Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
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165<br />
StMor 38 (2000) 165-195<br />
JOSEPH TORCHIA O.P.<br />
ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA:<br />
A KEY COMPONENT OF HIS REBUTTAL<br />
OF STOIC ETHICS<br />
To what extent can we speak of a class of things which are<br />
neither good nor bad, right nor wrong, but morally neutral? At<br />
a time when moral judgments are increasingly reduced to the<br />
status of personal preferences or mere opinions, the claim that<br />
there is a sphere of human existence which is immune to moral<br />
valuations is one which finds broad support. In a very real sense,<br />
the idea of such a “duty free” zone is highly compatible with the<br />
position that morality is relative to a given culture or subculture,<br />
or else, a purely private matter governed only by the dictates<br />
of individual conscience. For, once we eliminate a sense of<br />
objectivity and intrinsic value from our moral purview, it seems<br />
to follow that certain things are neither right nor wrong, but<br />
simply “there” for our uninhibited use or enjoyment.<br />
The notion of a category of morally irrelevant or “indifferent”<br />
things is one that is deeply rooted in the history of moral<br />
philosophy. While variations of this idea have emerged over the<br />
centuries, it assumed its classic expression in the ethics of<br />
Stoicism. For the Stoics, morality concerns only those areas of<br />
human existence which are subject to our control. In Stoic<br />
terms, things are morally classified in terms of three categories:<br />
first, what is good or virtuous; secondly, what is evil or vicious;<br />
and third, what is completely “indifferent” to considerations of<br />
virtue or vice. Such moral “indifferents” (adiaphora) encompass<br />
those things which are neither good nor evil, precisely because<br />
they are neither helpful nor harmful to our nature as rational<br />
beings. At the outset, however, it should be observed that the<br />
Stoic doctrine of adiaphora ultimately points to a conviction in<br />
the absolute self-sufficiency of the virtuous individual. From this<br />
standpoint, one who possesses virtue can be said to be happy<br />
even in the absence of those things usually considered crucial<br />
elements of any complete and well-balanced human life.