ChinaBrief In a Fortnight - The Jamestown Foundation

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
In This Issue:
In a fortnight
By Peter Mattis 1
professionalism and factionalism in the pla leadership selection
By Willy Lam 2
China evaluates the u.s. presidential race
By A. Greer Meisels 5
china and brunei: ties that bind?
By Prashanth Parameswaran 7
shifts in beijing’s afghan policy: a view from the ground
By Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen 10
In a Fortnight
By Peter Mattis
PLA Personnel Shifts Highlight Intelligence’s Growing
Military Role
The latest round of top-level People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel
selections reinforces an emerging trend in how the Chinese military
manages intelligence. First, ever since the departure of General Xiong Guangkai
in December 2005, the PLA has started rotating operational staff through the
deputy chief of the general staff slot for intelligence and foreign affairs. Second,
intelligence experience seems to be taking on greater significance in the PLA writ
large as a small diaspora of intelligence personnel have taken up posts outside their
system. These developments simultaneously indicate the PLA is trying to maintain
tighter political control of the intelligence apparatus and make intelligence more
operationally oriented. The result probably is a redirection of military intelligence
resources from informing civilian leadership decisions on foreign affairs toward
those of PLA officers.
With intelligence chief General Ma Xiaotian moving to become commander of the
PLA Air Force, Ma became the latest deputy chief of the general staff to have a
career after taking the intelligence portfolio and to have an operational background.
His immediate predecessor, Zhang Qingsheng, now serves as the deputy chief
for operations and had been seen as a potentially odd choice to replace General
General Xu Qiliang, New Central
Military Commission Vice Chairman
China Brief is a bi-weekly journal
of information and analysis
covering Greater China in Eurasia.
China Brief is a publication of
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1

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
Xiong. At the time, Zhang had served in a variety of
senior operational and staff positions as well as penned
a number of articles on different PLA priorities (Wen
Wei Po, December 20, 2005; Outlook Weekly, December
9, 2002; PLA Daily, January 30, 2001; January 14, 1997).
Although Ma’s replacement, former political commissar
Wang Guanzhong, is not as operationally experienced
as his two predecessors, Wang’s service in the Central
Military Commission’s (CMC) General Office for the last
16 years should give him a high-level, detailed knowledge
of the PLA and its senior decision-making tempo. Wang
also rose through the ranks of the Investigation and
Research Office (diaoyanju), an experience that probably
gave him a fairly sophisticated knowledge of the state of
the PLA (People’s Net, October 23).
Choosing an outsider to the intelligence system to lead it
helps the PLA keep its intelligence organizations focused
on military priorities and more directly under control.
Previously, career defense attachés like Xiong dominated
the principal military intelligence department, the Second
Department of the PLA General Staff Department
(2PLA). This led to a focus on foreign affairs rather
than military priorities, lending 2PLA the moniker of
“China’s CIA” (Chien Shao [Hong Kong], January 1,
2006). During the 1990s, President Jiang Zemin came to
rely on Xiong and even tried to install him as Minister of
State Security (South China Morning Post, March 18, 1998).
As PLA modernization pushed the military to rely ever
more heavily on intelligence for operations as part of
informatization (xinxihua), Xiong’s continuing presence
through 2006 probably inhibited 2PLA’s adherence to
the rest of the PLA’s modernization program because
he lacked the operational experience. His successors,
however, could not turn the intelligence apparatus into
their private reserve and had the experience to tie military
intelligence more closely to military needs.
Senior PLA intelligence personnel also have been
spreading out, suggesting this experience is being valued
in the PLA as it was not previously. The first to make
the jump was Assistant Chief of the General Staff Chen
Xiaogong, who moved to become one of the PLA Air
Force deputy commanders in 2009. This transfer may
have been politically motivated to prevent the emergence
of another Xiong, because, after his stint in the party’s
Foreign Affairs Office, Chen was rumored to be close
with Hu Jintao (People’s Net, October 23; “Personnel
2
Changes in PLA Ranks: Chen Xiaogang,” China Brief,
February 9, 2009; Ming Pao, January 21, 2009). Since then,
Chen’s successor at 2PLA, Yang Hui, was promoted to be
chief of staff of the Nanjing Military Region. At the same
time, the last signals intelligence leadership, including
both the commander and the political commissar, also
moved on. The commander, Wu Guohua, became deputy
commander of the Second Artillery, and the political
commissar, Wang Yongsheng, became a vice president
at National Defense University (Global Times, August 5,
2011).
Information is at the heart of the PLA’s modernization
program, so the rising importance of intelligence posts
relative to their previous stature within the military
should not be surprising. According to the PLA Daily
and other writings on informatization, the challenges
of fighting under informatized conditions require more
efficient and effective means of collecting, processing
and distributing intelligence. This also means integrating
intelligence deeper into PLA operations transitioning
away from a top-down intelligence distribution system
(PLA Daily, October 28, 2008). Consolidation of this
personnel trend at lower levels—such as operational
rotations for mid-career intelligence personnel or new
emphasis on intelligence-related education—would be
the most important sign that intelligence is taking on
greater relevance for the PLA at all levels.
