Vol. XXXVIII / 1 - Studia Moralia

Studia
Moralia
Biannual Review
published by the Alphonsian Academy
Revista semestral
publicada por la Academia Alfonsiana
VOL. XXXVIII/1
2000
EDITIONES ACADEMIAE ALPHONSIANAE
Via Merulana 31, C.P. 2458 - 00100 Roma, Italia

Studia Moralia – Vol. XXXVIII / 1
CONTENTS / ÍNDICE
Articles / Artículos
R. HAJDUK, Therapeutische Beichtpraxis. Eine Rückbesinnung
auf die Rolle des Beichtvaters nach dem
Buch Praxis Confessarii vom Heiligen Alfons Maria
de Liguori.....................................................................
D. J. BILLY, Models and Multivalence: On the Interaction
between Spirituality and Moral Theology .................
M. VIDAL, La Trinidad: origen y meta de la moral cristiana.
En las huellas de San Agustín y de San Buenaventura
.........................................................................
M. MCKEEVER, The Use of Human Rights Discourse as a
Category of Ethical Argumentation in Contemporary
Culture..................................................................
R. TREMBLAY, Le pain rompu à manger et le vin versé à
boire, visage du Crucifié ressuscité dans le temps de
l’Église. Dans le sillage de Lc, 24, 13-35 ....................
J. S. BOTERO G., El ‘fracaso conyugal’ en una nueva perspectiva.
Breve reflexión teológica para nuestros
tiempos.........................................................................
J. TORCHIA, St. Augustine’s Critique of the Adiaphora: A
Key Component of his Rebuttal of Stoic Ethics .......
M. B. RAMOSE, Only the Sovereign May Declare War and
NATO as Well................................................................
H. J. MÜNK, Sustainable Development as a Task of the
State. Ethical Aspects of Political-Legal Realisation ...
S. T. REHRAUER, The Injustice of Justice and the Justice of
Injustice ........................................................................
K.-W. MERKS, Tradition und moralische Wahrheit. Eine
Antwort an Brian V. Johnstone ....................................
5
45
67
103
127
141
165
197
217
229
265

5
StMor 38 (2000) 5-43
RYSZARD HAJDUK C.Ss.R.
THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS
Eine Rückbesinnung auf die Rolle des Beichtvaters
nach dem Buch Praxis confessarii
vom Heiligen Alfons Maria de Liguori
Die Beichtpraxis ist in vielen europäischen Kirchen von
einer tiefen Krise heimgesucht. Trotz zahlreichen Bemühungen,
den Vollzug des Bußsakramentes neu zu gestalten, bleiben viele
Katholiken der sakramentalen Versöhnung fern. Laut Umfragen
und Analysen 1 ist sie aber nicht deshalb gescheitert, weil kein
Sündenbewußtsein mehr bei den Gläubigen vorhanden ist,
sondern weil der Umgang mit dem Menschen und seinem
seelischen Zustand im Beichstuhl nicht dem entspricht, was die
Pönitenten von den Beichtvätern erwarten: sie sollen
einfühlsame, brüderliche Gesprächspartner sein, die den
Vergebungsvorgang auf der existentiellen Ebene vermitteln
können 2 . Angesichts der so formulierten menschlichen
Bedürfnisse muß man sich auch nicht wundern, daß die Suche
1
U. Silber, Buße und Beichte in der Erfahrung katholischer Frauen, in:
K.Schlemmer, Krise der Beichte - Krise des Menschen. Ökumenische
Beiträge zur Feier der Versöhnung, Würzburg 1998, 130; R.Zerfaß, Die
Verantwortung der Kirche für den einzelnen (Skript, Bd.1), Würzburg 1989,
156-163.
2
Zur heutigen Beichtkrise, die sich zunächst als ein
Kommunikationsabbruch darstellt, tragen die Verwalter des Bußsakramentes
bei, indem sie oft mit ihrem von dem Legalismus, der Hast und
Routine geprägten Verhalten den wahren Sinn der Begegnung mit dem
liebenden und die Vergebung schenkenden Gott im Sakrament zudecken.
Eine solche Einstellung der Beichtväter hängt mit der ganzen kirchlichen
Praxis zusammen, die den Bedürfnissen der heutigen Menschen und ihrem
Ruf nach der Erlösung scheinbar noch nicht gewachsen ist; R.Zerfaß, 163;
R. Gallagher, Der Dienst der Versöhnung Heute Redemptorist sein,
N. Londoño, Heute Redemptorist sein, Bonn 1997, 363.

6 RYSZARD HAJDUK
nach einer persönlichen, verständnisvollen Beziehung statt im
Beichstuhl in einem psychotherapeutischen Sprechzimmer
endet, wo sich ein von seiner Schuld beladener Mensch erhofft,
Unterstützung und Trost zu finden.
Hat die Beichte in der Konfrontation mit der immer
steigenderen Popularität der Psychotherapie noch eine Chance,
in den Augen der Christen an ihrer therapeutischen Bedeutung
zu gewinnen? Was sollte sich in der Beichtpraxis ändern, damit
das Bußsakrament zu einem von den Gläubigen ersehnten Ort
der Befreiung und seelischen Heilung wird?
Vielleicht ist man verblüfft, daß ausgerechnet Alphons
Maria de Liguori (1696 - 1787), der Heilige der Zeit der
Aufklärung, zu diesem Thema befragt wird. Zwar ist er vor 200
Jahren gestorben, aber erst 1950 zum Patron der Beichtväter
von Papst Pius XII. ernannt und als solcher bleibt er immer
noch ”im Amt”! Außerdem hat er eine Revolution in der
Konzeption der moraltheologischen Wissenschaft ausgelöst,
indem er sie nicht mehr als bloße Suche nach der objektiven
moralischen Wahrheit, sondern als eine praktisch orientierte
Reflexion verstanden hat, die auf die selig- und heilmachende
Wahrheit hin zielt 3 . Aus seinen moraltheologischen
Überlegungen zog er seelsorglich nützliche Schlußfolgerungen
heraus, die vor allem in der Beichtpraxis angewendet werden
sollten 4 .
In diesem Artikel wird kurz dargelegt, wie der Heilige
Alphons das Amt des Beichtvaters als einen therapeutischen
Dienst in seinem Buch Praxis confessarii beschreibt und wie
man heute im Lichte der gegenwärtigen, auf eine geistliche
Therapie ausgerichteten Pastoraltheologie und
Pastoralpsychologie seine Weisungen verstehen kann.
3
M.Vidal, Redemptoristisches Charisma und Moralangebot, in:
N.Londoño, 376-377.
4
Um den Beichtvätern zum effektiveren Dienst an den Menschen zu
verhelfen, schrieb Alphons unter anderem folgende Bücher: Praxis
confessarii, Avvertimenti ai confessori novelli, Homo Apostolicus, Il confessore
diretto per le confessioni della gente di campagna.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 7
1. Die Seelsorge als Therapie
Die Therapie ereignet sich nicht nur während
psychoterapeutischer Beratung, indem ein Psychotherapeut
versucht, seinem psychisch kranken Klienten durch ein
professionelles, gezieltes und methodisches Handeln seine
persönlichen Probleme zu bewältigen und die verlorene innere
Harmonie wieder herzustellen 5 . Sie hat auch ihren festen Platz
im Raum der christlichen Pastoral, wenn die Seelsorge als
Hilfestellung für die unter seelischen Konflikten Leidenden und
Bedürftigen verstanden wird.
1.1. Der therapeutische Charakter der Seelsorge
Therapeutisches Verständnis von Seelsorge stellt nichts
Neues dar 6 . Auf die Notwendigkeit eines therapeutischen
Umgangs mit dem Menschen weist deutlich die Bibel hin, in der
sich Gott selbst als Arzt offenbart (Ex 15,26) und Jesus, Gottes
Sohn, auf die Welt kommt, um die Kranken zu heilen (Lk 5,17).
Er schickt auch seine Jünger, damit sie allen Menschen das
Evangelium vom Reich Gottes verkünden und alle Krankheiten
heilen (Lk 9,2).
5
W.Ph.G.Zimbardo, F.L.Ruch, Psychologia i życie, Warszawa 1994, 487;
H.Deidenbach, Begegnung und Heilung. Psychologie und Pädagogik in
biblischen Geschichten, Frankfurt a.M. 1998, 153.
6
Die Rede von der therapeutischen Dimension der pastoralen Praxis
löst manchmal bei den Seelsorgern und Theologen Empörung aus. Der
Grund dafür scheint vor allem die Angst zu sein, daß die kirchliche Lehre
und ihre moralischen Implikationen zu kurz kommen, wenn der Mensch
und seine Bedürfnisse in den Vordergrund gestellt werden. Diese Denkart
stimmt sowohl mit der biblischen Offenbarung als auch mit der Botschaft
des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils nicht überein. Will nämlich die nach dem
Beispiel des Erlösers handelnde Kirche Jesu Heiltätigkeit fortsetzen, darf für
sie keine menschliche Not gleichgültig und kein Mensch ein Objekt, sondern
immer der Subjekt des kirchlichen Handelns sein; J.Kołodziejczyk,
Postmodernistyczna koncepcja kazania, w: Z.Sareło, Postmodernizm.
Wyzwanie dla chrześcijaństwa, Poznań 1995, 89; R.Hajduk, Leczyć rany serc
złamanych. Przyczynek do kaznodziejstwa terapeutycznego, Kraków 1996,
23.

8 RYSZARD HAJDUK
Die Seelsorge als einen therapeutischen Vorgang verstehen
bereits die Kirchenväter, die die Bedeutung von der heilenden
Kraft der pastoralen Praxis in ihren Schriften hervorheben. Für
Gregor von Nazianz ist die Menschenführung die Kunst über
allen Künsten und das Wissen, das alles andere übersteigt 7 . Er
vergleicht die Seelsorge mit der Medizin und beschreibt jene, die
das Hirtenamt im Volk Gottes ausüben, als geistliche
Therapeuten 8 . Ähnlich spricht Johannes Chrisostomus, der die
Aufmerksamkeit seiner Adressaten auf die heilende Wirkung des
Evangeliums richtet 9 . Wer aus dem Geiste Gottes redet, gibt dem
Menschen Mut und erfüllt seine Seele mit Frieden.
Das therapeutische Verständnis von Seelsorge umfaßt heute
die ganze Breite der kirchlichen Heilsorge für einzelne wie für
Gruppen von Gläubigen 10 . Alles, was die Kirche durch die
einzelnen Christen tut, soll den heilsbedürftigen Menschen in
seiner konkreten Situation Hilfe bringen (GS 3) 11 . Deshalb hat
die Seelsorge aus der Mitte der Person auf die Mitte der Person
hin zu geschehen 12 , indem sie die menschlichen Nöte erkennt
und den Betroffenen bei der Suche nach ihrer Bewältigung
verhilft 13 . Die pastorale Praxis setzt ihre heilende Kraft in
Bewegung, wenn sich die Seelsorger mit den Menschen auf die
7
Gregor von Nazianz, II. Rede, in: Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, Bd.59,
München 1928, 14.
8
In der Antike wurde der Begriff ”therapeuein” medizinisch
verstanden. Er bedeutete ”Begleiter” oder ”Diener”, der Kranken hilft und
war im Umlauf als eine Bezeichnung für den Dienst des Tierpflegers. Alles,
was der ”gute Hirte” tut, ist ”therapeuein”. Hirtliches, pastorales Handeln ist
also ”heilendes” Handeln; H.J.Clinebell, Modelle beratender Seelsorge,
München - Mainz 1971, 45; H.M.Stenger, Für eine Kirche, die sich sehen
lassen kann, Innsbruck 1995, 80-81.
9
Johannes Chrysostomus, Über das Priestertum. 4. Buch, in: Bibliothek
der Kirchenväter, Bd.27, München 1916, 193.
10
H.Pompey, Seelsorge zwischen Gesprächstherapie und
Verkündigung, ”Lebendige Seelsorge” 3/4 (1975), 162.
11
G.Griesl, Seelsorge oder Psychoanalyse?, ”Lebendige Seelsorge” 3/4
(1975), 152.
12
H.Windisch, Seelsorge aus der Mitte der Person, ”Theologie der
Gegenwart” 1 (1988), 12.
13
W.Müller, Menschliche Nähe in der Seelsorge, ”Lebendige Seelsorge”
1 (1988), 52.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 9
Suche machen, was Gott ihnen an Möglichkeiten ins Herz gelegt
hat 14 .
Der therapeutische Sinn des pastoralen Handelns verlangt
von dem Seelsorger, daß er ein Stück Weg mit den anderen geht.
Es handelt sich aber nicht um einen beliebigen Weg, sondern
um eine Strecke ”des Weges, den Gott mit ihnen geht, oder den
er diesen Menschen auf ihn zugehen läßt. Es ist eine Wegstrecke,
auf der er uns einander anvertraut und auf der er mit uns
Geschichte macht” 15 . Die therapeutische Seelsorge kann auch
als ”Begleitung des anderen im heiklen Übergang von heute
nach morgen” 16 begriffen werden, die ihm aber immer die letzte
Verantwortung für sein Schicksal überläßt und nur ”eine Hilfe
zur Selbsthilfe und Selbstverwirklichung” 17 leisten will.
Nur Gott kann heilen. Die Kirche und alles das, was
Menschen in der Kirche füreinander tun, bildet ein
Erfahrungsraum, wo mittels der Zeichen, der Sprache und der
Taten das heilende und befreiende Handeln Gottes an den
Menschen zum Vorschein kommt 18 . Der Heilsauftrag der Kirche
besteht darin, die Menschen zur Selbstverwirklichung auf der
Basis ihrer Berufung durch Gott frei zu machen und zu
ermutigen. Es geschieht nicht durch die moralischen Appelle,
sondern auf dem Weg der mystischen Grundlagenarbeit, indem
man den einzelnen in das Geheimnis einführt, das die
Liebesgeschichte Gottes mit der Menschheit ist 19 . In dieser
Perspektive nimmt die Seelsorge Gestalt des therapeutischen
Handelns, das dem Menschen den Weg zur Quelle des wahren
14
A.Schwarz, Seelsorger/Seelsorge zwischen Spiritualität und
Professionalität, ”Lebendige Seelsorge” 3/4 (1992), 181.
15
K. van Luyn, Der Seelsorger als Instrument seines pastoralen
Handelns, ”Lebendige Seelsorge” 2/3 (1983), 88.
16
R.Zerfafl, Der Seelsorger - ein verwundeter Arzt, ”Lebendige
Seelsorge” 2/3 (1983), 77.
17
R.Riess, Seelsorge. Orientierung, Analysen, Alternativen, Göttingen
1973, 227.
18
P.M.Zulehner, Pastoral: Entriegelung des Menschen, ”Theologie der
Gegenwart” 3 (1980), 8.
19
P.M.Zulehner, Priestermangel praktisch. Von der versogten zur
sorgenden Pfarrgemeinde, München 1983, 139-140.

10 RYSZARD HAJDUK
Heils zeigt und ihn zu einem sinnvollen und gesunden Leben
begleitet 20 .
1.2. Therapeutische Beziehungen im Rahmen der pastoralen
Praxis
In der so verstandenen seelsorglichen Praxis spielt die
zwischenmenschliche Begegnung eine wichtige Rolle als ein
Ort, an dem die heilende Botschaft Jesu und der konkrete
kranke und leidende Mensch miteinander in Berührung
kommen 21 . Einem Menschen begegnen heißt: Kontakt
anknüpfen, zu sprechen beginnen, Dialog führen. Dazu braucht
man nicht nur Worte, durch die ein bestimmter Inhalt vermittelt
wird, sondern auch Beziehung, die ihn wie auf einer Schiene
transportieren läßt 22 . Sie entscheidet, ob ein Seelsorgegespräch
zu einem dialogischen, partnerschaftlichen Suchen nach der
Glaubenshilfe als Lebenshilfe wird, d.h. ob sich dieses Gespräch
heilend auf den seelisch Leidenden auswirkt. Wenn eine
zwischenmenschliche Begegnung im Bereich der Seelsorge
therapeutische Qualität erhält, ist es ein Zeichen dafür, daß der
heilende Dienst Jesu an den Menschen durch die Kirche
verstanden und weiter praktiziert wird.
Unter den seelsorglichen Akten, die natürlicherweise eine
Form des therapeutischen Gesprächs annehmen sollen, hat die
Beichte eine besondere Stellung 23 . Im Bußsakrament, das sich
im Rahmen einer zwischenmenschlichen Begegnung vollzieht,
spricht Gott den Sünder von seinen Sünden los. Obwohl Gott
selber in seinem überreichen Erbarmen den Menschen von der
Last seiner Schuld befreit und ihm den Weg zum neuen Leben
eröffnet, ist die sakramentale Beichte ohne Begegnung mit
20
R.Hajduk, Die seelsorgliche Dimension der Predigt, St.Ottilien 1995,
34.
21
K.Baumgartner, Theologische Aspekte des Seelsorgegesprächs, in:
ders., Das Seelsorgegespräch in der Gemeinde, Würzburg 1982, 50.
22
H.Windisch, Sprechen heißt lieben. Eine praktisch-theologische
Theorie des seelsorglichen Gesprächs, Würzburg 1989, 28; R.Merkert, Ohne
Beziehung keine Kommunikation, ”Stimmen der Zeit” 9 (1993), 595-596.
23
H.M.Stenger, 81.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 11
einem Priester undenkbar. In seiner Person wirkt Jesus, der
göttliche Therapeut, der auch heute alle Kranken und Beladenen
aufrichten und heilen will.
Der Beichtvater steht vor einer schwierigen Aufgabe, sich
während des Beichtgesprächs so zu verhalten, damit die
seelische Heilung nicht nur in Worte gefaßt wird, sondern für
den Pönitenten eine nahe, zweifellos spürbare Realität darstellt,
wie es zur Zeit des irdischen Wirkens Jesu war.
In der Suche nach der Haltung des Beichtvaters, die zur
Entstehung einer therapeutischen Beziehung zwischen dem
Priester und dem Beichtenden verhilft, kann sich auch heute das
Buch Praxis confessarii von Alphons Maria de Liguori als
anregend erweisen. Es wurde zwar 1757 (bzw. 1755 unter dem
Titel Pratica del confessore per ben esercitare il suo ministero)
geschrieben, aber als ein Werk des Klassikers im Bereich der
Moral- und Pastoraltheologie verdient bestimmt auch ihre
Hochachtung durch die heutigen Beichtseelsorger.
2. Die therapeutische Haltung des Beichtvaters nach Praxis
confessarii
Das Buch des Heiligen Alphons Maria de Liguori Praxis
confessarii enthält eine praktische Anwendung seiner
Moraltheologie, damit alle Beichtväter wie der Verfasser zu den
eifrigen Anwälten der ”armen Sünder” werden können 24 . Neben
dem moraltheologischen Inhalt lassen sich auch in diesem Buch
deutliche Hinweise finden, die sich auf das Verhalten des
Beichtvaters dem beichtenden Menschen gegenüber beziehen.
In dieser Hinsicht ist das erste Kapitel von besonderer
Bedeutung; denn dessen Lektüre erlaubt bereits im ersten
Augenblick festzustellen, daß das Buch von einem
therapeutischen Konzept des Beichtvaterdienstes geprägt ist.
Am Anfang seines Buches spricht der Heilige Alphons von vier
Ämtern des guten Beichtvaters in folgender Reihenfolge und
24
Th.Rey-Mermet, La morale selon Saint Alphonse de Liguori, Paris
1987, 99; S.Majorano, La teologia morale e il ministero sacerdotale nella
visione alfonsiana, ”Studia Moralia” 34 (1996), 450.

12 RYSZARD HAJDUK
Ordnung: 1) das ”Amt des Vaters”, 2) das ”Amt des
Therapeuten”, 3) das ”Amt des Lehrers”; dann erst wird 4) das
”Amt des Richters” genannt 25 . Er widmet dem Amt des Richters
ganz wenig Platz entgegen der Meinung des Tridentinischen
Konzils; mehr Seiten verwendet er dagegen, um das Amt des
Therapeuten darzustellen. Seiner Meinung nach muß der Dienst
des Beichtvaters vor allem einen therapeutischen und
väterlichen Charakter besitzen und daher muß das
Bußsakrament in erster Linie heilen und nicht verurteilen 26 . Das
”Richten”, die Hinführung zur Unterscheidung und der
Zuspruch der rettenden Gerechtigkeit Gottes erhalten ihre
therapeutischen Züge von den zuerst genannten Ämtern des
Vaters und des Arztes 27 .
Die Hauptrisse der therapeutischen Einstellung des
Beichtvaters lassen sich folgenderweise thematisieren und
beschreiben:
2.1. Jedem Pönitenten mit bedingungsloser Liebe begegnen
Jesus Christus und sein Dienst an den Menschen ist für den
Heiligen Alfons die letzte Norm seines priesterlichens Wirkens 28 .
Sie ist auch in Praxis confessarii zu finden, indem der Verfasser
um eine liebevolle Annahme der Sünder an die Beichtväter
appelliert. Das Bußsakrament wurde vor allem für die sündigen
Menschen geschaffen. Der Beichtvater, der sein Amt in persona
Christi ausübt, ist verpflichtet, mit herzlichem Erbarmen und
desto größerer Liebe den Sünder aufzunehmen, je tiefer er in
Sünden verstrickt ist 29 . Eine solche Begegnung löst beim
Beichtvater echte Freude und Glück aus, indem er erfährt, daß
25
S.Alfonso Maria de Liguori, Praxis confessarii, Cap. I,2, w: Opere
morali di S.Alfonso Maria de Liguori, Vol.III, Torino 1848, 753.
26
S.Raponi, Attualizzazione del pensiero di S.Alfonso soprattutto in
merito all’attività pastorale a carattere popolare e alla chiamata di tutti alla
santità, ”Studia Moralia” 25 (1987), 343.
27
B.Häring, Moral für die Erlösten, ”Theologie der Gegenwart” 1
(1982), 10; Th.Rey-Mermet, La riconciliazione in S.Alfonso e nel suo tempo,
in: L.Alvarez Verdes, S.Majorano, Morale e redenzione, Roma 1983, 233.
28
S.Majorano, 454.
29
Praxis confessarii, Cap. I,3, 754.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 13
durch seinen Dienst ein Mensch für Gott gewonnen wird.
Wie Jesus das Anlitz des wahren Gottes und Vaters
offenbart, so soll der Beichtvater seinem Beispiel folgen und als
ein bedingungslos liebender Vater allen mit zuvorkommender
Liebe begegnen, unabhängig von ihrem gesellschaftlichen
Status, ihrer Ausbildung oder ihrem seelischen Zustand 30 . Ein
guter Verwalter des Bußsakramentes schickt keinen Menschen
weg, dem es am Können unter Fähigkeit mangelt, sein Gewissen
zu erforschen. In diesem Fall bemüht sich der Beichtvater, der
wie Jesus heilen und Sünde vergeben will, mit seinem
Pönitenten die Gewissenserforschung durchzuführen 31 .
Noch ”mehr” Liebe braucht er während des eigentlichen
Beichtvollzugs, wenn er sehr aufpassen muß, seinen Pönitenten
weder durch Ungeduld noch Überdruß zu verletzten 32 . Sein
Wohlwollen dem Menschen gegenüber bringt er durch
freundliche Einladung zur mutigen Öffnung des Herzens vor
dem himmlischen Vater zum Ausdruck. Damit verbindet er die
liebevolle Anhörung des Schuldbekenntnisses und den
herzlichen Aufruf zum Vertrauen auf Gottes Barmherzigkeit.
Die göttliche Liebe, die in der Haltung des Beichvaters für den
Beichtenden erfahrbar wird, eröffnet ihm den Weg zur
innerlichen Befreiung und zum neuen Leben mit Gott; Strenge
und Härte dagegen machen dem Menschen Angst vor dem
Beichten und tragen letztendlich zu seinem Unheil bei 33 .
Dem Heiligen Alfons liegt tief am Herzen, daß der
Beichtvater seinem Pönitenten die Schwere und Menge seiner
30
Diese Bemerkungen sind völlig verständlich, wenn man die damalige,
sehr verbreitete Beichtpraxis vor Augen hat. Alphons wußte sehr wohl, daß
zu seiner Zeit die dominierende Moraltheologie die Rolle des Beichtvaters
vor allem als die des ”Richters” ansah. Der Beichtvater war verpflichtet, sehr
streng mit den Pönitenten umzugehen. Seine Härte zeigte sich vor allem
darin, daß er dem Sünder die Absolution verweigerte; B.Häring, 10; Th.Rey-
Mermet, La riconciliazione in S.Alfonso e nel suo tempo, 229; O.Weiß, Wer
war Alfons von Liguori und was wollte er?, ”Spicilegium Historicum” 44
(1996), 416-417.
31
Praxis confessarii, Cap. I,19, 763.
32
Ibid., Cap. I,4, 754.
33
Ibid., Cap. I,5, 755.

14 RYSZARD HAJDUK
Sünden zeige und ihn mit Festigkeit ermahne. Es darf aber nur
im Klima der Liebe geschehen, damit der Sünder noch
deutlicher Gottes Barmherzigkeit erfahre und mit dem
himmlischen Vater enger verbunden voran lebe 34 . Die Wahrheit
ist annehmbar und heilend, wenn sie aus der Liebe heraus und
in der Liebe verkündet wird.
Die bedingungslose Liebe des Vaters, die er dem zur Beichte
gekommenen Menschen wie seinem Kind erweist, hat zuerst
eine theologische Basis. Nach dem Beispiel des Erlösers
indentifiziert Alphons den Sünder mit der Sünde nicht. Die
Sünde ist das Böse schlechthin; der Sünder ist aber von Grund
auf gut. Deshalb muß man ihn so herzlich aufnehmen, als ob es
Jesus selber tun würde 35 . Zwischen dem Verhalten des
Beichtvaters dem Beichtenden gegenüber und der Praxis Jesu
darf keine Dissonanz auftreten. Der Beichtvater ist nur ein
Nachfolger Jesu und Diener Gottes, durch den der himmlische
Vater dem Menschen mit längst zuvorgekommenen seiner Liebe
begegnet und dieser Haltung auf ewig treu bleibt.
Für den Heiligen Alphons hat die Bereitschaft zur
bedingunsfreien Aufnahme des Menschen auch eine wichtige
Bedeutung in der pädagogischen bzw. entwicklunspsychologischen
Perspektive. Seiner Meinung nach existiert nur
ein Weg, auf dem der Mensch zur Vollkommenheit gelangen
kann: die Liebe 36 . Indem er den Beichtvätern empfiehlt, mit
zuvorkommender Liebe jeden Pönitenten freundlich
aufzunehmen, hat er schon den ganzen Prozeß der Bekehrung
und der glücklichen Gestaltung des menschlichen Lebens im
Blick. Der Mensch kann nur seelisch gesund werden, wenn ihn
volle Akzeptanz, Sympathie und Ermutigung begleiten 37 . Gott ist
34
Ibid., Cap. I,4, 754.
35
Th.Rey-Mermet, La morale selon Saint Alphonse de Liguori, 99-100;
G.Velocci, Cristo: centro della spiritualità alfonsiana, ”Spicilegium
Historicum” 45 (1997), 43.
36
In seinem Buch ”Pratica di amar Gesù Cristo” wird dieser Gedanke
zum Leitmotiv: ”Alle Heiligkeit und Vollkommenheit eines Menschen
besteht darin, dafl man Jesus Christus, unseren Gott, unser höchstes Gut
und unseren Heiland liebt. Wer mich liebt - sagte Jesus, wird von meinem
Vater geliebt werden”.
37
S.Raponi, 343.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 15
der Vater, der für sein Kind ein offenes und zärtliches Herz hat
und sich immer als erster ihm wohlwollend zuwendet, um es
anzusprechen und zu einer großzügigen, liebevollen Antwort
aufzurufen. Diese göttliche Liebe, die in der Person und Haltung
des Beichtvaters erfahrbar werden soll, entspricht den tiefsten
menschlichen Bedürfnissen, kann den Menschen umwandeln
und mit dem himmlischen Vater vereinen 38 . Es gibt keine wahre
Bekehrung, wenn ihr Anfang nicht die bedingungslose Liebe
Gottes ist, die im seelsorglichen Dienst der Kirche sichtbar und
den Menschen vermittelt wird.
Die Liebe stellt den Ausgangspunkt für die ganze seelische
Therapie dar, die zur Anteilnahme am Leben und Lieben Gottes
führt. Die liebevolle Zuwendung des Vaters, die sich im
Verhalten des Beichtvaters offenbart, hat in der Lehre des
Heiligen Alphons eine klare therapeutische Dimension. Aus
diesem Grunde kann man dem P.B.Häring völlig zustimmen,
indem er sagt, daß Alphons das ”Amt des Vaters” im Beichtstuhl
dem des Arztes vorordnet 39 .
Neben dem starken Glauben an Gottes Barmherzigkeit und
die Macht seiner bekehrenden und heilig machenden Gnade, die
im Bußsakrament und in der Eucharistie wirksam ist, drückt
der Verfasser von Praxis confessarii sein unbegrenztes Vertrauen
auf den guten Willen des Sünders aus, der in seiner Bereitschaft,
die Schuld zu bekennen, deutlich wird 40 . Alfons glaubt, daß jeder
38
Die Lebensgeschichte des Gründers der Redemptoristen zeigt, wie
wichtig für ihn die Entdeckung war, daß Gott ihn liebt. Die Erfahrung der
Liebe Gottes gab ihm die für sein Leben grundlegendste Sicherheit, die er
auch den anderen, die nach einem Fundament ihrer Existenz suchen,
vermitteln wollte. Eine besondere Chance dafür bot die Beichtpraxis als ein
Ort der interpersonalen Begegnung sowohl mit dem Menschen als auch und
vor allem mit Gott an. Dann kann das zustande kommen, was für den
Heilprozeß die erstrangige Bedeutung hat: indem in der Haltung des
Beichtvaters die Vatergüte Gottes vorkommt, kann sich durch den
personalen Bezug zwischen Heilendem und zu Heilenden das Vaterbild
korrigieren oder von Grund auf verbessern; B.Häring, 10; A.Bazielich,
Spiritualità di S.Alfonso M. de Liguori, ”Spicilegium Historicum” 31 (1983),
366; M.Vidal, La imagen de Dios en la tradición redentorista, ”Spicilegium
Historicum” 46 (1998), 276.
39
B.Häring, 10.
40
Th.Rey-Mermet, La morale selon Saint Alphonse de Liguori, 101.

16 RYSZARD HAJDUK
mit Gottes Gnade zur Vollkommenheit gelangen kann, weil jeder
unabhängig von seiner Ausbildung und seinem materiellen
Zustand Gott und den Nächsten lieben kann 41 . Dieses immense
Vertrauen auf den Menschen und seine Möglichkeiten muß in
der konkreten seelsorglichen Tätigkeit zum Zuge kommen,
damit das menschliche Herz von der Sehnsucht nach der
Vollkommenheit und von einem auf die immerwährende Liebe
Gottes begründeten Selbstvertrauen erfüllt wird. Erst auf dieser
Basis wird der Prozeß des Heil- und Heiligwerdens im Innern
des Menschen voll in Gang gesetzt.
2.2. Verstehen und verständnisvoll mit dem Menschen
umgehen
Ein sich therapeutisch verhaltender Beichtvater muß viel
Verständniss für die Beichtenden haben und um die ihnen
angstmachenden Faktoren wissen, die beim Vollzug der Beichte
vorkommen können. Aus diesem Grunde warnt Alphons die
beichthörenden Priester vor den Konsequenzen der
rücksichtlosen Zurückweisung der Sünder wegen der
mangelnden Gewissenserforschung; denn er weiß, welche
negative Gefühle bezüglich des Bußsakramentes im
menschlichen Herzen auftauchen können, wenn der Beichtvater
einen Menschen entläßt. Hinsichtlich der Gefahr, daß der vom
Beichtvater entlassene Mensch nicht mehr beichten will,
empfiehlt der Verfasser seinen Brüdern im Priesteramt, daß sie
sich am Anfang mit einem herzlichen Zuspruch an die
Beichtenden wenden und ihnen Mut machen, ihre Schuld
aufrichtig zu bekennen. Zugleich sollen sie auch ihre Pönitenten
vergewissern, daß sie ihre Scham und ihre Hemmungen gut
verstehen 42 . Nach dem Heiligen Alphons handelt der Beichtvater
unvernünftig, wenn er den sich zu seiner Schuld bekennenden
Menschen mit scharfen Bemerkungen unterbricht. Ein solches
Verhalten kann nämlich dazu führen, daß der erschrockene
41
S.Majorano, Essere Chiesa con gli abbandonati. Prospettive
alfonsiane di vita christiana, Materdomini 1997, 42.
42
Praxis confessarii, Cap. I,3, 754.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 17
Pönitent aus Angst eine schwere Sünde nicht ausspricht.
Zurechtweisende Worte dürfen aus dem Munde des Priesters
nur dann fließen, wenn ein Beichtender seine Schuld ohne die
geringste Abscheu bekennt. Aber auch in diesem Fall muß ihm
der Beichtvater gleich liebevoll Mut zusprechen, damit er seine
Sünden aufrichtig bekenne.
Um den Menschen und seinen seelischen Zustand in seiner
ganzen Komplexizität zu verstehen, muß der Beichtvater die
Ursachen und Umstände seiner ethischen Fehlentscheidungen
kennenlernen. Deshalb fragt ein guter Priester nicht nur nach
der Gattung und der Zahl der Sünden, um dann
dementsprechend den Beichtenden loszusprechen oder zu
entlassen (ein in dieser Weise handelnder Priester würde sich
sicherlich in erster Linie für einen Richter halten). Indem er
aber seine Fragen stellt, will er sich die Motive und Umstände
der sündigen Taten des Beichtenden bewußt machen 43 . Ein
solches Handeln des Beichtvaters läßt sich mit dem eines Arztes
vergleichen, der nur heilen kann, wenn er den Ursprung und die
Ursachen der Krankheit genau ergründet hat 44 .
Der beichthörende Priester soll als Vater den Pönitenten voll
Liebe anhören und als Arzt, soweit es nötig ist, ihn ermahnen
und zurechtweisen 45 . Diese Haltung steht dem Beichtvater
zweifellos zu; denn auch ein guter Arzt läßt seine Patienten nicht
ohne Warnungen und Anweisungen gehen, die ihnen erfolgreich
helfen, die Gesundheit zu verbessern und zu erhalten. Jedoch
müssen die Ratschläge, die er gibt, dem Zustand und den
Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten des einzelnen entsprechen. So
verhält sich auch ein verständnisvoller Beichtvater, der seinem
Pönitenten nur eine Buße auferlegt, die weder seine
körperlichen noch seelischen Kräfte überfordert, sondern viel
mehr darauf abgestimmt ist.
Alphons weiß, daß keine Therapie möglich ist, bevor die
Krankheit nicht erkannt und nach ihren Ursachen untersucht
wird. Im Beichtstuhl kann sie nur begonnen werden, wenn der
Beichtende einem hörbereiten und verständnisvollen Priester
43
Ibid., Cap. I,20, 763-764.
44
Ibid., Cap. I,6, 755-756.
45
Ibid., Cap. I,7, 756.

18 RYSZARD HAJDUK
begegnet, dem die Welt der Gefühle, Ängste und seelischen
Widerstände nicht fremd ist. Deshalb versucht Alphons in Praxis
confessarii nicht nur das optimal menschenfreundliche
Verhalten des Beichtvaters aufzuzeichnen, sondern enthüllt
auch zugleich die psychischen Reaktionen, die im Innern des
Pönitenten auftauchen können. Dadurch will er verhindern, daß
ein Beichtvater wegen seines Mangels an Einfühlungsvermögen
jemanden verletzt oder aufgrund seiner auf bloßes Richten
orientierten Einstellung den Anschein erweckt, daß es mehr um
einen inquisitorischen Verhörungsprozeß als um einen Vollzug
des Bußsakramentes gehe 46 . Seelisches Heil und psychisches
Gleichgewicht hängen zusammen. Wer das nicht versteht, kann
dem Menschen zu seinem Glück und seiner vollkommenen
menschlichen und religiösen Entwicklung nicht verhelfen.
Alphons war ein guter Psychologe, der in seiner Moral- und
Pastoralthelogie auf die Fähigkeiten und Begrenztheit des
Menschen Rücksicht nahm 47 . Sein großes Anliegen war, die
Seelsorger zu überzeugen, daß sie immer den konkreten und
nicht einen abstrakten Menschen vor Augen haben sollen, an
dem ein allgemein helfendes Mittel angewendet werden darf.
Die Therapie kann nur gelingen, wenn die Art der Verletzungen,
ihre Ursachen, aber auch das Wachstumspotential des einzelnen
Organismus vom Arzt entsprechend eingeschätzt werden.
Die menschliche Schwachheit, die der heilige Verfasser aus
eigener persönlichen Erfahrung und dank seiner Nähe zu den
einfachen Menschen kennt, gibt ihm keinen Grund zum
Mißtrauen und zur Verzweiflung. In der Tiefe seines Herzens
wohnt eine unerschütterliche Sicherheit, daß alle menschliche
Schwachheit und Zerbrechlichkeit in der Begegnung mit
copiosa redemptio - der überreichen Erlösung - überwunden
werden kann 48 ; denn sie war gerade wegen der menschlichen
Unzulänglichkeit notwendig. Das geduldige und aufmerksame
Zuhören, das er von allen Beichtvätern fordert, eröffnet jedem
46
Th.Rey-Mermet, La morale selon Saint Alphonse de Liguori, 145.
47
G.Velocci, 43.
48
S.Majorano, Il popolo chiave pastorale di S.Alfonso, ”Spicilegium
Historicum” 45 (1997), 81.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 19
Pönitenten das Tor zu einer authentischen Erfahrung der
befreienden Intervention Gottes in seine Lebensgeschichte.
2.3. Mit vollem Engagement dem Sünder beistehen
Der Heilige Alphons kennt Pönitenten, die von den Priestern
erwarten, daß sie ihnen beistehen und zur Lossprechung
verhelfen 49 . Aus diesem Grunde ist es von großer Bedeutung,
daß der Beichtvater dem Beichtenden hilft, die notwendige
Disposition zur Lossprechung zu erlangen, falls sie noch nicht
vorhanden ist 50 . Die Aufgabe des Priesters besteht darin, daß er
dem Menschen Mut macht, eine gute Beichte abzulegen 51 .
Der Beichtvater ist nicht nur ein Diener Gottes, sondern
auch ein Diener des Menschen, für den er zur Verfügung stehen
und bei der Begegnung ganz auf ihn konzentriert sein soll 52 .
Deshalb muß er seine Zeit dem Bedürftigen vorbehaltlos
schenken und ohne Eile mit dem Beichtenden ein Gespräch
führen 53 .
Der Beichtvater ist verpflichtet, alles Mögliche zu tun, um
den Sünder für die Absolution zu disponieren 54 . Er darf sich
sogar dabei auf die tragischen Konsequenzen der fehlenden
Bereitschaft zur Bekehrung berufen, indem er dem Pönitenten
seinen jetzigen und künftigen unglücklichen Zustand vor Augen
stellt. Dadurch will er aber dem Menschen keine Angst machen,
sondern zur Umkehr bewegen. In dieser Weise hilft er auch dem
Pönitenten zu erfahren, wie Gott ihn liebt und wie groß seine
Würde ist, daß sich ein Geistlicher mit ihm und seinem Anliegen
so lang beschäftigt.
Das Beichthören ist die wichtigste und schwierigste
priesterliche Aufgabe; denn sie verlangt von dem Beichtvater
eine Kenntnis von allen anderen Wissenschaften, vor allem der
Moral, die verschiedene Gegenstände und viele
49
Praxis confessarii, Cap. I,3, 754.
50
Ibid., Cap. I,10, 757-758.
51
Ibid., Cap. I,4, 754-755.
52
Ibid., Cap. I,5, 755.
53
Ibid., Cap. I,7, 756.
54
Ibid.

20 RYSZARD HAJDUK
interpretationsbedürftige Gesetze umfaßt 55 . Die Menschen
brauchen kompetente Beichtväter, die ein gründliches Studium
der Moral hinter sich haben und über notwendige Fertigkeiten
verfügen, um die kompliziertesten Fälle im Beichtstuhl zu
lösen 56 . Alles, was sie wissen, soll für die Beichtenden hilfreich
sein. Der Beichtvater verwaltet das Amt des Lehrers, indem er
sich dem moraltheologischen Studium widmet und sich dann
seiner Kenntnisse um des Menschen und seines Heils willen
bedient.
Das größte Anliegen des Heiligen Alphons war, daß der
Beichtvater alle seine Möglichkeiten und Kräfte nutzt, um den
Menschen bei der Suche nach der heilenden Nähe Gottes zu
helfen 57 . Daher war die Lossprechung im gewissen Sinne die
Frucht des Engagements des Beichtvaters, der seine Zeit,
Aufmerksamkeit, Erfahrungen und Kenntnisse darauf setzt, um
den Pönitenten zu Gott zu führen. Indem der Priester sich ganz
für den Beichtenden hingibt, macht er Gott sichtbar, der im
priesterlichen Dienst gegenwärtig ist und jedem seiner geliebten
Kindern beisteht. Das sakramentale Zeichen als ein Raum des
die Liebe und Vergebung schenkenden Wirkens Gottes wird
durch die engagierte Haltung des Beichtvaters gestärkt und
beglaubigt.
Der Beichtstuhl war für den Verfasser von Praxis confessarii
ein Ort des Zuhörens und des Dialogs, wo der Mensch getröstet
und zu einem neuen auf Gott hin orientierten Leben ermutigt
werden konnte 58 . Auf diese Weise wurde der Priester mit seinem
Eifer und seiner Hilfsbereitschaft zu einem lebendigen
Werkzeug in den heilenden Händen Gottes, der in jedem
Menschen sein geliebtes Kind sieht und um sein irdisches und
ewiges Glück besorgt ist. Durch seine Sorge um das Heil der
einzelnen Menschen darf der Beichtvater am therapeutischen
Dienst Gottes an den Menschen teilhaben.
55
Ibid., Cap. I,17, 761-762.
56
Ibid., Cap. I,18, 763.
57
Th.Rey-Mermet, La morale selon Saint Alphonse de Liguori, 101.
58
L.Châtellier, La mission populaire: annonce prophetique du salut,
”Spicilegium Historicum” 45 (1997), 102.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 21
2.4. Das menschliche und religiöse Wachstum fördern
Das Bußsakrament darf nicht unterdrücken, sondern
befreien. Es soll bei dem Pönitenten die Sehnsucht nach den
göttlichen Frieden und Abneigung gegen irgendwelche Form des
Bösen erwecken 59 .
Der Mensch hat den Vorrang vor dem Gesetz; deshalb
müssen seine individuellen Möglichkeiten ständig vor Augen
gehalten werden, damit ihm die vorgeschriebenen Heilmittel
nicht zu einer unerträglichen Last werden 60 . Dabei muß die
Buße immer als Heilmittel verstanden werden. In diesem Geiste
interpretiert Alphons die Lehre des Tridentinischen Konzils
hinsichtlich des Sakramentes der Beichte: die Buße soll sowohl
heilsam als auch angemessen sein, d.h. sie soll sich auf den
Menschen therapeutisch auswirken und nach dessen Kräften
auferlegt werden 61 . Man kann sogar den Pönitenten fragen, ob er
nach seiner Einschätzung imstande ist, eine bestimmte Buße zu
verrichten. Es genügt auch, wenn die Genugtuung für die
Sünden dem Guten gleicht, das der Mensch in seinem Leben tut.
Der Beichtvater als guter Arzt ist verpflichtet, dem
Menschen Heilmittel vorzuschreiben, die ihm helfen, zum
wahren Glück und zur Vollkommenheit zu gelangen. Die Mittel
sollen geeignet sein, damit sich der Mensch mit ihrer Hilfe in der
Gnade Gottes erhalten kann. Alphons unterscheidet zwischen
den allgemeinen und besonderen Heilmitteln 62 . Zur ersten
Kategorie gehört an erster Stelle die Liebe zu Gott, die der
grundlegendste Zweck unserer Existenz ist; weiter das Gebet zur
Ehre der Mutter Gottes, der häufige Empfang der Sakramente,
oft praktizierte Betrachtung, die Erinnerung an die Gegenwart
Gottes zur Zeit der Versuchung, tägliche Gewissenserforschung,
59
Praxis confessarii, Cap. I,5, 755.
60
Man darf den Menschen nicht schaden. Infolgedessen muß der
Beichtseelsorger den Pönitenten in seinem guten Glauben lassen und auf
jene Ermahnung verzichten, die dem Menschen schädlich sein würde. Diese
Regel gilt sogar in dem Fall, in dem es sich um ein göttliches Gebot handeln
sollte, dessen Beachtung jedoch keine heilsnotwendigen Dinge betrifft; ibid.,
Cap.I, 8, 756.
61
Ibid., Cap. I,11, 758.
62
Ibid., Cap. I,15, 761.

22 RYSZARD HAJDUK
Eintritt in eine Bruderschaft für die Laien und das betrachtende
Gebet, sowie die Danksagung nach dem Gottesdienst für die
Priester. Die besonderen Heilmittel hängen mit der
Verschiedenheit der Laster zusammen.
Man kann sich fragen, warum der Heilige, der sich sonst für
einen rücksichstvollen Umgang mit den Menschen einsetzt,
wagt zu lehren, daß die Beichtväter ihren Pönitenten
entsprechende Heilmittel vorschreiben und direkt befehlen
dürfen, was zu tun ist. In der Tat ist es aber kein Appell an die
Priester, daß sie ihre Pönitenten von außen steuern sollen. Der
eifrigste Kirchenlehrer weiß, daß das Bußsakrament vor allem
für jene Menschen geschaffen wurde, die nach Heilung und
Befreiung dürsten 63 . Diese menschliche Not fordert den Priester
heraus, dem Menschen zur Bewältigung seiner Probleme zu
verhelfen. Indem der Beichtvater den Hintergrund des ethischen
Übels bereits erkannt hat, ist er imstande, dem Beichtenden
mögliche Auswege aus der unglücklichen Situation aufzuzeigen
und auf die Mittel hinzuweisen, die sich für ihn auf dem Weg zur
Vollkommenheit hilfreich erweisen können. Die Beichte ist noch
nicht alles. Es geht nicht um die Sünden, sondern um den
Menschen und sein Leben. Der Beichtvater darf nicht aus den
Augen verlieren, was nach der Beichte folgt. Eine dauerhafte
seelische Heilung ist nur möglich, wenn alle inneren
menschlichen Kräfte aktiviert werden und die Sehnsucht nach
einem erfüllten Leben aufgeweckt wird. Alphons weiß, daß sich
der Mensch nur in einem Klima der Freiheit und prozeßhaft
entwickeln kann, indem er in seinem Gewissen die selig
machende Wahrheit erkennt und sie zu seinem
Lebenswegweiser macht 64 . Es bringt nichts, wenn man versucht,
das persönliche und religiöse Wachstum durch von außen
kommende Angriffe zu beschleunigen. Jedes Reifwerden
braucht seine Zeit und die christliche Botschaft kann nur
stufenweise internalisiert werden 65 .
Der durch die Sünden verletzte und geschwächte Mensch
63
S.Majorano, La teologia morale e il ministero sacerdotale nella
visione alfonsiana, 453.
64
M.Vidal, Redemptoristisches Charisma und Moralangebot, 376.
65
S.Raponi, 341.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 23
braucht die Wahrheit, aber nur jene, die sich als eine
gesundmachende Medizin auf ihn auswirkt 66 . Alles, was der
Beichtvater sagt, muß auf das menschliche Wachstum hin
zielen. Infolgedessen ist auch die Buße mit positiven Zügen
versehen. Sie wird nicht mehr für eine simple Konsequenz des
Richtens gehalten, sondern von der ganzen therapeutischen
Funktion des Bußsakramentes her als ein heilender Faktor im
ständigen menschlichen Reifungsprozeß verstanden 67 .
3. Das Liguorianische in der heutigen pastoralpsychologischen
Beichtpraxislehre
Im Bußsakrament heilt Christus die Menschen durch sein
erlösendes Gericht am Kreuz, indem er sich seiner Diener und
deren sakramentalen Handelns bedient 68 . Der therapeutische
Charakter der sakramentalen Versöhnung scheint heute am
deutlichsten im Rahmen eines Beichtgesprächs zum Vorschein
zu kommen, wenn der Beichtvater auf seinen Pönitenten liebeund
verständnisvoll zukommt und durch sein Verhalten ein
Klima schafft, das schon in sich eine befreiende und heilende
Kraft besitzt. Dieses Konzept des sakramentalen Beichtvollzugs
entspricht der therapeutischen Ausrichtung der Liguorianischen
Beichtpraxislehre, nach welcher das Sakrament der Buße mit
der ärztlichen Behandlung prinzipiell vergleichbar ist.
3.1. Das Beichtgespräch als ein Raum der wahren
Bekehrung
Wie zu Lebzeiten des Heiligen Alphons so auch heute gehen
die Menschen oft zur Beichte mit der Angst, daß man sie
66
S.Majorano, Essere Chiesa con gli abbandonati, 77.
67
B.Häring, 11.
68
B.Häring, Shalom: Peace. The Sacrament of Reconciliation, New
York 1969, 43; J.Bommer, Das Bußsakrament als Gericht und als Seelsorge,
in: K.Baumgartner, Erfahrungen mit dem Bußsakrament, Bd.2.
Theologische Beiträge zu Einzelfragen, München 1979, 239.

24 RYSZARD HAJDUK
beurteilt, verurteilt und zurückweist 69 . Indem sie versuchen das
zu vermeiden, begrenzen sie sich auf oberflächliche, formelle
Sündenbekenntnisse. Dann berühren sie ihre inneren
Verletzungen und Probleme nicht, mit denen sie allein nicht
zurecht kommen können. Das kann zu einer Situation führen,
daß sich ein Pönitent zu seinen Sünden nach deren Zahl und
Gattung bekennt, die sakramentale Lossprechung erhält und
immer wieder feststellt, daß sich in seinem Leben nichts ändert.
Der Heilige Alphons weist bereits deutlich darauf hin, daß
die Beichte auf eine bloße Sündenaufzählung nicht beschränkt
werden darf. Wer nur in Eile vor großen Feiertagen beichtet, um
die Absolution möglichst schnell und dadurch auch einen freien
Zugang zum Kommunionempfang zu bekommen, nutzt die
Chance nicht aus, in die Tiefe seines Herzens hineinzudringen,
seine individuellen Konflikte zu erkennen und einen neuen Weg
in die Zukunft für sich zu entdecken.
Die Bekehrung betrifft nicht nur die in der Vergangenheit
begangenen Sünden und deren Bekenntnis, sondern sie
orientiert sich in erster Linie auf die Zukunft hin. So wie es
schon in Praxis confessarii betont wurde, handelt es sich im
Bußsakrament um ein neues, mit Gott verbundenes und zu ihm
führendes Leben. Nicht die Sünden, die nach dem
Schuldbekenntnis ein endgültig geschlossenes Kapitel
darstellen, nehmen den vordergründigen Platz im Gespräch mit
den Pönitenten ein, sondern die menschliche Zukunft und ihre
glückliche, gesunde Gestaltung.
Die besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird heute dem
bußsakramentalen Vollzug als einer zwischenmenschlichen
Begenung geschenkt, in der der Mensch seine Sünden
wahrnimmt und sie im Glauben an Gottes Gegenwart bekennt.
Dabei legt man großen Wert auf die Erfahrung der göttlichen
Barmherzigkeit, die mittels eines beichthörenden Priesters dem
Pönitenten zuteil wird 70 . Es geht vor allem darum, daß sich der
Beichtende seine Unvollkommenheit und Begrenztheit bewußt
macht und das Ausmaß seiner Schuld vor Gott tiefer versteht. In
69
D.Emeis, Mit den Sakramenten leben, Freiburg i.B. 1993, 72.
70
H.Lemke, Verkündigung in der annehmenden Seelsorge, Stuttgart
1981, 70.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 25
diesem Gedanken läßt sich ein Echo des großen Anliegens des
eifrigsten Kirchenlehrers vernehmen, dem besonders stark am
Herzen lag, daß sich jeder Pönitent mit seiner Schuld im
unermeßlichen Meere des göttlichen Erbarmens eingetaucht
sieht.
Man weiß aus der Erfahrung, daß es den Menschen sehr
schwer fällt, von seinen gelungenen oder mißglückten
Lebensentscheidungen kurz und bündig zu sprechen. Um sich
selbst genauer wahrzunehmen und seine Schuld in allen
Zusammenhängen auszudrücken, braucht der Beichtende
entsprechend genug Zeit. Dafür setzte sich schon der Heilige
Alphons ein, dem wichtig war, daß der Pönitent nicht nur die
Sünden der Reihe nach ausspreche, sondern auch von seinen
Lebensumständen erzähle, damit es dem Beichtvater leichter ist,
die für ihn richtigen Heilmittel vorzuschreiben. Der Unterschied
zwischen damals und heute besteht eigentlich nur darin, daß es
dem Heiligen mehr darum ging, daß der Priester den vor ihm
knienden Sünder besser versteht; in unserer Zeit handelt es sich
wieder mehr darum, daß der beichtende Mensch nicht nur auf
die Sünden seinen Blick richte, sondern daß er auch die
Ursachen seiner bösen Taten wahrnehme, die im Bereich seiner
bisherigen Lebensgeschichte, der unbewußten Bedürfnisse oder
innerlichen Verletzungen zu finden sind.
Schuldgefühle versetzen den Menschen in Angst und
machen ihn stumm. Deshalb muß der Seelsorger seinem
Pönitenten genügend Zeit lassen, damit er sich aussprechen
kann. Ein umfangreicher Zeitraum hilft dem Menschen sich mit
der ganzen Situation des Beichtgesprächs vertraut zu machen
und über seine Probleme offen zu sprechen. Man braucht auch
Zeit, um sich seinen ganzen, oft sehr komplizierten Zustand
bewußt zu machen und bis zu den Wurzeln der falschen
ethischen Entscheidungen vorzudringen. Bei der Beichte geht es
nicht nur darum, daß man sich auf das Sündenbekenntnis
beschränkt, sondern daß man auch seinem wahren Ich begegnet
und seine bisher unbekannte, unterdrückte Bereiche der
inneren Welt enthüllt. All das erinnert an die Hinweise des
Heiligen Alphons, der von den Beichtvätern verlangte, den
Pönitenten seine Zeit großzügig zur Verfügung zu stellen.
Jeder Mensch fürchtet sich vor der Strafe. Dieses Gefühl
kann nur gemindert oder sogar überwunden werden, wenn der

26 RYSZARD HAJDUK
Priester seinem Gesprächspartner während der Beichte
aufmerksam zuhört und ihn ermutigt, seinen wahren seelischen
Zustand ruhig anzuschauen. Zugleich gibt er ihm zu erkennen,
daß das Beichtgespräch mit einem Strafvollzug nichts zu tun hat
und daß die über sein Leben gesprochene Wahrheit befreit und
keine zusätzliche Qual verursacht. Gott will ihn heilen und nicht
verurteilen, bestrafen oder ablehnen. Im Bußsakrament zeigt
sich Gott als jener, der die durch die Sünde abgebrochene
Kommunikation mit dem Menschen herstellt, ihn zu sich zieht
und einen Liebesbund mit ihm aufs Neue schließt 71 . In dieser
Weise kommt die liguorianische Lehre vom heilenden Sinn der
Wahrheit und die therapeutische Wirkung der Buße wieder ins
Licht.
3.2. Der Mensch im Zentrum der seelsorglichen
Aufmerksamkeit
Nicht die Beichte und die Sünden stehen im Vordergrund,
sondern der Mensch 72 . Das Bußsakrament soll man so
zelebrieren, damit der Mensch eine echte Befreiung erfahre und
zu einem neuen Anfang mit Gott befähigt werde. Der
Beichtvater soll zu einem lebendigen Zeichen Christi werden,
der die Sünden vergibt und dem Pönitenten mit seiner immer
zuvorkommenden Liebe begegnet. Er darf keinen Richter
spielen, der das Recht hat, Urteile ergehen zu lassen, weil nur
Gott der Richter ist. Der Beichtvater hat den Auftrag, ein Diener
des Evangeliums und nicht des Gesetzes zu sein 73 . Der Mensch
findet nur dann zu Gott, wenn ihn ein bedingungsloses
Wohlwollen umhüllt. Auf dieser grundlegendsten Überzeugung
baute der Gründer der Redemptoristen seine praktische Theorie
des Beichtvollzugs auf, in dem der Mensch und sein inneres
Wachstum im Vordergrund stehen müssen.
71
L.Wachinger, Bei Schuld und Schuldgefühlen, in: K.Baumgartner,
W.Müller, Handbuch für das seelsorgliche Gespräch, Freiburg i.B. 1990, 243.
72
J.Bommer, 246; U.Silber, 130.
73
J.Tasch, Das seelsorgliche Gespräch in der Feier der Versöhnung, in:
K.Baumgartner, Das Seelsorgegespräch in der Gemeinde, 123; R.Gallagher,
365.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 27
Dem Menschen kann man nur helfen, indem man ihn
unterstützt, damit er sich selber helfen könne. In einer 5-
Minuten Beichte scheint es unmöglich zu sein, daß der Mensch
eine Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe erhalte. Eine solche Beichtpraxis ist
dann nur auf eine Belehrung zurückzuführen, die bei dem
Pönitenten den Anschein erwecken kann, daß er für den Priester
nur ein Objekt darstelle, das gar nicht im Zentrum der Seelsorge
steht, weil eine ethisch-theologische Theorie und die kirchliche
Disziplin die wichtigste Rolle spielen 74 . Dazu noch wirkt sich
eine hastige Belehrung auf den Menschen so aus, daß seine
Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft zur Selbsterkenntnis gelähmt werden
und in seinem Herzen zu keiner persönlichen Entscheidung
kommt 75 . In dieser Situation kann man den Pönitenten mit
einem Kunden vergleichen, der von einem Beamten freundlich
aber unpersönlich und kalt bedient wird. Das stimmt mit der
Vorstellung des Heiligen Alphons nicht überein, weil er sich
stark dafür einsetzte, daß der Beichtvater wie ein guter Arzt den
einzelnen und seinen inneren Zustand möglichst genau
kennenlernt, bevor er anfängt, entsprechende Heilmittel
vorzuschreiben.
Ein Beichtvater, der sich ganz auf den beichtenden
Menschen konzentrieren und alles tun will, um ihm zu einer
echten Lebenserneuerung zu verhelfen, muß mit den an den
Pönitenten gerichteten Fragen besonders vorsichtig umgehen.
Wer Fragen stellt, riskiert, daß er dem Dialog eine bestimmte
Richtung aufzwingt und bei dem Gesprächspartner den Zugang
zu einer vertieften Selbsterforschung blockiert 76 . Wenn sich der
Seelsorger um jeden Preis bemüht, mittels der Fragen die
intimsten Bereiche des menschlichen Innern zu berühren, weckt
74
In einer kurzen, auf ein Sündenbekenntnis und eine Belehrung
beschränkten Begegnung zwischen dem Beichtvater und seinem Pönitenten
ist es unmöglich, die menschlichen Probleme in ihrer Komplexizität genug
tief zu ergründen. Schnell formulierte Ratschläge bezüglich der
persönlichen Lebenskonflikte können sich dann für den betroffenen
Menschen als falsch und nachteilig erweisen; J.Schwermer, Das helfende
Gespräch in der Seelsorge, Paderborn 1991, 123.
75
K.Baumgartner, Pastorale Hinweise zum Beichtgespräch, in: ders.,
Das Seelsorgegespräch in der Gemeinde, 134.
76
J.Tasch, 123.

28 RYSZARD HAJDUK
er bei seinem Pönitenten Widerstandsgefühle angesichts der
verbalen und psychologischen Aggression, die er im Verhalten
des Beichtvaters spürt. Für den Beichtenden, der unter dem
Druck des integralen Schuldbekenntnisses und dem
Fragenbeschuß seitens des Priesters steht, wird das
Bußsakrament zu einem lästigen Vorgang. Statt ein Zeitraum
des Befreiungsprozeßes zu sein, nimmt die Beichte Gestalt einer
”Gewissenwäsche” an, die im menschlichen Herzen einen
Widerwillen gegen das Sakrament hervorruft. Derartiger
Umgang mit dem Menschen ist für den Patron der Beichtväter
unzulässig; denn er hat zwar den Priestern empfohlen, die
Pönitenten nach Motiven und Umständen ihrer sündigen Taten
zu befragen, aber sie sollen es immer im Geiste einer ärztlichen
Behandlung tun, die dem Menschen keine neuen seelischen
Verletzungen zufügt.
3.3. Die therapeutische Einstellung des Seelsorgers im
Beichtgespräch
Der Beichtvater hat die Aufgabe, den sakramentalen Vollzug
so zu gestalten, daß er sich nicht mehr auf einen formellen
Bericht über den Gewissenszustand des Pönitenten vor Gott und
dem Priester begrenzt, sondern zu einer lebendigen Begegnung
des Sünders mit seinem Bruder in Christus wird, in der Gott
selbst am Werk ist. Zugleich aber darf auch die Autorität des
Vaters nicht fehlen, der Leben weckt und fördert und der in
seinem göttlichen Gnadengericht die Schuldbeladenen
freispricht 77 .
Dieses Konzept entspricht im vollen Maße dem Gedanken
des Heiligen Alphons, der den Ämtern des Vaters und Arztes im
77
Ein vom Paternalismus geprägtes Vater-Kind-Spiel hat im Rahmen
des Bußsakramentes keinen Platz. Das bedeutet aber nicht, daß die
Vaterfigur aus dem Bereich der Beichtpraxis ganz verschwinden soll. Eine
Bruderschaft ohne Vater ist undenkbar. Die Beichtenden verlangen gewiß
die Solidarität des priesterlichen Bruders und Freundes und die Hilfe des
erfahrenen Arztes. Sie brauchen aber ebenso unverkennbar die Liebe des
Vaters, der seinen geliebten Töchtern und Söhnen das Heil im Übermaß
schenkt; A.Gläßer, Versöhnung in der Kirche - Versöhnung durch die Kirche,
in: K.Baumgartner, Erfahrungen mit dem Buflsakrament, 86.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 29
Beichtstuhl vor dem des Richters einen deutlichen Vorzug gab.
Im Unterschied zu den gegenwärtigen Visionen schenkte der
Verfasser von Praxis confessarii dem brüderlichen
(geschwisterlichen) Charakter der Beichte explicite kein
Interesse. Der Grund dafür ist in der damaligen Theologie zu
finden, die das Priesteramt vom Volke Gottes separat
betrachtete und jeden Geistlichen für ein ”höheres Wesen”
hielt 78 . Diesem theologischen Trend unterlag auch der Gründer
der Redemptoristen, obwohl er in seinem ganzen Leben die
Nähe zum einfachen Volk immer suchte und sowohl in seiner
Lehre (auch in Praxis confessarii) als auch in seiner Pastoral die
Würde jedes einzelnen Menschen hochzuschätzen wußte.
Weil die Bedeutung der zwischenmenschlichen Beziehung
für die heutige pastorale Praxis stark betont wird, steht der
Beichtvater unter dem Anspruch, das Klima des
Beichtgespräches so zu formen, daß der Mensch bereits im
sakramentalen Geschehen als solchem die befreiende und
heilende Gottes Nähe erfährt und sich einen neuen Weg mit Gott
in die Zukunft bahnt. Diesbezüglich erweist sich die sogennante
”personenzentrierte Gesprächstherapie” hilfreich, die vom
amerikanischen Psychologen, Carl R. Rogers stammt 79 und sehr
78
Die Lehre von der gleichen Würde aller Getauften wurde erst durch
das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil formuliert. Die vertikal einordnende
Abstufung in Kleriker und Laien wurde durch die Sicht der Kirche als
Gemeinschaft des pilgernden Gottesvolkes überholt und durch
gleichgestufte Partnerschaft ersetzt; T.Neufeld, Zur kommunikatven
Kompetenz des Beicht-Seelsorgers, in: K.Baumgartner, Erfahrungen mit
dem Bußsakrament, 348.
79
Die Menschen sind füreinander die bedeutendste Umweltbedingung.
Ob diese Umweltbedingung hilfreich und gesundmachend oder
beeinträchtigend und krankmachend ist, hängt davon ab, wie die Menschen
miteinander umgehen und sprechen. Eine Begegnung als solche oder ein
Gespräch als solches kann bereits durch das Beziehungsklima eine Therapie
sein. Das von C.R.Rogers entworfene Konzept der Gesprächstherapie basiert
auf drei grundlegendsten Prinzipien, die eine zwischenmenschliche
Beziehung zu einem sich heilend auf den Menschen auswirkenden Milieu
machen: bedingungslose Annahme des Gesprächspartners, Einfühlungsvermögen
und Echtheit; L.Wachinger, Wie eine Psychotherapie/Beratung
Seelsorge geschieht, in: I.Baumgartner, Handbuch der Pastoralpsychologie,
Regensburg 1990, 114.

30 RYSZARD HAJDUK
schnell von einer rein psychotherapeutisch angewendeten
Methode zu einem in der Seelsorge tief verankerten
Beziehungsmodell adaptiert wurde 80 . So wie in jedem
seelsorglichen Gespräch sind die Regeln des
personenzentrierten Ansatzes von Rogers auch im Rahmen des
sakramentalen Beichtvollzugs zu beachten. Die positive
Wertschätzung jedes Beichtenden, das einfühlsame Verständnis
für seine Lage und die damit zusammenhängenden Punkte von
Schuld und Versagen und die personale Ehrlichkeit des
Beichtseelsorgers tragen zur Entstehung eines
menschenfreundlichen Klimas bei und sind Voraussetzungen
für den angestrebten Prozeß der Umkehr zur Versöhnung 81 .
Liebevolle Zuwendung zum Beichtenden und offenes
Ansprechen sind Ausgang jedes guten Beichtgesprächs. Indem
der Beichtvater seinen Pönitenten zur Schulderkenntnis führen
will, dann kann das letztlich nicht durch Verurteilung,
Bedrohung und Bestrafung geschehen, sondern dadurch, daß er
den anderen bedingungslose Akzeptanz und Liebe trotz -
vielleicht gerade wegen seiner Schuld spüren läßt 82 . Die
zuvorkommende positive Zuwendung des Beichtvaters stiftet
eine Beziehung, in der die Selbstachtung, das Selbstvertrauen
und die Selbstakzeptanz des Gesprächspartners gefördert
werden. In diesem Klima kann der Beichtende ohne Angst seine
Schuld aussprechen, sich zu ihr bekennen und gleichzeitig zu
einem Verständnis seines Selbst in einem Ausmaß gelangen, das
ihn ermutigt, aufgrund dieser neuen Orientierung positive
80
Die Entdeckung, was für eine weittragende Bedeutung die Beziehung
in der Seelsorge hat, richtete die Aufmerksamkeit der Pastoralpsychologen
und Theologen auf die gesprächstherapeutischen Regeln, die ihre
Verwendung eigentlich in allen Bereichen des kirchlichen Handelns finden
können. Überall, wo ein Seelsorger in einer Beziehung zu einem anderen
Menschen steht, soll eine wärme- und verständnisvolle Atmosphäre
entstehen, die dem Menschen hilft, seine Würde zu erkennen und sein
menschliches Potential zu entwickeln. Die Prinzipien des therapeutischen
Gesprächs können sich beispielsweise in den Einzelgesprächen, in der
Beratung, in der geistlichen Führung, im Religionsunterricht, in der Predigt
oder in der Gruppenarbeit als nützlich erweisen.
81
T.Neufeld, 359.
82
J.Tasch, 114; T.Neufeld, 356.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 31
Schritte zu unternehmen 83 . Wer sich in der Schuld geliebt und
getragen weiß, entdeckt in sich Möglichkeiten, die Gott ihm ins
Herz gelegt hat und einen freien Lebensraum zu einem neuen
selbstverantworteten Verhalten.
Im heutigen Postulat der bedingungslosen positiven
Wertschätzung klingt das Verlangen des Heiligen Alphons
heraus, daß jeder Pönitent mit zuvorkommender Liebe vom
Beichtvater aufgenommen werden soll. Obwohl sich dieser
Hinweis sicherlich in erster Linie aus der theologischen
Reflexion ergibt, ist es aber nicht zu übersehen, daß die
seelsorgliche Praxis für den Patron der Beichtväter und
Moralisten immer einen bedeutsamen Lernort darstellte 84 . Vor
allem im Beichtstuhl und in seelsorglichen Gesprächen lernte er
vom einfachen Volk die ”psychologische” und therapeutische
Bedeutung von Güte und Erbarmen, durch die seine moral- und
pastoraltheologische Theorie gekennzeichnet ist 85 , was sich
auch in seinem Buch Praxis confessarii widerspiegelt.
Wenn eine zwischenmenschliche Begegnung ihre heilende
Kraft in die Tat umsetzen soll, muß sie zu einem Vorgang des
Mitlebens und Mitfühlens, der Teilhabe am fremden Leben
werden 86 . In einem Beichtgespräch steht der Beichtvater vor
dem Auftrag, sich um ein einfühlsames Verstehen zu bemühen,
den Ansatz dort zu suchen, wo der Beichtende sich befindet, die
Angst abzubauen und den Beichtenden als gleichrangigen
83
C.R.Rogers, Die nicht-direktive Beratung, München 1972, 28.
84
Bevor Alphons de Liguori einen Satz formulierte, hatte er die in ihm
innewohnende Wahrheit praktiziert. Das, was er aus der Begegnung mit den
Menschen im Beichtstuhl gelernt hatte, führte er in seine Theologie ein, die
ganz und gar von seiner Erfahrung lebte; G.Velocci, 41; T.Kennedy, Did
St.Alphonsus Practise Practical Theology? ”Per venire dunque alla pratica”:
Practice or Pragmatism?, ”Spicilegium Historicum” 45 (1997), 157.
85
O.Weiß, 416.
86
C.R.Rogers, A Theory of Therapy as Developed in the Client-Centered
Framework, in: B.N.Ard, Counseling and Psychotherapy. Classics on
Theories and Issues, Palo Alto 1966, 64; C.R.Rogers, The Interpersonal
Relationship: The Core of Guidance, in: C.R.Rogers, B.Stevens, Person to
Person. The Problem of Being Human, London 1994, 93; H.Stenger, Dienen
ist nicht nur dienen. Ein Beitrag zur Redlichkeit pastoralen Handelns,
”Lebendige Seelsorge” 2/3 (1983), 87.

