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Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

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165<br />

StMor 38 (2000) 165-195<br />

JOSEPH TORCHIA O.P.<br />

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA:<br />

A KEY COMPONENT OF HIS REBUTTAL<br />

OF STOIC ETHICS<br />

To what extent can we speak of a class of things which are<br />

neither good nor bad, right nor wrong, but morally neutral? At<br />

a time when moral judgments are increasingly reduced to the<br />

status of personal preferences or mere opinions, the claim that<br />

there is a sphere of human existence which is immune to moral<br />

valuations is one which finds broad support. In a very real sense,<br />

the idea of such a “duty free” zone is highly compatible with the<br />

position that morality is relative to a given culture or subculture,<br />

or else, a purely private matter governed only by the dictates<br />

of individual conscience. For, once we eliminate a sense of<br />

objectivity and intrinsic value from our moral purview, it seems<br />

to follow that certain things are neither right nor wrong, but<br />

simply “there” for our uninhibited use or enjoyment.<br />

The notion of a category of morally irrelevant or “indifferent”<br />

things is one that is deeply rooted in the history of moral<br />

philosophy. While variations of this idea have emerged over the<br />

centuries, it assumed its classic expression in the ethics of<br />

Stoicism. For the Stoics, morality concerns only those areas of<br />

human existence which are subject to our control. In Stoic<br />

terms, things are morally classified in terms of three categories:<br />

first, what is good or virtuous; secondly, what is evil or vicious;<br />

and third, what is completely “indifferent” to considerations of<br />

virtue or vice. Such moral “indifferents” (adiaphora) encompass<br />

those things which are neither good nor evil, precisely because<br />

they are neither helpful nor harmful to our nature as rational<br />

beings. At the outset, however, it should be observed that the<br />

Stoic doctrine of adiaphora ultimately points to a conviction in<br />

the absolute self-sufficiency of the virtuous individual. From this<br />

standpoint, one who possesses virtue can be said to be happy<br />

even in the absence of those things usually considered crucial<br />

elements of any complete and well-balanced human life.

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