Peter Mattis is Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown
Foundation.
***
Professionalism and Factionalism
in the PLA Leadership Selection
By Willy Lam
The Beijing leadership has reshuffled the high command
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the military
goes through its own leadership transition separate from
but linked to the 18th Party Congress beginning later this
week. The move, which was announced last week, has also
given hints about the reorganization of the policy-setting
Central Military Commission (CMC). The membership
of a much rejuvenated CMC will be confirmed by the

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, which
is due to open on November 8. Although this round
of personnel selection reinforces the PLA’s increasing
dedication to professionalism in its upper echelons, this
series of personnel changes also reflects intense horsetrading
among the party’s principal factions.
The new chiefs of the “Four General Departments”—
the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political
Department (GPD), General Logistics Department
(GLD) and General Armaments Department (GAD)—
are respectively General Fang Fenghui (age 61); General
Zhang Yang (age 61); General Zhao Keshi (age 65); and
General Zhang Youxia (age 62). Moreover, General Ma
Xiaotian, (age 63) and General Wei Fenghe (age 58) have
been appointed Commander of respectively the Air
Force and the Second Artillery Corps. The incumbent
Commander of the Navy, Wu Shengli (age 67) is
expected to remain in his post for the foreseeable future.
Also named were a dozen-odd new deputy and assistant
chiefs of the headquarters units as well as the Navy, Air
Force and Second Artillery Corps (PLA Daily, October
25; China News Service, October 25).
The chiefs of the four general departments as well as the
three military divisions will become ordinary members
of the CMC. Uncertainties, however, still hang over
the identities of the top CMC leadership. According to
reports out of Beijing and Hong Kong, President Hu
(age 69) will stay on as CMC chairman for at least two
years beyond his retirement from the Politburo and
the Central Committee at the 18th CCP Congress. The
precedent for this in the post-revolutionary generation
was set by ex-president Jiang Zemin, who continued
being CMC chair for almost two years after his retirement
from all other party slots at the 16th Party Congress in
2002. This means that Vice President Xi Jinping, (age
59) who is slated to soon replace Hu as CCP general
secretary, will remain CMC vice chairman for the time
being. The two new CMC vice chairmen are former PLA
Air Force Commander General Xu Qiliang (age 62) and
Commander of the Jinan Military Region General Fan
Changlong (age 65). The newly retired GAD Director,
General Chang Wanquan (age 63) is set to replace
General Liang Guanglie as Defense Minister (Xinhua,
November 4; Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong] October 26; South
China Morning Post, October 26; Apple Daily [Hong Kong]
October 25).
3
The just-named Chief of the General Staff General
Fang perhaps best exemplifies the new generation of
professionally savvy officers. Fang, a native of Shaanxi
Province and graduate of the elite National Defense
University, was the youngest of China’s seven regional
commanders when he was given the No. 1 post of the
Beijing Military Region (MR) in 2007. Apart from his
command-and-control skills, Fang is a much-published
author on military strategy, particularly in the areas of
computer-aided war games and the synchronization of
different branches of the military forces. One of General
Fang’s favorite mottoes is that “radically changing times
demand innovation in strategic theories.” President Hu
was said to be very impressed with Fang’s orchestration
of the 2009 military parade in Bejing, which marked
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s
Republic. Last year, Fang won plaudits when he supervised
complicated-scale maneuvers involving more than 30,000
soldiers from the Beijing, Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs.
While the great majority of his predecessors as Beijing
MR commander went into retirement after serving in this
sensitive position, General Fang seems to have a bright
future ahead of him (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong] October
26; Southern Metropolitan News [Guangzhou] October 25;
Ifeng.com [Beijing], August 29, 2011).
Two hot contenders for the post of GDP director lost
out apparently due to their close association with the
disgraced Politburo member and Chongqing Party
Secretary Bo Xilai. They are the Political Commissar of
the General Logistics Department General Liu Yuan (age
61) and the Political Commissar of the Second Artillery
Corps General Zhang Haiyang (age 63). Like Bo, who is
the son of revolutionary hero Bo Yibo, Generals Liu and
Zhang are deemed high-profile princelings. General Liu
is the son of the late state president Liu Shaoqi, while
General Zhang is the son of former Politburo member
General Zhang Zhen. While Bo has never served in the
PLA, he has a large following amongst the “princeling
generals.” The charismatic former Politburo member
is due to be put on trial for alleged crimes including
large-scale corruption and dereliction of duty (Sing Tao
Daily [Hong Kong] October 24; Ming Pao [Hong Kong]
October 24).
After Bo was detained by authorities in mid-March, PLA
disciplinary authorities have run numerous campaigns
to promote the ideal of “the party’s absolute leadership

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
over the army.” An August 1 Army Day commentary in
the PLA Daily made an unusual reference to the army’s
immunity against being manipulated by “ambitious
careerists” in the mould of Bo. “In the midst of even
the most dangerous situations, not a single troop in
our army’s history has mutineered or surrendered to
the enemy,” said the Daily commentary, “And not even
the most cunning and ambitious careerist has been able
to use the army to realize his conspiracy” (PLA Daily,
August 1; Xinhua, August 1). In a talk last month, then-
CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou urged officers and
soldiers to “ensure that the troops must uphold a high
level of unison with the central party leadership and the
CMC in the areas of thought and politics.” Xu added
“We must resolutely listen to the directions of the party
central leadership, the CMC and Chairman Hu” (Xinhua,
October 11; PLA Daily, October 11).