32 RYSZARD HAJDUK
Partner anzuerkennen. Dazu führt das aktive Zuhören, das darin
besteht, daß der Priester versucht, sich in die Erlebniswelt seines
Gesprächspartners innerlich zu versetzen und mehr zu hören als
nur Worte und Sätze 87 . Indem der Beichtende sich überzeugt,
daß seine Probleme, Nöte und Fragen dem Beichtvater nicht
gleichgültig sind, vergrößert sich erheblich seine Sicherheit und
sein Selbstwertgefühl 88 .
Das empathische Verstehen eröffnet dem Beichtseelsorger
den Zugang zur inneren Welt des Menschen, um mit ihm
zusammen an der Lösung seiner Probleme zu arbeiten 89 .
Dadurch vollzieht der Beichtvater sein Amt des Bruders, der
dem Beichtenden zur Seite geht, ihm helfen will, seine Situation
zu begreifen und ihn mit seiner Anwesenheit und Nähe auf der
Suche nach einem neuen Lebensweg begleitet. Als sein alter ego,
der ihm nicht in irgendwelcher Position voraus ist, bemüht sich
der Priester im Herzen seines Pönitenten die Sehnsucht zu
wecken, die ihn zum Fundament der menschlichen Existenz
und damit auch zur Heilung führen wird 90 .
In einem humanen, einfühlsamen Dialog wird die
menschliche Schuld mitsamt ihren Wurzeln und ihrem Kontext
erst richtig wahrgenommen und beim Namen genannt. Eine
gemeinsam mit dem Pönitenten erarbeitete Diagnose des
angeklagten Tuns regt an, geeignete Gegenmaßnahmen in den
Blick zu nehmen und vielleicht schon einen ersten, möglichst
genau umschriebenen Schritt anzugehen. Nicht Verharmlosung,
Bagatellisierung oder Zudecken mit dem Mantel der Liebe hilft,
sondern das ehrliche Erkennen und Benennen der Schuld
machen den Weg zur seelischen Gesundung frei. Dann erweisen
87
P.F.Schmid, Seelsorge als Begegnung. Grundlage für eine
annehmende Pastoral, ”Lebendige Seelsorge” 2/3 (1983), 96; P.Schmidt,
Erkenntnisse der Gesprächspsychologie in ihrer Bedeutung für das
Seelsorgegespräch, w: K.Baumgartner, Das Seelsorgegespräch in der
Gemeinde, 28.
88
T.Neufeld, 359-360.
89
R.Tausch, A.-M.Tausch, Gesprächspsychotherapie. Einfühlsame
hilfreiche Gruppen- und Einzelgespräche in Psychotherapie und
alltäglichem Leben, Göttingen 1979, 42.
90
M.Kroeger, Themenzentrierte Seelsorge, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz
1973, 36; T.Neufeld, 361.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 33
sich auch Ermahnungen, Anregungen und Hinweise des
Beichtvaters vom Nutzen, mittels deren unverzichtbare Impulse
vermittelt werden, die für die kommende Lebensausrichtung
entscheidend sind. Solche Mahnungen und Anregungen muß
der Beichtvater so formulieren, daß sie nicht als repressive
Anklage verstanden, sondern als helfende, vorwärtsbringende
Orientierungshilfe angesehen und eingesehen werden 91 .
Hören und verstehen waren auch für den Heiligen Alphons
wichtige Fähigkeiten des Beichtvaters, der wie ein guter Arzt
sowohl den inneren Zustand als auch die Lebenslage seines
Pönitenten untersucht. Spricht der Patron der Moralisten
ausdrücklich von keiner Empathie, sind deren Elemente in
seiner Lehre klar bemerkbar: das Wissen von der inneren
Wirklichkeit der Gefühle, Hörbereitschaft und
Einfühlungsvermögen. Auch ein Trend zu einem
verständnisvollen Umgang mit den Menschen fällt ins Auge,
wenn Alphons seine Brüder im priesterlichen Amt ermahnt, die
Buße als Heilmittel zu betrachten und bei deren Auflegung auf
die menschlichen Möglichkeiten Rücksicht zu nehmen. Die
humanistische Psychologie hilft also den heutigen Theologen
und Seelsorgern das zu vertiefen, was sich bereits in der
pastoraltheologischen Reflexion des Heiligen zumindest
ansatzhaft befand.
Die gegenwärtige Pastoralpsychologie schenkt auch eine
große Aufmerksamkeit dem Prinzip der Authentizität, das vom
Seelsorger verlangt, zu seiner eigenen Überzeugung immer fest
zu stehen und erkennen zu lassen, daß diese Überzeugung für
ihn etwas Lebendiges ist, das sein Leben begleitet und ihm eine
Ausrichtung gibt 92 . In der zwischenmenschlichen Beziehung
führt die Selbstöffnung einer Person zur Selbstöffnung des
Gesprächspartners. Die Echtheit des Seelsorgers weckt beim mit
ihm kommunizierenden Menschen die Bereitschaft und
Fähigkeit, seine bedeutsamen Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen
mitzuteilen und andere daran teilhaben zu lassen 93 .
91
Ibid., 361.
92
P.F.Schmid, 97.
93
R.Tausch, A.-M.Tausch, 92-93.

34 RYSZARD HAJDUK
Das authentische Verhalten des Beichtvaters ist ein
wichtiger Faktor im Vollzug des Beichtgesprächs. Solang sich
der Beichtseelsorger hinter seiner Amtsrolle versteckt, schafft er
Distanz zu seinem Pönitenten und provoziert bei ihm
Aggression; denn gegenüber der im kalten Verhalten des
Priesters personifizierten, hohen Autorität der Kirche fühlt sich
der Beichtende schwach, demütigt und minderwertig. Dazu
kommt noch ein innerlicher Zwang, ein formelles, den
offiziellen kirchlichen Vertreter zufriedenstellendes
Schuldbekenntnis ablegen zu müssen. Wenn er noch als Antwort
auf sein Sündenbekenntnis eine allgemein geltende,
priesteramtliche Belehrung erhält, wird seine Enttäuschung
vollkommen 94 .
Der Mensch ist erst imstande, sich offen und ehrlich
auszusprechen, wenn ihm ein wahres menschliches Gesicht
begegnet, das sich hinter keiner Fassade verbirgt. In einem
Klima der Offenheit, das dank dem authentischen Verhalten des
Beichtseelsorgers entsteht, kann der Mensch sein Herz vor dem
anderen angstfrei erschließen und sein wahres Antlitz zeigen.
Indem er sich selbst seinem Gesprächspartner anvertraut, findet
er Befreiung. Die Beziehung hilft ihm aus der Einsamkeit und
Isolation herauszukommen, weil er in der Person des
Seelsorgers jenem begegnet ist, der ihn versteht und den er an
seinen Erfahrungen teilhaben lassen kann. Der Mensch, der im
Klima der Authentizität mehr sein Selbst wird, verstärkt in sich
die Verantwortung für sein eigenes Schicksal und macht sich
seine schöpferischen Kräfte zunutze 95 .
In den Erwägungen des Heiligen Alphons kam das Prinzip
der Echtheit direkt nicht zur Sprache. Es wurde aber in Praxis
confessarii mit Nachdruck mehrmals hervorgehoben, daß der
Beichtvater mit seinem ganzen Wissen und allen seinen
Erfahrungen dem Pönitenten auf dem Weg zur Heilung und
Heiligung beistehen soll. Der Priester kann sein therapeutisches
94
J.Tasch, 116.
95
C.R.Rogers, A Way of Being, Boston 1976, 178; P.F.Schmid,
Personenzentrierte seelsorgliche Beratung und Begleitung im
Einzelgespräch, in: K.Baumgartner, W.Müller, 78.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 35
Amt nur dann wirksam ausüben, wenn sein Wesen und seine
Haltung durch den Geist Jesu durchdrungen und umgewandelt
wird. Authentisch helfen und zu Gott führen kann nur jener, der
sich selbst von Gott leiten läßt. Der Beichtvater hat nicht nur als
Mensch authentisch aufzutreten, sondern auch als alter Christus
mit der göttlichen, zuvorkommenden Liebe jedem Pönitenten zu
begegnen.
Obwohl sich die liguorianische Beichtpraxislehre in vielen
Punkten mit der gegenwärtigen Theorie des Beichtgesprächs
deckt, sind auch Unterschiede zwischen ihr und der heutigen
pastoralpsychologichen Überlegungen zu beobachten. Die
Pastoralpsychologie konzentriert sich mehr auf den psychischen
Hintergrund der Schuld und die theologischen Daten sind oft
für sie zweitrangig, obwohl eine Übereinstimmung mit der
theologischen Basis notwendig ist. Ihr Ziel ist das
therapeutisches Wirken der Seelsorger zu verstärken, damit der
Mensch durch das pastorale Handeln der Kirche geheilt wird.
Die Pastoralpsychologie hat vor allem die Heilung im Blick, die
das individuelle Wachstum fördert und dem Menschen
ermöglicht, friedlich auf Erden zu leben.
Alphons war in erster Linie ein Theologe, der ein lebendiges
Verhältnis zur menschlichen Wirklichkeit pflegte und dadurch
auch ein bestimmtes psychologisches Wissen erwarb. Als ein
wahrer Diener der überreichen Erlösung sprach er in Praxis
confessarii nicht nur von Heilung, sondern auch von Heiligung,
die das Ziel jedes menschlichen Lebens darstellt. Wenn aber der
Mensch zur Vollkommenheit gelangen soll, darf das nicht am
menschlichen Wachstum vorbei geschehen. Dies betrifft jedoch
nicht nur das irdische Schicksal der Menschen, sondern reicht
über die vergängliche Realität weit hinaus, wo jeder Lebensweg
seine endgültige Erfüllung findet.
Alphons setzt sich für eine geistliche Therapie ein, die auch
den Willen des Menschen anspricht. Darum appelliert er an die
Beichtväter um die Hochachtung für das menschliche Gewissen,
das die letzte menschliche Instanz der ethischen Verantwortung
vor Gott ist. Das Bußsakrament ist für ihn nicht nur ein Ort, wo
man dem Menschen hilft, seine Schuld zu verarbeiten und in der
Versöhnung mit Gott neu anzufangen. Es ist auch eine Schule,
in der das menschliche Gewissen reif wird und seine Fähigkeit
zur Unterscheidung zwischen dem Guten und Bösen

36 RYSZARD HAJDUK
entwickelt 96 . Der Mensch kann nur vom Innern her wachsen,
indem er sich der entsprechenden Heilmittel bedient, die ihm
die Wahrheit über sein Leben im Lichte Gottes immer neu
betrachten lassen.
Der Patron der Beichtväter, der in Praxis confessarii auf die
vom Rigorismus geprägte Beichtpraxis seiner Zeit reagierte, ist
ein Genie, dessen Weisungen in bezug auf den priesterlichen
Dienst im Beichtsakrament in ihrem Kern immer noch aktuell
bleiben. Seine theologischen Kenntnisse und psychologischen
Intuitionen können auch heute für jeden Beichtseelsorger
hilfreich sein, der im Geiste des Evangeliums und nach dem
Vorbild des Göttlichen Arztes das heilende Tun Gottes im
Bußsakrament fortsetzen will.
4. Konsequenzen für die Ausbildung der künftigen
Beichtseelsorger
Die alphonsianische Beichtpraxislehre stellt ein Ideal der
geistlichen Therapie dar, das auch die heutigen Beichtseelsorger
ansprechen und und ihnen wertvolle praktische Hinweise
anbieten kann. Aus den im Lichte der gegenwärtigen
pastoraltheologischen und psychologischen Überlegungen
reflektierten Weisungen des Heiligen Alphons lassen sich
Konsequenzen herausziehen, die die praktisch-theologische
Ausbildung der Priesterkandidaten betreffen. Die wichtigsten
von denen präsentieren sich folgendermaßen:
4.1. Jesus lieben und wie Jesus lieben
Alphons forderte von den Beichtvätern, daß sie sich die
zuvorkommende Liebe und das heilende Tun Jesu zu ihrem
Handlungsmuster machen. Auch heute soll der Pönitent durch
den priesterlichen Dienst im Bußsakrament Christus als dem
Prinz des Friedens und dem göttlichen Heiler begegnen 97 . Das
96
S.Majorano, La teologia morale e il ministero sacerdotale nella
visione alfonsiana, 456.
97
B.Häring, Shalom: Peace, 46; K.Baumgartner, Gesprächs-Seelsorge

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 37
kann nur geschehen, wenn der Beichtvater im Geiste Jesu
handelt und Heil und Leben von seinem Verhalten ausgeht.
Diese Haltung ist erlernbar, indem man einen ständigen Kontakt
mit dem Wort Gottes pflegt 98 .
Für die priesterliche Ausbildung bedeutet das eine
grundsätzliche Orientierung an Jesus Christus und seinem
Evangelium. Es geht dabei nicht nur um eine stille Betrachtung
des in der Einsamkeit gelesenen Wortes, sondern auch um einen
lebendigen, auf die alltägliche Realität bezogenen,
gemeinschaftlichen Austausch, der verhilft das Evangelium als
das authentische Lebensmuster zu begreiffen und allen
zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen eine erlösende Qualität zu
verleihen.
Das liebevolle Verhältnis zu Gott kann erfahren und vertieft
werden, indem sich der Priesterkandidat selbst um Buße und
Bußsakrament im eigenen Leben bemüht. Was er selbst in der
Begegnung mit dem liebenden Vater im Beichtgespräch erhält,
wird er auch dann imstande sein, seinen künftigen Pönitenten
weiter zu schenken. Daraus ergibt sich eine wichtige Aufgabe
für die in den Priesterseminaren tätigen Beichtväter und
geistlichen Führer, den sakramentalen Vollzug der Beichte so zu
gestalten, daß die durch sie verkörperte totale Hingabe Jesu um
des menschlichen Heils willen für die Beichtenden spürbar
wird.
4.2. Mit den Augen Gottes auf den Menschen schauen
Das große Anliegen des Patrons der Beichtväter war, seine
Amtsbrüder zu überzeugen, daß jedem einzelnen Menschen die
hohe Aufmerksamkeit gilt, deshalb hat man mit jedem so
umzugehen, daß seine menschliche Würde gefördert wird. In
der gegenwärtigen Theologie lassen sich dieselben Töne hören,
indem sie im Geiste des letzten Konzils die unantastbare Würde
im Dienst der Versöhnung, in: W.Beinert, Kirche zwischen Konflikt und
Konsens. Versöhnung als Lebensvollzug der Glaubensgemeinschaft,
Regensburg 1989, 154.
98
M.Merkel, Aspekte der interpersonalen Dynamik der Beichte, in:
K.Baumgartner, Erfahrungen mit dem Bußsakrament, 401.

38 RYSZARD HAJDUK
jedes einzelnen unterstreicht und die Achtung der Person zum
obersten Maßstab des kirchlichen Handelns macht 99 . Es wird
auch zugleich eine gewisse Solidarität mit allen Menschen
verkündet, die sich in jedem Bereich der pastoralen Praxis
bewähren muß.
Für die Priesterkandidaten scheint eine biblische
Anthropologie sehr brauchbar zu sein, die lehrt, nach dem
Beispiel Jesu den Menschen in den Mittelpunkt zu stellen und
auf ihn nicht mehr wie auf einen Angeklagten, sondern auf einen
Kranken zu schauen 100 . Einer tieferen Erkenntnis der
menschlichen Not dient auch das Studium der Psychologie und
Soziologie, die aus der humanwissenschaftlichen Sicht die
heutigen gesellschaftlichen und individuellen Krankheiten
beleuchten.
In der priesterlichen Ausbildung darf man auch den
ständigen Kontakt zum menschlichen Alltag nicht
unterschätzen. Für den Heiligen Alphons waren die pastorale
Praxis und das Zusammenleben mit den Ärmsten ein wichtiger
Lernort. Auch heute trägt eine erfahrungsreiche Verbindung mit
der konkreten Lebenswirklichkeit für die Seminarstudenten zu
einem unabdingbaren existentiellen Prozeß der Identifikation
mit den leidenden Menschen wesentlich bei 101 . Auf diesem Weg
kann der künftige Beichtseelsorger sein Einfühlungsvermögen
vertiefen und sich die Bedürfnisse des heutigen Menschen
besser bewußt machen. Infolgedessen vergrößert sich auch die
Chance, daß die einmal bei ihm beichtenden Menschen nicht als
Objekte behandelt werden, denen ein beliebiges und universelles
Heilmittel zu jeder Zeit und ohne Ausnahme verschrieben
werden kann. Indem er die ihm begegnenden Menschen kennt
und sich als einer von ihnen sieht, ist er imstande zu
unterscheiden zwischen dem, was den anderen tötet und dem,
was ihn gesund macht 102 .
99
E.Klinger, Armut. Eine Herausforderung Gottes. Der Glaube des
Konzils und die Befreiung des Menschen, Zürich 1990, 110.
100
J.Bommer, 244.
101
M.Merkel, 401-402.
102
Der Heilige Alphons legte darauf großen Wert, daß die richtigen
Heilmittel an die richtigen Personen verschrieben werden. Er war sich

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 39
4.3. Sich selbst erkennen und verstehen
Dem Verfasser von Praxis confessarii lag tief am Herzen, daß
die Beichtväter sich der inneren Empfindungen ihrer Pönitenten
bezüglich des Bußsakramentes bewußt sind und und eine
verständnisvolle Haltung ihnen gegenüber annehmen. Ähnlich
sprechen heute die Pastoraltheologen und Pastoralpsychologen,
die den Seelsorger auf die Notwendigkeit des Erkennens der
Vorgänge in seiner eigenen Seele hinweisen, weil man in dieser
Weise am besten eine Einsicht in die Seele eines anderen
Menschen bekommen kann 103 .
Bereits in der priesterlichen Ausbildung sollen sich die
Stundenten bemühen, ständig in Kontakt mit dem eigenen
Personenkern zu bleiben. Ein Eingetauchtsein in die Tiefe seiner
Persönlichkeit führt den Priesterkandidaten in die Welt der
bisher unbewußten Anteile seines Selbst (dem sogenannten
Schatten), mit denen er sich auseinandersetzen muß, um in der
Zukunft die Gefahr zu vermeiden, daß seine unbekannten und
unbewußten Gefühle und Aggressionen auf die Beichtenden
projiziert werden. Das geduldige Verweilen in den tiefsten
Bereichen seiner Psyche ermöglicht ihm auch, seine wahre
Motivation zum Priesterberuf zu erkennen 104 und sich mit allen
seinen Fähigkeiten und Schatten zu akzeptieren. Eine solche
Selbstwahrnehmung und Selbstannahme macht den Weg zur
bedingungslosen Akzeptanz der Anderen frei, die nach wie vor
zu den wichtigsten Eigenschaften des Beichtseelsorgers zählt.
dessen bewußt, daß sogar das beste Medikament eine tödliche Wirkung
haben kann, wenn der Zustand des Patienten bei seiner Dosierung nicht
entsprechend eingeschätzt und berücksichtigt wird. Deshalb durfte er sagen,
daß der Mensch und sein Heil vor jedem ethischen Prinzip immer Vorrang
haben. Gott hat nämlich das Gesetz für den Menschen geschaffen und nicht
den Menschen für das Gesetz; S.Majorano, Il popolo chiave pastorale di
s.Alfonso, 81-82.
103
M.Merkel, 401.
104
E.Feifel, Kommunikative Theologie, in: K.Baumgartner,
Erfahrungen mit dem Bußsakrament, 492-493.

40 RYSZARD HAJDUK
4.4. Zur therapeutischen Gesprächsführung befähigt werden
Der Gründer der Redemptoristen empfahl den Beichtvätern,
sich genug Zeit für jeden Beichtenden zu nehmen, damit ein
nützliches, heilendes Gespräch im Beichtstuhl geführt werden
konnte. Heute scheinen die Gesprächsfähigkeiten die Bedingung
sine qua non für jeden Seelsorger zu sein, der seine ganze
pastorale Tätigkeit unter der Gestalt von unterschiedlichen
zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen verwirklicht. Deshalb
müssen sich die künftigen Beichtväter die Fähigkeit zur
pastoralen Gesprächsführung bereits während des
Theologiestudiums aneignen 105 . Dazu reicht aber keine rein
theoretische Ausbildung aus, die sich mit einer
Handbücherlektüre begnügt. Welche konkrete Auswirkung bei
einem Gesprächspartner eine liebevoll-einladende Haltung und
Flexibilität im Auftreten seitens des Seelsorgers hat, läßt sich
nur feststellen, wenn ein Raum im ganzen Ausbildungssystem
vorgesehen wird, wo eine effektiv dürchgeführte Gruppenarbeit
oder/und eine ernstgenommene Krankenbegleitung Platz
haben 106 . Erst derartige ”Übungen” können für die Studenten die
echte Grundlage für die Reflexion über die Rolle und
Bedingungen der therapeutischen Beziehungen sein. Aufgrund
einer gekoppelten Wirkung von der pastoraltheologischen und
humanwissenschaftlichen Theorie und vernünftig geplanten
seelsorglichen Praxis entstehen Fertigkeiten, die jedem
Priesterkandidaten erlauben, sich angstfrei und vorbehaltlos
seinen seelsorglichen Aufgaben zu widmen. Angst taucht nur
dort auf, wo die Liebe fehlt; lieben kann man wieder nur jenen,
den man kennt. Die in direkten interpersonalen Kontakten
erworbenen Menschenkenntnisse befreien von der Angst sowohl
vor einem Zusammenstoß mit der Wirklichkeit als auch vor dem
möglichen Versagen in der seelsorglichen Arbeit und verstärken
die Bereitschaft, den Leidenden und Kranken mit der ganzen
Hingabe und Liebe zu dienen.
105
J.Bommer, 246.
106
M.Merkel, 400.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 41
4.5. Die Sakramente als Orte der Gotteserfahrung
betrachten
Der Heilige Alphons war bemüht, den Beichtvätern den Weg
zu zeigen, auf dem sie zu lebendigen Zeichen des Wohlwollens
Gottes werden und seine zuvorkommende Liebe für den
Pönitenten transparent und erfahrbar machen. Auch heute gilt
die von Alphons vertretene Regel, daß der Mensch sich erst dann
bekehren und dauerhaft an Gott orientieren kann, wenn ihm
eine Geborgenheit schenkende göttliche Nähe zuvor begegnet 107 .
Das Bußsakrament ist daher nicht nur als ein im Namen Gottes
vollzogener, zur Losspsrechung führender Ritus zu verstehen,
sondern als ein Raum, wo der glaubende Mensch die
versöhnende und heilende Hand Gottes ergreift und dem
versöhnenden und heilenden Christus begegnet 108 .
Für das Theologiestudium ergibt sich daraus eine
Notwendigkeit, die Sakramentenlehre im Sinne der
mystagogischen Pastoral zu vermitteln, die das Wirken Gottes in
der menschlichen Wirklichkeit zu enthüllen sucht 109 . Die
Sakramente erzählen von Gottes Absicht mit dem Menschen
und tragen dazu bei, daß diese Absicht im Leben von Menschen
vorankommt. In dieser Perspektive sind Heil und Gnade nicht in
erster Linie als Veränderungen am Menschen, d.h. als Heiligung,
Reinigung und Berufung, sondern als Zuwendung Gottes selbst
zu verstehen 110 .
Darum geht es auch im Sakrament der Versöhnung, dessen
Vollzug von jener Form und Atmosphäre begleitet werden soll,
die dem Beichtenden ermöglicht, die Frohe Botschaft zu
vernehmen und zugleich auch sie hautnah zu erleben. In dieser
Weise wird das Beichtgespräch zu einer erlösenden und
107
P.M.Zulehner, Moderne Religiosität und christlicher Glaube,
”Theologie der Gegenwart” 2 (1991), 94.
108
K.Baumgartner, Gesprächs-Seelsorge im Dienst der Versöhnung,
161.
109
O.Fuchs, Heilen und befreien. Der Dienst am Nächsten als Ernstfall
von Kirche und Pastoral, Düsseldorf 1990, 179; P.M.Zulehner,
Lebenserfahrungen auf dem Weg von der versorgten zur sorgenden
Gemeinde, ”Lebendige Seelsorge” 5 (1984), 302.
110
P.M.Zulehner, Priestermangel praktisch, 139.

42 RYSZARD HAJDUK
heilenden Begegnung mit Gott, der die beste Medizin für den
Menschen anwendet: einen anderen Menschen - seine Nähe,
seine Stimme, sein Wort und seinen Beistand. Die verstehende,
einfühlende Nähe des Beichtseelsorgers, sein Zuhören,
Annehmen und Raten, sein orientierendes Wort - ”all das kann
Wunder wirken: das Wunder, daß ein Mensch wieder Hoffnung
bekommt und Zuversicht, das Wunder, daß er plötzlich wieder
erkennt, wie er seinen Weg weitergehen kann, das Wunder, daß
er sich befreit und wie neugeboren fühlt” 111 . So kann die
göttliche Therapie am Menschen im Bußsakrament weiter
vollzogen werden, womit der Heilige Alphons einen
wesentlichen Beitrag für seine Mitbrüder Redemptoristen und
für die Beichtpraxis überhaupt geleistet hat.
Lubaszowa 33
33 - 172 Siedliska
Poland.
RYSZARD HAJDUK, C.Ss.R.
—————
Summary / Resumen
Saint Alphonsus Maria de Liguori was proclaimed Patron of
Moralists and Confessors in 1950 by Pope Pius 12 th . For Saint
Alphonsus the confessor’s function is to be understood as a therapeutic
ministry: this is clear from the Praxis Confessarii (1757). The role of
the confessor is, above all, that of a therapeutic and fatherly attitude
which seeks to heal rather than to judge. This approach fits in well with
the contemporary understanding of the sacrament as one of
reconciliation. It is to be understood as a sacrament of healing
salvation, and the confessor communicates this through his general
attitude and the welcoming atmosphere which he creates. For these
reasons, the alphonsian approach to celebrating the sacrament of
reconciliation can be of great practical value in contemporary ministry.
111
K.Baumgartner, Gesprächs-Seelsorge im Dienst der Versöhnung,
153.

THERAPEUTISCHE BEICHTPRAXIS 43
Pío XII proclamó a San Alfonso María de Liguori Patrono de
Moralistas y Confesores en 1950. San Alfonso concibe la tarea de
confesor como un ministerio terapéutico, lo que aparece claro en la
Praxis Confessarii (1757). El papel del confesor se manifiesta, ante
todo, en la disposición terapéutica y paterna que busca sanar más que
juzgar. Este acercamiento corresponde bien al actual modo de entender
el sacramento como una reconciliación. Se tiene que concebir como
sacramento de salvación curativa, y el confesor lo transmite por medio
de su actitud general y creando una atmósfera de acogida. Por estas
razones, el acercamiento alfonsiano a la celebración del sacramento de
la reconciliación, puede ser de gran valor práctico en el actual
ministerio.
—————
The author is a Professor of Theology at the Redemptorist
Theologate, Tuchów, Poland.
El autor es profesor de teología en el teologado redentorista de
Tuchów, Polonia.
—————

45
StMor 38 (2000) 45-66
DENNIS J. BILLY C.Ss.R.
MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE:
ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
SPIRITUALITY AND MORAL THEOLOGY
The recent interest in the relationship between spirituality
and moral theology has already given rise to a substantial body
of literature. 1 This material has gone far in defining the limits of
each discipline and in providing the general contours of their
ongoing historical interaction. A subtle assumption supported
by this literature, however, is the “singular” (as opposed to
“multivalent”) nature of that relationship. Rather than looking
at what different and, at times, even conflicting models of
interaction might contribute to their knowledge of the two
fields, authors have tended to focus on studying the relationship
within the boundaries of preset categories of one-to-one
1
The more significant works include: TULLO GOFFI, Etico spirituale:
Dissonanze nell’unitaria armonia (Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna,
1984); SERGIO BASTIANEL, La preghiera nella vita morale cristiana (Casale
Monferrato: Edizioni Piemme, 1986); MAURICE ZUNDEL, Morale et mystique
(Quebec: Editions Anne Sigier, 1986); MICHAEL K. DUFFY, Be Blessed in What
You Do: The Unity of Christian Ethics and Spirituality New York/Mahwah, NJ:
Paulist Press, 1988); NEIL BROWN, Spirit of the World: The Moral Basis of
Christian Spirituality (Manly, New South Wales, Australia: Catholic Institute
of Sydney, 1990); MARK O’KEEFE, Becoming Good, Becoming Holy: On the
Relationship of Christian Ethics and Spirituality (New York/Mahwah, NJ:
Paulist Press, 1995); DENNIS J. BILLY and DONNA L. ORSUTO, eds., Spirituality
and Morality: Integrating Prayer and Action (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist
Press, 1996); MARCIANO VIDAL, Moral y espiritualidad: De la separación a la
convergencia (Madrid: Editorial El Perpetuo Socorro, 1997); RICHARD GULA,
The Good Life: Where Morality and Spirituality Converge (New York/Mahwah,
NJ: Paulist Press, 1999); See also WILLIAM C. SPOHN, “Spirituality and Ethics:
Exploring the Connections,” Theological Studies 58(1997): 109-23, as well as
the issues dedicated to spirituality and ethics in The Way Supplement, 88
(Spring, 1997) and Listening 34 (Fall, 1999).

46 DENNIS J. BILLY
theological correspondence. They presume, in other words, that
the two disciplines relate to each other at any one time within
the general parameters of a single theological model. 2 This
“presumption of singularity” is a valid methodological choice,
but has positive and negative aspects to it. If it is a useful
hermeneutical tool for clarifying the contours of the relationship
of certain prefixed definitions of the disciplines (a positive), one
has to wonder if it accurately describes the malleable, constantly
shifting nature of a relationship in which the disciplines
themselves are experiencing ground-shifting changes (a
negative).
To counteract this last tendency, this essay uses the
“presumption of multivalence” as its official point of departure.
To do so, it will examine five possible models of interaction
between the two disciplines: (1) the hierarchical, (2) the
integrative, (3) the collaborative, (4) the contextual, and (5) the
absorption(al). It will proceed model by model, offering a
summary of the relationship each envisions and a list of its
various strengths and weaknesses. It will then present some
observations on the complex matrix of relationships involved in
the comparative study of spirituality and moral theology and
draw appropriate conclusions about the relevance of its
methodological approach for future research in the field.
The Hierarchical Model
Summary. The best place to begin is with the classical
division of the theological disciplines and subdisciplines of the
2
For the use of models in theology, see ROBERT M. SCARLEMANN,
“Theological Models and Their Construction,” Journal of Religion 53(1973):
65-82. For the use of models in spirituality, see STEFANO DE FIORES and TULLO
GOFFI, eds. Nuovo dizionario di spiritualità (Rome: Edizioni Paoline, 1979),
s.v. “Modelli spirituali,” by S. Spinsanti. See also L. BORRIELLO, E. CARUANA,
M.R. DEL GENIO, N. SUFFI, eds. Dizionario di mistica (Vatican City: Libreria
Editrice Vaticana, 1998), s.v. “Modelli spirituali,” by L. Crippa. For the
strengths and weaknesses of models in theological methodology, see, AVERY
DULLES, The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System (New York: Crossroad,
1995), 46-52.

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 47
post-Tridentine era. According to this rendering of the
relationship, moral theology is concerned with the analysis and
application of the divine precepts, while spiritual theology
focuses on the life of perfection. Spiritual theology, in turn, is
further divided into ascetical theology, which studies the process
of detachment people must go through in order to deepen their
relationship with God, and mystical theology, which examines
the process leading them to an ever-deepening union with God.
All of these disciplines look to dogmatic theology to provide
them with the foundational truths of the Catholic faith. Their
specific concerns, however, have to do with the implications of
these truths in the life of the believer, who journeys to God along
the purgative, illuminative, and unitive ways. As such, they are
eminently practical in scope and are concerned with the person’s
sanctification. What is more, they relate to each other in a
clearly worked-out hierarchical fashion. Ascetical theology
presupposes moral theology; mystical theology, in turn,
presupposes ascetical. The image they convey is that of a threetiered
pyramid. Moral theology is at the base and outlines the
details of a believer’s responsibility to God and neighbor in light
of the commandments. Ascetical theology occupies the middle
position and leads the believer through a process of purgation to
the point where he or she comes to a deeper awareness of the
illuminating presence of God’s Spirit. Mystical theology rests at
the summit and brings the believer from the point of
illumination to varying degrees of union with God. When seen
in this light, moral, ascetical, and mystical theology, while
independent disciplines in their own right with their own proper
principles and objects of study, are also intimately related.
Mystical theology cannot exist without ascetical theology, nor
can ascetical exist without moral. None of them can exist,
moreover, without the insights into the foundational truths of
the faith given them by dogmatic theology.
Strengths. This model has many obvious strengths. It draws
clear distinctions among the various disciplines yet allows them
to interact within the general heuristic framework of the
purgative, illuminitive, and unitive journey. When properly
understood, the hierarchical structure of that journey is
fundamentally participatory in nature and allows for a two-way
exchange at each disciplinary interface. The moral life, in other

48 DENNIS J. BILLY
words, is the condition for the possibility for the ascetical life
and the ascetical life is the condition for the possibility of the
mystical. The earlier stages are not left behind, but subsumed
into the later. The later, in turn, are already anticipated in the
earlier and are the immediate goals toward which they tend.
When seen in this light, the hierarchical model provides the
threefold advantage of: (1) mapping out the entire scope of a
person’s spiritual journey, (2) in three distinct theological
disciplines, (3) which allow for a considerable amount of
interplay in the actual lived experience of the believer. Its
predilection for organization and clarity, moreover, easily allows
its content to be codified into teaching manuals that could offer
useful pedagogical instruments for the classroom.
Weaknesses. This model, however, also has a number of
distinct weaknesses. As the notion of hierarchy lost its
dominance in the Western philosophical tradition as a
fundamental organizing concept of the structure of reality, the
hierarchical model gradually fell out of favor. This loss of
influence was due, at least in part, to the growing perception
that the distinctions between the various disciplines had become
overly rigid and resistant to change. Specialists had lost sight of
the connections their field shared with the whole of theology
and a process of fragmentation gradually set in. As a result, the
hierarchical organization of the disciplines lost its participatory
emphasis and the disciplines themselves gradually drifted apart.
Once this happened, it was easy for the organizing hierarchical
framework of the disciplines to be interpreted in an exclusive
(almost elitist) fashion, assigning the way of the commandments
to the laity in their parishes and the way of perfection to priests
and religious in their rectories, monasteries, and convents. In
addition to these historical difficulties, the model is also
criticized for focusing almost exclusively on the individual quest
for holiness and having little to contribute (or, at best, merely
presuming) the more current emphasis on the communal. What
is more, the manualist presentation favored by the hierarchical
model can (and did) easily cause its adherents to lose touch with
the actual sources of the Catholic moral and spiritual tradition
(i.e., the texts themselves). If that is not enough, the traditional
concept of “spiritual theology” propounded by the model does
not correlate completely and, in some instances, outright

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 49
contradicts the relatively recent (and still developing) notion of
“spirituality” as it is being discussed in academic circles. 3
The Integrative Model
Summary. Another model for the interaction of spirituality
and moral theology predates the hierarchical and has deep roots
in the Christian tradition. According to this approach, the
spiritual and moral teachings of the Church are thoroughly
intertwined. This integrative model existed prior to the
development of a theological nomenclature that assigned the
study of the deposit of the faith to distinct scientific disciplines.
In the tradition it found two forms of expression: (1) monastic
theology, which itself is deeply tied to and in close continuity
with patristic thought, and (2) high scholastic theology,
especially as it appears in the theological synthesis of Thomas
Aquinas.
Monastic theology was practical in its orientation and
emphasized the epistemological role of love as a way of leading
a person to a deep, intimate union with God. It was sapiential in
its scope, closely tied to the Scriptures, and symbolic in the way
it expressed its insights and convictions. It based itself in
Augustine’s Neoplatonic synthesis of Christian thought and read
both the Scriptures and the Book of Creation in allegorical
terms. Such interpretation was done primarily usually fourfold
division of the senses of Scripture presented in John Cassian’s
Conferences (14.8): (1) the literal, which conveyed the historical
truth of the text, (2) the allegorical, which communicated
something about Christ and his Church, (3) the tropological,
which taught the moral meaning of the text, and (4) the
anagogical, which brought the meaning of the text regarding the
last things. In this way, all of theology (e.g., history, dogma,
morality, and eschatology) was united in the act of lectio divina
and had practical significance for the believer. The Scriptures
3
For the continuities and discontinuities between “spiritual theology”
and the contemporary discipline of “spirituality,” see SANDRA SCHNEIDERS,
“Spirituality in the Academy,” Theological Studies 50(1989): 687-90.

50 DENNIS J. BILLY
were the focal point of the act of “faith seeking understanding”
and provided the believer with the opportunity to delve beneath
the literal crust of the text and nourish him or herself on the rich
spiritual senses beneath it. In this way, not only morality but the
whole of theology was integrated into the spiritual life of the
believer. 4
High scholastic theology, by way of contrast, tended to be
more speculative in orientation, and to emphasize the power of
human reason to clarify the content of divine revelation. It
valued Augustine’s synthesis, but leaned even more heavily on
the recently retrieved Aristotelian corpus made available to it
through Jewish and Arab translators. It used dialectics and
syllogistic reasoning as hermeneutical tools for arriving at the
truth. It also stayed with the literal meaning of the text in its
exposition of the Scriptures and was not afraid to depart from
the text in order to dispute whatever tensions it was able to
uncover in the tradition. If its emphasis on the objective content
of revelation placed theology one step away from the actual
experience of the believer and if it degenerated in later years to
elaborate (some would say “needless”) speculations with
seemingly nothing to do with the faith, the great masters of its
Golden Age (especially Bonaventure and Aquinas) were able to
integrate doctrine, morality, and spiritual teaching in the one
subalternated science of theology. The close structural
connection in Aquinas’ treatment of the acquired and infused
virtues and his discussion of the gifts of the Spirit and the New
Law is a prime example of the type of integration scholastic
thought was capable of. In his thinking, the life of the virtues is
closely integrated with the life of grace and finds its most
4
The classical presentation of monastic theology appears in JEAN
LECLERCQ, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic
Culture, trans. Catharine Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press,
1982), 191-235, 276; For the importance of allegory for the medieval
interpretation of texts, see STEPHEN L. WAILES, Medieval Allegories of Jesus’
Parables (Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London: University of California Press,
1987), 9-21. See also HENEI DE LUBAC, Exégèse médiévale: les quatre sense de
l’écriture, vol. 2 (Aubier: Editions Montaigne, 1959), 643-56.

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 51
concrete expression in the presence of the gifts of the Spirit in
the life of the believer. 5
Strengths. The strengths of the integrative model lie in the
continuity it is able to sustain between the moral and spiritual
spheres of life, while at the same time allowing for appropriate
distinctions. In this model, spirituality is not subsumed into
moral theology; nor is moral theology subsumed into
spirituality. The distinctions between the two disciplines, simply
do not exist. That is not to say, however, that the two spheres
cannot be logically distinguished from one another (as if the
tropological sense could be absorbed by the other senses, or
Aquinas’ understanding of the gifts of the Spirit collapsed into
the virtues). On the contrary, the model assists the believer in
seeing the moral implications of all Christian spiritual teaching,
as well as the spiritual implications of the moral. Because it
existed prior to the hierarchical rendering of theology into
various disciplines and subdisciplines, the model also supplies a
badly needed corrective to those who have become convinced
that theology cannot be rethought to embrace fundamentally
different organizing categories of thought. Finally, the presence
of the model in two very different understandings of philosophy
(i.e., Christian Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism) and theology
(i.e., of the monastic and high scholastic types) encourages the
development of similar complementary attempts at integrating
these two intimately related spheres of human existence.
Weaknesses. The weaknesses of the model stem from the
lack of focus it can have toward specific problems faced by the
believer in the spiritual-moral life. By concentrating on the
integrative role of theology in general, it can easily lose sight of
5
For an excellent comparison of monastic and scholastic theology, see
B. P. GAYBBA, Aspects of the Medieval History of Theology: 12th to 14th
Centuries (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1988), 7-65. For the historical
relationship between monastic and scholastic theology, see JEAN LECLERCQ,
“Monastic and Scholastic Theology in the Reformers of the Fourteenth to
Sixteenth Centuries,” in From Cloister to Classroom: Monastic and Scholastic
Approaches to Truth, Cistercian Studies Series, no. 90, ed. Rozanne Elder
(Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1986), 178-201, esp. 194. For the
limitations of the scholastic method, see DULLES, The Craft of Theology, 41-
46.

52 DENNIS J. BILLY
the genuine insights of specialized research conducted to resolve
particular difficulties. One of the reasons why the hierarchical
model developed as it did in later centuries was precisely to
counteract the lack of precision that the integrative model
brought to bear on specific issues. From this perspective, the
principles of casuistry in moral theology and the various
distinctions concerning the nature and scope of prayer in
spiritual theology are understandable (even expected)
outgrowths of the integrative approach. If these specialized
disciplines eventually lost sight of the underlying unity
sustained by the integrative model, they nevertheless succeeded
in spelling out many of its hidden implications and applying
them to the changing cultural horizons of Western Christianity.
When seen in this light, the hierarchical model presupposes the
integrative – and vice versa. The strengths of each complement
the weaknesses of each and provide a hermeneutical matrix
within which the present fragmented state of the theological
sciences can be understood and responded to.
The Collaborative Model
Summary. Another important model for the interaction
between spirituality and moral theology emerged after the
breakdown of the hierarchical rendering of the theological
disciplines. It considers the two disciplines as autonomous in
their own right (i.e., each with its own methodological concerns
and proper field of scientific inquiry), but capable of
participating in and contributing to the goals of the other.
According to this model, the two disciplines relate to each other
as equal partners in the act of “faith seeking understanding.”
Each respects the boundaries of the other and is deeply
conscious of its own limitations. Each discipline realizes that
many of the questions it must face will also be relevant to the
other, even if from a different perspective. Each discipline
acknowledges that a deeper knowledge of the way the other
discipline deals with these questions can be helpful to its own
concerns. This collaborative model combines the strengths of
both the hierarchical and integrative models without giving vent
to their weaknesses. It recognizes the importance of specialized

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 53
disciplines within theology, but emphasizes the importance of
their being in touch with the insights of other fields, especially
those with which it has been traditionally linked (e.g., moral and
spiritual theology). It seeks to sustain a dialectical interaction
between the disciplines without claiming a theological
ascendancy of one over the other and without simply merging
them. In doing so, it hopes to avoid the fragmentation of the
theological disciplines (the historical fate of the hierarchical
model) and the lack of practical application (the inherent danger
of the integrative model). The relationship of circularity
proposed by the model emphasizes the concept of relationality
itself (with God, with others, with the world, with oneself) as the
point of contact between the two disciplines. It recognizes that
Christian morality verifies the authenticity of Christian
spirituality and that Christian spirituality motivates believers to
live out the moral implications of their Christian calling. This
circular relationship helps moral theology to keep its sights
beyond the tedious requirements of quandary ethics and
reminds spirituality that it must offer practical suggestions for
Christian living. What is more, the experiential, instructional,
and analytical dimensions of the disciplines make the
possibilities of collaborative interaction even more numerous –
and necessary. 6
Strengths. The model has a number of obvious strengths. For
one thing, it allows the two disciplines to maintain their own
identities, while permitting them to interact on areas of
common concern. This constructive conversation of equal
partners engaged in a common pursuit has the potential of
opening up new areas of research for each discipline and of
providing even deeper insights into ground already covered. By
allowing “disciplinary autonomy” and “interdisciplinary
dialogue” to govern the contours of the relationship, spirituality
6
These dimensions are treated at length in WALTER PRINCIPE, “Towards
Defining Spirituality,” Studies in Religion/Sciences religieuses 12 (1983): 135-
37. See also MICHAEL DOWNEY, ed., The New Dictionary of Catholic
Spirituality (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1993), s.v. “Spirituality,
Christian,” by Walter H. Principe.

54 DENNIS J. BILLY
and moral theology can be free to be themselves, one of the most
fundamental elements of which means to be in relation to other
disciplines – and especially to each other. This emphasis on
collaborative reciprocity provides a new and refreshing
paradigm for discerning an underlying unity for the whole of
theology. What is more, the “democratic” (as opposed to
“hierarchical”) positioning of the relationship is better suited to
the present exigencies of the theological mindset and can
provide a forum in which different traditions of spirituality and
moral theology can benefit from the free exchange of ideas. If
that is not enough, the model also encourages a certain “spirit of
cooperation” which uses critical theological analysis as the basis
for exploring the inner and outer contours of what in the past
was a developing but potentially problematic interaction.
Weaknesses. The model’s weaknesses stem from its lack of a
methodological matrix with which to guide the ongoing
dialogue between the two disciplines. Without a clear sense of
the context the dialogue has grown out of, situates itself, and is
tending toward, the interaction between the two disciplines can
easily degenerate into a series of aimless (and fragmented)
exchanges. As a result, a great deal of energy can be diverted
from many of the legitimate demands of the individual
disciplines themselves. For this reason, much work is needed in
drawing up a methodological program within which the
interface between spirituality and moral theology can be
explored. Since spirituality, moreover, is a relatively recent
academic discipline and is only now exploring the
methodological bases upon which its own identity rest, there is
a potential danger that it will play only a secondary, passive role
in its interaction with moral theology. That is to say, it will allow
the more refined methodological approaches of the older
discipline to control the orientation and movement of the
discussion. For this reason, one of the most pressing areas of
concern for this model is to examine the methodological
parameters within which a sound, collaborative dialogue
between equals can exist. Only then can both disciplines
participate in a genuine relationship of reciprocity.

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 55
The Contextual Model
Summary. Another model for the interaction of spirituality
and moral theology uses one discipline to contextualize the
other. More often than not it is spirituality which is used to
provide the general parameters within which moral theology
should be presented, studied, and understood. That is not to say
that moral theology cannot do the same for spirituality, only that
it happens more rarely – if at all. This model presupposes set
boundaries between the two disciplines and is not one to
encourage a deep interchange of ideas between them. It
recognizes, however, that both disciplines are praxis-oriented
and can benefit greatly if one is read in light of the other. To
accomplish this aim, the model often uses an inclusio/exclusio
format, which sandwiches the central discipline under
consideration between an introduction and conclusion from the
other (e.g., a/b/a or spirituality/moral theology/spirituality). This
a/b/a arrangement encircles the topic of discussion from one
discipline in an appropriate literary context of the other, thus
demonstrating the relevance of one field for the other without
requiring an in-depth interaction. Entire books can be written in
this manner, with each chapter exhibiting the same contextual
structure. When done well, such contextualization sheds light on
the material being treated in the central discipline. When done
poorly, the introductory and concluding pieces stick out badly
and actually become a distraction. In either case, the interaction
between spirituality and moral theology occurs only in the
context that one provides for the other. If some theologians look
upon this approach as a mere literary gimmick that makes their
writings easier to read and more accessible to the general public,
others see in it an intrinsic link between the content of their
research and the context in which they present it. This latter
concern becomes even more evident when the context used to
introduce and conclude the material under investigation comes
from that dimension of the other discipline which directly
touches upon human experience. Contextualizing one’s material
in this way can also pave the way for the employment of other
models that allow for more of an interaction between the two
disciplines.
Strengths. This model has a number of strengths. For one

56 DENNIS J. BILLY
thing, it preserves the integrity of each discipline, while
recognizing that they can be used with great benefit to elucidate
other fields. It encourages a “soft” interface between the two
disciplines, one which steers clear of a profound methodological
interaction, but which nevertheless succeeds in connecting the
two disciplines at appropriate points of interest. What is more,
the parameters of the context/content relationship are flexible
enough to allow varying proportions of one discipline to shed
light on particular points of interest from another. In this way,
the model has great potential for allowing the particular content
under consideration to shed light on greater and greater
amounts of material from the other discipline it uses for its
context. A relationship of reciprocity can thus evolve, whereby
context sheds light on content – and vice versa. Such a
relationship of reciprocity is different from that of the
collaborative model, but can easily be used in conjunction with
it. This insight discloses one of the greatest strengths of the
contextual model: its capacity to adapt to changing contexts and
to be used in different circumstances in conjunction with a
variety of other models. Such flexibility can make this model an
important presence in the continuing discussion on the
relationship between spirituality and moral theology.
Weaknesses. This model also has a number of weaknesses.
For one thing, the context provided for the material under
consideration can often appear as a mere accessory which can
easily be detached from the main arguments and discarded (or,
at best, not taken seriously). In such cases, the contextualizing
material can appear as a mere cosmetic accretion and be looked
upon in a demeaning, even derogatory sense. From there, subtle
projections can be transferred onto the discipline as a whole and
the entire process can actually work against a deeper
understanding of the relationship between spirituality and
moral theology. For this reason, great caution must be made not
to draw too facile (and superficial) parallels between the content
and the contextualizing disciplines. Otherwise, the final product
may very well work against the stated (or implicit) goals of the
project. If that is not enough, the model’s “soft” interfacing of the
disciplines focuses on loose (as opposed to strong) connections
between the disciplines. That is to say that it uses context rather
than concrete arguments to shed light on the relationship

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 57
between the two disciplines, thus leaving itself open for possible
misinterpretations by the reader.
The Absorption Model
Summary. Another model for the interaction of spirituality
and moral theology allows for the near or total absorption one
discipline by the other. It does so by defining the boundaries of
each in such a way so that one functions either entirely or in
part within the methodological scope of the other, i.e., either as
a subdiscipline or an integrally related field of theological
inquiry. When viewed in this light, moral theology could be
completely subsumed into spirituality – or vice versa. Such a
scenario would normally demand a loosening of strict claims of
autonomy by one of the disciplines and a widening of the object,
scope, and methodological boundaries of the other. Depending
on how this redefining of the boundaries between the two
disciplines is conceived of and implemented, this model could
allow for a variety of relationships between them. As such, it
recognizes the possibility of different degrees of absorption
within the model and, depending on the theological exigencies
of the moment, even a state of flux between the two. This model
seeks a post-hierarchical integration of spiritual and moral
theology. Keenly aware of the sordid history of the relationship
between the two disciplines (i.e., marriage, divorce, remarriage),
it recognizes that it must construe their present relationship in
such a way that allows the traditional nomenclature to survive,
even if in a qualified, thoroughly renovated sense. It
accomplishes its aim by softening the nature of the boundaries
between the two disciplines so that a merging of theological
horizons can occur. It envisions something more than mere
dialogue which, important as it is, ultimately leaves each
discipline free to return to its theological locus to integrate and
then implement what it has learned. Instead, it looks for a single
methodological nexus that ultimately will embrace what it
previously took two separate disciplines to accomplish. Its goal
is to arrive at an integrated model for the relationship between
spirituality and moral theology in a post-hierarchical setting. As
such, it makes an adaptive use of the past in order to transcend

58 DENNIS J. BILLY
categories which today are impractical or overly confining.
Strengths. This model has many strengths. For one thing, it
seeks to forge a new context in which the traditional differences
are overcome by rethinking the parameters of likeness and
differences between the two disciplines. What is more, the soft,
malleable boundaries proposed by the model and the various
degrees of absorption it permits provides theologians with a
flexible matrix within which they can understand how the two
disciplines interact over time. That is to say, it allows them to
view the relationship between the two disciplines along a wide
spectrum of possible interfaces, ranging anywhere from total
absorption of one by the other, to a state in which the process
has barely begun, or anywhere in-between. As indicated earlier,
the model incorporates a historical awareness in its
consideration of the interaction between the two disciplines and
carries that awareness with it as it tries to formulate the context
within which a new integration of the disciplines can evolve. If
that is not enough, it can be used in conjunction with other
models to highlight the multivalent nature of the relationship
between the two disciplines and to complement those models
which emphasize differences rather than the common ground
shared by them. In doing so, it can help provide a dynamic
context and starting point for a gradual reintegration of other
the theological disciplines.
Weaknesses. This model also has a number of weaknesses.
Creating malleable boundaries between the disciplines so that
one can be absorbed by another or turned into a subdiscipline
can divert attention away from areas already treated by the
traditional nomenclature and still in need of constant attention.
Allowing for a shifting rate of absorption, moreover, can result
in a proliferation of interactions between the two disciplines
with little or no organizing principle among them to serve as a
unifying force. What is more, the process of absorption may
ultimately do nothing more than create a tertium quid (i.e., a
third discipline), whose larger scope and purpose make it
difficult to handle the more highly focused and concentrated
issues that more specialized fields were designed for. If that is
not enough, focusing on a changing interface of absorption
could water down some of the valid claims of autonomy and
actually hinder the kind of dialogue which is necessary for a

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 59
growing mutual understanding between the two fields. For these
reasons alone, the absorption model must be used with great
care and caution. When used appropriately, it shows great
promise for understanding the ever-changing contours of the
relationship between spirituality and moral theology. When not,
it can blur (or even destroy) legitimate boundaries and offer
nothing substantial in their place.
Observations
The various strengths and weaknesses of the above models
can be overcome only by using them in close conjunction with
one another. The simultaneous juxtaposition of models will
create “a logical web” of insights that, in keeping with the
multivalent approach referred to earlier, can counteract the
weaknesses of any single one of them. The following remarks
focus on what such a web might look like and what
contributions each of the above models can make.
1. To begin with, the multivalent approach simply presumes
that the constantly changing contours of the disciplines
themselves precludes the possibility of ever arriving at a
definitive understanding of their ongoing interaction. All that
can hoped for are a series of focused insights that help to
describe their past interaction, their present way of relating, and
their orientation toward the future. Since relationships even
among theological disciplines are rarely simple and often
include a wide variety of subtle, even conflicting nuances, it
follows that the accuracy of the description of the relationship
between spirituality and moral theology will be a direct function
of the number of perspectives taken into account. 7 The five
models discussed above contribute to mapping out the changing
interface between the two disciplines. When juxtaposed with
7
This insight must be qualified by that of AVERY DULLES: “Admitting the
inevitability of such a pluralism of models, theology usually seeks to reduce
this pluralism to a minimum. The human mind, in its quest for explanations,
necessarily seeks unity.” See Models of the Church (Garden City, NY: Image
Books, 1974), 33.

60 DENNIS J. BILLY
one another, they are capable of emphasizing the complexity of
the relationship by bringing to the fore obvious, latent, and even
contradictory themes.
2. The insights gained by the juxtaposition of the various
models are the “mental threads” that constitute the vast “logical
web” of sensibilities needed for describing the changing
contours of the interaction between the two disciplines. These
insights are singular in character, but relate to each other in a
variety of ways and different degrees of intensity. Those
belonging to the same model and the same moment of
interfacing have the most in common and are the most closely
related. Next, come those sharing the same model but different
moments of interfacing. These, in turn, are followed by those
coming from complementary models sharing the same moment
of interfacing, which in turn are followed by complementary
models sharing different moments of interfacing. The weakest
links in the web come respectively from conflicting models
sharing first the same and then different moments of interfacing.
The complex web resulting from the juxtaposition of models
provides a great number of perspectives from which to study the
interaction between the two disciplines. The pattern formed by
this vast web relations is open to the contributions of still other
models and constitutes a tightly bound ball of “logical” string
which wraps (and therefore ties together) the interface of the
two disciplines at it center.
3. In addition to looking to models and moments of
interfacing, the various levels of spirituality and moral theology
must also be taken into account when determining the variety of
ways and the differing intensities with which the two disciplines
interact. That is to say that the logical web covering the
interaction between the two disciplines must pay attention to
the experiential, instructional, and analytical dimensions of the
interface. When doing so, the circular relationship among these
relationships must also be averted to, since the experiential level
leads to the instructional and analytical levels, which in turn
combine to foster new experiences of the sacred. What is more,
the relationship between the two disciplines necessarily requires
an examination of how the various dimensions of each
discipline interact with those of the other. The result makes for
an even tighter web of logical insights from which to examine

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 61
the relationship between the two disciplines.
4. As far as the individual models themselves are concerned,
the hierarchical model serves as a touchstone for all reflection
on the interaction between the two disciplines. Its classical
nomenclature provides an important point of departure for
theological reflection concerning the nature of the two
disciplines and is a stable point of reference for emerging
insights. This hermeneutical function should raise awareness
not only of how the disciplines themselves have evolved over
time (e.g., the continuity of the present discipline of spirituality
with spiritual theology), but also of the underlying structure
used to frame their relationships (e.g., hierarchy, collaboration,
logical web, etc.). As such, it reminds those involved in studying
the relationship between the two disciplines of the orientation
each has toward self-transcendence. The close connection,
moreover, between the hierarchical model and the heuristic
metaphor of journey brings to the fore the importance of
framing the interface between the two disciplines in terms that
tie in immediately with human experience.
5. The integrative model, by way of contrast, evokes the past
as a nostalgic point of reference for the ongoing interaction
between spirituality and moral theology. It points to a time
before the establishment of the theological disciplines when the
Church’s spiritual and moral teachings were fully integrated
with each other. If this historical moment can never be retrieved
due to the critical threshold caused by theology’s later
specialization, it reminds theologians of the roots of their
disciplines and inspires them to seek new ways of integrating
them. As such, it represents a voice from the past which propels
the interaction between spirituality and moral theology forward
and functions, at least in a qualified sense, as one of their
ongoing projected goals. When viewed in this light, the
integrative model inspires theologians to explore alternative
ways of bringing about a reintegration of their disciplines. It
does so by finding a relational metaphor from the past that can
be heuristically projected onto the future as the point of
convergence toward which the two disciplines tend.
6. The collaborative model highlights the importance of
genuine dialogue as a means of bringing the two disciplines
together. Such dialogue presupposes an honest assessment of

62 DENNIS J. BILLY
the similarities and differences between the two fields, as well as
an intense desire to work together on areas of common concern.
It calls for the formulation of helpful parameters within which
such dialogue can occur and warns participants of the danger
that can accrue from a monopolization of the theological
discourse by one of the conversing partners. The model can also
be applied to the various models for the interaction of spiritual
and moral theology themselves. It does so mainly by
encouraging them to strengthen their ties through a
comparative analysis of their relevant likenesses and differences.
As such, it provides an important model for how the
juxtaposition of the various models can take place and offers a
context within which a deeper understanding of how this logical
web of insights might be understood.
7. The contextual model offers loose literary ties as a way of
understanding the interaction between spirituality and moral
theology. It emphasizes the importance of context for
interpreting the content under consideration and encourages a
close reading of one in light of the other. However close that
reading may be, the boundaries between the two disciplines
remain very distinct and the strength of the bonds between the
two disciplines relatively light. This model draws attention to
those less intensive ways in which spirituality and moral
theology relate – and relishes them. It can also be readily applied
to the logical web of insights used to depict the interaction
between the two disciplines. Here, the juxtaposition of models
provides the necessary context from which to view the ongoing
interaction of the two disciplines. Once the logical web is
removed, there is no solid foundation for understanding how the
interface of spirituality and morality takes place over time. From
this perspective, the logical web of insights becomes a complex
conceptual (or “literary”) construct, whose sole purpose is to
provide an adequate hermeneutical context for understanding
the ongoing interaction of the two disciplines.
8. The absorption model raises the possibility of a new type
of integration between spirituality and moral theology. As such,
it forces theologians to imagine the ongoing evolution of
theology and envision a day when the present distinctions
among the disciplines will no longer be needed. In this way, it
projects into the future a teleological point of orientation toward

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 63
which the interaction between the two disciplines tends. It must
be noted, however, that the envisioned reintegration brought
about by the evolution of these theological disciplines will
demand that theology itself be thought of in an entirely different
way. The absorption of the disciplines, in other words, cannot
take place without having profound methodological and
material effects on the emerging science. Those effects point to
the reintegration of theology in a post-hierarchical setting in a
way that it will be perceived as both a “unified diversity” and a
“diversified unity.” The juxtaposition of these heuristic terms
adds yet another layer to the logical web of insights that sets the
parameters for the interface between the two disciplines and
adds a certain, eschatological “already but not yet” quality to
their ongoing evolution.
9. Each of the above models provides valuable insights into
the nature of the interaction between spirituality and moral
theology. Their hermeneutical juxtaposition emphasizes the
importance of strict boundaries (the hierarchical), no
boundaries (the integrative), boundaries-with-dialogue (the
collaborative), loose boundaries (the contextual), and merging
boundaries (the absorption(al)) in discussing the interface
between the two disciplines. Using these models in this way
allows one to understand the complex parameters of the
relationship. The logical web of insights formed by their
simultaneous juxtaposition allows their ongoing interaction to
assume a dynamic (as opposed to static) character. As such, it
prevents an oversimplified description of their relationship and
invites the theologian to envision a relationship of profound
depth and subtlety. This multivalent approach resolves conflicts
by placing them on different levels of the interface between the
two disciplines. The logical web it constructs initiates a
hermeneutical process whereby the weaknesses of one model
are checked by the strengths of the others. It is also sensitive to
the historical and cultural contingencies of this process which,
at any given period in the interaction of the two disciplines,
might allow one model to achieve the privileged status of a
theological paradigm.
10. At any one moment, this juxtaposition of models
provides the possibility of multiple perspectives from which to
examine the interaction between spirituality and moral theology.

64 DENNIS J. BILLY
The variety of ways in which the relationship can be understood
does not by any means imply that the two disciplines have no
distinct boundaries. On the contrary, the great number of
perspectives helps one to appreciate the changing historical
contours of the relationship, which is made possible by virtue of
the fact that boundaries emerged from the past, still exist, and
continue to emerge. The changing shape of these boundaries
points not to the collapse of these disciplines or their simple
merging (e.g., spirituality into moral theology – or vice versa),
but to the development of distinct traditions that focus on
different aspects of the logical web of insights tying them
together. These traditions will themselves be complementary in
nature and offer great possibilities for the post-hierarchical
reintegration of the fields referred to earlier. The use of a logical
web of insights, in other words, will help to create the context
within which complementary traditions of the relationship
between spirituality and moral theology can arise and flourish.
Concluding Remarks
The multivalent approach adopted in this essay allows for a
variety of simultaneous correspondences in the interface
between the disciplines of spirituality and moral theology. It
gives the theologian a number of perspectives from which to
view their ongoing interaction and encourages him or her to
take advantage of the various insights they provide. Not all of
these viewpoints will be helpful at any given time – but some
will. The good theologian is one who is able to draw key
connections from within this logical web of insights and apply
them in concrete ways to the experiential, instructional, and
analytical dimensions of the two disciplines.
The use of models in drawing up the parameters of the
ongoing interaction between spirituality and moral theology
presupposes the limited nature of theological language in its
attempts to explain the mystery of God and, by analogous
extension, its own internal functioning. The logical gap between
the model and the reality it seeks to express (in this case, the
interaction between the two disciplines) incorporates the best
insights of what traditionally has been referred to as positive

MODELS AND MULTIVALENCE 65
(i.e., kataphatic) and negative (i.e., apophatic) theology. That is
to say that it supplies a linguistic structure which, at one and the
same time, both affirms and negates its depiction of what is
taking place between the two disciplines. When many models
are employed to examine the contours of the relationship in
question, the result is a complex web of interlocking and, at
times, even conflicting insights that depict the interaction on a
wide variety of levels.
The multivalent approach depicted in this essay uses
proportionate analogy to steer a middle course between
univocal and equivocal reasoning. By recognizing a
proportionate likeness and difference in the ongoing interface
between the two disciplines, it avoids the pitfalls of one-to-one
correspondence so typical in the former and the latent
relativistic tendencies so common in the latter. Studying the
interaction between spirituality and moral theology in this way
thus brings to the fore the deeper question of the nature of
human reason itself, a topic of central concern for both
disciplines – and, indeed, for the whole of theology.
Accademia Alfonsiana
Via Merulana 31
C.P. 2458
00100 Roma - Italy.
DENNIS J. BILLY, C.Ss.R.
—————
Summary / Resumen
This essay examines five theological models for the interaction of
spirituality and moral theology: the hierarchical, the integrative, the
collaborative, the contextual, and the absorption(al). The author
considers the strengths and weaknesses of each and employs the
“presumption of multivalence” for highlighting their important
complementary functions.
El presente ensayo analiza cinco modelos teológicos para la
interacción entre espiritualidad y teología moral: el jerárquico, el

66 DENNIS J. BILLY
integrador, el colaborador, el contextual, y el de absorción. El autor
examina los puntos fuertes y frágiles de cada modelo y utiliza la
“presunción polivalente” para destacar sus importantes funciones
complementarias.
—————
The author is an extraordinary professor at the Alphonsian
Academy in Rome.
El autor es profesor extraordinario de la Academia Alfonsiana en
Roma.
—————

67
StMor 38 (2000) 67-101
MARCIANO VIDAL C.SS.R.
LA TRINIDAD:
ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA
EN LAS HUELLAS DE SAN AGUSTÍN
Y DE SAN BUENAVENTURA
La moral cristiana es inseparable de la teología y de la espiritualidad.
Lo “moral” y lo “teologal”, manteniendo su peculiaridad
y su adecuada autonomía, convergen hacia una unidad
superior que es la experiencia cristiana, en la que se articulan las
diversas dimensiones de la fe 1 .
La existencia cristiana fluye de la vida trinitaria. Aquí está
“aquella eterna fonte” de donde “todo origen viene” (san Juan de
la Cruz). La Trinidad es el misterio fontal, cuyo contenido da
significado y consistencia a todos los demás misterios cristianos.
No en vano el Concilio Vaticano II en Lumen gentium señala
que el misterio de la Iglesia procede del dinamismo trinitario
del Padre (n. 2), del Hijo (n. 3), y del Espíritu Santo (n. 4). “Así
toda la Iglesia aparece como el pueblo unido ‘por la unidad del
Padre, del Hijo y del Espíritu Santo’” (n. 4).
En el Misterio de la Trinidad está también el fundamento
último y la meta definitiva de la vida moral cristiana. Sin embargo,
a pesar de ser obvia, esta afirmación no suele ser desarrollada
con la amplitud que se merece en los tratados de teología
moral.
El objetivo de la siguiente reflexión es presentar la moral cristiana
desde la Comunión Trinitaria. Expondré esta orientación
básica de la moral cristiana recogiendo, en primer lugar, el
1
He analizado esta orientación en: M. VIDAL, Moral y Espiritualidad. De
la separación a la convergencia (Madrid, 1997); traducción italiana: Morale e
Spiritualità. Dalla separazione alla convergenza (Assisi, 1997).

