Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

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122 MARTIN MCKEEVER A number of recent theological studies have considered human rights, 25 noting both the important historical process of cross-fertilization between theology and this form of discourse, as well as the weighty systematic questions which emerge when one attempts to integrate human rights discourse into theological ethics. We will not repeat here the results of these useful studies but simply note the manner in which they confirm the need noted above for a better articulation of the normative basis of human rights. 26 It is worth noting, however, that just as our reading of the prelude to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shows a strong reliance on ethical principles (without an extensive articulation of same), so too a reading of documents which present Official Catholic teaching, particularly on moral issues, would show an increasingly heavy reliance on the discourse of human rights as a category of ethical argumentation. In some cases the underlying ethical values such as the dignity of human life and duty not to kill, torture or act unjustly toward human beings are simply stated without further justification. In both social encyclicals and in those on bio-medical issues (though interestingly not in the same way) human rights discourse is invoked as a category of ethical argumentation, but is not elaborated at a theoretical level. In other documents, particularly those of a more theoretical nature, the ethical basis of human rights is sought in an articulation of the natural law 25 See, for example, K. HILPERT, Die Menschenrechte, Geschichte, Theologie, Aktualität. (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1991); F. COMPAGNONI, I diritti dell’uomo, Genesi, storia e impegno cristiano. (Torino: San Paolo, 1995). 26 “Menschenrechte sind also kritische Prinzipien zur Beurteilung der Gerechtigkeit von positiven Rechtsordnungen. Die positive Geltung der Gesetze allein und für sich verbürgt noch nicht ihre Gerechtigkeit. [...] Der Maßstab des Rechts ist nicht die Macht, sondern die in den Menschenrechten entfaltete überpositive Gerechtigkeit. Das ist dann auch der Grundgedanke dessen, was man in der Ethik wenigstens seit der Stoa Naturrecht nannte.” K. HILPERT, Die Menschenrechte, 70. See also F. COMPAGNONI, I diritti dell’uomo, 189-210; K. Tanner, Der lange Schatten des Naturrechts, Eine fundamentalethische Untersuchung (Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1993).

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 123 alongside the teaching drawn from Revelation. 27 What is perhaps needed at this stage, in the context of the broader magisterium, is a critical articulation of the link between fundamental ethical theory and human rights discourse as used in the discussion of specific moral issues. 28 Such a project is not easy, of course, and will inevitably form only one part of a theological treatment of human rights. To take account of the mystery of God in the context of a discussion of human rights gives rise to new and profound difficulties. We must face for instance the difficult question “Does God respect human rights?” An adequate response to a question such as this would carry us into the turgid waters of theodicy, but the question itself can help us to appreciate the complexity of the problem at a theological level. It can help us to understand, for instance, that human rights discourse is tied to a relational paradigm that is quite inadequate in describing our relations with God. 29 The relationship of creature to Creator and sinner to Saviour is quite different from that of one who claims a right to one who respects it. The Good News is that we are saved not by right but by grace: so, in theological terms, any discourse which aspires to save humanity without the grace of God can only be considered a new variation on Pelagianism. Perhaps the fundamental contribution of the theological perspective to this whole question is that it can help us to understand that the relational paradigm implied by rights discourse does not suffice even for our human relations. Theological ethics can and should recognise the validity of human rights discourse, but it cannot accept that human relations be reduced to this level. There is at times a certain 27 In this regard one might profitably compare and contrast the role of human rights discourse in the ethical argumentation of texts such as De Abortu and Centesimus Annus with the role of natural law discourse in Veritatis Splendour and Fides et Ratio. 28 For a sharp warning about taking a facile approach to human rights see J.L. Lockwood, “Historical Prolegomena to a Theological Review of «Human Rights»” Studies in Christian Ethics 9, 2 (1996) 52-65. 29 In his typically sweeping style J. MILBANK maintains that Christian ethics are so different from anything like morality that no link is possible. See his The Word Made Strange (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 7-35, 219-232.

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 123<br />

alongside the teaching drawn from Revelation. 27 What is<br />

perhaps needed at this stage, in the context of the broader<br />

magisterium, is a critical articulation of the link between<br />

fundamental ethical theory and human rights discourse as used<br />

in the discussion of specific moral issues. 28<br />

Such a project is not easy, of course, and will inevitably form<br />

only one part of a theological treatment of human rights. To take<br />

account of the mystery of God in the context of a discussion of<br />

human rights gives rise to new and profound difficulties. We<br />

must face for instance the difficult question “Does God respect<br />

human rights?” An adequate response to a question such as this<br />

would carry us into the turgid waters of theodicy, but the<br />

question itself can help us to appreciate the complexity of the<br />

problem at a theological level. It can help us to understand, for<br />

instance, that human rights discourse is tied to a relational<br />

paradigm that is quite inadequate in describing our relations<br />

with God. 29 The relationship of creature to Creator and sinner to<br />

Saviour is quite different from that of one who claims a right to<br />

one who respects it. The Good News is that we are saved not by<br />

right but by grace: so, in theological terms, any discourse which<br />

aspires to save humanity without the grace of God can only be<br />

considered a new variation on Pelagianism.<br />

Perhaps the fundamental contribution of the theological<br />

perspective to this whole question is that it can help us to<br />

understand that the relational paradigm implied by rights<br />

discourse does not suffice even for our human relations.<br />

Theological ethics can and should recognise the validity of<br />

human rights discourse, but it cannot accept that human<br />

relations be reduced to this level. There is at times a certain<br />

27<br />

In this regard one might profitably compare and contrast the role of<br />

human rights discourse in the ethical argumentation of texts such as De<br />

Abortu and Centesimus Annus with the role of natural law discourse in<br />

Veritatis Splendour and Fides et Ratio.<br />

28<br />

For a sharp warning about taking a facile approach to human rights<br />

see J.L. Lockwood, “Historical Prolegomena to a Theological Review of<br />

«Human Rights»” Studies in Christian Ethics 9, 2 (1996) 52-65.<br />

29<br />

In his typically sweeping style J. MILBANK maintains that Christian<br />

ethics are so different from anything like morality that no link is possible.<br />

See his The Word Made Strange (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 7-35, 219-232.

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