Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
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110 MARTIN MCKEEVER<br />
“It is a human right to choose whether or not to carry a<br />
pregnancy to term”<br />
How is the individual citizen, the legislator or other<br />
interested party to respond concretely to such claims? From<br />
even this brief list, to which one could easily add hundreds of<br />
other examples, it is clear that a blanket acceptance or a blanket<br />
refusal of all human rights claims is not an adequate response.<br />
A pragmatic response must take account of a number of factors<br />
which complicate the question: the proliferation and widening<br />
range of human rights claims, the conflicting nature of some<br />
claims, the forum in which public policy is debated, the limited<br />
nature of available resources, the authority to protect and<br />
enforce human rights claims.<br />
Human rights discourse has become the preferred idiom in<br />
which to press for almost every imaginable kind of social,<br />
political and legal reform or development. One unfortunate<br />
consequence of this is that human rights which concern<br />
survival, and as such merit a certain priority, are discussed in the<br />
same idiom as much less urgent, though quite possibly<br />
legitimate, concerns. The proliferation of human rights claims 9<br />
derives also from the fact that the term has been stretched to<br />
include an ever wider range of subjects (individuals, couples,<br />
families, communities, nations) and an ever wider range of<br />
issues (physical and mental well-being, social conditions,<br />
political structures and processes, gender and ethnic issues).<br />
There is thus a need for a method of distinguishing between<br />
different types of human rights and different degrees of urgency<br />
involved. This is particularly clear in the context of so called<br />
“social rights”, sometimes known as the third generation of<br />
human rights, when limited resources are to be distributed<br />
among individuals and groupings who make rival claims on the<br />
basis of various rights. Faced with such demands it is surely too<br />
easy simply to declare that whole populations have the right to<br />
9<br />
On the consequences of the proliferation of rights claims see L.W.<br />
SUMNER, The Moral Foundations of Human Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,<br />
1987).