Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

192 JOSEPH TORCHIA
sonhood, we would be obliged to exclude anyone who lacks this
capacity from the moral community. Such a position reflects the
assumption that one’s humanity (i.e., human biological life) is
distinct from one’s personhood. Once this distinction is operative
in assessments of those deprived of higher brain or neocortical
function, PVS patients (and those in related neurological
syndromes) are, for all practical purposes, viewed as “dead” or
“living corpses.” Gormally, for one, observes that the thesis that
PVS patients are “dead persons” underlies analogous claims
about the appropriate treatment of preborn children, the handicapped
newborn, the mentally handicapped, and those with
senile dementia. 60
My critique of such positions or their philosophical underpinnings
must be left for another day. I only cite them as contemporary
expressions of the Stoic notion which Augustine refutes
in the discussions under scrutiny in this paper. In my estimation,
however, Augustine also offers a compelling alternative
to such contemporary anthropological assumptions, and a
powerful message to a culture in desperate need of reaffirming
the value of the created order and the dignity of the person. As
we have seen, his rejection of the possibility of moral “indifferents”
is ultimately traceable to a metaphysical vision of reality
committed to the goodness of everything which exists. 61 His cri-
60 LUKE GORMALLY, “Definitions of Personhood: Implications for the
Care of PVS Patients,” Ethics and Medicine 9:3 (Autumn, 1993): 46b.
61
In this paper, I have confined my discussion to an assessment of
Augustine’s critique of the Stoic notion of moral indifferents specifically as
it pertains to things or states of being. But it should be noted that the adiaphora
also encompass actions or forms of behavior. I have prescinded from a
consideration of this dimension of the topic. In and of itself, an act like rubbing
one’s head can be viewed as morally neutral. On the other hand, however,
one might rub one’s head for the purpose of signalling another person
to commit an immoral act like theft or murder. In this connection, ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS (ST I,2, Q. 18, a. 9) makes a key distinction between an action that
is indifferent in its species, and an action that is good or evil in individual
instances. From his standpoint, a moral dimension accrues to the act on the
basis of the circumstances, the end of the action, and the intention of the
agent. As Aquinas states, “every human action that proceeds from deliberate
reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.”