68 MARCIANO VIDAL
núcleo de la revelación trinitaria, para deducir, a continuación,
las implicaciones que esa confesión de fe tiene para la comprensión
y la realización de la vida cristiana en general y, más
concretamente, de la vida moral.
Conforme indica el subtítulo, seguiré las huellas del pensamiento
teológico de san Agustín y de san Buenaventura. Sin
embargo, mi intención no es hacer un estudio de carácter histórico
ni de exégesis técnica del pensamiento agustiniano o bonaventuriano.
Mi interés es de carácter preferentemente sistemático
y propositivo.
I. EL MISTERIO TRINITARIO
La teología trinitaria ha conocido en la segunda mitad del
siglo XX una época de gran esplendor, solamente superable por
la etapa decisiva de los siglos III-IV 2 . Dado el objetivo de estas
páginas, no es necesario ni exponer el estado de la cuestión de
los estudios sobre la Trinidad 3 ni resumir las orientaciones sobre
este misterio cristiano 4 . Únicamente quiero dejar constancia de
algunas perspectivas que tienen particular relieve para las implicaciones
éticas.
1. CIRCULARIDAD HERMENÉUTICA ENTRE “TRINIDAD HISTÓRICA” Y
“TRINIDAD INMANENTE”
A través de la Revelación de la Trinidad en la historia de salvación
(“trinidad económica”) llegamos a vislumbrar el misterio
2
Cf. M. GONZÁLEZ, El estado de situación de los estudios trinitarios en el
umbral del tercer milenio: SOCIEDAD ARGENTINA DE TEOLOGÍA, El misterio de la
Trinidad en la preparación del Gran Jubileo (Buenos Aires, 1998) 9-97.
3
Ver, a título de muestra, el boletín bibliográfico de G. EMERY,
Chronique de théologie trinitaire: Revue Thomiste 98 (1998) 469-496.
4
Remito a tres tratados recientes escritos en castellano: J. R. GARCÍA-
MURGA, El Dios del amor y de la paz. Tratado Teológico de Dios desde la
reflexión sobre su Bondad (Madrid, 1991); J. Mª. ROVIRA, Tratado de Dios, uno
y trino (Salamanca, 1993); L. F. LADARIA, El Dios vivo y verdadero. El misterio
de la Trinidad (Salamanca, 1998).

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 69
de la vida intratrinitaria (“trinidad inmanente”). K. Rahner formuló
esta orientación mediante una especie de axioma, a modo
de tesis: “la Trinidad económica es la Trinidad inmanente y viceversa”
5 .
Esta tesis rahneriana sobre la identidad de la Trinidad inmanente
y económica es, en principio, compartida por los teólogos
actuales. Sin embargo, se introducen en ella algunos matices no
de poca monta. Para W. Pannenberg la afirmación de Rahner,
“que pudo ser sugerida por Barth”, “no significa, evidentemente,
que la Trinidad esencial coincida sin distinción alguna con la
economía salvífica trinitaria, sino sólo que se trata de dos aspectos
de una y la misma realidad divina” 6 . B. Forte es todavía más
explícito al decir que la expresión “viceversa” del axioma rahneriano
“no puede ser aceptada: no obstante todas las precisiones
posibles, dicho axioma corre el riesgo de resolver lo divino en lo
humano” 7 . Por otra parte, este teólogo trata de justificar la articulación
entre Trinidad “histórica” y Trinidad “inmanente” en la
misma estructura de la Revelación, tal como fue formulada por
el Concilio Vaticano II 8 .
Con estas precisiones, se puede aceptar que para comprender
el misterio trinitario es conveniente comenzar por su manifestación
en la Historia de Salvación; desde ahí se puede acceder
a su ser en la vida intratrinitaria. Es una correcta aplicación del
axioma de que la Trinidad “económica” (en la Historia) es la que
mejor manifiesta el ser de la Trinidad “inmanente”.
Esta perspectiva de la Historia (o de la “Economía”) es la
que adopta el Concilio Vaticano II en los principales pasajes trinitarios:
Lumen gentium, 2-4; Ad gentes, 2-4. El Concilio unió
“teología” y “economía” en esta formulación, tradicional y origi-
5
K. RAHNER, Advertencias sobre el tratado “de Trinitate”: Escritos de
Teología, t. IV (Madrid, 1964) 105-136 (“La Trinidad ‘económica’ es la
Trinidad inmanente”: p. 117).
6
W. PANNENBERG, La doctrina de la Trinidad en Hegel, y su recepción en
la teología alemana: Estudios Trinitarios 30 (1996) 50.
7
B. FORTE, Creer y pensar la Trinidad a partir de la estructura trinitaria de
la “Re-velatio”: Estudios Trinitarios 30 (1996) 56.
8
Dei Verbum, c. I, nn. 2-6: “De ipsa revelatione”. En parecido sentido: J.
PRADES, De la Trinidad económica a la Trinidad inmanente: Revista Española
de Teología 58 (1998) 285-344.

70 MARCIANO VIDAL
nal a la vez, del misterio trinitario: “este designio (el plan de
Salvación) dimana del ‘amor fontal’ o caridad de Dios Padre,
que, siendo principio sin principio del que es engendrado el Hijo
y del que procede el Espíritu Santo, creándonos libremente por
su benignidad excesiva y misericordiosa y llamándonos además
por pura gracia a participar con Él en la vida y la gloria, difundió
con liberalidad y no deja de difundir la bondad divina, de
modo que el que es Creador de todas las cosas se hace por fin
todo en todas las cosas (1 Cor 15, 28), procurando al mismo
tiempo su gloria y nuestra felicidad” 9 . En otro lugar el mismo
Concilio utiliza la fórmula tradicional: “a Dios Padre por Cristo
en el Espíritu” 10 . Fuera de estos dos pasajes, el Vaticano II habla
de la Trinidad en su vertiente económica o funcional dentro de
la historia de salvación.
2. LAS CATEGORÍAS DE “PERSONA” Y DE“SUBSTANCIA”
Para exponer el contenido de fe del misterio trinitario la teología
ha tenido que servirse de categorías de la razón humana.
El pensamiento griego utilizó palabras y conceptos que significaban
tanto la unidad en la “esencia” (ousía) como la diversidad
en la “subsistencia” (hypóstasis), término este último con el que
se aludía también a “persona”, para cuya conceptualización los
teólogos griegos no creyeron muy adecuado el término prósopon,
por significar inicialmente “máscara”.
La teología latina acuñó una fórmula más uniforme y precisa:
“una substantia et tres personae”. Esta diferencia terminológica
entre los latinos y los griegos la observó certeramente
san Agustín: “Lo que nosotros, siguiendo la costumbre, decimos
de la persona, lo entienden los griegos, conforme al genio de su
idioma, de la substancia. Ellos dicen tres substancias y una esencia.
Nosotros, tres personas y una esencia o substancia” 11 .
9
Ad gentes, 2. Una originalidad de esta formulación está en la manera
de expresar la “procesión” del Espíritu Santo, más cercana a la teología
oriental que a la occidental: “ex quo (Patre) Filius gignitur et Spiritus
Sanctus per Filium procedit” (no: “Filioque”).
10
Lumen gentium, 51.
11 SAN AGUSTIN, De Trinitate, VII, 4, 8: Obras de San Agustín. Edición

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 71
En relación con el uso de estas categorías hago una anotación,
tomada de K. Rahner 12 . Conviene no exagerar la aplicación
de las categorías de “persona” y de “substancia” al referirlas a la
Trinidad inmanente. Son categorías y conceptos que están
sometidos a la variación histórica; hoy no tienen el mismo significado
que tuvieron cuando fueron utilizados por vez primera en
el cristianismo.
3. LA COMUNIÓN O RELACIÓN: LA REALIDAD TRINITARIA
Para comprender y para hablar del misterio trinitario sería
conveniente superar el viejo planteamiento de comenzar por “De
Deo uno” para llegar al “De Deo trino”. En la revelación cristiana
(en la “Economía”) lo primero que se manifiestan son las
Personas. En las Personas descubrimos la realidad divina.
La concepción latina ha propendido a partir de la “Esencia”
divina común para llegar a la diversidad de “Personas”. En cambio,
la concepción griega parte de las Personas y en Ellas descubre
la condición divina. Esta segunda forma es más cercana a la
presentación que aparece en la Biblia. No hay más “substancia
divina” que la perijóresis (circunincessio o circuninsessio), es
decir, las relaciones; dicho de otro modo, la realidad trinitaria es
la comunicación en el amor.
La categoría de “comunión” es una de las perspectivas utilizadas
hoy con mayor predominio para exponer el contenido de
la fe trinitaria 13 . De J. Moltamnna es esta formulación: “La esencia
del Dios trinitario es esta comunión” 14 . San Juan lo expresó
de forma más pletórica diciendo que “Dios es amor” (1 Jn 4, 8.
bilingüe, t. V (Madrid, 1948) 480-481: “Sic enim dicunt illi tres substantias,
unam essentiam, quemadmodum nos dicimus tres personas, unam essentiam
vel substantiam”.
12
K. RAHNER, El Dios Trino como principio y fundamento trascendente de
la Historia de Salvación: Mysterium Salutis, II/1 (Madrid, 1969) 359-445;
Curso Fundamental de la Fe (Barcelona, 1979) 167-171.
13
G. GRESHAKE, Der dreieine Gott. Eine trinitarische Theologie (Freiburg-
Basel-Wien, 1997).
14
J. MOLTMANN, El Espíritu de Vida. Una pneumatología integral
(Salamanca, 1998) 332.

72 MARCIANO VIDAL
16) 15 . A esta revelación de Dios como Amor corresponde la revelación
de la Caridad como el camino de la vida cristiana: camino
de la perfección personal y camino de la transformación del
mundo. Según el Concilio Vaticano II, es el Verbo de Dios el que
nos ha hecho esta doble revelación: “Él mismo (el Verbo de Dios)
nos revela que Dios es amor (1 Jn 4, 8) y que la ley fundamental
de la perfección humana, y por ello de la transformación del
mundo, es el mandamiento del amor” 16 .
En el contexto de esta comprensión del Dios “triuno” como
comunión de vida adquiere un significado más profundo la circularidad
hermenéutica de cada Persona con el Misterio trinitario.
De modo especial ha destacado H. U. von Balthasar esa circularidad
en relación con la cristología y la pneumatología: viendo
la “misión” de Jesús y la “misión” del Espíritu como traducciones
económicas (histórico-salvíficas) de la “generación” y de
la “procesión” intratrinitarias. Ambas dimensiones -la histórica
y la inmanente- constituyen el único significado del Agape divino,
que es, al mismo tiempo, kénosis (vaciamiento) y donación
(entrega) 17 .
Es, sobre todo, el Espíritu Santo quien sella la Comunión
trinitaria. Él es, según la expresión de los místicos, como el
mutuo y único beso del Padre y del Hijo. La “apropiación” del
amor (así como de la “santidad”) por parte del Espíritu, no resta
a la vida trinitaria la realidad de comunión amorosa, sino que la
expresa de forma más plena. Así lo vio san Agustín al explicar
que “el Espíritu Santo se dice propiamente Amor aunque no lo
15
“Expresa así (Juan) la verdad más alta de nuestra fe, y al mismo tiempo
una experiencia de sentido” (J. R. GARCÍA-MURGA, El Dios del amor y de la
paz. Tratado Teológico de Dios desde la reflexión sobre su Bondad, Madrid,
1991, 11). Esta comprensión de Dios es decisiva en la reflexión teológica
actual: J. R. GARCÍA-MURGA, Dios, sólo amor. Presentación de libros, acompañada
de una reflexión: Estudios Eclesiásticos 74 (1999) 95-128. Añadir: T.
KELLY, “God is Love”. A Theological-Moral Reading of 1 John: Studia Moralia
37 (1999) 35-71.
16
Gaudium et spes, 38.
17
Cf. M. GONZÁLEZ, La Trinidad, corazón hermenéutico de la realidad cristiana.
Esbozo del aporte de Balthasar a la sistemática trinitaria del siglo XX:
Proyecto 10 (1998) 127-140.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 73
sea Él solo en la Trinidad” 18 . “Si el amor con que el Padre ama al
Hijo y el Hijo ama al Padre indicio es de la comunión inefable
de ambos, ¿qué hay más natural que llamar propiamente amor
al que es Espíritu común de ellos” 19 .
4. ESTRUCTURA DE LO HUMANO
La Trinidad es contenido -y el contenido máximo- de la
Revelación. Pertenece, por tanto, al orden de la fe. Sin embargo,
toda la realidad -y particularmente, la condición humana- está
transida por este misterio. Hay “huellas” de la Trinidad en la realidad
creada y ésta ha de buscar su perfección asemejándose al
ejemplar de la Trinidad.
Fue san Agustín quien, desde el libro VIII hasta el final (libro
XV) de su tratado De Trinitate, mejor y más fructuosamente
recorrió el itinerario antropológico para buscar la imagen de la
Trinidad en la persona humana. Las “huellas trinitarias” en la
condición humana le ayudaron a barruntar la secreta vida íntima
de Dios al mismo tiempo que arrojaron luces sobre el ser del
espíritu humano.
Está en pie la advertencia de K. Rahner sobre la necesidad
de usar con cautela la “explicación psicológica” (de san Agustín
y de santo Tomás) de la vida intratrinitaria, a partir de las funciones
humanas de la “inteligencia” y de la “voluntad”. Esta
explicación, de carácter “psicológico”, puede correr el peligro de
encerrar el misterio trinitario “hacia dentro de él” y no tener
suficientemente en cuenta que se trata de un misterio hecho
“historia de salvación”.
Teniendo cuidado de no vaciar el contenido histórico-salvífico
del misterio trinitario, no se puede dejar de reconocer la
importancia y la funcionalidad que tiene la Trinidad en cuanto
estructura básica no sólo de la experiencia cristiana sino de la
comprensión de la realidad 20 . Esta su condición de estructura
18
De Trinitate, XV, 19: l. c., 902-911.
19
Ibid., XV, 19, 37: l. c., 911.
20
Cf. H. HÄRING, La fe cristiana en el Dios trino y uno: Concilium n. 258
(1995) 237-252.

74 MARCIANO VIDAL
básica de la experiencia cristiana y de la realidad humana es la
que, entre otras funcionalidades, hace de la Trinidad un paradigma
ético de primer orden para la vida moral.
II. LA TRINIDAD: FUENTE Y META DE LA VIDA CRIS-
TIANA
El Misterio trinitario no es sólo el contenido básico de la
confesión de fe ni únicamente el objeto de la celebración cristiana.
Es también la “fuente” y la “meta” de la vida cristiana.
Ésta es, por definición, una forma de vida trinitaria.
Hay concepciones de la existencia cristiana que han
subrayado de modo especial esta impronta trinitaria. Pero, aun
en aquellas en las que ese rasgo no parece estar a flor de piel, de
hecho está presente y, además, sustentando todo el edificio. No
puede ser de otro modo, ya que la vida cristiana no es otra cosa
que el despliegue, en el tiempo histórico y biográfico, del misterio
eterno de Dios.
Hay planteamientos teológicos de la Trinidad que ponen
particular énfasis en destacar la relevancia de la Trinidad para la
comprensión y la realización de la existencia cristiana.
Formulan una Trinidad “para nosotros”. La teología trinitaria,
sin entrar en los pormenores de la concreción, ofrece una visión
sapiencial para orientar los diversos ámbitos de la existencia cristiana
(vida sacramental, sexualidad, ética, espiritualidad) 21 .
En la tradición mística la contemplación de la Trinidad ha
constituido el supremo objetivo y la magna tarea de la experiencia
del creyente. El Pseudo-Dionisio, san Bernardo, san
Buenaventura, san Juan de la Cruz y otros grandes místicos han
colocado la meta de la experiencia cristiana en la contemplación
del Misterio trinitario. Algunos, como Ricardo de San Víctor,
han establecido un puente entre la Teología y la Mística precisamente
mediante la exposición teológico-mística sobre la
Trinidad 22 .
21
Ver, en el sentido indicado en el texto, la exposición de C. M. LA
CUGNA, God for Us. The Trinity and the Christian Life (San Francisco, 1991).
22
Cf. M. SCHNIERSTSHAUER, Consumatio Caritatis. Eine Untersuchung zu

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 75
El Concilio Vaticano II situó la vida eclesial dentro de la
influencia del Misterio trinitario 23 . En relación con “el misterio
sagrado de la unidad de la Iglesia”, remontó la visión hasta la
realidad trinitaria: “El modelo y principio de este misterio (de la
unidad de la Iglesia) es la unidad de un solo Dios Padre e Hijo
en el Espíritu Santo, en la Trinidad de personas” 24 .
De esta suerte, la vida cristiana no es otra cosa que la realización
en el tiempo del significado salvífico de la Trinidad, proclamada,
celebrada y vivida como origen y meta de la Historia
de Salvación 25 .
III. IMPLICACIONES PARA LA MORAL CRISTIANA
En la reflexión teológico-moral actual hay un interés especial
por recuperar la raíz trinitaria de la vida moral cristiana. La
moral cristiana del presente y, más aún, la del futuro ha de formularse
como una moral trinitaria 26 .
La Trinidad es para la moral cristiana no sólo un “paradigma”
de comportamiento sino también, y sobre todo, el “fundamento”
del obrar moral. Éstas son las dos direcciones que adopta
la orientación trinitaria de la reflexión teológico-moral.
1. LA TRINIDAD COMO PARADIGMA ÉTICO
La referencia más recurrente de la reflexión teológico-moral
a la Trinidad es la de utilizar la vida trinitaria como “modelo” o
Richard von St. Viktors De Trinitate (Mainz, 1996), sobre todo pp. 33-70.
Sobre la teología trinitaria de Ricardo de San Víctor, cf. P. CACCIAPUOTI, “Deus
Existentia Amoris”. Teologia della carità e teologia della trinità negli scritti di
Riccardo di San Vittore (+1173) (Repols, 1998).
23
Lumen gentium 1-4.
24
Unitatis redintegratio, 2.
25
Cf. P. SORCI, Trinità e storia della salvezza nella liturgia: Ho Theológos
16 (1998) 21-45.
26
Cf. L. G. JONES, Transformed Judgment. Toward a Trinitarian Account
on the Moral Life (Notre Dame, 1990); T. GOFFI, Etica cristiana trinitaria
(Bolonia, 1995).

76 MARCIANO VIDAL
paradigma para construir el ethos propio del cristiano:
La comprensión de la persona como “donación” y “comunión”:
“El ser del hombre es un don: procede del amor creador
de Dios. El ser del hombre como persona es ser un don de sí
mismo: se afirma y se realiza dándose, con olvido de sí mismo.
En esto la persona humana es imagen y semejanza de las
Personas divinas que se afirman dándose: el Padre al Hijo, el
Hijo al Padre y el Espíritu Santo, don mutuo e increado entre el
Padre y el Hijo” 27 .
Paradigma de la relación interpersonal. Tanto estudios de teología
trinitaria como reflexiones antropológicas ponen de relieve
la significación de la Trinidad para entender y construir las
relaciones interpersonales en la igualdad (por ejemplo, la igualdad
de género), en el respeto a la persona del otro, en la caridad,
y para la edificación de la comunidad 28 .
La Trinidad, fundamento y paradigma de la familia. En la
Exhortación Apostólica Familiaris consortio (1981) se insinúa
una teología trinitaria de la familia, sobre todo al considerar a
ésta como una “comunión de personas” 29 .
Paradigma para la ética social cristiana. Ésta es la orientación
trinitaria más utilizada en la reflexión teológica actual 30 . J.
Moltmann plantea una “doctrina social de la Trinidad” 31 ; habla
también de una “teología de la experiencia social de Dios” 32 ; atribuye,
de modo especial, al Espíritu Santo esa función de comunión:
“la esencia del Dios trinitario es esta comunión (…). El
Espíritu Santo, que es honrado ‘juntamente con’ el Padre y con
27
E. YANES, Discurso inaugural de la LXX Asamblea Plenaria de la CEE
(23/XI/1998): Ecclesia n. 2.922 (5/XII/1998) 31.
28
Ver, a título de muestra, los siguientes estudios: B. FORTE, La Trinità
fonte e paradigma della carità: Asprenas 32 (1985) 398-402; X. PIKAZA,
Trinidad y comunidad cristiana (Madrid, 1990); J. A. MERINO, La Trinidad,
paradigma de la vida comunitaria en S. Buenaventura: Estudios Trinitarios 30
(1996) 3-34; M. OFILADA, Hacia la Trinidad y la Amistad: el camino hacia un
redescubrimiento del Misterio de Dios: Philippiniana Sacra 33 (1998) 73-94.
29
Familiaris consortio, 11-16 (especialmente, 15).
30
Cf. E. CAMBÓN, La Trinidad, “modelo” de la sociedad. Una presentación
catequética: Didascalia 53 (1999) n. 519, 10-18.
31
J. MOLTMANN, Trinidad y Reino de Dios (Salamanca, 1985).
32
J. MOLTMANN, El Espíritu de vida (Salamanca, 1998) 268-288.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 77
el Hijo, es también la fuente de la energía que reúne a los seres
humanos, de tal manera que puedan encontrarse, alegrarse recíprocamente
y alabar al Dios comunión” 33 . Para L. Boff la vida
trinitaria es el mejor programa para la sociedad humana 34 .
Desde la Trinidad se puede asumir teológicamente la categoría
del “otro” tal como la propone M. Lévinas 35 . Las categorías trinitarias
tienen también capacidad para valorar y orientar la cultura
actual 36 .
2. ESTRUCTURA TRINITARIA DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA
Las implicaciones morales que acabo de señalar pertenecen
a lo que podríamos denominar orientaciones sustantivas. Todas
ellas se basan en otra consideración más profunda de la relación
del Misterio trinitario y la moral cristiana. Es la que define la
estructura formal de la vida moral cristiana como una estructura
trinitaria. Se trata de una fundamentación de la moralidad en
el misterio fontal de la fe cristiana. Hay, al respecto, propuestas
tanto desde la teología protestante 37 como desde la católica 38 .
Propondré mi orientación sirviéndome del pensamiento de san
Agustín y de san Buenaventura.
33
Ibid., 332.
34
L. BOFF, La Trinidad, la sociedad y la liberación (Madrid, 1987); ID., La
Santísima Trinidad es la mejor comunidad (Madrid, 1990)
35
Th. FREYER, “Nähe” – eine trinitätstheologische Schlüssel-“kategorie”:
Theologie und Glaube 40 (1997) 271-288.
36
Iglesia Viva n. 167 (1993): “Trinidad y cultura actual”.
37
E. FUCHS, Pour une réinterpretation éthique du dogme trinitaire: Études
Théologiques et Religieuses 61 (1986) 533-540.
38
G. RINANDI, La domanda etica. Per una fondazione trinitaria dell’etica:
VARIOS, Una teologia como storia. La “Simbolica ecclesiale” di Bruno Forte
tra filosofia e teologia (Cinisello Balsamo, 1998) 185-194.

78 MARCIANO VIDAL
IV. PENSAMIENTO AGUSTINIANO
1. PERSPECTIVAS AGUSTINIANAS SOBRE LA MORAL CRISTIANA
San Agustín es un océano en el pensamiento cristiano.
Ninguno de los temas que él trata puede ser reducido a una sola
perspectiva. Esta norma hermenéutica tiene aplicación también
en la moral. No se puede reducir el pensamiento moral agustiniano
a una sola consideración.
a. La Moral como “historia” del Deseo
Para san Agustín Dios es el objeto y la meta del Deseo humano.
El inicio de las Confesiones y el final de la Ciudad de Dios
señalan el punto de partida y el final del camino de la vida
humana; en medio acaece la historia del deseo existencial de
cada persona.
El comienzo: “nos hiciste, Señor, para ti, Señor, e inquieto
está nuestro corazón hasta que descanse en Ti” 39 . La meta: “Allí
descansaremos y contemplaremos, contemplaremos y amaremos,
amaremos y alabaremos. Esto será lo que suceda finalmente
sin fin alguno” 40 .
La existencia humana es la historia distendida del deseo 41 .
Consiguientemente, la moral cristiana consiste en la realización
coherente de la historia del deseo humano.
b. La Moral como “praxis” de la Caridad
Pocos pensadores cristianos habrán destacado tanto, como
san Agustín, la constitución amorosa del misterio de Dios:
39
Confesiones, I, 1, 1 (“Fecisti nos ad te, Domine, et inquietum est cor
nostrum donec requiescat in Te”).
40
De civitate Dei, XXII, 30, 5: Obras de San Agustín. Edición bilingüe,
T. XVI (Madrid, 1958) 1722 (“Ibi vacabimus et videbimus, videbimus et amabimus,
amabimus et laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine”).
41
Confesiones, XIII, 9, 10: “pondus meum amor meus: eo feror quocumque
feror. Requies nostra locus noster”.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 79
misterio de amor intratrinitario y misterio de amor comunicativo
en la creación y en la historia de la salvación.
De esa comprensión de Dios nace la moral agustianiana
centrada en el Amor. A san Agustín se le debe la formulación
lapidaria de una ética reducida al amor: “ama y haz lo que quieras”
42 . Este imperativo categórico agustiniano sobrepasa en
valía, en originalidad y en capacidad sugestiva a todas las formulaciones
precedentes -estoicas: “sigue la naturaleza” o epicúreas:
“busca una jerarquización de los placeres”- y posteriores -
kantianas: “la razón como ley universal” o sartrianas: “atrévete a
ser libre”.
Además, san Agustín supo concretar esa norma ética del
amor en la praxis histórica de las “dos ciudades”: “dos amores
fundaron dos ciudades, a saber: el amor propio hasta el desprecio
de Dios, la terrena, y el amor de Dios hasta el desprecio de sí
propio, la celestial” 43 .
c. La Moral bajo la “Ley evangélica”
La encíclica Veritatis splendor ha recordado recientemente
los rasgos específicamente neotestamentarios de la moral agustiniana.
Una moral que, en este caso, se basa en una comprensión
de Dios tal como es revelado en Cristo.
San Agustín hace proceder la moral cristiana del Sermón de
la Montaña, el cual constituye la carta magna de la moral
evangélica 44 . En otro contexto, identifica la moral cristiana con
la propuesta paulina de la Ley del Espíritu o ley nueva, una categoría
de indudable trascendencia en la historia de la moral cristiana
y de gran actualidad en los planteamientos actuales de la
moral católica 45 .
42
In Epist. Joan., IV, 8, Tract. VI: PL 35, 2.033 (“dilige et quod vis fac”).
43
De civitate Dei, XIV, 28: l. c., 985 (“Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores
duo; terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem
vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui”).
44
Veritatis splendor, 15, citando a san Agustín en: De Sermone Domini in
Monte, I, 1, 1: CCL 35, 1-2.
45
Veritatis splendor, 23-24, citando a san Agustín en: De spiritu et littera,
19, 34; 21, 36; 26, 46: CSEL 60, 187, 189-190, 200-201.

80 MARCIANO VIDAL
d. La Moral como “seducción” de la Belleza
Además de los planteamientos anotados, le corresponde, de
manera particular, a san Agustín haber resaltado la comprensión
de Dios como Belleza. Habrá que esperar a la monumental
obra de H. U. von Balthasar para poder encontrar una exposición
tan profunda y tan completa del misterio cristiano en clave
de belleza como la que aparece en san Agustín.
San Agustín es un espíritu preocupado por la belleza 46 , una
realidad que para él procede de la suma belleza que es Dios 47 .
San Agustín ve el mundo como una obra estética creada por el
Artista divino: “la sabiduría de Dios se extiende de uno a otro
confín, y por ella el supremo Artífice coordinó todas las obras
para un fin de hermosura” 48 . La misma historia humana es comprendida
como un “bellísimo poema” 49 , como “un gran canto de
un inefable artista” 50 , como una “modulación prevista” 51 .
Llevado de su afición por la retórica, donde las “antítesis”
constituyen “uno de los más brillantes adornos del discurso” 52 ,
san Agustín llega a descubrir en el mal una función estética para
resaltar la belleza del poema general de la creación y de la historia
humana. “Dios no hubiera creado no digo ángeles, ni siquiera
hombre alguno, del que presupusiese su mal futuro, si no
hubiera conocido a la vez las buenas utilidades que reportaría de
ello. De esta suerte embellecería el orden de los siglos como un
bellísimo poema con esa especie de antítesis” 53 . “Así va trans-
46
Confesiones, IV, 15, 24-27.
47
De divinitate, 83, 4: PL, 40, 28 (“omne pulchrum a summa pulchritudine,
quod Deus est”).
48
De vera religione, 39, 72: Obras de San Agustín. Edición bilingüe, t. IV
(Madrid, 1948) 158-159 (“Ita enim Sapientia Dei pertendit a fine usque ad
finem fortiter (Sap 8, 1). Ita per hanc summus ille artifex opera sua in unum
finem decoris ordinata contextuit”).
49
De civitate Dei, XI, 18: l. c., 745-746 (“pulcherrimum carmen”).
50
Epist. 138, 1, 5: Obras de San Agustín. Edición bilingüe, t. XI (Madrid,
1953) 129 (“velut magnum carmen cuiusdam inaffabilis modulatoris”).
51
Epist. 166, 5, 13: Obras de San Agustín. Edición bilingüe (Marid,
1953) 479 (“modulatio praecognita et praefinita”).
52
De civitate Dei, XI, 18: l. c., 745.
53
Ibid.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 81
curriendo la hermosura de las edades del mundo, cuyas partículas
son aptas cada una a su tiempo, como un gran cántico de un
inefable artista, para que los que adoran dignamente a Dios
pasen a la contemplación eterna de la hermosura aun mientras
dura el tiempo de la fe” 54 . “Dios no permite que vayan pasando
con mayor prisa o lentitud que la exigida por una modulación
prevista y predeterminada los espacios temporales en esas naturalezas
que nacen o mueren” 55 .
Para san Agustín, la moral cristiana es una participación de
la belleza de Dios. Teniendo de fondo la anámnesis platónica,
comprende el sentido moral como un recuerdo y una llamada de
la primera Hermosura: “¿Qué hay que pueda servir al alma de
recordatorio de la primera Hermosura abandonada, cuando sus
mismos vicios le aguijan a ello?” 56 .
La búsqueda de Dios es un camino hacia la Hermosura:
“era arrebatado hacia Ti por tu hermosura” 57 . Una vez encontrada,
surge la pena del tiempo perdido fuera de ella: “tarde te amé
belleza tan antigua y tan nueva, tarde te amé” 58 .
Esta comprensión de la moral, y de la vida cristiana en general,
en clave de belleza, aunque tiene en san Agustín un exponente
cualificado, es una visión compartida con otros Padres de
la Iglesia, con otros teólogos y, sobre todo, con los místicos. La
expresión literaria más perfecta de la atracción del alma hacia la
Belleza absoluta se encuentra en san Juan de la Cruz: “descubre
tu presencia,/ y máteme tu vista y hermosura;/ mira que la dolencia/
de amor, que no se cura/ sino con la presencia y la figura” 59 .
Conviene anotar que para san Agustín la consideración de la
moral como belleza no le lleva a desentenderse de las injusticias
y, en general, del mal moral. Por el contrario, san Agustín da un
relieve especial a la necesidad de “dolerse de la injustucia ajena
y del pecado”, dolor que será en nosotros tanto mayor cuanto
54
Epist. 138, 1, 5: l. c., 129.
55
Epist. 166, 5, 13: l. c., 479.
56
De vera religione, 39, 72: l. c., 158.
57
Confesiones, VII, 7, 23 (“rapiebar ad Te decore tuo”).
58
Ibid., X, 27, 38 (“sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova,
sero te amavi”).
59
Cántico B, estrofa 11.

82 MARCIANO VIDAL
más justos seamos y más caridad tengamos: “tanto más dolor te
causará la injusticia ajena cuanto más justo fueres” y “tanto más
te dolerás del pecado cuanto más caridad tengas” 60 .
e. Fundamentación trinitaria de la Moral
Creo que todo ese conjunto de perspectivas agustinianas
sobre la moral cristiana, que acabo de recordar, converge hacia
un enfoque unificador, que se encuentra en la confesión cristiana
del Misterio Trinitario. Es lo que analizo a continuación, para
hacer mío el planteamiento agustiniano acerca de la fundamentación
trinitaria de la moral cristiana.
A fin de hacer un análisis suficientemente objetivo de la propuesta
agustianiana creo que es conveniente partir de la orientación
de san Agustín en la teología trinitaria, señalar a continuación
cómo el Misterio trinitario ilumina todo el conjunto de
la existencia cristiana, para señalar por último el planteamiento
trinitario de la moral cristiana.
2. EL CAMINO ANTROPOLÓGICO-TRINITARIO DE SAN AGUSTÍN
A san Agustín le corresponde, por méritos propios, el título
de “Doctor de la Trinidad” 61 . Su tratado De Trinitate marca un
camino nuevo en la interpretación del misterio trinitario 62 ,
camino seguido después por la tradición teológica occidental y
de modo especial por santo Tomás.
Agustín partió de un punto distinto del adoptado por los
Padres griegos. Se propuso comprender la vida íntima de Dios
analizando las “procesiones” divinas. Para ello buscó la imagen
60
Enarr. in Ps 98, 12: PL 27, 1.268, 1.269 (“tantum enim te torquet aliena,
quantum recesseris a tua”; “ecce abundet in te caritas, plus dolebis peccatum”).
61
Ver la Introducción de L. ARIAS al agustiniano Tratado de la Santísima
Trinidad: Obras de San Agustín. Edición bilingüe, t. V (Madrid, 1948), 1-112.
62
Sobre la fuerza innovadora de la teología trinitaria de san Agustín, cf.
B. STUDER, Anstösse zu einer neuen Trinitätslehre bei Augustinus von Hippo:
Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift 108 (1999) 123-138.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 83
de la Trinidad en las criaturas y, particularmente, en la criatura
racional. Desde la “trinidad psicológica” del espíritu humano
(mens, notitia, amor) barruntó, como por medio de “un espejo y
en enigma” (1 Cor 13, 12), la secreta vida íntima de Dios. “Nadie
antes de san Agustín había encontrado en el alma tantas huellas
de Dios, nadie había traducido al lenguaje humano con tanta
emoción el misterio de la vida divina” 63 . Los libros VIII al XV de
su tratado sobre la Trinidad constituyen la experiencia más original
de búsqueda de la Trinidad a través del análisis del espíritu
humano. Ve la imagen del Padre en la “memoria”, la del Hijo
en la “inteligencia” y la del Espíritu Santo en el “amor” 64 ; pero,
constata al mismo tiempo la gran desemejanza que hay entre la
imagen humana y la realidad divina 65 . A través de la dialéctica
de la “semejanza” y de la “desemejanza” con el espíritu humano,
el pensamiento agustiniano asciende, con seguridad y con audacia,
del análisis psicológico a la comprensión de la vida íntima
de Dios.
Buscando la imagen de Dios en la criatura, Agustín penetró
en lo más profundo del espíritu humano. Su tratado sobre la
Trinidad constituye, al mismo tiempo, un análisis vigoroso de la
interioridad humana.
3. INTERPRETACIÓN TRINITARIA DE LA EXISTENCIA HUMANA
Precisamente por razón de ese entrecruce de análisis psicológico
e interpretación trinitaria el pensamiento agustiniano
ofrece una visión hondamente trinitaria de la existencia humana.
Somos “creados a imagen” de la Trinidad (cf. Gn 1, 26) y
toda nuestra existencia consiste en una búsqueda de su
“semejanza” (cf. l Jn 3, 2) 66 . Entre el “creados a imagen de la
Trinidad” y el “seremos semejantes a Él” transcurre el tiempo
humano, la tensión existencial del espíritu humano. Esa tensión
no es otra cosa que la activación de la “trinidad psicológica”: el
63
L. ARIAS, l. c., 102.
64
De Trinitate, XV, 21: l. c., 916-919.
65
Ibid., XV, 22 y 23: l. c., 918-923.
66
Ibid., XIV, 19: l. c. 822-827.

84 MARCIANO VIDAL
recuerdo de la mente, el verbo del conocimiento, y la dilección del
amor.
Si el espíritu humano tiene una estructura “especular” del
misterio trinitario se deduce que su realización consistirá en
reproducir, dentro de la imperfección de la imagen, el ejemplar
de la vida trinitaria. “Si la mente es por naturaleza imagen de
Dios Trino, su perfección y hermosura consistirá en acrecentar
el parecido. Pensar en Dios, conocer a Dios, amarlo cada día
más intensamente es el secreto del progreso del alma por las
rutas luminosas de la santidad” 67 . El quehacer humano se cifra
en “la renovación de la imagen de Dios en el alma hasta alcanzar
una perfecta semejanza en la gloria” 68 .
Así, pues, la vida cristiana se define por reproducir, en imagen
y semejanza, la estructura de la vida trinitaria. La moral cristiana
no es otra cosa que el quehacer de perfección en la
semejanza de la vida trinitaria: perfección en el “recuerdo” de
las maravillas de la obra del Padre, perfección en el “conocimiento”
de la verdad del Hijo, Verbo Encarnado, y perfección en
el “amor” de donación que es la obra del Espíritu Santo.
De las tres dimensiones de la perfección san Agustín resalta
la del amor. Su comprensión trinitaria de la moral cristiana es
preferentemente agápica. En el tratado De Trinitate dedica una
especial atención a los análisis del amor 69 , en cuanto vestigio de
la Trinidad 70 . Son también de destacar, a este respecto, las
reflexiones sobre el Espíritu Santo en cuanto don de amor con
que termina el libro XV y todo el tratado 71 . Siguiendo la
Escritura, Agustín proclama que Dios es amor y que la existencia
cristiana también consiste en amar. “En consecuencia, Dios
es amor, como la Escritura lo proclama, y el amor viene de Dios
y actúa en nosotros para que Dios permanezca dentro de nosotros
y nosotros en Él, y esto lo sabemos porque nos dio de su
Espíritu” 72 .
67
L. ARIAS, l. c., 101-102.
68
De Trinitate, XIV, 17: l. c., 818-821.
69
Ibid., VIII, 7-10, 10-14: l. c., 525-535; todo el libro IX: l. c., 536-571.
70
Ibid., VIII, 10, 14: l. c., 534-535.
71
Ibid., XV, 17-27: l. c., 893-941.
72
Ibid., XV, 19, 37: l. c., 909-910.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 85
4. LA CARIDAD TRINITARIA: FUNDAMENTO DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA
Es precisamente la caridad el cauce de que se sirve Agustín
para exponer la estructura trinitaria de la moral cristiana. Esta
orientación agustiniana, que está fundamentada en el tratado
Sobre la Trinidad, es recurrente a lo largo y ancho de todas sus
obras. Tomé nota de ello más arriba, al ofrecer una panorámica
de los planteamientos agustinianos sobre la moral cristiana. En
este contexto más directamente trinitario recojo sus peculiares
aportaciones en la obra De las costumbres de la Iglesia Católica 73 .
En los primeros capítulos de esta obra (cc. 2-6) recuerda una
vez más que el fundamento y el contenido de la moral cristiana
no es otro que Dios, ya que en Él se verifican las condiciones del
sumo Bien, cuya posesión es capaz de hacer feliz a la persona 74 .
“Es cierto que todos queremos vivir una vida feliz” 75 . Ahora bien,
“Dios es para nosotros la suma de todos los bienes, es nuestro
sumo bien” 76 . Por eso, “tendiendo hacia Él, vivimos una vida
santa; y si lo conseguimos, será una vida, además de santa, feliz
y bienaventurada” 77 .
La vida santa y feliz consiste en la “unión con Dios con un
modo de contacto admirable e inteligible” 78 . Tal unión se realiza
mediante la práctica de la caridad. “Es, pues, la caridad la que
produce nuestra semejanza con Dios; y así, conformados y como
sellados con el sello de la divina semejanza y segregados o separados
del mundo, no volvamos a mezclarnos jamás con las criaturas”
79 .
73 SAN AGUSTÍN, De las costumbres de la Iglesia Católica. Versión, introducción
y notas de T. PRIETO: Obras de San Agustín, Edición bilingüe, t. IV
(Madrid, 1948) 235-451.
74
T. PRIETO, l. c., 253: “Como fundamento de la ética cristiana pone el
Santo el sumo bien, que no es otro ni puede serlo que Dios, único objeto
cuya posesión hace al hombre feliz. Todo esto lo demuestra filosóficamente
con el análisis de los caracteres del sumo bien, y concluye que sólo Dios
posee tales caracteres”.
75
De las costumbres de la Iglesia Católica, I, 3, 4: l. c., 265.
76
Ibid., I, 8, 13: l. c., 277.
77
Ibid., I, 6, 10: l. c., 265.
78
Ibid., I, 11, 18: l. c., 285.
79
Ibid., I, 13, 23: l. c., 291.

86 MARCIANO VIDAL
Agustín dedica ocho capítulos (cc. 7-14) a analizar el significado
de esta virtud en sí misma y otros trece capítulos (cc. 15-
27) a exponer el contenido de las virtudes cardinales en cuanto
mediaciones concretas del amor. “Se detiene con fruición en el
análisis de la caridad, la más excelente de las virtudes, única que
realiza la verdadera unión del hombre con el sumo bien, que no
es otro que la Trinidad, unión irrompible, y que le hace feliz para
siempre” 80 .
La caridad es para san Agustín el vínculo de unión de la persona
con la Trinidad. “Debemos amar la unidad trina, Padre,
Hijo y Espíritu Santo, la cual constituye toda la realidad” 81 . De
ahí que atribuya esta “obra de la caridad” al Espíritu Santo 82 , el
cual es el sello de la Comunión trinitaria.
De este modo, la moral cristiana, centrada en la caridad,
refleja y realiza la estructura trinitaria de la vida divina, fuente
y meta del peregrinar humano.
V. ORIENTACIÓN DE SAN BUENAVENTURA
1. EL BIEN: FUNDAMENTO DE LA MORAL
La teología bonaventuriana descansa, en gran medida, sobre
el concepto de Bien 83 . Aunque no escribió ningún tratado De
bono, como lo hicieran san Agustín y Alejandro de Halés, se sirvió
de esta categoría para comprender la realidad divina. El
bien, que tiene su mediación antropológica en el dinamismo del
amor 84 , es por naturaleza difusivo. Según la metafísica del
80
T. PRIETO, l. c., 253.
81
De las Costumbres de la Iglesia Católica, I, 14, 24: l. c., 290-293: “Deum
ergo diligere debemus trinam quandam unitatem, Patrem, Filium et
Spiritum sanctum, quod nihil aliud dicam esse, nisi idipsum esse”.
82
Ibid., I, 13, 23: l. c., 291: “esto es obra únicamente del Espíritu Santo”.
83
Cf. F. DE VENTOSA, La metafísica del Bien en la teología de S.
Buenaventura: Naturaleza y Gracia 1 (1954) 7-39; M. LÁZARO, El concepto de
bien según Buenaventura: Naturaleza y Gracia 45 (1998) 359-373.
84
Cf. M. LÁZARO, El concepto de amor en Buenaventura: Anales de la
Universidad de Cuenca 42 (1997) 83-94.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 87
Pseudo-Dionisio, que a su vez proviene del platonismo, la difusión
del bien se realiza mediante dos dinamismos fundamentales:
a través de la expansión de sí mismo y con el hecho de ser
compartido por varios.
San Buenaventura aplica a la realidad de Dios la categoría
de bien. Dios es, como el bien, difusivo de sí mismo: “ad intra”,
en la autocomunicación trinitaria; y “ad extra”, a través de la
creación. Se comprende que la teología bonaventuriana utilice
la “via Caritatis” para penetrar en el misterio trinitario; no lo
hace, como la teología latina, desde la “esencia” común a las tres
Personas sino desde la “comunión” de las Personas entre sí,
según la orientación de la teología griega.
A partir de esta orientación bonaventuriana, al Dios del
Nuevo Testamento le corresponde como nombre propio, el de
Bien 85 . “El bien es el principalísimo fundamento” para comprender
al Dios trinitario del Nuevo Testamento así como el
“ser” fue el “principio radical” para expresar los atributos divinos
en el Antiguo Testamento 86 . “Razón por la que el
Damasceno, siguiendo a Moisés, dice ser el que es el nombre primario
de Dios, mientras que Dionisio, siguiendo a Cristo, asegura
que el nombre divino primario es el bien” 87 .
Queda así justificada la afirmación de que san
Buenaventura comprende la bondad de Dios no con la categoría
de “trascendental”, como santo Tomás, sino con la categoría de
“trascendente”. “En san Buenaventura, la bondad no es algo
adjetival en Dios, sino que es su definición misma. Desde que es,
es bondad, y mientras es bondad, es dándose” 88 . No puede ser de
otro modo, ya que en palabras del mismo san Buenaventura “el
bien, en efecto, es difusivo de suyo; luego el sumo bien es sumamente
difusivo de suyo” 89 .
85 SAN BUEVAVENTURA, Itinerario de la mente a Dios, c. VI: Obras de San
Buenaventura, t. I (Madrid, 1945) 620-627.
86
Ibid., 620-621.
87
Ibid., 612-613.
88
J. HEREU, “Itinerarium mentis in Deum”. La Teología mística de san
Buenaventura: Verdad y Vida 51 (1993) 349-350.
89 SAN BUEVAVENTURA, l. c., 620-621.

88 MARCIANO VIDAL
La comprensión de Dios como Bien tiene en san
Buenaventura, y en general en la escuela franciscana, una peculiaridad
digna de ser destacada. Santo Tomás entiende la bondad
de Dios con las categorías de la metafísica aristotélica; predica
de Dios el atributo de bondad como si se tratara de un “trascendental”
(bondad) del Ser (Dios). Por el contrario, san
Buenaventura se sirve de la metafísica platónica y, consiguientemente,
entiende la bondad de Dios con la categoría de “trascendente”;
es decir, la bondad no sólo es atributo de Dios sino Dios
mismo.
La vida moral cristiana recibe una orientación peculiar
desde esta comprensión bonaventuriana de Dios como Bien. La
moralidad no es otra cosa que la realización del bien y éste se
verifica a través del amor de donación. La persona moral es una
ex-istencia, es decir, un “salirse de sí misma” en el doble sentido
del “bien que se difunde”: a través de la “donación” a otro y
mediante el “compartir” con otros. De este modo el Ejemplar,
que es Dios como Bien absoluto, se realiza en parte en la criatura
racional. El “ejemplarismo ético” es la expresión adecuada
para la comprensión bonaventuriana de la Moral 90 .
Así, pues, la aportación bonaventuriana a la moral cristiana
se realiza desde su concepción de Dios como Bien, un bien no
sólo “trascendental” al Ser de Dios sino “trascendente” en sí
mismo y, por consiguiente, identificado con Dios mismo. Esta
orientación plenamente “teologal” de la moral culmina en la plenitud
“trinitaria” mediante la revelación y el descubrimiento de
Dios como Comunión Trinitaria. Esto es lo que analizo a continuación,
exponiendo en primer lugar el puesto de la Trinidad en
la síntesis bonaventuriana así como la peculiaridad de su teología
trinitaria.
2. LA TRINIDAD: CLAVE DE BÓVEDA DE LA SÍNTESIS BONAVENTURIANA
“En el sistema bonaventuriano todas las verdades son interdependientes
y se integran e interrelacionan de un modo
90
Cf. J. L. PARADA, El ejemplarismo moral en la ética teológica de san
Buenaventura (Murcia, 1991).

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 89
concéntrico. Dentro de esa dinámica envolvente se realiza y se
comprende la historia humana que, partiendo ‘de la beatísima
trinidad’ vuelve de nuevo a ella ‘a manera de círculo inteligible’,
como dice al final de las Cuestiones disputadas sobre el misterio
de la Santísima Trinidad” 91 .
Es propio del pensamiento bonaventuriano trabajar
mediante la “dialéctica de la síntesis”: búsqueda de la totalidad
en el objeto 92 y uso de una metodología a la vez filosófica, teológica
y mística 93 . Pocos sistemas teológicos son tan compactamente
unitarios y reflejan una experiencia de vida tan indivisible
como la síntesis de san Buenaventura. Razón (filosofía), fe
(teología), oración (mística) se dan cita para expresar una experiencia
de vida -en este caso, la maravillosa experiencia de vida
franciscana-, la cual constituye la arqueología fundante del pensamiento
reflejo 94 .
La clave de bóveda de la síntesis bonaventuriana es la “beatísima”
(éste es el adjetivo más recurrente en los escritos de san
Buenaventura) Trinidad 95 . El conjunto de la realidad forma un
círculo dinámico en cuyo inicio y en cuya meta está la Trinidad:
“de la Trinidad a la Trinidad”. Utilizando la categoría omnicomprensiva
del ejemplarismo, su peculiar “forma mentis” 96 , san
91
J. A. MERINO, La Trinidad, paradigma de vida comunitaria, en S.
Buenaventura: Estudios Trinitarios 30 (1996) 10.
92
En san Buenaventura “la misma noción de fragmento no tiene ningún
sentido. Únicamente se puede captar en su totalidad la economía general de
la doctrina o, de lo contrario, no se verá nada” (E. GILSON, La philosophie de
Saint Bonaventure (Paris, 1943) 385).
93
J. A. MERINO, a. c., 6: “En Buenaventura se entrelazan filosofía, teología
y mística en un sistema unitario y compacto difícilmente superado”.
94
Cf. J. A. MERINO, a. c., 8-10.
95
Cf. I. DELIO, Bonaventure’s Metaphysics of the God: Theologial Studies
60 (1999) 228-246, especialmente pp. 231-233 (“The Trinity as Fountain
Fullness”).
96
Cf. L. AMORÓS, Introducción General: Obras de San Buenaventura.
Edición bilingüe, t. I (Madrid, 1945) 121-124. “Apoyándonos en el mismo
Doctor Seráfico, podemos dar una definición del ejemplarismo que comprenda
este doble aspecto del mismo (función activa prototípica y huella
pasiva manifestativa del ejemplar en relación con la imagen), diciendo que es
la doctrina de las relaciones de expresión que existen entre Dios y las criaturas”
(Ibid., 122).

90 MARCIANO VIDAL
Buenaventura interpreta la creación entera como reflejo de la
Trinidad: “la creación es como un libro en el que resplandece, se
representa y se lee la Trinidad creadora en tres grados de expresión,
es a saber: a modo de vestigio, de imagen y de semejanza;
de manera que la razón de vestigio se halla en todas las criaturas,
la razón de imagen sólo en las intelectuales y la razón de
semejanza sólo en las deiformes; por las cuales el entendimiento
humano está destinado a subir poco a poco, como por las gradas
de una escala, hasta el Sumo Principio que es Dios” 97 .
La presencia trinitaria en la creación es una afirmación
explicitada con frecuencia en las obras bonaventurianas.
Limitando la consideración a la síntesis del Breviloquium, en ella
se constata la presencia de la Trinidad en el acto creador. Se dice
que “las criaturas son efecto de la Trinidad creadora por triple
género de causalidad” (eficiente, ejemplar, final) 98 . La Trinidad se
hace presente y actuante de modo especial en la criatura racional,
cuya alma es creada a imagen de la Trinidad, “por la unidad
de esencia y la trinidad de potencia” 99 . La transformación operada
por la gracia se realiza “conforme a la beatísima Trinidad” 100 .
Se puede, pues, intercambiar la expresión de “Dios creador”
(Deus creator) por la de “Trinidad creadora” (Trinitas creatrix o
creans). La realidad se sustenta en la Trinidad. Tiene, por tanto,
una estructura trinitaria, no solo de ejemplaridad trinitaria sino
de consistencia trinitaria. La Trinidad ejercita la triple causalidad,
eficiente, ejemplar y final, con respecto a la realidad y ésta
se siente interpretada por esa triple hermenéutica trinitaria.
3. LA “VIA CARITATIS” DEL ACCESO A LA TRINIDAD
San Buenaventura accede al Misterio Trinitario por la puerta
de la caridad (“per viam caritatis”) 101 . Siguiendo a Ricardo de
97
Breviloquium, parte 2ª, c. 12, 1: Obras de San Buenaventura. Edición
bilingüe, t. I (Madrid, 1945) 283-285.
98
Ibid., parte 2ª, c. 1, 2: l. c., 340-343.
99
Ibid., parte 2ª, c. 9, 3: l. c., 270-271.
100
Ibid., parte 5ª, c. 1, 5: l. c., 380-381.
101
Cf. A. VILLALMONTE, El argumento “ex caritate” en la doctrina trinita-

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 91
San Víctor, a la naciente tradición franciscana reflejada en
Alejandro de Halés, y a los Padres griegos, el pensamiento bonaventuriano
parte de la trinidad de las Personas en lugar de iniciar
el camino en la unidad de la Esencia divina. Para él, sensibilizado
por la preferencia de la tradición franciscana hacia lo
“concreto” y no hacia lo “abstracto”, el estatuto ontológico divino
no es tanto la unidad esencial cuanto la trinidad de personas
102 .
Las Personas trinitarias constituyen la vida divina. Esta no
es otra cosa que la relación o comunión entre Ellas. La Trinidad
consiste en la perijóresis, que san Buenaventura prefiere traducir
por el vocablo dinámico de circumincessio y no por el más
estático de circuminssesio. Sin menguar la unidad substancial,
el pensamiento bonaventuriano prefiere definir la vida intratrinitaria
por las Personas divinas, que se constituyen por la relación.
Precisamente por eso, la Trinidad consiste en ser en y en ser
hacia.
No le costó a san Buenaventura trasladar a la Trinidad el
concepto de Bien, una categoría decisiva para su comprensión
de Dios y de la realidad creada, según señalé más arriba. El
Bien, en la interpretación bonaventuriana, es difusivo, es decir
requiere “ser compartido” y precisa “entregarse”. Estas dos cualidades
del Bien se realizan de forma eminente en la Trinidad. El
Dios trinitario se define por ser “realidad compartida” y por ser
“entrega mutua absoluta”.
Siendo el Bien absoluto, la Trinidad es esencialmente
Comunicación. La vida trinitaria no es soledad, aburrimiento o
monotonía, como pensaron algunos filósofos (Aristóteles,
Feuerbach), sino “profunda comunicación, íntima convivencia,
fuerte solidaridad, igualdad y coparticipación totales, infinitas
delicias e ilimitada jocundidad” 103 .
Por ser Bien absoluto y Comunicación esencial, la Trinidad
es Amor. “El amor es la exégesis magistral de la vida trinitaria”
104 . San Buenaventura introduce la hermenéutica del amor
ria de S. Buenaventura: Revista Española de Teología 53 (1953) 521-537.
102
Cf. J. A. MERINO, a. c., 10-26.
103
J. A. MERINO, a. c., 26.
104
Ibid., 26.

92 MARCIANO VIDAL
como clave explicativa del Misterio Trinitario. Para él, la
Trinidad es una Trinidad agápica: el Padre es el amante (“diligens”),
el Hijo es el amado (“dilectus”) y el Espíritu Santo es el
co-amado (“condilectus”). “Dios se comunica sumamente
teniendo desde toda la eternidad un ser amado y co-amado y por
esto Dios es uno y trino” 105 .
4. LA ESTRUCTURA TRINITARIA DE LA EXISTENCIA CRISTIANA
Conociendo el puesto central que ocupa la Trinidad en la
síntesis bonaventuriana no puede extrañarnos que el Doctor
Seráfico comprenda toda la vida cristiana, incluida en ella la
dimensión moral, en clave trinitaria. Ésta es la perspectiva que
adopta en la parte quinta del Breviloquium 106 , que titula “De la
Gracia del Espíritu Santo” y en la que hace una presentación de
la vida cristiana en su conjunto.
La gracia tiene para san Buenaventura una estructura trinitaria:
es “un don por el cual el alma se perfecciona y viene a ser
esposa de Cristo, hija del Padre eterno y templo del Espíritu
Santo” 107 . El dinamismo de la existencia cristiana no es otra cosa
que el dinamismo de la gracia. Buenaventura llama a este dinamismo
“los ejercicios de la gracia”, que concreta en cuatro: ejercicios
del creer, ejercicios del amar, ejercicios del obrar, ejercicios
del orar 108 .
Todas estas ejercitaciones de la gracia tienen una estructura
trinitaria en su causa eficiente, en su causa ejemplar y en su
causa finalizante, ya que la gracia nos inclina a realizarlas en
conformidad con las exigencias de la “bienaventurada Trinidad”.
“La gracia nos dirige y regula para las ejercitaciones debidas y
meritorias en lo que se ha de creer, en lo se ha de amar, en lo que
se ha de obrar y en lo que se ha de pedir, según las exigencias de
la suma verdad, bondad, justicia y misericordia de la bienaven-
105
Breviloquium, parte 1ª, c. 2, 3: l. c., 208-209.
106
Breviloquium, parte 5ª, c. 1-10: l. c., 376-429.
107
Ibid., parte 5ª, c. 1, 2: l. c., 376-377.
108
Ibid., parte 5ª, c. 7, 1: l. c., 410-411.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 93
turada Trinidad” 109 . Como se puede advertir fácilmente, san
Buenaventura establece una concordancia entre las ejercitaciones
de la gracia y los atributos divinos: el creer concuerda con la
verdad divina, el amar con la bondad divina, el obrar con la justicia
divina, el orar con la misericordia divina.
La gracia y las ejercitaciones de la gracia corresponden a la
criatura “deiforme”, en la que se hace presente la Trinidad. Ésta
está presente y operante en todas las criaturas; pero lo está de un
modo especial en la criatura “deiforme”, que constituye una plenitud
de la criatura “racional” y que, por supuesto, supera a la
criatura “no racional”. La presencia activa de la Trinidad en la
criatura “deiforme” hay que entenderla desde Dios como “don
que viene de Él” pero, mirada desde la orilla humana, se concreta
en la conformación de la mente con la “beatísima
Trinidad”. Una conformación que se realiza mediante el vigor de
la virtud, el esplendor de la verdad y el fervor de la caridad: “nuestra
mente se conforma a la beatísima Trinidad por el vigor de la
virtud, por el esplendor de la verdad y por el fervor de la caridad
… y con todo esto el hombre viene a ser placiente y acepto a
Dios” 110 .
109
Ibid., parte 5ª, c. 7, 3: l. c., 410-411.
110
Ibid., parte 5ª, c. 1, 6: l. c., 380-381: “mens nostra efficitur conformis
beatissimae Trinitatis per vigorem virtutis, splendorem veritatis et fervorem
caritatis … et ex his omnibus homo Deo placens y acceptus existit”. La expresión
“splendor veritatis” ha cobrado un relieve especial en la Teología moral
actual a partir de la Encíclica de Juan Pablo II “Veritatis splendor”. En esta
encíclica no se recoge la impostación triádica de san Buenaventura: vigor de
la virtud, esplendor de la verdad, fervor de la caridad. Por otra parte, aunque
san Buenaventura no lo cita, en su formulación resuena un texto agustiniano,
de sabor “africano”. Dice el Obispo de Hipona que algunos interpretan el
término “Temán” (“vendrán de Temán”) del cántico de Habacuc por
“Austral” o “Africano” y añade, “por lo cual se significa el mediodía, esto es,
el fervor de la caridad y el esplendor de la verdad” (“alii interpretati sunt ab
Austro vel ab Africo: per quod significatur meridies, id est fervor charitatis e
splendor veritatis”): SAN AGUSTÍN, La Ciudad de Dios, l. XVIII, c. 32: Obras de
San Agustín. Edición bilingüe, t. XVI-XVII (Madrid, 1958) 1298.

94 MARCIANO VIDAL
5. LA MORAL CRISTIANA EN ESTRUCTURA TRINITARIA
A la luz de esa síntesis bonaventuriana sobre el dinamismo
de la existencia cristiana, en cuanto “ejercitaciones de la gracia”,
se comprende que el Doctor Seráfico trate la moral cristiana en
clave trinitaria.
En primer lugar, conviene tomar nota del encuadre en el que
sitúa la dimensión moral cristiana. Ésta es considerada como un
“ejercicio de la gracia” 111 . Es, por lo tanto, una moral de gracia.
En cuanto moral de gracia, la moral cristiana se rige por la “ley
evangélica” y no por ley mosaica 112 . Ahora bien, si la gracia tiene
una configuración trinitaria, la vida moral también participa de
esa misma estructura trinitaria: a través del comportamiento
moral “el alma se perfecciona y viene a ser esposa de Cristo, hija
del Padre eterno y templo del Espíritu Santo” 113 .
En cuanto al contenido de la moral cristiana, san
Buenaventura opta por organizarlo en torno a las exigencias de
la Caridad, cuya doble dimensión -hacia Dios y hacia el prójimorecoge
el contenido de las dos tablas del código mosaico. “De los
preceptos morales algunos definen nuestras relaciones con Dios
y otros nuestras relaciones con el prójimo, según el doble mandamiento
de la caridad; y esto quiso insinuar el Espíritu Santo
por medio del misterio de las dos tablas, de las cuales por lo
mismo se dice que estaban grabadas por el dedo de Dios” 114 .
San Buenaventura hace obra de orfebre al engarzar todos
los contenidos de la moral cristiana en torno a la joya preciosa
de la Trinidad. Las exigencias en relación con Dios tienen una
organización triplemente ternaria: “como Dios es trino, es decir,
Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Santo, debe ser adorado como suprema
majestad, confesado como verdad y aceptado como caridad
111
Ver la exposición en: Breviloquium, parte 5ª, c. 9: l. c., 418425.
112
Ibid., parte 5ª, 9, 3: l. c., 420-421: “Se dice que la ley mosaica se diferencia
de la evangélica en que aquélla es de figuras y ésta de realidades;
aquélla, de castigos, y ésta, de gracia; aquélla, literal, y ésta, espiritual; aquélla,
letra que mata, y ésta, espíritu que vivifica; aquélla, ley de temor, y ésta,
ley de amor; aquélla, de servidumbre, y ésta, de libertad; aquélla, de carga, y
ésta, de facilidad”.
113
Ibid., parte 5ª, 1, 2: l. c., 376-377.
114
Ibid., parte 5ª, 9, 4: l. c. 420-423.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 95
según la triple facultad irascible, racional y concupiscible, por
acto de obra, de boca y de corazón” 115 . Organización trinitaria
también descubre en las exigencias éticas hacia el prójimo:
“como el prójimo es imagen de la Trinidad y, por tanto, en cuanto
representa la imagen del Padre, tiene derecho a la piedad; en
cuanto representa la del Hijo, a la veracidad, y en cuanto representa
la del Espíritu Santo, a la benignidad, resulta que son siete
los mandamientos de la segunda tabla” 116 .
Pocas síntesis de moral cristiana reflejarán mejor la estructura
trinitaria de la existencia cristiana como la propuesta de
san Buenaventura. Me parece conveniente completar esta presentación
con la alusión a la configuración también trinitaria de
la experiencia mística.
6. DINAMISMO TRINITARIO DE LA EXPERIENCIA MÍSTICA
La teología bonaventuriana parte de la experiencia vivida y
se abre al horizonte de la mística. Esta configuración teológica
cobra mayor significado en el tratado sobre la Trinidad. La
reflexión trinitaria se convierte en fulgor místico en el Itinerario
de la mente a Dios, una visión total y grandiosa que el Doctor
Seráfico tuvo del universo en el otoño de 1259 en el monte
Alverna 117 .
Esta apasionada búsqueda del Creador a través de las criaturas
tiene tres momentos caracterizados por el uso de tres claves
hermenéuticas, las cuales corresponden a tres capacidades
receptoras de la condición humana. Correlacionando claves hermenéuticas
y capacidades receptoras, san Buenaventura compone
la guía del itinerario hacia Dios: el mundo no racional se
desvela como “vestigio” de Dios y es captado por los “sentidos”;
115
Ibid., parte 5ª, 9, 4: l. c., 422-423.
116
Ibid., parte 5ª, 9, 5: l. c., 422-423.
117 SAN BUEVAVENTURA, Itinerario de la mente a Dios: Obras de San
Buenaventura, t. I (Madrid, 1945) 556-633. Ver, entre otros muchos estudios,
esta aproximación desde la teología mística: J. HEREU, “Itinerarium mentis in
Deum”. La teología mística de San Buenaventura: Verdad y Vida 51 (1993)
339-351.

96 MARCIANO VIDAL
la criatura racional se descubre como “imagen” de Dios y es
apreciada como tal por el “espíritu”; la criatura deiforme aparece
como “luz” refleja de Dios y es sentida así por la “mente”.
Tanto las claves hermenéuticas como las capacidades receptoras
funcionan dentro de un dinamismo trinitario: es la Trinidad
quien sustenta, como causa eficiente, ejemplar y final, todo ese
universo de presencia divina 118 .
La misma Trinidad es quien atrae hacia sí la tensión de
búsqueda de esa peregrinación mística. “El Itinerario no es el
discurso del método racional sino el discurso de la experiencia
existencial del homo viator que se encamina hacia ese infinito
amado y deseado, que es el Tú trinitaro” 119 . La culminación del
camino está en el “descanso místico”, en ese “éxtasis” de la
mente que acaece por exceso de luz y de afecto y que cambia el
vaciamiento de la criatura por la presencia de la Trinidad en ella.
En esta etapa final del camino, el alma se entrega toda ella “a la
esencia creadora, esto es, al Padre, y al Hijo, y al Espíritu
Santo” 120 . Y de tal modo se entrega a la Trinidad que llega a clamar
por el paso definitivo hacia Ella: “muramos, pues, y entremos
en estas tinieblas, reduzcamos a silencio los cuidados, las
concupiscencias y los fantasmas de la imaginación; pasemos
con Cristo crucificado de este mundo al Padre, a fin de que,
118
Las criaturas no racionales: “proclaman con claridad que en ellas,
como en espejos, puede verse la generación eterna del Verbo, Imagen e Hijo
que del Padre emana eternamente” (Itinerario de la mente a Dios, 2, 7: l. c.,
582-583). La criatura racional: “si consideramos el orden, el origen y la virtud
de estas potencias, el alma nos lleva a la misma beatísima Trinidad… El
alma a sí misma, de sí misma como por espejo se eleva a especular a la santa
Trinidad del Padre, del Verbo y del Amor” (Ibid., 3, 5: l. c. 598-601). Criatura
deiforme: “allí donde a manera de candelabro, reluce la luz de la verdad en
la faz de nuestra mente, en la cual resplandece, por cierto, la imagen de la
beatísima Trinidad” (Ibid., 3, 1: l. c., 590-591; cf. Ibid., 6, 1. 2. 3. 6: l. c., 620-
627).
119
J. A. MERINO, a. c., 23.
120
“Ha de darse poco a la inquisición y mucho a la unción; poco a la lengua
y muchísimo a la alegría interior; poco a la palabra y a los escritos, y
todo al don de Dios, que es el Espíritu Santo; poco o nada a la criatura y todo
a la esencia creadora, esto es, al Padre, y al Hijo, y al Espíritu Santo”:
Itinerario de la mente a Dios, 7, 5: l. c., 630-631.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 97
manifestándose a nosotros el Padre, digamos con Felipe: Esto
nos basta” 121 .
VI. BALANCE
De las reflexiones precedentes se deducen algunas afirmaciones
básicas para la comprensión y para la praxis de la vida
moral cristiana. Quiero referirme a dos: la primera, al hecho de
la funcionalidad “moral” de la confesión de fe trinitaria; la
segunda tiene que ver con el modo de esa vertiente moral del
Misterio trinitario.
El contenido de la confesión de fe trinitaria no se reduce a
un “misterio” propio de la “lógica” de la fe cristiana, sin ninguna
implicación para la práctica concreta de la vida. Gracias a
Dios, ya ha sido superada aquella situación que describía K.
Rahner hace algunos años: “los cristianos, a pesar de que hacen
profesión de fe ortodoxa en la Trinidad, en la realización religiosa
de su existencia son casi exclusivamente ‘monoteístas’.
Podemos, por tanto, aventurar la conjetura de que si tuviéramos
que eliminar un día la doctrina de la Trinidad por haber descubierto
que era falsa, la mayor parte de la literatura religiosa quedaría
casi inalterada” 122 .
La Comunión trinitaria es el misterio del ser y del actuar de
Dios. En cuanto tal, es el principio constitutivo del cristiano y de
la historia humana. “La trinidad no solamente tiene una historia,
que es expresión de su naturaleza singular y que constituye
una auténtica sociedad divina, sino que ha creado una historia
externa a través de la creación y de la redención, llamada historia
de la salvación” 123 .
A partir de esta primera afirmación hay que ser críticos frente
a la postura escéptica de I. Kant ante el “valor práctico” de las
verdades de fe cristiana: Trinidad, Encarnación, Resurrección,
121
Itinerario de la mente a Dios, c. 7: l. c., 632-633.
122
K. RAHNER, El Dios trinitario como principio y fundamento trascendente
de la Historia de Salvación: Mysterium Salutis, II/1 (Madrid, 1969) 361-
362.
123
J. A. MERINO, a. c., 31.

