Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Series

Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (CCISS)
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
CCISS
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection
Policy Research Series
NATO Approaches to Energy Security:
Future Options, Challenges
and Directions
Elinor Sloan
No. 1 - 2007
This study is undertaken as part of the CCISS Critical
Energy Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Project,
supported by a Contribution Agreement with Natural
Resources Canada, Energy Infrastructure Protection Division
MARCH 2007
The opinions expressed in this Study are those of the author only,
and do not necessarily represent the views of CCISS or of Natural Resources Canada

CCISS
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection
Policy Research Studies
No. 1 – 2007
NATO Approaches to Energy Security:
Future Options, Challenges
and Directions
Elinor Sloan*
Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University, Ottawa
March 2007

NATO APPROACHES TO ENERGY SECURITY:
FUTURE OPTIONS, CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS
Elinor Sloan*
Introduction
Energy security is a growing area of focus for NATO. The Alliance first made
broad reference to the issue in the new strategic concept it adopted at its 50 th Anniversary
summit in April 1999. In it, the Alliance noted that while the core of its function
remained to deter and/or respond to an armed attack on the territory of one of the Allies,
NATO security could also be affected by other risks, such as the disruption of the flow of
vital resources. Subsequent summit declarations were silent on energy security, but the
subject reemerged early in 2006. Prompted largely by Russia’s decision to cut off gas
supplies to Ukraine—which because of pipeline routes dramatically impacted the flow of
oil to several European countries—Poland put forward a proposal that would see all
Alliance members committing to help one another in an energy crisis, just as they might
in time of a military crisis. 1 U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, a high-ranking member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, went further, arguing energy security should be a
commitment under the Article V mutual defence clause of the North Atlantic Treaty. 2
The official response by NATO Heads of State and Government at their November 2006
summit in Riga, Latvia, was cautious yet explicit: “We support a coordinated,
international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy
infrastructure security. With this in mind, we direct the Council in Permanent session to
consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security, in order to define
those areas where NATO may add value…” 3
The notion of NATO approaching energy security in terms of where it “may add
value” is important. Energy security, like any kind of security, can only be achieved
* Dr. Elinor Sloan is an Associate Professor of international security studies in the Department of Political
Science, Carleton University.
1 “NATO Considers Role in Increasing Energy Security,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 23 January 2007.
2 Speech to the NATO summit conference, Riga, 27 November 2006.
3 Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, para 45.
2

through a wide range of tools, just one of which is the use of military force. “It is obvious
that the protection of critical infrastructure or crisis response options involving military
forces are only part of the overall package of initiatives that would be necessary to
guarantee the security of energy supplies,” notes one NATO official. 4 This reality points
not only to non-military approaches, but also to a key role for non-military organizations.
In the case of Europe, for example, most countries look to the European Union to provide
energy security, which can be defined as the reliable availability of oil and gas supplies at
affordable prices. 5 To this end, the EU is in the process of developing an energy security
strategy that encompasses three “challenges”: diversifying oil and gas suppliers to
include the Caspian Region and Black Sea, the Middle East and North Africa, and
Norway (in addition to Russia); diversifying energy sources to include coal, nuclear
power and renewable energy (in addition to oil and gas); and, promoting energy
interconnection and an internal energy market in Europe. 6 The European Union may also
play a role in the “homeland security” role of protecting European ports and liquid
natural gas (LNG) terminals. 7
This paper examines those aspects of energy security that may best be addressed
by NATO. More specifically, it highlights a potential NATO role in three areas:
diplomatic engagement; critical infrastructure protection, including the protection of
pipelines and oil installations; and, guaranteeing the free movement of oil tankers through
key maritime choke points. It discusses the types of military forces useful in the latter two
areas, and NATO military capabilities with regard to each. It also draws out changes in
US military strategy that are relevant to these missions. The paper concludes that while
NATO’s approach to energy security is in its very early stages, it is possible and even
4 Jamie Shea, NATO Director of Policy Planning, “Energy Security: NATO’s Potential Role,” NATO
Review (Autumn 2006), www.nato.int
5 This definition is a paraphrased version of definitions found in Daniel Yergin, “What Does ‘Energy
Security’ Really Mean?” Wall Street Journal, 11 July 2006, p. A12, and Yergin, “Ensuring Energy
Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006), pp. 70-71.
6 Vince L. Morelli, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges (Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for
Congress, 11 September 2006). See also “Do you Want Putin’s Paw on the Pipe?” Economist, 13 January
2007, p. 13, and “A Sparky New Policy,” Economist,” 13 January 2007, p. 61.
7 See, for example, Brooks Tigner, “European Union Crafts a Security Blueprint,” Defense News, 23
January 2006, and Justin Stares, “Full Steam Ahead: Brussels Draws Up Plan For ‘EU Navy’,” Telegraph,
21 May 2006.
3

