Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

186 JOSEPH TORCHIA
In my estimation, Augustine’s polemic against Manichaeism
shares an important feature with his critique of the Stoic notion
of morally indifferent things. In both contexts, he was reacting
against a rigid mentality which viewed good and evil (or in the
case of the Stoics, virtue and vice) as diametically opposed and
mutually exclusive. The fundamental principles of Augustine’s
metaphysics enabled him to respond to each of these outlooks in
a compelling manner. His affirmation of the goodness of all
things was fully operative in his refutation of Manichaean dualism,
as well as the Stoic notion that some things are morally
irrelevant.
For Augustine, only God can be absolutely good. But by the
same token, nothing can be absolutely evil (at least not in sheer
ontological terms). For the Stoics, on the other hand, things that
are morally relevant are either completely good or completely
bad. But in Augustinian terms, as we have seen, the claim that a
thing or practice is “not good” does not necessarily mean that it
is totally evil. Accordingly, his Christian metaphysics (ultimately
rooted in Divine Revelation) enabled him to speak in terms of
degrees of goodness and evil in the context of a vast participation
system. For this reason, Augustine rejected the Stoic claim that
some aspects of creation or the trials of life can be dismissed as
moral “indifferents” on the grounds that they are extrinsic to our
true, rational selves.
As we have observed, the Stoics’ chief criterion for determining
what is good is the capacity to promote or conserve our
being. Conversely, their chief criterion of evil is the capacity to
diminish our fundamental oikeiosis. Anything connected with the
body was situated in a morally neutral no-man’s land. In the framework
of Augustine’s metaphysics (and its hierarchical vision of
reality), such narrow criteria simply do not suffice. Indeed, the
true goodness of creatures cannot be based solely upon their
potential to promote our being or rationality. Rather, their goodness
must be rooted in their creation by a supremely good Creator
that shares His own goodness with everything He creates. All
creatures are inherently good, intrinsically valuable, and therefore,
morally relevant by virtue of their very existence. Strictly
speaking, even life’s trials assume a moral relevance insofar as
they are instrumental in shaping our choices as moral agents, or,
insofar as they contribute to our moral and spiritual growth.