Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

172 JOSEPH TORCHIA
culation of his own teachings, or discarding what is wholly
unacceptable from a Christian perspective. 14
The Augustine of the Cassiciacum dialogues (A.D. 386-388)
was especially receptive to Stoic ethics. This intellectual dependence
is reflected in his emphasis on the role of reason in the
moral life, and the assumption that conduct should stand in harmony
with both nature and reason. In Augustine’s earliest definitions
of the happy life, we find some of the key components of
the classical Stoic understanding of virtue: an emphasis on the
quality of the inner life, the primacy of intention, correct ratiocination,
and equanimity in the face of the vicissitudes of
human existence. 15 Conversely, vice was seen as the product of
the irrational tendencies of the will which find expression in
pleasure, pain, desire, and fear. 16 Like the Stoics, the early
Augustine endorsed the position that the wise man was able to
subordinate his desires for transitory things to a higher vision of
the good, and thereby, ground his happiness upon what is
immutable and certain. 17
Augustine’s early confidence in the autonomy and self-sufficiency
of the life of virtue underwent considerable change as he
progressed in his own spiritual journey to God. An awareness of
his moral and metaphysical contingency (rendered more acute
as a result of his controversy with the Pelagians and an increasing
emphasis upon the radical fallenness of human nature)
prompted a serious revision of his attitude toward Stoic ethics.
Accordingly, his initial definitions of virtue as rightly ordered
reason were supplanted by an understanding of the virtuous life
14
For an extended discussion regarding the evolution of Augustine’s attitude
toward Stoicism and the ways in which he used Stoic thought, see
COLISH’S The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, Volume II.
15
The works in question encompass the Cassiciacum dialogues, written
shortly after Augustine’s conversion and Baptism (i.e., between late A.D. 386
and early 387). See De ordine II,8(25); II,9(27); De Beata Vita IV,25(33); De
Quantitate Animae 17(30); 33(73); Soliloquia I,6(13).
16
De libero arbitrio I,3(8)-I,4(10); I,8(18).
17
In this regard, Augustine reflects the influence of both Stoicism (and
its emphasis upon the proper use of reason and will) and the Neoplatonic
notion of an immutable Good that is immune to loss. Cf., Soliloquia I,12(21).