probable NATO will adopt an approach that encompasses political engagement and direct
military action.
NATO political roles
Diplomatic mechanisms
NATO has always been as much a political as a military organization; that is to
say, it has always sought to address threats to the security of NATO members through
both political and military means. This dual nature was implicit in the 1949 North
Atlantic Treaty, which opens with the statement that parties will seek to address threats to
their security through peaceful means as set out (in Chapter Six) of the United Nations
Charter, before moving on to discuss military capabilities and the article V military
guarantee. The approach became explicit in the 1967 Harmel Report, which identified the
two main functions of the Alliance as being military strength for deterrence and defence,
and diplomatic efforts in the context of a policy of détente. The first post-Cold War
Strategic Concept went still further, stating that NATO’s new strategy for security lay in
a three-pronged effort of dialogue with former adversaries, cooperation with these same
countries to deal with specific problems, and (last but not least) collective defence. As
noted in the concept: “The political approach to security will thus become increasingly
important. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential.”
NATO’s political approach to security was evident throughout the 1990s and
early 2000’s, even as it embarked on its first military operations (IFOR and SFOR in
Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo) and moved its theatre of activity progressively out of area
(ISAF in Afghanistan and the training mission in Iraq). In 1991 NATO created the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) encompassing NATO members, former Warsaw
Pact countries and former republics of the Soviet Union; in 1994 it launched the more
individualized Partnership for Peace (PfP) program open to all European and former
Soviet countries; in 1997 it transformed the NACC into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC) to accommodate the fact that not all PfP countries were in the NACC;
4

that same year it created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), renamed and
given greater collaborative capacity as the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002; and in
1997 it also created the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Other NATO forums for diplomacy
include the Mediterranean Dialogue, created in 1994 and now comprising Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia; and, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
(ICI) of 2004, which includes Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.
NATO’s range of established consultative mechanisms with different countries and
groups of countries, all of which—with the exception of the ICI—pre-date current
concerns with energy security, means the Alliance is well placed to address this issue
through diplomatic means.
Regional overlap
Russia. One region where diplomatic mechanisms and energy concerns overlap is
Russia. Russia is an important supplier of oil and gas to European countries. As a whole,
the European Union gets almost a third of its oil and almost half of its gas from Russia
and for some countries, such and Poland and Germany, the proportions are much higher.
As indigenous European oil and gas sources are depleted over the next several decades,
Russia is projected to provide an ever-greater share of European energy supplies. 8
Although Russia was a reliable energy supplier in the latter part of the Cold War and
during the 1990s, in recent years it has become seen as less trustworthy. When Russia cut
off gas supplies to Kiev at the turn of the 2006 new year over a price dispute, gas supplies
fell across Europe. 9 A year later, when Russia cut oil supplies to Belarus over what was
also essentially a price dispute, Europe again felt the impact. 10 Given the central and
growing role of the reliable flow of gas and oil from Russia to Europe in European
energy security, and the existence of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO could play an
8 For specific figures on European energy imports from Russia see, Paul Gallis, NATO and Energy Security
(Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 21 December 2006), p. 2, and Jeffrey Fleishman, “Russian-
Belarusian Oil Feud Ripples Through Europe,” Los Angeles Times, 14 January 2007.
9 Morelli, p. 4. See also “Power Games: Energy Security,” Economist, 7 January 2006, and “Nervous
Energy – Energy Security,” Economist, 7 January 2006.
10 “Russia Halts Oil Exports to Belarus,” Reuters, 8 January 2007.
5

important diplomatic role. Senator Lugar has advocated regular high-level consultations
between Russia and NATO on energy security; 11 the NRC would be the logical venue.
The Caucasus and Central Asia. Another region where there is overlap is the
Caucasus and Central Asia. The Caspian Sea region holds significant oil and gas reserves
and is an area from which European countries seek to diversify their energy supplies. 12
Key countries include Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan because of their oil reserves, and
Georgia (as well as Azerbaijan) because of its strategic location between the Caspian Sea
and land routes to the Mediterranean Sea. As former Soviet Republics, these countries
became members of the NACC in 1991, subsumed by the EAPC in 1997, and thus have
been part of the Alliance’s diplomatic apparatus for some years. At its 2002 summit in
Prague, NATO heads of state and government decided to strengthen political dialogue
with the “strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia,” 13 while at its
2004 summit in Istanbul the Alliance announced a “special focus” on engaging these
partners. 14 More recently, a senior NATO official has described energy security as an
obvious topic for enhanced EAPC consultations because many of these countries are
either important suppliers of oil and gas, or leading transit countries. 15
Developments at the political level in the EAPC are closely linked to the more
operational Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. When it was initiated in 1994, the PfP
offered all European countries the opportunity to develop an Individual Partnership
Program (IPP) with NATO. These were specific to each country and included such things
such as defence policy, planning and budgeting, air defence, information sharing and
communications, civil-military relations (democratic control over armed forces),
education and training, crisis management and civil emergency planning, and training
exercises to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations. At its Prague summit in 2002, NATO reinvigorated the IPP
11 Speech to the NATO summit conference, Riga, 27 November 2006.
12 For detailed discussions on amounts of proven and unproven oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea
region and other regions of the world please see Morelli and also Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2004).
13 Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, para 7.
14 Istanbul Summit Communiqué, 28 June 2004, para 31.
15 Shea, www.nato.int
6