In terms of factional dynamics, President Hu seems to be
a major beneficiary of the reshuffle. Apart from Chief of
the General Staff General Fang, GPD Director General
Zhang is said to be close to the supremo. Given that the
GDP controls functions including appointments and
discipline, Hu may through his close ties with General
Zhang be able to maintain some say in personnel
matters even after his departure from the CMC. Hu’s
clout also is evidenced by the surprise appointment of
another protégé, the relatively inexperienced Hong Kong
Garrison commander Zhang Shibo, as General Fang’s
successor as Beijing MR commander. Before assuming
the Hong Kong posting in late 2007, Zhang, a 60 year-old
lieutenant general, was commander of the 20th Group
Army (Apple Daily, October 26; Sina.com, October 24].
Other appointments may reflect the preferences of expresident
Jiang and Vice President Xi. The probable
promotion of Jinan MR Commander General Fan to the
CMC vice chairmanship reflects Jiang’s residual influence.
General Fan is the protégé of soon-to-retire CMC Vice
Chairman General Xu, who is deemed Jiang’s “unofficial
representative” in the CMC. Both Generals Xu and Fan
had served for long periods in the 16th Group Army.
Earlier this year, General Fan (age 65) was expected to
be leaving the armed forces after having reached the
mandatory retirement age for regional commanders. Xi’s
influence in the PLA has been adversely affected by the
fact that the career of several princeling generals has been
hurt by their association with Bo Xilai. New Air Force
4
commander General Ma Xiaotian and GAD Director
General Zhang Youxia, however, are notable princelings.
General Zhang is thought to be particularly close to Xi.
The fathers of Xi and General Zhang, respectively Xi
Zhongxun and General Zhang Zongxun were close allies
when both worked in northwestern China before the
CCP came into power in 1949 (Ming Pao, October 25;
Sing Tao Daily, October 25).
The marathon reshuffles also have followed the tradition
begun by President Hu of the frequent movement of
personnel not only across different military divisions
but also from headquarters to the regions. For example,
the Political Commissar of the Chengdu MR, General
Tian Xiusi, was made the Political Commissar of the Air
Force. Assistant GPD Director General Wei Liangzhong
became the Political Commissar of the Guangzhou MR,
while General Wang Guanzhong, the veteran Director of
the PLA General Office, was appointed a Deputy Chief
of the GSD (Ming Pao, October 26; Ta Kung Pao, October
25). Also notable are the proverbial “helicopter rides”
taken by the likes of General Fan of the Jinan MR and
General Zhang of the Hong Kong Garrison. It is very
rare for a regional commander to be elevated directly
to CMC vice chairman. General Zhang’s promotion to
the post of Beijing MR Commander is also unusual. In
light of the importance of the Beijing MR, only officers
who had held senior posts such as deputy commander or
chief of the general staff of the country’s seven MRs had
been named to that sensitive slot (Ta Kung Pao, October
24; Apple Daily, October 24).
Given that factional loyalty is a key consideration behind
the on-going personnel movements, it is perhaps not
surprising that not as much priority has been given to
weeding out corruption in the military. This is despite
the fact that General Liu Yuan–one of the high-profile
losers in the promotion sweepstakes–was praised highly
for initiating an anti-graft campaign within the GLD
early this year. Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, a professor
at the National Defense University and a respected
military commentator, pointed out recently that “corrupt
generals” were an even more serious problem than
“corrupt cadres.” Last month, Liu said “Corruption is
the only force that can defeat the PLA.” “Yet the forces
of corruption are more powerful than those of fighting
corruption,” he added. “And perpetrators of corruption
are more resourceful than graft busters” (Wen Wei Po,

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
October 8; Sina.com, October 8). The onus is on the
post-18th Party Congress leadership to demonstrate
that members of the newly promoted top brass live up
to the oft-repeated motto of decai jianbei, that is, “having
high moral attributes as well as being professionally
competent.”
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown
Foundation. He has worked in senior editorial positions in
international media including Asiaweek newsmagazine, South
China Morning Post and the Asia-Pacific Headquarters of
CNN. He is the author of five books on China, including the
recently published Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New
Leaders, New Challenges. Lam is an Adjunct Professor of
China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
***
China Evaluates the U.S.
Presidential Race
By A. Greer Meisels
China watchers in the United States have devoted
the better part of this year to understanding the
dynamics and vagaries of the once-a-decade power
transition that will take place in China later this month.
