Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

184 JOSEPH TORCHIA
In this way, Augustine can rightfully say that the condition
of anger and the utterance of an angry word against another person
is a greater sin than a case in which one’s anger festers in
silence. 46 But if the Stoic thesis were true, it would seriously
undermine Christian teachings regarding human accountability
and the prospect for an eternal reward or punishment for the
moral quality of our lives. 47 Like his critique of the adiaphora,
Augustine’s criticism of the equality of sins reflects a certain
scale of values that is itself based upon an distinctive Christian
understanding of the scheme of reality. In this respect, his ethics
continually refers us to his metaphysics and anthropology. The
concluding section, then, considers the broader philosophical
basis of Augustine’s moral theory and its relevance for his critique
of pertinent Stoic notions.
Augustine’s Ordo of Creation: The Parameters of Moral Action
In Augustinian terms, reality is depicted as an ordered
whole in which God holds the preeminent position (as supremely
perfect, eternal, and immutable), mutable spiritual creatures
(i.e., angels and human souls) occupy the intermediate
position or mid-rank, and mutable corporeal realities occupy the
lowest level. All creatures depend upon God (as the plenitude of
Being) for their existence and goodness. 48 In this scheme, any
movement away from God is tantamount to a movement toward
non-being. Broadly speaking, creatures tend toward non-being
by virtue of their creaturely finitude and susceptibility to change.
In moral terms, rational creatures tend toward non-being as a
result of sin, that is, through erroneous choices for apparent
goods.
On the basis of these metaphysical presuppositions,
Augustine refuted the radical dualism of Manichaeism. If God is
the supreme Creator of everything which exists (and thereby,
everything depends upon God for its very being), there is no pos-
46
De Sermone Domini in Monte I,9(24): PL xxxiv, 1241.
47
Epistula 92(5): PL xxxiv, 320.
48
De Natura Boni 1: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 855.