process by launching a new practical mechanism, the Individual Partnership Action
Programs (IPAP). Although it covers similar areas as the earlier IPP, the IPAP could be
an avenue for practical cooperation in developing capabilities for the protection of critical
energy infrastructure.
NATO enlargement and energy security may also be linked in the Caucasus,
especially with regard to Georgia. In the Riga summit declaration Alliance leaders
affirmed only that NATO would continue an Intensified Dialogue with Georgia, which
covers a full range of issues relating to its aspiration for membership. But Senator Lugar
was more explicit, arguing NATO should invite Georgia to join the Alliance, given it is
“host to critical segments of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan [see below] oil pipeline and the
Southern Caucasus natural gas pipeline.” 16 With the possibility of Georgia’s
membership,” argue some observers, “the United States appears to envisage an alliance
that plays a strategic role in the Caucasus, one that would serve Western interests in the
competition for oil and gas resources.” 17
North Africa and Middle East. NATO diplomatic mechanisms and the energy
concerns of its members clearly overlap in two other areas of the world, North Africa and
the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria are Europe’s primary oil suppliers
from these regions, while Libya and especially Algeria supply Europe with gas. 18
Because Algeria and Kuwait (as well as other large oil producers in the Middle East, but
not Saudi Arabia) are part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI respectively, it is
possible that these Alliance consultative mechanisms could play a role in NATO’s
diplomatic approach to energy security. The ICI, in particular, is seen as being linked to
the growing focus of NATO countries on energy security. Much like the PfP and its
associated action plans, the ICI seeks to promote cooperation in the areas of defence
reform, crisis management and civil emergency planning, joint exercises, training and
education. However some observers have argued that energy security is the primary
16 Speech to the NATO summit conference, Riga, 27 November 2006.
17 Nicholas Wood, “Four Nations Face Barriers as They Seek Bids to Join NATO,” New York Times, 19
July 2006.
18 For details, see Morelli, p. 18.
7

objective behind the initiative, and understandably so. NATO’s European members, even
more so than the United States, are dependant on the safe supply of oil from the region
and therefore, it is argued, it “would be unwise not to endeavor to establish as many
beneficial relationships with its suppliers as are possible.” 19 NATO has appealed to Saudi
Arabia to join the initiative, citing a shared interest in stopping weapons proliferation, 20
but given the country’s centrality for European oil supplies it would seem logical that
energy security is also an important consideration.
Global initiatives. A few Alliance members have begun discussing how to bring
other nations around the world into closer association with NATO. Prompted by the ISAF
experience in Afghanistan, where more than a dozen non-NATO countries are
participating in this Alliance operation, Britain and the United States have proposed a
global partnership plan encompassing certain “Contact Countries” such as Australia, New
Zealand, Japan and South Korea. Scholarly experts have argued these countries should be
admitted to NATO, based on the view that Alliance membership should ultimately be
governed by shared values rather than geography. 21 But most believe NATO membership
“is not in the cards,” at least in the short term. 22 At the Riga summit, Alliance leaders
agreed only that the Council in Permanent Session would discuss how to increase the
operational relevance of relations with Contact Countries, and strengthen NATO’s ability
to work with potential contributors to NATO operations which share NATO’s interests
and values. 23 No reference was made to energy security, but others have made the link.
“NATO should develop associations with nations and regions that can contribute to
countering key threats to energy security,” Britain’s shadow defence secretary has
argued, “NATO members should especially be encouraged to form such associations with
19 Chief executive of the National Council on U.S.-Arab relations, as quoted in Riad Kahwaji, “NATO’s
Negotiations With GCC Nations Draw Suspicions,” Defense News, 16 January 2006, p. 12.
20 “NATO Urges Saudi Arabia to Join Cooperation Pact,” Washington Post, 21 January 2007.
21 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006),
p. 111.
22 Paul Ames, “NATO to Consider Boosting Pacific Ties,” Washington Post, 23 November 2006.
23 Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, para 12.
8

nations in the Pacific region.” 24 Senator Lugar has similarly connected Alliance energy
security to strengthened relationships with Japan, Australia and South Korea. 25
NATO military roles
Critical energy infrastructure protection
NATO’s political dimension will likely be very important in its approach to
energy security. Nonetheless, given the existence of other key political forums—notably
the European Union and the G-8—the Alliance’s greatest “value added” for energy
security may best be found in areas more directly related to the use of military force. One
of these areas might be the protection of energy infrastructure, including oil and gas
pipelines, oil-drilling rigs and oil refineries. Given the importance of energy supplies to
the prosperity of the globalized (Western) and globalizing (notably India and China)
world, and the essential anti-globalization nature of contemporary Islamic fundamentalist
terrorism, 26 these infrastructures are thought to be key targets of terrorist activity. Indeed,
Al Qaeda has explicitly threatened to attack what Osama Bin Laden calls the “hinges” of
the world economy, including energy critical infrastructure. 27 These threats have been
backed up by concrete trends. In recent years terrorists have targeted pipelines, refineries
and pumping stations in some of the most oil-rich areas of the world, including Iraq,
Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. 28 In summer 2001, a terror attack on a pipeline that feeds a
Saudi Arabian oil terminal was thwarted; 29 in April 2004 Al Qaeda attacked an oil
terminal near Basra, Iraq, killing three and shutting down the terminal for two days; 30 in
2006 there was an attempted suicide bombing at the main oil processing center in Saudi
24 Liam Fox, “How to Stop Terrorists Turning Off Our Lights,” Sunday Telegraph, 21 May 2006.
25 Speech to the NATO summit conference, Riga, 27 November 2006.
26 See Elinor C. Sloan, Terrorism in 2025: Likely Attributes and Dimensions, paper prepared for the
Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, January 2007.
27 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” p. 70.
28 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 (November/December
2004), p. 65.
29 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “Threats to Oil Transport,” www.iags.org, accessed 26
January 2007.
30 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO,”
www.iags.org, accessed 5 February 2007.
9