Questions surrounding whether or not the fifth
generation leaders will usher in a new era of political and
economic reform, which “factions” will gain the upperhand
in the Politburo’s Standing Committee, and what
the heir apparent, Xi Jinping’s, views are on the U.S.-
China relationship have been fodder for pundits and
analysts alike. Yet curiously, the same level of scrutiny
about the potential U.S. leadership transition does not
appear to be present on the Chinese side. Questions
about which candidate might help improve U.S.-China
relations, or which candidate might be more amenable to
Beijing seem rarely asked. Instead, one is confronted with
what could be described as election fatigue with Chinese
characteristics. This statement by foreign ministry
spokesman, Hong Lei, sums it up well: “We hope the
U.S. Republican and Democratic candidates will get rid
of the impact of election politics and do more things
conducive to China-U.S. mutual trust and cooperation”
5
(Global Times, October 18).
During a recent private conversation with a leading U.S.
studies scholar from the China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR), he remarked “Its
strange that the U.S. presidential election this year is
not a very hot topic among pundits in Beijing. Probably
there are other hot spots like the South China Sea.” It
is true that this has been a challenging year for China.
There have been several high-profile political scandals
and an up-tick in the number of disputes with some of
her neighbors in the South and East China Seas. It is not,
however, that these other issues have obviated the need
for China to report on the U.S. presidential campaign.
What is becoming clear is that a two-pronged approach
has developed with regard to how China is covering the
campaign and the elections this time around. Rather
than discuss what could be at stake for China should the
United States see a second-term Obama administration
or a Mitt Romney-led Republican administration in the
White House, the narrative revolves around either the
dangers of playing the “China card,” which is considered
by many to be “both ridiculous and meaningless” or the
fact that there is not a substantial difference between
either candidate when it comes to China policy (Xinhua,
September 9, 2011).
How Do This Year’s Candidates Play the “China
Card?”
Coverage of the U.S. presidential elections in China seem
tinged with a sense of resignation that China-bashing has
become part of the U.S. political landscape—some go as
far as to refer to it as a ritual. Chinese analysts, however,
concede that this ritual “negatively impacts China-U.S.
relations and leaves Americans with the impression that
China is responsible for their country’s decline” (Xinhua,
October 18). In fact, playing the “China card,” “Chinabashing”
or “scapegoating” has become so ubiquitous
that it seems simply expected. Though numerous articles
opine that China is not the source of U.S. economic woes,
they also admit that the politicization (zhengzhihua) of
topics such as the economy and unemployment is simply
part and parcel of today’s U.S. election campaign (Caixun,
July 19; Xinhua, November 14, 2011).
This should not imply, however, that people in China are
not paying attention to the claims these two candidates
are making. For example, Mitt Romney’s frequent

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
promises to label China as a currency manipulator the
first day he is in office has received a lot of coverage. By
and large, Mr. Romney has been cited as sounding rather
vociferous when it comes to China’s trade and economic
practices with some mentioning “Romney’s willful
attacks on China…” (Xinhua, October 17). But what is
more interesting is that some of the candidate’s doublespeak,
or change of position, has also been brought to
light. For example, Mitt Romney visited China back in
2006 while still governor of Massachusetts and, at that
time, made several statements about how the United
States should seek cooperation with China based on free
trade principles and how he admired the Chinese for
their strong work ethic (People’s Daily, November 8, 2011).
Certain Chinese feel this is a far cry from the China policy
that is outlined on his official campaign website which
could be considered “an outdated manifestation of a Cold
War mentality” (China Daily, August 27). These changes
in tune or “capriciousness” have been “attributed to the
deeply rooted bad habits of the U.S. political nature. The
United States is a country that needs to find rivals at any
time and everywhere” (People’s Daily, November 8, 2011).
In other words, the strident language used by presidential
candidates is seen more as a manifestation of the flaws in
the American political tradition, rather than expressions
of a candidate’s actual beliefs.
President Barack Obama is not immune to this sort of
criticism either. For example, some have made note of
his “strong moves against China, including imposing
high tariffs on Chinese products, rejecting Chinese
companies’ investment in the United States, and filing
trade cases with the World Trade Organization against
Chinese companies” (Guangzhou Daily, October 18). In
China, there also seems to be an understanding that
most incumbent presidents, including Obama, engage
in credit-claiming. Several jabs have been made about
how President Obama used the debates as a platform to
demonstrate his “success” in getting the Chinese yuan
to appreciate “because we have pushed them hard...”
(Xinhua, October 17).
President Obama and Mitt Romney, thus, are both seen
as focusing more on “partisan self-interest” rather than
on the potential adverse affects their rhetoric may have
on the U.S.-China relationship, writ large (Hexun, July
11).
6
The Pendulum Always Swings Back to the Middle
The other point that gets emphasized is that no matter
which party or president is in power, the U.S.-China
relationship has been fairly consistent (with some rough
patches now and again) since the two countries ushered
in a new era of diplomatic relations forty years ago.