98 MARCIANO VIDAL
Ascensión, etc. 124 . Para el filósofo de la Ilustración, “del dogma
de la Trinidad, tomado literalmente no cabe forjar absolutamente
nada en función de lo práctico, aun cuando uno crea llegar a
entenderlo y mucho menos cuando uno se percata de que sobrepasa
todos nuestros conceptos. Si hemos de venerar a tres o a
diez personas representa una cuestión que el discente aceptará
literalmente con igual facilidad tanto en un caso como en el
otro, puesto que carece de concepto alguno sobre un Dios multipersonal
(hipóstatis), pero sobre todo porque no puede sacar
regla alguna para su conducta a partir de semejante multiplicidad”
125 . Parecidas apreciaciones hace en relación con los dogmas
cristianos de la Encarnación, de la Resurrección y de la
Ascensión 126 .
En cuanto al modo de funcionalidad moral del Misterio trinitario,
es fácil aceptar su normatividad paradigmática. La
Comunión trinitaria es el modelo y la utopía suprema de la vida
humana. La vida personal, la relación interpersonal, la vida
familiar, la vida social, toda la existencia humana mide su nivel
de realización por la semejanza al modelo de la vida trinitaria.
Tanto la perspectiva psicológica agustiniana como el ejemplarismo
bonaventuriano, en cuanto vías de acceso al Misterio
trinitario, apoyan esta interpretación “paradigmática” de la vida
trinitaria en orden a configurar el ideal ético de la vida humana.
Apoyándose en la teología trinitaria de san Buenaventura, J. A.
Merino afirma que “la trinidad es el modelo supremo de la
utopía de la convivencialidad humana y el mejor paradigma
para un humanismo integral y transpersonal” 127 . Este mismo
autor hasta se atreve a esbozar un “manifiesto al servicio del per-
124
I. KANT, Der Streit der Fakultäten (1798): Werke, VII (Berlín, 1922)
311-431. Cito por la traducción castellana de R. Rodríguez Aramayo, publicada
por la editorial Trotta con estudio preliminar de J. Gómez Caffarena: I.
KANT, La contienda entre las facultades de filosofía y teología (Madrid, 1999).
125
Ibid., 20.
126
Ibid., 20-21. Ver, en las páginas citadas, las anotaciones hermenéuticas
de J. Gómez Caffarena sobre el texto kantiano. Conviene añadir que Kant
admite la funcionalidad de la gracia en la vida moral (Ibid., 24-25) así como
la capacidad de la razón humana para ser vehículo de la revelación divina
(Ibid., 28).
127
J. A. MERINO, a. c., 34.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 99
sonalismo cristiano” basándose en la doctrina bonaventuriana
sobre el Misterio trinitario 128 .
El Concilio Vaticano II utiliza esta lectura paradigmática del
Misterio trinitario. Para justificar la unidad de la Iglesia y para
apoyar el trabajo del ecumenismo cristiano apela a la unidad de
la Comunión trinitaria. Después de una exposición vibrante y
grandiosa del Proyecto de Dios realizado por Cristo y continuado
en la Iglesia mediante la presencia del Espíritu Santo, el
Concilio expresa así la unidad de esa historia salvífica: “Éste es el
misterio sagrado de la unidad de la Iglesia, en Cristo y por Cristo,
obrando el Espíritu Santo la variedad de funciones. El modelo y
principio supremo de este misterio es la unidad de un solo Dios
Padre e Hijo en el Espíritu Santo, en la Trinidad de personas” 129 .
Una orientación más expresamente ética se encuentra en
Gaudium et spes, al justificar en el paradigma de la vida trinitaria
el doble principio ético de la unión entre todos los hijos de
Dios y de la entrega sincera de uno mismo en servicio de los
demás: “El Señor Jesús, cuando pide al padre que todos sean
uno…, como nosotros somos uno (Jn 17, 21-22), ofreciendo perspectivas
inaccesibles a la razón humana, sugiere cierta semejanza
entre la unión de las personas divinas y la unión de los hijos
de Dios en la verdad y en el amor. Esta semejanza muestra que el
hombre, que es la única critarura en la tierra a la que Dios ha
amado por sí misma, no puede encontrarse plenamente a sí
mimso sino en la entrega sincera de sí mismo (cf. Lc 17, 23)” 130 .
Creo que es necesario dar un paso más en la comprensión de
la funcionalidad moral del Misterio trinitario. El Concilio
Vaticano II, en el texto citado de Unitatis redintegratio (n. 2),
habla de “modelo” y de “principio supremo”. La Trinidad,
además de paradigma, es principio de la vida moral. Esta dimensión
ontológica de la Trinidad en la vida moral es la que justifica
la vertiente paradigmática. La Comunión trinitaria no solo es
modelo de la moral cristiana sino su conformación ontológica.
Así lo expresa el Catecismo de la Iglesia Católica al caracterizar
la vida moral como una “conformación con Cristo en el Espíritu
128
Ibid., 32-34.
129
Unitatis redintegratio, 2.
130
Gaudium et spes, 24.

100 MARCIANO VIDAL
Santo para gloria de Dios Padre” 131 .
De hecho, el Catecismo de la Iglesia Católica, al inicio de la
parte dedicada a la Moral, propone una estructura trinitaria
para exponer el contenido de la moral cristiana 132 , si bien en el
ulterior desarrollo de la materia no es tan patente su opción por
ese esquema, prefiriendo el del Decálogo y el de las Virtudes 133 .
El reciente Directorio General para la Catequesis tiene un interés
especial en resaltar la estructura del “cristocentrismo trinitario”
en la propuesta del mensaje cristiano. El hondo “cristocentrismo”
134 del mensaje cristiano ha de interpretarse desde el misterio
fontal de la Trinidad y convertirse, así, en “cristocentrismo
trinitario” 135 .
La moral cristiana tiene una estructura ontológica trinitaria,
ya que toda la vida cristiana tiene idéntica configuración. Es ésta
una perspectiva que tiene su origen en la misma Revelación y que
ha sido mantenida fielmente por la Tradición. El Papa Juan
Pablo la ha vuelto a explicitar con ocasión de la preparación al
Gran Jubileo del Año 2000, proponiendo el Misterio trinitario
como contenido y estructura de esta magna celebración cristiana
136 . San Ireneo lo expresó con esta densa fórmula: “Por el
Espíritu subirán al Hijo, después por el Hijo subirán al Padre” 137 .
Manuel Silvela 14
28010 Madrid
Spain.
MARCIANO VIDAL
131
Catecismo de la Iglesia Católica, n. 2558: “La Iglesia lo (el Misterio de
la Fe) profesa en el Símbolo de los Apóstoles (Primera parte del Catecismo)
y lo celebra en la Liturgia sacramental (Segunda parte), para que la vida de
los fieles se conforme con Cristo en el Espíritu Santo para gloria de Dios
Padre (Tercera parte)”.
132
Ibid., nn. 1693 (Padre), 1694 (Cristo), 1695 (Espíritu Santo).
133
Cf. M. VIDAL, La Moral cristiana en el nuevo Catecismo (Madrid, 1993)
37-43.
134 CONGREGACIÓN PARA EL CLERO, Directorio General para la Catequesis
(Vaticano, 1997) n. 98 (pp. 107-108).
135
Ibid., n. 99 (pp. 108-110).
136 JUAN PABLO II, Tertio millennio adveniente (Vaticano, 1994), passim
(ver, por ejemplo, n. 8).
137 SAN IRENEO, Adversus haereses, V, 36, 2: PG, 7, 1223: “Per Spiritum
quidem ad Filium, per Filium autem ascendere ad Patrem”.

LA TRINIDAD: ORIGEN Y META DE LA MORAL CRISTIANA 101
Summary / Resumen
—————
Christian morality, just as the Christian life itself, has its origin
and goal in the Trinity. Notwithstanding how obvious this is, this
affirmation has not been developed with an appropriate fullness in the
treatises of moral theology. The author, basing his argument on the
fundamental meanings of the Mystery of the Trinity (I), alludes to the
Trinitarian dimension of the Christian life (II). He proceeds with an
analysis of the implications of the Trinity for morality, considering the
Trinitarian communion as the ethical paradigm and foundational
structure of the moral life (III). This double affirmation is studied both
in the thought of St. Augustine (IV) and in the work of Saint
Bonaventure (V). Drawing up the balance of the argument (VI), it is
very clear that there is a need for a Trinitarian formulation of Christian
morality such as is indicated in the Catechism of the Catholic Church
and the apostolic letter Tertio millennio adveniente of John Paul II.
La moral cristiana, lo mismo que toda la vida cristiana, tiene su
origen y encuentra su meta en la Trinidad. A pesar de ser evidente, esta
afirmación no ha sido desarrollada con la amplitud debida en los tratados
de teología moral. El autor, basándose en los significados fundamentales
del Misterio trinitario (I), alude a la dimensión trinitaria de
la vida cristiana (II) y se detiene en el análisis de las implicaciones de
la Trinidad para la moral, considerando la comunión trinitaria como
paradigma ético y como estructura fundante de la vida moral (III); esta
doble funcionalidad ética es estudiada tanto en el pensamiento de san
Agustín (IV), como en la obra de san Buenaventura (V). Como balance
(VI), aparece con claridad la necesidad de una impostación trinitaria
de la moral cristiana tal como señalan el Catecismo de la Iglesia
Católica y la carta apostólica Tertio millennio adveniente de Juan
Pablo II.
—————
The author is an invited Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor invitado en la Academia Alfonsiana
—————

103
StMor 38 (2000) 103-125
MARTIN MCKEEVER C.Ss.R.
THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE
AS A CATEGORY OF ETHICAL ARGUMENTATION
IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1
It would seem, prima facie, that there is something morally
wrong about driving a tank over a crowd of unarmed students
and their bicycles. Not everyone agrees, however, and so those of
us who hold this conviction are faced with the challenge of
rationally justifying and defending it. Even among those who
would condemn such an action as morally wrong, the reasons
for holding this conviction will probably be quite diverse. Some
will maintain that it is wrong because it is against the law of the
state, or against natural law, or against the law of God; others
will say that it is wrong because of the consequences for the
victims, their families and society in general; others again will
argue that such an action is wrong because of some special
intuitions or sentiments which it provokes in us; and the
intellectually lazy will undoubtedly insist that it is wrong
because it is wrong and there is nothing more to be said about
the matter!
To take up any of these positions, or others of a similar
kind, is of course to engage in ethics in that it is to attempt to
provide a generalized theoretical explanation of why a certain
action is to be considered morally right or wrong. A
comprehensive account of the myriad answers to the question as
to what makes an action morally right or wrong just would be
1
This article is an elaborated version of the inaugural lecture entitled “Il
dilemma etico-politico del discorso sui diritti umani nella cultura odierna”
delivered by the author at the Alphonsian Academy at the beginning of the
academic year 1998-99. While retaining most of the material used in the oral
original, this written version develops in particular the treatment of the
normative basis of human rights, hence the change in title.

104 MARTIN MCKEEVER
an extremely long history of ethics. Different schools and
methods of ethics, in fact, are distinguished from one another
on the basis of how they conceive of what is good for human
beings and how they believe this good should be realized.
To the specific question: What makes driving a tank over
unarmed students morally wrong?, one of the most common
answers offered today is “because it is against human rights”. In
such a response, human rights discourse is being used as an
ethical category in the sense that the action is classified as
morally wrong on the basis of a set of criteria supplied by, or
implicit in, the idea of human rights. Such a manner of
discussing moral issues, particularly of a social nature, has
become so common that we tend to take it for granted, perhaps
overlooking the fact that it constitutes yet another way of doing
ethics. But is there not something strange and contorted about
saying that what makes driving over students morally wrong is
the fact that they have a human right not to be driven over? The
purpose of this article is to attend carefully to this way of using
human rights discourse and notice some of the problems
involved in reasoning in this way, particularly in the context of
contemporary culture.
In what follows, after a number of preliminary comments,
this usage of human rights discourse will be examined in three
different perspectives which we will call pragmatic (meaning
specific choices and actions concerning human rights claims)
semantic (meaning the evolution and current nuances of the
term “human rights” as a linguistic construction) and normative
(meaning the collocation of human rights discourse in
systematic ethical theory). It is this third perspective which is of
primary interest here. Since human rights discourse is used as
an ethical category both in “secular” and in “ecclesial”
discussions, and since on this score these two forms of discourse
overlap to such a considerable degree, we will develop the main
argument of this piece in the idiom of “secular” ethics, limiting
the treatment of the specifically theological aspects of the issue
to a separate, concluding section.

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 105
Preliminary comments
Before broaching an analytical study of the issue in hand, a
number of preliminary comments of a more general nature will
serve to better understand the dimensions of this question and
the context in which it is set. A gloss on the main terms used in
the title of this article will serve to unearth a number of such
background considerations.
Herbert McCabe has said that a serious moral issue is
always an issue about “who gets hurt”. If this is true, a key focal
point of moral discussion must be the suffering of human
beings, particularly the suffering imposed on innocent human
beings by the wrongdoing of others. Human rights discourse
undoubtedly constitutes one of the great efforts in contemporary
culture to respond to some of the more horrific hurts which are
done to human beings every day, in every corner of the world. If
one further considers the heroic dedication, at times to the point
of martyrdom, of those who have struggled in practice for the
defence of human rights, one can understand the kind of moral
authority which this kind of discourse has assumed. The
question arises, however, as to whether every claim to human
rights is ethically justifiable and as to how the burgeoning range
of such claims can be ethically evaluated.
It is not the purpose of this article to investigate the morality
of specific human rights claims, but rather to study the manner
in which this kind of discourse is used as a category of ethical
argumentation in contemporary debates about social issues. In
more technical terms one might say that our subject is
“metaethical” 2 in nature in that it seeks to explore our very
ability to arrive at ethical judgements using the category of
human rights. Argumentation concerning human rights, which
is sometimes presented as if it were ethically self-evident, will be
seen to be fraught with difficulty and in need of much more
careful articulation, particularly if one considers the context of
interpretation.
2
For a discussion of the idea of metaethics in the context of human
rights discourse see the first chapter of K. CRONIN, Rights and Christian
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1-24.)

106 MARTIN MCKEEVER
This context is constituted by contemporary culture, which at
least in the industrially developed countries is variously
described as modern or postmodern, or in some such terms. It
is important to note that the way in which the broader cultural
context is conceived has considerable importance for the use of
human rights as an ethical category. We will have reason
presently to examine some aspects of this question in more
detail, for the moment it must suffice to notice the major
implications for human rights discourse of construing the
culture in modern or postmodern terms.
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the
concept of rights for modern, liberal culture. 3 No other term,
with the possible exception of freedom, has played such a role in
the historical, constitutional and juridical evolution of modern
parliamentary democracies. Rights, as a juridical category,
figure prominently in the written constitutions of many states
and even more so in the articulation of more recent
international agreements and conventions. In such a cultural
milieu it is clear that constitutional battles, such as those for
emancipation of various kinds, are best conducted in the
language of rights, which allows appeal to national constitutions
and international conventions. Ironically, in such a context
human rights discourse may also prove to be something of an
ethical blind-spot in the sense that set against this backdrop all
claims to human rights tend to appear ipso facto morally
defensible. In order to assess the moral validity of such claims
one needs a contrasting theoretical background against which it
will be easier to identify possible errors, contradictions and
distortions. This is a matter which will emerge more fully in our
treatment of the semantics of human rights discourse.
Another characteristic of the cultural form of modernity 4 is
the way in which it attempts to separate politics and ethics,
3
The broader theme of liberalism as a cultural form and as an ideology
is treated more extensively in M. McKEEVER, “The Ethical Ambivalence of
Liberalism” Studia Moralia 35 (1997) 401- 425.
4
D. HARVEY offers a useful synthetic treatment of the evolution and
salient characteristics of modernity in his work The Condition of
Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 23-56.

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 107
particularly in the sense of distinguishing between the public
sphere of political discourse and the private sphere of individual
moral choice. 5 Such an attempt at separating politics and ethics
has major implications for the use of human rights discourse.
Even though many of the key documents (declarations,
conventions, constitutions) to which appeal is made themselves
employ ethical arguments, it is not easy to gain consensus for
such arguments in a pluralist cultural context. The tendency,
therefore, is to employ these foundational documents in a
positivist manner, prescinding from a deeper theoretical
justification of their content. While this may help avoid some of
the immediate problems of consensus, the price to be paid is
that discussions about human rights are often bereft of any
coherent ethical criteria, and thus rendered susceptible to abuse
and manipulation.
As regards the link between human rights discourse as an
ethical category and postmodern culture, a number of points
should be noted. The very idea that we now live in a postmodern
rather than a modern culture is anything but self-evident. While
one can certainly observe important changes in the way
contemporary society is organized, a good case can be made for
describing this culture as an alternative form of modernity
rather than some fundamentally different form of culture. The
fact that marketing, to take but one example, is done by
computer is interesting and significant but it does not alter the
primary fact that it is marketing. The neutral chronological
denominator “contemporary” is used here to denote a culture
that is predominantly modern but which manifests those
significant cultural accretions we have come to know as
postmodernity.
5
It is, of course, one thing to acknowledge this separation, descriptively,
as the way things tend to be understood in contemporary culture and
another to assume that this is the way things have to be or the way they
should be. One authoritative voice which refuses to make such a separation
is that of Aristotle, who introduces his treatment of ethics as follows:
“Therefore, the Good of man must be the end of the science of Politics [...]
This then being its aim, our investigation is in a sense the study of Politics.”
Nichomachean Ethics, I. ii. 8 (Translation H. RACKHAM, LOEB Classical
Library, XIX, 1982).

108 MARTIN MCKEEVER
In so far as one can talk of a subculture of “postmodernity”, it
is a matter of some importance for human rights discourse. There
is a strange irony in the fact that, philosophically speaking,
postmodernism tends to deny all possibility of universals. 6 This
has major consequences for a discourse such as that of human
rights which makes claims for all human beings everywhere
precisely because they are human beings! The irony of
contemporary culture construed as postmodern is, therefore, that
it notionally rejects the theoretical basis of the discourse it uses in
order to promote in practice a wide range of emancipatory claims.
One final introductory point on modern/postmodern
culture. Both are generally considered “secular” forms of culture
in which religion plays no constitutive role in the functioning of
the State. The question arises as to where such a State is to find
its ethical vision, which has been traditionally closely linked to,
when not actually integrated into, a religious vision. 7 The main
candidate for this role proposed by modernity was of course
human reason itself, in the version conceived by Descartes and
Kant. It is this very concept of reason which is charged with
instrumental and totalitarian tendencies by the fathers of
postmodernism such as Levinas and Lyotard. 8 In their zeal to
refute such a conception these thinkers have, logically enough,
felt the need to recreate ethics as such. This is not the place to
evaluate their success or failure in this regard, but it is
important to note that their theory deprives modernity of its
primary source of ethical vision without providing an alternative
of an accessible or popular kind. The listlessness and nihilism of
contemporary culture has surely some of its roots here.
6
For a rather strident presentation of this position see Z. BAUMAN,
Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 37-61; a more restrained line of
argument is to be found in A. TOURAINE, Critique de la modernité, (Fayard,
1992).
7
An important area which requires more attention in academic studies
is the relationship between protestantism and human rights discourse. For a
recent overview of the protestant ethical tradition alert to these issues see D.
MÜLLER, L’éthique protestante dans la crise de la modernité, Généalogie,
critique, reconstruction. (Paris, CERF; Genève, Labor et Fides, 1999).
8
J-F. LYOTARD, La condition post-moderne, (Éd. de Minuit, 1979 ); E.
LEVINAS, Etica come filosofia prima (Milano: Guerini, 1991).

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 109
In the light of these comments it will be clear that the
cultural milieu in which current discussions of human rights
issues take place is by no means a neutral environment but is
itself, in considerable measure, the product of historical
processes in which human rights discourse has played a
significant role. The task in hand is to study more closely some
of the main issues which arise when this discourse is used as a
category of ethical discourse in such a cultural context.
A pragmatic perspective
Human rights discourse is often used in situations of
distress, oppression and conflict, sometimes of an extremely
urgent and critical nature. Appeals for action in such
circumstances are often pragmatic in nature, calling for an
immediate response of a humanitarian, juridical, political or
even military kind. Human rights discourse has shown itself to
be charged with a particular political valency in a whole range
of struggles and battles: the enforced abolition of apartheid in
South Africa, the collapse of the Soviet system, the various
Balkan catastrophes and Pinochet’s arrest in Britain are among
the many cases in point. The precise role that human rights
discourse has played in inspiring, supporting and effecting the
political processes involved in such cases is well beyond the
scope of this article, but there is no doubt that it has played its
part. Both in situations of this kind, as well as in less dramatic
circumstances, the pragmatic question arises as to how one
should respond to an increasingly wide range of human rights
claims. Let us consider, simply by way of illustrating the
problem, the following list of claims:
“It is a human right not be tortured”
“It is a human right to end one’s own life if the pain caused by
terminal illness becomes intolerable”
“It is a human right to have the freedom to express one’s
political opinion without being driven over by a tank”
“It is a human right of homosexual couples to adopt children”
“It is a human right of the embryo not to be aborted”
“It is a human right to have sufficient food to sustain one’s life”

110 MARTIN MCKEEVER
“It is a human right to choose whether or not to carry a
pregnancy to term”
How is the individual citizen, the legislator or other
interested party to respond concretely to such claims? From
even this brief list, to which one could easily add hundreds of
other examples, it is clear that a blanket acceptance or a blanket
refusal of all human rights claims is not an adequate response.
A pragmatic response must take account of a number of factors
which complicate the question: the proliferation and widening
range of human rights claims, the conflicting nature of some
claims, the forum in which public policy is debated, the limited
nature of available resources, the authority to protect and
enforce human rights claims.
Human rights discourse has become the preferred idiom in
which to press for almost every imaginable kind of social,
political and legal reform or development. One unfortunate
consequence of this is that human rights which concern
survival, and as such merit a certain priority, are discussed in the
same idiom as much less urgent, though quite possibly
legitimate, concerns. The proliferation of human rights claims 9
derives also from the fact that the term has been stretched to
include an ever wider range of subjects (individuals, couples,
families, communities, nations) and an ever wider range of
issues (physical and mental well-being, social conditions,
political structures and processes, gender and ethnic issues).
There is thus a need for a method of distinguishing between
different types of human rights and different degrees of urgency
involved. This is particularly clear in the context of so called
“social rights”, sometimes known as the third generation of
human rights, when limited resources are to be distributed
among individuals and groupings who make rival claims on the
basis of various rights. Faced with such demands it is surely too
easy simply to declare that whole populations have the right to
9
On the consequences of the proliferation of rights claims see L.W.
SUMNER, The Moral Foundations of Human Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1987).

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 111
food, for instance, when they are offered no way in which they
can practically exercise that right. 10
The proliferation of human rights claims has another almost
inevitable consequence: at least some of the many claims are
incompatible, as when conceding the claim of one person or
group involves rejecting the claim of another. The most
controversial case in point is that of the “right to life” of the
unborn child against the “right to choose” of the mother. The
context of debates such as this has become so emotionally
charged that the ethical grounds which can be offered for or
against these positions are drowned out by a polemical
exchange in which rights language is often used without any
attempt to explain its ethical basis.
In contemporary cultures the lobbies which represent the
interests of various groups have become very important in the
political and legislative processes. In view of this, there is a real
danger that a new version of the classical political dynamic of
might is right will prevail: those who have the strongest lobby
will be able to claim rights which weaker lobbies are not in a
position to claim.
The pragmatic response to human rights claims may also be
considered at the level of “public relations”. If an individual,
group or institution (such as a national state or the Church)
were simply to accept every claim to human rights as ipso facto
legitimate, such parties would quickly be used to promote
alleged rights which are ethically questionable. On the other
hand, to be opposed to human rights is anything but “politically
correct” in that it leaves the party in question open to the charge
of being reactionary and closed to social progress. 11 In this
context the pragmatic problem consists both in the actual
judgement about which claims to accept as morally legitimate
10
For a discussion of the political practicalities of human rights claims
in this century see J.A. JOYCE, The New Politics of Human Rights (London,
The MacMillan Press, 1978).
11
The bitter memory of the alienation and misunderstanding
surrounding the Church’s initial attitude to “modernism” is a case in point.

112 MARTIN MCKEEVER
and in the public communication of the reasons for this decision
in a context of highly polemical debate. 12
As noted above, human rights claims are often the subject of
intense political debate at a national and international level.
This inevitably leads to the tendency to use human rights
discourse, with a stronger or weaker ethical accent, as an
instrument of political pressure or simply as a instrument for
the achievement of one’s own (personal, national or
international) political interests. A key pragmatic issue is the
judgement as to how human rights discourse is being used in a
given context. Here the choice cannot simply be between an
illegitimate political use and a legitimate ethical use of such
discourse, for contrary to the tendency of modern culture to
separate these two fields, they are often in fact profoundly
interconnected. One must distinguish rather between an
ethically justified use of human rights discourse which is at one
and the same time political in nature, and a use of human rights
discourse, perhaps veiled in ethical terms, for ethically
unjustified political ends. Such a distinction requires the
application of ethical criteria according to which rival claims
can be assessed. If human rights discourse is to be used as an
ethical category it must be used to explain why it is right or
wrong to do something and not simply as a rhetorical
instrument for the attainment of pragmatic ends. In the light of
these considerations the need for a closer study of the whole
question at a normative level becomes increasingly clear. Before
passing on to the normative perspective it will be useful to
consider briefly the semantic dimension of this question.
12
Perhaps because of this polemical context, the Church has generally
been cautious about making public interventions on the more controversial
human rights issues. One of the ironies of this stance in the case of Germany,
for example, is that the Church has at times been “links überholt” in public
discussions on the environment and on some sexual and reproductive issues,
in the sense that parties such as the Greens have been more ready to publicly
deny certain spurious claims to human rights.

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 113
A semantic perspective
It has already been noted that the discourse of human rights
is peculiarly suited to the task of conducting campaigns for
political and social change in contemporary culture. What is it
that makes this phrase such a powerful polemical instrument in
public debate? An answer to this question must consider the
evolution and use of the term “human rights” at a semantic level,
that is to say at the level of the nuances and resonances with
which the term has become charged. The following brief fable
may help to illustrate this aspect of the issue:
Once upon a time there were two linguistic cells, one was called
“right” and the other was called “human”. From its humble
etymological origins as a merely spatial denominator, the word
“right” had developed into a moral adjective, that is to say an
adjective used to describe what is just and good. In the course of
this evolution the genes of the cell became charged with a colourful
range of linguistic chromosomes: justice, order, law, propriety and
so forth. At a certain point, the adjective “right” transformed itself
into a noun, first of an objective order (“Right”, with the capital R)
and later of a subjective order (natural rights). The semantic effect
of this process was that the word “right” took on a more positive
and concrete nuance.
The word “human”, on the other hand, was an adjective used
to indicate the biological characteristics of the species homo
sapiens. With the passing of time, however, “human” was no longer
content with a merely biological connotation and assumed a
broader anthropological cultural valency. So much so, indeed, that
the chromosomes of this cell became invested with virulent
linguistic chromosomes such as: person, subject, autonomy,
individual and dignity.
Then, one day, more than two hundred years ago, in the mind
of an unknown philosopher, the cell “right” met the cell “human”.
What a scene! The chromosomes justice, order and law embraced
those of person, dignity and autonomy. A new cell came to be,
product of the cross fertilization of these two rich semantic fields
and destined to capture the imagination of the modern world:
human rights. Und wenn sie nicht gestorben sind, dann leben sie
noch heute..., (and they all lived happily ever after...)

114 MARTIN MCKEEVER
Like every fable, this one suggests some truths which are
anything but fabulous. Alaisdair MacIntyre 13 argues that the
Babel-like confusion of modern ethical discussion is due to the
fact that many of the terms in use have been extricated from the
original conceptual context within which they find their
meaning. The term “human rights” would seem to be a case in
point, in that this locution is so often used with very little
awareness of the conceptual matrices from which the
component terms have been drawn. 14 But surely it is precisely
the personalistic, juridical and emancipative resonances of the
component terms with lend the term “human rights” its
polemical force? It will be argued below , in fact, that a residual
normative element perdures in human rights discourse, but in a
masked form in order not to offend relativist sensibilities.
Equally, it is often forgotten that the neologism “human
rights” was developed in the real world of modern politics and
economics. There is a very close tie, for example, between the
concept of right and the concept of freedom, to the point that it
has been argued that human rights discourse is the quintessence
of modern liberal culture. 15 If one considers liberal culture as
ethically beyond reproach this fact constitutes no problem. If,
however, one is aware of the moral ambiguity of this form of
13
See, in particular, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981); Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).
14
Among the innumerable sources treating the historical evolution of
human rights see in particular: I. SHAPIRO, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); L. STRAUSS, Diritto
naturale e storia, (Venezia: Neri Pozza Editore, 1957); M. VILLEY, Le droit et
les droits de l’homme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983); C.B.
MACPHERSON, Libertà e proprietà alle origini del pensiero borghese. La teoria
dell’individualismo possessivo da Hobbes a Locke, trans. Silvana Borutti
(Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1982); G. TERRUZZI, “I Diritti Umani Nella
Storia”, in I Diritti Umani, riflessioni teoriche e indicazioni didattiche, a cura
di P. DANUVOLA (Brescia: Editrice La Scuola, 1989) 21-41; G. OESTREICH,
Geschichte der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten im Umriss (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, (1968) 1978).
15
See, for example, N. BOBBIO, L’età dei diritti (Einaudi contemporanea
12, 1992).

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 115
culture then the question must arise as to the degree to which
human rights discourse is an accomplice in such ambiguity. 16
At a semantic level, then, the use of human rights discourse
in contemporary culture constitutes something of a dilemma. It
is probably no exaggeration to say that it is almost the only form
of ethical discourse which finds consensus among people today
and so to communicate in today’s world it is necessary to use this
language. But the acceptability of this discourse is at least partly
due to the fact that it reproduces the culture in which people are
living, including some of its morally doubtful aspects. So the
dilemma is between using a discourse that is at times loaded with
nuances of individualism and rationalism, but which at least
finds a certain consent, or using a more precise language based
on a more articulate moral and juridical theory, but which may
not be understood or appreciated by many interlocutors.
A normative perspective
Having thus examined the use of human rights discourse
from a pragmatic and a semantic point of view we may now pass
on to examine this same usage in a normative perspective. For
reasons noted above, there is a marked tendency to prescind
from such a treatment of human rights and simply use this
discourse in a functional and, at times, polemical manner. To
examine human rights discourse in a normative perspective
means to ask how this form of argumentation relates to a
systematic theoretical understanding of ethics. In what follows
the complex issues involved in viewing human rights in this way
will be illustrated by making a normative analysis of a selected
text. It will become clear that many of the issues which have
emerged in the other perspectives have their roots at this
normative level.
Of the many texts which might serve this purpose, such as
the Déclaration des droits de l’homme e du citoyen of 1789,
16
For an excellent exposition of the use of rights discourse for
oppressive purposes see R. TUCK, Natural Rights Theories, Their origin and
development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

116 MARTIN MCKEEVER
perhaps the most suitable is the preamble to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations on
December 10th 1948:
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind,
and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has
been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of
law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly
relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and
women and have determined to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation
with the United Nations, the promotion of universal
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is
of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,
Now, therefore,
The General Assembly
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 117
to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping
this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among
the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of
territories under their jurisdiction.
Although there has been a series of declarations in the
intervening period, 17 the above text, and the list of rights
specified thereafter, remains a cornerstone of human rights
discourse. Read, as it generally has been, in a pragmatic or
semantic perspective, it constitutes a rich source for both
reflection and action and has been used accordingly for over
fifty years. Read in a normative perspective, however, it proves
remarkably scant and vague in content.
The key questions which concern normative ethics are the
manner in which we know what is good and the manner in
which this knowledge can be used in the formulation of moral
precepts for the guidance of human behaviour. If we read the
above text with these questions in mind it emerges that the
primary good with which it is concerned is “the dignity and
worth of the human person”. On the basis of this dignity and
worth the text recognises the human person as the subject of
“equal and inalienable rights” which determine how the person
may and may not be treated. These rights are then listed in detail
in the body of the declaration.
As regards how we come to know the dignity and worth of
the human person and how this knowledge leads to the
recognition of the rights subsequently listed, the document is
silent. From a normative point of view, in other words, the
declaration consists of a list of precepts as to how the human
being should be treated but it does not elaborate upon the
source of these norms beyond the generic appeal to human
dignity. In other words, both the preamble and the specific
17
For a compilation of such texts see I. BROWNLIE, Basic Documents on
Human Rights. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).

118 MARTIN MCKEEVER
precepts presuppose a judgement of an ethical nature but they
do not explain how this judgement is reached.
Does this mean that the text is of no interest from the point
of view of normative ethics? It would seem necessary here to
distinguish between the text as such, which is of course the
product of a complex process of negotiations and compromises
between the signatory states, and the ethical positions which it
presupposes or which are implicit within it.
Take, for example, the very idea of the dignity and worth of
the human person. 18 Such an idea is not ethically neutral in that
it presupposes the application, at least implicitly, of an
axiological framework within which different kinds of goods are
evaluated and graded. Viewed within such a framework the
human being is judged to be of a certain value - of more value
than a bicycle for example. Such an evaluative framework in
turn implies an epistemology which ascribes to the human being
the ability to know what is good and to reason about the
implications of this knowledge for human behaviour. If human
rights discourse involves no such process of evaluating the good,
then it simply cannot be considered a form of ethical discourse,
even though it may retain some polemical or emotive efficacy.
That the document does, in fact, presuppose such ethical
judgements emerges in negative terms when it expresses the
outrage of “the conscience of mankind” in face of the atrocities
done to human beings. In more positive, albeit generic, terms,
the ethical basis of the document finds expression in the
repeated appeals to justice and freedom.
A similar line of analysis can be articulated concerning the
idea of inalienable rights. In its first clause, the text juxtaposes
the “inherent dignity” of human beings and their “equal and
inalienable rights”. Implicit in such a juxtaposition is the
relationship between the perception of a good (the dignity of the
18
For a philosophical investigation of this theme see A. GERWITH,
Human Rights, Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago-London:
University of Chicago Press, 1982); L.W. SUMNER, The Moral Foundations of
Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). In a theological vein see E.
SCHOCKENHOFF, Naturrecht und Menschenwürde, Universale Ethik in einer
geschichtlichen Welt (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1996).

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 119
human person) and the formulation of prescriptive norms (the
recognition of rights). The inherent logic of the declaration is
that faced with a good of such fundamental value as the human
person, we are morally obliged to behave in a certain way: there
are things which one may and which one may not do to a human
being. What is more, the document continues, human dignity is
a good which deserves a form of protection that is juridically
acknowledged and “protected by the rule of law”. 19 Such an
affirmation presupposes the existence, or the creation of, an
ethico-juridical system, that is to say, of theoretical and concrete
structures such as laws, constitutions, declarations, courts,
judges and coercive forces. The proprium of a right as opposed
to a request, a desire or a need, consists precisely in the fact that
it is ethically and juridically binding, or to put it another way, in
the obligation that it recognises and protects between the
subject of the right and other subjects. 20
As well as being inalienable these rights are declared to be
universal, that is they are recognised as the rights of all human
beings as human beings. From the point of view of normative
ethics this implies an important claim about the universality of
human nature and the universality of at least some ethical
norms. If we ask on what basis the document ascribes this
universality to human rights, the only answer seems to be that
this universality is considered self-evident. Although the 1948
declaration does not use this adjective, the idea would seem to
be implied in the fact that no grounds are evinced to justify the
claim of universality. From a normative point of view, such a
presupposition is of considerable ethical importance and
19
The juridical status of human rights is discussed in T. MERON (ed.)
Human Rights in International Law: Legal and policy issues (Oxford, 1984);
see also Unione Giuristi Cattolici Italiani, Diritto naturale e diritti dell’uomo
all’alba del XXI secolo (Colloquio internazionale, Roma, 10-13 gennaio 1991)
Quaderni di Iustitia 40.
20
The relationship between rights and duties has been the subject of
endless discussion in the literature, to cite but a few studies: A.I. MELDEN,
Rights and Persons (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1980); R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambrige, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, (1977) 1980).

120 MARTIN MCKEEVER
warrants careful rational justification. If such presuppositions
are not critically examined they are in danger of uncritically
absorbing the current prejudices and distortions of a given
cultural context. In this regard a number of authors have noted
the roots of human rights discourse in the ambitious
Enlightenment claims concerning “right and reason”. 21
In the light of this reading of the preamble, we can conclude
that the text indeed implies a normative ethical system, but it
does not articulate one. If we reconstruct in a critical fashion the
process of reasoning presupposed by the text, it proves to be
remarkably similar to that traditional form of ethical
argumentation known as “natural law”. 22 How else is one to
describe the normative basis of a theory which ascribes such
inherent value to human beings and prescribes such specific
norms for their treatment? It is surely ironic that the preferred
juridical discourse of liberal culture proves to be so heavily
reliant on a classical ethical theory, even if the presence of this
latter would seem to be largely in incognito.
We can imagine the comment of a postmodern philosopher
on such normative affirmations 23 . Smiling with a benevolent
condescension he or she would explain: “But I too am a member
of Amnesty International, I am no less in favour of human rights
than you are, but I simply do not see the need for this
rationalistic superstructure. In order to reject torture I do not
need your abstract discourse on the dignity of the human
21
For a lucid synthesis of recent literature on this point see P. BOURETZ,
“Droits” in Dictionnaire d’éthique et de philosophie morale (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1996).
22
It is a commonplace that “natural law” is used to refer not to one
ethical theory but to a whole gamut of theories, some of which contradict
each other. Here the term is used to refer to the “mainline” classical natural
law tradition as articulated in Augustine, systematically presented in
Aquinas and consistently refined in the intervening theological reflection.
23
For texts which contain far more audacious declarations than those
represented here see: R. RORTY, “Diritti Umani, razionalità e sentimento” in
I Diritti Umani, Oxford Amnesty Lectures, a cura di Stephen Shute e Susan
Hurley (Garanzi Editore, 1994) Italian trans. S. Lauzi, original title On
Human Rights (Basic Books, 1993); Z. BAUMAN, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993), 24-59, Italian trans. G. Bettini, Le sfide dell’etica (Milano:
Feltrinelli Editore, 1993).

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 121
person, nor your presumed norms, which can so easily become
totalitarian. All I need to know is that I am helping Pablo in El
Salvador or Heng Ching in China. Everything else is absurd.”
The key problem with human rights discourse at the
normative level arises out of the tendency in contemporary
culture to refuse, or at least to consider with suspicion, any
discourse which dares to have rationalist, universalist or
absolutist premises. The alternative proposed is a pragmatic and
relativistic utilitarianism: human rights discourse helps people
so we should support human rights here and now, without
further ado. In a cultural context such as that of today it may
well be that in a given case such a response is the right one at a
pragmatic level. Such an approach may also impose itself for
semantic reasons as a kind of juridical and ethical esperanto
which renders natural law theory in an idiom which is
“politically acceptable”. In normative terms it remains
unsatisfactory in that it risks falling into a nihilistic stance on
ethics which undermines the human ability to know right and
wrong and to articulate that knowledge in prescriptive terms
based on something more than spontaneous individual impulse.
If such a mentality is to be avoided normative considerations
must be integrated more explicitly and critically into human
rights discourse. 24
Postscript: Human rights discourse in theological ethics
In contemporary culture, human rights discourse is used by
christians, by people of other religions and by non believers. For
this reason the argument of this piece has been articulated in
“secular” terms, without taking into account the specifically
theological dimensions of the problem. In this brief postscript
we will note a few aspects of the issue which are of specifically
theological interest.
24
“Le destin juridique des droits de l’homme passe par l’avenir d’une
philosophie de la loi naturelle, et aujourd’hui, comme naguère, par une
critique de la philosophie du sujet.” B. BARRET-KRIEGEL, Les droits de
l’homme et le droit naturel (Paris: PUF, 1989), 99.

122 MARTIN MCKEEVER
A number of recent theological studies have considered
human rights, 25 noting both the important historical process of
cross-fertilization between theology and this form of discourse,
as well as the weighty systematic questions which emerge when
one attempts to integrate human rights discourse into
theological ethics. We will not repeat here the results of these
useful studies but simply note the manner in which they confirm
the need noted above for a better articulation of the normative
basis of human rights. 26
It is worth noting, however, that just as our reading of the
prelude to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shows a
strong reliance on ethical principles (without an extensive
articulation of same), so too a reading of documents which
present Official Catholic teaching, particularly on moral issues,
would show an increasingly heavy reliance on the discourse of
human rights as a category of ethical argumentation. In some
cases the underlying ethical values such as the dignity of human
life and duty not to kill, torture or act unjustly toward human
beings are simply stated without further justification. In both
social encyclicals and in those on bio-medical issues (though
interestingly not in the same way) human rights discourse is
invoked as a category of ethical argumentation, but is not
elaborated at a theoretical level. In other documents,
particularly those of a more theoretical nature, the ethical basis
of human rights is sought in an articulation of the natural law
25
See, for example, K. HILPERT, Die Menschenrechte, Geschichte,
Theologie, Aktualität. (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1991); F. COMPAGNONI, I
diritti dell’uomo, Genesi, storia e impegno cristiano. (Torino: San Paolo,
1995).
26
“Menschenrechte sind also kritische Prinzipien zur Beurteilung der
Gerechtigkeit von positiven Rechtsordnungen. Die positive Geltung der
Gesetze allein und für sich verbürgt noch nicht ihre Gerechtigkeit. [...] Der
Maßstab des Rechts ist nicht die Macht, sondern die in den
Menschenrechten entfaltete überpositive Gerechtigkeit. Das ist dann auch
der Grundgedanke dessen, was man in der Ethik wenigstens seit der Stoa
Naturrecht nannte.” K. HILPERT, Die Menschenrechte, 70. See also F.
COMPAGNONI, I diritti dell’uomo, 189-210; K. Tanner, Der lange Schatten des
Naturrechts, Eine fundamentalethische Untersuchung (Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln:
Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1993).

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 123
alongside the teaching drawn from Revelation. 27 What is
perhaps needed at this stage, in the context of the broader
magisterium, is a critical articulation of the link between
fundamental ethical theory and human rights discourse as used
in the discussion of specific moral issues. 28
Such a project is not easy, of course, and will inevitably form
only one part of a theological treatment of human rights. To take
account of the mystery of God in the context of a discussion of
human rights gives rise to new and profound difficulties. We
must face for instance the difficult question “Does God respect
human rights?” An adequate response to a question such as this
would carry us into the turgid waters of theodicy, but the
question itself can help us to appreciate the complexity of the
problem at a theological level. It can help us to understand, for
instance, that human rights discourse is tied to a relational
paradigm that is quite inadequate in describing our relations
with God. 29 The relationship of creature to Creator and sinner to
Saviour is quite different from that of one who claims a right to
one who respects it. The Good News is that we are saved not by
right but by grace: so, in theological terms, any discourse which
aspires to save humanity without the grace of God can only be
considered a new variation on Pelagianism.
Perhaps the fundamental contribution of the theological
perspective to this whole question is that it can help us to
understand that the relational paradigm implied by rights
discourse does not suffice even for our human relations.
Theological ethics can and should recognise the validity of
human rights discourse, but it cannot accept that human
relations be reduced to this level. There is at times a certain
27
In this regard one might profitably compare and contrast the role of
human rights discourse in the ethical argumentation of texts such as De
Abortu and Centesimus Annus with the role of natural law discourse in
Veritatis Splendour and Fides et Ratio.
28
For a sharp warning about taking a facile approach to human rights
see J.L. Lockwood, “Historical Prolegomena to a Theological Review of
«Human Rights»” Studies in Christian Ethics 9, 2 (1996) 52-65.
29
In his typically sweeping style J. MILBANK maintains that Christian
ethics are so different from anything like morality that no link is possible.
See his The Word Made Strange (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 7-35, 219-232.

124 MARTIN MCKEEVER
dissonance between human rights discourse and Gospel
discourse, not because the Gospel wants to deny human rights,
but because it wishes to go beyond the very idea of rights. In face
of a culture which tends to conceive of every human relation in
terms of rights, christian ethics insists, for example, on the
importance of qualities such as service, love, altruism, sacrifice
and gratuity. In a word, the christian who lives in contemporary
culture needs to be bilingual, that is to say, able to understand
and speak the idiom of human rights, but without forgetting the
more ancient and more sacred eloquence of the Gospel.
Via Merulana, 31
C.P. 2458
00100 Roma
Italy.
MARTIN MCKEEVER, C.Ss.R.
—————
Summary / Resumen
Human rights discourse has become so pervasive in contemporary
culture that it is often used without an adequate realization of the
complex ethical issues it raises. This article attempts to analyse these
issues, particularly as they arise in the social setting of contemporary
culture. Adopting in turn a pragmatic, a semantic and a normative
perspective on human rights discourse, the strengths and weaknesses of
this way of discussing ethical questions is explored. The need for greater
elucidation of the ethical basis of human rights claims is emphasised.
While deliberately keeping the main focus on the use of this discourse
in secular culture, the piece concludes with a brief consideration of the
implications of the argument for the use of human rights language in
theological discussion.
La cuestión de los derechos humanos se ha difundido tanto en la
cultura contemporánea, que a menudo se utiliza sin la adecuada
interpretación de los complejos problemas éticos que genera. Este
artículo intenta analizar estos problemas, sobre todo en la forma como
aparecen en el escenario social de la cultura actual. Se exploran los
argumentos a favor y en contra sobre cómo abordar los problemas

THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 125
éticos, adoptando al mismo tiempo una perspectiva pragmática,
semántica y normativa acerca de la cuestión de los derechos humanos.
Se hace hincapié en la necesidad de clarificar aún más el fundamento
ético relativo a las reivindicaciones de los derechos humanos. Mientras
el enfoque principal se orienta deliberadamente al uso de este tema en
la cultura laica, la sección concluye con una breve reflexión acerca de
la incidencia del argumento sobre la utilización del lenguaje de los
derechos humanos en la discusión teológica.
—————
The author is an invited Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor invitado en la Academia Alfonsiana.
—————

127
StMor 38 (2000) 127-140
RÉAL TREMBLAY C.Ss.R.
LE PAIN ROMPU À MANGER ET LE VIN VERSÉ À BOIRE,
VISAGE DU CRUCIFIÉ RESSUSCITÉ
DANS LE TEMPS DE L’ÉGLISE
Dans le sillage de Lc 24, 13-35
Il n’est pas rare d’entendre dire que les contemporains de
Jésus ont eu bien de la chance de pouvoir “entendre”, “voir” de
leurs yeux, “toucher” de leurs mains (cf. 1 Jn 1, 1; Jn 19, 35; etc)
le “Verbe de vie” en personne en cet homme concret qu’était
Jésus de Nazareth. Si cela est indéniable du point de vue des
attentes creusées dans le peuple d’Israël par les promesses messianiques
de l’Ancien Testament (cf. Mt 13, 17; Jn 8, 56) 1 ; si cela
est également indéniable du point de vue des assises “de chair et
d’os”, pour ainsi dire, à donner au témoignage apostolique (cf. 2
P, 1, 16ss; etc.) sur lequel s’édifiera ensuite l’Église de tous les
temps (cf. Jn 21, 28) 2 , on peut s’interroger sur le bien-fondé
d’une telle observation en considérant le type de présence divine
à l’Église rendu possible par l’accomplissement du mystère
pascal. Sans préjudice donc de la place et du rôle inaliénables de
1
L’accomplissement de cette attente se réalise par exemple en la personne
du vieillard Siméon lors de la présentation de Jésus au Temple:
“Maintenant, ô Maître, tu peux, selon ta parole, laisser ton serviteur s’en aller
en paix; car mes yeux ont vu ton salut...” Lc 2, 29-30. Pour un commentaire
musical génial de ce verset biblique, voir l’“aria” initial de la Cantate 82 de
J.-S. BACH: Ich habe genug (BWV 82: W. SCHMIEDER, Thematisch-systematisches
Verzeichnis der musikalischen Werke von Johann Sebastian Bach,
Wiesbaden, 1990 2 , 136-137). Pour des explications plus détaillées sur la consistance
propre du texte que le Kantor de la Thomaskirche de Leipzig
emprunte à un auteur anonyme, voir: A. DÜRR, Die Kantaten von Johann
Sebastian Bach, II, Kassel, 1971, 542-543; A. BASSO, Jean-Sébastien Bach, II,
Paris, 1985, 440-441.
2
Signalons que le “voir” dont il s’agit ici a pour objet le Crucifié ressuscité
et non sa visibilité sacramentelle.

128 RÉAL TREMBLAY
la présence terrestre du Seigneur dans la trame historique du
plan du Père en faveur de l’homme, manifester pour elle de la
nostalgie dans le temps de l’Église ne reviendrait-il pas en définitive
à porter ombrage au mystère pascal, plus encore à en
méconnaître les virtualités profondes au point d’en remettre en
cause la consistance (I)? Après avoir essayé de répondre brièvement
à cette question, je m’attacherai à montrer où et comment
se condensent au maximum les possibilités du Crucifié ressuscité
à se rendre présent aux croyants dans le temps de l’Église.
Nous les verrons se précipiter dans le pain et le vin eucharistiques
qui, comme tels, se présenteront comme une véritable
apparition du Crucifié ressuscité (II). En exerçant sur les
croyants le pouvoir d’attraction et de communion qui émergera
de ce qui précède, cette apparition sera d’une part supérieure à
celle du Jésus de l’histoire et d’autre part inférieure à la venue du
Christ glorieux sur les nuées du ciel à la consommation des siècles,
sans toutefois qu’il y ait pleine discontinuité entre l’une et
l’autre puisque l’épiphanie eucharistique du Crucifié ressuscité
sera le lieu de l’émergence du “désir”, du marana tha de l’Église,
ayant justement pour objet cette venue sans le voile sacramentel
(cf. Ap 22, 17). Nous nous proposons de revenir brièvement sur
ce point en conclusion de notre travail.
I. Présence du Christ et accomplissement du mystère
pascal
Il serait vain de vouloir circonscrire dans nos catégories la
présence mystérieuse du Crucifié ressuscité auprès des siens
pendant les jours qui précédèrent son départ définitif pour le
ciel à l’Ascension (cf. Lc 24, 51; Mc 16, 19; Ac 1, 9). Nous sommes
placés en face d’un mystère qui nous dépasse. Jamais Dieu
en personne n’a été si proche de l’homme soumis au temps et à
l’espace 3 . Dès lors toutes tentatives de l’esprit humain de mesurer
l’exacte densité de cette présence sont intempestives et doivent
céder le pas à une crainte révérencieuse et à l’adoration, un
3
Les barrières de la “chair” terrestre et de la “chair semblable à celle du
péché” (Rm 8, 3) en effet n’existent plus.

LE PAIN ROMPU À MANGER ET LE VIN VERSÉ À BOIRE, VISAGE DU CRUCIFIÉ 129
peu comme Moïse devant le buisson ardent (cf. Ex 3, 5) ou très
exactement comme Thomas devant les plaies ouvertes du
Ressuscité (cf. Jn 20, 28).
Cette réserve une fois établie et maintenue avec fermeté, l’on
peut insister sur la capacité du Crucifié ressuscité d’avoir accès
à l’intimité la plus secrète de ses disciples. L’on pense ici presque
spontanément à l’expérience des pèlerins d’Emmaüs racontée
par Luc (cf. Lc 24, 13-35) 4 . Pendant que ceux-ci étaient en chemin
avec un inconnu rencontré en cours de route et qu’à la
lumière des Écritures ils échangeaient avec lui sur l’événement
récent de la crucifixion de leur Maître à Jérusalem, ils sentirent
monter en leurs “coeurs” comme une chaleur intense de toute
évidence encore jamais éprouvée. C’est eux-mêmes qui le reconnaissent
après que cet inconnu maintenant reconnu eût disparu
de devant eux. “Notre coeur n’était-il pas tout brûlant au dedans
de nous, quand il nous parlait en chemin et qu’il nous expliquait
les Écritures” (Lc 24, 32) 5 . Pendant sa vie terrestre, Jésus avait
très souvent rompu le pain des Écritures à l’adresse des siens et
des foules qui le suivaient; c’était, pour ainsi dire, son occupation
majeure et pratiquement exclusive, lui qui sera plus tard
considéré par Jean comme l’exégète du Père (cf. Jn 1, 18) 6 . On
peut facilement imaginer que son enseignement avait plus d’une
4
En l’occurrence, nous renvoyons à l’étude de J. DUPONT, Les disciples
d’Emmaüs (Lc 24, 13-35), dans M. BENZERATH/A. SCHMID/J. GUILLET (éd.), La
Pâque du Christ mystère de salut. Mélanges en l’honneur du Père Durrwell
(LD., 112), Paris, 1982, 166-195 qui offre une bonne vue d’ensemble de l’état
de la recherche à propos de cette péricope lucanienne, et cela depuis la
monographie de Dupont lui-même parue en 1954 dans les Mélanges Ubach:
Les Pèlerins d’Emmaüs (Luc, XXIV, 13-35), dans Miscellanea Biblica B.
Ubach, Montserrat, 1954, 349-374. Pour le commentaire biblique proprement
dit, nous utilisons celui de J. ERNST, Das Evangelium nach Lukas (RNT),
Regensburg, 1977, 654-666 qui s’inspire en grande partie du travail désormais
classique de J. WANKE, Die Emmauserzählung. Eine redaktionsgeschichtliche
Untersuchung zu Lk 24, 13-35 (EThSt., 31) Leipzig, 1973.
5
Nous laissons pour le moment de côté le fait que ce constat émerge de
la célébration de la “fraction du pain”. Nous y reviendrons dans la seconde
partie de ce travail.
6
Sur “Jésus exégète de Dieu”, voir les remarques suggestives de H. U.
VON BALTHASAR, Kennt uns Jesus - kennen wir ihn? Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1980,
86ss.

130 RÉAL TREMBLAY
fois remué les coeurs. Les textes évangéliques en témoignent. Il
suffira de citer l’attitude de Zachée (Lc 19, 1-10). Comment un
homme si loin des idéaux proposés par Jésus a-t-il pu changer
aussi rapidement et radicalement de vie sans d’abord avoir été
touché en profondeur par les comportements et les paroles du
maître? Cela dit, une constatation doit être faite. Si profond que
fût l’impact de l’activité missionnaire de Jésus sur l’intériorité de
l’homme, jamais pourtant les Évangélistes notèrent explicitement,
comme en notre péricope, que les “coeurs” de ses auditeurs
furent atteints au point d’être consumés par un feu mystérieux.
Cette remarque nous permet de penser que Jésus a dû
jouir de pouvoirs nouveaux par suite de sa résurrection d’entre
les morts. Appartenant désormais totalement au monde de Dieu
ou encore rempli de la force intérieure de l’Esprit par lequel le
Père l’a ressuscité d’entre les morts, Jésus peut s’introduire, s’infiltrer
dans l’intimité des “coeurs” encore plus finement qu’il
avait pu le faire pendant sa vie terrestre. En l’occurrence, il peut
justement se comporter comme le feu qui rejoint les moindres
recoins de l’objet qu’il consume.
Mais cette première donnée nous conduit à une autre
comme à son présupposé. En effet, si le Crucifié ressuscité peut
par l’Esprit toucher les fibres profondes du “coeur” des croyants,
c’est que par le même Esprit il est devenu radicalement pro-existant.
Depuis son entrée dans l’histoire en raison de la décision
éternelle et purement amoureuse du Père de filialiser sa créature
moyennant la croix de son Fils (cf. Ep 1, 4-5), Jésus fut certes
toujours un être donné, un être “en tenue de service” (cf. Lc 12,
37; 22, 27; Jn 13, 4-5), un être ’εν µορϕ ~˛η δούλου (cf. Ph 2, 7), mais
la résurrection marque un plus à cet égard. Le “Serviteur” est
maintenant glorifié, pénétré de toutes parts par l’Amour du Père
en personne et ainsi devenu justice pour les multitudes (cf. Is 53,
11). À partir de cette imprégnation totale de l’être théandrique
de Jésus par le Pneuma paternel, est-il possible d’attribuer des
traits encore plus précis à ce que nous présentions plus haut
comme une nouvelle maîtrise des “coeurs” due à la force intérieure
de l’Esprit? Sans trop déborder le sens du texte biblique
qui nous sert toujours de guide, on pourrait certainement dire
que cette maîtrise des coeurs est plus attractive et plus unitive
que celle dévolue au Jésus de l’histoire. Comment cela?
Ressuscité d’entre les morts, Jésus jouit de la plénitude

LE PAIN ROMPU À MANGER ET LE VIN VERSÉ À BOIRE, VISAGE DU CRUCIFIÉ 131
eschatologique. Comme tel, il implante dans le monde comme
un pôle d’attraction qui fait que l’homme et la création avec lui
sont tournés vers celui qui accomplit toutes choses (cf. Col 1,
16). La recréation de type filial que le Crucifié ressuscité réalise
en sa propre personne - il est comme Fils l’“Homme Nouveau”
(Ep 3, 15) - suscite en l’homme une prédisposition ou une prédétermination
à recevoir la grâce de l’adoption filiale et, chez le
croyant, une préparation immédiate à la recevoir avec l’aspiration,
une fois en possession de ce don, à l’acquérir selon une
intensité toujours plus grande.
Ce don de la filiation progressant au rythme de la croissance
incessante du désir (cf. Ap 21, 16) instaure aussi, entre le
Ressuscité et les croyants, un rapport de caractère beaucoup
plus unitif que celui existant entre le Jésus terrestre et ses disciples.
Ceci affleure dans notre texte biblique lorsque l’on voit passer
les mêmes disciples d’un état de vide et de désarroi par suite
de la perte tragique du Maître en qui ils avaient placé leurs espérances
messianiques à un état de plénitude intérieure due à la
reconnaissance de Jésus désormais “Vivant” (Ap 1, 17) qu’ils
croyaient mort à tout jamais. Autant la tristesse et la lassitude
dues à l’absence de la personne aimée étreignaient d’abord leurs
coeurs, autant la joie de sa présence les dilate maintenant. C’est
précisément cette joie les embrasant intérieurement qui les
pousse à retourner “à l’heure même” à Jérusalem pour communiquer
aux “Onze” et à “leurs compagnons” la “bonne nouvelle”
des retrouvailles du Crucifié ressuscité 7 .
Il découle de tout cela que regretter, après la résurrection du
Christ, le type de contact que les disciples ont eu avec le Jésus de
l’histoire serait faire un pas en arrière considérable. Plus encore.
7
Lohfink cité par Ernst a ce texte suggestif: “Das Sich-Entfernen von
der Stadt, in diesem Fall gleichbedeutend mit der Entfernung von Jesus und
der künftigen Gemeinde, wird durch die Erscheinung des Auferstandenen
eingeholt und umgekehrt in die Bewegung auf die Stadt hin” J. ERNST, o.c.,
664. Et l’on pourrait ajouter qu’il se situe en pleine conformité avec la pensée
de Luc puisque c’est de Jérusalem que doit partir le message du salut par
la mort et résurrection du Seigneur pour être proclamé dans le monde entier
dont Rome est la capitale (cf. Lc 24, 47; Ac 1, 8).

132 RÉAL TREMBLAY
Cela reviendrait à porter atteinte à la consistance même du
mystère pascal puisque, passé totalement en Dieu par sa victoire
sur le péché et la mort et échappant ainsi aux limites de l’espace
et du temps, le Crucifié ressuscité est par l’Esprit du Père
un être totalement pour-les-autres et capable d’atteindre les
“coeurs” selon des possibilités encore absolument inédites. Don
intérieur du Père, l’Esprit fait en effet du Crucifié dont il s’est
emparé totalement un être essentiellement ouvert-sur-les-autres
et à même de les rejoindre jusqu’au noyau le plus substantiel de
leur être pour les entraîner vers lui et se les unir selon une intimité
ineffable. Sans fausse accomodation, on pourrait de ce
point de vue faire appel au texte de Paul: “Même si nous avons
connu le Christ selon la chair, nous ne le connaissons plus ainsi
à présent” (2 Co 5, 16).
II. Le prolongement sacramentel de la présence du
Crucifié ressuscité
Mais ce mode d’être du Crucifié ressuscité différent du mode
d’être du Jésus de l’histoire n’entame en rien son réalisme corporel.
Les Écritures (cf. Lc 24, 37-43; Jn 20, 19-23) 8 et, à sa suite,
la grande tradition de l’Église 9 sont explicites à cet égard.
N’insistons donc pas.
Dans la logique de cette donnée, la présence plus que jamais
réelle du Ressuscité à ses disciples devra, bien que libre à l’égard
du temps et de l’espace en raison de sa totale appartenance au
8
Et les commentaires de J. ERNST, o.c., 666-668; R. SCHNACKENBURG, Das
Johannesevangelium (HThKNT., IV/3), Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 380-390.
9
Les textes abondent ici. Rappelons en l’occurrence un passage d’Ignace
d’Antioche et un autre d’Irénée de Lyon. “Pour moi, je sais et je crois que
même après sa résurrection il (le Christ) était dans la chair. [...] Et après sa
résurrection, Jésus mangea et but avec eux (Pierre et les autres qui étaient
avec lui) comme un être de chair...” Ad Smyrn., III, 1.3 (SCh., 10, 135). - “De
même donc que le Christ est ressuscité dans la substance de sa chair et a
montré à ses disciples les marques des clous ainsi que l’ouverture de son côté
- autant de preuves que c’était bien sa chair qui était ressuscitée d’entre les
morts -, de même, dit l’Apôtre, «Dieu nous ressuscitera, nous aussi, par sa
puissance» (1 Co 6, 14)” AH. V. 7, 1 (SCh., 153, 85).

LE PAIN ROMPU À MANGER ET LE VIN VERSÉ À BOIRE, VISAGE DU CRUCIFIÉ 133
monde de Dieu, rester de quelque manière liée à la réalité du
monde non encore glorifiée et à sauver. Notre texte biblique
nous le suggère clairement lorsque la reconnaissance du
Crucifié ressuscité se fait au moment de la “fraction du pain” 10 .
Ce prolongement spatio-temporel du Seigneur auprès des siens
est encore affirmé par le fait qu’aussitôt reconnu le Crucifié ressuscité
disparaît. C’est comme s’il voulait signifier à l’Église que,
jusqu’à sa venue finale, il entend couler sa corporéité de
Ressuscité en une autre corporéité relevant de ce monde spatiotemporel
et accessible aux croyants qui y vivent encore. Comme
Ressuscité il cède la place à une autre forme incarnée 11 de pré-
10
Nous reconnaissons ici le terme technique pour désigner le banquet
du Seigneur qui ne s’est imposé cependant que dans un stade plus tardif de
la réflexion théologique. C’est Ernst qui le note. Faut-il comprendre notre
verset (30) comme une claire allusion à l’eucharistie? Non et oui pense le
même auteur. Dans le contexte du repas juif de l’hospitalité, manque, au plan
du déroulement des faits historiques, toute référence eucharistique. “Jésus,
écrit-il, n’a nullement voulu comme Ressuscité répéter la dernière Cène. Il a
plutôt pris le pain et l’a partagé, comme cela était la coutume dans chaque
repas”. “Par contre, continue-t-il, on ne peut pas ne pas relever que Luc s’est
représenté cet événement quotidien à la lumière de la célébration chrétienne
primitive de l’eucharistie” o.c., 662 (C’est moi qui traduis). Cette interprétation
me semble insuffisante. Tout en reconnaissant que la donnée historique
et son rapport à l’eucharistie sont assez ténus, il serait plus qu’étonnant
que Luc ait prêté à un événement si important pour la constitution et la vie
de l’Église une signification complètement ignorée par le Ressuscité en personne.
Mutatis mutandis, vaut ici le principe évangélique: les disciples ne
sont pas au-dessus du Maître.
11
Il peut le faire puisqu’en tant que ressuscité et donc jouissant de la
plénitude eschatologique, il a le pouvoir, s’il le veut, d’attirer à lui une réalité
de ce monde au point d’en faire le décalque de sa corporéité glorifiée et, par
là, de sa présence dans le temps et l’espace. C’est en un sens analogue que
Durrwell écrit: “Consacrés par l’Esprit, le pain et le vin sont assumés si entièrement
en celui qui est leur plénitude finale, par une réduction si immédiate
sur le centre, que le Christ en devient la sub-stantia totale et que, se nourrissant
de l’eucharistie, les chrétiens s’unissent, sans intermédiaire, au corps
du Christ” F.-X. DURRWELL, L’Eucharistie sacrement pascal, Paris, 1980, 100.
(C’est l’auteur qui souligne). Pour plus de détails sur la pensée durrwellienne,
voir notre étude à paraître dans les Mélanges Bordoni: A proposito della
presenza sacrificale di Cristo nell’eucaristia. Giustificazione e complementarità
di due approcci.

134 RÉAL TREMBLAY
sence 12 au point que c’est là qu’il faudra désormais le chercher et
le trouver. Nous touchons ici à une des assises de la structure
sacramentelle de l’Église en général et, en elle, du septénaire
sacramentel, notamment de son sommet, l’eucharistie. En
somme, l’eucharistie est l’apparition du Crucifié ressuscité dans
le temps qui précède la pleine irruption de l’eschatologie à la fin
des temps.
Or qui dit “apparition” dit visibilité, réalité perceptible à
l’oeil, et qui parle d’“apparition” dans le présent contexte parle
de réalité visible coïncidant avec la réalité manifestée. Dès lors
la question se pose: en quoi le pain et le vin eucharistiques
relaient-ils le Crucifié ressuscité sous les traits retenus plus haut
à la suite de l’épisode lucanien des pèlerins d’Emmaüs?
On pourrait dire que le pain partagé et le vin versé sont des
réalités de ce monde foncièrement données. Le dicton populaire
ne se trompe pas lorsqu’il compare à du pain quelqu’un de particulièrement
dévoué ou serviable: “il est comme du bon pain”
dit-on spontanément. L’être radicalement pro-existant du
Crucifié ressuscité trouverait donc une espèce de parenté avec
ces réalités et prendrait ainsi visage dans le temps de l’Église
“sous les apparences” du pain et du vin distribués aux convives
d’un repas. On pourrait pousser encore plus loin ces rapports
pour continuer à préciser les traits sacramentels du Crucifié ressuscité.
Le pain offert en partage est un pain rompu, brisé, fractionné;
le vin versé est un vin répandu. Or le Ressuscité n’est-il
pas “Serviteur” des hommes jusqu’à la mort dont il porte du
reste encore et pour toujours les marques dans son corps re-vivifié
(cf. Lc 24, 39-40; Jn 20, 27; Ap 5, 6)? Rompu et répandu, le
pain et le vin eucharistiques renvoient ainsi au service de la
croix, au “corps donné pour vous” et au “sang versé pour vous”
(Lc 22, 19-20 et parall.; cf. 1 Co 11, 23-25), sans insister sur la
séparation comme sur l’unité de ces mêmes éléments qui,
comme tels, rendent manifestes dans le temps le sacrifice éternel
du Christ d’abord accompli “une fois pour toutes” sur le
Golgotha (cf. Hé 9, 26).
12
Il est bien entendu qu’il s’agit ici d’une présence forte dans le sens du
dogme de Trente (cf. DH 37 [éd. française], 1651) réaffirmé avec fermeté par
l’Encyclique Mysterium Fidei de PAUL VI (cf. DH 37 [éd. française], 4411-4413).