Arabia; 31 that same year saw attacks against pipelines and oil installations in Nigeria. 32
There have also been numerous attacks against oil pipelines in Iraq. Pipelines, through
which 40% of the world’s oil flows, are especially vulnerable to terrorist activity because
they travel thousands of miles over sometimes volatile territory and are difficult to
protect.
The Caucasus. One area of focus for NATO could be a major oil pipeline in the
Caucasus that opened in spring 2006, a parallel gas pipeline that is being built, and the
offshore oil and gas installations in the Caspian Sea that feed these pipelines. Stretching
from the Azerbaijan capital of Baku on the Caspian Sea, to Tbilisi in Georgia, and on to
the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil
pipeline is the second longest in the world. 33 It is considered an attractive supply route to
world markets because it does not travel over Russian or Iranian territory, and it does not
require tankers to pass through the heavily congested Bosphorus Strait that separates the
Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea, and are surrounded by Istanbul. The BTC pipeline
carries oil from a massive oil field in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea, 34 but American
policy makers hope Kazak oil will also eventually be piped under the Caspian Sea to the
start of the BTC conduit in Baku. 35 The natural gas pipeline that is being constructed
parallel to the BTC pipeline will likely carry natural gas from a gas field in the Caspian
Sea off the coast of Azerbaijan. 36 In addition, this pipeline may be extended eastward
under the Caspian to provide an outlet for Kazak gas, 37 and perhaps gas from
Turkmenistan. 38
Some outside measures are already being taken to improve security in Central
Asia and the Caucasus, which is replete with ethnic, religious and political tensions
31 “Danger Signs in Nigeria,” New York Times, 28 February 2006.
32 ibid.
33 The longest is the Druzhba pipeline from Russia to central Europe, constructed during Soviet times.
34 François Gremy, “West Azeri Platform of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshi Offshore Oilfield Commences Oil
Extraction,” Caucaz.com, accessed 5 February 2007.
35 Klare, p. 135.
36 Fulya Ozerkan, “Energy to Lead Tbilisi Agenda,” Turkish Daily News, 7 February 2007.
37 Brendan Hoffman, “Why the White House Woos Azerbaijan,” Christian Science Monitor, 28 April 2006.
38 “The Caucasus: Hanging Together,” Economist, 10 February 2007, p. 49.
10

within and amongst the region’s states. 39 In Kazakhstan, the United States signed a
military aid agreement a decade ago under the Clinton administration and began
supplying Kazak forces with arms, technical assistance and advanced military training for
the purposes of increasing the ability of local forces to protect oil related infrastructure. 40
More recently, it has helped finance the establishment of a Kazak rapid reaction brigade
to enhance Kazakhstan’s ability to respond to terrorist threats to oil platforms. 41 In
Azerbaijan, the United States is providing assistance in the form of maritime security
training; 42 because five states border the Caspian Sea, the exact demarcation of the sea
border—which has implications for resource ownership—remain in dispute, and this has
in the past led to military confrontations. 43 In Georgia, soldiers from America’s European
Command have trained a local “pipeline protection battalion” in capabilities to protect the
BTC pipeline. 44
These measures compliment the efforts of British Petroleum, the BTC project’s
lead company, to ensure the security forces of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are
properly trained to safeguard security along the pipeline. 45 In addition, the pipeline is
equipped with sophisticated sensor technology to protect against intruders, sabotage, and
illegal siphoning, 46 and the United States is supplying radars to Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan to monitor security in the Caspian Sea region more generally. 47 But the
current combination of technology and largely intermittent patrols—some by armed
personnel on horseback—is thought by experts to be insufficient to ensure the security of
the line. 48 Alliance members have raised the possibility of using high-resolution earth
observation satellites to monitor developments in places like the Caucasus where energy
39 For example, Georgia has tense relations with Russia; Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in a
low-level war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Kahabakh since the break up of the Soviet Union; and
Turkey and Armenia do not have diplomatic relations.
40 Klare, p. 135.
41 ibid., p. 138.
42 Liz Fuller, “Azerbaijan: Military Has Cash, But No Security Doctrine,” Radio Free Europe,
www.rferl.org, accessed 2 February 2007.
43 “NATO Considers Role in Increasing Energy Security,” at www.globalsecurity.org, accessed 23 January
2007.
44 Klare, p. 137.
45 Brooks Tigner, “How Secure is New Pipeline Across Caucasus?” Defense News, 13 March 2006, p. 36.
46 ibid.
47 “NATO Considers Role in Increasing Energy Security.”
48 Tigner, “How Secure is New Pipeline.”
11

