Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
170 JOSEPH TORCHIA When circumstances permit, we choose these particular things instead of those, for instance health instead of disease, life instead of death, wealth instead of poverty. 9 But the very fact that value is always contingent upon shifting circumstances is demonstrative of its relativity. For this reason, human happiness can never be based exclusively upon such adiaphora, regardless of their preferability. Rather, the rational being must cultivate a broader vision of the concrete situation in which the moral judgment is made. In the final analysis, longrange happiness might well demand a willingness to forfeit such “preferables” as wealth, bodily comfort, or even health. It must be remembered that what the Stoics designated as “indifferent” were those things outside the control of reason and its capacity to move the will. 10 Because the proverbial sage can reject what most people would consider preferable (if not genuine goods) in everyday life, he is able to ground his happiness exclusively upon what is virtuous (and by implication, wholly consistent with the dictates of reason). Such equanimity reveals that condition of apatheia whereby reason remains constantly removed from the passions, from evil things, from the adiaphora, and indeed, from anything which detracts from our nature as rational moral agents. 11 For the Stoics, apatheia provides nothing less than the sine qua non of the virtuous life. In this respect, however, the crucial consideration is not necessarily the forfeiture of such externals for its own sake, but rather, the ability to relinquish our dependence upon them for our happiness. From a practical moral standpoint, only those who are able to detach themselves in this manner are capable of making rationally sound judgments regarding what is right or wrong. But an important corollary attaches to the Stoic understanding of virtue as a harmony of reason with nature: if reason is in accordance with nature, then 9 STOBAEUS 2,83,10-84,2. 10 EPICTETUS, Discourses I,30; Manual 50. 11 MARCIA L. COLISH, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, Volume I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 44.
ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 171 everything we do will be equally virtuous; if reason is contrary to nature, then all of one’s actions will be equally vicious. Virtue... is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. 12 In objective moral terms, however, the Stoics view all virtues as equally good, and all vices as equally bad. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate...and the same rule applies to all the other virtues. 13 Augustine and the Stoics: A Preliminary Assessment Augustine’s critique of the Stoic notion of the adiaphora must be approached within the framework of his overall response to Stoic ethics, and in broader terms, to Stoic thought in general. At the outset, it should be noted that Augustine’s attitude toward Stoicism exhibits something of an ambiguity. On the one hand, he approached this particular school in a polemical context, so as to refute the errors inherent in its teaching. On the other hand, however, Augustine frequently appropriated Stoic insights for his own purposes as a Christian theologian and philosopher. In this way, Augustine’s moral theory represents something of a Christianized brand of Stoicism (along with ideas derived from the Neoplatonic tradition), particularly in his earliest writings. But even in these instances, Augustine exhibits a high degree of selectivity, choosing what is useful in the arti- 12 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII,89. 13 Ibid., VII,127.
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ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 171<br />
everything we do will be equally virtuous; if reason is contrary<br />
to nature, then all of one’s actions will be equally vicious.<br />
Virtue... is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its<br />
own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive.<br />
Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the<br />
state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious.<br />
When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness<br />
of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates.<br />
12<br />
In objective moral terms, however, the Stoics view all virtues<br />
as equally good, and all vices as equally bad.<br />
It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is<br />
nothing intermediate...and the same rule applies to all the other<br />
virtues. 13<br />
Augustine and the Stoics: A Preliminary Assessment<br />
Augustine’s critique of the Stoic notion of the adiaphora<br />
must be approached within the framework of his overall response<br />
to Stoic ethics, and in broader terms, to Stoic thought in general.<br />
At the outset, it should be noted that Augustine’s attitude<br />
toward Stoicism exhibits something of an ambiguity. On the one<br />
hand, he approached this particular school in a polemical context,<br />
so as to refute the errors inherent in its teaching. On the<br />
other hand, however, Augustine frequently appropriated Stoic<br />
insights for his own purposes as a Christian theologian and philosopher.<br />
In this way, Augustine’s moral theory represents<br />
something of a Christianized brand of Stoicism (along with<br />
ideas derived from the Neoplatonic tradition), particularly in his<br />
earliest writings. But even in these instances, Augustine exhibits<br />
a high degree of selectivity, choosing what is useful in the arti-<br />
12 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII,89.<br />
13<br />
Ibid., VII,127.