rights. It shook the conscience of people of goodwill. It called for action to make Belgrade desist from such 28 Detrez, R., Kosovo, De uitgestelde oorlog, Houtekiet:Antwerpen – Baarn 1999, p. 12. 29 Detrez, R., Kosovo, Antwerp, 1999, p. 18-20. 30 Detrez, R., Kosovo, Antwerp, 1999, p. 139-166. 31 Detrez, R., Kosovo, Antwerp 1999, p. 125-136.
ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 209 gross violation of human rights. The action envisaged could be either persuasive or coercive. Among those who took the view that the time had come for Belgrade to stop gross human rights violations was NATO. The next question to be answered is whether resort to war, as NATO held, was the only means open to make Belgrade desist from the gross violation of human rights in respect of the ethnic Albanians. The road to war Right at the outset we emphasise that Serb cruelty and inhumanity towards the ethnic Albanians was, in the latter part of the 1990’s, by every test against reasonableness a clear case of gross violation of human rights. Action was therefore called for to bring an end to this situation. Indeed the search for a peaceful reversal of this situation had begun and reached its highest point at Rambouillet. The peace negotiations at Rambouillet were therefore an attempt to obtain the voluntary consent of the contending parties to a mutually acceptable settlement. Had this been achieved then NATO’s threat of air strikes would have been superfluous and war would also have been averted. In the complex negotiations process there occurred an odd shift away from the main contending parties to the facilitators and the protection of their respective interests. 32 One paramount interest was to secure for NATO the “core” military role in the agreed settlement. Thus even when “The Serbian delegation, under duress, had been willing to accept the principles of the Rambouillet package, save for the very detailed twenty-fifth chapter on the NATO-led occupation force. … The Western 32 Marc Weller states this point in these terms: “However noble the intentions of many of the individuals who had been assigned roles in this play, the fate of the people of Kosovo appeared to be somehow incidental to the proceedings, which were instead focused on a number of metaquestions. These meta-questions concerned three principal issue areas: - a fundamental change in the roles of international actors; - a struggle about the core values of the international system; and – the legitimacy of the threat or use of force in international relations.” “The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo”, International Affairs, Vol. 75 No. 2 April 1999, p. 211-212.
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ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 209<br />
gross violation of human rights. The action envisaged could be<br />
either persuasive or coercive. Among those who took the view<br />
that the time had come for Belgrade to stop gross human rights<br />
violations was NATO. The next question to be answered is<br />
whether resort to war, as NATO held, was the only means open<br />
to make Belgrade desist from the gross violation of human<br />
rights in respect of the ethnic Albanians.<br />
The road to war<br />
Right at the outset we emphasise that Serb cruelty and<br />
inhumanity towards the ethnic Albanians was, in the latter part<br />
of the 1990’s, by every test against reasonableness a clear case of<br />
gross violation of human rights. Action was therefore called for<br />
to bring an end to this situation. Indeed the search for a peaceful<br />
reversal of this situation had begun and reached its highest point<br />
at Rambouillet. The peace negotiations at Rambouillet were<br />
therefore an attempt to obtain the voluntary consent of the<br />
contending parties to a mutually acceptable settlement. Had this<br />
been achieved then NATO’s threat of air strikes would have been<br />
superfluous and war would also have been averted. In the<br />
complex negotiations process there occurred an odd shift away<br />
from the main contending parties to the facilitators and the<br />
protection of their respective interests. 32 One paramount interest<br />
was to secure for NATO the “core” military role in the agreed<br />
settlement. Thus even when “The Serbian delegation, under<br />
duress, had been willing to accept the principles of the<br />
Rambouillet package, save for the very detailed twenty-fifth<br />
chapter on the NATO-led occupation force. … The Western<br />
32<br />
Marc Weller states this point in these terms: “However noble the<br />
intentions of many of the individuals who had been assigned roles in this<br />
play, the fate of the people of Kosovo appeared to be somehow incidental to<br />
the proceedings, which were instead focused on a number of metaquestions.<br />
These meta-questions concerned three principal issue areas: - a<br />
fundamental change in the roles of international actors; - a struggle about<br />
the core values of the international system; and – the legitimacy of the threat<br />
or use of force in international relations.” “The Rambouillet conference on<br />
Kosovo”, International Affairs, <strong>Vol</strong>. 75 No. 2 April 1999, p. 211-212.