esources could come under threat, 49 but there may also be a role for NATO military
forces (see below).
Africa. Another area of focus for NATO could be energy infrastructure in West
Africa. Here the locations are far more diverse than in the Caucasus, but Nigeria is
perhaps representative of the scope of the challenge. Like the Caucasus, the region is
politically unstable and the energy infrastructure is the subject of frequent attacks. This
infrastructure, scattered throughout the Niger Delta, consists of two large oil terminals on
the coast, over 50 producing oil fields—most on land but some offshore—as well as a
network of pipelines leading from the oil fields to the terminals.
U.S. military activities in Africa pertaining to oil 50 have not been as extensive as
in the Caucasus, but they are starting to grow. In 2005 the United States launched a
Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative under which the United States is providing
military expertise, equipment and development aid to nine West African states, including
Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia. 51 The
Initiative is meant to help these countries deal with lawless areas where militant Muslim
groups could find a haven for their activities, yet it will also allow the United States to
increase its presence in an area of growing oil importance. U.S. Special Operations
Forces, Marines and engineers are already helping train armed forces in the region, which
has been described by NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S.
General (retired) James Jones, as “worthy of significant attention by the United States
because of its immense potential from an energy standpoint.” 52 Most recently, U.S.
President Bush has approved the creation of an Africa Command for the U.S. military, to
be operational by September 2008. Although growing terrorist activity in Africa is the
49 Gallis, p. 5.
50 The United States has had a permanent military presence in Djibouti since soon after 9/11. The Horn of
Africa joint task force, reporting to U.S. Central Command, includes about 1,500 troops whose mission is
to detect and defeat transnational terrorism, primarily through military training for local forces and
humanitarian aid to friendly governments. See Richard White, “Pentagon to Train a Sharper Eye on
Africa,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 January 2007.
51 Jason Motlagh, “U.S. Seeks To Secure Sahara Desert,” Washington Times, 17 November 2005.
52 General James Jones (ret’d), former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, testimony before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 February 2006.
12

key driver behind the decision, safeguarding future oil supplies is also likely a major
motive. 53 Unique among most of the U.S. military’s geographic unified commands, this
command is to be headquartered in the region itself, further underscoring the growing
importance of Africa to American security concerns. 54
America’s Global Defense Posture Review. U.S. activities in Africa, the Middle
East and Central Asia with respect to energy security cannot be seen in isolation from
broader changes in U.S. military force posture. In August 2004 President Bush
announced a Global Defense Posture Review that marked the most significant
redeployment of American armed forces since the 1950s. One part of the plan is a smaller
global footprint in terms of overall force size. The United States is bringing home some
70,000 troops and 100,000 family members from large bases in Europe and South Korea,
and it has also withdrawn its forces from Saudi Arabia.
Another part of the review is a more globally distributed footprint. In a pattern
that has been compared to the Roman Empire's dozens of frontier posts, and the British
Empire's worldwide system of naval bases, the United States is in the process of
establishing numerous small bases throughout an “arc of instability” that stretches from
the Balkans to the Caucasus and around the Asian shore. 55 The idea is that by having a
network of smaller bases closer to areas of instability or projected “hotspots” the U.S.
military will be better able to respond to any unpredictable threats that emanate from
these regions. 56 According to the plan, American bases in Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Japan and South Korea are being maintained but reduced in size. They are to
be key nodes or hubs in a network of smaller bases that will include numerous “forward
operating bases” and “cooperative security locations” in southern Europe, Africa, the
Middle East and Asia. The forward operating bases will be lightly-manned U.S. military
installations that can accommodate a large surge in American power should the need
53 White, “Pentagon to Train a Sharper Eye on Africa.” See also Andrew Gray and Kristin Roberts, “Bush
Approves New Military Command for Africa,” Washington Post, 6 February 2007.
54 U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Central Command are headquartered in Florida, while U.S. Pacific
Command is headquartered in Hawaii. U.S. Africa Command will be co-located with the headquarters of
U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany until a headquarters location can be found in Africa.
55 “The Next American Empire,” Economist, 20 March 2004, p. 34.
56 Ann Scott Tyson, “New US Strategy: ‘Lily Pad’ Bases,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 August 2004.
13

arise, while the cooperative security locations will be host-nation facilities with
equipment and logistical capabilities, but no permanently stationed U.S. military forces. 57
As a result of the war on terrorism, the United States dramatically increased its
military presence in the “arc of instability” in the years after 9/11. In Central Asia, it
established military installations in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. 58 The United States was forced to withdraw from Uzbekistan in 2005, but is
exploring options in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, 59 and Georgia. 60 In the
Middle East, the United States withdrew its forces from Saudi Arabia in spring 2003, but
it consolidated its military presence in Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain (and Iraq). In Eastern
Europe, the United States has signed basing agreements with Bulgaria and Romania. 61
Further West, America still has troops and facilities in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Africa,
negotiations are underway for cooperative security locations in 10 African countries,
including Algeria, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal and Uganda. 62 The United States may also establish a staging area in northern
Australia. 63
Many of the areas where the United States is establishing small bases as part of its
battle against terrorism coincide with unstable regions of the world that have substantial
oil reserves, and from where America (and Europe) hopes to diversify its oil supply. This
is most obvious in the Caucasus, but basing agreements with Bulgaria and Romania have
also been discussed in the context of the fact that they are only 1,200 miles from the
Caspian Oil fields, just across the Black Sea. 64 As for the cooperate security locations in
Africa, Sao Tome and Principe is considered especially attractive because it is a relatively
stable country that is close to the major West African oil producing countries. 65 Early
57 Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (November/December 2005), p. 85.
58 Michael Kilian, “U.S. Expanding Military Sites in Mideast, Asia,” Chicago Tribune, 23 March 2004.
59 Cooley, p. 89.
60 Vince Crawley, “European Chief Considers Using Existing, Austere Bases,” Army Times, 17 January
2005.
61 Vince Crawly, “U.S. Presence Blossoms in East Europe,” Defense News, 30 May 2005, p. 22.
62 Cooley, p. 85.
63 Bradley Graham, “US May Halve Forces in Germany,” Washington Post, 25 March 2004.
64 Crawly, “U.S. Presence.”
65 Klare, p. 144.
14