As Xie Tao wrote, “…from Richard Nixon to Barack
Obama, the dominant trend of U.S. China policy has
been one of remarkable continuity. Barring extraordinary
circumstances, if there was any noticeable change at all, it
was often more of fine-tuning than a bolt of lightning”
(China Daily, April 27). Consequently, even though there
is a tradition of the opposition candidate campaigning
for president by underscoring the incumbent’s so-called
“weakness” on China— few seem concerned that this
will translate into actual pugnacity once in the Oval
Office. For instance, when Clinton was running for office,
he attacked George H.W. Bush as being too weak on
China; and when George W. Bush was on the campaign
trail, he used the same rhetoric to describe the Clinton
administration. Obama used the word “coward” when
describing some of the latter Bush’s China policies, and
today Romney is using the same tactics against Obama
(Beijing News, July 31). It should then come as no surprise
that China does not dissect each and every utterance
made by an U.S. presidential candidate with a fine-toothed
comb. After all, “No matter who wins the election, every
U.S. president… attaches great importance to the China-
U.S. relations. In other words, China-bashing is nothing
but a topic which aims to attract the public attention”
(Chinamil.com.cn, October 24).
On the other hand, though Chinese observers of U.S.
politics might appear analytically complacent when
it comes to the presidential elections, this should not
imply that they do not closely follow the policies and
pronouncements that come out of the White House.
One such case in point is the U.S. “pivot” or “re-balance”
to Asia. Though some here in the United States might
dismiss this strategy as more slogan than substance at this
point, Chinese analysts have paid very close attention to
nearly every official and semi-official statement on the
topic. Some remark that the U.S. strategic rebalancing to
Asia has damaged trust and urge the U.S. to “… make
its strategic rebalancing less provocative…” and that
no matter which candidate wins the election, how they
handle relations with China and how they work to build

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
strategic resassurance will be critically important (China
Daily, November 1; “Pivot and Parry: China’s Response to
America’s New Defense Strategy,” China Brief, March 15).
Therefore, though some like Niu Xinchun of CICIR may
conclude that during this election season both Obama
and Romney are doing little more than attempting “to
score political points by attacking China. I don’t think
they will really follow through on some of their campaign
rhetoric if they are elected,” it seems difficult to square
the circle with those analysts who so carefully scrutinize
the statements that come from the administration once in
office (Global Times, October 18).
The Role of Domestic Politics in Foreign Policy
Formulation
Finally, it appears as if the Chinese may be suffering, to
a certain extent, from the same disease which they claim
plagues many Americans; namely, that they underestimate
the role domestic politics plays when it comes to the
current election-year rhetoric and “would-be” policies of
future U.S. presidents. In the recently released Pew Global
Attitudes report on how the U.S. and Chinese publics
view each other, “the top concern of Americans—cited
by 78 percent—is the large amount of American debt
held by China. About seven-in-ten (71 percent) say the
loss of U.S. jobs to China is a very serious problem for
the [United States] and 61 percent say the same about
the trade deficit with China” [1]. Yet when Obama and
Romney make statements about debt-rebalancing and
fears about job loss to China, most Chinese analysts see
this as mere politicking as opposed to a true reflection
of the concerns being voiced by the American people.
Hence, instead of viewing candidates’ strong statements
on China as little more than “a handy tool for U.S.
politicians who try to court the votes and support
of ill-informed voters by ratcheting up antagonistic
sentiment toward China,” perhaps it is important for
them to recognize that these statements are sometimes
manifestations of domestic sentiment, whether wellinformed
or not (Xinhua, September 14). Conceivably
then, it would be worthwhile for analysts in Beijing to not
only pay attention to elite opinions and statements, but
also to perform more rigorous analysis of the domestic
U.S. political environment since it may prove to be a
harbinger for how the U.S.-China relationship evolves in
the future.
7
A. Greer Meisels is the Associate Director and Research Fellow,
China and the Pacific, at the Center for the National Interest.
Notes:
1. Bruce Drake, “American, Chinese Publics
Increasingly Wary of the Other,” Pew Research
Center, November 1, 2012, available online
.
***
China and Brunei: Ties that Bind?
By Prashanth Parameswaran
When Chinese President Hu Jintao met Brunei’s
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah on the sidelines of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting
this September in Russia, both leaders said they were
pleased with the development of bilateral ties in recent
years (Xinhua, September 8). Though relations between
Beijing and Bandar Seri Begawan have strengthened
considerably over the last few years, the future could pose
challenges that both sides will have to navigate in order to
preserve these close ties.
Sino-Brunei relations are deeply rooted in history and
date back over 2,000 years. The two sides traded as early
as China’s Western Han Dynasty, and some accounts
suggest Chinese settlers from Fujian province arrived
in Borneo and settled in the area now called Brunei in
the 13th and 14th centuries. Brunei’s Sultan Abdul Majid
Hassan, who died during his travels in China in the early
15th century despite the Chinese emperor’s best efforts
to help treat his illness, was buried with royal tribute in
Nanjing and continues to serve as a living symbol of the
relationship today (Brunei Times, November 9, 2008). In
more recent times, however, relations were somewhat
distant as Brunei was a British protectorate for most of
the last century until it gained independence in 1983. Even
then, due to various concerns including communism
and sensitivities related to its ethnic Chinese population,
Brunei on September 30, 1991, was then the last member
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
to establish official ties with Beijing.