LE PAIN ROMPU À MANGER ET LE VIN VERSÉ À BOIRE, VISAGE DU CRUCIFIÉ 135
Le pain et le vin sont encore des aliments destinés à être consommés
et, par conséquent, à être assimilés à la substance de
celui qui les consomme. Par le processus physiologique de la
digestion, ils perdent leur consistance propre pour devenir celle
de la personne qui en use. En tant qu’aliments, il y a donc en eux
comme un indice d’unité, d’abandon d’eux-mêmes à l’autre qui
va jusqu’à l’identification des substances au profit de celui qui
consomme.
Considérés sous cet angle, les éléments eucharistiques ne
sont-ils pas la traduction spatio-temporelle par excellence de la
capacité du Crucifié ressuscité d’avoir accès à l’intimité du
croyant et de sa volonté de s’y unir au point de devenir une substance
13 avec lui? En se donnant en nourriture, Jésus pénètre
dans les “coeurs” selon un degré de profondeur que l’amour
humain ne pouvait que rêver d’atteindre. Qui n’a pas entendu
une mère dire à son enfant avec un fort sentiment d’impuissance
toutefois: “je te mangerais tant je t’aime”? C’est le voeu de l’assimilation
totale qui fait partie intégrante de l’amour humain,
mais qui curieusement s’avère irréalisable entre les personnes
humaines. En l’occurrence, on ne peut qu’admirer la puissance
inventive de Dieu qui se sert des aliments du pain et du vin pour
médiatiser dans le temps de l’Église la mort d’amour de son Fils
pour les hommes et ainsi répondre à leur aspiration à la fusion
totale 14 avec l’être aimé. De là, on voit que ce n’était pas en vain
13
Nous parlons ici de “substance” pour rester dans la ligne du phénomène
de l’assimilation des éléments eucharistiques. À propos du rapport de l’eucharistie
à l’Église, H. de Lubac parle plutôt de même “corps” et de même
“chair”. Citons ce beau texte qui vient enrichir et compléter nos propres
réflexions: “La Tête et les membres ne font qu’un seul corps. L’Épouse et l’Époux
sont «une seule chair». Il n’y a pas deux Christs, dont l’un serait personnel
et l’autre «mystique». Certes, la Tête et les membres ne se confondent pas,
les chrétiens ne sont pas le corps «physique» (ou eucharistique) du Christ; l’Épouse
n’est pas elle-même l’Époux. Toutes les distinctions demeurent, mais
elles ne sont pas discontinuité. Aussi l’Église n’est-elle pas un corps quelconque;
elle est le Corps du Christ. Ce que Dieu lui-même a uni, que l’homme ne
le sépare pas: «qu’il ne sépare pas l’Église du Seigneur!»” H. DE LUBAC,
Méditations sur l’Église (Th., 27), 1954, 135. (C’est l’auteur qui souligne).
14
Qui n’égale pas confusion, évidemment. En Dieu, plus l’union est
étroite, plus s’affirme la différence. - Thérèse de Lisieux parle de l’effet de

136 RÉAL TREMBLAY
que le Créateur avait inscrit ce désir dans le coeur des hommes.
Mais il faut pousser encore plus loin notre réflexion. Tandis
que dans le cas de la consommation d’un aliment appartenant
uniquement à ce monde, c’est l’organisme assimilant qui s’empare
de la substance de l’aliment consommé pour en être nourri
et fortifié, dans le cas du pain et du vin eucharistiques c’est le
mouvement inverse qui se produit. Certes, en tant que réalités
matérielles, les éléments eucharistiques subissent le même sort
que les autres aliments. Mais comme nourriture spirituelle contenant
le corps et le sang du Crucifié ressuscité, c’est la substance
des croyants qui se trouve comme attirée (cf. Jn 6, 44; 12, 32)
en celle du “Vivant” et identifiée à lui pour en être vivifiée à
jamais (cf. Jn 6, 58). Dans la foulée d’un texte de s. Augustin 15 , J.
Ratzinger dit en substance la même chose en ces termes: “Les
moyens normaux de nutrition sont moins forts que l’homme. Ils
le servent: ils sont consommés de manière à ce qu’ils soient assimilés
au corps de l’homme et qu’ils l’édifient. Mais cette nourriture
spéciale - l’eucharistie - se situe, exactement à l’inverse, audessus
de l’homme, est plus forte que lui et ainsi le processus
vers lequel tend le tout est renversé: L’homme, qui consomme ce
pain lui est assimilé, est assumé par lui, est fondu en ce pain et
devient pain comme le Christ lui-même” 16 .
grâce ressenti lors de sa première communion comme d’une “fusion”: “Ce fut
un baiser d’amour, je me sentais aimée, et je disais aussi: «Je vous aime, je
me donne à vous pour toujours.» […] Depuis longtemps, Jésus et la pauvre
petite Thérèse s’étaient regardés et s’était compris… Ce jour-là ce n’était plus
un regard, mais une fusion…” Manuscrit A 35r o , dans THÉRÈSE DE L’ENFANT-
JÉSUS ET DE LA SAINTE-FACE, Oeuvres complètes, Paris, 1996, 125 (c’est Thérèse
qui souligne). Un mois plus tard, lors de sa seconde communion, Thérèse fait
pratiquement la même expérience en citant à l’appui Ga 2, 20: “... Je me répétais
sans cesse à moi-même ces paroles de S t Paul: «Ce n’est plus moi qui vis,
c’est Jésus qui vit en moi!…»” Ibid., 36r o , dans o.c., 127.
15
“«Je suis l’aliment des grands, grandis et tu me mangeras. Et tu ne me
changeras pas en toi, comme l’aliment de ta chair, mais c’est toi qui seras
changé en moi»” Conf. VII, x, 16 (traduction de l’édition de la Bibliothèque
Augustinienne: Oeuvres de Saint Augustin 13. Les Confessions. Livres I-VII,
Paris, 1962, 617). Pour d’autres textes patristiques de même veine, voir H. DE
LUBAC, o.c., 135, note 121.
16
J. RATZINGER, Schauen auf den Durchbohrten, Einsiedeln, 1984, 75.
(C’est l’auteur qui souligne et c’est moi qui traduis).

LE PAIN ROMPU À MANGER ET LE VIN VERSÉ À BOIRE, VISAGE DU CRUCIFIÉ 137
C’est ainsi que le pain et le vin eucharistiques considérés
comme aliments ou nourriture achèvent de manifester dans le
temps et l’espace un trait fondamental de la figure du Crucifié
ressuscité, trait que l’on pourrait se représenter comme une
accessibilité au “coeur” ou à l’intimité la plus profonde des
croyants pour les unir, “comme deux morceaux de cire fondus”
17 , à son propre Coeur et ainsi construire, dans le feu de
l’Esprit, une communauté de fils en marche vers la maison du
Père 18 .
17
CYRILLE D’ALEXANDRIE, In Joan., 4, 2 (PG 73, 584). Dans la ligne de cette
image, l’on pourrait citer parmi bien d’autres ce beau texte de CYRILLE DE
JÉRUSALEM: “C’est donc avec une pleine conviction que nous participons à ce
repas comme au corps et au sang du Christ. Car sous la figure du pain, c’est
le corps qui t’est donné, sous la figure du vin, c’est le sang qui t’est donné,
afin que tu deviennes, en participant au corps et au sang du Christ, un seul
corps et un seul sang avec le Christ. C’est ainsi que nous devenons des «porte-
Christ», son corps et son sang s’étant répandus dans nos membres. De cette
façon, selon saint Pierre, nous devenons participants de la nature divine”
Catéchèses mystagogiques, IV, 3 (SCh., 126, 136). (C’est moi qui souligne).
18
S. LÉON LE GRAND admet, lui aussi, que “ce qu’on a pu voir” dans le
Rédempteur “est passé dans les rites sacramentels”. Mais il ne perçoit pas le
“plus” sacramentel (en référence maintenant à l’eucharistie) dans la possibilité
pour le Crucifié ressuscité d’entrer en communion plus profonde avec les
croyants, mais dans le fait que par là l’enseignement (→ l’ouïe) a remplacé la
visibilité (→ la vision) pour permettre une plus grande pureté et fermeté de
la foi: “Et pour que la foi fût plus excellente et plus ferme, l’instruction, écritil,
a succédé à la vision: c’est sur son autorité que les coeurs des croyants,
illuminés par les rayons d’en haut, s’appuieront désormais”. Bien que la
chair terrestre et glorieuse de Jésus soit essentielle à la foi catholique, la
vision (comme le toucher) qui s’y rattache fait de quelque manière écran,
selon notre auteur, à la contemplation spirituelle de sa filiation divine: “C’est
(à la suite de l’Ascension) [...] que le fils de l’homme fut connu plus excellemment
et plus saintement comme le Fils de Dieu: car s’étant retiré dans la
gloire de la majesté paternelle, il commença d’une manière ineffable à être
plus présent par sa divinité, bien qu’il fût plus loin par son humanité. C’est
alors que la foi mieux instruite se mit spirituellement en marche pour s’approcher
du Fils égal au Père; elle n’eut plus besoin de toucher (remarquons
cette allusion au toucher qui renvoie probablement à Jn 20, 27) dans le
Christ cette substance corporelle par laquelle il est inférieur au Père. La
nature du corps glorifié demeurant la même, la foi des croyants, en effet, fut
appelée là où elle pourrait toucher le Fils unique égal à celui qui l’engendre,

138 RÉAL TREMBLAY
Conclusion
En présence des rapports bien réels de l’eucharistie au
Crucifié ressuscité et donc à l’eschatologie; en présence de sa
puissance et de son efficacité, on pourrait s’installer confortablement
dans ce “déjà” 19 sans aspirer au “pas encore” que le
sacrement, en raison même de sa consistance, implique tout
aussi nécessairement. Le retour hâtif des pèlerins d’Emmaüs à
Jérusalem ne comporte-t-il pas, en plus des raisons signalées ailleurs,
le désir de revoir en personne celui qui avait disparu de
devant eux en se coulant dans la visibilité sacramentelle? Et de
fait, Luc le note explicitement: “Ils parlaient encore quand il se
tint en personne au milieu d’eux et leur dit: «Paix à vous!»” (Lc
24, 36).
C’est que si l’eucharistie représente un plus par rapport au
Jésus de l’histoire, en ce sens qu’elle est l’émergence dans le
monde du Christ de Pâques, elle représente aussi un moins par
rapport à la venue finale de ce dernier. Elle est une manifestation
encore voilée, tamisée du Crucifié ressuscité. À bien y penser,
il ne peut pas en être autrement. Comment le croyant appartenant
encore au monde des “arrhes” (cf. 2 Co 1, 22) pourrait,
sans mourir, être mis en présence de l’eschatologie pleinement
réalisée? Il n’est pas adapté à porter un tel poids de gloire 20 .
Mutatis mutandis vaut ici la crainte religieuse souvent exprimée
lors des théophanies vétéro-testamentaires (cf. Ex 19, 16ss; 34,
20; Lv 16, 2; Nb 4, 20; Dt 5, 23ss; 18, 16; etc.) 21 . De ce point de
vue, l’on se rend encore mieux compte de la génialité divine de
l’invention de l’eucharistie soulignée dans un autre contexte.
non d’une main charnelle, mais d’une intelligence spirituelle” De Ascensione.
Sermo II, 2. 4 (SCh., 74, 140.141).
19
Les croyants qui n’ont aucune hâte de quitter ce monde pour aller
“voir” le Seigneur ne sont-ils pas semblables à ces hôtes qui préfèrent l’antichambre
à la salle du banquet?…
20
À moins que Dieu en dispose autrement comme c’est le cas pour les
apparitions du Crucifié ressuscité pendant les “quarante jours” qui suivent
Pâques.
21
À titre de complément, voir les notes substantielles de la Bible de
Jérusalem jointes tour à tour à Ex 24, 16 et à Ex 34, 20.

LE PAIN ROMPU À MANGER ET LE VIN VERSÉ À BOIRE, VISAGE DU CRUCIFIÉ 139
L’eucharistie est à coup sûr la présence absolument réelle du
Crucifié ressuscité dans le temps de l’Église de même que la visibilité
pleinement accordée à son état de Ressuscité, mais en
même temps une présence visibilisée mesurée aux capacités des
“yeux du coeur” (cf. Ep 1, 18) non encore pleinement adaptés à
la révélation directe de la δόξα de l’Éternel. C’est pourquoi ce
vivre en exil loin du Seigneur, ce cheminement dans la foi, ce
moins donc, devrait susciter une tension vers le plus, devrait
faire sourdre l’attente impatiente de la “claire vision” (cf. 2 Co 5,
6-7) 22 .
École du définitif, l’eucharistie est-elle comme telle aussi
vivement ressentie en nos Églises qu’elle l’était par exemple dans
les Églises de Paul (cf. 1 Co 11, 26) et de Jean (Ap 3, 20-22; etc.)?
Pour que l’acclamation suivant les paroles consécratoires: “nous
attendons, Seigneur, ta venue dans la gloire” ne reste pas, en nos
assemblées, lettre morte, une condition préalable est absolument
nécessaire: prendre conscience que l’eucharistie est icibas,
comme disait s. Alphonse Marie de Liguori, la dernière ou
la plus parfaite invention de Dieu pour se faire aimer 23 .
Via Merulana, 31
C.P. 2458
00185 Roma
Italy.
RÉAL TREMBLAY, C.Ss.R.
22
Cf. Sacrosanctum Concilium, 8 (DH 37 [éd. française], 4008). - Par l’évocation
de cette dialectique de l’accomplissement et de la promesse constitutive
de l’eucharistie perçue comme présence/épiphanie du Crucifié ressuscité,
l’on pense à s. Irénée qui cependant l’étend, en la rattachant à la manifestatio
Dei, à l’ensemble de l’histoire du salut. Voir sur ce point, R. TREMBLAY,
La manifestation et la vision de Dieu selon saint Irénée de Lyon (MBTh., 41),
Münster, 1978, 66-128; H.U. VON BALTHASAR, Herrlichkeit. Eine theologische
Ästhetik. I/2: Fächer der Stile, Einsiedeln, 1962, 44ss.
23
“O Dio d’amore [...] vi siete ridotto in fine a mettervi sotto le specie di
pane per farvi nostro cibo, e così unirvi tutto con ciascuno di noi. Ditemi,
replico, ci è più che inventare per farvi amare?” ALFONSO DE’ LIGUORI, Pratica
di amare Gesù Cristo, 2 (Opere ascetiche, I, Roma, 1933, 25). Pour compléter,
voir notre brève étude: Alcuni elementi maggiori della concezione alfonsiana
dell’eucaristia, dans Incontro con S. Alfonso Maria de’ Liguori, Napoli, 1997,
49-56.

140 RÉAL TREMBLAY
Summary / Resumen
—————
The Church is in Jubilee as it recalls that 2000 years ago the Son
of God united Himself to human flesh in order to bring back men and
women to the home of the Father. Her joy is possible because this is an
event that does not just belong to the past: but is ever present, especially
through the Sacrament of the Eucharist. This article would like to be a
help in strengthening the joy of the Church by showing how the
eucharistic presence of the Risen Crucified shows a “plus” in respect to
the first type of presence but a “minus” in respect to the final type which
is the definitive and eschatological presence that the sacrament already
prepares by arousing the desire in the heart of believers: “Come, Lord
Jesus!”
La Iglesia celebra el Jubileo al recordar que hace 2000 años el Hijo
de Dios se unió personalmente a la humanidad para devolver a los
hombres y mujeres a la casa del Padre. Su alegría es posible porque éste
es un evento que no pertenece sólo al pasado, sino que es siempre
actual, sobre todo en el Sacramento de la Eucaristía. El autor del
artículo quisiera ayudar a intensificar la alegría de la Iglesia indicando
cómo la presencia eucarística del Resucitado Crucificado muestra
“más” respecto a su primer modelo de presencia, pero “menos” respecto
al modelo final que es la presencia definitiva y escatológica que el
sacramento ya prepara suscitando el deseo en el corazón de creyentes:
“Ven, Señor Jesús!”
—————
The author is Professor of Fundamental Moral Theology at the
Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor titular de moral fundamental en la
Academia Alfonsiana.
—————

141
StMor 38 (2000) 141-164
J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO C.Ss.R.
EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’
EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA. BREVE REFLEXIÓN
TEOLÓGICA PARA NUESTROS TIEMPOS
Introducción
Si examinamos las causales de nulidad del matrimonio, sea
a la luz del viejo código de Derecho Canónico, sea siguiendo el
proceso jurisprudencial de los tribunales eclesiásticos, podremos
descubrir que a la raíz de estos pronunciamientos existe
una determinada concepción del ser humano. No juzgamos
aventurado afirmar que hasta la Redemptor hominis, la primera
carta encíclica del pontificado de Juan Pablo II (4 Marzo, 1979),
jugó papel de radical importancia la definición del hombre
como “animal racional”. No es el momento de analizar las consecuencias
que el empleo de tal definición ha desencadenado en
la historia.
Con la Redemptor hominis creemos se abre una nueva perspectiva:
el Papa define al hombre como “un ser capaz de amar”:
“el hombre no puede vivir sin amar. Su ser mismo le parece
incomprensible, su vida le parece sin sentido si no le es manifestado
el amor, si no lo experimenta y se lo apropia, si no participa
vivamente en el dinamismo del amor” (n. 10). Incluso uno de
los grandes filósofos del personalismo como fue Mounier se permitió
cambiar el slogan cartesiano del “cogito, ergo sum”, por
otro más revolucionario “amo, ergo sum” 1 . Esta nueva perspectiva
abre la posibilidad de una reflexión sobre el fracaso conyu-
1
La ética conyugal en el siglo XX está haciendo serios intentos por fundarse
en el amor. Prueba de ello es la corriente aparecida en los años 50 llamada
“la nueva moral”, y los estudios posteriores de algunos moralistas. Cfr.
A. BOSCHI, “La cosi detta ‘Morale Nuova’”, La Scuola Cattolica 84 (1956) 336-
350 y 401-426; J. S. BOTERO G., Etica coniugale. Per un rinnovamento della
morale matrimoniale, San Paolo, Milano 1994, 44, nota 17.

142 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
gal 2 como una realidad que puede y debe ser remediada, para
que el hombre pueda encontrar el sentido de existir y de amar 3 .
En un contexto filosófico y teológico tradicional el fracaso
conyugal fue una realidad material que nunca tuvo cabida dentro
de la reflexión teológica, porque se jugaba con el principio de
“todo o nada”. A la raíz de este criterio se intuye una filosofía
esencialista, no existencialista como la que prevalece al presente.
La iglesia, que se consideraba “una sociedad perfecta” según
la visión esencialista, favoreció una “ética del éxito”, en la que el
fracaso no tenía cabida; de ahí una cierta ‘demonización’ del fracaso.
Una concepción de ‘sociedad perfecta’, de ‘ética del éxito’
puede reflejar un cierto orgullo, una cierta autosuficiencia y una
visión de los actos humanos como ‘perfectos’ ya desde el
comienzo. J. Lacroix afirmaba que la humildad nos abre a la verdad
mientras que el orgullo es una actitud de rechazo; el orgullo
es idealista, la humildad es realista 4 .
El mismo principio escolástico del “ex opere operato” contribuyó
a reforzar una concepción mágica de la conducta humana:
un primer acto, como fue el caso del consentimiento matrimonial
o de la primera relación marital ya decidía definitivamente
un estado de cosas. Desde el siglo pasado la sociedad civil
había asumido el fracaso matrimonial como una realidad humana
e hizo de éste objeto de estudio y de reflexión cuando introdujo
en la legislación de los estados el divorcio vincular; en este
final del segundo milenio el fracaso conyugal comienza también
a ser objeto de seria preocupación y de meditación para la igle-
2
El Magisterio de la iglesia tradicionalmente ha hablado de ‘divorzio’
cuando se trata de la ruptura del matrimonio. Recientemente (10 de Julio,
1993) tres obispos alemanes en una pastoral conjunta se han referido explícitamente
al ‘fracaso irremediable’ de algunas parejas.
3
De Vulpian señala una escala de valores en línea ascendente en materia
de sensibilidad ético-cultural: 1. la bioemotividad axiológica, 2. la potenciación
mental y cultural, 3. la colectividad, 4. la expresión personal y 5. la
empatía solidaria. Del primero dice: “se refiere a que la gente busca integrar
a un tiempo la emoción, el instinto, la intuición y el intelecto. Esta capacidad
‘bioemotiva’ se da especialmente ente los jóvenes” en O. FRANÇA TARRAGÓ,
“Evolución de las mentalidades morales de los jóvenes”, Estudios
Eclesiásticos 70 (1995) 357.
4
Cfr. J. LACROIX, L’échec, PUF., Paris 1964, 96-97.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 143
sia, a nivel de las tres grandes comunidades cristianas.
No podemos resignarnos a la actitud sin sentido de quien
ignora una realidad presente. El fracaso conyugal toma en estos
momentos las características de una calamidad social, de una
‘epidemia’ (GS. n. 47). Diríamos que es un mal que se desarrolla
en cadena: los hogares fracasados, como una bola de nieve,
parecería que generan nuevas parejas o familias camino del fracaso.
Consideramos necesario afrontar el problema con un gran
respeto de la tradición eclesial, pero también con objetividad,
pues debe interesarnos todo aquello que en nuestro tiempo está
afectando al ser humano, como lo sugiere la Gaudium et Spes (n.
3). No sólo la iglesia, también el estado y la sociedad deberán
preocuparse por este mal endémico de nuestro tiempo.
Por esta razón proponemos una reflexión en la que nos
interpelamos por qué el fracaso es una realidad tan corriente en
nuestra época que ya ha dejado de ser ‘noticia’. Nos proponemos
proyectar la posible fundamentación de una ‘teología del fracaso
conyugal’ y, finalmente, nos preguntaremos si hay alternativas
para el fracaso conyugal.
1. El fracaso conyugal 5 , una realidad que interpela
No es necesario argumentar demasiado para constatar el
hecho social de una cantidad de fracasos de pareja. Basta mirar
las estadísticas oficiales de divorcios 6 ; basta asomarse a la ven-
5
Cfr. M. ECK, “Les échecs dans la vie conjugale”, en L’homme devant l’échec
(Groupe Lyonnais d’Etudes Médicales Philosophiques et Biologiques),
Presses de la Cib, Paris 1959, 123-138.
6
Los autores que se han dedicado al estudio del divorcio ofrecen datos
que son fiables: EVA ESTEBAN G. afirma que “en los años noventa las separaciones
se producen en dos de cada tres matrimonios en USA, uno de cada
dos en el Reino Unido y uno de cada seis en España”, Cfr. “El concepto de
relación de pareja en las sociedades occidentales contemporáneas”,
Miscelánea Comillas 56 (1998) 180, nota 1. El diario suizo Corriere del Ticino
en su publicación del 20 de Julio de 1998, pag. 5 daba a conocer estas cifras
sobre este fenómeno en la Confederación Helvética: en 1997 aumentaron los
divorcios en un 5.5% sobre la cifra del año anterior. De 100 matrimonios
celebrados, 41 habían solicitado el divorcio.

144 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
tana de los medios de comunicación social para darse cuenta del
fenómeno cada vez más arrollador del divorcio (afectivo, de
hecho, legal), de las separaciones de pareja; basta curiosear la
abundante literatura que al presente se difunde, lo que revela
una preocupación generalizada en torno a este fenómeno; basta
preguntar a los abogados cuál es la fuente más pingüe de ingresos
que tienen ...
Si nos preguntamos por las causas del fracaso, las encontraremos
muy diversas: de una parte, ha caído el muro de la institución
que salvaguardaba el compromiso de pareja y la alianza
conyugal ha quedado a merced de la buena voluntad de los contrayentes
7 . De otra parte, el hombre-varón de nuestro tiempo
tiene miedo a compromisos definitivos 8 y la mujer se aprovecha
de la coyuntura de la liberación femenina para reivindicarse por
los siglos de dominio machista de que fue víctima.
La mentalidad postmodernista que prevalece entre las generaciones
jóvenes contribuye en forma eficaz a multiplicar las
cifras de parejas fracasadas. Los signos de la postmodernidad no
pueden menos que favorecer este fenómeno: frente a lo absoluto
de la modernidad prevalece lo relativo de la postmodernidad;
frente al esfuerzo que se inculcaba en otro tiempo, hoy se abre
espacio a lo fácil, lo ‘light’; frente a la atención que se daba al
pasado y al futuro, la postmodernidad solo mira al presente 9 ;
frente a lo objetivo de un pacto, de una palabra firme dada como
7
J. PARRA JUNQUERA alude al cambio que se operó en el matrimonio al
pasar de la institucionalización a la privatización del presente: “en la actualidad
esta necesidad de publicidad parece haber sido sustituida por la necesidad
de la privacidad. Para sentirse personalmente comprometido con la
pareja se desea que la unión sea privada, libre y sin papeles. De ahí el rechazo
a la mediación institucional...”, en “Cambios y tendencias en la familia
actual”, Icade 34 (1995) 34.
8
J. M. DÍAZ MORENO escribe que “un cierto miedo al compromiso perpetuo
que, al menos como proyecto de vida, entraña el matrimonio, es razonable.
Pero, hoy en determinados (y amplios) ambientes, predomina un miedo
que equivale a una práctica negación de todo compromiso permanente. Esto
lleva a que sea moneda de curso legal, en determinados sectores de nuestra
sociedad, tanto el cambio de pareja, a merced prácticamente, del sentimiento
o del deseo de nuevas experiencias”, en Razón y fe 236 (1997) 43-44.
9
E. GERVILLA, Postmodernidad y educación. Valores y cultura de los jóvenes,
Dykinson, Madrid 1993, 66.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 145
garantía, las parejas de hoy se atienen a motivaciones de tipo
subjetivo: sólo les interesa su realización personal, su realización
como individuo. SAVAGNONE recoge la frase de alguien que
argumenta en favor de la liberación del compromiso conyugal
so pretexto de una malentendida autorrealización: “me apena
por el dolor de mis hijos, pero yo debo realizarme” 10 . Y entre
todas las causas del fracaso, sin duda que la inmadurez humana,
a diversos niveles, es la que más desastres produce.
DÍEZ DEL RÍO añade a los anteriores signos de la postmodernidad
otros que, a nuestro juicio, están afectando directamente
la vida de pareja: el ‘pensamiento débil’ 11 , los consensos blandos,
el hedonismo, la subjetividad, el placer individualista, el interés
por lo privado, la inmadurez, la desconstrucción del mundo
heredado, etc 12 .
En síntesis, podríamos decir que la postmodernidad nos ha
traído una nueva cosmovisión que está afectando radicalmente
el modo tradicional de pensar y de vivir. Se debe destacar el
énfasis que la postmodernidad hace a ciertos aspectos que las
generaciones anteriores habían minusvalorado como el sentimiento
y el afecto, el interés por cuerpo, la prevalencia del aquí
y del ahora, el relieve al placer, etc. No pretendemos justificar
este nuevo ritmo, pero sí tratar de comprender que se hace necesaria
una integración de los valores de la modernidad y de la
postmodernidad.
El fracaso de tantas parejas en su proyecto de vida conyugal,
además de ser una realidad de nuestra época, es sobretodo síntoma
de un desbarajuste social. Dónde radica fundamentalmente
este mal social?. Una explicación está en el hecho de que el
fundamento de la estructura social (pareja, familia, sociedad,
etc.) ha cambiado. Ya no son sólo la naturaleza, la razón, la ley,
10
G. SAVAGNONE, Evangelizzare nella postmodernità, LDC., Leumann
(Torino), 1996, 67.
11
Cfr. G. MORRA, Il quarto uomo alude a la trascendencia del ‘pensamiento
débil’ que genera una ‘sociedad débil, una ‘familia débil’, una ‘escuela
débil’ e, incluso, una ‘religión débil’. Il quarto uomo, Postmodernità o crisi
della modernità?, Armando, Roma 1992, 133-152.
12
Cfr. I. DÍEZ DEL RÍO, “Postmodernidad y nueva religiosidad”, Religión
y Cultura 39 (1993) 62-63.

146 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
la autoridad, la fuerza de la institución las que dan estabilidad y
firmeza a la pareja humana, sino que aparecen en la panorámica
del comienzo de milenio unos nuevos criterios que cuestionan
los fundamentos tradicionales.
Tenemos la impresión de que las viejas generaciones vegetaron
a la sombra de unos parámetros que, como muros protectores,
daban seguridad y garantizaban la durabilidad a las instituciones
que surgían dentro de dichos muros. Un aire renovador
ha hecho caer las murallas, y hoy las nuevas generaciones afirman
principios distintos (“todo vale” 13 ), ponen fundamentos
diversos (“la cultura” por ejemplo 14 ), orientan la vida en una
nueva dirección, dejándose llevar por el subjetivismo, por la permisividad
15 , y en alas del sentimiento.
Estos pocos datos nos explican por qué en otro tiempo no se
hablaba del fracaso en general y menos aún del fracaso matrimonial.
Los diccionarios enciclopédicos solo recogían el término
‘fracaso’ aludiendo a la línea empresarial o comercial. Sólo
recientemente se ha comenzado a hablar del fracaso en otros
campos de la actividad humana 16 .
Al referirnos al fracaso conyugal no debemos limitarnos a
señalar las causas externas que lo propician o lo determinan.
Debemos atender también a los factores internos que hoy están
revelándose como motivos de dicho fracaso. Esto nos hace
intuir que el problema es mucho más hondo y grave de lo que
podría pensarse, lo que nos exigirá una mayor atención. Y si,
con ARANGUREN GONZALO, afirmamos que “la existencia humana
camina constantemente de la mano de la posibilidad del fracaso
13
Cfr. E. GERVILLA, Postmodernidad y educación ...65-66.
14
Cfr. J. S. BOTERO G., “Frontera ética de la familia hoy”, en Políticas de
la familia. Perspectivas jurídicas y de servicios sociales en diferentes países, Dir.
M. Juárez Gallego, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid 1993, 81-95.
15
Cfr. G. LIPOVETSKY, La era del vacío. Ensayos sobre el individualismo
contemporáneo, Anagrama, Barcelona 1986, 22.
16
D. MIETH, “Ethos del fracaso y la vuelta a empezar. Una perspectiva
teológico-ética olvidada”, Concilium 231 (1990) 243-259; L. A. ARANGUREN G.,
“El fracaso existencial: derrota o posibilidad?”, Religión y Cultura 43 (1997)
24-49; E. BLESKE, “Fallimento nel progetto di fedeltà per tutta la vita”,
Concilium 5 (1990) 134-147; P. DE LOCHT, L’église et l’échec de l’amour
humain, Centurión, Paris 1971.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 147
y esta vecindad permanente alienta la búsqueda por esclarecer
tal realidad”, comprenderemos por qué dicha realidad es más
frecuente de lo que pueda imaginarse, es más fácil de lo que
pudiera esperarse. Por tanto, fracasar, y fracasar en un negocio
tan serio como es el matrimonio, no es algo excepcional, no es
algo extraño. Todo lo contrario.
El fracaso conyugal es una realidad que interpela a todas las
instancias sociales. Nos hallamos ante la dialéctica de condenar
sin más esta realidad del fracaso o banalizarla en tal forma que
la consideremos como algo normal y corriente. Ni una ni otra
posición es válida. Creemos que la orientación que Juan Pablo II
sugiere respecto de las uniones consensuales puede aplicarse a
la situación de las parejas fracasadas: “los pastores y la comunidad
eclesial deberán preocuparse por conocer tales situaciones
y sus causas concretas, caso por caso; se acercarán (a ellas) con
discreción y respeto; se empeñarán en una acción de iluminación
paciente, de corrección caritativa y de testimonio familiar
cristiano que pueda allanarles el camino hacia la regularización
de la situación” (FC. n. 81).
2. Es posible una reflexión teológica sobre el fracaso?
A primera vista puede parecer audaz tal intento. Nos lo han
inspirado unas pocas páginas del libro Jesus and Divorce de G.
R. EWAL quien sugiere la posibilidad de elaborar “a Theology for
Failure” (una teología del fracaso) 17 . Ewald, refiriéndose al
divorcio como fracaso de pareja, se pregunta si la iglesia posee
una reflexión teológica en relación a los que han fracasado en su
matrimonio. Y a renglón seguido plantea que la actitud de Jesús
de Nazareth frente al pecado del hombre fue una actitud redentora,
no punitiva (“redemptively, not punitively”).
BOURGY, DINGEMANS y otros han escrito también sobre “la teología
del fracaso” (Théologie de l’échec). A este propósito afirman
que, si bien la iglesia debe mantener en pie el principio de la
indisolubilidad, de otra parte, ‘debe también mantener en alto el
17
Cfr. G. R. EWALD, Jesus and Divorce. A biblical Guide for Ministry to
divorced Persons, Herald Press, Pennsylvania 1991, 120-125.

148 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
signo de la esperanza’ en medio de las pruebas y en favor de los
más pobres 18 . Es preciso, concluyen, que se reconcilie la exigencia
de la perennidad del matrimonio con la esperanza evangélica.
W. KASPER, frente a la actitud pastoral a asumir ante las
parejas fracasadas, sugiere un triple punto de vista: teológico,
antropológico y jurídico 19 . Nosotros preferimos hacerlo desde la
misma historia de la salvación, contemplada como un pacto que
implica la participación de dos partners - YHWH e Israel - y que
se realiza en tres tiempos: la creación, la caída y los últimos
tiempos.
Anteriormente, señalábamos varias causas o ‘factores externos’,
que son ocasión de fracaso en la vida matrimonial. Pero
ahora deberemos añadir algo más: el fracaso hace parte de la
misma condición humana. ARANGUREN GONZALO ha comentado en
forma interesante el libro de JEAN LACROIX, L’échec 20 : “Uno de los
tributos que la persona tiene que pagar, como ser limitado y finito,
es la experiencia del fracaso”, escribe Aranguren Gonzalo 21 .
Siendo así la situación existencial del hombre, se comprende
que allí donde entra la actividad humana está también presente
la posibilidad del fracaso.
No creemos atrevido afirmar que en el corazón de la historia
de la salvación está inscrito el hecho del fracaso. Y esto por
una razón muy clara: el plan divino de salvar al hombre es un
proyecto de alianza en que participan dos partners, Creador y
criatura, Dios y el hombre. Se comprende entonces porqué Yavé-
Dios aparezca implicado en el A.T. en experiencias de fracaso.
Los profetas Oseas, Isaías y Ezequiel son quienes, en forma
explícita, nos dan noticia del comportamiento divino frente a la
infidelidad del pueblo hebreo, el tropiezo más serio en el pacto
18
Cfr. P. BOURGY- L. DINGEMANS - O. HAYOH, Le remariage des divorcés.
Pour une attitude nouvelle de l’église, Cerf, Paris 1977, 53.
19
Cfr. W. KASPER, Teología del matrimonio cristiano, Sal Terrae,
Santander 1980, 90-96.
20
Cfr. L. A. ARANGUREN GONZALO, “El fracaso existencial...”, 29-49; J.
LACROIX, L’échec, PUF., París 1964.
21
L. A. ARANGUREN GONZALO, “El fracaso existencial...”, 34.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 149
de la alianza. Isaías pone en labios de YHWH–Esposo palabras
como éstas: “Por un breve instante te abandoné. Pero con gran
compasión te recogeré. En un arranque de furor te oculté mi
rostro por un instante, pero con amor eterno te he compadecido”
(54,7-8). Ezequiel, en particular, es patético en la descripción
del enojo de YHWH: relata las muestras de afecto de un
Esposo galante y de la cólera de un amor ofendido, pero a pesar
del disgusto enorme, YHWH promete restablecer la alianza: “Yo
mismo restableceré mi alianza contigo” (16,62).
La figura de Oseas es un verdadero símbolo en acción: la
vida del profeta reproduce en forma antropológica la experiencia
de YHWH de cara a la conducta infiel de Israel: es el esfuerzo
de un esposo engañado, defraudado, que no se resigna a la
traición de su esposa e insiste en recuperarla y volverla como a
los tiempos del primer amor (2,8-18 y 21-22). En su tiempo
Oseas experimentó en su propia carne el dolor que YHWH
sentía por causa de la infidelidad del pueblo. Es significativo que
la literatura moderna se esté preocupando en particular por la
figura de este profeta. Oseas vuelve a ser figura de actualidad en
nuestro tiempo 22 .
B. RENAUD en su estudio sobre “la Genèse et unité rédactionnelle
de Os. 2” 23 nos ofrece el esquema concéntrico del capítulo
segundo del profeta; allí aparece claro cómo la alianza YHWH-
Israel, simbolizada por la pareja Oseas-Gomer, se desmorona
totalmente, “porque ella ya no es mi mujer y Yo no soy su marido”
(2,4), para reiniciar de nuevo y restaurarse plenamente
como ‘en un principio’. De parte de YHWH es patente la decisión
de re-establecer el pacto: “Yo te desposaré conmigo en justicia y
en derecho, en amor y compasión, te desposaré conmigo en fidelidad...”
(2,21) y ella dirá entonces: “voy a volver a mi primer
marido porque entonces me iba mejor que ahora” (2,9).
22
Cfr. H. W. WOLFF, Oseas, hoy. Las bodas de la ramera, Sígueme,
Salamanca 1984; S. VIRGULIN, “La sposa infedele in Osea”, en Lo sposo e la
sposa... 27-39; W. VOGELS, “Osée-Gomer, car et comme Yahweh-Israël. Os. 1-
3”, NRTh. 103 (1981) 711-727.
23
B. RENAUD, “Genèse et unité redactionnelle de Os. 2”, RScR. 54 (1980)
1-20. Ver p. 3.

150 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
Al primer hombre lo presenta el Génesis como salido de las
manos del Creador y puesto en un contexto de relación interpersonal
en plena armonía, paz y justeza. Pero pronto este primer
hombre saboreó la amargura del fracaso a causa de su propia
limitación y a causa del tentador. M. ORAISON describe en
forma gráfica el primer fracaso: “el hombre se dirige a YHWH.
Y no responde diciendo ‘nosotros’ (mi mujer y yo...). Habla precisamente
de la mujer como si esta no se hallara allí; o más exactamente,
la rechaza, no se solidariza con ella. ‘Es la mujer que
me has dado’. Existe incluso como un matiz de reproche implícito,
podríamos decir... Parece ser que el hombre piensa: ‘yo
estaba tan tranquilo solo; por qué me has dado esta compañera
causante de catástrofes y que me ha hecho perder la cabeza?’.
(...) Apenas se afirma el éxito de pareja de una manera perfecta
cuando ya se introduce su caída al dar el primer paso al frente...
Ya no son solidarios en la alegría y en el entusiasmo. Incluso
separados por el odio, hombre y mujer que se han amado permanecen
unidos por el mismo fracaso de su amor, por la cuestión
imborrable de dicho fracaso y la nostalgia de no haber
triunfado” 24 .
En el N.T. encontramos a Jesús de Nazareth afrontando la
realidad del fracaso, cuyas raíces vienen desde la caída del primer
hombre y de la primera mujer. Un dato que puede parecer
escandaloso es la presencia de cuatro prostitutas 25 en las genealogías
que los evangelistas ofrecen de la persona de Jesús (Mat.
1,2-17 y Luc. 3,23-38), lo que abriría espacio a una reflexión
sobre la kénosis de Dios en Cristo.
En su primera presentación en la sinagoga de Nazareth ya
“experimentó el fracaso y el rechazo”: “ningún profeta es bien
recibido en su patria” 26 . Posteriormente, cuando los fariseos le
tienden la trampa en torno a la excepción que hizo Moisés a su
pueblo, tolerando el divorcio por causa de la “dureza de
24
M. ORAISON, Armonía de la pareja humana, Studium, Madrid 1967, 39.
25
Cfr. H. U. VON BALTHASAR, Sponsa Verbi. Saggi teologici II, Morcelliana,
Brescia 1972, 207.
26
Cfr. F. CUERVO ARELLANO, “Jesús Evangelizador, nosotros evangelizadores
con Él”, Religión y Cultura 43 (1997) 519.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 151
corazón” (σκληροκαρδια Mat. 19,7) 27 , Jesús responderá
recordándoles el proyecto primigenio del Creador. Y a la reacción
de los discípulos que encuentran severa la disposición de
“no separarse...”, Jesús contesta en una forma que también hoy
es válida: “No todos entienden este lenguaje” (19,11) 28 .
Encontramos en Juan algunas pistas sugestivas sobre la
forma como Jesús hace frente a casos concretos de fracaso. El
relato joánico del encuentro de Jesús con la samaritana (4, 5-31)
nos ofrece varios detalles significativos: Jesús intuye la situación
de esta mujer (“has tenido cinco maridos y el que ahora tienes
no es tu marido”), acepta dialogar con ella no obstante el escándalo
de los discípulos, le revela la fuente nueva del “agua viva” y
esta mujer, al final del diálogo, corre a llamar a sus conciudadanos
“venid a ver... No será este hombre el Cristo”?.
También Juan relata otro encuentro particular cuando los
escribas y fariseos le presentan una mujer que ha sido sorprendida
en adulterio (8,3-12): Jesús escucha la acusación, cambia la
actidud de todos los presentes, de acusadores en acusados por la
Torà (“quien esté libre de pecado, que arroje la primer piedra”)
y termina absolviendo a la mujer de su pecado. Jesús es coherente
con su enseñanza: “Dios no ha enviado su Hijo al mundo
para condenar, sino para salvar” (Juan 3,17).
También Pablo experimentó esta realidad del fracaso personal:
“realmente mi proceder no lo comprendo; pues no hago lo
que quiero, sino que hago lo que aborrezco...” (Rom. 7,15). H.
SCHLIER comentando esta perícopa paulina afirma que la potencia
del pecado, que encuentra en la ley el estímulo para revelarse
concretamente, afecta el modo de ser del hombre en su estructura
existencial. Este exegeta intuye que dentro de la totalidad
del hombre hay dos ‘yo’ que luchan entre sí: vida y muerte. Un
‘yo’ corresponde al hombre en cuanto creatura humana que ama
la vida; el otro ‘yo’ es aquel que está en poder del pecado, el hombre
histórico, la creatura humana en cuanto se presenta históri-
27
Cfr. U. BECKER, “Σκληρος duro, obcecado”, Diccionario teológico del
NT., II, Sígueme, Salamanca 1980, 54-56.
28
Cfr. G. GONZÁLEZ, “Incapacidad para entender. Imposibilidad de cumplir”,
Ciencia Tomista 108 (1981) 327-346.

152 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
camente después de Adán y en su descendencia 29 . La escisión de
su propio ser personal la percibe como un fracaso.
También la iglesia como comunidad de hombres y de mujeres
debe reconocerse fracasada en ciertas circunstancias de la
historia. Cuando se identificó con un determinado sistema filosófico,
como sucedió al inspirarse demasiado en el pensamiento
estoico; cuando bendijo la cultura latina como la única válida
para encarnar el mensaje revelado; cuando se apoyó en el derecho
romano para crear su propia regulación canónica como un
muro defensor, olvidando que “el sábado es para el hombre, no
el hombre para el sábado” (Mc. 2,28); cuando se fió excesivamente
de la ‘modernidad’, enfatizando la validez de la razón
humana, desconfiando del pluralismo, rechazando la afectividad,
afirmándose en una actitud de severidad y de excesivo rigorismo.
Tradicionalmente se había ‘analogado’ la fidelidad de
YHWH a su pueblo, de Cristo a la iglesia, con el matrimonio cristiano,
pero queriendo hacer de dicha analogía una igualdad
matemática, lo que ciertamente no es válido. DURRWELL denuncia
una tal pretensión: la alianza Cristo-Iglesia, por cuanto respecta
a Cristo-Esposo, es indefectible; por lo que toca a la comunidad
cristiana, los hechos lo demuestran, es una alianza llamada a
hacerse indisoluble, pero que de hecho es destructible 30 . A la
iglesia, formada por hombres y mujeres, la compararon los profetas
en el AT. con una ‘esposa infiel’, y en la comunidad primitiva
la designó algún escritor cristiano como la “casta meretrix”.
U. VON BALTHASAR ha dedicado casi 100 páginas de su obra
Sponsa Verbi a este tópico 31 .
Y aún puede continuar tropezando si se limita a considerar
como únicas causas del fracaso matrimonial “la dureza de
29
Cfr. H. SCHLIER, La lettera ai Romani. Commentario teologico del NT,
Paideia, Brescia 1979, 381-387.
30
Cfr. F. X. DURRWELL, “Indissoluble et destructible mariage”, RDC. 36
(1986) 214-241.
31
Cfr. L. CREMASCHI, “La casta meretrix. Il tema della chiesa-sposa nei
Padri”, en Lo sposo e la sposa, G. Barbaglio y otros, EDB. Bologna 1979, 209-
220; H. U. VON BALTHASAR, Sponsa Verbi. Saggi teologici II, Morcelliana,
Brescia 1972, 189-285.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 153
corazón” y la desobediencia a una ley. El principio de la indisolubilidad
del matrimonio ha influido con bastante frecuencia en
modo destructivo más bien que protector, porque dicho principio
exige el sacrificio de otros importantes intereses existenciales,
escribe E. BLESKE 32 .
Esta panorámica rápida de experiencias de fracaso en la
historia salvíficia nos hace pensar en la kénosis 33 de Dios a lo
largo de la historia, sea en el A.T. como en el N.T., sea en la historia
de la iglesia, como en la existencia de cada uno de los creyentes.
Kénosis es el nombre que podemos dar a esta actitud de
Jesús al asumir la condición del hombre limitado y sometido al
rechazo, a la incomprensión, a la frustración. “Cuántas veces he
querido reunir a tus hijos, Jerusalén, como una gallina su nidada
bajo sus alas y tú no has querido” (Luc. 13,34).
Esta kénosis tiene una razón de ser: revelar su proyecto de
rehabilitar al hombre, limitado por su doble condición de creatura
y de pecador. Qué comporta este proyecto de rehabilitación?
Descubrir a la humanidad la fuerza del amor salvíficodivino
que es eternamente fiel; hacer ver al hombre que por el
misterio de la redención lo ha re-generado, lo ha re-creado en su
condición primigenia de amistad y de armonía. Ya los profetas
Isaías y Jeremías intuían esta rehabilitación cuando exclamaban
“hazme volver y volveré...” (Is. 44,22, Jer. 31,18, Lam. 5,21).
Comporta también el ofrecimiento del amor misericordioso que
va más allá de la justicia, lo que quiere decir que “la dimensión
divina de la redención no solo se actúa en cuanto hace justicia,
sino en cuanto revela la fuerza creativa del amor”, como afirma
Juan Pablo II (DM. 7). Una es la lógica de la justicia, otra es la
lógica del amor.
La distinción que hace J. LACROIX a propósito de ‘reacción de
fracaso’ (parálisis del sujeto afectado que puede desembocar en
el suicidio) y ‘reacción contra el fracaso’ (reasumir el acto y ope-
32
Cfr. E. BLESKE, “Fallimento nel progresso di fedeltà per tuta la vita”,
Concilium 5 (1990) 135.
33
Cfr. A. OEPKE, “Κενοω” (vuotare), GLNT. V, Paideia, Brescia 1969, 326-
333; J. GNILKA, La lettera ai filippesi. Commentario teologico del N.T., Paideia,
Brescia 1968, 200-229.

154 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
rar un reajuste generador de nuevos progresos) 34 nos sugiere
una pista para entender porqué el fracaso está en el corazón de
la historia de la salvación y la manera como Jesús asume el fracaso.
“Lo que separa a estos dos momentos de reacción, dice
ARANGUREN GONZALO, es la capacidad o incapacidad del sujeto
para hacer frente a la realidad del fracaso. Ahí radica la ambivalencia
del fracaso: en el uso que hacemos del mismo” 35 .
Precisamente, la actitud de YHWH en el A.T., de Cristo en el N.T.
es la de ‘reacción contra...’. Ejemplos, entre otros muchos, las
figuras de Oseas, de la Samaritana, de la ‘pecadora perdonada’
(Luc. 7,36-50), de ‘la mujer adúltera’ (Jn. 8,2-12).
Visto el fracaso en esta perspectiva de “reacción contra ...”,
lo representaríamos gráficamente con una línea oblicua ascendente
para significar un ideal, una aspiración, pero quebrada a
trechos, para indicar que el objetivo propuesto se ve frustrado en
algunos momentos, pero que en definitiva culminará su propósito.
Esta es la historia de la salvación.
El simbolismo esponsal, que como un hilo de oro, atraviesa
toda la Escritura (Antiguo y Nuevo Testamento), no obstante las
vicisitudes de infidelidad, va siempre adelante en búsqueda de la
culminación feliz cuando llegue la boda definitiva del Cordero
con la ‘novia’: “han llegado las bodas del Cordero y su esposa se
ha engalanado...” (Apoc. 19,7). La historia de la salvación ha
caminado a veces con dificultad, pero llegará al término añorado
36 .
“Reacción contra...” es la actitud humana y evangélica al
tiempo, que debe emprender la iglesia frente a la calamidad del
fracaso matrimonial que se difunde cada vez más. Pero “reaccionar
contra...” en qué forma? Aquí radica el núcleo del problema.
Las soluciones tradicionales son una forma, pero no la única.
Una reflexión renovada sobre la teología y la ética de la pareja
humana deberá abrir caminos nuevos y lanzarse a la búsqueda
de nuevas respuestas al problema del fracaso conyugal. Será
tarea no solo de la jerarquía y de los teólogos, sino de toda la
34
Cfr. J. LACROIX, L’échec..., 33.
35
L. A. ARANGUREN GONZALO, “El fracaso existencial...”, 41.
36
Cfr. B. MAGGIONI, “Il simbolismo sponsale nella Scrittura”, Credere oggi
52/2 (1989) 18-30.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 155
comunidad. Incluso aquellos que han saboreado la amargura del
fracaso pueden ofrecer con su experiencia una válida colaboración.
La ética conyugal tradicional reflejaba fielmente el esquema
del derecho romano (derecho-deber). Pablo en la Carta a los
Efesios opera un cambio de 180 grados al romper el viejo esquema
37 e introducir un elemento nuevo, el amor: “Maridos amen a
sus mujeres como Cristo ama a la iglesia” (5,25). Creemos estar
en una posición válida cuando hemos sugerido fundar la ética
conyugal sobre los presupuestos del amor, la sexualidad y la
sacramentalidad 38 . De estos tres presupuestos se derivarán consecuencias
avaladas por muchos teólogos y juristas que servirán
para superar la frecuente crisis de fracaso conyugal.
Una visión atenta de la historia de la iglesia nos lleva a
descubrir tres períodos significativos en lo que respecta al tema
del fracaso matrimonial: el primer milenio caracterizado por
una actitud de benignidad y condescendencia que corresponde
en buena parte a los Padres de la iglesia; la segunda etapa que
cubre todo el segundo milenio caracterizado por la centralidad
en la iglesia de Roma, por el rigor especulativo y por el énfasis
en la norma eclesial; el tercer período se inicia con Vaticano II 39 .
Es una nueva etapa que quiere caracterizarse por la reconciliación
de fe-razón, de rigor-benignidad, de ideal-situación histórica,
de la verdad como principio con la vida concreta.
Si quisiéramos caracterizar la actitud de la iglesia en cada
uno de estos tres períodos, diremos que el primer milenio, o la
época de los Padres de la iglesia, se tipificó por la actitud general
de afirmar “no se debe” aceptar como solución del fracaso la
separación o divorcio de la pareja, pero manifestando claramente
una conducta de benignidad y de tolerancia. La actitud de
37
Cfr. E. BOSETTI, “Quale etica nei codici domestici (Haustafeln) del N.
T.”, RTM 72 (1986) 9-31; S. ZEDDA, “Spiritualità cristiana e saggezza pagana
nel l’etica della famiglia. Affinità e differenze tra s. Paolo e I coniugalia praecepta
di Plutarco”, Lateranum 48 (1982) 110-124.
38
Cfr. J. S. BOTERO G., Etica coniugale. Per un rinnovamento della morale
matrimoniale, San Pablo, Milano 1994, 40-171.
39
Cfr. J. S. BOTERO G., “De la severidad a la benignidad. Una perspectiva
de cambio en ética conyugal”, Studia Moralia 34 (1996) 323-350.

156 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
la teología escolástica y de la legislación eclesial del segundo
milenio fue la de declarar “no se puede” 40 tolerar ninguna solución
al fracaso matrimonial, a no ser las que el derecho de la
iglesia ha establecido (declaración de nulidad del matrimonio en
sus diversas modalidades). Por esta razón, mientras los Padres
fueron más condescendientes con las dificultades de la pareja
manteniendo en pie el compromiso de fidelidad, la Escolástica y
la teología postridentina fueron más severas e intransigentes.
La condescendencia o misericordia, que caracterizó la
acción pastoral de algunos de los Padres de la Iglesia y que había
desaparecido casi por completo durante el segundo milenio, a
raíz del pontificado de Juan XXIII 41 , del Vaticano II y del pontificado
de Pablo VI 42 , ha regresado al panorama eclesial. El
Sínodo de obispos sobre la familia (1980) se pronunció, en una
de las 43 proposiciones enviadas al Papa para la elaboración de
la Exhortación postsinodal Familiaris consortio, a favor del
restablecimiento de la benignidad dentro de la acción pastoral
de la iglesia: “movido por la solicitud pastoral en favor de aquellos
fieles (se refiere a los divorciados vueltos a casar) el sínodo
espera que se ponga en acto una nueva y profunda investigación
que tenga en cuenta la praxis de las iglesias orientales con el
objetivo de hacer efectiva la misericordia pastoral” 43 .
La historia de la teología moral dentro de la iglesia católica
está viviendo un nuevo período. A las tendencias que hemos
conocido, en la época de los Padres hacia la benignidad, la
orientación de la teología en la época de la Escolástica y del pos-
Trento hacia una cierta severidad, ahora, después de Vaticano II
se insinúa un volver a las fuentes y un “reformular las normas
40
Cfr. G. CERETI, Matrimonio e indissolubilità. Nuove prospettive, EDB.,
1971, 236; E. SCHILLEBEECKX, Il matrimonio realtà terrena e mistero di salvezza,
Paoline, Roma 1980, 260-261.
41
Cfr. G. ALBERIGO, “La miséricorde chez Jean XXIII”, Le Supplement 146
(1992) 201-215.
42
El pontificado de Pablo VI es célebre en este aspecto por sus alocuciones
a la Rota Romana (29 enero, 1970 y 8 Febrero 1973) sobre la necesidad
de recuperar dentro de la jurisprudencia de la iglesia la “equidad canónica”
entendida como “justitia dulcore misericordiae temperata”.
43
Cfr. SINODO DEI VESCOVI SULLA FAMIGLIA, “Le 43 proposizioni”, Il Regnodoc.
26 (1981) 386-397. Ver propos. n. 14,6.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 157
morales universales”, como sugiere Juan Pablo II (VS. n. 53).
La realidad del fracaso conyugal no es ajena al plan salvífico
de Dios y a su prolongación en la acción de la iglesia; este hecho
nos debe sensibilizar pues, como afirma la GS. (n. 1), “nada hay
verdaderamente humano que no encuentre eco en el corazón de
Cristo”. El fracaso de las parejas se manifiesta con una doble
cara: de una parte revela la fidelidad divina que permanece en
pie como oferta de salvación; de otra parte, revela la miseria
humana tan necesitada de la paciencia divina y humana.
KASPER, como otros teólogos, ha intentado integrar en la
proyección de una posible solución el ideal evangélico de la fidelidad
ejemplar de Cristo con la situación histórico-concreta del
hombre pecador: “la iglesia post-pascual hubo de elaborar constantemente
con la ayuda del Espíritu de Jesús que le había sido
otorgado, nuevos ordenamientos en los que, por una parte, se
salvaguardase en toda su plenitud la exigencia escatológica de
Jesús y, por otra, se tuviese en cuenta la situación concreta” 44 .
Cristo resucitado conserva las huellas de la crucifixión por
muchas razones; una de ellas porque quiere enseñarnos a sacar
provecho del mal, o como escribe KASPER, “porque a menudo
Dios escribe recto con líneas torcidas”. Es el mismo KASPER
quien explota la imagen de las ‘cicatrices’: “la culpa produce una
herida que no desaparece sin más, pero las heridas pueden cicatrizar.
Esas cicatrices son marcas permanentes que de tiempo en
tiempo pueden volver a doler; pero que permiten un modo de
pervivencia que, a pesar de todos sus inconvenientes, puede llegar
a plenificar humanamente y aun a hacer madurar humanamente
por el dolor” 45 .
La pareja humana desde la más remota antigüedad ha debido
luchar por salvar su vocación a la fidelidad-indisolubilidad 46 .
En nuestro tiempo se hace particularmente difícil porque,
además de la lucha interna que sufre el ser humano por superar
44
W. KASPER, Teología del matrimonio cristiano..., 72.
45
W. KASPER, Teología del matrimonio cristiano..., 95.
46
Cfr. J. S. BOTERO G., “De la indisolubilidad a la fidelidad. De la fidelidad
a la indisolubilidad. Una nueva perspectiva”, Anales Valentinos 24/47
(1998) 203-222; ID., Divorciados vueltos a casar. Un problema humano, una
tradición eclesial, una perspectiva de futuro, San Pablo, Bogotá 1999.

158 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
la incoherencia que el primer pecado introdujo en él (Rom. 7,
15-21), debe superar la rivalidad varón-mujer que viene desde el
paraíso 47 , y todavía más, debe superar hoy los signos negativos
de la postmodernidad.
3. Posibles alternativas al fracaso conyugal.
Si el fracaso es una realidad que entra dentro de las posibilidades
del ser humano, como ‘proyecto en realización’ que es, se
sigue como lógica consecuencia que deberá existir una puerta de
salida. En un contexto de filosofía esencialista 48 se pensaba que
el hombre debía triunfar normalmente, y si fracasaba no había
posibilidad de recuperación.
La actitud emblemática de la historia de la salvación como
una ‘reacción contra...’ nos coloca en la perspectiva de sugerir
tres alternativas al fracaso conyugal, que formulamos con los
verbos: prevenir, acompañar, resolver.
Una primera actitud será la de prevenir con una educación
adecuada a las nuevas generaciones que se ven afectadas seriamente
por los signos negativos de la postmodernidad; serán ellas
las que formarán las parejas del tercer milenio Las publicaciones
a este respecto son numerosas 49 . GERVILLA sugiere “educar en
el relativismo”, “educar en el presente”, “educar en el individualismo
hedonista y narcisista”, tres aspectos de la postmodernidad
que inciden particularmente en la psicología de los jóvenes.
La Congregación de la Doctrina de la fe dio a conocer (19 Marzo,
1995) las Directivas sobre la formación de los seminaristas acerca
de los problemas relativos al matrimonio y a la familia. Uno de
47
Cfr. W. VOGELS, “The Power Struggle between Man and Woman. Gen.
3,16b”, Biblica 77 (1996) 197-209.
48
Cfr. Mons. Légaré durante el Sínodo de obispos sobre la familia
(1980) planteó la necesidad de un cambio en favor de “ripensare la teologia
del matrimonio in una prospettiva più esistenziale e personalista...”, en G.
CAPRILE, Il sinodo dei vescovi 1980, La Civiltà Cattolica, Roma 1981, 124.
49
Cfr. E. GERVILLA, Postmodernidad y educación..., 157-181; ID., “Impacto
de la postmodernidad en el hecho educativo presente”, Sinite 36/109 (1995)
231-246; L. GONZÁLEZ-CARVAJAL, “Educar en un mundo postmoderno”,
Educadores 34/161 (1992) 7-27.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 159
sus apartados (n. 41) hace referencia a las situaciones conflictivas
del matrimonio 50 .
Insistimos en la educación en orden a la vida conyugal en
tres campos que se ven afectados por el pensamiento postmoderno:
el amor, la sexualidad y el cuidado del cuerpo, el sentido
de la vida 51 . Enfatizamos una educación en estos tres planos
para corregir las posturas tergiversadas que se observan en estos
campos: el amor entendido como sensibilidad narcisista que
busca solo el goce individual; el cuerpo que es visto en su dimensión
estética, desligada de lo ético; la pérdida del sentido trascendente
porque solo se piensa al “aquí y ahora”. La ética del
joven postmoderno es la del ‘radar’, no la de la ‘brújula’.
La segunda actitud que hemos sugerido es la de hacer compañía
a las parejas que ya existen al presente y que no han recibido
una formación adecuada para hacer frente a los signos de
la época postmoderna. Estas parejas están necesitadas en especial
de una justa comprensión de lo que es la fidelidad conyugal.
BORSATO plantea una triple concepción de la fidelidad 52 : fidelidad
a una palabra empeñada en el pasado; fidelidad a sí mismo, al
proyecto de realización individual, y fidelidad al otro. La primera
concepción es hoy rechazada a causa del ‘miedo a compromisos
definitivos’; la segunda es la que está al orden del día por
razón del individualismo que prevalece. La tercera es la que
debemos inculcar al hombre de nuestro tiempo. Un mecanismo
que consideramos válido para lograrlo es la recuperación en
nuestro medio ambiente del sentido de la relación interpersonal
50
Cfr. G. ANFOSSI, “Luci e ombre nell’attuale formazione dei seminaristi
circa i valori relativi al matrimonio ed alla vita familiare”, Seminarium 35/4
(1995) 641-651; C. A. ANDERSON, “Criteria and Content of the intellectual
Fomation of future Priests with Regard to Marriage and Family”,
Seminarium 35/4 (1995) 652-663.
51
Cfr. S. VERGES R., “Axiología del amor y de la vida en la postmodernidad”,
Estudios de Deusto 37/82 (1989) 253-269; S. DE GUIDI, “L’amore nella
cultura postmoderna. Problemi e prospettive”, Rassegna di Teologia 39
(1998) 501-524; B. BENNASSAR, “Culto al cuerpo. Entre el tabú, la banalización
y la idolatría”, Biblia y Fe 14/42 (1988) 377-398; J. VAN DER VLOET, “La fede di
fronte alla sfida postmoderna”, Communio 110 (1990) 8-15.
52
Cfr. B. BORSATO, Vita di coppia. Linee di spiritualità coniugale e familiare,
EDB., Bologna 1993, 90-94.

160 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
que está inscrita en la naturaleza de todo hombre. “El desarrollo
auténtico de la persona exige la mediación de la relación
interpersonal. No hay personalización sin desarrollo de la alteridad”,
escribió FERNÁNDEZ DEL RIESGO 53 .
La tercera actitud es la de resolver la situación de fracaso de
tantas parejas. Desde hace algún tiempo se está insinuando fuertemente
un comportamiento de benignidad y misericordia,
como lo sugieren las intervenciones de Pablo VI frente a la Rota
Romana (1970 y 1973) en la inauguración del año judicial y de
Juan Pablo II con la carta encíclica Dives in misericordia. Pero
creemos que no es suficiente. Se hace necesaria una acción más
audaz. JIMÉNEZ URRESTI alude a un “desteologizar” lo que ha sido
indebidamente teologizado, y un “desjuridizar” lo que ha sido
indebidamente juridizado 54 . Sería una tarea prolija entrar a
detallar este cometido.
El intento de resolver los casos de parejas fracasadas en su
matrimonio se ha llevado a cabo siguiendo un proceso: invitar a
la reconciliación, y si esto no fuera posible, deberán mantener
vida continente; un tercer paso consiste en hacer la demanda de
nulidad matrimonial al tribunal competente que definirá la
situación de acuerdo a las normas establecidas. Pero hay casos
particularmente complejos como los que menciona el Papa en la
Familiaris consortio (n. 84), muy similares a los que Urrutia
llama harship situation y conflict situation 55 . La primera corresponde
al caso de una pareja de fieles que viven la experiencia
de una segunda unión a conciencia de que la primera fue ciertamente
válida pero al presente está irremediablemente destruída;
la segunda es la situación de quienes, estando en una segunda
unión, están convencidos de que el primer matrimonio era
verdaderamente nulo, pero no tienen la posibilidad de demostrarlo
en un tribunal. Creemos que una triple disposición puede
condensar cuanto queremos sugerir a propósito de la tercera
53
M. FERNÁNDEZ DEL RIESGO, “La postmodernidad y la crisis de los valores
religiosos”, Diálogo Filosófico 5/14 (1989) 218.
54
Cfr. T. I. JIMÉNEZ URRESTI, De la teología a la canonística, Pontificia
Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca 1993, 366-378.
55
Cfr. F. J. URRUTIA, “Il criterio di distinzione tra foro interno e foro
esterno”, en Vaticano II. Bilancio e prospettive, 25 anni dopo. 1962-1987, I., a
cura di R. Latourelle, Cittadella, Assisi 1987, 567-569.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 161
alternativa: una disposición antropológica, eclesial y teológica.
Recientemente (Octubre de 1999) la Conferencia Episcopal
Italiana realizó el Tercer Encuentro Nacional de responsables
diocesanos de la Consulta Pastoral Familiar que estudió el tema
espinoso de ‘los matrimonios en dificultad’ 56 . En este encuentro
participaron teólogos, sacerdotes ocupados en la pastoral,
parejas de esposos y también un representante de la Asociación
de familias separadas. Sólo se conoce la información periodística
de este evento, pero el hecho por sí mismo es ya significativo:
revela la preocupación de una iglesia local que quiere hacer
frente a un problema de gran actualidad, un problema que afecta
no sólo a los individuos interesados sino también a toda la
comunidad eclesial.
Querer resolver el problema de los divorciados vueltos a
casar, por ejemplo, implica una doble actitud: mirar a la persona
humana que experimenta esta situación de conflicto y mirar
a la comunidad eclesial. Ya hemos anotado que Vaticano II dio
énfasis particular a la persona humana, “al hombre todo entero,
cuerpo y alma, corazón y conciencia …” (GS. n. 3) como digna
de toda consideración. Una persona, que como afirma Juan
Pablo II, “conoce, ama y realiza el bien moral según diversas etapas
de crecimiento” (FC. n. 34) y que “como toda realidad viviente
comienza el camino cotidiano hacia la progresiva actuación
de los valores y deberes del matrimonio” (FC. n. 65).
Pero también toda la comunidad eclesial, según el pensamiento
del Papa, no debe limitarse solamente a cuidar de las
familias que viven en condiciones de normalidad, sino que
deberá preocuparse también por aquellas familias que se hallan
en situaciones difíciles o irregulares: “para ellas tendrá palabras
de verdad, de bondad, de comprensión, de esperanza, de viva
participación en sus dificultades…” (FC. n. 65).
La disposición teológica, a que hicimos mención, corresponde
a la acogida que se merece la propuesta del Papa en la
Veritatis splendor (n. 53) de “buscar y encontrar la formulación
de las normas morales universales y permanentes más adecuada
a los diversos contextos culturales, más capaz de expresar ince-
56
Cfr. M. BIANCHI, “Matrimoni in crisi. Dove va la pastorale?”, Settimana
38 (1999) 1 e 16; A. BOBBIO, “La chiesa e i coniugi separati. La legge e la grazia”,
Famiglia Cristiana 69/44 (1999) 19-20.