eports surrounding the Global Posture Review stated that the US envisioned putting
some 20,000 troops in Africa and the Caucasus, and that part of the reason for this was to
help protect emerging oil-production areas. 66
Maritime interdiction operations
NATO’s future role in energy security could involve maritime interdiction
operations. Everyday some 4,000 tankers ship approximately 60% of world oil supplies
to their markets. Geography dictates that all of these tankers must pass though at least one
of a handful of narrow straits, including the Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and
Malaysia, the Strait of Hormuz linking the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea, the Bab-el-
Mandeb Strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the Bosphorus Strait linking
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the Panama and Suez Canals, and the Strait of
Gibraltar. Because oil tankers, as well as the growing number of LNG tankers, are slow
moving and largely unprotected, they make a relatively easy target for terrorists. Oil
tankers are a particularly attractive target because although disabling just one in the open
sea would have a negligible impact on world oil markets, doing so in one of the narrow
maritime “choke points” could have a dramatic impact. A single burning supertanker and
its spreading oil slick could block these heavily traveled passages to the transit of other
tankers for several weeks. 67
As with pipelines and other energy infrastructure, there is tangible evidence that
tankers are at risk from terrorist activity. According to FBI Director Robert Mueller “any
number of attacks” on oil tankers in the Gulf of Aden around the Horn of Africa have
been thwarted. 68 In his 2003 State of the Union speech, President Bush revealed the
United States had already stopped terrorist attacks on ships going through the Strait of
Hormuz. Most well known is that in October 2002 the French oil tanker Limburg was
struck by terrorists off the coast of Yemen. There have also been reports of terrorists
66 Andrew Higgins, “In Quest for Energy Security, U.S. Makes New Bet: On Democracy,” Wall Street
Journal, 4 February 2004.
67 Luft and Korin, p. 66.
68 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “Threats to Oil Transport.”
15

hijacking tankers in the Strait of Malacca, and of Al Qaeda operatives planning attacks on
tankers traveling through the Strait of Gibralter. 69
Some states surrounding the world’s strategic maritime choke points are taking
measures to secure these waterways. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, for example,
have signed a tri-lateral initiative designed to secure the Strait of Malacca. But the task is
well beyond the capacity of their navies. 70 To assist in this regard, in the early post-9/11
period U.S. Pacific Command announced plans for a small-boat squadron to protect oil
shipping and deter terrorism in the Strait of Malacca. 71 The United States also proposed a
Regional Maritime Security Initiative aimed at increasing security in the Strait, and
involving joint exercises and information sharing to generate a common maritime
picture. 72 More generally speaking, planes and ships from the command regularly patrol
vital tanker routes in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the western Pacific. 73
For some experts “the U.S. Navy has effectively become a guarantor of open
shipping lanes throughout the world…defending the so-called ‘chokepoints’ at which the
flow of oil might most easily be interrupted as a result of hostile military action or
terrorist or pirate raids.” 74 Yet this is a mammoth undertaking that cannot be carried out
effectively by the American Navy alone. In part in recognition of this fact the Navy
recently put forward the idea of a “Thousand Ship Navy.” This would not be a formal
alliance but rather “a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners” under
which “everyone brings what they can, when they can, for as long as they can.” 75 An
example given is cooperation between the United States, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore to secure the Strait of Malacca, but the Thousand Ship Navy concept would
presumably be far more global than the originally envisioned regional initiative.
Countries such as India, Japan and South Korea are almost entirely dependant on oil
69 Luft and Korin, pp. 64, 66 & 67.
70 Luft and Korin, p. 69.
71 Klare, p. 72.
72 Luft and Korin, p. 69.
73 Klare, p. 7.
74 Jos Van Gennip, Energy Security (Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Paper, 2006).
75 Christopher Cavas, “Spanning the Globe: U.S. Floats Fleet Cooperation Concept to Allies,” Defense
News, 8 January 2007, p. 11.
16

supplies that go through these pirate-infested waters. 76 In this context, it may make sense
to bring some of the Contact Countries (discussed above) into a closer relationship with
NATO for the purposes of monitoring shipping in their neighborhood.
A high-ranking NATO official has suggested NATO’s maritime operations could
monitor ship lanes and critical choke points that are insufficiently covered by national
assets, especially during a heightened threat situation. 77 This would not be an entirely
new mission for NATO members; NATO governments have been involved in the past in
maritime operations to secure energy supplies. Operation Earnest Will was a U.S.-led
coalition operation conducted in 1987 and 1988 to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf from Iraqi and Iranian attacks, in the context of the ongoing Iran-Iraq war.
Although Earnest Will was not a NATO operation per se, most participants were NATO
countries and some countries, such as Britain, France and the Netherlands, played
significant roles. The allies captured Iranian vessels laying mines, and engaged in
firefights with Iranian troops that were using oil platforms to fire on ships. 78
More recently, NATO as an organization has been carrying out Operation Active
Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea. Launched shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
operation is NATO’s only Article V mission. Like the American-led Proliferation
Security Initiative, begun by the United States in 2003 and possessing a global mandate,
Active Endeavor’s primary mission in the Mediterranean is to counter terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by stopping ships suspected of
carrying terrorists and/or WMD and their delivery systems. But Active Endeavor also has
an implicit role in promoting energy security. “Keeping the Mediterranean’s busy trade
routes open and safe is critical to NATO’s security,” notes an early NATO briefing on the
operation, “In terms of energy alone, some 65% of the oil and natural gas consumed in
Western Europe pass through the Mediterranean each year, with major pipelines
connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain.” 79 As part of the mission, and in
76 Luft and Korin, p. 70.
77 Shea, www.nato.int
78 Gallis, pp. 4-5.
79 “Active Endeavor: Combating Terrorism at Sea,” NATO Briefing (December 2003), p. 2.
17

