Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

118 MARTIN MCKEEVER
precepts presuppose a judgement of an ethical nature but they
do not explain how this judgement is reached.
Does this mean that the text is of no interest from the point
of view of normative ethics? It would seem necessary here to
distinguish between the text as such, which is of course the
product of a complex process of negotiations and compromises
between the signatory states, and the ethical positions which it
presupposes or which are implicit within it.
Take, for example, the very idea of the dignity and worth of
the human person. 18 Such an idea is not ethically neutral in that
it presupposes the application, at least implicitly, of an
axiological framework within which different kinds of goods are
evaluated and graded. Viewed within such a framework the
human being is judged to be of a certain value - of more value
than a bicycle for example. Such an evaluative framework in
turn implies an epistemology which ascribes to the human being
the ability to know what is good and to reason about the
implications of this knowledge for human behaviour. If human
rights discourse involves no such process of evaluating the good,
then it simply cannot be considered a form of ethical discourse,
even though it may retain some polemical or emotive efficacy.
That the document does, in fact, presuppose such ethical
judgements emerges in negative terms when it expresses the
outrage of “the conscience of mankind” in face of the atrocities
done to human beings. In more positive, albeit generic, terms,
the ethical basis of the document finds expression in the
repeated appeals to justice and freedom.
A similar line of analysis can be articulated concerning the
idea of inalienable rights. In its first clause, the text juxtaposes
the “inherent dignity” of human beings and their “equal and
inalienable rights”. Implicit in such a juxtaposition is the
relationship between the perception of a good (the dignity of the
18
For a philosophical investigation of this theme see A. GERWITH,
Human Rights, Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago-London:
University of Chicago Press, 1982); L.W. SUMNER, The Moral Foundations of
Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). In a theological vein see E.
SCHOCKENHOFF, Naturrecht und Menschenwürde, Universale Ethik in einer
geschichtlichen Welt (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1996).