162 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
santemente la actualidad histórica y hacer comprender e interpretar
auténticamente la verdad”. Ejemplos de esta nueva formulación
podrían ser: el papel del amor dentro del matrimonio
que teólogos y juristas estudian actualmente, el alcance de la
dimensión unitiva en la relación sexual íntima de los esposos, la
comprensión de la sacramentalidad dentro una visión ‘extensiva
no reductiva’, etc. La Comisión Teológica Internacional ya había
sugerido en 1977 la posibilidad de que “no hay que excluir que
la iglesia pueda determinar más las nociones de sacramentalidad
y de consumación y dar ulteriores ilustraciones sobre su
sentido de tal modo que, en consecuencia, toda la doctrina sobre
la indisolubilidad del matrimonio se proponga en una síntesis
más cuidada y más profunda” 57 .
Juan Pablo II en 1983, dirigiéndose a un grupo de sacerdotes,
los exhortaba a redescubrir las razones profundas de la
vocación cristiana de los esposos: que se esclarezcan los fundamentos
bíblicos y antropológicos, que se iluminen mejor los
principios fundamentales de la teología moral, etc. En este
campo tendrían cabida muchos elementos que la teología postconciliar
plantea, como el respeto que se merece ‘la conciencia
recta’, que está adquiriendo particular importancia y relieve.
Otro tema a estudiar es el llamado “el mal menor” que tiene una
trayectoria más larga aún dentro de la historia de la iglesia; lo
encontramos en algunos de los Padres y en algunos teólogos
célebres quienes admitían un segundo matrimonio con tal de
evitar un mal mayor como sería el uxoricidio 58 . Recientemente
vuelve a cobrar fuerza dentro de la teología moral, tanto en la
literatura como en el magisterio episcopal 59 .
57
COMISION TEOLÓGICA INTERNACIONAL, “Proposiciones sobre algunas cuestiones
doctrinales referentes al matrimonio cristiano”, Revista Española de
Derecho Canónico 35 (1979) 133.
58
Cfr. ORIGENES, Commentarium in Matth. 14,23, PG., 13,1245; S.
JERÓNIMO, Comentarium in Matth., 5,29-34, Sources Chrétiennes n. 242, 121;
S. TOMÁS DE AQUINO, Suma contra gentiles, III, c. 123.
59
Cfr. F. CUERVO, Principios morales de uso más frecuente. Con las
enseñanzas de la Enc. ‘Veritatis splendor’, Rialp, Madrid, 1994, 15-50; A.
AGUILÓ, La tolerancia, Palabra, Madrid 1995, 123-139; G. MIGLIETTA, Teología
moral contemporánea. Il principio del duplice effetto, Urbaniana University
Press, Roma 1997, 114-118; VESCOVI DELL’OBERRHEIN, “Accompagnamento
pastorale dei divorziati” (10 Luglio 1993), Il Regno-doc. 19 (1993) 618.

EL ‘FRACASO CONYUGAL’ EN UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA 163
Conclusión
La realidad de los fracasos frecuentes y numerosos nos apremia
hacer un discernimiento cuidadoso. La reflexión teológica
moderna nos ofrece pistas válidas para iluminar mejor el problema
“a la luz del evangelio y de la experiencia humana” (GS.
n. 46).
Con KASPER, afirmamos que “la iglesia habrá de estar constantemente
preguntándole a su ordenamiento jurídico si se
adecúa también a las dificultosas y complejas situaciones humanas,
o si de forma inmisericorde, hiere y rechaza aun a aquellas
personas que están en lo más hondo dispuestas a una conversión
y reconciliación y hacen todo lo humanamente posible dentro de
su peculiar situación, en lugar de ayudarlas eficazmente de un
modo humano y cristiano” 60 .
Durante las sesiones de Vaticano II, Mons. E. Zoghbi tuvo
una intervención que causó impacto. Se refería a la situación de
algunos cristianos que en la flor de la juventud ya han fracasado
en su matrimonio. Estos fieles se hallan entonces en una encrucijada:
o mantener la continencia, que en muchos casos supone
un heroísmo especial 61 , o contraer una nueva unión soportando
las consecuencias del aislamiento de la iglesia. Es justo imponer
por decreto a un fiel un estado de vida que no corresponde a su
vocación original? 62 . Esperamos que en este período de búsqueda
de soluciones teológico-pastorales a los problemas eclesiales,
pueda la iglesia encontrar perspectivas nuevas para afrontar la
situación de los divorciados, y así salir al encuentro de las
inquietudes profundamente humanas que zarandean fuertemente
a tantos hermanos.
Via Merulana 31
C.P. 2458
00100 Roma
Italy.
J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO, C.Ss.R.
60
W. KASPER, Teología del matrimonio cristiano..., 91-92.
61
Cfr. J. S. BOTERO G., “El cónyuge inocentemente abandonado: un problema
a replantear”, Estudios Eclesiásticos 73/286 (1998) 443-472.
62
Cfr. G. CAPRILE, Il Concilio Vaticano II. Quarto periodo 1965. Cronache
del Concilio, La Civiltà Cattolica, Roma 1969, 130-131.

164 J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO
Summary / Resumen
—————
Marriage breakdown, a disturbing reality in contemporary society,
is undergoing a symbolic change. It is no longer a hopeless situation
with no solution, but rather appears as a possibility which is part of
human existence and which opens up the opportunity of reshaping
one’s life. The history of salvation shows that the people of God, old and
new, experienced this reality of breakdown. For two thousand years the
Church has experienced this drama in its members and has tried to
understand and solve it. Now the possibility and suitability of
elaborating a ‘theology of marital breakdown’ is being raised, in such
terms as: prevention through a careful education of the new
generations, accompaniment of couples so that they can live even better
the ideal of conjugal fidelity, and resolution of limit-cases in a prudent
and appropriate manner.
El fracaso conyugal, una realidad alarmante en la sociedad presente,
está cambiando de signo: ya no es la situación que tiene carácter
de irremediable, sin solución, sino que aparece como una posibilidad
que acompaña al hombre en su existencia, y que hace pensar en la
oportunidad de poder rehacer su vida. La historia de la salvación revela
que tanto el antiguo como el nuevo pueblo de Dios experimenta esta
realidad del fracaso. La iglesia ha vivido en sus hijos durante dos milenios
este drama y ha intentado comprenderlo y resolverlo. Hoy se plantea
la posibilidad y conveniencia de elaborar una ‘teología del fracaso
conyugal’ que sugiere unas alternativas como: prevenir mediante una
educación esmerada a las nuevas generaciones, acompañar a las
parejas para que vivan cada vez mejor el ideal de la fidelidad conyugal,
y resolver los casos-límite sabia y oportunamente.
—————
The author is an invited Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor invitado de la Academia Alfonsiana
—————

165
StMor 38 (2000) 165-195
JOSEPH TORCHIA O.P.
ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA:
A KEY COMPONENT OF HIS REBUTTAL
OF STOIC ETHICS
To what extent can we speak of a class of things which are
neither good nor bad, right nor wrong, but morally neutral? At
a time when moral judgments are increasingly reduced to the
status of personal preferences or mere opinions, the claim that
there is a sphere of human existence which is immune to moral
valuations is one which finds broad support. In a very real sense,
the idea of such a “duty free” zone is highly compatible with the
position that morality is relative to a given culture or subculture,
or else, a purely private matter governed only by the dictates
of individual conscience. For, once we eliminate a sense of
objectivity and intrinsic value from our moral purview, it seems
to follow that certain things are neither right nor wrong, but
simply “there” for our uninhibited use or enjoyment.
The notion of a category of morally irrelevant or “indifferent”
things is one that is deeply rooted in the history of moral
philosophy. While variations of this idea have emerged over the
centuries, it assumed its classic expression in the ethics of
Stoicism. For the Stoics, morality concerns only those areas of
human existence which are subject to our control. In Stoic
terms, things are morally classified in terms of three categories:
first, what is good or virtuous; secondly, what is evil or vicious;
and third, what is completely “indifferent” to considerations of
virtue or vice. Such moral “indifferents” (adiaphora) encompass
those things which are neither good nor evil, precisely because
they are neither helpful nor harmful to our nature as rational
beings. At the outset, however, it should be observed that the
Stoic doctrine of adiaphora ultimately points to a conviction in
the absolute self-sufficiency of the virtuous individual. From this
standpoint, one who possesses virtue can be said to be happy
even in the absence of those things usually considered crucial
elements of any complete and well-balanced human life.

166 JOSEPH TORCHIA
An Augustinian Touchstone
An explicit critique of this teaching is found in the moral
theory of St. Augustine of Hippo. While Augustine’s critique
offers an illuminating referent for an issue that loomed large in
ancient Stoicism, it also provides a touchstone for assessing a
question of great contemporary relevance: is it ever justifiable to
assume that things or situations are completely devoid of moral
significance and content? As we shall see, Augustine’s rejection
of the notion of the adiaphora was firmly grounded in the tradition
of Christian wisdom (and its integration of Scriptural insights,
the teaching of the Church, and the contributions of
human reason). Let us first consider the mainlines of the Stoics’
understanding of the adiaphora in the context of their moral
approach as a whole.
The Adiaphora and Stoic Ethics
Ethics constitutes one of the three great branches of Stoic
thought (along with physics and logic). In its most general
terms, Stoic ethics was grounded upon the ideal that humans
should conform their actions to nature. For the Stoics, action in
“accordance with nature” was consistent with a universal rationality
perceived to be operative in everything which exists. 1 In
this regard, Stoic ethicists also appealed to a “law of nature” (or
“natural law”) which they viewed as an expression of an eternal
divine wisdom implicit in the governance of the world, and
likewise, in the moral norms guiding right conduct. This ethical
outlook corresponded to a teleological vision of the universe
which presupposes an intelligible purposiveness in nature and
its processes.
In Stoic terms, things possess certain impulses consistent
with their very nature. From this standpoint, the designation of
“natural” must always be understood in relation to a specific
1 GERARD VERBEKE, The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 45.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 167
thing or activity. According to the Stoic philosopher Chryssipus,
the basic biological drive toward self-preservation (oikeiosis)
constitutes the most fundamental of these natural impulses.
An animal’s first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation,
because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as
Chryssipus affirms in the first book On Ends: his words, are,
“The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its
consciousness.” 2
In keeping with their teleological perspective, the Stoics
approached nature as an integral whole: life-forms (i.e., plants
and animals alike) were closely related, and every species was
thought to share the same natural tendency toward self-preservation.
By virtue of their emphasis upon the preservation impulse
as the determinant of moral rectitude, the Stoics opposed the
Epicurean teaching that creatures are motivated primarily by a
drive for what is conducive to pleasure (and conversely, by a propensity
to avoid what causes pain).
Since pleasure and pain always attend some previous experience,
they cannot provide the basis of moral judgments concerning
good and evil. For this reason, the Stoics looked to the
principle of oikeiosis (i.e., the tendency toward self-preservation)
as the criterion of moral judgment. From this standpoint, the
good is anything that promotes and conserves our being (and
thereby, is beneficial or useful), and evil is anything that causes
injury, undermines our being, and harms us. 3 While the good
enables us to be virtuous and happy, evil renders us vicious and
unhappy. These diametrically opposed moral conditions, however,
do not depend upon what concerns the body. Things connected
with bodily existence, on the other hand, are designated
as “indifferents” (e.g., life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength,
2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII,85. Also see
CICERO’S De legibus (I,21,56), for a reference to a higher law that governs
moral conduct.
3 GIOVANNI REALE, A History of Ancient Philosophy. Volume III, The
Systems of the Hellenistic Age. Edited and Translated by John R. Catan
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 264-65.

168 JOSEPH TORCHIA
wealth, reputation, noble birth, and their opposites), precisely
because they can neither help nor hurt us, in respect to our status
as moral agents and rational beings. 4
But in this context, the term “indifferents” (adiaphora) must
be understood in two ways: first, in terms of those things not
responsible for happiness or unhappiness (e.g., wealth and
health); secondly, in terms of those things which are incapable of
prompting an impulse of attraction or repulsion (e.g., the simple
act of twitching one’s arm or leg). In the former case, however,
the things in question can indeed evoke an attraction or repulsion
on our part. Although we can be happy without health, for
example, it is still preferable to be healthy rather than ill. In this
respect, we must differentiate those things capable of making us
happy from those things to which we impart some value and/or
preferability (despite the fact that they do not necessarily yield
happiness or unhappiness in the strict sense).
A further distinction, then, must be made between adiaphora
which are (1) in accordance with nature (e.g., health,
strength, or well-functioning sense organs); (2) contrary to nature;
and (3) neither in accordance with, nor contrary to nature (a
kind of subclass of “indifferents” among the broader category of
adiaphora). In keeping with our fundamental oikeiosis, we possess
an inclination to discern precisely what will support or
oppose our nature. For this reason, things are always designated
as “indifferent” in relation to a full human life.
For difference and indifference belong to things which are
said relatively. Because, they say, even if we call bodily and external
things indifferent, we are saying they are indifferent relative
to a well-shaped life (in which living happily consists) but not of
course relative to being in accordance with nature or to impulse
and repulsion. All things in accordance with nature are to-betaken,
and all things contrary to nature are not-to-be-taken. 5
But it must be stressed that the Stoics sharply distinguish
value and goodness (just as they demarcate good and evil, virtue
4 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII, 101-103.
5 STOBAEUS 2,79,18-80; 13; 82, 20-1.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 169
and vice). Indeed, many things that we value highly (and which
definitely contribute to a happy life) can be put to a good or bad
use. Thus, the mere possession of wealth neither guarantees
happiness nor renders us immune to misery. By the same token,
poverty does not necessarily render one miserable or susceptible
to injury. The Stoic determinant of value, then, is always conformity
with nature: things in accordance with nature (i.e. things
“to-be-taken”) are valuable, despite the fact that they are never
the necessary conditions of happiness (at least not for the genuinely
virtuous individual). 6
On the basis of this criterion of value, however, we can at
least say that some things or states of being are “preferable” to
others.
Some valuable things have much value and others little. So
too some disvaluable things have much disvalue and others little.
Those which have much value are called ‘preferred’ and those
which have much disvalue ‘dispreferred’. That is preferred...
which, though indifferent, we select on the basis of a preferential
reason. The like principle applies to being dispreferred, and
the examples are analogous. 7
In effect, the notion of oikeiosis presupposes an innate tendency
to promote one’s being, and by implication, to choose
those alternatives which are most conducive to the attainment
of this end.
Therefore Chryssipus was right to say: “As long as the future
is uncertain to me I always hold to those things which are
better adapted to obtaining the things in accordance with nature;
for god himself has made me disposed to select these.” 8
The moral agent, then, must decide how to act in a given
situation in a manner which stands in accordance with nature.
6 STOBAEUS 2,83,10-84,2.
7 STOBAEUS 2,84,18-85,11.
8 EPICTETUS, Discourses 2,6,9.

170 JOSEPH TORCHIA
When circumstances permit, we choose these particular
things instead of those, for instance health instead of disease, life
instead of death, wealth instead of poverty. 9
But the very fact that value is always contingent upon shifting
circumstances is demonstrative of its relativity. For this reason,
human happiness can never be based exclusively upon such
adiaphora, regardless of their preferability. Rather, the rational
being must cultivate a broader vision of the concrete situation in
which the moral judgment is made. In the final analysis, longrange
happiness might well demand a willingness to forfeit such
“preferables” as wealth, bodily comfort, or even health.
It must be remembered that what the Stoics designated as
“indifferent” were those things outside the control of reason and
its capacity to move the will. 10 Because the proverbial sage can
reject what most people would consider preferable (if not genuine
goods) in everyday life, he is able to ground his happiness
exclusively upon what is virtuous (and by implication, wholly
consistent with the dictates of reason). Such equanimity reveals
that condition of apatheia whereby reason remains constantly
removed from the passions, from evil things, from the adiaphora,
and indeed, from anything which detracts from our nature as
rational moral agents. 11
For the Stoics, apatheia provides nothing less than the sine
qua non of the virtuous life. In this respect, however, the crucial
consideration is not necessarily the forfeiture of such externals
for its own sake, but rather, the ability to relinquish our dependence
upon them for our happiness. From a practical moral
standpoint, only those who are able to detach themselves in this
manner are capable of making rationally sound judgments
regarding what is right or wrong. But an important corollary
attaches to the Stoic understanding of virtue as a harmony of
reason with nature: if reason is in accordance with nature, then
9 STOBAEUS 2,83,10-84,2.
10 EPICTETUS, Discourses I,30; Manual 50.
11 MARCIA L. COLISH, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early
Middle Ages, Volume I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 44.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 171
everything we do will be equally virtuous; if reason is contrary
to nature, then all of one’s actions will be equally vicious.
Virtue... is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its
own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive.
Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the
state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious.
When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness
of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates.
12
In objective moral terms, however, the Stoics view all virtues
as equally good, and all vices as equally bad.
It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is
nothing intermediate...and the same rule applies to all the other
virtues. 13
Augustine and the Stoics: A Preliminary Assessment
Augustine’s critique of the Stoic notion of the adiaphora
must be approached within the framework of his overall response
to Stoic ethics, and in broader terms, to Stoic thought in general.
At the outset, it should be noted that Augustine’s attitude
toward Stoicism exhibits something of an ambiguity. On the one
hand, he approached this particular school in a polemical context,
so as to refute the errors inherent in its teaching. On the
other hand, however, Augustine frequently appropriated Stoic
insights for his own purposes as a Christian theologian and philosopher.
In this way, Augustine’s moral theory represents
something of a Christianized brand of Stoicism (along with
ideas derived from the Neoplatonic tradition), particularly in his
earliest writings. But even in these instances, Augustine exhibits
a high degree of selectivity, choosing what is useful in the arti-
12 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII,89.
13
Ibid., VII,127.

172 JOSEPH TORCHIA
culation of his own teachings, or discarding what is wholly
unacceptable from a Christian perspective. 14
The Augustine of the Cassiciacum dialogues (A.D. 386-388)
was especially receptive to Stoic ethics. This intellectual dependence
is reflected in his emphasis on the role of reason in the
moral life, and the assumption that conduct should stand in harmony
with both nature and reason. In Augustine’s earliest definitions
of the happy life, we find some of the key components of
the classical Stoic understanding of virtue: an emphasis on the
quality of the inner life, the primacy of intention, correct ratiocination,
and equanimity in the face of the vicissitudes of
human existence. 15 Conversely, vice was seen as the product of
the irrational tendencies of the will which find expression in
pleasure, pain, desire, and fear. 16 Like the Stoics, the early
Augustine endorsed the position that the wise man was able to
subordinate his desires for transitory things to a higher vision of
the good, and thereby, ground his happiness upon what is
immutable and certain. 17
Augustine’s early confidence in the autonomy and self-sufficiency
of the life of virtue underwent considerable change as he
progressed in his own spiritual journey to God. An awareness of
his moral and metaphysical contingency (rendered more acute
as a result of his controversy with the Pelagians and an increasing
emphasis upon the radical fallenness of human nature)
prompted a serious revision of his attitude toward Stoic ethics.
Accordingly, his initial definitions of virtue as rightly ordered
reason were supplanted by an understanding of the virtuous life
14
For an extended discussion regarding the evolution of Augustine’s attitude
toward Stoicism and the ways in which he used Stoic thought, see
COLISH’S The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, Volume II.
15
The works in question encompass the Cassiciacum dialogues, written
shortly after Augustine’s conversion and Baptism (i.e., between late A.D. 386
and early 387). See De ordine II,8(25); II,9(27); De Beata Vita IV,25(33); De
Quantitate Animae 17(30); 33(73); Soliloquia I,6(13).
16
De libero arbitrio I,3(8)-I,4(10); I,8(18).
17
In this regard, Augustine reflects the influence of both Stoicism (and
its emphasis upon the proper use of reason and will) and the Neoplatonic
notion of an immutable Good that is immune to loss. Cf., Soliloquia I,12(21).

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 173
in terms of a rightly ordered love of God. 18 In the mature
Augustine’s outlook, then, virtue becomes the means to a
Summum Bonum that is only attainable under the inspiration
and assistance of Divine grace. 19
Augustine’s Critique of the Adiaphora
In light of the foregoing assessment, it is interesting to
observe that Augustine’s explicit criticisms of the adiaphora
emerge in writings composed after the turn of the fifth century
(that is, subsequent to the revision of his understanding of the
virtuous life). In this connection, his rejection of the possibility
of morally indifferent things (along with the corollary thesis
regarding the equality of vices) coincided with a drastic reinterpretation
of the grounds of human happiness. This reinterpretation
was complemented by a general reaction against the ideal
of the self-sufficient sage as the paradigm of the virtuous life.
Generally speaking, Augustine’s critique of the adiaphora can be
approached on an exegetical level and a more specific ethical
one. After examining each dimension of this critique, I delineate
the broader moral, metaphysical, and theological presuppositions
operative in his responses.
1. Exegetical Dimension
Augustine’s initial statement regarding the adiaphora emerges
in Letter 82 (written to St. Jerome around the year A.D.
405). 20 Augustine begins with a general reference to the notion
18
Cf., De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum
I,3(4-5); I,8(13); I,15(25).
19
Also see De libero arbitrio II,19(50), where the virtues are designated
as “intermediate goods.” Cf., Sermones 150; 156; Io eu. tr. 7,8; 19,11.
20
This particular letter is part of the extended correspondence between
Augustine and Jerome regarding the proper exegesis of St. Paul’s criticism of
St. Peter’s seeming insincerity recounted in Galatians 2:11-14 (i.e., in view of
the fact that Peter relinquished eating with Gentiles only after members of
James’ community came to Antioch). The ensuing debate concerned
Augustine’s rejection of the “polite lie” attributed to Paul in this context.

174 JOSEPH TORCHIA
of morally indifferent things, as upheld by certain unnamed philosophers.
In this context, his concern is not the morality of
human actions or the moral status of things as such, but rather,
whether the observance of the rites surrounding the Old Law fall
under such a morally neutral category.
We must be careful... not to speak, as philosophers do, of
certain human acts as midway between right and wrong; such as
are to be classified neither as good deeds nor as sins; and we are
forced to the conclusion that observance of the ceremonies of
the Law cannot be an indifferent matter, but either good or evil. 21
If such observances are not morally indifferent, can we view
them as good or bad? As a point of departure for his response,
Augustine focuses upon Ezekiel 20:25:
Therefore I gave them statutes that were not good, and ordinances
through which they could not live.
But as Augustine is quick to observe, the mere assertion that
such laws were “not good” does not necessarily mean that they
were absolutely evil. Indeed, the statutes and precepts in question
here were pagan practices which Yahweh allowed the
Israelites to adopt as a means of enacting His judgment and
abetting their eventual repentance.
Augustine applies a similar line of reasoning to the precepts
of the Old Law.
Why should I not say that those requirements of ancient
ceremonies are not good because men are not justified by them;
they are figures that foreshadow the grace, by which we are
21
Epistula 82(13): CSEL XXXIV (Pars I), 363: Sed cauendum est uidelicet
in hac disputatione, ne sicut philosophi quaedam facta hominum media
dicamus inter recte factum et peccatum, quae neque in recte factis neque in
peccatis numerentur, et urgeamur eo, quod obseruare legis caeremonias non
potest esse indifferens sed aut bonum aut malum.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 175
justified; on the other hand, they are not bad, because they were
precepts of divine origin, adapted to times and people? 22
If these ceremonies prefigured the coming of Christ (and if
God instituted them in order to prepare the way for the universal
redemption of humanity), they surely cannot be deemed evil.
I say, therefore, that circumcision and the other ordinances
of this sort were divinely revealed to the former people through
the Testament which we call Old, as types of future things, which
were to be fulfilled by Christ. But, with the passing of time, those
observances were to be given up by all Christians, because, if
they were then retained, there might be no distinction between
what God enjoined on His people by Moses and what the
unclean spirit of demons set up in the temples of idols. 23
From this standpoint, Augustine’s contention that such practices
are “not good” must be understood in relation to the New
Law and what has been revealed in Christ. If they are “not good,”
it is only because they have been superseded by Christianity and
its teachings. For this reason, it would be wrong to uphold them
as if they still had binding force. But this does not mean that they
should be viewed as evil per se. By virtue of the fact that they
were instrumental in the unfolding of Divine Revelation, they
must possess some value, at least in purely pedagogical terms.
When this fulfillment had come, those obligations remained
for the instruction of Christians, to be read simply for the understanding
of the previous prophecy, but not to be performed
through necessity. 24
22
Epistula 82(14): CSEL XXXIV (Pars I), 363-64: Cur autem non dicam
praecepta illa ueterum sacramentorum nec bona esse, quia non eis homines
iustificantur, umbrae sunt enim praenuntiantes gratiam, qua iustificamur,
nec tamen mala, quia diuinitus praecepta sunt tempori personisque congruentia,
cum me adiuuet etiam prophetica sententia, qua dicit deus se illi
populo dedisse praecepta non bona?
23
Epistula 82(15); 82(16): CSEL XXXIV (Pars I), 364-65.
24
Epistula 82(15): CSEL XXXIV (Pars I), 364-65.

176 JOSEPH TORCHIA
But what does Augustine’s assessment of this seemingly esoteric
theological issue tell us about his understanding of the
adiaphora in an ethical context? In my estimation, it reveals
some key metaphysical presuppositions that assume a highly
prominent role in his overall understanding of moral living.
First, Letter 82 demonstrates Augustine’s reluctance to view any
aspect of created reality in exclusively negative terms. Just as the
ceremonies of the Old Law cannot be evil (because they were
ordained by God for His own salvific purposes), creation as a
whole cannot be evil. But it is not enough to say that created realities
are “not evil.” If they were created by God, they must be
viewed as fundamentally good as well. This is borne out, in fact,
by one of the earliest teachings in Genesis (1:31): God looked at
everything He had made, and He found it very good. In this connection,
Augustine reinforces his arguments in Letter 82 with a
reference to St. Paul’s words in I Timothy (4:4):
Everything God created is good; nothing is to be rejected
when it is received with thanksgiving, for it is made by God’s
word and prayer.
2. Ethical Dimension
Augustine provides a more focused ethical critique of the
adiaphora in De Civitate Dei xix.4. As his remarks reveal, valuations
of things or actions as morally “good,” “bad,” or “indifferent”
reflect a certain vision of the nature of reality. In support
of this observation, we see that Augustine readily establishes the
ultimate goal of human striving (and by implication, the basis of
human happiness): eternal life constitutes the supreme Good,
while eternal death is the supreme evil. 25 In Augustinian terms,
correct or right living provides the ultimate determinant for the
achievement of the former option rather than the latter one. But
it is clear that such a position points to a belief in a supernatural
destiny for human beings. Accordingly, Augustine places
25
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 1-6: CC xlviii, 664.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 177
himself at odds with those who would localize the ultimate good
or evil of humanity in the present life, and ground our happiness
in the body, the soul, pleasure, virtue, or the primary gifts of
human nature. 26
While Augustine does not yet name his opponents explicitly,
we can easily infer that the Stoics are the focus of his critique.
“All these philosophers have wished,” he contends, “to be happy
here on earth and to achieve bliss by their own efforts.” 27 From
a practical standpoint, however, the folly of these efforts is readily
apparent. The very vicissitudes of the present life militate
against such a naive optimism in the capacity of human striving.
Indeed, the mere possession of wisdom provides no defense
against misfortune and disaster.
For who is competent, however torrential the flow of his eloquence,
to unfold all the miseries of this life? For is there any
pain, the opposite of pleasure, any disturbance, the contrary of
repose, that cannot befall a wise man’s body? Then what about
the primary goods, so called, of the mind itself? Then again,
what of virtue itself? Although it claims the top-most place
among human goods, what is its activity in this world but unceasing
warfare with vices, and those not external vices but internal...
vices? 28
Augustine’s detailed catalogue of the varieties of human
misery provides the supporting data for his contention that the
basis of genuine happiness cannot be found in the present life.
But the recognition of this fact by no means commits him to a
pessimism regarding the prospects for achieving happiness.
From a Christian standpoint, such a telos is indeed attainable,
but only in the life to come. This supernatural end is wholly consistent
with the spiritual dimension of human existence, and the
immortality of the human soul.
26
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 11-18: CC xlviii, 664.
27
De Civitate Dei xix,4: 11-18.
28
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 22-23; 27-29; 39-40; 61; 65: CC xlviii, 664-65.

178 JOSEPH TORCHIA
We are beset by evils, and we have to endure them steadfastly
until we reach those goods where there will be everything
to supply us with delight beyond the telling, and there will be
nothing any longer that we are bound to endure. Such is the salvation
which in the world to come will also be itself the ultimate
bliss. 29
But while the assurance of an eternal reward generates at
least some hope in our present trials, it provides little comfort
for those who must still undergo them. Augustine is fully cognizant
of the scope and extent of human hardship. In contrast to
the Stoics (who downplay the importance of externals in the life
of the rational being), he never minimizes the evils confronting
human existence. From his standpoint, the failure of the Stoic
position lies in its paradoxical claim that the “wise man” can
somehow be happy, even when his misery prompts him to commit
suicide.
I am astounded at the effrontery of the Stoics in their contention
that those ills are not ills at all, when they admit that if
they should be so great that a wise man cannot or ought not to
endure them, he is forced to put himself to death and to depart
from this life. Yet so great is the stupefying arrogance of those
people who imagine that they find the Ultimate Good in this life
and that they can attain happiness by their own efforts, that
their ‘wise man’...even if he goes blind, deaf, and dumb, even if
enfeebled in limb and tormented with pain...and thus is driven
to do himself to death...that such a man would not blush to call
that life of his, in the setting of all those ills, a life of happiness! 30
An implication of the Stoic emphasis upon the autonomy of
the individual was an endorsement of suicide (under certain
conditions) as a means of avoiding excessive pain and the infirmities
of old age. 31 For the Stoics, the moral admissibility of sui-
29
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 196-200: CC xlviii, 668-669.
30
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 105: CC xlviii, 666.
31
Cf. MARCUS AURELIUS, Meditations V,29; VIII, 47; X, 8; EPICTETUS,
Discourses I, 9; 24; III, 24.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 179
cide was rooted in their absolutization of human freedom. But
it also proceeded from their general devaluation of the body and
the relegation of bodily existence to a morally irrelevant status.
In this particular context, Augustine does not elaborate upon the
immorality of suicide, or the reasons why it is inherently wrong.
Rather, he simply addresses the inconsistencies embedded in the
Stoic ideal of the happy life. “Is anyone so blind,” he asks, “as to
fail to see that if it were a happy life it would not be a life to seek
escape from?” 32
In response to such a contradictory claim, Augustine draws
the following conclusion:
The wise man, ought...to endure even death with a steadfastness,
but a death that comes to him from outside himself.
Whereas if he is compelled, as those philosophers say, to inflict
it on himself, they must surely admit that these are not only
evils, but intolerable evils, when they compel him to commit this
crime. 33
In Stoic terms, then, the truly wise man can be deemed
happy even in the face of abject misery. This position is justified
on two grounds: first, the attainment of virtue (along with the
condition of apatheia) is viewed as a means of buffering one
against the vicissitudes of earthly existence; secondly, physical
ills cannot be viewed as evil, precisely because they affect only
the bodily life.
Augustine, in fact, would strongly agree with the Stoics that
genuine happiness is based upon the quality of the inner life,
rather than one’s external situation or range of material possessions.
Indeed, his earliest writings exhibit a thorough commitment
to the Stoic notion that happiness must be based upon an
immutable good that can never be lost against one’s will. 34 But
by the time that he wrote the De Civitate Dei, Augustine had
developed a rather pragmatic moral theory that moved closer to
defining happiness in terms of the good of the whole person –
32
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 123-125: CC xlviii, 667.
33
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 166-170: CC xlviii, 668.
34
See n. 17, above.

180 JOSEPH TORCHIA
that is, in terms of the soul and the body alike. While he would
always uphold the primacy of the spiritual over the corporeal
life, one of his abiding concerns was the explanation of the unity
of the body and the soul in human beings. 35 In De Civitate Dei
xix.4, however, his chief interest lies in coming to terms with the
reality of misfortune in human life, and not with a focus upon
its goods. In opposition to the Stoics, he vehemently denies that
virtue provides any guarantee against the encroachment of such
negativity.
If they are genuine virtues (and genuine virtues can exist
only in those in whom true godliness is present) they do not profess
to have the power to ensure that the people in whom they
exist will not suffer any miseries; genuine virtues are not such
liars as to advance such claims. 36
So too, Augustine strongly opposes the Stoic dismissal of
physical distresses as neither goods nor evils. For him, such ills
are genuinely evil, at least in existential terms. 37 Unlike the Stoic
materialists (who ground their happiness completely in the present
life), however, the Christian Augustine can face these trials
with a patient endurance that finds support in the hope of eternal
life.
35
One of Augustine’s most explicit statements on this particular issue is
found in the De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum
I,4(6). See De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum
I,27(52), for Augustine’s classic definition of the human being as “a rational
soul, making use of a mortal and earthly body.” In this definition, we see a
blending of Augustine’s emphasis on the primacy of the soul with a recognition
of the importance of the body in human existence.
36
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 180-184: CC xlviii, 668.
37
This statement must be qualified, since it might be construed as contradicting
Augustine’s interpretation of evil as a lack or deficiency of being
and goodness. While Augustine defined evil in negative terms in a metaphysical
sense, he still recognized the real impact of such negativity in human
life. Accordingly, his denial that evil has an ontological status of its own does
not imply that it has no effect (e.g., in the way that starvation, as the absence
of nourishment, has an effect on the one who is starving).

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 181
We are beset by evils, and we have to endure them steadfastly
until we reach those goods where there will be everything
to supply us with a delight beyond the telling, and there will be
nothing any longer that we are bound to endure. Such is the salvation
which in the world to come will also be itself the ultimate
bliss. Yet these philosophers refuse to believe in this blessedness
because they do not see it; and so they attempt to fabricate for
themselves an utterly delusive happiness by means of a virtue
whose falsity is in proportion to its arrogance. 38
The very fact that Augustine does not place all of the “eggs”
of happiness in the “basket” of the present life, so to speak, enables
him to view even its setbacks in positive terms. From
Augustine’s Christian perspective, there is a definite continuity
between the present life and the life to come. Paradoxically, even
what is now perceived as evil might well be good in the long-run,
if it contributes to our moral growth and spiritual progress. In
this respect, it must be remembered that the “goodness of the
whole” theme provided one of the key components of
Augustine’s response to the problem of evil. Such a thesis (whereby
the parts are harmoniously ordered for the good of the
whole) lends itself to a recognition of the inherent value of all
things. This theme not only provides grounds for upholding the
universal value of things, but likewise, for coming to terms with
the presence of pain and suffering within human experience.
From this standpoint, even evil (whether it be viewed as real or
apparent) has a place in the grand scheme of things, and thereby,
assumes a moral relevance. 39
38
De Civitate Dei xix,4, 193-202: CC xlviii, 668-669.
39
In this connection, Augustine relies upon several analogues in his
attempt to resolve the unresolvable problem of evil. In one instance, he compares
the universe to a vast mosaic composed of many stones. If one or two
of the stones is lost, the beauty of the whole is still not diminished or
destroyed. Likewise, individual instances of imperfection and evil do not
mar the beauty and magnificence of the whole of creation. In practical
terms, imperfection provides the contrasting “tint” or “hue” which enables
us to appreciate the beauty of the totality.

182 JOSEPH TORCHIA
3. Augustine’s Rejection of the Equality of Sins
While Augustine rejects the notion that earthly ills are
morally neutral, then, he also denies that they are absolutely
evil. Everything in our world (including ourselves) exhibits a
curious mixing of both good and evil. While created things are
fundamentally good, they also reveal varying degrees of an
imperfection that is ultimately rooted in their finitude and/or
fallenness. This was something that the Stoics could not appreciate.
From their perspective, good and evil (and by implication,
virtue and vice) must always be mutually exclusive moral categories.
For the Stoic sage, the practical upshot of such a position
was an indifference to the world at large, and the demotion of
many things that are part and parcel of human existence to a
morally inconsequential status.
As we have seen, the Stoics’ understanding of virtue as a
consistent inner disposition for living in accordance with nature
carried an important corollary: all virtues and vices are
equal in virtuousness or viciousness, respectively. In this sense,
the wise man possesses every virtue, while the fool possesses
none at all. Accordingly, the uncompromising mentality which
characterizes the Stoic distinction between virtue and vice
carried over into their understanding of the parameters of the
virtuous life.
Marcia Colish offers a succinct explanation for this key
aspect of Stoic moral theory:
The moral life is not a question of piecemeal effort or habituation
to the good. If the fool sees the light and chooses to shed
his vicious orientation, he can experience an instant conversion
to wisdom. Since the fool’s logos is not in harmony with nature,
nothing he does is good; since the sage’s logos is in conformity
with nature, everything he does will be good automatically. 40
The unacceptability of such a moral doctrine from the
standpoint of Christian morality is readily obvious. But what is
40 COLISH, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages,
Volume I, 44-45.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 183
Augustine’s precise rationale for its rejection? In this connection,
it is interesting to observe that a major thrust of his criticism
of this particular notion focuses upon its logical weaknesses.
From Augustine’s perspective, the contention that all sins are
equal is tantamount to asserting that two species of animals are
equal, merely because they are classified according to the same
genera, or because they share certain behavioral traits. 41 For
Augustine, however, such a theory not only fails on logical
grounds, but according to the canons of common sense as well.
Accordingly, he depicts those who endorse the equality of sins (a
position unique to the Stoics in Augustine’s reckoning) as
arguing “against all experience.” 42 Indeed, the collapse of any
distinction between wrongdoing can only lend itself to absurd
consequences.
There could be nothing more ridiculous or more senseless
than to say that someone who sometimes laughed extravagantly
should be judged to have committed the same kind of sin as the
one who wantonly set fire to his fatherland. 43
In opposition to this view, Augustine views sin and evil in
terms of a well-defined hierarchy. “Certain gradations,” he contends,
“are evident... both in the sins and in the liability.” 44 But
any hierarchy presupposes some criterion or standard of judgment.
For Augustine, this criterion is determined on the basis of
the way in which individual sins (and the vicious tendencies
which promote them) stand in relation to the order of love.
Why, then, cannot we say that sins are equal? It might be
because he who sins more grievously deals a greater blow to charity,
while he who sins more lightly wounds it less. 45
41
Epistula 104(14): CSEL XXXIV (Pars I), 592.
42
Epistula 167(4): PL xxxiii, 735.
43
Epistula 104(13): PL xxxiii, 591.
44
De Sermone Domini in Monte I,9(24): PL xxxiv, 1241: Gradus itaque
sunt in istis peccatis, ut primo quisque irascatur, et eum motum retineat
corde conceptam.
45
Epistula 167(17): PL xxxiii, 740.

184 JOSEPH TORCHIA
In this way, Augustine can rightfully say that the condition
of anger and the utterance of an angry word against another person
is a greater sin than a case in which one’s anger festers in
silence. 46 But if the Stoic thesis were true, it would seriously
undermine Christian teachings regarding human accountability
and the prospect for an eternal reward or punishment for the
moral quality of our lives. 47 Like his critique of the adiaphora,
Augustine’s criticism of the equality of sins reflects a certain
scale of values that is itself based upon an distinctive Christian
understanding of the scheme of reality. In this respect, his ethics
continually refers us to his metaphysics and anthropology. The
concluding section, then, considers the broader philosophical
basis of Augustine’s moral theory and its relevance for his critique
of pertinent Stoic notions.
Augustine’s Ordo of Creation: The Parameters of Moral Action
In Augustinian terms, reality is depicted as an ordered
whole in which God holds the preeminent position (as supremely
perfect, eternal, and immutable), mutable spiritual creatures
(i.e., angels and human souls) occupy the intermediate
position or mid-rank, and mutable corporeal realities occupy the
lowest level. All creatures depend upon God (as the plenitude of
Being) for their existence and goodness. 48 In this scheme, any
movement away from God is tantamount to a movement toward
non-being. Broadly speaking, creatures tend toward non-being
by virtue of their creaturely finitude and susceptibility to change.
In moral terms, rational creatures tend toward non-being as a
result of sin, that is, through erroneous choices for apparent
goods.
On the basis of these metaphysical presuppositions,
Augustine refuted the radical dualism of Manichaeism. If God is
the supreme Creator of everything which exists (and thereby,
everything depends upon God for its very being), there is no pos-
46
De Sermone Domini in Monte I,9(24): PL xxxiv, 1241.
47
Epistula 92(5): PL xxxiv, 320.
48
De Natura Boni 1: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 855.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 185
sibility of an independent principle of evil. Moreover, if God provides
the ultimate Cause of all things, then everything must be
fundamentally good. But Augustine likewise affirmed that created
realities exist within a hierarchy that admits a scale of being
and goodness. 49 In this respect, he upholds the logical priority
and ontological primacy of good over evil. From this standpoint,
the notion of a completely evil reality is wholly untenable.
Indeed, if a thing were evil in an absolute sense, it simply could
not exist. It likewise could not be conceptualized, since it would
lack the goodness which is necessarily correlative with being.
If they are deprived of all good, they will be absolutely
nothing. Hence, as long as they exist, they are good. Therefore,
whatsoever things exist are good. But evil, of which I asked
“Whence is it?” is not a substance, for if it were a substance, it
would be good. 50
Accordingly, if evil can be said to “exist” (as it does for the
one experiencing it), it can only do so as a corruption, deficiency,
or lack of goodness and being. As I have already observed,
Augustine viewed reality in terms of a harmonious gradation.
We have, then, a metaphysical scheme that not only admits
varying degrees of being and goodness, but varying degrees of
mutability and corruptibility as well. Indeed, Augustine extolled
the diversity of created being to such an extent that even imperfection
and disorder could be reconciled with the goodness of
the whole.
The constant passing and succession of things give rise to a
unique terrestrial beauty, with the result that even those things
which die or which cease to be what they have been do not
disturb and disfigure the limit and form and order of the created
universe. 51
49
Confessiones VII,13(19): PL xxxii (Pars I), 743-744.
50
Confessiones VII,12(18): PL xxxii (Pars I), 743.
51
De Natura Boni 8 : CSEL XXV (VI,2), 858.

186 JOSEPH TORCHIA
In my estimation, Augustine’s polemic against Manichaeism
shares an important feature with his critique of the Stoic notion
of morally indifferent things. In both contexts, he was reacting
against a rigid mentality which viewed good and evil (or in the
case of the Stoics, virtue and vice) as diametically opposed and
mutually exclusive. The fundamental principles of Augustine’s
metaphysics enabled him to respond to each of these outlooks in
a compelling manner. His affirmation of the goodness of all
things was fully operative in his refutation of Manichaean dualism,
as well as the Stoic notion that some things are morally
irrelevant.
For Augustine, only God can be absolutely good. But by the
same token, nothing can be absolutely evil (at least not in sheer
ontological terms). For the Stoics, on the other hand, things that
are morally relevant are either completely good or completely
bad. But in Augustinian terms, as we have seen, the claim that a
thing or practice is “not good” does not necessarily mean that it
is totally evil. Accordingly, his Christian metaphysics (ultimately
rooted in Divine Revelation) enabled him to speak in terms of
degrees of goodness and evil in the context of a vast participation
system. For this reason, Augustine rejected the Stoic claim that
some aspects of creation or the trials of life can be dismissed as
moral “indifferents” on the grounds that they are extrinsic to our
true, rational selves.
As we have observed, the Stoics’ chief criterion for determining
what is good is the capacity to promote or conserve our
being. Conversely, their chief criterion of evil is the capacity to
diminish our fundamental oikeiosis. Anything connected with the
body was situated in a morally neutral no-man’s land. In the framework
of Augustine’s metaphysics (and its hierarchical vision of
reality), such narrow criteria simply do not suffice. Indeed, the
true goodness of creatures cannot be based solely upon their
potential to promote our being or rationality. Rather, their goodness
must be rooted in their creation by a supremely good Creator
that shares His own goodness with everything He creates. All
creatures are inherently good, intrinsically valuable, and therefore,
morally relevant by virtue of their very existence. Strictly
speaking, even life’s trials assume a moral relevance insofar as
they are instrumental in shaping our choices as moral agents, or,
insofar as they contribute to our moral and spiritual growth.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 187
These metaphysical presuppositions provide the very foundation
of Augustine’s theory of human nature and ethics.
Indeed, Augustine viewed human nature as exhibiting the same
order and harmony that is found on a cosmic level. Accordingly,
our mid-rank status (which situates us between God and higher
spiritual realites on the one hand, and lower corporeal natures
on the other) establishes our position in the created order and
defines the parameters of our happiness.
Thus man is an intermediate being, but intermediate
between beasts and angels. A beast is irrational and mortal,
while an angel is rational and immortal. Man is intermediate,
inferior to the angels, and superior to the beasts; he is a rational
and mortal animal, sharing mortality with the beasts, and rationality
with the angels. And that is why, when we look for a mean
between blessed immortals and wretched mortals, we have to
find a being who combines happiness with mortality, or wretchedness
with immortality. 52
In this moral environment, rectitude consists in choosing
what is really good (that is, in directing our choices to God and
true being) and rejecting what merely appears to be good (and
thereby, subordinates us to the things we should rightfully
govern as rational beings). As recounted in the Confessiones,
Augustine’s pivotal ethical insight came only after he recognized
that the cause of moral evil (i.e., sin or iniquitas) was rooted in
the human will, rather than in the nature of things.
I asked “What is iniquity?” and I found that it is not a substance.
It is perversity of will, twisted away from the supreme
substance, yourself, O God, and towards lower things. 53
But for Augustine, will is an expression of the soul’s love. It
is significant, then, that his most mature definition of virtue
speaks in terms of a “rightly ordered love” (ordo est amoris), that
is, the good use of the will whereby things are desired or loved in
52
De Civitate Dei IX,13: PL xli (Par 7), 267-268.
53
Confessiones VII,16(22): PL xxxii (Pars I), 744.

188 JOSEPH TORCHIA
a manner that conforms to the dictates of the order prescribed by
God for the governance of the universe. 54 But how should we love
created goods, and most especially, created goods less than ourselves
in the ordo of reality? (In this context, I specify “goods less
than ourselves,” since it is precisely this type of thing that the
Stoics would probably dismiss as morally irrelevant.) Augustine’s
answer to this particular question provides the basis of his definitive
response to the Stoic conception of the adiaphora.
In effect, the answer has already been given: we should love
these things in conformity with their position (and our own) in
the order of creation as a whole. In this respect, our moral choices
must reflect a sense of our subordination to those realities
that exceed us in excellence and those beneath us in dignity in
the scale of being. In other words, we must make a distinction
between (a) those things that are willed or loved for their own
sake; and (b) those that are desired as a means to another end
(or more precisely, for the sake of something else). R.A. Markus
sums up Augustine’s understanding of these moral stances in
these terms:
The contrast is not between love of God and love of creatures,
but between a rightly ordered love which embraces both
God and creatures, and a perverse or disordered love by which
creatures are loved inordinately for their own sakes, without
reference to God. 55
In the De diversis quaestionibus (LXXXIII), Augustine articulates
this key distinction by means of Ciceronian terminology
(i.e., the honestum and the utile) that he adapts in the interests of
his own moral theory. Although he does not view them as
mutually exclusive, Augustine draws a sharp distinction between
these ethical concepts. Accordingly, he explicitly rejects Cicero’s
equation of moral rectitude (i.e., the honestum) with what is use-
54
De Civitate Dei XV,22: PL xli (Pars 7), 467.
55
R.A. MARKUS, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval
Philosophy (edited by A.H. Armstrong), Part V, “Marius Victorinus and
Augustine” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 391.

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 189
ful (i.e., the utile). 56 For Augustine, the honestum is sought for its
own sake, while the utile points toward something else, as a
means to an end. On the basis of this distinction, he arrives at the
following explanation of vice and virtue, respectively:
Consequently every human perversion (also called vice) consists
in the desire to use what ought to be enjoyed and to enjoy
what ought to be used. In turn, good order (also called virtue)
consists in the desire to enjoy what ought to be enjoyed and to
use what ought to be used. Now honorable things are to be
enjoyed, but useful things are to be used. 57
On the basis of the foregoing definition, Augustine would
limit our enjoyment to God alone. Everything else must be used
as a means to this final end. The one exception to this rule,
however, concerns our relationship with other people. Clearly, it
would be inappropriate to speak in terms of “using” our neighbor
as some means to an end. Accordingly, Augustine would say
that people must be “enjoyed in God.” In this way, they are loved
in the manner that people should be loved, as images and likenesses
of their Creator.
When you enjoy a man in God, you enjoy God rather than
the man. Yet, “to enjoy” is very close to saying “to use with delight.”
When that which is loved is close at hand, it is inevitable,
also, that it bring pleasure with it. If you pass beyond this pleasure
and refer it to that end where you remain forever, you are
using; it would not be correct, but an error, to say you are
enjoying it. If you cling to it and place the goal of all your joy in
it as a permanent abode, then you ought with truth and correctness
to be said to enjoy it. And this we must not do, except in
regard to the... greatest and unchangeable Good. 58
56
See CICERO, De Officiis II, 3, 9.
57
De diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, 30: PL xl, 19: Omnis itaque
humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque
utendis frui. Et rursus omnis ordinatio, qua virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis
frui, et utendis uti. Fruendum est autem honestis, utendum vero utilibus.
58
De Doctrina Christiana I,33(37): PL xxxiv (Pars 3), 33.

190 JOSEPH TORCHIA
But to what extent does such a characterization of the soul’s
proper relation toward lesser things commit Augustine to a utilitarian
position? In addressing this particular question, we must
clarify precisely what he means by uti in this context. When
Augustine speaks in terms of “using” what one ought to use, he
specifies the boundaries of the soul’s proper affection toward
lower corporeal natures. From this standpoint, it would be
immoral to invest anything other than God with the status of an
ultimate concern. Such an inordinate love or “enjoyment” of
created things would amount to serving the creature rather than
the Creator, and thereby, violating what Augustine understands
as the rule of perfect religion. But this does not mean that the
goodness of such things depends upon their contribution to a
greater good alone. In contrast to the Stoics (who only impart a
moral significance to things to the extent that they are useful or
beneficial to us), Augustine never denies the inherent value of
created goods. In Augustinian terms, then, the distinction
between “enjoyment” (frui) and “use” (uti) establishes a guideline
for loving or desiring things in light of their ontological status.
Conclusion
Once viewed in terms of the scheme of creation, nothing
(however humble its status) can be “written off” or casually
dismissed as morally insignificant. Indeed, even non-believers
could easily be repelled by the Stoics’ characterization of some
of the most fundamental human goods as adiaphora. The claim,
for example, that one’s physical well-being does not really matter
clashes with the dictates of simple common sense. How can
one meaningfully deny the importance of life, health, and the
promotion of what is necessary for our very survival? Yet, it
would appear that the notion of a morally neutral category is
one which now finds a wide following. In respect to the natural
world, support for this notion is evident in the wholesale and
often arbitrary destruction of an environment and animal life
assumed to be at the “disposal” of humans. More drastically, it
is revealed in the thorough devaluation of the human body and
everything connected with it. In a contemporary setting, this

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 191
trend is readily apparent in popular attitudes toward sexuality,
as well as in certain bioethical discussions regarding end-of-life
decisions.
In a sexual context, it is interesting to observe that those
who engage in promiscuous behavior often presuppose the
moral neutrality of their own bodily existence. For all its shallowness,
the current “talk show” phenomenon of American television
offers some educative illustrations of this viewpoint. I
have in mind those situations in which panelists or participants
proclaim (usually with great conviction) something on the order
of “what I do with my body is my business, as long as I don’t hurt
anyone.” The tacit assumption here seems to be that “my body”
is extrinsic to “my true self,” and therefore, morally irrelevant.
Such an attitude flows from a flawed conception of human nature
that separates “self” and “body,” and in the process, empties
the latter of moral content. If the body possesses any value, it is
grounded exclusively in its capacity to yield pleasure or to promote
one’s interests.
We likewise encounter a tendency to devalue the human
body in postmodernist responses to the issue of human personhood,
particularly (but not exclusively) in connection with
the debate regarding the moral status of Persistent/Permanent
Vegetative State (PVS) patients. In this connection, the postmodernist
understanding of personhood presupposes a dualistic
framework which dichotomizes the life of mind and body, and
deprives bodily life of any moral significance or value in its own
right. This anthropology is closely linked to the notion that personhood
is definable in terms of the possession of rationality
and the exercise of moral autonomy. For the postmodernist,
however, “rational capacity” translates into “consciousness” (or
conscious activity). From this perspective, PVS patients cannot
qualify as persons, precisely because they do not exhibit selfconscious
experience. 59 But on the basis of this criterion of per-
59
Cf., the remarks of BEN A. RICH, “Postmodern Personhood: A Matter
of Consciousness,” Bioethics 11, nos. 3 and 4 (1997): 208: “Personhood status
has been applied only to those actual or theoretical beings who possess
or can develop a sense of right and wrong and hence possess the capacity to
participate as a moral agent in a moral community.”

192 JOSEPH TORCHIA
sonhood, we would be obliged to exclude anyone who lacks this
capacity from the moral community. Such a position reflects the
assumption that one’s humanity (i.e., human biological life) is
distinct from one’s personhood. Once this distinction is operative
in assessments of those deprived of higher brain or neocortical
function, PVS patients (and those in related neurological
syndromes) are, for all practical purposes, viewed as “dead” or
“living corpses.” Gormally, for one, observes that the thesis that
PVS patients are “dead persons” underlies analogous claims
about the appropriate treatment of preborn children, the handicapped
newborn, the mentally handicapped, and those with
senile dementia. 60
My critique of such positions or their philosophical underpinnings
must be left for another day. I only cite them as contemporary
expressions of the Stoic notion which Augustine refutes
in the discussions under scrutiny in this paper. In my estimation,
however, Augustine also offers a compelling alternative
to such contemporary anthropological assumptions, and a
powerful message to a culture in desperate need of reaffirming
the value of the created order and the dignity of the person. As
we have seen, his rejection of the possibility of moral “indifferents”
is ultimately traceable to a metaphysical vision of reality
committed to the goodness of everything which exists. 61 His cri-
60 LUKE GORMALLY, “Definitions of Personhood: Implications for the
Care of PVS Patients,” Ethics and Medicine 9:3 (Autumn, 1993): 46b.
61
In this paper, I have confined my discussion to an assessment of
Augustine’s critique of the Stoic notion of moral indifferents specifically as
it pertains to things or states of being. But it should be noted that the adiaphora
also encompass actions or forms of behavior. I have prescinded from a
consideration of this dimension of the topic. In and of itself, an act like rubbing
one’s head can be viewed as morally neutral. On the other hand, however,
one might rub one’s head for the purpose of signalling another person
to commit an immoral act like theft or murder. In this connection, ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS (ST I,2, Q. 18, a. 9) makes a key distinction between an action that
is indifferent in its species, and an action that is good or evil in individual
instances. From his standpoint, a moral dimension accrues to the act on the
basis of the circumstances, the end of the action, and the intention of the
agent. As Aquinas states, “every human action that proceeds from deliberate
reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.”

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 193
tique of the adiaphora clearly reflects this commitment. The causal
relationship between God and creatures provides the foundation
for purposefulness and intelligibility throughout created
reality. Morally speaking, it also establishes a basis of objective
laws for the regulation of human conduct. Accordingly,
Augustine envisions a true moral cosmos based upon a proper
ordering of the soul’s loves and relationships that is correlative
with a larger Ordo. This is not to say that Augustine’s anthropology
does not exhibit certain dualistic presuppositions of its
own. While he continually attempted to develop a theory of
human nature that did justice to our psychosomatic unity, he
would always identify the human being with the soul, and thereby,
define us in terms of a soul using a mortal and earthly body. 62
But although Augustine defined us primarily in terms of a spiritual
principle endowed with reason (and conversely, subordinated
the body to the soul as its ruler), he likewise viewed us as
occupying a crucial mid-rank position between God and lower
corporeal natures.
In a very real sense, the human person (as a composite of
soul and body, spirit and matter) is a microcosm of creation. As
such, the person requires the same harmonization of parts to
whole that is operative on a cosmic scale. From this standpoint,
the body has a value as an indispensable component of human
nature, just as corporeal reality is necessary for the completion
of creation as a whole. But by the same token, the body and its
well-being cannot be absolutized as ends in themselves. Rather,
they must be viewed in terms of the dignity of a person created
in God’s image, and in a broader sense, in relation to a hierarchy
of being in which humans constitute the very summit of God’s
creative activity.
A WORD CONCERNING SOURCES
This paper has relied upon the following translations: DIOGENES LAER-
TIUS, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. 2 Volumes, translated by R.D. Hicks. The
62
De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum I,27
(52). Cf., De Quantitate Animae 13(22); De Trinitate I,10(22).

194 JOSEPH TORCHIA
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London:
William Heinemann, Ltd., 1958); A.A. LONG and D.N. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic
Philosophers, Volume 1 (Cambridge: University Press, 1995); ST. AUGUSTINE
OF HIPPO, City of God, translated by Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1972); Confessions, translated by John K.
Ryan (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1960); De Doctrina Christiana,
translated by John J. Gavigan, O.S.A, FC 4 (New York: CIMA Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1947); Eighty-Three Different Questions, translated by David L. Mosher,
FC 70 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, Inc.,
1982); Letters, Volume 1, translated by Wilfred Parsons (New York: Fathers
of the Church, Inc., 1951).
Dominican House of Studies
487 Michigan Avenue N.E.
Washington D.C. 20017
USA.
JOSEPH TORCHIA, O.P.
—————
Summary / Resumen
This paper examines St. Augustine of Hippo’s critique of the stoic
notion of a moral category encompassing things which are completely
“indifferent” to considerations of virtue or vice. Such “indifferents”
(adiaphora) constitute those things which are neither good nor evil,
precisely because they are neither helpful nor harmful to our nature as
rational beings. Generally, Augustine’s critique of the adiaphora
unfolds on an exegetical level and a more specific philosophical one
that incorporates elements of his metaphysics and the moral theory it
supports. In Augustinian terms, all creatures are inherently good,
intrinsically valuable, and therefore, morally relevant by virtue of their
very creation by a supremely good Creator.
Este artículo analiza la crítica de San Agustín de Hipona sobre la
noción estoica de una categoría moral que abarca asuntos totalmente
“indiferentes” a las reflexiones sobre virtud o vicio. Tales “indiferentes”
(adiaphora) constituyen los elementos que no son ni buenos ni malos,
precisamente porque no son útiles ni nocivos a nuestra índole de seres
racionales. En general, la crítica de Agustín sobre la adiaphora se
desarrolla a nivel exegético y más específicamente filosófico e incorpora

ST. AUGUSTINE’S CRITIQUE OF THE ADIAPHORA 195
elementos de su metafísica, y lo respalda la teoría moral. En términos
agustinianos, todas las criaturas son de por sí buenas, intrínsecamente
valiosas y, por ello, moralmente relevantes en virtud de su misma
creación por un Creador sumamente bueno.
—————
The author, a Ph.D. in Philosophy (Fordham University) and a
Ph.D. in Early Christian Studies (Catholic University of America), is
a Dominican currently completing his studies towards an S.T.L.
El autor, doctor en Filosofía (Universidad de Fordham) y doctor
en Patrística (Universidad Católica de América), es un dominico que
completa actualmente sus estudios de Licencia en Teología.
—————

197
StMor 38 (2000) 197-216
M. B. RAMOSE
ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR
AND NATO AS WELL
The just war theory was not constructed in the language of
human rights as we understand this language today. The theory
relied, at least implicitly, upon natural law. 1 Its doctrine then
was primarily conceived as moral teaching consistent with the
basic tenets of natural law. In this sense it is a theory pertaining
to the moral, in contradistinction to the legal, justification of
war. Thus one of the central concepts of this theory, namely,
permissibility, referred primarily to morality than legality. That
which was morally permissible was necessarily legally valid
although that which was lawful was not of necessity morally
permissible. This reasoning was in a sense the result of the
critique of natural law resulting in the prominence of the idea of
natural rights. 2 Law was conceived of as the servant of morality
but certainly not the other way round. Despite its apparent
supersesion and thus primacy over natural law, positive law
continues to implicitly rely upon and even appeal to the basic
tenets of natural rights. The humanitarian crisis in Kosovo
leading to war between NATO and Belgrade revives the apparent
struggle for supremacy between natural rights and positive law.
In this way it raises the question of precedence or otherwise
between morality and legality in matters pertaining to war. It is
precisely these issues that we wish to consider. Our thesis is that
far from undermining the just war theory, contemporary human
rights theory and practice is a refinement thereof.
1
D’Entreves, A.P., Natural Law, Hutchinson University Library: London
1951. Cobbah, J.A.M., African values and the human rights debate: an
African perspective, Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 9, Number 3 1987, p.
312-314.
2
Hart, H.L.A., Are there any natural rights?, The Philosophical Review,
Volume LXIV, No. 2 , 370 1955, p. 175ff.

198 M. B. RAMOSE
Permissibility: a question of morality or legality
The term “just”in the context of the just war theory means
licit or permissible. As such it has a direct bearing on the
question: under what conditions is war licit or permissible? The
idea of the permissibility of war may give rise to yet another
question, namely, permitted by whom? One answer is that war
may be just only if it conforms to the supposedly self-evident
and eternal natural law. But this seems to beg the question
because the idea of natural law is far from uncontestable. In the
final analysis natural law rests upon the intuitive conviction that
a particular state of affairs is intrinsically good and therefore
permissible. Neither intuition nor conviction permits of
argument in the strict sense. Despite their impermeability to
argument both tend to lay claim to objectivity and, by
implication, to universality as well. The basic problem here is
the universalizability of a particular intuition or conviction.
“God” is often posited as the solution to the problem of
universalizability. But “God”is pre-eminently a matter of belief
(faith), a metaphysical necessity beyond the sphere of scientific
probability. 3 Consequently, this proposed solution is not
particularly useful because it is irrelevant to knowledge in the
positivist sense. 4 The criterion of objectivity is implicit in the
quest for universalizability. Since even the former is by no
means an uncontested terrain particularly in the humanities and
the social sciences, 5 it follows that the appeal to natural law as
the ground for the permissibility of war is at best tenuous.
Another answer may be that war is just only if it conforms
to positive law. Positive law is inextricably interconnected to the
3
Gilson, E., God and Philosophy, Yale University Press: New Haven
1941, p. 141.
4
Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books Ltd.:
Harmondsworth 1974, p. 12. For a criticism of the verification principle, see,
for example, Ryle, G., Collected Papers, 2, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd.: London
1971, p. 127. For an exposition of the falsification principle aimed partly at
refuting the verification principle, see, for example, Flew, A., and MacIntyre,
A., (ed.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology, S.C.M.: London 1963, p. 106.
5
Gould, Carol, C., and Wartofsky, M.W., (ed.) Women and Philosophy,
G.P. Putnam’s Sons: New York 1976, p. 45-53.

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 199
concept of knowledge in the positivist sense.
Accordingly, it recognizes objectivity as the criterion for
knowledge proper. But the validity of this criterion with regard
to representativity, 6 for example, is questionable as well. Thus
positive law fares no better than natural law which appeals to
“God” instead of objectivity. At the abstract level, the appeal to
the universality or objectivity of either natural or positive law is
useful for as long as it is emptied of all concrete content. Applied
to concrete situations, it assumes a concrete character which is
decisive in the decision on whether or not war is permissible. It
is thus the prevailing moral convictions at the time which are
decisive in endorsing the permissibility or otherwise of a
particular war. On this showing, it is not legality or lawfulness
which is a primary consideration. Morality is primary in the
sense that often positive law relies upon it to found and justify
its principles. This it does through specifically legal language.
Permissibility therefore speaks, in the first instance, to the
morality rather than the legality of war. Accordingly, posing
permissibility as a question of disjuncture between morality and
legality is justifiable if the purpose is to demarcate the two
spheres. However, the inextricable intertwinement between the
two means that it is simultaneously a moral and legal question.
In the context of the just war theory, permissibility refers
also to the principles that govern the initiation of war (ius ad
bellum) and those that regulate its conduct (ius in bello). We
propose to focus on the principles pertaining to ius ad bellum.
One of the principles of ius ad bellum is that only the sovereign
may declare war. The reason for our focus on this principle is
that it is pertinent to determine whether or not it has been
rendered obsolete by the NATO declaration of war on Belgrade.
Another is that there must be a just cause (iusta causa).
Indisollubly linked to this is the principle of the right intention
(intentio recta). These principles will be used as the basis to
examine the validity or otherwise of NATO’s appeal to human
rights violations as the permissible cause of war. In this
6
See, the introduction by Harding, Sandra and Hintikka, Merrill in
their edited work, Discovering Reality, D. Reidel Publishing Company:
Dordrecht 1983.

200 M. B. RAMOSE
connection particular attention will be devoted to the
proportionality and the double effect principles as they relate to
the aims of war on the one hand and the determination of what
constitutes “gross”violation of human rights.
On the right to declare war (ius ad bellum)
Resort to war is deemed to be justified only if all the
peaceful remedies have been exhausted and have failed to
achieve the intended effect. On this basis war may be said to be
just, according to Aquinas, when it is waged at the command of
the sovereign. The command of the sovereign must be
accompanied simultaneously by a just cause and the right
intention. 7 According to Aquinas, there is a just cause if war is
waged in order to: (i) repel an injury; (ii) gain vindication
against an offence, such as, tarnished national honour; (iii)
redress an injury or regain the thing lost. It is to be especially
noted that the logical and practical interconnection between the
just cause and the listed aims thereof is so inextricable that there
is virtual synonimity between them. As such they function
contemporaneously as the causative factors of war and the aims
thereof to the extent that these latter envisage ameliorative
change to the situation necessitating war.
The Thomist list of the aims of the just cause evidently
excludes the violation of human rights as understood in
contemporary human rights theory and practice. On this basis
the question arises as to whether or not NATO’s appeal to this
undermines or adds a new chapter to the Thomist principle of
the just cause. It is to be emphasized that it is not the principle
of the just cause which is at stake but only its scope of
application. This is because the apparent necessity to justify
resort to war not only predates 8 Aquinas’ doctrine on the just
7
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae. 40, 1.
8
Cicero, De Officiis, Bk. 1. X-XII Aquinas also refers more than once to
St. Augustine in expounding his doctrine thus recognising him as both a
predecessor and an authority. His references to Gratian’s Decretum reaveal
also that he recognised himself as only one link in the unfolding chain of
thought about war. He was thus by no means the first theorist of the just war.

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 201
war but its pervasiveness and persistence also remain an
integral part of the political reality of our time. The principle of
the just cause may be expanded to cover this situation.
Contemporary human rights theory and practice revolves
around the rights to life, liberty and limb. The last mentioned is
a metaphor for the protection of individual physical integrity. If
and when there is a deliberate intention to inflict physical injury
for illicit purposes such as ethnic cleansing then there is reason
to define the situation as gross violation of human rights.
Considering that such infliction means at the same time the
threat to life or the actual loss thereof, there is a basis for the
argument that the right to life is violated as well. Similarly, the
right to liberty is violated by the existing threat to restrict or
actually paralyse its exercise. In such circumstances, the
principle of the just cause may be invoked and, thus expanded,
to justify resort to war. Rather than overturn and undermine the
apparent necessity to justify resort to war, NATO has reaffirmed
this by seeking justification in human rights violation. We
therefore submit that the principle of the just cause is vindicated
and thus applies to human rights violations. It remains
necessary in determining the permissibility of war.
Whether or not a particular war is justified also depends
upon the determination of the presence or absence of the right
intention. The principle of the right intention means, according
to Aquinas, the motivation to do good and avoid evil whenever
war is contemplated and actually waged. If war is waged in
order to do evil it is not only immediately unjust but it must also
be deemed a sinful act. Indeed, Aquinas’doctrine of the just war
goes farther beyond the question of the permissibility of war.
For Aquinas the resolution of this question subserves the
principal theological aim which is to determine the sinfulness or
innocence of a particular war. 9 Accordingly, his first and basic
question is couched in these words: “is it always a sin to wage
war?” 10 It is not our concern to pursue this theological line of
questioning. We limit ourselves to the permissibility of war
9
Russell, F.H., The Just War in the Middle Ages, Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge 1975, p. 258-291.
10
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 2a2ae. 40, 1.

202 M. B. RAMOSE
insofar as the notion of intention means responsibility for one’s
actions. In order to determine such responsibility it is
insufficient to construe and limit the meaning of intention to a
putative and abstract act only. Intention is manifest in conduct
that has concrete consequences. Accordingly, the political aims
of war – war being the continuation of politics by other means 11
– shall play a crucial role in our consideration of the right
intention with regard to NATO’s war with Belgrade.
Furthermore, the war aims of NATO will also be assessed in
terms of the proportionatilty and double effect principles. The
former is a check on the questionable proposition that the end
justifies the means. It holds instead that even if the end may be
justified not any and every means is permissible to achieve it.
Thus in our context it is pertinent to determine if war was, in the
circumstances, the only means open to NATO’s declared aim to
achieve the restoration of recognition, respect and protection of
human rights in Kosovo. If the determination is affirmative still
it is vital to invoke the principles of ius in bello in order to
determine if the kind, scale and magnitude of the war was
proportionate to the aim pursued. Here the double effect
principle also comes into play. According to this principle, one
may licitly pursue an action with foreseeable evil effects only if
the following conditions are verified at one and the same time:
(a) that the action intended must be directly and immediately
linked to the achievement of a good purpose; (b) that only the
good effect must be intended; (c) that the good effect must flow
directly from the use of appropriate means and be indifferent to
any bad effects that may be inherent to the action as a whole; (d)
that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting
whatever bad effect. 12 It holds therefore that in the pursuit of a
legitimate aim it is illicit to inflict and impose undue and more
harm on those who are supposed to benefit from such an aim.
There should thus be less harm and minimum burden on the
intended beneficiaries. In a war situation this means on the one
11
Clausewitz, C. von, On War, (ed. & trans.) Howard, M. and Paret, P.,
Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey 1976, p. 605-606.
12
Mangan, J.T., An historical analysis of the principle of double effect,
Theological Studies, Vol. X No. 1 (March) 1949, p. 42.