Since then, China increasingly has seen Brunei as a useful
source of oil and gas to fuel its economic growth and a
voice for better ties between it and ASEAN. Meanwhile,
Brunei, an Islamic sultanate with a population of 400,000
and the fifth richest country in the world per capita,
has considered Beijing to be a crucial partner to engage
to both diversify and strengthen its fossil-fuel-based
economy and preserve peace and stability in the Asia-
Pacific region.
While relations between the two countries have tightened
over the last decade or so, the last year has seen a
particular increase in the momentum of the relationship
ahead of Brunei’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2013. Last
November, Wen Jiabao became the first Chinese premier
to visit Brunei in the history of the bilateral relationship,
and both sides celebrated the 20th anniversary of
the establishment of diplomatic relations with great
fanfare. Wen’s visit began what the Brunei Times called
“a whole new chapter” in Sino-Brunei relations (Brunei
Times, November 23, 2011). This year, the chairman of
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC) Jia Qinglin paid the first visit of its kind to
Brunei in April, and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
also visited in August (Xinhua, August 11; People’s Daily,
April 20). Top officials also have met on the sidelines of
key meetings, as Chinese President Hu Jintao and Brunei’s
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah most recently did at APEC.
Commercial relations have strengthened considerably,
as well. Trade in 2011 soared to $1.3 billion, nearly four
times what it was in 2008 and surpassing the $1 billion
target set by the two countries previously (Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Brunei Darussalam, 2012).
The bulk of that is in energy, which is not surprising
since Beijing needs to fuel its rapid growth while Brunei is
Southeast Asia’s third largest oil exporter and the world’s
fourth largest natural gas exporter. Soon after Wen’s
visit to Brunei in 2011, for example, Brunei agreed to
increase oil exports to China from 13,000 barrels per day
to 16,000 barrels per day. Meanwhile, China’s National
Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) has inked a deal with
Petroleum Brunei for oil and gas commercial exploration,
while Zhejiang Henyi Group and Sinopec Engineering
Inc. currently are working to help develop an oil refinery
and aromatic cracker plant in Brunei to boost the energy
8
sector in the largest ever foreign direct investment in the
country (China Daily, July 19).
Both sides increasingly have tried to broaden the reach of
their cooperation beyond energy. Within the economic
realm, the two countries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) to boost cooperation in agriculture
in April. Apart from increased trade, the MoU also included
more joint efforts in human resource development
and providing training for government officials and
professional technical personnel (Brunei Times, April 20).
Both sides have tried to encourage greater investment
and private sector interaction. Beijing has signaled that
it would like small and medium enterprises (SMEs) from
Brunei to invest in “lesser developed” parts of China,
while Bandar Seri Begawan has tried to get Beijing to
broaden its range of investments in the country through
a range of trade fairs, expositions and symposiums. A
recent National Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(NCCI) meeting in Brunei, for instance, saw a Chinese
delegation comprising government representatives from
various industries including real estate, construction,
medicine, and gem and jade (Brunei Times, October 26).
Cooperation also has been recently extended to the city
level, with Nanjing and Bandar Seri Begawan becoming
sister cities last year—an arrangement that is expected to
boost tourism and cultural activities.
China and Brunei also continue to place a great emphasis
on people-to-people ties, which CPPCC Chairman Jia
Qinglin singled out as one of the four ways to enhance
bilateral cooperation during his visit earlier this year
(Xinhua, April 20). For Brunei, the main focus is on
tourism because aside from its ASEAN neighbors, China
brings the most tourists into Brunei (Brunei Times, June
8). Beijing and Bandar Seri Begawan have also both been
paying increasing attention to the role of youth in bilateral
ties. Chinese youth groups have paid visits to Brunei, and
the Universiti Brunei Darussalam and Zhejiang University
forged an official partnership in July this year, initiatives
that not only cement inter-generational ties between the
two nations, but also potentially could provide Brunei
with young investors or graduates interested in working
or doing business there (Xinhua, July 20; Brunei Times,
April 24, 2011). The ceremonial dimension of peopleto-people
ties also should not be overlooked. China
continues to invest a great deal in emphasizing the rich
history of the relationship, promoting the China-Brunei

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
Friendship Hall completed in 2006 and the Brunei
Heritage Garden unveiled in 2008—both of which are
located in Nanjing where the former Brunei sultan is
buried. For Brunei’s part, the Brunei-China Friendship
Association founded in 2006 continues to promote ties
through events including cultural exchanges and exhibits.
Yet, despite the great strides in Sino-Brunei relations
over the past few years, the relationship still has its
limits, which could pose challenges for both sides in the
coming years. First and most obviously, China is only one
of Brunei’s key partners, and the sultanate has boosted
its relationships with a wide variety of actors over the
past few years ranging from the United States and the
European Union to the its ASEAN neighbors and Russia
in order to diversify its options. While this is natural,
it is a tricky balancing act to maintain, particularly for
a very small country that is trying to manage ties with
much larger powers and is acutely sensitive to fears of
entrapment or abandonment. What would happen if, for
instance, tensions between Washington and Beijing should
increase in the Asia-Pacific in the future? Bandar Seri
Begawan would find itself in the middle of a great power
rivalry and potentially have to choose sides, which could
pose challenges for its diversification strategy. Neither
the United States nor China would like being spurned,
and Beijing in particular has demonstrated its tendency to
use economic coercion in certain circumstances to make
its displeasure known [1].
