Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

202 M. B. RAMOSE
insofar as the notion of intention means responsibility for one’s
actions. In order to determine such responsibility it is
insufficient to construe and limit the meaning of intention to a
putative and abstract act only. Intention is manifest in conduct
that has concrete consequences. Accordingly, the political aims
of war – war being the continuation of politics by other means 11
– shall play a crucial role in our consideration of the right
intention with regard to NATO’s war with Belgrade.
Furthermore, the war aims of NATO will also be assessed in
terms of the proportionatilty and double effect principles. The
former is a check on the questionable proposition that the end
justifies the means. It holds instead that even if the end may be
justified not any and every means is permissible to achieve it.
Thus in our context it is pertinent to determine if war was, in the
circumstances, the only means open to NATO’s declared aim to
achieve the restoration of recognition, respect and protection of
human rights in Kosovo. If the determination is affirmative still
it is vital to invoke the principles of ius in bello in order to
determine if the kind, scale and magnitude of the war was
proportionate to the aim pursued. Here the double effect
principle also comes into play. According to this principle, one
may licitly pursue an action with foreseeable evil effects only if
the following conditions are verified at one and the same time:
(a) that the action intended must be directly and immediately
linked to the achievement of a good purpose; (b) that only the
good effect must be intended; (c) that the good effect must flow
directly from the use of appropriate means and be indifferent to
any bad effects that may be inherent to the action as a whole; (d)
that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting
whatever bad effect. 12 It holds therefore that in the pursuit of a
legitimate aim it is illicit to inflict and impose undue and more
harm on those who are supposed to benefit from such an aim.
There should thus be less harm and minimum burden on the
intended beneficiaries. In a war situation this means on the one
11
Clausewitz, C. von, On War, (ed. & trans.) Howard, M. and Paret, P.,
Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey 1976, p. 605-606.
12
Mangan, J.T., An historical analysis of the principle of double effect,
Theological Studies, Vol. X No. 1 (March) 1949, p. 42.