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 203
hand recognition and respect of the adversary’s right to life by
applying only the maximum physical force necessary to achieve
the aims of war. Killing could conceivably be avoided especially
where the adversary surrenders. On the other hand less harm
and minimum burden on the intended beneficiaries means also
the recognition and respect of the principle of non-combatant
immunity. Applied to the NATO war with Belgrade, this means
that the effect of the war, once ended, must be ameliorative to
the overall situation. It must be the prevalence of the state of
affairs where gross human rights violations are no longer
present in Kosovo.
Only the sovereign may declare war
That only the sovereign may declare war meant that only the
sovereign was vested with the power to rule and protect the
community as a whole. One of the problems of this principle is
that it lends credence to the idea that war is the game of kings.
On this reasoning, the fate of the community is placed in the
hands of the sovereign who is by no means incapable of
plunging the community into war for reasons extraneous to the
preservation of the common good. For Aquinas the principle
was understandable since he adhered 13 to the hierocratic
principle of rulership in the Respublica Christiana. 14 It may be
suggested, in his defence, that the overriding consideration was
the principle of teleology which he invoked to demonstrate that
only the sovereign power was entitled to declare war. Implicitly,
the king (sovereign) by the grace of God was identified as the
only authority who could decide on war. This could apparently
13
Steenberghen, Van, F., The reading and study of St. Thomas, Theology
Digest, Vol. IV, No. 3 Autumn 1956, p. 166-169.
14
UllmanW., The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages,
Methuen and Company Limited: London 1955. Ullamn, W., The Bible and
principles of government in the Middle Ages, Settimane di Studio del Centro
Italiano di Studi sull’alto Medioevo, 10 1963, p. 187-227. Wilks, M., The
Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge 1964.

204 M. B. RAMOSE
not have been otherwise because in the hierocratic scheme of
the societas Christiana the state, in the modern sense 15 , could not
have existed alongside the all-embracing Christian society. This
defence does not, however, invalidate the criticism that the
principle that only the sovereign may declare war is unduly
restrictive. 16 Furthermore, the principle of popular sovereignty,
seen in the light of the contract theories of the state, meant that
sovereign authority was ultimately delegated 17 since the
sovereign was by definition, to use Hobbes’expression, “a mortal
god”. Resort to war is therefore no longer a matter of exclusive
sovereign discretion but of popular authorisation 18 consonant
with the procedural requirements pertaining to such
authorisation. Even then war is no longer conceived of as a
possibility only with reference to an external enemy. Specific
experiences in contemporary history illustrate the untenability
of the thesis that only the sovereign may declare war.
15
Ullman, W., Juristic obstacles to the emergence of the concept of state
in the Middle Ages, Annali di Storia del Diritto, 13 1969, p. 43-64.
16
Delos, J.T., A sociology of modern war and the theory of the just war,
Cross Currents, Vol. VIII No. 3 Summer 1958, p. 252.
17
We note that our position here runs directly counter to the argument
that “any explanation of legitimate political authority merely in terms of a
simple exercise or delegation of the powers belonging to an individual, is
false. Whatever quasicontractual procedures may be involved in political
life, it is clear that St. Thomas would reject those modern contract theories
which are based upon the use by public power of some supposed natural
right of the individual. The private individual does not, in fact, possess any
natural right sufficient to equip the public power with adequate authority.
On the contrary, political authority consists in a hierarchy of government
corresponding to the hierarchy of the ends of human activity.” Midgely,
F.B.F., The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations,
Elek Bootes Ltd.: London 1975, p. 19 Our counter pertains to (i) the rejection
of natural law as the basis of both individual or state authority: (ii) the
assumption that “government” may arise without reference to any consent
and, therefore, some kind of “contract” between the government (state) and
the governed.
18
Murray, J.C., Remarks on the moral problem of war, Theological
Studies, Volume 20 No. 1 (March) 1959, p. 46-47.

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 205
The experience 19 of two world-wars 20 underlined the
resolution to affirm the necessity for pacific setttlement of
disputes. The United Nations Organisation – in a sense the
successor in title to the League of Nations – was constituted
partly as a response to this affirmation. The imperative for
decolonization posed a further challenge to the principle that
only the sovereign may declare war. The recognition, respect and
protection of human rights constituted the core of the challenge.
On this basis, humanitarian law recognized, for example, selfdetermination
as permissible ground for declaring war. 21
Similarly, “gross” human rights violation were recognized by
Tanzania under the leadership of Julius Nyerere as permissible
ground for declaring war on Idi Amin’s Uganda. 22 The situation
in the Central African Republic of Emperor Bokassa was also
manifestly a case of “gross” human rights violation. That
Nyerere’s principle was not applied later when a similar
situation arose in Rwanda in the 1990s reflects not the absence
of principle but the lack of political will to apply it consistently.
Thus even before the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo there was
already a precedent in international politics that
“gross”violation of human rights constituted a just cause for
war. Cumulatively, these examples show that it can no longer be
held that only the sovereign, in the narrow sense of the ruler or
designated “Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces” of a
particular state, may declare war. On this basis NATO could
19
Ferencz, B.B., An International Criminal Court, Volume I, Oceana
Publications, Inc.: London 1980, p. I-90.
20
Alston, P., The United Nations and Human Rights, Clarendon Press:
Oxford 1992, p. 1-8.
21
Shaw, M., Title to territory in Africa, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1986, p.
1-3.
22
Akinyemi, A.B., The Organization of African Unity and the concept of
non-interference in internal affairs of member-states, The British Year Book
of International Law, Forty-Sixth Year of Issue, 1975, p. 393. Kunig, P., The
Protection of Human Rights by International Law in Africa, German
Yearbook of International Law Jahrbuch für internationales Recht, Volume
25 1982, p. 142. Alston, P., The United Nations and Human Rights,
Clarendon Press: Oxford 1992, p. 145 and 159

206 M. B. RAMOSE
theoretically declare war even if it lacks the traditional attributes
constitutive of a sovereign. Indeed arguments for the prior
issuance of a mandate by the United Nations Security Council
sanctioning the use of force proceed on the presumption that
not only the sovereign may declare war. This presumption
underlines the recognition that the United Nathions Security
Council, being not vested with the traditional attributes of
sovereignty, may nevertheless declare war whenever necessary.
Whether or not NATO’s declaration would be equally justified
particularly under the prism of ius ad bellum is the matter we
propose to investigate.
One of the basic problems with the precedent that
“gross”violation of human rights constituted a just cause for war
was that it left undefined the meaning of “gross”violation. The
NATO declaration of war on Belgrade fared no better in this
respect. The cardinal problem then is: by what measure are
“gross” human rights violations determined? Can there be an
“objective” standard at all? 23 In what way are “crimes against
humanity”, “crimes against peace”, or “common crimes against
mankind”, for example, either a help or a hindrance to the
determination of “gross” violation of human rights? 24 A
comparative study, with due regard to the inherent limitations of
such a study, 25 of the events in Idi Amin’s Uganda, in Rwanda
and Kosovo could be one way of answering the question
pertaining to the yardstick with which to determine “gross”
23
Bassiouni, M.C., Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal
Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, The Netherlands 1992, p. 69-
86.
24
A Treatise on International Criminal Law, Volume I, (ed.) Bassiouni,
M.C. and Nanda, V.P., Charles C. Thomas Publisher: Springfield USA 1973,
p. 159-272, 455-556.
25
For example, Kunig observes appositely that: “It should also not be
forgotten that the yardstick of the human rights ideal which arose in the
European tradition is by no means always necessarily a suitable criterion by
which to judge events taking place in a completely different political context
from the one which produced the rules on human rights:…” Kunig, P., The
protection of human rights by International Law in Africa, German
Yearbook of International Law Jahrbuch für internationales Recht, Volume
25 1982, p. 140.

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 207
violation of human rights. Even apart from such a study it may
be assumed that the apology that the international community
did much less than it could have done in Rwanda made by
President Clinton during his visit there is proof, at face value,
that the three situations are on par as far as “gross” violation of
human rights is concerned. However, this in no way tells us
exactly what constitutes “gross”violation of human rights. It
would seem then that resort to reasonableness in the face of
manifest inhumanity towards others is the ultimate judge
determining the “gross” violation of human rights in a given
situation. Coupled to this is the pursuit, guided by prudence, of
a pragmatic course. So it is then that neither “objectivity” nor
“truth” exist independently already at hand waiting only to be
grasped and applied by the discerning intellect. On the contrary,
both are the result of a constant as well as complex interactive
process between the perceiving subject and the perceived. 26
“Truth” and “objectivity” then must be understood as the
contemporaneous convergence of perception and action. 27 It
follows then that an appeal to whatever cause as the justification
for war must meet the test of reasonableness according to the
understanding of truth and objectivity as defined here.
Accordingly, the threat or actual use of force to injure on a wide
scale, indiscriminately, disproportionately and without just
cause the individual right to life, liberty and limb would
constitute gross violation of human rights.
The struggle for Kosovo
In the light of the foregoing we turn to a brief outline of the
issues underlying the struggle for Kosovo. The purpose of the
outline is to provide a picture of the circumstances which in the
judgement of NATO warranted the declaration of war on
Belgrade. The basis of the struggle between the ethnic Albanians
26
Bohm, D., The Undivided Universe, Routledge and Kegan Paul:
London 1993, p. 16-17.
27
Bohm, D., Thought as a System, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London
1994, p. 181.

208 M. B. RAMOSE
and the Serbs living together in Kosovo is the question of title to
territory. The deeper philosophical meaning of this is the
question of identity. It is an attempt by each side to answer the
question: who and what am I? For each side being the bearer of
title to Kosovo territory is an ineradicable attribute of their
identity. Does the territory of Kosovo, and thus sovereignty over
it, belong by right to the ethnic Albanians or the Serbs? Each
population group answers the question affirmatively but in its
favour. Whether or not the basis for the answer is mythical or
historically justified appears to be a secondary consideration in
the light of the fact that each group is convinced about the truth
of its claim. 28 For the Serbs the conviction that Kosovo belongs
to them contains a religious dimension underlined by the battle
of Kosovo (Kossovo). 29 On this basis the loss of Kosovo to the
ethnic Albanians would be in breach of God’s will that Kosovo
should remain their eternal possession. Since the death of God
is unthinkable for the Serbs it follows that sovereignty over
Kosovo may be ceded to the ethnic Albanians only when the
Serbs no longer exist. In this sense for the two groups the
struggle for Kosovo is a matter of life and death. In the more
than six hundred years of this struggle blood has been shed
periodically. 30 Again in the second half of the 1990’s there was
constitutional engineering 31 designed to balance the conflicting
claims. Intermittent bloodshed was also a feature of the struggle
for Kosovo. The latter gradually escalated into brutal inhuman
“ethnic cleansing” verging on the genocidal. It even took the
form of cruel and forced massive exodus of the ethnic Albanians
out of Kosovo. The nature, kind and the scale of Serb cruelty and
inhumanity towards the ethnic Albanians was unreasonable and
thoroughly out of proportion to the declared aims pursued by
Belgrade. It had undoubtedly assumed the character of gross
violation of human rights. It shook the conscience of people of
goodwill. It called for action to make Belgrade desist from such
28
Detrez, R., Kosovo, De uitgestelde oorlog, Houtekiet:Antwerpen –
Baarn 1999, p. 12.
29
Detrez, R., Kosovo, Antwerp, 1999, p. 18-20.
30
Detrez, R., Kosovo, Antwerp, 1999, p. 139-166.
31
Detrez, R., Kosovo, Antwerp 1999, p. 125-136.

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 209
gross violation of human rights. The action envisaged could be
either persuasive or coercive. Among those who took the view
that the time had come for Belgrade to stop gross human rights
violations was NATO. The next question to be answered is
whether resort to war, as NATO held, was the only means open
to make Belgrade desist from the gross violation of human
rights in respect of the ethnic Albanians.
The road to war
Right at the outset we emphasise that Serb cruelty and
inhumanity towards the ethnic Albanians was, in the latter part
of the 1990’s, by every test against reasonableness a clear case of
gross violation of human rights. Action was therefore called for
to bring an end to this situation. Indeed the search for a peaceful
reversal of this situation had begun and reached its highest point
at Rambouillet. The peace negotiations at Rambouillet were
therefore an attempt to obtain the voluntary consent of the
contending parties to a mutually acceptable settlement. Had this
been achieved then NATO’s threat of air strikes would have been
superfluous and war would also have been averted. In the
complex negotiations process there occurred an odd shift away
from the main contending parties to the facilitators and the
protection of their respective interests. 32 One paramount interest
was to secure for NATO the “core” military role in the agreed
settlement. Thus even when “The Serbian delegation, under
duress, had been willing to accept the principles of the
Rambouillet package, save for the very detailed twenty-fifth
chapter on the NATO-led occupation force. … The Western
32
Marc Weller states this point in these terms: “However noble the
intentions of many of the individuals who had been assigned roles in this
play, the fate of the people of Kosovo appeared to be somehow incidental to
the proceedings, which were instead focused on a number of metaquestions.
These meta-questions concerned three principal issue areas: - a
fundamental change in the roles of international actors; - a struggle about
the core values of the international system; and – the legitimacy of the threat
or use of force in international relations.” “The Rambouillet conference on
Kosovo”, International Affairs, Vol. 75 No. 2 April 1999, p. 211-212.

210 M. B. RAMOSE
insistence on a controlling role for NATO thus precluded a
combined approach to Belgrade and doomed the prospects for a
Security Council resolution on the question.” 33 Why the
insistence that NATO should form the “core” and thus
paramount military presence in Kosovo even at the expense of a
United Nations security force properly and duly mandated? Why
concede a decisive role to NATO when specifically European
institutions such as the Council of Europe and the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe could have played a
role fitting to their status? For some these Organisations – albeit
with American presence – are still too weak to assume the
leadership that the United States provides in promoting stability
and security in Europe. In the aftermath of the collapse of the
Soviet Union, so the argument continues, American leadership
in Europe is even more important. However, such leadership
may be dispensed with and NATO would become obsolete once
Europe is firmly established to provide for its own stability and
security. 34 The merits of this questionable argument
notwithstanding, an attempt to answer the questions posed
must take into account the fact that NATO, born before its rival
military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, insisted upon its continued
existence when the latter disbanded voluntarily in the aftermath
of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The justification for the
continued existence of NATO is to be found partly in the
identification of Islam, particularly by the predecessor of Xavier
Solana, Willy Claes, as the enemy of NATO. Does this mean that
in the apparent absence of a credible ideological threat backed
by force NATO has decided to be the defender of an unidentified
religion against Islam? What is the special and unique problem
about Islam? Apart from this seeming revival of the crusade
wars another reason for the continued existence of NATO lies in
the alliance’s “new strategic concept.” 35 The latter, taking its cue
33
Blackburn, R., Kosovo: the war of NATO expansion, 235 New Left
Review, May/June 1999, p. 108.
34
Odom, W.E., Russia’s several seats at the table, International Affairs,
Vol. 74 No. 4 1998, p. 813-815.
35
NATO Review No. 2 Summer 1999. “The Alliance’s Strategic concept
approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 211
from the collapse of the Soviet Union, argues for the
enlargement of NATO. Enlargement is imperative, on this view,
because Europe must be defined anew as a “geostrategic
concept”. 36 According to Article 21 of the Washington Summit
Communique, one of the aims of the alliance’s new strategic
concept is the recognition that: “The security of the Balkan
region is essential to achieving lasting stability throughout the
Euro-Atlantic area. Our goal is to see the integration of the
countries of the region into the Euro-Atlantic community. We
want all the countries and peoples of South-Eastern Europe to
enjoy peace and security and establish normal relations with
one another, based on respect of human rights, democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law.” 37 Pursuant to this “goal”
the alliance paid little attention to the possible role that the
Council of Europe or the OSCE could play. Nor did it consider
itself bound to seek prior United Nations Security Council
resolution as a basis for its action on Belgrade. Consequently,
the alliance unilaterally conferred upon itself the mandate to
declare and wage war on Belgrade. 38
In justification of its unilateral conferment upon itself of the
said mandate NATO invoked the doctrine of limited sovereignty.
Reminiscent of the much criticised Brezhnev doctrine, this
invocation found its strongest advocate in the British Prime
Minister and is accordingly widely known as the Blair
doctrine. 39 The basic tenet of this doctrine is that in principle
sovereignty is no longer unlimited even with regard to internal
or domestic matters. The road to intervention from outside is
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 23 and 24 April
1999.”
- NATO Review No. 4 Winter 1998. Ruhle, M.M. “Taking another look at
NATO’s role in European security.”
36
Verbeke, J., A new security concept for Europe, Studia Diplomatica,
Vol. LI: 1998, No. 3-4, p. 130-131.
37
NATO Review, No. 2 Summer 1999.
38
de Volkskrant, maandag 26 april 1999, p. 5 (NAVO gaat veiligheid in
Europa en wijde omgewing bewaken, “De alliantie geeft zichzelf het
mandaat om zonder toestemming van de Veiligheidsraad in actie te
komen.”)
39
Le Monde Diplomatique, (Nouvel ordre global) juin 1999, p. 1.

212 M. B. RAMOSE
therefore open provided there is justification therefor. One of the
problems with the Blair doctrine is that it calls into question
Article 14 of the alliance’s “Statement on Kosovo” declaring its
reaffirmation and “support for the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of all countries in the region.” 40 In this context,
“territorial integrity” must – in view of the alliance’s preferred
solution to the Kosovo conflict – be understood primarily in the
sense of territorial unity. The alliance considers the latter more
decisive than conceding sovereign statehood to the ethnic
Albanians and the Serbs in a territorially divided Kosovo. 41
Furthermore, the Blair doctrine is not free of the criticism that
it is selective. The situation in East Timor is distinguishable
since right from the beginning it was the United Nations,
ostensibly unencumbered by the Blair doctrine, and not NATO
which established an international military force there.
Considering, as previously suggested, that precedent is already
established in international politics to the effect that appeal to
sovereign jurisdiction in no way precludes intervention under
whatever circumstances, there is certainly something to be said
for the Blair doctrine. However, in this particular case the Blair
doctrine fails to satisfy the criteria of both ius ad bellum and jus
in bello.
NATO correctly identified gross violation of human rights as
the just cause permitting, other things being equal, resort to war.
However, it foundered on the right intention because (i) it did
not advance a convincing argument proving that all the peaceful
avenues had been exhausted; (ii) gross violation of human rights
was used as a subterfuge to conceal – albeit without success –
the subordination of this to the strategic aims of the alliance.
Having demonstrated its will to war on Belgrade and, being the
undisputed military victor, NATO expressed its willingness to
legitimate its action after the fact. It would seek legality only
after might has had its way. Thus for as long as NATO’s strategic
aims could be secured and, especially the insistence that the
alliance must form the “core” of any future international
military presence in Kosovo only then NATO was prepared to
40
NATO Review, No. 2 Summer 1999.
41
Weller, M., International Affairs, Vol. 75 No. 2 April 1999, p. 215-216.

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 213
countenance the search for a United Nations Security Council
resolution. This is the message of Article 6 of the “Statement on
Kosovo” declaring: “NATO is prepared to suspend its air strikes
once Belgrade has unequivocally accepted the above mentioned
conditions and demonstrably begun to withdraw its forces from
Kosovo according to a precise and rapid timetable. This could
follow the passage of a United Nations Security Council
resolution, which we will seek, requiring the withdrawal of Serb
forces and the demilitarisation of Kosovo and encompassing the
deployment of an international military force to safeguard the
swift return of all refugees and displaced persons as well as the
establishment of an international provisional administration of
Kosovo under which its people can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the FRY. NATO remains ready to form the core of such an
international military force. It would be multinational in
character with contributions from non-NATO countries.” 42 In the
result the alliance secured a United Nations Security Council
resolution – Resolution 1244 – subtley conceding the core
military role to NATO. NATO’s military success, under American
leadership, 43 enabled it finally to secure legality rather than
legitimacy for its war on Yugoslavia. Under American
leadership, it has demonstrated the virtues but not necessarily
the efficacy of military power in a seemingly unipolar world. 44 In
this way it is the reaffirmation of the maxim that auctoritas non
veritas facit legem. Yet, its conquest has failed to move the
principal contending parties away from their original
convictions about their title to Kosovo territory. 45 Similarly, it
has left observers sceptical about precipitate resort to war on
ostensibly the right reason but for the wrong purpose. This logic
of conquest must give way to volunatary and informed consent
as the only foundation of law.
42
NATO Review, No. 2 Summer 1999, (Emphasis added).
43
Wills, G., Bully of the free world, Foreign Affairs, Volume 78, Number
2 March/April 1999, p. 50-53.
44
Huntington, S.P., The lonely Superpower, Foreign Affairs, Volume 78,
Number 2 March/April 1999, p. 39.
45
Le Monde Diplomatique (Guerre dans les Balkans) août 1999, p. 2.

214 M. B. RAMOSE
To the question of title to Kosovo territory NATO continues
to provide “autonomy” as the solution. 46 The underlying
consideration here is to preserve the geopolitcal status quo in
the Balkans. 47 However, “autonomy” within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is no longer acceptable to the ethnic
Albanians whom NATO purportedly sought to protect. 48 Despite
the massive destruction 49 and arguably disproportionate harm
that NATO has inflicted upon the ethnic Albanians and the Serbs
alike the question of sovereignty over Kosovo remains as before
a matter of life and death. 50 The deep-seated convictions on
either side of the ethnic divide have survived the NATO
bombardments. Their survival questions the effectiveness of
bombs which in the massive destruction that they sowed in
Yugoslavia destroyed also themselves irretrievably but not the
contending convictions about sovereign title to Kosovo territory.
For this reason only precarious peace has been established in
Kosovo. No doubt NATO bombardments have brought an end to
gross violation of human rights by the Serbs and one of her war
aims has therefore been achieved.
Conclusion
We have shown in the foregoing that the principle of the just
war theory stipulating that only the sovereign may declare war
was not initially conceived to cover human rights violations. In
its unadulterated traditional context and form this principle can
no longer be applicable to the reality of contemporary
international relations. In order to avoid obsolescence the
principle requires both refinement and expansion to be relevant
to contemporary experience regarding sovereignty and human
46
NAVO Kroniek, Nr 1 voorjaar 1999, p. 21.
47
Detrez, R., Kosovo, Antwerp 1999, p. 188-89.
48
De Morgen (Er moet een Chinese muur tussen Kosovo en Servie
komen) zaterdag 5 juni 1999, p. 16.
49
Financial Times (EU counts cost of reconstruction) Thursday June 24
1999, p. 3.
50
Detrez, R., Kosovo, Antwerp 1999, p. 189.

ONLY THE SOVEREIGN MAY DECLARE WAR AND NATO AS WELL 215
rights theory and practice. It therefore must concede, as we have
argued, that not only the United Nations Security Council but
also organisations like NATO may, despite their lack of
traditional attributes of sovereignty, declare war in the face of
gross human rights violations by appeal to the principle of the
just cause as elaborated in the theory of the just war. In this way
the principle of the just cause could be and has been expanded
to cover gross human rights violations. Accordingly,
contemporary human rights theory and practice does not
undermine but adds a new dimension to the theory of the just
war.
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant
Department of Philosophy (Legal Philosophy)
Postbus 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
THE NETHERLANDS
M. B. RAMOSE
—————
Summary / Resumen
The humanitarian crisis that led to war between NATO and
Belgrade calls into question especially the principle of the just war
doctrine that only the sovereign may declare war. Not only who is the
sovereign but also the character of sovereignty appears to have been
modified by NATO’s appeal to human rights violation as proper and
sufficient justification for the declaration of war. Precisely because the
just war theory was not constructed in the language of human rights as
we understand it today, it is pertinent to enquire if contemporary
human rights theory and practice either undermines or adds a new
dimension to the just war. The seemingly persistent necessity to justify
resort to war means that human rights theory and practice reaffirms in
particular the principle of the just cause and thereby vindicates the just
war theory.
La crisis humanitaria que ha llevado a la guerra entre la OTAN y
Belgrado cuestiona el principio de la guerra justa, doctrina según la

216 M. B. RAMOSE
cual sólo el soberano puede declarar la guerra. Tanto la condición de
soberano como el carácter de soberanía parecen haber sido
modificados por el reclamo de la OTAN a la violación de los derechos
humanos como justificación adecuada y suficiente para declarar la
guerra. Precisamente porque la teoría de la guerra justa no se elaboró
con el significado que le damos hoy a los derechos humanos, conviene
investigar si la actual teoría y práctica de tales derechos humanos quita
o añade una nueva dimensión a la guerra justa. La supuesta necesidad
persistente de justificar el recurso a la guerra, significa que la teoría y
práctica de los derechos humanos confirman de modo especial el
principio de la causa justa, por lo cual se respalda la teoría de la guerra
justa.
—————
The author is a Lecturer in the Philosophy of Law at the Catholic
University of Brabant (Tilburg University), Holland.
El autor es profesor adjunto de Filosofía del Derecho en la
Universidad Católica de Brabant (Universidad de Tilburg), Holanda.
—————

217
StMor 38 (2000) 217-228
HANS J. MÜNK
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
AS A TASK OF THE STATE. ETHICAL ASPECTS
OF POLITICAL-LEGAL REALISATION
1. Introduction
Reflection on the tasks of the state has come to be treated
rather sceptically. As a consequence of the process commonly
referred to as “globalisation”, opportunities for obstructing the
actions of nations have apparently expanded in some spheres (in
particular for large international corporations). Be that as it
may, national governments, being the entities of international
law, are the key mediators of international political structures. 1
Especially with respect to the political-ethical and legal
dimensions of the model of sustainable development, states have
no alternative but to act as principal intermediaries, i.e. as
centres of decision-making and co-ordination. Ethical reflection
on the model of sustainability, such as contained in the
documents produced at the world summit in Rio (1992), must
necessarily address issues which involve the ethics of the state.
In the discussion that follows, I assume a positive
relationship between law and morality, a democratically
constituted state, the option for a free market economy, and
elements of social welfare. The topic is addressed from the
perspective of a “western” industrialised country. This means
that with respect to the model of sustainable development, I do
not question the criteria of democracy, a market economy, and
social welfare (in terms of the range of social welfare in
industrialised nations). Quite the contrary, the focus is on
1
Cf. Bartholomäi, R., Sustainable Development und Völkerrecht.
Nachhaltige Entwicklung und intergenerative Gerechtigkeit in der
Staatenpraxis (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997).

218 HANS J. MÜNK
assuring that these criteria are fulfilled in the long run. This also
applies with respect to the criterion of “ecological tolerance”.
2. Characteristics of the Model
A review of the evolution of the concept of “sustainable
development” 2 may be omitted here, and the definition of
sustainable development as formulated in the final report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development
(“Brundtland-Kommission”) may be directly adopted:
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two
key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential
needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be
given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of
technology and social organisation on the environment’s ability
to meet present and future needs”. 3 This conceptual definition
continues to represent the standard in contemporary political
thinking on sustainable development. The essential structural
components (identified on the basis of existing interpretations)
may be characterised as follows:
a) A globally structured, cross-border concept of development
which serves to link together social sub-systems in a variety
of ways.
b) Re-coupling of developmental processes – especially those of
the economic system – with the long-term conservation of
natural resources.
c) Securing of basic needs; furthermore, assuring that all
human beings currently living on the planet (the poor in
particular) receive an adequate share of the world‘s goods
2
Cf. Schanz, H., Forstliche Nachhaltigkeit. Sozialwissenschaftliche
Analysen der Begriffsinhalte und –funktionen, Dissertation an der
forstwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
(Freiburg: Institut für Forstökonomie, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 1996).
3
WCED, The World Commission on Environment and Development,
Our Common Future (Oxford: University Press 1987), p. 32.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A TASK OF THE STATE. ETHICAL ASPECTS 219
and adequate development opportunities (just distribution
worldwide: intra-generational justice).
d) Securing the physical pre-requisites for a worthy human
existence for future generations (intergenerational justice).
This model implies a number of basic ideas that are
significant from social ethics point of view [the goal of
maintaining living standards, while also conserving natural
resources (industrialised countries); the goal of upgrading
economic-social conditions without destroying natural
resources (developing countries); the goal of peaceful global
partnership] 4 .
This list of tasks shows that the model of sustainability I
propose belongs to the systemic and structural level.
The central function, in both conceptual and practical
terms, is the appropriate inter-connecting of the three main
components: ecology, economics and social concerns. These
components are understood to be three autonomous but
nonetheless interdependent dimensions of social development.
To distinguish and specify this networking function, the German
Council of Experts on Environmental Issues (Deutscher
Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen, SRU) has suggested
using the expression “retinity” (“Retinität” in German; derived
from the Latin word “rete” which means “net”) or the “principle
of retinity” 5 . This neologism precisely captures the essence of
the sustainability theme: sustainability requires first and
foremost balanced allocation and reciprocal facilitation of
integration among the three component areas – with a forwardlooking,
precautionary view for the good of the whole. In the
4
For a detailed discussion of the implications of the model cf. Münk,
H.J., ”Nachhaltige Entwicklung und Soziallehre”, Stimmen der Zeit 216 (4)
(1998), pp. 231-245.
5
Der Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen (SRU),
Umweltgutachten 1994, Für eine dauerhaft-umweltgerechte Entwicklung
(Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel, 1994), pp. 54f. The Commission, which is
joined to the German Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and
Nuclear Reactor Security, thereby took up a proposal of Wilhelm Korff; cf.
Korff, W., ”Wirtschaft vor der Herausforderung der Umweltkrise”, Zeitschrift
für Evangelische Ethik 36 (1992), p. 168.

220 HANS J. MÜNK
new “Lexikon der Bioethik” (Encyclopaedia of Bioethics),
“retinity” is defined as an ethical principle, “the basic
requirement of which is to guide the development of human
civilisation such that the network of ecological systems which
support it is preserved”. 6
3. Foundation in Social and Environmental Ethics
Describing the foundations of the model with respect to
contents necessarily draws on principles of social ethics and
concepts such as those developed in the context of traditional,
“classical” paradigms. As a Catholic theologian, I have elsewhere
sought to demonstrate this by way of the principles of Catholic
social doctrine. 7 In one decisive point, however, I exceed the
boundaries of this doctrine; namely, in connection with the task
of total interconnection as engendered by the concept of
“retinity”. For any social ethics embedded in Christian theology,
building bridges that connect back to the central themes of
(theoretical) systematic theology is an inherent requirement.
This has been and continues to be acknowledged in at least a
fundamental way with respect to anthropological aspects (e.g.
concerning the creation of man in the image of God). This
cannot be asserted to the same degree with respect to nonhuman
life, and even less so with respect to the non-living
dimensions of Creation. Classical social principles as well as the
more modern imperative to give the option for the poor priority
are anthropocentric. The non-human dimensions of nature are
addressed more or less secondarely, as a necessary implication
of human life. However, this is not consistent with the essential
6
Vogt, M., ”Retinität”, in W. Korff et al. (ed.), Lexikon der Bioethik, vol.
3 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus 1998) p. 209.
7
Cf. the work cited in remark 4. Of course, other approaches are also
conceivable, such as the discursive ethical type; cf. e.g. Höhn, H.-J., ”Technik
und Natur: Perspektiven einer ökologischen Sozialethik”, in H.-J. Höhn (ed.),
Christliche Sozialethik interdisziplinär (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh,
1997) pp. 263-289. On social principles, cf. Baumgartner, A. / Korff, W. ,
”Sozialprinzipien”, in W. Korff et al. (ed.), Lexikon der Bioethik, vol. 3
(Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998) pp. 405-411.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A TASK OF THE STATE. ETHICAL ASPECTS 221
character of Christian theology of creation, which would accord
the non-human elements and realms of nature in the Creation a
significance that goes beyond a mere anthropocentric
perspective 8 . The fact that the model of sustainable development
is founded in material ethics compels us to include ethical
principles of regulating our dealings with non-human nature.
The loop back to “classical” social principles can be constructed
through the introduction of the principle of retinity. This brings
about at least a partial correction of strongly anthropocentric
interpretations of the model, which professes the independence
and equality of the economic, ecological, and social spheres and
thus allows room for a weighting of non-human creatures and
realms as inspired by the theology of creation. This being said,
the ethical dimensions of the task facing the state – on which
this paper will now focus – are placed in the foreground of the
discussion.
4. Sustainable Development as a Task of the State
The self-concept of a state and a general outline of the state‘s
main functions is normally formulated in a constitution. Among
the classical tasks of the state embodied in such terms as
“police”, “law and order”, “protection”, “security”, “rule of law”
and “social state”, there has become established in recent
decades, that of “environmental protection”. This relatively new
functional dimension has passed through various phases in
terms of the degree of internationalisation and interconnections
with different social systems on the way to its current form,
known under the title “Agenda 21”. The state is expected to
exercise influence over entire social systems and institutions
such that it is able to offer the protection necessary and provide
for the existential needs of future generations, while at the same
time promoting optimal social and economic development.
Fulfilling the demands of this immense job is of paramount
importance in securing public welfare, which is the purpose of
8
A more detailed discussion is provided in Münk, H.J., Nachhaltige
Entwicklung und Soziallehre, op. cit., pp. 237-239.

222 HANS J. MÜNK
the state. Without this “the survival of a free democratic
community and the modern affluent society of industrial
nations is jeopardised”. 9 The ethical foundations legitimating
the state are at issue here. They urgently require that
implementing a programme of sustainable development be
treated as a function of the state. The state is called to apply
appropriate steering measures so as to co-ordinate and make
compatible the sub-systems of society that are constantly
developing under the momentum of their own internal laws and
to ultimately assure overall compatibility. These systems are
interdependent upon one another, e.g. the efficiency of social
welfare depends to a large extent on the state of the economy.
The sustainability model emphasises the importance of
integrating the workings of the various social sub-systems so as
to be conducive to general welfare. In order to do this, the state
must exercise its right to make and carry out collectively binding
decisions. The ethical dimension of this right stands in a
constant relationship to the ethical dimension of the state,
whereby law is not to be understood as an immediate
instrument for executing pre-defined ethical norms. The task of
concrete politics is to negotiate that which can be achieved in
the interest of general welfare and to establish its social validity,
to which end legal steering instruments are needed. Law is thus
distinguished from politics: it is bound to the values and
priorities formulated in the constitution in a special way. 10
Sufficiently integrating the sustainability model into
constitutions is itself not only a legal, but in a certain respect,
also an ethical issue. There is also a clear international
dimension to the issue. The countries of the North are perhaps
not yet sufficiently aware of an important feature of
international ethics that could have major repercussions at the
level of international legal regulation: protection of the
environment as “public property” only extends to a country’s
own borders. Environmental problems on the other hand do not
respect countries’ claims to sovereignty. Strictly speaking, when
9
Der Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen, Umweltgutachten
1994 (cf. note 5) p. 61.
10
Cf. op. cit., p. 61f.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A TASK OF THE STATE. ETHICAL ASPECTS 223
one country adds to the environmental burdon of another
country, the former is actually encroaching on the territory of
the latter, against the latter‘s will and interests. It could be said
that the perpetrating country is committing an act of aggression
and violating the sovereignty of the other country. Otfried Höffe
once referred to this as a “perpetuation of warfare with other
means” 11 . The issue of sustainable development not only
requires the concept of national sovereignty to undergo a
relativization, but also requires that it should be treated with
respect.
The individual elements of “sustainable development” as a
task for the state can be described as follows:
Social Order:
By virtue of its democratic legitimation and constitutional
foundations, the state plays a special role in the definition,
interpretation and implementation of sustainable development.
It is incumbent upon the state to devise the framework of social
order imperative to achieving this end through the legislative
means put at its disposal in the constitution.
Security:
Security in this context refers to securing the natural
resources necessary for sustaining human life.
Orientation:
Mainstream liberal western political philosophy does not
delegate leadership in matters of worldview and beliefs to the
state. Orientation in this context refers to the concrete
establishment of normative rules of action which citizens have
generally accepted. A conceptual framework of this kind must
by its nature address goals of sustainability, guidelines, and
various problems solving options, all of which involve values
that are of ethical significance.
11
Höffe, O., Moral als Preis der Moderne. Ein Versuch über
Wissenschaft, Technik und Umwelt (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1993), p. 195.

224 HANS J. MÜNK
Realization:
An example in this area is the creation of basic structures
and mechanisms for the economy. The right incentives must be
given so as to permit eco-social reform to progress under
economically efficient conditions; it is very important to keep
competitive distortions from occurring, especially at the
international level.
Moderation:
Here the focus is on non-legislative activities, such as
promotion of consensus and processes designed to bring about
acceptance. This task also includes the state’s role as mediator of
solutions negotiated between private parties (e.g. negotiations
between environmental organisations and industrial
associations). 12
5. Ethical Perspectives
5.1 Legitimation:
In addition to the points already addressed regarding the
ethical legitimation of a programme of sustainable
development, a further point is deserving of special treatment,
namely the rights of future generations. Of central concern here
are all the natural resources which are required long term to
assure a dignified human existence. I find that principles of
justice are applicable in this case: Anyone who contributes to the
destruction of the environment is in principle infringing on the
rights of others. This may be legitimate, for instance if the party
affected consents to it. Assuming basic equality of rights for the
different generations, the manner in which one generation treats
the environment – in particular, the condition in which the
environment is left by a given generation – must be such that it
12
These five points are derived from: Heins, B., Die Rolle des Staates für
eine Nachhaltige Entwicklung der Industriegesellschaft (Berlin: Analytica
1997), pp. 101-111.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A TASK OF THE STATE. ETHICAL ASPECTS 225
is principally acceptable to future generations. 13 The discursive
ethical element recognisable in this line of thought is meant to
be advocatory. Future generations rank as the weakest, most
vulnerable part conceivable in this scenario. They have no
chance to stand up for their own interests in the present,
although their opportunities for development may be drastically
and irreversibly compromised.
A just approach would be to allow each generation the same
rate of increase in environmental impact or deterioration in
environmental conditions as the current generation. 14 It is
commonly acknowledged that even fairly small increases in the
rates of deterioration in the most problematic areas of ecology
are, within the span of only a few decades, likely to lead to a
situation in which we ourselves would not care to live. Principles
of justice dictate that we do not leave nature in a poorer and/or
more precarious state than that which we inherited. The thought
that the earth and its fruits are the common property of all
mankind, that is to say, of all generations, is familiar to
theological social ethics (and is also apparent in some secular
contexts) – it is a form of “capital”, the “interest” on which
allows us to live our lives. In less picturesque terms one could
say that our natural, ecological “capital” should not lose any of
its value. This type of thinking is also the substrate of the
“management rules” which have evolved from interpretation of
the model of sustainable development. These rules demand that
the sum of “natural” nature and artificial, technology-based
equivalents allows comparable opportunities of life to future
generations. In this requirement for justice lies the pivotal
aspect of obligation – along with the theologically founded
13
Cf. Höffe, O., Moral als Preis der Moderne, p. 173.
14
The question of exactly how many generations are to be included in
this comparison is not primary; O. Höffe argues for 100 generations; cf.
Moral als Preis der Moderne, p. 184f. At present there is little doubt that the
problem of resources alone (not to mention climate and ozone layer
problems) forces us to think in substantially more narrow time frames; for
an overview, cf. Lochbühler, W., Christliche Umweltethik. Schöpfungstheologische
Grundlagen, Philosophisch-ethische Ansätze, Ökologische
Marktwirtschaft (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1996) pp. 24-43.

226 HANS J. MÜNK
obligation to protect the non-human spheres of life and the
Creation. The magnitude of the task necessitates an element of
political-legal protection and legitimates it (legitimating
function).
5.2 Orientation:
Insofar as such ethical standards influence legislation and
administration, they contribute to the orientation of politicalsocial
action (orientation function).
5.3 Interpretation, Concretion, Operationalization:
Implementing the model of sustainable development
requires comprehensive interpretation and specification, as
previous studies have very clearly shown. 15 This entails
numerous weighing and balancing processes in specific areas,
each of which must be ethically sound. The effort and
achievement overall must also be in keeping with the ethical
significance of the task as a whole. Ethical challenges are also
likely to present themselves in the evaluation and solution of
partial problems confronted in the state’s task of working
toward “sustainable development”, for instance in the
identification and assessment of risks. The principles of justice
stipulate that no future generation may be required to tolerate a
condition we ourselves are not willing to accept (interpretation,
concretion, operationalization function).
5.4 Implementation, Motivation:
Ethics can act as a motivating and fortifying factor in the
development of an ethos of acceptance and participation in the
sense of an ”ethos of sustainability” 16 (implementation,
motivation function).
15
Cf. Friends of the Earth Europe (ed.), Towards Sustainable Europe
(Bruxelles 1995). Smith, P./Tenner, A. ”Dimensions of Sustainability”,
Proceedings of the Congress‚ Challenges of Sustainable Development‘.
Amsterdam, 22nd-25th August 1996 (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1997).
Umweltbundesamt, Nachhaltiges Deutschland. Wege zu einer dauerhaftumweltgerechten
Entwicklung (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1997).
16
Cf. Der Rat der Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen, Umweltgutachten
1994, pp. 156-159.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A TASK OF THE STATE. ETHICAL ASPECTS 227
5.5. Control, Criticism, Limitation:
A model this comprehensive in nature may invite overinterpretation
and offer a basis for ideology-building such as
that familiar from the “old” discussions on ecology. 17 In this
respect, ethics has a critical, controlling function, including
defining the limits of the demands associated with the model.
The right to live of current generations must be respected; it
must not be allowed to be instrumentalised out of the need to
protect future generations. It should also be remembered that
the central structural elements of sustainable development were
formulated with an eye on certain problems of systemic ethics,
and they should be limited to this particular area of work 18
(control, criticism, limitation function).
Universitãre Hochschule Luzern
Institut für Sozialethik
Kasermeplatz 3
Postfach 7427
6000 Luzern 7
Switzerland.
HANS J. MÜNK
—————
Summary / Resumen
Following a brief analysis of the model of sustainable development,
the relationship between the ethical foundations of sustainable
development in today‘s world and the ethical legitimation of states is
discussed. The functions of the state with respect to lawmaking as
understood in these normative terms are then examined from different
perspectives. A guide is thus established for determining in detail the
role of ethics in the state’s task of pursuing “sustainable development”.
17
For example, “eco dictatorship” and “nature as a substitute for
religion”.
18
The long-term time perspective, for instance, is not a viable parameter
for the doctor-patient relationship; it is important, however, with respect to
the systemic framework conditions, because they have to be able to provide
such support into the distant future.

228 HANS J. MÜNK
Siguiendo un breve análisis del modelo de desarrollo sostenible, se
ventila la relación entre las bases éticas del desarrollo sostenible y el
mundo actual y la legitimación ética de los Estados. Se examinan,
entonces, desde diferentes perspectivas, las funciones del Estado para
legislar tal como se entiende en estos términos normativos. Se establece
así una pauta para determinar en detalle el papel de la ética en la tarea
del Estado de seguir ‘el desarrollo sostenible’.
—————
The author is Ordinary Professor of Theological and
Philosophical Ethics in the Institute for Social Ethics of the Faculty
of Theology, University of Luzern, Switzerland.
El autor es profesor ordinario de Teología y de Ética Filosófica
en el Instituto de Ética Social de la Facultad de Teología, en la
Universidad de Lucerna, Suiza.
—————

229
StMor 38 (2000) 229-263
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER C.Ss.R.
THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE
AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE
PART ONE:
I suspect that we are all in agreement as theologians that
questions of justice and injustice are of central concern to moral
theology. My suspicion is also that we sometimes disagree
radically about the proper way in which the boundaries which
delineate justice and injustice are to be drawn. This is partially
due to the very nature of justice itself. There is an intellectually
slippery quality to it.
Moral theology is not alone in dealing with this problem.
Moral psychology as well struggles with the search for a
definition which will enable it to design consistent and useful
research strategies in the study of how people make judgements
concerning issues of justice. Lawrence Kohlberg years ago wrote
that:
Justice is not a rule or a set of rules, it is a moral principle.
By moral principle we mean a mode of choosing which is
universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt
always in all situations… A moral obligation is an obligation to
respect the right or claim of another person. A moral principle is
a principle for resolving competing claims, you versus me, you
versus a third person. There is only one principled basis for
resolving claims: justice or equality. Treat every man’s claim
impartially regardless of the man. A moral principle is not only
a rule of action but a reason for action. As a reason for action
justice is called respect for persons. 1
1
L. KOHLBERG, “Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the
Platonic View” in Sizers, eds., Moral Education (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 1970), pp. 79-80.

230 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
Whether or not we might agree with Kohlberg’s
characterization of justice as a principled basis for resolving
claims, or with his identification of justice with equality or
impartiality, the practical insufficiency of his and most other
ways of defining justice according to only one particular overriding
quality, function, or principle is illustrated eloquently in
the following classic poem of Edgar Lee Masters:
Carl Hamblin
The press of the Spoon River Clarion was wrecked,
And I was tarred and feathered,
For publishing this on the day the Anarchists were hanged
in Chicago:
“I saw a beautiful woman with bandaged eyes
Standing on the steps of a marble temple.
Great multitudes passed in front of her,
Lifting their faces to her imploringly.
In her left hand she held a sword.
She was brandishing the sword,
Sometimes striking a child, again a laborer,
Again a slinking woman, again a lunatic.
In her right hand she held a scale;
Into the scale pieces of gold were tossed
By those who dodged the strokes of the sword.
A man in a black gown read from a manuscript:
“She is no respecter of persons.”
Then a youth wearing a red cap
Leaped to her side and snatched away the bandage.
And lo, the lashes had been eaten away
From the oozy eye-lids;
The eye-balls were seared with a milky mucus;
The madness of a dying soul
Was written on her face–
But the multitude saw why she wore the bandage.” 2
2
EDGAR LEE MASTERS, Spoon River Anthology (New York: Collier, 1962),
p. 148.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 231
Here we have a very clear, albeit a bit cynical, expression of
how the nature of justice is revealed in acts of injustice, of how
injustice can flow out of justice, and of how the reverence for a
particular concept of or belief in justice can lead to acts of
injustice. Also revealed is the contradiction hidden in the
attempt to identify justice solely with impartiality. For Kohlberg,
justice consists in a respect for persons because it is universal
and impartial. However, Masters’ character reminds us that this
same blind impartiality and universality makes justice “no
respecter of persons.” Persons are after all, among their many
other defining qualities, individuals. No doubt those who
burned the press and attacked the author of a critical poem did
so in the name of respect for justice. Masters knew that people
take their belief in justice very seriously, perhaps even more
seriously than their obligation to see the realities of justice and
injustice as they manifest themselves concretely in the real
world. The crime of the fictional Carl Hamblin was that he
defamed their faith in justice itself, and this in their minds
justified their destruction of his property and the silencing of a
metaphorical clarion voice which proclaimed that what some
perceive to be a blindfold symbolizing the impartial blindness of
justice, for others is nothing but a bandage covering the
festering wound of an unseeing, uncaring madness. 3
This very tension, that the same acts of justice can, when
looked at from alternative perspectives, be seen by some as acts
3
In all fairness to Kohlberg, he recognized this difficulty with his
definition. His whole theory of moral development according to invariant
stages had as its purpose the specification of precisely this reality: Different
people reason about justice according to different criteria: “The problem,
however, runs deeper than just what goes into the bag of virtues, it’s what we
mean by any one of them when we stop to think deeply about it, itself. As I
say, honesty and responsibility are good words, involve little controversy, but
it’s also true that a vague consensus on the goodness of these terms conceals
very real disagreement about what they mean. What is one man’s integrity is
another man’s stubbornness, what is one man’s honesty and openness in
expressing his true feelings is another man’s insensitivity to the feelings of
the other person.” L. KOHLBERG, “The Implications of Moral Stages for
Problems in Sex Education,” Paper for Sex Information Council of the United
States Conference (July 1972), p. 12.

232 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
of justice, and by others as injustice, has plagued the ethical
attempt to clarify the boundaries between the two for centuries. 4
And it is essential that we as moral theologians renew our
dedication to do so, because as recent psychological
investigations into violence and evil have shown, contrary to the
myths about them that abound in human society, some of the
worst injustices are perpetrated and carried out by good-willed
people in the very name of justice. 5 It is not so much a problem
of moral relativism, although certainly it is aggravated by
tendencies toward moral relativism. Perhaps it is rather that
there is an internal tension within the very nature of justice itself
which reflects the underlying tension at the heart of what it is to
be human.
Where do we begin?
In her insightful study of justice, Karen Lebacqz suggests
that in the Christian’s attempt to understand the demands of
justice, rather than beginning with an attempt to define the
nature of what justice is, we must begin by taking a cold hard
look at the reality of the world in which we find ourselves
situated—a world filled with injustice. In order to do so we must
look closely to the social sciences which help us to understand
the causes, nature, and impact on people’s lives of these realities
of injustice. 6 In terms of the metaphor of Masters’ poem, we
4
This struggle historically to elucidate a comprehensive understanding
of justice in both philosophy and religious and social groups despite the
changing social and historical atmosphere in which the struggle is carried
out, and the consequent effect upon development of ideas about the nature
of both justice and reason, is thoroughly studied by Alisdair MacIntyre. See
A. MACINTYRE, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1988).
5
For an enlightening discussion of this issue, see R. BAUMEISTER, Evil:
Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1999), pp.
170-202.
6
“I begin with the realities of injustice. The formal principle of justice
is therefore not to give to each what is due but to correct injustices. This
simple shift in starting point has profound implications for a theory of

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 233
need to take off the blindfold or the bandage, in order to see why
and how the innocent as well as the guilty are often struck down
with the sword, while some of the guilty are able to evade the
sword by placing tokens of their worth into the scales of justice’s
other hand. One way to do this is to look upon the faces of those
who have been struck, and those whose money has tipped the
scales.
The methodological option for the primacy of injustices
around and among us as a starting point in reflection about
justice is intriguing to me for a variety of reasons. First, there is
the admonition in recent Magisterial teaching that the moral
theologian is always to be guided in his research and reflection
by theological truth. 7 One of those truths is that none of us is
just yet all of us are called to justice. Magisterial teaching also
reminds us that the formal dimensions of a moral act can never
be separated from its bodily dimensions, 8 that we are called to
preserve a harmony between faith and life, 9 and of course we
have the insight of the Church’s pastoral mission that one of the
privileged places where theological truth and the will of God
reveals itself is in our concrete real lived experience. 10 Second, a
similar approach has already been taken up in philosophical and
legal ethics by people like Kurt Baier and Joel Feinberg. Baier
suggests that the proper domain of justice can be located if “…
instead of asking what justice consists in, we start by exploring
the various things of which we say that they are just and
unjust.” 11 Feinberg, who rightly points out that the classical
definitions of types of justice (commutative, distributive,
justice. If justice begins with the correction of injustices, then the most
important tools for understanding justice will be the stories of injustice as
experienced by the oppressed and the tools of social and historical analysis
that help to illumine the process by which those historical injustices arose
and the meaning of them in the lives of the victims.” K. LEBACQZ, Justice in
an Unjust World (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1987), p. 150.
7
Veritatis Splendor 84.
8
Ibid., 49.
9
Ibid., 26.
10
Gaudium et Spes 34-35.
11
K. BAIER, The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason
and Morality (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), p. 330.

234 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
retributive), rather than revealing the nature of justice itself,
merely specify the domains under which particular rules of
justice are applicable, suggests that it is more fruitful and
certainly more in keeping with our individual and shared
experience to both specify and apply concepts of justice in
response to the injustices that actually occur around us. 12 Third,
at least one area of contemporary cognitive and social
psychology has taken a particular interest in the dynamics
governing how and under what conditions ordinary people
recognize a situation of injustice, and the influence that this
recognition has upon their behavioral responses. In particular,
the work of Sabini and Silver suggests that the feeling of anger
is closely tied to the belief that a moral infraction has occurred; 13
Weiner has discovered a strong correlation between belief that
one has been morally wronged and violent responses to the
perceived perpetrator; 14 Margolis highlights the importance of
the boundaries of our self-concept and our emotional capacity
while living within a social field of multiple moralities; 15 and
Edney offers the insight that if people truly cared about each
other, then concepts of justice would be unnecessary and
redundant, hence justice concepts may in fact be nothing more
than social and cognitive heuristics to help people who do not in
fact care about others (for whatever reason this might be) to
behave as if they did. 16 Thus, three different disciplinary
perspectives, the theological, the philosophical and the
psychological agree on the fruitfulness of adopting injustice as
an initial starting point which can reveal something to us about
the nature of justice.
12
J. FEINBERG, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 265-266.
13
J. SABINI and M. SILVER, Moralities of Everyday Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982), pp. 163-182.
14
B. WEINER, Judgments of Responsibility: A Foundation for a Theory of
Social Conduct (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 14-24; 186-215.
15
D. MARGOLIS, The Fabric of Self: A Theory of Ethics and Emotions (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 1-14.
16
J. EDNEY, “Rationality and Social Justice,” Human Relations 37 (1984),
pp. 163-180.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 235
The pretension of the remainder of this article is humble: to
survey issues raised by some of the current research being
carried out in psychology in the area of injustice concerns, in the
attempt to make available for the further reflection of moral
theologians some (a very limited amount) of the results of
psychological research pertinent to the question of how people
conceive of justice and injustice; how they arrive at judgments
concerning whether or not justice or injustice has been done;
and how they actually respond to situations which they perceive
to be unjust in real life. Psychology is not only concerned with
understanding injustice but also with how to use this
understanding in order to respond effectively to it. Part of the
self-defined purpose of the natural sciences is the discovery of
those processes which will enable us to control and improve our
human existence. 17 And this also is a valid research activity for
the moral theologian who is encouraged in his ministry by the
teaching Magisterium to make an instrumental and proper use
of the discoveries of the empirical sciences for precisely these
same purposes. 18 There are a variety of theoretical approaches to
17
The scientific concern of investigation into moral phenomena is
threefold. First of all, the interest is primarily in coming to understand the
‘why’ of what people do. Secondly, the recognition that people act differently
and unpredictably across situational boundaries leads to the attempt to
understand why this is so in terms of the interior or subjective aspects of the
acting agent. Thirdly, the study is itself motivated by a concrete goal, the
search for an explanation able to be generalized across individual and
situational boundaries in such a way that future behavior can be predicted
and modified. The psychologist’s interest in “moral behavior” should be
understood to be an interest in the pattern of behavior in real-life contexts
with attention to the inner processes that produced the behavior. “Without
knowing the inner processes that gave rise to the behavior, we cannot call it
“moral,” nor can we know how it is likely to generalize to other situations.
This concern with situational context and the inner processes that produce
the behavior is not just an academic nicety, but is essential to understanding,
predicting, and influencing moral behavior.” J. REST, “The Major Components
of Morality” in W. KURTINES and J. GEWIRTZ, eds. Morality, Moral Behavior, and
Moral Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), p. 26.
18
“A critical examination of the analytical methods borrowed from
other disciplines must be carried out in a special way by theologians. It is the
light of faith which provides theology with its principles. That is why the use

236 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
the study of morality in psychology. While even psychology itself
admits that “None of the major theoretical approaches offers an
adequately comprehensive view of the psychology of morality…”,
19 this does not mean that we as theologians can ignore or
take lightly the information that each of them does provide.
For the sake of synthesis I would like to cluster the
psychological research according to three main areas of interest,
which not surprisingly also correspond to the common
philosophical and theological questions which have classically
been raised concerning the nature of justice and injustice. The
three clusters I have chosen are:
1. Research concerning the way that people ordinarily
understand the nature of justice and injustice.
2. Research concerning the specification of the rules governing
justice and injustice in both simulated and real-life situations.
3. Research into the reasons why and the ways that ordinary
people justify their unjust behavior in everyday situations.
In the remainder of this article, I will concentrate on the first of
these clusters, expanding and developing the latter two in the
second part to be published at a later date.
Before considering the first of these, there are a few things
that need to be mentioned regarding the difference between
morality and justice. For some these are one and the same
reality, justice being the overall integrative virtue or principle
that unifies all other moral concepts. This way of thinking about
justice is very similar to the Socratic ideal. Justice is an inner
harmony or ordering of one’s self which enables the person to do
of philosophical positions or of human sciences by the theologian has a
value which might be called instrumental, but yet must undergo a critical
study from a theological perspective. In other words, the ultimate and
decisive criterion for truth can only be a criterion which is itself theological.”
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Instruction on Certain Aspects of
the “Theology of Liberation,” VII. 10.
19
J. REST, “The Major Components of Morality,” p. 24.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 237
what is just. 20 However, as moral theologians and pastoral
ministers, we are all painfully aware of the reality of sin even in
the lives of the most just among us. We all know how easy it is
for even good people to commit acts of injustice, particularly
when they believe that what they are doing is in fact just. 21
Furthermore, many would agree that there are certain actions or
situations which might be considered immoral but would not
necessarily be seen as unjust, 22 whereas it would be more
difficult to conceive of a situation or act of injustice which
would not be characterized as immoral. This becomes
particularly evident under conditions where the line drawn
between what is just and unjust becomes blurred. For our
20
“But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being
concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which
is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit
the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them
to do the work of others, –he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own
master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound
together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the
higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate
intervals–when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but
has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he
proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the
treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always
thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this
harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which
presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition,
he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.”
PLATO, The Republic: The Complete and Unabridged Jowett Translation (New
York: Vintage Books, 1991), pp. 163-164.
21
Aristotelian ethics recognized this difficulty and added the
requirement that “In order to comprehend the full meaning of justice as a
moral state it is necessary not only to distinguish between just and unjust
persons but also between persons and their actions.” E.C. GARDNER, Justice
and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 25.
22
Witness the distinction made by Lita Furby: “… justice and morality
are not always synonymous because justice is a concept limited to
phenomena involving the treatment of a person or persons, whereas
morality is not (e.g. promiscuity might be considered immoral but not
unjust).” L. FURBY, “Psychology and Justice,” in R. COHEN ed., Justice: Views
from the Social Sciences (New York: Plenum Press, 1986), p. 153.

238 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
purposes, justice and injustice fall within a specific domain of a
broader reality called morality. Thus our dialogue with the
relevant psychological investigations might also serve to reveal
some of those tendencies which help to clarify that often
ambiguous line separating justice from injustice in the daily
lived experience of our people who are sincerely seeking to
follow the way of justice taught and made possible by the Christ
event.
Broadly speaking, contemporary psychology maintains that
all human action is explainable in terms of motivation—driven
by a need or want related directly or indirectly to survival and
flourishing. Concepts of justice and injustice have a great deal to
do with the basic need people have to feel in control of our own
lives and surroundings. This same need is considered to be the
foundation of the activity of thinking itself. 23 Moral concepts, of
which justice is one of the more important, make it possible for
us to create and maintain stable expectations about our own and
other people’s behaviors within a shared social (moral) order. If
I know how people are supposed to behave in certain situations,
then I know what to do when I find myself in this same or
similar situations. I also know how to respond when people do
not behave in conformity with these expectations. Morality
concepts also enable us to make determinations concerning the
types of persons other people are. These enable us to predict
how they will behave in a wide variety of different situations and
circumstances. The world becomes psychologically and
emotionally a secure and controllable place in which to live
comfortably. But the socially shared life-space is extremely
complex. The partitioning of the social world into areas
governed by specific realms of justice makes life within the
shared social world much more manageable. Likewise, holding
people responsible for specific kinds of unjust behavior enables
groups to provoke social change according to desired
directions. 24
23
M. CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, The Evolving Self: A Psychology for the Third
Millennium (New York: Harper, 1993), pp. 159-162.
24
B. WEINER, Judgments of Responsibility, p. 84.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 239
1. The understanding of injustice
There are three major issues dealt with in psychological
research regarding the way that people understand and use
concepts of justice. The first deals with how much influence
one’s intellectual definition of justice or injustice has upon
actual behavior; The second deals with whether justice and
injustice are conceptualized primarily in terms of equity,
equality, or humanitarian concerns (such as need); The third
deals with the reality of gender differences in the
conceptualization of what justice is and in the use of the concept
in reasoning about morality.
Does reasoning about justice make a difference?
A few famous experiments in the history of moral
psychology have called into question the real importance of the
way that people intellectually think about justice with respect to
the consequent effect upon their actual behavior. The first is
Stanley Milgram’s well-known experiment, 25 in which the
majority of his experimental subjects were shown to be capable
of inflicting painful electric shocks on another person, even to
the point of doing serious physical harm, in spite of their firm
beliefs about the injustice of doing so, extreme feelings of
anxiety while doing so, and their own prior self-evaluations
which indicated that they could not “see” a situation in which it
would be justifiable for them to do so. 26 The only variable which
25
Milgram’s experiment was really a series of different experiments
carried out over several years. For information regarding the details of all of
the different variations, see S. MILGRAM, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,”
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67 (1963), pp. 371-378; Idem.,
“Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority,” Human
Relations 18 (1965), pp. 57-76; Idem., Obedience to Authority (New York:
Harper & Row, 1974).
26
As Sabini and Silver point out, the tendency to participate in the
injustice was even more pronounced when the role assigned was that of a
cooperator as opposed to being the direct perpetrator of another’s suffering:
“Each of the 110 people claimed that he would disobey at some point.
Milgram, aware that people would be unwilling to admit that they

240 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
seemed to be determinative of the anomalous results seemed to
be that of the physical presence and proximity of an authority
figure. A second experiment known as the “Good Samaritan
Experiments,” which studied the opposite side of the injustice
coin, was carried out by Darley and Batson at Princeton
Theological Seminary. 27 The experiment attempted to discover
whether or not seminary students who were asked to prepare
and give a lecture at a nearby campus building on the topic of
the gospel parable of the Good Samaritan would be more apt to
stop and help an obviously distressed physically ill person in the
alley separating the two buildings than a similar group asked to
prepare and deliver a lecture on the topic of job opportunities.
From the perspective of Christian ethics, the results of the
experiment were disappointing to say the least. The only factor
which seemed to have any influence over whether or not the
seminary student stopped to render help was whether or not the
student was in a hurry. 28 A third research project carried out by
themselves would obey such an unreasonable and unconscionable order,
asked another sample of middle-class adults to predict how far other people
would go in such a procedure. The average prediction was that perhaps one
person in a thousand would continue to the end. This prediction was wrong.
In fact 65 percent (26/40) of the subjects obeyed to the end … In one variation
the subject himself was not ordered to pull the switch delivering the shock,
rather he performed a different, also essential task, while another person (in
reality a confederate) pulled the switch. In this case roughly 90 percent
(37/40) of the subjects continued to perform the subsidiary task through 450
volts.” J. SABINI and M. SILVER, Moralities of Everyday Life, pp. 59-60.
27
Again, the actual experiment consisted of various similar experiments
over an extended time period. For complete details reported by the original
authors, see J. DARLEY and C. BATSON, “From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 27 (1973), pp. 100-108.
28
“Most of the seminary students did not help the victim in this
situation, and neither the topic on which they were to lecture nor the value
they placed on religious commitment was associated with helping … The
only factor that seemed to influence helping in this situation was the amount
of time each student believed he had before his lecture was to begin; those
who believed they had to hurry were less likely to help than were those who
believed they had ample time and thus could afford to stop.” R. LIEBERT,
“What Develops in Moral Development?” in W. KURTINES and J. GEWIRTZ, eds.,

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 241
Hartshorne and May also found little correlation between
children’s concepts of fairness and justice and their actual
behavior when placed in moral situations. 29 On the other hand,
the research carried out in the realm of moral development
theory has provided a substantial amount of data which
indicates that the way individuals conceive of justice and
injustice really does have an impact upon the way they reason
about their choices in behavioral situations, and this reasoning
in turn does causally impact their actual behavior. 30 Particularly
striking are the studies carried out by Haan, Smith and Block, 31
which demonstrated a strong correlation between Kohlberg’s
stages of moral development and active participation in the freespeech
movement sit-in at the University of California at
Berkeley in the 1960’s.
While not constituting an empirical proof either way
concerning the influence of thinking about justice upon actual
behavior, these experimental results certainly call into question
the efficacy and importance of people’s intellectual beliefs about
what constitutes justice or injustice in guiding their actual
Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1984), p. 187.
29
Hartshorne and May wanted to establish a link between awareness of
moral standards of conduct and the actual effect this knowledge has upon
behavior. They studied several different immoral activities which comprised
stealing, lying, and cheating in more than 30 different situations, and found
an extremely low correlation between their subjects knowledge that an
activity is morally wrong, and their refraining from such activity in actual
behavior. For the full details of the experiment and its other general
conclusions, see H. HARTSHORNE and M. MAY, Studies in the Nature of
Character (3 Vols.). Vol. 1, Studies in Deceit; Vol. 2, Studies in Self-Control;
Vol. 3 Studies in the Nature of Character (New York: Macmillan, 1928-1930).
30
For a broad survey of experiments which provide this type of data, see
A. BLASI, “Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Critical Review of
the Literature,” Psychological Bulletin 88 (1980), pp. 1-45.
31
The force of this study is compelling, since it studied actual behavior
in a real-life situation rather than in the artificial context of a psychology
laboratory. For details see N. HAAN, M. SMITH, and J. BLOCK, “Moral
Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social Behavior, Family Background,
and Personality Correlates,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10
(1968), pp. 183-201.

242 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
concrete behavior in imaginary or real-life situations. Even
people who firmly believe that injustice involves causing harm
to the innocent and that it is morally wrong to do so, at times
justify their doing so, while those who also firmly believe that
justice requires helping those in need, justify their failure to do
so. If we bear in mind that thinking can guide behavior, but that
there is no guarantee that it will do so, and that behavior also
reveals thinking even when what it reveals may be different from
the actual explanation given by the person who acts, the
apparent conflict between the two sets of data might be properly
interpreted to be the result of a conflict of justice issues. In the
good Samaritan experiment, it appears that the importance of
arriving on time and not keeping others waiting took precedence
over the obligation to help; in the Milgram experiment, either
the importance of obedience to authority, fulfilling one’s
contractual obligations, or not wanting to disappoint the
authority figure, took precedence in moral thinking over the
moral obligation not to cause pain to an innocent. “Findings of
inconsistencies may, instead, reflect the individual’s efforts at
coordinating the different types of judgments relevant to a given
behavioral situation. That is, assessments need to be made of
nonmoral social judgments and their coordination with moral
judgments.” 32 Rather than substantiating the lack of influence of
thoughts about justice and injustice on actual moral behavior,
when taken together, all of the data both positive and negative,
tend to indicate that the determinant factor in moral behavior
has to do with how one orders the many different forms of
conceiving of justice and injustice with respect to each
particular action situation.
Criteria for Distinguishing the unjust from the just
Whereas Lebacqz centers her reflection concerning injustice
primarily upon the realities of oppression and exploitation as
32
E. TURIEL and J. SMETANA, “Social Knowledge and Action: The
Coordination of Domains,” in W. Kurtines and J. GEWIRTZ, eds., Morality,
Moral Behavior, and Moral Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1984), pp. 266-267.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 243
these are experienced and recognized in a variety of forms, 33
Feinberg divides the reality of injustice according to 3 separate
categories: those actions which are exploitative of other persons;
those which discriminate injudiciously, and those which defame
or damage the reputation or good name of others. 34
Psychological research on the other hand, focusing as it does on
how people actually do use the concepts of injustice in making
decisions and acting upon them in either real life or imaginary
situations, reveals again a two-fold quality of justice concepts
which entails either the violation of universal and impersonal
principles governing equity or equality concerns, or violations of
categories and concepts which are properly anthropological in
nature, revealing underlying beliefs about what it means to be
human. 35 For the most part however, experimentation has been
confined to issues relating primarily to the domain of
distributive judgment.
Equity theory 36 advanced the proposition that people judge
questions of injustice according to the contributions rule that “…
justice judgments reflect the relative ratio of one’s contributions
(or inputs) to one’s receipts (or outputs). Justice is achieved
33
KAREN LABACQZ, Justice in an Unjust World, pp. 11-17;155.
34
J. FEINBERG, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, pp 265-266.
35
L. FURBY, “Psychology and Justice,” pp. 179-180.
36
For further information concerning equity theory, see J. ADAMS,
“Inequity in Social Exchange,” in L. BERKOWITZ, ed., Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1965), pp.
267-299; W. AUSTIN and E. HATFIELD, “Equity Theory, Power and Social
Justice,” in G. MIKULA, ed., Justice and Social Interaction: Experimental and
Theoretical Contributions from Psychological Research (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1980), pp. 25-61; L. BERKOWITZ and E. WALSTER, eds., Equity Theory:
Towards a General Theory of Social Interaction. Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, Vol. 9 (New York: Academic Press, 1976); P. BRICKMAN,
“Preference for Inequality,” Sociometry 40 (1977), pp. 303-310; M. DEUTSCH,
“Equity, Equality and Need: What Determines which Value Will be Used as
the Basis of Distributive Justice?” Journal of Social Issues 31 (1975), pp. 137-
149; J. GREENBERG and R. COHEN, Equity and Justice in Social Behavior (New
York: Academic Press, 1982); H. TAJFEL, “Psychological Conceptions of
Equity: The Present and the Future,” in P. FRAISSE, ed., Psychologie de Demain
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982); E. WALSTER, G. WALSTER and
E. BERSCHEID, Equity: Theory and Research (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978).

