Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia
103 StMor 38 (2000) 103-125 MARTIN MCKEEVER C.Ss.R. THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE AS A CATEGORY OF ETHICAL ARGUMENTATION IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1 It would seem, prima facie, that there is something morally wrong about driving a tank over a crowd of unarmed students and their bicycles. Not everyone agrees, however, and so those of us who hold this conviction are faced with the challenge of rationally justifying and defending it. Even among those who would condemn such an action as morally wrong, the reasons for holding this conviction will probably be quite diverse. Some will maintain that it is wrong because it is against the law of the state, or against natural law, or against the law of God; others will say that it is wrong because of the consequences for the victims, their families and society in general; others again will argue that such an action is wrong because of some special intuitions or sentiments which it provokes in us; and the intellectually lazy will undoubtedly insist that it is wrong because it is wrong and there is nothing more to be said about the matter! To take up any of these positions, or others of a similar kind, is of course to engage in ethics in that it is to attempt to provide a generalized theoretical explanation of why a certain action is to be considered morally right or wrong. A comprehensive account of the myriad answers to the question as to what makes an action morally right or wrong just would be 1 This article is an elaborated version of the inaugural lecture entitled “Il dilemma etico-politico del discorso sui diritti umani nella cultura odierna” delivered by the author at the Alphonsian Academy at the beginning of the academic year 1998-99. While retaining most of the material used in the oral original, this written version develops in particular the treatment of the normative basis of human rights, hence the change in title.
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103<br />
StMor 38 (2000) 103-125<br />
MARTIN MCKEEVER C.Ss.R.<br />
THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE<br />
AS A CATEGORY OF ETHICAL ARGUMENTATION<br />
IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1<br />
It would seem, prima facie, that there is something morally<br />
wrong about driving a tank over a crowd of unarmed students<br />
and their bicycles. Not everyone agrees, however, and so those of<br />
us who hold this conviction are faced with the challenge of<br />
rationally justifying and defending it. Even among those who<br />
would condemn such an action as morally wrong, the reasons<br />
for holding this conviction will probably be quite diverse. Some<br />
will maintain that it is wrong because it is against the law of the<br />
state, or against natural law, or against the law of God; others<br />
will say that it is wrong because of the consequences for the<br />
victims, their families and society in general; others again will<br />
argue that such an action is wrong because of some special<br />
intuitions or sentiments which it provokes in us; and the<br />
intellectually lazy will undoubtedly insist that it is wrong<br />
because it is wrong and there is nothing more to be said about<br />
the matter!<br />
To take up any of these positions, or others of a similar<br />
kind, is of course to engage in ethics in that it is to attempt to<br />
provide a generalized theoretical explanation of why a certain<br />
action is to be considered morally right or wrong. A<br />
comprehensive account of the myriad answers to the question as<br />
to what makes an action morally right or wrong just would be<br />
1<br />
This article is an elaborated version of the inaugural lecture entitled “Il<br />
dilemma etico-politico del discorso sui diritti umani nella cultura odierna”<br />
delivered by the author at the Alphonsian Academy at the beginning of the<br />
academic year 1998-99. While retaining most of the material used in the oral<br />
original, this written version develops in particular the treatment of the<br />
normative basis of human rights, hence the change in title.