esponse to specific intelligence, German ships have already been involved in escorting
tankers through the Strait of Gibraltar. 80
U.S. and NATO force transformation and energy security roles
Components of military transformation
If the protection of critical energy infrastructure like pipelines and oil drilling rigs,
as well as maritime interdiction operations to ensure the security of key ocean supply
routes, are possible future NATO missions then the question arises as to whether NATO
has or is developing the appropriate forces to carry out such missions. Since the mid-
1990s NATO, led by the United States, has been engaged in a process of “transforming”
its military forces. This involves a number of technological, doctrinal and organizational
changes, all of which are interrelated.
Technologically, the focus is on the development of precision-guided munitions
for manned and unmanned aircraft and army platforms; advanced surveillance,
intelligence gathering and reconnaissance capabilities through unmanned aerial vehicles,
earth imaging satellites, and aircraft that can look down and see surface movement by
virtue of a ground moving target indicator capability; and advanced command and control
capabilities through rapid data transmission among military platforms, including
communications satellites, and technologies that can make sense of the vast amount of
information that is transmitted. Doctrinally, force transformation encompasses the move
towards standoff force projection, especially on the part of the air force; more mobile and
rapidly deployable ground forces to the theatre of operations; ground forces that are also
more mobile, flexible and agile in theatre; a change in naval doctrine from open ocean
“blue water” warfare to “brown water” operations in the littorals—that is, littoral
warfare—close to the coasts of countries; and an ever greater “jointness” among services,
meaning that operations are increasingly characterized by navies, armies and air forces
working together in the battlespace. Organizationally, transformation involves dividing
80 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “Maritime Terrorism.”
18

forces up into smaller, more mobile and agile units that can be tailored and brought
together for specific kinds of missions.
This description of transformation is largely consistent with what was earlier
referred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs, the prevailing term of the 1990s. Today,
military transformation also includes broader elements that first became apparent after
9/11, and even more so in the course of addressing the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The changing parameters of transformation now include an increased emphasis
on special operations forces, as well as counter-insurgency capabilities and the ability to
carry out stability and reconstruction operations. Although stabilization operations
require a large force size, the prevailing characteristic of NATO’s military transformation
is a move away from the heavy, massive, in-place military forces designed for Cold War
operations, toward lighter and more mobile expeditionary units relevant to contemporary
security requirements. Special operations forces, especially, “fit precisely into the model
of a leaner, more flexible military” that transformation advocates have been trying to
create. 81 Military transformation and energy security
America’s “emphasis on power-projection capabilities is extremely significant,”
argues one analyst, “because these are precisely the kind of forces it takes to fight
regional oil wars and protect distant pipelines, refineries and delivery routes.” 82 Indeed, a
number of aspects of military force transformation may be relevant to a future NATO
military role in the area of energy security. Ground forces—especially special operations
forces—that can deploy rapidly to a crisis situation surrounding an oil or natural gas
pipeline would be useful, as would naval forces that can monitor maritime choke points
and respond to threats.
81 Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004), p.
102.
82 Klare, p. 70.
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NATO’s new Rapid Response Force (NRF) could facilitate both roles. This force
of up to 25,000 personnel was announced at the NATO summit in Prague in 2002 and
was declared fully operational at the Riga summit four years later. The force, which
combines land, sea, air and special operations forces, can deploy with five days notice
and can sustain itself for thirty days, or longer if it is re-supplied. Units are assigned to
the force on a one-year rotational basis. Forces first undergo a six-month joint training
program, during which they are certified to a certain standard; afterward, the forces spend
six months on “stand-by” as the NRF. The land component of the force is a brigade-sized
unit (roughly 5,000 troops); the naval component comprises a carrier battle group,
amphibious task group and surface action group; the air component is capable of 200
combat sorties per day; and the special operations component is variable depending on
the mission at hand. The entire force can be tailored to a specific operation and may end
up smaller, the same size, or even larger than that which carries out the prior training. 83
The force is truly multinational: an NRF exercise in 2006, for example, included
American F-16s, Turkish special forces, a Spanish aircraft carrier, a submarine, several
frigates and troops from a dozen different NATO countries, for a total force of about
7,800 personnel. 84
In the event of a threat to critical energy infrastructure it is conceivable that the
NATO Response Force could deploy to one of the many forward operating bases that the
United States is planning (which, as mentioned, are to be located close to key oil
producing areas). Because access to strategic airlift is central to any rapid deployment
capability, at Riga fourteen NATO countries plus Sweden reached agreement on a NATO
Strategic Airlift Capability under which these countries will jointly purchase three or four
of America’s C-17 airlifters. In addition, many European countries will begin taking
deliveries of the smaller A400M airlifter in 2010; until then, NATO is using Russian and
Ukrainian airlifters as an interim solution. 85
83 “The NATO Response Force: What Does This all Mean in Practice?”, http://www.nato.int, accessed 10
February 2007.
84 Gareth Harding, “NATO Armed and Ready,” Washington Times, 26 June 2006.
85 Under the NATO Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, signed with Russia in early 2006. This is a three-year
contract, with an option for renewal until 2012.
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A key component in responding to threats to energy infrastructure would likely be
special operations forces. These are forces that are specially trained, equipped and
organized to carry out, by generally unconventional means, missions to achieve specific
military or political objectives. Their missions are typically secret in nature, and often
involve rescues or assaults on high-value enemy targets. 86 Their increased use responds
to the requirement for ever-greater precision in warfare where the enemy is not a
division, a brigade, or even a smaller unit, but rather a handful of individuals. As a result,
Western militaries need combat strike forces that are trained in sabotage, guerrilla
warfare and covert operations. To this end, it is significant that at the Riga summit allies
launched a special operations forces transformation initiative aimed at increasing the
ability of the special forces of individual NATO countries to train and operate together. 87
As part of this initiative, NATO is developing a framework for training and employing
special forces, and arrangements for sharing information and tactics. 88
The naval platforms necessary for monitoring maritime choke points are
consistent with those necessary for littoral warfare. Terrorists, like criminals and drug
smugglers, often move along the coasts transporting supplies, weapons and personnel.
Frigates are the existing naval platform that is best suited to the “global coast guard role”
of maritime interdiction operations. 89 Most, if not all, NATO navies have frigates. In
addition, small diesel-electric submarines possessed by some NATO countries, such as
Canada, may be useful platforms for transporting special operations forces to offshore
oilrigs seized by terrorists. 90
But critics contend “NATO navies are still mostly configured for the Cold War,
which means that they have a maritime surveillance capability that was designed to keep
track of a few hundred big Soviet warships, hardly suited to gathering intelligence on
86 Gregory L. Vistica, “Military Split On How to Use Special Forces in Terror War,” Washington Post, 5
January 2004, p. 1.
87 Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, para 24.
88 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, speech at the Canadian War Museum, 15 June 2006.
89 Melana Zyla Vickers, “LCS Could Bolster Defense Against Terror,” Defense News, 14 July 2003, p. 28.
90 David Pugliese, “A New Role for Victorias,” Defense News, 27 November 2006, p. 5.
21

