Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

194 JOSEPH TORCHIA
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London:
William Heinemann, Ltd., 1958); A.A. LONG and D.N. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic
Philosophers, Volume 1 (Cambridge: University Press, 1995); ST. AUGUSTINE
OF HIPPO, City of God, translated by Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1972); Confessions, translated by John K.
Ryan (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1960); De Doctrina Christiana,
translated by John J. Gavigan, O.S.A, FC 4 (New York: CIMA Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1947); Eighty-Three Different Questions, translated by David L. Mosher,
FC 70 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, Inc.,
1982); Letters, Volume 1, translated by Wilfred Parsons (New York: Fathers
of the Church, Inc., 1951).
Dominican House of Studies
487 Michigan Avenue N.E.
Washington D.C. 20017
USA.
JOSEPH TORCHIA, O.P.
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Summary / Resumen
This paper examines St. Augustine of Hippo’s critique of the stoic
notion of a moral category encompassing things which are completely
“indifferent” to considerations of virtue or vice. Such “indifferents”
(adiaphora) constitute those things which are neither good nor evil,
precisely because they are neither helpful nor harmful to our nature as
rational beings. Generally, Augustine’s critique of the adiaphora
unfolds on an exegetical level and a more specific philosophical one
that incorporates elements of his metaphysics and the moral theory it
supports. In Augustinian terms, all creatures are inherently good,
intrinsically valuable, and therefore, morally relevant by virtue of their
very creation by a supremely good Creator.
Este artículo analiza la crítica de San Agustín de Hipona sobre la
noción estoica de una categoría moral que abarca asuntos totalmente
“indiferentes” a las reflexiones sobre virtud o vicio. Tales “indiferentes”
(adiaphora) constituyen los elementos que no son ni buenos ni malos,
precisamente porque no son útiles ni nocivos a nuestra índole de seres
racionales. En general, la crítica de Agustín sobre la adiaphora se
desarrolla a nivel exegético y más específicamente filosófico e incorpora