Second, Brunei’s preferred low-key approach to dealing
with contentious issues may be challenged as it assumes a
very public role as ASEAN chair in 2013, at a crucial time
for the organization. The country has a long tradition of
avoiding confrontation and trying to resolve differences
peacefully with mutual respect and consensus as embodied
in the approach of its foreign minister, Prince Mohamed
Bolkiah [2]. For instance, despite having a sovereignty
claim over the Louisa Reef, a small atoll in the South
China Sea that overlaps with Chinese (and Malaysian)
claims, the sultanate has not occupied any of the territory
and tends to downplay the issue with Beijing by focusing
on multilateral mechanisms for dispute resolution and
joint development. Similarly, at the ASEAN deliberations
in July this year that were hosted by Cambodia and
infamously produced no joint communique because of
differences over the South China Sea, Brunei simply said
it would be “guided by” the decision of the ASEAN
9
chair. This contrasts with the other Southeast Asian
compatriots and South China Sea claimants that insisted
on a reference to the dispute [3]. As the ASEAN chair
next year, Brunei will not have the luxury of simply
deferring to other countries or remaining neutral on what
to do about the South China Sea question. While it may
be tempted to once again downplay or sidestep the issue
to avoid angering Beijing, doing so may risk undermining
ASEAN unity as Vietnam, the Philippines and other
members may want a tougher line.
Third, fundamental domestic challenges also exist for
both sides further down the road that could affect ties.
For Brunei, it needs to make a difficult transition away
from its deep reliance on fossil fuels, which now account
for more than 60 percent of the economy and 95 percent
of export revenues, that are expected to run out in the
next two to three decades. While the government realizes
this transition needs to occur and has had its fair share
of successes—like in alternative energy sources—the
shift required is a dramatic one. This shift entails not
only a realignment of economic incentives and priorities
but also possibly changing the very relationship between
state and society (AsiaMoney Plus, July 19, 2011). The
path is not without its risks for Sino-Brunei relations as
Chinese interest in the sultanate may ebb as its oil and
gas reserves decline or Brunei may itself face domestic
hiccups down the road that constrain its ability to act
effectively in the international arena. China also faces its
own transition and will need to both reorient its economy
and renegotiate its social contract domestically while
taking on greater responsibilities internationally in line
with its growing power. With the growing breadth and
depth of relationships and roles that Beijing will have in
the coming years, there is the possibility that tiny Brunei
increasingly may be out of China’s radar, particularly if
the sultanate’s economic and geopolitical significance
also declines.
When Premier Wen delivered a speech at Universiti
Brunei Darussalam during his visit there last November,
he praised Sino-Brunei relations as developing smoothly
based on mutual respect and equal treatment, and added
that he was “fully confident of the future development
of bilateral ties” (Xinhua, November 21, 2011). While
the significant progress the relationship has made over
the past few years is cause for optimism, the potential
challenges of today and the decades ahead may certainly

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
put that prediction to the test.
Prashanth Parameswaran is a PhD candidate at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a freelance
journalist. He has written widely about international affairs in the
Asia-Pacific and blogs about the region at The Asianist [www.
asianist.wordpress.com].
Notes:
1. For specific examples and a broader discussion
of this, see, Bonnie Glaser “China’s Coercive
Economic Diplomacy: A New and Worrying
Trend,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, August 6, 2012.
2. Carlyle A. Thayer, “Background Briefing: Brunei:
National Security Outlook,” Thayer Consultancy,
August 22, 2011.
3. Carlyle A. Thayer. “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct
in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for
Community-Building?” The Asia-Pacific Journal,
Vol. 10, Issue 34, No. 4, August 20, 2012.
***
Shifts in Beijing’s Afghan Policy: A
View From the Ground
By Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen
In a clear but still gradual shift over the past year,
Chinese policymakers have changed their stance
on Afghanistan from cultivated disinterest to growing
engagement. As the potential security vacuum left by
Western withdrawal in 2014 comes into sharper relief,
Beijing has come to realize that it will have to play a role
in encouraging a more stable and developed future for
Afghanistan. As with China’s engagement in Central Asia
as a whole, Chinese activity in Afghanistan is less a part
of a grand strategy for the region and more the sum of
number of disparate parts. Nevertheless, the sum of these
parts could have major consequences for Afghanistan and
the region’s trajectory as it signals a growing realization by
Beijing of the role it will find itself playing in the future.
