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Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

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ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 199<br />

concept of knowledge in the positivist sense.<br />

Accordingly, it recognizes objectivity as the criterion for<br />

knowledge proper. But the validity of this criterion with regard<br />

to representativity, 6 for example, is questionable as well. Thus<br />

positive law fares no better than natural law which appeals to<br />

“God” instead of objectivity. At the abstract level, the appeal to<br />

the universality or objectivity of either natural or positive law is<br />

useful for as long as it is emptied of all concrete content. Applied<br />

to concrete situations, it assumes a concrete character which is<br />

decisive in the decision on whether or not war is permissible. It<br />

is thus the prevailing moral convictions at the time which are<br />

decisive in endorsing the permissibility or otherwise of a<br />

particular war. On this showing, it is not legality or lawfulness<br />

which is a primary consideration. Morality is primary in the<br />

sense that often positive law relies upon it to found and justify<br />

its principles. This it does through specifically legal language.<br />

Permissibility therefore speaks, in the first instance, to the<br />

morality rather than the legality of war. Accordingly, posing<br />

permissibility as a question of disjuncture between morality and<br />

legality is justifiable if the purpose is to demarcate the two<br />

spheres. However, the inextricable intertwinement between the<br />

two means that it is simultaneously a moral and legal question.<br />

In the context of the just war theory, permissibility refers<br />

also to the principles that govern the initiation of war (ius ad<br />

bellum) and those that regulate its conduct (ius in bello). We<br />

propose to focus on the principles pertaining to ius ad bellum.<br />

One of the principles of ius ad bellum is that only the sovereign<br />

may declare war. The reason for our focus on this principle is<br />

that it is pertinent to determine whether or not it has been<br />

rendered obsolete by the NATO declaration of war on Belgrade.<br />

Another is that there must be a just cause (iusta causa).<br />

Indisollubly linked to this is the principle of the right intention<br />

(intentio recta). These principles will be used as the basis to<br />

examine the validity or otherwise of NATO’s appeal to human<br />

rights violations as the permissible cause of war. In this<br />

6<br />

See, the introduction by Harding, Sandra and Hintikka, Merrill in<br />

their edited work, Discovering Reality, D. Reidel Publishing Company:<br />

Dordrecht 1983.

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