terrorists using rubber dinghies.” 91 Indeed, the frigate is thought to be impractical for
patrolling close to shore because of its size. The U.S. Navy is developing a new class of
ship, the Littoral Combat Ship, which is a smaller, faster vessel specifically designed for
terrorist interdiction, anti-mining operations, and anti-submarine warfare along the coasts.
It is possible that other NATO navies will do so as well.
Conclusion
NATO’s approach to energy security is in its embryonic stages. In early 2006 a
senior NATO official stated that NATO was considering what it could do to protect
critical energy infrastructure and the maritime shipping of energy supplies, but that the
issue was “unfolding as we speak” and no decisions had been reached. 92 That spring
Senator Lugar, a Republican, sponsored a resolution calling on the United States to lead
the discussion at NATO headquarters about the role the Alliance could play in energy
security, and for the President to submit to Congress a report detailing “a strategy for
NATO to develop secure, sustainable, and reliable sources of energy, including
contingency plans if current resources are put at risk.” 93 Although the resolution passed
the U.S. Senate, it did not become law before the fall 2006 Congressional elections. In
January 2007 a senior Democratic member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
traveled to NATO headquarters to discuss, among other things, NATO energy security.
Given the apparent bipartisan interest in the issue, it is possible that the new Congress
will pursue legislation pertaining to NATO energy security. As of the end of January
2007, no formal staff point of contact on this issue had been created at NATO
headquarters. 94
NATO’s approach to energy security could include both political and military
elements. Politically, NATO’s wide range of established diplomatic mechanisms—most
of which date from before current concerns about energy security—indicate that NATO
91 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “Maritime Terrorism.”
92 Jones testimony, 7 February 2006.
93 “Senate Clears Lugar’s NATO Energy Security Resolution,” States News Service, 12 June 2006.
94 Author correspondence with a senior NATO official, 30 January 2007.
22

is well placed to address issues of energy security through diplomatic means, whether
that be with Russia, Ukraine, or countries in the Middle East, Africa, and/or Caucasus
and Central Asia. The Alliance may be open to NATO membership for strategic countries
in key oil producing regions, notably Georgia, and it is pursuing closer relations, though
no formal program, with other countries around the world that can help promote energy
security.
Militarily, NATO could undertake measures to protect critical energy
infrastructure in places like the Caucasus and West Africa, and also use its naval forces to
monitor the safe passage of oil tankers through critical shipping choke points. NATO is
pursuing a U.S.-led force transformation process that in many respects is relevant to new
concerns for energy security. Characteristics of the land force elements of the NATO
Response Force, declared fully operational at the most recent NATO summit, mesh well
with changes underway as part of America’s Global Defense Posture Review, which in
turn are relevant to Alliance energy concerns. NATO’s naval forces may not be ideal for
a new “energy protection” mission, but they are still effective, as demonstrated by the
prior experience of NATO navies in protecting shipping. Thus while the use of military
force is only a small part of the overall energy security picture, it is an area where, in
addition to its diplomatic efforts, NATO can perhaps provide the greatest “value added”
to what is ultimately a multi-institutional challenge.
23

CCIS