Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

206 M. B. RAMOSE
theoretically declare war even if it lacks the traditional attributes
constitutive of a sovereign. Indeed arguments for the prior
issuance of a mandate by the United Nations Security Council
sanctioning the use of force proceed on the presumption that
not only the sovereign may declare war. This presumption
underlines the recognition that the United Nathions Security
Council, being not vested with the traditional attributes of
sovereignty, may nevertheless declare war whenever necessary.
Whether or not NATO’s declaration would be equally justified
particularly under the prism of ius ad bellum is the matter we
propose to investigate.
One of the basic problems with the precedent that
“gross”violation of human rights constituted a just cause for war
was that it left undefined the meaning of “gross”violation. The
NATO declaration of war on Belgrade fared no better in this
respect. The cardinal problem then is: by what measure are
“gross” human rights violations determined? Can there be an
“objective” standard at all? 23 In what way are “crimes against
humanity”, “crimes against peace”, or “common crimes against
mankind”, for example, either a help or a hindrance to the
determination of “gross” violation of human rights? 24 A
comparative study, with due regard to the inherent limitations of
such a study, 25 of the events in Idi Amin’s Uganda, in Rwanda
and Kosovo could be one way of answering the question
pertaining to the yardstick with which to determine “gross”
23
Bassiouni, M.C., Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal
Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, The Netherlands 1992, p. 69-
86.
24
A Treatise on International Criminal Law, Volume I, (ed.) Bassiouni,
M.C. and Nanda, V.P., Charles C. Thomas Publisher: Springfield USA 1973,
p. 159-272, 455-556.
25
For example, Kunig observes appositely that: “It should also not be
forgotten that the yardstick of the human rights ideal which arose in the
European tradition is by no means always necessarily a suitable criterion by
which to judge events taking place in a completely different political context
from the one which produced the rules on human rights:…” Kunig, P., The
protection of human rights by International Law in Africa, German
Yearbook of International Law Jahrbuch für internationales Recht, Volume
25 1982, p. 140.