244 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
when this ratio appears equal for all the individuals involved in
a given distribution or exchange.” 37 In laymen’s terms this could
be summarized in the formula that people should get what they
deserve. Those working within the cognitive-developmental
approach advance the proposition that people judge questions of
injustice according to the equality principle, expressed in
Kohlberg’s statement above, which maintains that all people
should receive equally and impartially based upon the
considerations of universal justice. In layman’s terms, it
amounts to the belief that each should get his equal share of the
pie. According to equity, injustice might be illustrated by a
condition in which two equally qualified and capable workers
receive differing amounts of pay for the same amount and type
of work. According to equality, injustice might be illustrated
when one racial group is consistently and arbitrarily excluded
from full participation in economic and political decision
making procedures. Humanitarian concerns temper both of
these with the consideration of the underlying fundamental
demands that being human requires. All human beings have
certain fundamental needs which they are entitled to satisfy.
There are also some actions, such as beating people, which are
in themselves unjust regardless of whether they are equitable or
equal because they are not worthy activities for human beings. 38
These distinctions are consolidated by Feinberg when he
independently derives from his threefold distinction of forms of
injustice two general types of justice which seem to cross the
37
L. FURBY, “Psychology and Justice,” p. 155.
38
Witness the following quotation taken from Gaudium et Spes 27 in
Veritatis Splendor 80: “Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of
homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide; whatever
violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and
mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit; whatever is offensive to
human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary
imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women
and children; degrading conditions of work which treat laborers as mere
instruments of profit, and not as free responsible persons: all these and the
like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they
contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice,
and they are a negation of the honor due to the Creator.”

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 245
boundaries of the traditional moral domains: justice is either
comparative, or it is noncomparative. Though both of these
types of justice make use of both the principles of equity and
equality, the way they do so is complementary. Comparative
justice corresponds more commonly to the demands of equality,
noncomparative justice corresponds roughly to the demands of
equity. In the first, injustice consists in treating people
differently; in the latter, in treating them alike. 39
This distinction and the resulting tension which most people
feel when facing the underlying reality it attempts to elucidate is
illustrated in Jesus’ parable of the workers in the vineyard found
in Matthew 20:1-16. 40 According to the perspective of
comparative justice, the owner has violated the principle of
equity because he pays each of his workers the same amount,
even though in comparison some have worked 3 times the
amount of others. The equitable thing is to pay more to those
who have worked more. However, from the perspective of
noncomparative justice the owner has not violated the principle
of equity. He is just, because he has fulfilled the demands of
equality. Each has been paid according to what was agreed
upon, regardless of considerations of what others had agreed
upon, and each has received the exact same amount. Whether
one of these two types of justice orientation is primary in the
teachings of Jesus, or whether there is a difference of dominance
between one or the other type of justice concept in the Old
Testament as compared to the New Testament are issues for
Biblical scholars to resolve. My purpose here is to point out the
very real presence of this distinction in our tradition and
theological sources and remind the reader that depending upon
which perspective we adopt, the same action can be easily
39
J. FEINBERG, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, pp. 266-277.
40
Other scriptural examples which might be read from the perspective
of this distinction would include the Old Testament law of the talon, the
rules for conquest and warfare; in the New Testament the Father’s response
to the prodigal son’s brother, the parable of the talents, the observation
concerning the widow’s mite, the parable of the unjust judge, and the parable
of the unforgiving servant.

246 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
interpreted by both participants and observers as being just and
unjust at the same time.
This distinction highlighted in the psychological research
between the use of equity and equality principles, coupled with
questions regarding how we define what it is to be human, is
particularly interesting for moral theologians when joined to the
theoretical framework provided by the psychology of being as
developed by Rom Harré. He maintains that there are different
types of moralities prevalent or dominant in different social
groups, these moral types arising out of the nature and structure
of the group itself. A group can be organized and structured
around a common characteristic or reduced group of
characteristics which all members share in common, such as the
society of all human beings (all sharing the same characteristics
which make a person human), of racial groups, national groups,
etc. But, as in the case of a monastery or military organization,
a social group can also be functionally organized hierarchically
according to the task each member carries out in the context of
the social roles he occupies and the status accorded to him
within the organizational structure of the dynamics of the
group. 41 This distinction is roughly paralleled in Hamilton and
41
As Harré points out, “It could be argued that it is an ideological
illusion to believe that there is such an entity as ‘society’ as a group of
essentially similar beings; to build moral reasonings on that premise is naive.
Behind all this is a deep logical confusion about the nature of social groups.
One kind of group exists by virtue of the essential similarity in some
important respects of all its members; another by virtue of functional
differentiation of members by reference to their locations in a role structure,
particularly of a self-maintaining microsystem such as a monastery. The
egalitarian moralities whose moral superiority is pre-supposed in treating
moral reasoning as universalistic are slipped in along with the conception of
‘society’ as a group of the first kind. No place can be found for aristocratic
and feudal moralities which involve a conception of society as an order, even
as a hierarchical structure, that is, a group of the second kind where
universalistic reasoning would be inappropriate. Clearly, to presume that for
real human circumstances to reason on a basis of universality of application
of a moral rule or moral assessment is an advance is to take for granted that
societies which are formed of morally and socially similar individuals are
higher forms of human association than those formed of morally and
socially differentiated individuals. But this is itself a moral position.”

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 247
Sander’s division of the social and moral situation according to
the two bipolar axes of equality or inequality of members (the
vertical), and of low or high solidarity (the horizontal), in the
attempt to reveal the underlying influence of the mutual
interaction between macro level differences among differing
societies and micro level differences between roles within a
society. 42
In the first type of social organization, injustice is usually
conceived of as violation of the principle of equality. It is
grounded and defined in terms of a disruption of the equality
among all of the members, excluding some from full
membership and participation. In the second type of group,
since inequality of members is tempered by the role distinction
which specifies their place within the social hierarchy, injustice
is defined in terms of unfair or inequitable reward based upon
one’s performance of his task or one’s task assignment. Injustice
is a violation of a principle governing equity. The first group, in
which justice is egalitarian in nature, is closer to the traditional
Aristotelian ideal and tends toward Feinberg’s classification of
noncomparative justice. People’s rights and claims are grounded
in their membership, which is itself grounded in the natural
qualities which make them members. The latter type of social
structure more closely approximates the Platonic ideal of proper
ordering according to function and ability. Those who are best
able to fulfill certain tasks are slotted to those tasks, and they are
not asked to do those things for which they are not suited.
Because some roles are more important than others, they
deserve greater compensation and status according to the extent
that the role expectations are fulfilled by those who occupy
them. This is a comparative concept of justice, since one’s
abilities, place, and dues are only able to be evaluated by a
comparison of one’s self to others in the group. In the one
perspective, the source of the moral criteria inheres in the
R. HARRÉ, Personal Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp.
229-230.
42
V. L. HAMILTON and J. SANDERS, Everyday Justice: Responsibility and the
Individual in Japan and the United States (New Haven, Yale University Press,
1992), pp. 8-12.

248 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
quality of the individual, whereas in the other, in the acts he/she
performs.
We should not miss the importance here of the impact that
social mechanisms have upon considerations of group
membership. Membership criteria specify the conditions of
entitlement to equal or equitable treatment. They often also
justify excluding those who are not members of the social group
from the same equal treatment. Social membership often leads
to the assimilation of social stereotypes and culturally
embedded myths which define the criteria for membership in
the reduced social group. As Tajfel observes:
Once this has occurred, an individual has no need to
construct his own justifications of inequity or injustice, so long
as acts which are oppressive, exploiting, cruel, unjust or
generally ‘inhuman’ are committed against certain groups whose
members are socially or culturally characterized as being
beyond the range within which apply certain principles
(whatever they may be), of interpersonal conduct. 43
Social reality is further complicated by the fact that people
belong to more than one group at a time. Even within the
domain of an egalitarian membership structure, the very nature
of social life requires that each member adopt different roles at
different times, the roles themselves being organized
hierarchically within the broader social organization. A normal
individual must develop the ability to move freely between the
two types of justice orientation and learn the rules of how and
when to apply these appropriately. 44 Moral confusion can easily
43
H. TAJFEL, “Intergroup Relations, Social Myths and Social Justice,” in
H. TAJFEL, ed., The Social Dimension, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), p. 698.
44
For an enlightening presentation of the influence of this social reality
upon the nature of morality, the processes of moral judgment, and moral
development of the ability to manage justice concepts, see W. KURTINES,
“Moral Behavior as Rule-Governed Behavior: A Psychosocial Role-
Theoretical Approach to Moral Behavior and Development,” in W. KURTINES
and J. GEWIRTZ, eds., Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), pp. 303-324.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 249
occur when the boundary lines governing the two types of
comparative and noncomparative injustice, of what constitutes
inequity and inequality cross. Often the demands of both
comparative and noncomparative, equity and equality are easily
harmonized. Sometimes this is not so easily accomplished. 45
This reality is clearly reflected in the Pauline corpus of
scripture. Prescinding from the scholarly question regarding
which parts of the corpus were actually written by Paul, it is
obvious that the early Christian communities had to face the
concrete results of this tension and we find in these writings an
attempt to formulate moral principles which would enable them
to harmoniously balance the demands of both. To the
Corinthians and Ephesians Paul preached a respect for the
proper order necessary for the harmony of the community which
closely approximated the Socratic ideal of justice, a comparative
equality and a noncomparative equity. All are members of the
same body, but within the body all have specific roles. Justice
consists in respect for these roles, ordered according to the
demands of the love which unifies them all. Not all are called to
be apostles, or teachers, or prophets, but those who are should
exercise their function well and freely. 46 But to the Romans he
preached the primacy of the principle of equity, and to the
Galatians the principle of noncomparative equality. 47 God judges
each one impartially according to his or her deeds; but at the
same time, there is no difference between Jew or Greek, slave or
free, male or female. The reality of social organization grounded
in culturally defined definitions of role and status are recognized
and respected, but the differences resulting from the nature of
the social grouping are relativized and minimized by the oneness
of all flowing out of the power of baptism.
45
As Feinberg points out: “Since both noncomparative and comparative
justice make valid claims on us, and since it is in principle possible for both
to be satisfied, we must conclude that in so far as a given act or arrangement
fails to satisfy one or the other of the two kinds of principles, it is not as just as
it could be.” J. FEINBERG, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, p. 284.
46
1 Corinthians 12; Ephesians 4
47
Romans 2:5-11; Galatians 3:26-28

250 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
Gender Differences in the Definition of Justice and Injustice
The difficulties that Paul faced in the early Christian
community with respect to the proper relationship between and
equal and unequal treatment of men and women is particularly
interesting in light of the wealth of current psychological
research highlighting gender differences in the use of these
concepts of equality, equity, and human social membership.
Unless one has been asleep or locked in an ivory tower during
the past 30 years, we can presume a familiarity with the debate
raging in cognitive moral psychology between two differing
theories of moral development which has come to be known as
the debate between an ethic of justice as opposed to an ethic of
care. 48 In itself this characterization is a misrepresentation of the
real issues involved, falsely implying that either one or both of
the main positions is advancing the suggestion that care and
justice could be two diametrically opposed concepts. While the
works of Gilligan and Kohlberg are the best known illustrations
of gender differences, they are not the only ones to discover
gender differences in the way human beings formulate their
judgments concerning what constitutes a just or an unjust
action. 49 Though the discussion often revolves primarily around
48
For a comprehensive treatment of the major issues involved in this
debate, see M. J. LARRABEE, ed., An Ethic of Care: Feminist and
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1993). The primary
work of Carol Gilligan which began the debate is well worth consulting, not
only to understand the nature of the controversy, but also for the
information provided and the importance of the issues raised. See C.
GILLIGAN, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
49
Hoffman, for example, found that females of all ages score higher
than males on tests of empathic ability. See M. HOFFMAN, “Sex differences in
Moral Internalization and Values,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 32 (1975), pp. 720-729; M. HOFFMAN, “Sex Differences in Empathy
and Related Behaviors,” Psychological Bulletin 84 (1977), pp. 712-722. For a
more comprehensive survey of the research supporting the existence of
gender differences, see A. KAHN and W. GAEDDERT, “From Theories of Equity
to Theories of Justice: The Liberating Consequences of Studying Women,” in
V. O’LEARY, R. UNGER, and B. WALLSTON, eds., Women, Gender and Social
Psychology (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1985), pp. 129-148; and B. MAJOR

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 251
whether one of the two ways of reasoning about justice,
according to universal principles or according to an attention in
care for the effects of one’s actions on others, is superior (more
mature?), 50 and in spite of the ambiguity of the data concerning
these differences, 51 the fact of a gender difference and a
preference in women for one justice perspective and in men for
another remains a significant reality that needs to be
recognized. It is a fact that adult men tend more toward a use of
the equity principle and adult women tend more to use the
principle of equality in making determinations of what
constitutes justice and injustice.
A fair treatment of these distinctions requires the avoidance
and K. DEAUX, “Individual Differences in Justice Behavior,” in J. GREENBERG
and R. COHEN, eds., Equity and Justice in Social Behavior (New York:
Academic Press, 1982), pp. 43-76.
50
Lita Furby rightly points out that: “… it is instructive that no one
minimized the gender differences as long as the differences seemed to
suggest that women’s moral development was ‘arrested’ relative to men’s. It
was only when Gilligan suggested a reason for the gender differences that
implied (in at least some people’s minds) that women might be superior to
men that the validity and significance of gender differences in justice
reasoning was seriously questioned.” L. FURBY, “Psychology and Justice,” pp.
176-177.
51
It is important that we not exaggerate the differences discovered.
Milgram’s experiment already referred to earlier in this article found no
significant gender differences in actual harming behavior. There are also
other methodological issues which call into question whether or not the
gender differences are truly significant. Kohlberg structured his studies
around hypothetical situations which most people would be unlikely to face
in their ordinary lives, whereas Gilligan studied situations which her women
subjects were not only likely to face, but in fact had probably faced or were
facing at the time of participation in the studies. Norma Haan has
demonstrated that in real life action situations there is little or no difference
between men’s and women’s moral reasoning. See N. HAAN, Hypothetical and
Actual Moral Reasoning in a Situation of Civil Disobedience,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975), pp. 255-70; N. HAAN, “Two
Moralities in Action Contexts,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
36 (1978), pp. 286-305. Mary Jeanne Larrabee has also compiled articles by
several authors which provide a broader perspective with respect to the many
questions concerning the validity of the data regarding differences in gender
in moral reasoning. See M. J. LARRABEE, ed., An Ethic of Care, pp. 143-206.

252 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
of two possible traps: the tendency to mentally divide the world
into two competing groups who speak different moral
languages, and trying to decide which of the two is superior; 52
and the tendency to discount the data by classifying those who
present it as ideological feminists or representatives of a macho
culture, 53 thereby psychologically and emotionally negating the
validity or the relevance of the empirical facts that their research
reveals. Avoidance of the first responds to the demands of
equality, avoiding the second responds to the demands of equity.
By way of this mutual respect for the two perspectives, we are
able to see how the distinctions between comparative or
noncomparative justice in terms of equity and equality can mix
in such a way that justice and injustice easily become confused.
Care is humanitarian, and it is particular. It is relational and
person-oriented. It is noncomparative. The just thing to do is to
meet the needs of this person here and now without comparing
his needs to others, or taking into account whether he/she is
deserving of or has earned the right to this care. But care can
also exercise itself in comparative justice. Sometimes the caring
thing to do can only be determined by comparing the needs of
this person with those of others who also need to be cared for.
Universal equity claims to be noncomparative as well. All are to
be treated equally and impartially on the basis of their
individual acts, and this precludes judging on the basis of
comparison. I should receive what I deserve regardless of
whether others around me are receiving what they deserve. On
52
Before we can begin to make any such type of inference, “We need to
know more about many things, including the precise nature and extent of
the gender differences, the social causes of these differences, content effects,
the fine-grained features of the ethic of care, the role of the competency it
makes use of in justice reasoning, and the plausibility of carving morality
into only two voices.” O. FLANAGAN and K. JACKSON, “Justice, Care, and
Gender,” in M. J. LARRABEE, An Ethic of Care, pp. 83-84.
53
While not wishing to exaggerate this tendency, it has been my
experience that books dealing with gender difference studies in psychology
are difficult to find in Roman theological libraries, and even in those
libraries which have them, they are often catalogued under the heading of
“feminist literature” rather than being afforded the status of moral
psychology.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 253
the other hand, universal justice must often be comparative,
because rights and claims of justice inhere in individuals, and
each individual is different from every other, exists in a nexus of
interpersonal relationships, and in this real situation certain
rights of specific people do take precedence over others. The
distinction between the two perspectives really lies within the
domain of moral application, and the domain of moral
application is specified by both broader humanitarian concerns
and the demands of the particular moment in which the
application must be made. The moral domain must be
coordinated to the requirements of the other domains operative
in the specific social-moral situation. 54
Gender differences in the use of comparative and
noncomparative justice, of equity and equality concepts, relate
the question of injustice to the broader social domains in which
actions are assessed by way of humanitarian definitions. The
two types of justice are tied to the way in which an individual
constructs his or her self-concept, relative to others inside and
outside of one’s group. Dianne Margolis distinguishes two types
of self-construct which correspond typically to differing social
groups structured in two distinct ways. The obligated self, typical
of an individual socialized within a more traditional
hierarchically role-stratified social structure, operates more
within the domain of the relational moral perspective. The
exchanger self, typical of the contemporary market based and
more loosely organized egalitarian social structure prevalent in
the economically developed world, operates more within the
realm of the individual and act centered perspective. In the
former, one defines one’s identity and worth as a person in terms
of having fulfilled one’s role obligations and in terms of the
relationships one has with respect to other people in the social
54
As Turiel and Smetana argue, “The variance in the application of
moral concepts suggests that social situations can be multidimensional,
requiring the individual to coordinate (perhaps with varying degrees of
success), different social components and goals … Morality is only one
component, however, in situations that include more than one goal. In
weighing moral and organizational goals, individuals will sometimes
subordinate one to the other.” E. Turiel and J. Smetana, “Social Knowledge
and Action: The Coordination of Domains,” p. 272.

254 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
order. Justice consists in being who you are, doing what is
expected of you, and knowing and remaining in your proper
place in the social group. In the latter, one’s identity is the result
of a process of making one’s self into a marketable product. Selfworth
is based on one’s having been able to develop one’s own
personal abilities, and on the basis of whether one has received
compensation appropriate to one’s contributions. One’s place in
the social world depends upon what one’s abilities are, what one
does, and how hard one tries. 55 Justice consists in getting what
you deserve, and what you deserve is calculated rationally on the
basis of what you have earned. 56
Women in the Western world, where most of the
psychological studies have been carried out, typically have been
assigned the role of caretakers in society. As such they are
socialized into and develop self-constructs more in keeping with
the obligated self. Men, on the other hand, because of the way in
which the social structure of Western society has historically
developed, typically participate more fully and directly in the
world of the marketplace and are socialized into and develop
self-constructs bounded by the domain of the exchanger self.
Since this is the case, we might expect that women would tend
to make use more of a justice framework constructed around the
concepts of care–helping others, treating people equally, the
55
D. MARGOLIS, The Fabric of Self, pp. 74-76.
56
Rom Harré points to a similar distinction between societies whose
morality is organized around the central concepts of honor and deliberation.
Honor based moralities are grounded in the demands of obedience to role
specified tasks, and give rise to moral thinking which is more narrative and
character oriented in nature, whereas deliberation systems of morality focus
primarily upon the concrete individual acts of agents with particular interest
in the reasons why they choose to act as they do. The first presupposes that
the moral task is given by the dictates of one’s place in society and justice
consists in fulfilling one’s obligations in obedience. Thus injustice would
result from a lack of will-power, being fundamentally a sin of akrasia. The
second perspective allows that individual’s have a choice between alternative
courses of behavior and make use of their intellectual capacity to discern
through processes of deliberation which of the two or more courses of action
are more morally appropriate. In this type of moral world, injustice is the
result of bad judgment or insufficient deliberation. It is a sin of wrong
choice. See R. HARRÉ, Personal Being, pp. 219-255.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 255
fulfillment of responsibilities; whereas men would be more
inclined to measure justice in terms of equity—of giving people
what they have earned and what they deserve. It is not so much
that men and women have different ways of conceiving of
morality or justice, but rather that the domains of life in which
they experience and live both morality and justice are different. 57
Margolis’ analysis of these two types of self-construct
enables us to see something else which often remains hidden.
The very emphasis upon equality which becomes a concern in
the justice categories of women is itself a response to the
injustices they regularly experience in trying to live the obligated
self in social worlds structured according to the principles of
equity and exchange. They see injustice as inequality and lack of
caring because that is the injustice that they regularly
experience. They are not afforded equal access to the same
opportunities to construct their self-images according to their
accomplishments or to receive equal social recognition on the
basis of their personal achievements. Most of them never have
access to the exchanger’s playing field, and even those few who
do make it onto the field often do not receive an equitable
treatment. Rather than being allowed to play, they are more
often relegated to the tasks of watering the field and cutting the
grass. By the same token, we might see in men’s strong emphasis
upon reasoning according to universal principles, not a thinly
disguised attempt to justify the injustices which result from the
exclusion of women, but rather the recognition of the reality of
57
Margolis points out that this perspective takes us beyond the
incomplete description provided by role theories: “But roles are different
from selves. Role theory imagines one self playing a variety of roles, some of
which have greater importance to the person. It does not recognize that the
same role, for instance, a member of a Town Committee, can demand a
variety of behaviors, emotional displays, and feelings, depending on the
image that participants have of the self that has entered the role. Women and
men enacted the role of Town Committee Member differently because
different moral orientations were expected of women and men.” D.
MARGOLIS, The Fabric of Self, p. 154. This notion of morality as revelatory of
people’s expectations is extremely important in much of the current
psychological literature, and will be dealt with in greater depth in the second
part of this series.

256 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
inequity in their daily lives and the consequent attempt to level
the playing field. For them, injustice is inequity because that is
the injustice they experience when in spite of their
accomplishments, their abilities, their talents, and their effort,
they do not receive the compensation or the recognition that
they believe they justly deserve. 58 The world of the marketplace
cannot offer them the fulfillment of self which only extended
relationality can provide to a human person. 59 In a world
without pre-assigned roles which define who one is, and which
prescribe patterned and stable ways of relating to others,
everything depends upon what one does, and how hard one
tries. This type of world is filled with people who are born with
an edge over others, with people who cheat, and with people
who in spite of how hard and how much they work, will never
receive what they truly deserve. It carries with it the heavy price
of losing contact with many of the more human elements of
moral experience.
Grist for the Mill of Moral Theological Reflection
In this first part of the series I have surveyed three major
issues revealed by psychological inquiry into the nature of
justice and injustice concepts. By way of conclusion to part one
I would like to point to a few possible areas where our moral
theological tradition may have something to both bring to the
table and take from the table of dialogue with the empirical
sciences. I will address them in inverse order, beginning with
gender differences and finishing with the relationship between
thoughts and actions.
Our tradition has struggled with the justice and injustice of
gender differences within the Church and beyond the Church
since apostolic times. In a sense it is comforting to see that the
empirical sciences are finally studying a phenomenon with
which we have been struggling for nearly two millenia. Our
experience in having made both mistakes and progress in this
58
Ibid., p. 82.
59
As Dignitatis Mulieribus 7 reminds us, “To be human means to be
called to interpersonal communion.”

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 257
area might better equip us to offer them some useful advice in
guiding the discussion. The debate raging over whether women
are morally immature in their thinking compared to men brings
to mind the medieval debate among theologians concerning the
ontological inferiority of women and the justifications according
to natural law of excluding them from equal social participation
based upon their categorization as “defective men” or not “fully
rational.” 60 In retrospect, these arguments and discussions
would appear almost comical, were it not for the fact that they
seem to continue to have force in many of the discussions we are
still witnessing today in the secular realm. While we, from a
distance, are able to see that these arguments, while attempting
to respond to real differences and distinctions, were grounded in
and conditioned by a particular historical and social structure,
our empirically scientific counterparts do not seem to have the
luxury of this position of historical distance.
If our own mistakes in this area teach us anything, they
reveal that the primary difficulty is anthropological and rests in
the categories we use to define what it means to be a full human
being. It revolves around the humanitarian concern at work in
moral thinking. In the contemporary world, human
membership is defined in two ways. There are certain qualities
of human membership that we all share equally. At the same
time, human beings are social beings, and sociality requires a
certain structuring and ordering of our shared life-world. People
are often in fact assigned roles and tasks which are not always
freely chosen. When the assignment is grounded in false
categorizations concerning level of membership, or when the
assignment is gratuitous and arbitrary, questions of injustice
should and do arise. Margolis is right in pointing out that there
are in fact certain tasks that need to be done for society to
continue, and that the real ethical question is whether or not it
would be more just to assign these equally to both men and
women, thereby opening up access to other roles in a more
60
For a good example of this type of argument for the natural inferiority
of women, see St. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae I. q. 92, a. 1-2; II-II, q.
149, a. 4; II-II, q. 177, a. 2.

258 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
egalitarian fashion. 61 This matter of injustice goes beyond
gender differences and would extend to any area where the
access to roles and the assignment of roles is neither equitable
nor equal.
Veritatis Splendor 110 reminds us that elaboration of the
anthropological foundations of moral teaching is part of the
vocation of the Catholic Moral Theologian. I believe that the
specific, concrete, Christian anthropological stance explicated in
recent Magisterial teaching, particularly in Dignitatis Mulieribus
6-7, Cristifideles Laici 49-50, and Salvifici Doloris 28, both
recognizes the differences between, and defends the
fundamental equality and interdependence of men and women.
This emphasis upon the anthropological insight of Christian
tradition is not only helpful in bringing these two genderdifferentiated
positions closer together, but also states clearly
the Christian obligation to carry out this task within the context
of mutual help. It is the recognition by Church authority that
these two ways of seeing are complementary. To allow one’s self
to be helped requires a recognition of one’s need for the help
another has to offer. By listening to the “other moral voice” of
women, men can learn something about the nature of injustice
that their own perspective blinds them to, and in listening to the
perspective of men, women can also learn something about
injustice to which their perspective blinds them. The two voices
61
Injustice as improper distribution of assignment in this area can have
long-term and powerful effects not only upon the quality of life, but on the
survival of a social group itself. As Margolis observes, “We are not born
equal. We are born with a broad range of strengths and weaknesses in our
physical, mental, and psychological makeup–and we are born dependent.
Without an ethic of protection and care, market-dominated societies would
be depopulated in a lifetime for there would be no social basis, neither motor
nor motive to bring new generations to life and adulthood … no society, not
even one dominated by market exchange, can get on without a system of
obligation that assigns caregiving responsibility.” D. MARGOLIS, The Fabric of
Self, p. 83. We might do well to read this statement in the context of the
“culture of death” concept comprising the central argument of Evangelium
Vitae. Perhaps the unjust distribution in the assignment of these essential
care giving responsibilities is one of the principal causal factors in the
prevalence and power of this “culture of death” today in the developed
world.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 259
can complement each other if they are able to speak as equals
and in mutual respect. Justice is often blind. If blind, it needs to
rely on hearing. If it is also deaf to the voice of half the people in
the world, the face of justice is distorted into “the madness a
dying soul,” and justice becomes “no respecter of persons.” The
voice of the ethic of care of women may remove the blindfold
from men’s eyes, just as the voice of the ethic of justice may
remove the blindfold from women’s. True equity requires caring
and conformity, true equality requires principled reflection and
rational deliberation. It has taken us a while to realize this, but
it is the justice that Jesus both taught and practiced.
Beyond gender differences, the psychological data also
reveals a fundamental difference in the way people understand
and use justice concepts depending upon the type of social
situations in which decisions are made and actions carried out.
In the course of a week, most people will find themselves
making moral decisions within and across many different moral
domains. 62 These moral situations are in part outlined or
delineated by two factors, the nature of the objective
relationship that the actor has with others in the action
opportunity (the parameters of which are offered by the moral
domain), and the inner reasoning processes at work in the actor
which relates his knowledge of the relevant principles and rules
to their applicability in the concrete action situation. This twofold
division roughly corresponds to the classical distinction
between objective and subjective morality, between the concerns
of phronesis and deontology. What unifies these two activities or
directions are principles of morality. As Agnes Heller reminds
us, there are in fact distinguishable social and moral clusters in
which justice concepts may mean different things, and make
different demands upon people. There are also transclusteral
aspects of justice which help the individual to integrate and
make sense of all of the others. Separating these, and properly
ordering them is part of the work of individual conscience in its
relationship to legitimate authority. 63
62
A. MACINTYRE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp. 1-2.
63
A. HELLER, General Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 39-44; 106-
113.

260 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
Social reality is pliable. What holds its fibers together are
concepts of justice. Justice and injustice however, are also
flexible concepts. They are conceived of in terms of comparative
equity, noncomparative equity, comparative equality and
noncomparative equality. Often the demands of two or more of
these conceptions are in harmony in what they require, but
there are times and situations where the demands of one type of
justice concept are at odds with the demands of another. It is
often difficult for conscience to keep them clear. The lines
between them are fuzzy enough in many peoples minds to begin
with. When they become further blurred, the result is injustice,
often carried out in the defense of justice.
The data concerning the effects of the understanding of
justice upon actual justice and injustice related behavior is
extremely important for us as moral theologians. From the
perspective of our tradition it can both remind us to look
seriously at, and also scientifically validate the accuracy of one
very important insight of our Catholic moral tradition. Sin and
virtue are in the will informed by the reason. 64 On the one hand,
the data certainly indicates that the way people reason about
justice has a consequent effect in their helping behavior. On the
other hand, there is sufficient data to indicate that the effect
reasoning has differs depending upon the nature of the task at
hand, the situation, and the particular goal in the mind of the
individual. All of these findings lend force to much of our
classical descriptions of how human moral action unfolds, and
reinforces the traditional wisdom that it is not enough to
educate the minds of our people, it is also essential to strengthen
and form their wills, and to be vigilant over the structure of the
societies in which their lives unfold. Combined with intellectual
education, there is a need for Christian discipline. Combined
with moral catechesis there is a demand for the formation of
real Christian community. By the same token, the difference in
actual behavior between how people think about injustice and
what they actually do in real-life situations reveals a universal
tendency which crosses the boundaries of both gender and
64
St. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 20.

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 261
concept-definition. The one area in which we do really seem to
be equal is that both men and women alike, both equity and
equality thinkers, both defenders of abstract principle and
caretakers, both comparers and noncomparers, are equally
capable of and seem to have a great facility in participating in
and perpetrating injustices against others.
When it comes to justice and injustice, people are in fact
moral relativists in much of their daily living. The empirical
research can help us to understand why this is so. This in itself
says nothing about what or how people should be. The Christian
tradition and perspective is clear and consistent in its
recognition of moral relativism as a manifestation of the effects
of original sin still at work among us. 65 But it is not enough just
to say that people shouldn’t be moral relativists. It is important
to help free them from the forces which lead to the exercise of
moral relativity, moving them beyond these into a more just way
of living justice. The information provided by the social and
empirical sciences is invaluable in this task as well, and I believe
we have as moral theologians the obligation to familiarize
ourselves with it and to reflect upon it theologically without fear
of the challenges it may present to us. A passage through the
psychological literature can make us more cognizant of some of
the pitfalls we ourselves fall into. Justice often becomes
confused with justification, i.e. rationalization. While
philosophically and theologically we might have a specific
definition, it often doesn’t jive practically with the real
understanding and usage of the concept in our people’s daily
lives. The empirical data can provide us with an effective reality
check for our theories.
In the second part of this series, I will examine how the two
other areas studied by moral psychology—the constitutive,
regulative, and procedural rules which people use in order to
make concrete applications of the principles of justice; and
certain cognitive and emotional processes, biases, and
tendencies which lead people regularly to behave unjustly—can
help us to better understand how and why good people in their
65
Veritatis Splendor 112.

262 STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
ordinary daily living are able to commit acts of injustice in the
name of justice.
Via Merulana 31
C.P. 2458
00100 Roma
Italy.
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER, C.SS.R.
—————
Summary / Resumen
Moral theologians and pastoral ministers regularly encounter the
puzzling reality that good people sometimes carry out or participate in
acts of grave injustice. At times they even do so in the name of justice.
This article, the first of a series on the theme, begins an exploration of
the ambiguous nature of questions of justice and injustice. Because
justice issues are often clarified by the experience of injustice, the
author offers a defense for a particular methodological choice in
philosophy, theology and psychology. Recent empirical evidence
relating to the justice-injustice theme is examined, and three major
areas are examined: the effect (or lack thereof) which thinking about
justice has upon subsequent behavior; the different and often
contradictory principles which people use in decisions about justice;
and gender differences as they effect moral development in the
conceptualization and application of the principles of justice. These
data are challenging for both moral theologians and psychologists and
need a theoretical framework if they are to be well integrated. The article
concludes by highlighting possible areas of mutual learning between
theologians and psychologists as they seek to meet the challenge of the
reality of people doing injustice in the name of justice.
Los teólogos de la moral y los ministros de la pastoral encuentran
una realidad enigmática: muchas veces las personas buenas realizan o
participan habitualmente en actos de grave injusticia. A veces lo
justifican en nombre de la justicia. Este artículo, el primero de una
serie sobre el tema, comienza explorando la ambigüedad de las
cuestiones sobre justicia e injusticia. Como los problemas de la justicia
se ponen de relieve frecuentemente por la experiencia de injusticia, el
autor ofrece una defensa para esta opción metodológica particular en

THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE 263
filosofía, teología y psicología. Se analiza la reciente evidencia empírica
concerniente al tema de justicia y injusticia, al igual que las tres áreas
principales: el efecto (o la falta de efecto) que tiene la forma de concebir
la justicia en la conducta subsecuente; los principios diferentes y a
menudo contradictorios que las personas emplean en decisiones sobre
justicia; y las diferencias entre hombre y mujer en cuanto al desarrollo
moral, la conceptualización y la aplicación de los principios de la
justicia. Estos datos desafían a los teólogos de la moral y a los
psicólogos. Para poder integrarlos adecuadamente, se requiere una
armazón teórica. El artículo concluye destacando las posibles áreas de
aprendizaje mutuo entre teólogos y psicólogos, para llevar a cabo la
tarea de ayudar a las personas a no cometer injusticia en nombre de la
justicia.
—————
The author is an invited Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor invitado de la Academia Alfonsiana en
Roma.
—————

265
StMor 38 (2000) 265-278
KARL-WILHELM MERKS
TRADITION UND MORALISCHE WAHRHEIT
Eine Antwort an Brian V. Johnstone 1
Die Frage der Tradition, darin stimme ich mit Brian
Johnstone (B.J.) überein, ist ein bedeutendes Thema der
gegenwärtigen Moraldebatte.
Einerseits wird mit der Frage nach der Tradition ein reelles
Problem zur Sprache gebracht. Es zeigt sich, daß der
weitgehende Abschied von Tradition (und damit verbunden von
Sitte, Konvention und Autorität) als Nährgrund und Einbettung
von Moral (und Recht) Lücken hinterlassen hat, die nicht so
leicht durch andere “Träger” gefüllt werden können, und es
bisher auch nicht wurden.
Anderseits zeitigt die Rückbesinnung auf Tradition
merkwürdige, ja sehr bedenkliche Blüten. Unter Berufung auf
die eigene kulturelle, ethnische, religiöse Tradition werden
wirklich oder vermeintlich traditionelle Normen und Werte zur
Ausgestaltung der eigenen Gesellschaftsordnung wie im Umgang
mit andern Gesellschaften, Staaten und Kulturen
propagiert. Mit ihnen will man sich - durch Rückbesinnung auf
die eigene Geschichte - gegen “Normen- und Werteschwund” in
der modernen Gesellschaft oder auch gegen fremde, verfremdende
Einflüsse zur Wehr setzen und der Moral (der “wahren”
Moral) zu erneutem Ansehen verhelfen.
Die Berufung auf Tradition kennt also verschiedene
Stoßrichtungen, die sicher auch unterschiedlich moralisch zu
beurteilen sind: Da ist einmal eine allgemeine Kritik an moder-
1
Brian V. Johnstone, Can Tradition Be a Source of Moral Truth? A Reply
to Karl-Wilhelm Merks, StMor 37 (1999), 431-451 (im weiteren Text zitiert
als: J.). Der Artikel bezieht sich auf: Karl-Wilhelm Merks, “De sirenenzang
van de tradities: Pleidooi voor een universele ethiek, Bijdragen 58 (1997),
122-143 (im weiteren Text zitiert als: M.).

266 KARL-WILHELM MERKS
ner Rationalität, Pluralisierung und Individualisierung, die sich
zum Teil verbindet mit der Abwehr “kolonialistischer” kultureller
Überfremdung. Aber auch das Streben nach nationaler Einheit,
die Verteidigung überkommener Sozialstrukturen, doktrinelle,
ideologische Stabilisierung, Ausgrenzung des Fremden
usw. nähren sich aus dem Rückgriff auf Tradition und
Traditionen.
Alles zusammengenommen zeigt sich, daß diese
Entwicklung und die in ihr zum Ausdruck gebrachte moralische
Sorge keineswegs so unschuldig sind, wie man auf den ersten
Blick meinen könnte.
Zwar soll damit eine neue inhaltliche Besinnung auf
gemeinsame Werte und Normen ermöglicht und Gemeinschaftsbildung
erneuert werden. Aber gleichzeitig werden Gemeinschaften
auch gegeneinander ausgespielt und zerstört, Koalitionen
geschlossen, Polarisierungen hervorgerufen, kollektive Ziele
auch Andersdenkenden auferlegt, Individuen unterdrückt und
in ihrer Würde mißachtet. Dies alles darf und muß für
Moraltheologen und für jeden moralisch empfindsamen Menschen
Anlaß sein, über die wirkliche Bedeutung von Tradition
nachzudenken.
Hierbei steht nicht zur Diskussion, daß menschliche
Existenz ohne Tradition undenkbar ist. Das gilt für die
Gesellschaft wie für jedes Individuum: “Tradition” ist die
spezifisch menschliche Lebensweise schlechthin. Auch dies ist
selbstverständlich und darf, ebenso wie die bedenklichen Seiten,
nicht in seiner moralischen Bedeutsamkeit unterschätzt werden.
In meinem Artikel habe ich an diesem Aspekt meines Erachtens
keinen Zweifel gelassen. Er bildet den selbstverständlichen
Hintergrund meiner Ausführungen. Die folgenden
Bemerkungen wollen jedoch nochmals meine Ansicht
unterstreichen, daß gerade eine kritische Sicht und in diesem
Sinne die Relativierung von Tradition der beste Beitrag sind zu
ihrer Verteidigung.
Traditionen haben nur Zukunft, wenn sie die
verteidigungswürdigen Aspekte des modernen Denkens
integrieren können. Hierzu gehören meines Erachtens in
allererster Linie, wie ich dargelegt habe (M. 137f.), die Achtung
vor der Würde der menschlichen Person sowie ein von daher
sich begründendes Ethik-Verständnis, in dem die menschliche

TRADITION UND MORALISCHE WAHRHEIT 267
Person mit ihrer Freiheit und Verantwortung zentral steht. 2 Die
kritische Haltung gegenüber einem allzu selbstverständlichen
Gebrauch des Traditionsarguments sowie gegenüber dem vorbehaltlosen
Vertrauen auf Tradition hängen hiermit aufs engste
zusammen.
B.J. unternimmt demgegenüber den Versuch, in einer
traditionsfreundlicheren Interpretation aufzuweisen, daß
Tradition Quelle (source) und Kriterium (criterion) für
moralische Wahrheit (moral truth) sein kann. Nun will ich dem
nicht in jeder Hinsicht widersprechen.
In gewisser Weise fühle ich mich selbst mit meiner These
durch das Plädoyer von B.J. unterstützt. Doch geht B.J.
anderseits von einem bestimmten Punkt an zu vertrauensvoll
mit der moralischen Selbstverständlichkeit von Traditionen um.
Daher fühle ich mich genötigt, auf die Sache nochmals
einzugehen.
Die meines Erachtens zentrale Frage lautet: Was lehren uns
die verschiedenen Aspekte des Traditionsphänomens für die
Beziehung zwischen Tradition und moralischer Wahrheit? Wie
verhalten sich die Diskrepanz zwischen Moral und Tradition
einerseits, wie ihre gegenseitige Abhängigkeit anderseits,
zueinander? Begründet Tradition Moral wirklich? Und wenn ja,
in welchem Sinne dann?
Notwendige Unterscheidungen
Ein erster Punkt ist die präzise Unterscheidung zwischen
Tradition als “Vehikel” von Moral und als Katalysator
moralischer Entwicklung, und Tradition als Argument für die
Richtigkeit einer moralischen Position. Ich denke, hier muß jede
Zweideutigkeit vermieden werden.
2
Vgl. jetzt ausführlich zu den verschiedenen Aspekten dieses Ethikmodells:
Karl-Wilhelm Merks, Gott und die Moral. Theologische Ethik heute,
Münster (LIT) 1998.

268 KARL-WILHELM MERKS
Geltung - faktisch und normativ
Ohne Tradition gibt es keine Moral. In einem soziologischen
Sinne ist Tradition daher Grundlage (Nährboden) jeglicher
Moral überhaupt sowie der “Grund” ihrer Geltung. Geltung
freilich nur im Sinne von “faktisch in Geltung sein”. Hingegen ist
Tradition nicht Grund im normativen Sinne von “zu Recht in
Geltung sein”.
Diese normative Gültigkeit ergibt sich nicht aus dem Faktum
“Tradition”, sondern nur aus der Richtigkeit des durch das
Faktum “Tradition” Tradierten. Dieser Unterschied bleibt nach
meinem Empfinden im Beitrag von B.J. unterbelichtet, während
er den Kernpunkt meiner Überlegungen betrifft. Wahrscheinlich
hängt dies damit zusammen, daß B.J. dem tatsächlichen Prozeß
moralischer Bildung und den anthropologischen, sozialen und
kulturellen Bedingungen dieses Prozesses seine
Aufmerksamkeit schenkt. Auch die - ja doch gerade aus
Gültigkeitsfragen jeweils vorgenommenen - Korrekturen am
geltenden Ethos innerhalb einer Tradition selbst werden
wiederum in ihrem Prozeßcharakter analysiert und nicht nach
dem Grund ihres Wahrheitsanspruches befragt. Dadurch
entsteht das bedauerliche Bild eines Gegensatzes dort, wo er
nicht besteht. B.J. gibt eigentlich eine Antwort auf eine Frage,
die ich nicht gestellt habe. Das Problem dagegen, das ich zur
Sprache bringe, kann so keine Antwort finden. Dies ist umso
merkwürdiger, als ich mich in einigen zentralen Punkten meiner
Argumentation sehr wohl verstanden und durch B.J. selbst
unterstützt fühle. Dies betrifft sowohl mein Traditionskonzept
allgemein (J. 431f.), wie die Anerkennung der von mir notierten
langlebigen Fehlentwicklungen auch in kirchlichen Traditionen
(Beispiel: Ketzerverbrennung), wie auch die damit verbundene
unvermeidbare Kritik an bestimmten Aspekten des römisch-katholischen
Traditionsmodells (J. 447f.). Schließlich ist das Traditionsmodell,
das B.J. vorstellt, alles andere als kritikloser
Traditionalismus; vielmehr gehören Kritik und Korrekturoffenheit
nach seiner Auffassung zur Tradition selbst hinzu.

TRADITION UND MORALISCHE WAHRHEIT 269
Quelle und Kriterium
Hierzu will ich zunächst anmerken, daß nicht bestimmte
Fehlentwicklungen in einer Tradition das eigentliche Argument
meiner Traditionskritik sind. Sie sind vielmehr der Anlaß zu
einer grundsätzlicheren Überlegung: Traditionen geben
faktische Entwicklungen von Wertebewußtsein wieder. Ob diese
Entwicklungen aber moralisch legitim sind, hängt nicht von
dieser Faktizität ab, es ist keine Frage der Tatsächlichkeit, sondern
eine Frage nach der Richtigkeit. Diese Frage aber wird
nicht beantwortet durch ein “Es ist unsere Tradition (also ist es
richtig)”. Die moralisch negativen Aspekte von Traditionen
machen diese Frage der Logik lediglich sichtbar. Es ist eben stets
wieder nötig, daß Korrekturen die - keineswegs aus sich selbst
heraus zuverlässigen - Traditionen durchbrechen.
Nun kann man zwar B.J. zustimmen, daß solche
Bewegungen der Selbstkorrektur sich immer schon innerhalb
von Traditionen selbst abspielen, da ja überhaupt nichts Menschliches
außerhalb von Tradition geschieht. Hierbei denkt B.J. sich
diesen Prozeß der Selbstkorrektur als permanenten “Test”, ob
Überzeugungen und Praktiken mit den konstitutiven Gütern
dieser Tradition (J. 434f.) übereinstimmen. Für die katholische
Tradition wäre dieser Gültigkeitstest in der Stimmigkeit mit
dem authentischen Zeugnis der ursprünglichen Zeugen
(Apostel) zu finden (wobei es freilich häufig langer Zeit bedarf -
vgl. Ketzerverbrennung - bis diese Stimmigkeit erreicht wird).
Selbst wenn man in solcher Selbstkorrektur keinen Zufall
sehen will - und das tue ich nicht, da ich in der Tat glaube, daß
Ketzerverbrennung nicht zum Evangelium paßt -, wird durch
eine solch lange Dauer die moralische Geduld und das
Vertrauen zur Tradition, in der immerhin Religion, Tradition
und Autorität auf enge Weise und konstitutiv miteinander
verknüpft sind (J. 436), doch arg auf die Probe gestellt.
Dieses Problem wird nicht dadurch entschärft, daß es auf
der möglichen Verfälschung eines guten Traditionsbegriffes
(“tradition of identity”: siehe hierzu weiter unten) beruht. Vielmehr
wirft das die Frage auf, ob und wie denn überhaupt eine
solche enge Beziehung zwischen Religion, Tradition und
Autorität für die Moral einen argumentativen Mehrwert
bedeuten kann. Meines Wissens waren es immerhin die besten

270 KARL-WILHELM MERKS
katholischen Traditionen (!), die die eigene Rolle der Vernunft
(in ihrer Aktivität als - persönliches - Gewissen), auch gegenüber
der Trias von tradition-authority-religion verteidigten. 3
Natürlich kann Moral sich nicht ohne das intime
Kennenlernen konkreter Moralgestalten entwickeln (J. 437ff.).
Und auf solche Weise ist Tradition damit in der Tat “source of
moral truth”: das moralisch Richtige quillt immer wieder aus
Tradition(en) hervor, selbst die moderne Subjektivität wäre, wie
zurecht angemerkt wird (J. 450), nicht ohne die abendländische
Tradition denkbar.
Aber dadurch wird die Tradition nicht zum Kriterium für
ihre eigene Richtigkeit. Eine Rechtsvermutung für die Tradition
läßt sich höchstens in pragmatischer Annäherung verstehen: in
Traditionen werden die Selbsterfahrungen und die
Selbstkorrektur von Menschen durch die Generationen hindurch
zusammengebracht. Dies verschafft Tradition eine
gewisse Plausibilität, ja selbst Kompetenz. Hier kann man
verweisen auf das Diktum des Thomas von Aquin bezüglich der
normativen Bedeutung der consuetudo. Man kann ihr
Normkraft unterstellen, “inquantum scilicet per exteriores actus
multiplicatos interior voluntatis motus et rationis conceptus
efficacissime declaratur; cum enim aliquid multoties fit videtur
ex deliberato rationis iudicio provenire” (STh I-II 97, 3c.). Der
eigentliche Grund für die Normativität der consuetudo ist damit
also das deliberatum rationis iudicium. Genau dies ist auch für
die Tradition der Fall. 4
Ebenso wie der Einzelne können sich auch die Menge, ja
auch eine Reihe von Generationen irren, fehlgehen, ein falsches
Bewußtsein haben. Traditionen können im Dienst der
Mächtigen, im Interesse der eigenen Gruppe, zum Erhalt des
Status quo mißbraucht werden, dann sind sie nicht mehr Quelle
3
Vgl. auch B.J. selbst (445f.) mit seinen Überlegungen zur authority.
4
In diesem Sinne würde ich auch B.J.’s Berufung auf A. MacIntyre (433)
stark relativieren: “a living tradition ... is an historically extended, socially
embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods
which constitute that tradition”; sie ist eben nicht mehr als ein Argument.
Und sicher, wo sie als Autorität (von Menschen!) verstanden wird, trifft auch
für sie Thomas’ Urteil zu: “locus ab auctoritate...infirmissimus”(STh I, 8, 2
ad 2).

TRADITION UND MORALISCHE WAHRHEIT 271
des moralisch Guten, sondern Quelle von Egoismus,
Ungerechtigkeit, Ausschliessung und Repression.
Meine Konklusion daher: source of moral truth: ja;
criterion: nein. Damit ist gemeint: die Berufung auf (eine)
Tradition hat als solche keine legitimierende Kraft (auch wenn
moralische Legitimation selbst nicht ohne Einbettung wiederum
in Tradition verstanden werden kann)!
Tradition of truth - tradition of identity
Eine ähnliche Einsicht scheint B.J. mit der Unterscheidung
zwischen einer “tradition of truth” und einer “tradition of
identity” (J. 437; 447f.) ausdrücken zu wollen. Man kann daraus
folgern: Wo Tradition sich als Interesse an (abgrenzender) Identität
formuliert, ist die Gefahr groß, daß sie nicht primär auf die
Wahrheit hin orientiert ist, sondern auf sich selbst fixiert bleibt,
und daher die Wahrheitsfrage allzuleicht durch das Selbsterhaltungsbedürfnis
beeinflußt wird. Beispiele hierfür sind überall zu
finden: das “amerikanische” Familienideal, die “preußischen”
Staatstugenden, die “reine katholische” Lehre, das
“afrikanische” Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein, die “islamische” Identität
- neben ihrem positiven Kern können sie zugleich höchst
zweifelhafte Nebenwirkungen zeitigen.
Identitäts-Interesse gefährdet die Wahrheitskompetenz
einer Tradition. Identitätsclaims begründen jedenfalls nie
moralische Wahrheit, sondern sind an ihr zu messen. Im
übrigen würde ich gerne wissen, wie man denn anders beide
Formen von Tradition (tradition of truth -tradition of identity)
unterscheiden will. Offensichtlich ist dies ja nicht aus der
Tatsache des Tradition-Seins allein möglich. Also sind wir doch
wieder auf andere Kriterien angewiesen.
Aus diesem Grunde habe ich postuliert (M. 138), daß
Tradition an der Ethik gemessen werden muß und nicht Ethik
an der Tradition. Wie unterscheiden sich also Formen von
Tradition, die auf die eigene Identität ausgerichtet sind, von der
von B.J. so genannten “tradition of truth”?
Ein zentraler Begriff hierfür ist der des “true good” (J.
437f.): eine “tradition of truth” beweist sich darin, daß sie sich
durch “the true good(s)” konstituiert sieht, das (die) durch ihre

272 KARL-WILHELM MERKS
Mitglieder in Wort und Tat bezeugt wird (werden). Diese
Bezeugung verwirklicht sich als aktives Engagement in Form
auch einer dauernden Vergewisserung und der permanenten
Bereitschaft zu erforderlichen Korrekturen. Insofern bedeutet
Tradition nicht Erstarrung und Kritiklosigkeit, Tradition ist
“reasoned tradition”.
Für B. J. sind Tradition und Traditionen also nicht nur
Kontinuität des Bestehenden, sondern zugleich Diskontinuität,
die Öffnung auf jeweils erforderliche Veränderungen. Wichtig
für dieses Traditionskonzept ist ihm aber ganz offensichtlich der
Gedanke einer Selbstkorrektur (444) im Rahmen eben dieser
Tradition selbst. Hierüber läßt sich, denke ich, wenn man die
Vorstellung nicht zu sehr preßt, reden.
Mehr Schwierigkeiten macht mir ein anderer
Gesichtspunkt: Im Grunde muß, wenn ich es richtig verstehe,
die Bezeugung einer Gemeinschaft, sie habe “the true good(s)”
gefunden, zunächst einmal mit Vertrauen akzeptiert werden (J.
440f.); kritische Prüfung geschieht erst und je schon im Rahmen
dieses Vertrauens.
Ich frage mich aber, wie von daher überhaupt noch ein
Urteil über moralische Standards von Menschen außerhalb
meiner eigenen Traditions-Gemeinschaft möglich und legitim
sein kann.
Natürlich geht es bei meiner These über die kritische
Beziehung zwischen Vernunft und Tradition nicht um eine
abständliche, sozusagen noch inhaltlose kritische Vernunft, wie
B.J. (438) zu suggerieren scheint. Ohne Praxis kann ich den
Wert eines Handelns nicht wirklich erfahren. Doch verstehe ich
Einfühlsamkeit in eine Traditions-Gemeinschaft nicht zunächst
einmal als vertrauensvolle Übergabe, die danach erst eine
eigene kritische Verifikation ermöglichen würde. Ein solches
Denkmodell taugt vielleicht für das (pädagogische) Hineinwachsen
von Kindern in eine moralische Gemeinschaft. Es ist
aber nicht geeignet, den wahren Grund und die Rechtfertigung
eines verantworteten moralischen Engagements zu beschreiben.
Nicht der gläubige Anschluß an das Zeugnis einer
Gemeinschaft sowie ihr Verständnis von “the true good(s)” ist
“principium” von Moral, sondern - wie Thomas von Aquin sehr
gut gesehen hat, ist dieses gelegen in der Eröffnung des mensch-

TRADITION UND MORALISCHE WAHRHEIT 273
lichen Geistes für die Frage von “gut”und “böse” überhaupt. 5
Diese ist Ausgangspunkt und auch der letzte Maßstab für jedes
moralische Zeugnis, von welcher Gemeinschaft auch immer. Die
Basis für Moral ist so die Unterscheidungsfähigkeit von
“gut”und “böse” im Subjekt (!), und nicht irgendwelche “Güter”
und das “Gut” einer Tradition. Güter legitimieren sich von
diesem Kern der Moralität her, nicht aber bestimmt sich “gut”
und “böse” von den Gütern her (wie vor allem der Güterkonflikt
lehrt). Daher muß sich ja auch das Gewissen und die eigene
Einsicht notfalls gegen Traditionen und ihre (behaupteten)
Güter durchsetzen. 6
Nimmt man dies aber ernst, so lautet für mich die logische
Konsequenz: die Legitimität der Tradition und das Vertrauen,
das die Tradition verdient, hängt davon ab, ob sie auf das
tatsächliche “true good” orientiert ist oder nicht. Oder anders
gesagt: allein die moralisch legitimierte Tradition kann Moralität
legitimieren. Maßstab ist also nicht die Tradition, sondern “the
true good”. Genau dies ist meine These!
Wie vergewissern wir uns, wo vergewissern sich Traditionen,
daß sie auf “the true good(s)” hin orientiert sind? Die je schon
hierüber bestehenden Vorstellungen und Praktiken als solche
einfachhin genügen ja offensichtlich nicht. Wie setzt also ein aus
moralischen Gründen erforderlicher Wandel ein, z. B. bezüglich
der Abschaffung von Sklaverei, von Frauenunterdrückung, von
Diskriminierung Homosexueller usw. Und worauf gründen die
Möglichkeiten des interkulturellen Dialogs sowie Überlegungen
zu einem universellen (Rahmen-) Ethos für alle Kulturen und
Traditionen?
5
STh I-II 94,2.
6
Dies ist die Gestalt unmittelbar moralischer Transzendenz (das Gute
übersteigt alle “Güter”), die zugleich für Gläubige und Ungläubige gültig und
zugänglich ist. Hier liegt denn auch der Ansatzpunkt für moralische Universalität.
Mit der von B.J. (444) angesprochenen Transzendenz wechseln wir in
ein anderes Register, das die Moralität in meinem Verständnis umfängt, aber
nicht ersetzt. Realistisch können wir nicht annehmen, daß in unserer sublunaren
Welt von hierher überhaupt irgendwelche gemeinsam-menschlichen
Moralauffassungen, die ich noch stets für erstrebenswert halte, ihren Ausgang
nehmen könnten.

274 KARL-WILHELM MERKS
Das Subjekt
Mit diesen Fragen komme ich auf einen zweiten zentralen
Punkt zu sprechen, die Bedeutung des Subjektes für die Moral-
Legitimation. 7
Ich denke, man kann den gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel
des 19./20. Jahrhunderts in den modernen westlichen
Gesellschaften in einem zentralen Punkt charakterisieren als
Wechsel von einer traditions- und gemeinschaftsorientierten zu
einer subjektorientierten Gesellschaftsform.
Dieser Prozeß hat viele Facetten. Er bedeutet Gewinn und
Verlust, die bisweilen beide Hand in Hand gehen. So ist die
Befreiung des einzelnen Menschen aus ihn vereinnahmenden
und einengenden Sozialstrukturen zugleich die Lostrennung aus
der - Identität tragenden und stärkenden - Gruppe. Die Ablehnung
der Plausibilität von Traditionen ist zugleich Abnabelung
vom Nährboden eines moralischen Erfahrungsreichtums. Die
Konzentration auf die moralische Vernunft des Einzelnen geht
leicht einher mit der Schwächung der Aufmerksamkeit für
allgemein verbindliche Werte und Aufgaben.
Dies ist genau der Kontext, in dem, um im Bilde meines
Aufsatztitels zu bleiben, die “Sirenen” ihre Stimme erheben.
Dies ist auch die Stelle, an der eine Reflexion über die
Bedeutung der modernen Subjektorientierung anzusetzen hat.
1. Zunächst sind einige Mißverständnisse auszuräumen. Das
Subjekt, über das ich spreche, ist nicht “separated from
tradition” (J. 441), noch handelt es sich um eine abstrakte “autonomous
reason”, wie sie, übrigens häufig fälschlich, Kant zugeschrieben
wird. Von daher bedeutet die von mir verteidigte
menschliche Verantwortung für Normen auch nicht, “that I
7
Die kritischen Bemerkungen B.J.’s zu meinem Person- und
Subjektbegriff (448f.) sind mir nicht verständlich. Ich denke, daß meine
Ausführungen dies nicht rechtfertigen. Wenn B.J. schreibt: “this person
chooses freely to be so related, and it is in this that responsability consists”,
bleiben mir am Ende immer noch meine grundsätzlichen Fragen: Ist
moralische Wahl Wahl von Moral oder von Tradition und Gemeinschaft?
Und: Gibt es für diese Wahl keine (a-priorischen) moralischen Prinzipien?

TRADITION UND MORALISCHE WAHRHEIT 275
stand apart from and over tradition, in a kind of god-like
detachment, freely determining the norms for myself and
everyone else in the tradition” (J. 441).
Eine solche Sicht würde ja nur anstelle einer unkritischen
Traditionsautorität die ebenso unkritische Subjektautorität
setzen. Nein, vielmehr geht es auch hier um “the true good”.
Meine These ist aber, daß der Zugang zu “the true good” den
Weg über die Subjekte nehmen muß. Damit ist nicht gemeint, es
gebe “an ethics of the subject outside and above all tradition, by
which the tradition must be judged” (J. 441f.). Es geht vielmehr
um die Frage des organisierenden Prinzips, um das Gefälle und
das Zentrum im Prozeß der moralischen Überzeugung und
(Selbst-) Vergewisserung.
Nun, hier hat sich der Schwerpunkt verschoben von der
akzeptierten Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß die Tradition Recht hat, zur
Einstellung, daß dieses Recht in Zweifel gezogen werden darf und
öfter auch muß. Wir treffen hier übrigens auf die alte jüdische
und christliche Tradition des Propheten wie des Gewissens.
Die damit grundgelegte Korrekturfunktion erkennt, wie wir
sahen, auch B.J. an, freilich erklärt er diesen Aspekt als einen
Teil der Tradition selbst. Das ist in einem allgemeinen Sinne
wahr, und ich würde darüber kein weiteres Wort verlieren, wenn
es nicht konkrete Traditionen gäbe, die dem Subjekt genau
dieses Gewissensrecht absprechen oder es an allerlei
Vorbedingungen knüpfen wollen.
In solch einer Situation muß es zum Schwur kommen.
Tradition, weder mit großem “T” noch mit kleinem “t”, kann
Menschen ihr Gewissen abnehmen. Wohl hingegen kann das
Gewissen Menschen nötigen, sich gegenüber ihren Traditionen
kritisch zu verhalten und eventuell sich von ihnen zu
verabschieden. Nicht Tradition, sondern Gewissen-Subjektpersonale
Verantwortung sind das Kriterium, auch gegenüber
der Tradition.
Kurzum: Tradition kreiert “the true good(s)” nicht, sondern
“true goods” definieren die zuverlässige Tradition.
2. B.J. hat zurecht darauf hingewiesen, daß dieses moderne
Personsverständnis selbst wiederum aus einer bestimmten,
partikularen Tradition hervorgegangen und in dieser Tradition
verwurzelt ist (J. 450). Dies ist richtig und sollte in seiner

276 KARL-WILHELM MERKS
Bedeutung nicht gemindert werden. Ich würde höchstens
hinzufügen, daß diese Entwicklung nicht ohne Kritik “von
außen”, insbesondere die Auseinandersetzung der Aufklärung
mit der katholischen Tradition, zustande gekommen ist. Eine
solche Umorientierung auf die unabdingbare Verantwortung der
Subjekte kann das Traditionsverständnis nicht unberührt lassen.
Wir können die Orientierung auf das Subjekt und die personale
Verantwortung eben nicht mehr verstehen als ein zufälliges
Produkt einer partikularen Tradition. Wie sollen wir uns
Traditionen gegenüber verhalten, die diese Gewissensorientierung
der Moral, die ja immer eine individuell-personale ist, nicht
anerkennen? Sind solche Traditionen dann gleichwohl auch in
diesem Punkt als legitim anzusehen? Zweifelsohne gibt es ja Traditionen,
in denen die Gemeinschaftsbezogenheit so stark
dominant ist, daß die Idee der personal-individuellen Gewissensverpflichtung
kaum anerkannt wird. Ist die Tradition dann
(vorläufig) immer noch legitim? Von der Tradition selbst her
wäre eine solche Frage nach den Vorstellungen von B.J. nicht zu
entscheiden, solange nicht innerhalb der Tradition selbst der
Zweifel entsteht. Aber diese Frage wird doch nicht erst relevant
durch den Zufall und die Faktizität des entstandenen Zweifels,
sondern drängt sich auf wegen der moralischen Unhaltbarkeit
der Nichtanerkennung der Person - Tradition hin, Tradition her.
Genau dies ist ja auch der Grund, weshalb die Verteidiger
der Universalität von Menschenrechten bei aller
Detaildiskussion letztlich gegenüber den Bestreitern dieser
Universalität Recht haben. 8
3. Es hilft uns nicht weiter, wenn wir uns um die darin zum
Ausdruck kommende Veränderung des moralischen
Legitimationsmodells herumdrücken und dessen
Spannungsverhältnis zum traditionsorientierten Modell durch
ein “et...et” abschwächen. Es gibt nicht eine “innere Stimme der
Moral” und eine “moralische Stimme der Gemeinschaft” zu
8
Vgl. in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Überlegungen von U. Eco
bezüglich der Grundlagen einer verbindlichen Ethik in allgemein
menschlichen Erfahrungen, in: C.M. Martini/U. Eco, Woran glaubt, wer
nicht glaubt?, Wien 1998, 82ff.

TRADITION UND MORALISCHE WAHRHEIT 277
gleichen Rechten, wie A. Etzioni vorzuschlagen scheint. 9 Es verwundert
mich nicht, daß Etzioni sein für einen Kommunitaristen
doch einigermaßen überraschendes Plädoyer für einen Ausgleich
zwischen Autonomie des Einzelnen und Werteordnung der
Gemeinschaft am Ende doch zugunsten des Individuums
zuspitzen muß: “Die Gemeinschaft bietet eine normative
Grundlage, einen festen Ausgangspunkt, eine Kultur und Tradition,
ein Verbundenheitsgefühl und einen Ort für moralische
Dialoge, aber sie ist nicht die letzte Instanz in moralischen
Angelegenheiten. Das sind ihre Mitglieder.” 10 So ist es!
Meine Folgerungen aus alledem kann ich so
zusammenfassen:
a) Die Auflösung traditionsorientierter Gesellschaftsformen
und im Zuge damit der Individualisierungsprozeß sind ein
Faktum der Modernisierung. Dieser Prozeß wird weltweit weiter
fortschreiten.
b) Das Bewußtwerden der Verantwortung des Menschen
auch für die Standards, Werte und Normen der Tradition ist ein
moralischer Gewinn.
c) Die Berufung auf Traditionen als Quelle (source, nicht
criterion!) von Moral gilt nur, wo sie diese personale
Verantwortung selbst zu integrieren imstande sind.
d) Die moralischen Möglichkeiten personaler
Verantwortung werden allerdings nur realisiert werden, wenn es
gelingt, Gesellschaften und Traditionen zu schaffen, die eine
solche personale Verantwortlichkeit als essentiellen Teil ihrer
selbst verstehen und kultivieren. Die Kirche bildet hier keine
Ausnahme.
Theologische Faculteit Tilburg
Academielaan 9
5037 ET Tilburg
The Netherlands.
KARL-WILHELM MERKS
9
A. Etzioni, Die Verantwortungsgesellschaft. Individualismus und
Moral in der heutigen Demokratie, Darmstadt 1997, 168ff.
10
Ebd. 324f.

278 KARL-WILHELM MERKS
Summary / Resumen
—————
In this article the author replies to an essay by Brian V. Johnstone
“Can Tradition be a Source of Moral Truth? A Reply to Karl-Wilhelm
Merks” (StMor 37 (1999) 431-451). The author does not deny that
tradition has a place in the gaining of moral knowledge. However, he
argues that a critical view of it, and thus a relativizing of tradition, is
the best way to defend it. An important distinction is made between a
source of moral truth and the criterion of truth. He maintains and
develops his original thesis that the criterion of moral truth is not
tradition, but the subject, as the bearer of conscience and personal
responsibility.
El autor responde en este artículo a otro de Brian V. Johnstone
“Can Tradition be a Source of Moral Truth? A Reply to Karl-Wilhelm
Merks” (StMor 37 (1999) 431-451). El autor no niega que la tradición
ocupe un puesto en la fase del conocimiento moral. Sin embargo,
argumenta que un punto de vista crítico sobre el tema, aun
relativizando la tradición, es la mejor manera de defenderla. Es
importante la distinción que hace entre fuente de verdad moral y
criterio de verdad. Merks sostiene y desarrolla su tesis original de que el
criterio de verdad moral no es la tradición, sino el individuo poseedor
de conciencia y responsabilidad personal.
—————
The author is Ordinary Professor of Moral Theology at the
Tilburg Faculty of Theology.
El autor es profesor titular de teología moral en la Facultad
Teológica de Tilburg.
—————