Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

204 M. B. RAMOSE
not have been otherwise because in the hierocratic scheme of
the societas Christiana the state, in the modern sense 15 , could not
have existed alongside the all-embracing Christian society. This
defence does not, however, invalidate the criticism that the
principle that only the sovereign may declare war is unduly
restrictive. 16 Furthermore, the principle of popular sovereignty,
seen in the light of the contract theories of the state, meant that
sovereign authority was ultimately delegated 17 since the
sovereign was by definition, to use Hobbes’expression, “a mortal
god”. Resort to war is therefore no longer a matter of exclusive
sovereign discretion but of popular authorisation 18 consonant
with the procedural requirements pertaining to such
authorisation. Even then war is no longer conceived of as a
possibility only with reference to an external enemy. Specific
experiences in contemporary history illustrate the untenability
of the thesis that only the sovereign may declare war.
15
Ullman, W., Juristic obstacles to the emergence of the concept of state
in the Middle Ages, Annali di Storia del Diritto, 13 1969, p. 43-64.
16
Delos, J.T., A sociology of modern war and the theory of the just war,
Cross Currents, Vol. VIII No. 3 Summer 1958, p. 252.
17
We note that our position here runs directly counter to the argument
that “any explanation of legitimate political authority merely in terms of a
simple exercise or delegation of the powers belonging to an individual, is
false. Whatever quasicontractual procedures may be involved in political
life, it is clear that St. Thomas would reject those modern contract theories
which are based upon the use by public power of some supposed natural
right of the individual. The private individual does not, in fact, possess any
natural right sufficient to equip the public power with adequate authority.
On the contrary, political authority consists in a hierarchy of government
corresponding to the hierarchy of the ends of human activity.” Midgely,
F.B.F., The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations,
Elek Bootes Ltd.: London 1975, p. 19 Our counter pertains to (i) the rejection
of natural law as the basis of both individual or state authority: (ii) the
assumption that “government” may arise without reference to any consent
and, therefore, some kind of “contract” between the government (state) and
the governed.
18
Murray, J.C., Remarks on the moral problem of war, Theological
Studies, Volume 20 No. 1 (March) 1959, p. 46-47.