Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 115
culture then the question must arise as to the degree to which
human rights discourse is an accomplice in such ambiguity. 16
At a semantic level, then, the use of human rights discourse
in contemporary culture constitutes something of a dilemma. It
is probably no exaggeration to say that it is almost the only form
of ethical discourse which finds consensus among people today
and so to communicate in today’s world it is necessary to use this
language. But the acceptability of this discourse is at least partly
due to the fact that it reproduces the culture in which people are
living, including some of its morally doubtful aspects. So the
dilemma is between using a discourse that is at times loaded with
nuances of individualism and rationalism, but which at least
finds a certain consent, or using a more precise language based
on a more articulate moral and juridical theory, but which may
not be understood or appreciated by many interlocutors.
A normative perspective
Having thus examined the use of human rights discourse
from a pragmatic and a semantic point of view we may now pass
on to examine this same usage in a normative perspective. For
reasons noted above, there is a marked tendency to prescind
from such a treatment of human rights and simply use this
discourse in a functional and, at times, polemical manner. To
examine human rights discourse in a normative perspective
means to ask how this form of argumentation relates to a
systematic theoretical understanding of ethics. In what follows
the complex issues involved in viewing human rights in this way
will be illustrated by making a normative analysis of a selected
text. It will become clear that many of the issues which have
emerged in the other perspectives have their roots at this
normative level.
Of the many texts which might serve this purpose, such as
the Déclaration des droits de l’homme e du citoyen of 1789,
16
For an excellent exposition of the use of rights discourse for
oppressive purposes see R. TUCK, Natural Rights Theories, Their origin and
development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).