The most visible and significant element of China’s
renewed focus on Afghanistan was marked by the visit
in late September of Politburo member and security
10
supremo Zhou Yongkang to Kabul (Xinhua, September
24; China Daily, September 24). This was the first visit by a
Politburo-level Chinese official to the country since 1966
when President Liu Shaoqi visited the country just prior to
being purged during the Cultural Revolution. It marked,
however, the latest in a growing series of high-level visits
and meetings marking China’s more focused attention on
Afghanistan. This attention dates back to February 28,
2012, when Beijing hosted the first Afghanistan-China-
Pakistan trilateral dialogue. Held at the level of foreign
ministry director-general positions (or rough equivalents),
the meeting was given a senior stamp of approval when the
group was met by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
a day after the discussions (Afghan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, February 28). Then in June, as China was hosting
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit
in Beijing, President Hu Jintao signed a bilateral “strategic
and cooperative partnership” agreement with President
Karzai as well as welcoming the country to becoming an
official SCO observer (Xinhua, June 8). President Karzai
thanked President Hu for helping facilitate the SCO
upgrading, saying “without your support, we cannot do
this” (Xinhua, June 8). Just over a month later on July 27,
this was followed by a further high level meeting between
China’s Central Military Commission Vice Chairman
General Guo Boxiong and Afghan Defense Minister
Abdul Rahim Wardak. The focus of the meetings was
to “enhance strategic communication and strengthen
pragmatic cooperation in order to contribute to bilateral
strategic cooperation” (Xinhua, July 27). The full impact
of relationships established during this visit, however,
may have been undermined by Wardak’s resignation
after a no confidence vote in Kabul just over a week
later (Reuters, August 7). Whatever the case, the growing
importance China accords to the bilateral relationship
would have been emphasized again in late September by
Zhou Yongkang’s visit.
The importance of Zhou’s visit was not only the
symbolism of a senior Chinese visitor to Kabul, but also
the emphasis that his presence casts on China’s interests
in Afghanistan. Within the (now outgoing) Politburo,
Zhou is responsible for security matters, primarily
domestic, something that highlighted China’s interest
in Afghanistan’s potential as a safe haven for militants.
With an eye toward the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO
combat forces in 2014, China increasingly has expressed
concern about the possible spillover of militancy from

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
Afghanistan into China’s western Xinjiang province.
Notwithstanding its proximity to Kashgar—a city China
is trying to develop into a regional trade hub—China
keeps its border with Afghanistan tightly closed, with
locals in Xinjiang reporting that authorities encouraged
them to help monitor any movements across the border
[1]. Afghanistan has asked repeatedly for China to open
the Wakhan Corridor that links the two countries, but
been rebuffed by Chinese security concerns (China Daily,
October 16, 2010). When the authors visited earlier this
year, there was little evidence the border was about to be
opened.
Chinese security concerns are further visible in
announcements made during Zhou’s visit about China
agreeing to train some 300 Afghan police officers over
the next four years (“Zhou Yongkang’s Trip Highlights
Security Diplomacy,” China Brief, October 5). Previously,
China has provided training for various Afghan technical
personnel and officials with Foreign Minister Yang
declaring in July 2010 they had trained some 781 Afghans
so far with a further 200 trained that year. In May, China
and the United States jointly hosted a two-week training
session for a group of some 15 young Afghan diplomats
(Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 17; July 21,
2010). China’s current willingness to explore training
security personnel also highlights the growing importance
of this aspect of their relationship.
Judging from the June SCO Summit in Beijing, China clearly
is aware of the potential implications of deterioration
in Afghan security and the implications for the broader
region and within this context. During the summit, Beijing
focused heavily on persuading Russia and Central Asian
member states to coordinate commitments (at least those
within the SCO) toward Afghanistan to some degree, and
provide aid to contribute to Afghanistan reconstruction
and stabilization. As is usual with SCO endeavors, this
looked more like a multilateral vehicle for Chinese
bilateral activities. The “strategic partnership” signed
was between Beijing and Kabul and the 150 million yuan
($23 million) in aid promised to Afghanistan came from
China, not the SCO as an organization (Xinhua, June 8).
Nevertheless, Afghanistan will benefit from an increased
profile and upgraded role to observer within the SCO.
It may be asked to contribute information on militants
to the SCO’s Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS)
in Tashkent and presumably also will be able to benefit
11
from others’ contributions. Overall, the summit was
symbolically important for both China and Afghanistan.
Beijing announced it will be engaged in Afghanistan’s
future and Kabul gained commitments from a regional
power to bolster its post-2014 prospects.
To examine Afghanistan from a broader perspective,
China’s main concern with Central Asia is the importance
of the region in helping Xinjiang develop by providing
trading partners as well as routes to Russian, European
and Middle Eastern markets. Security concerns
emanating from Afghanistan are clearly a major potential
obstacle to this. Thus, Zhou’s visit and China’s attention
more generally can be said to have both a security and
economic dimension that links Xinjiang and the broader
region. This economic dimension for Afghanistan in
particular was emphasized by the fact that pictures
of Zhou’s visit showed him being met at his plane by
Afghan Commerce and Industry Minister Anwar ul-Haq
Ahady (Xinhua, September 22). Furthermore, Zhou is
a graduate of the Beijing Petroleum Institute and spent
most of the 1960s and 1970s working in the oil sector,
including a period as General Manager of China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)—a company that has
made a number of investments in Afghanistan and that
has encountered problems in the country as well. It seems
probable that these topics would have been on Zhou’s
agenda in Kabul.
In mid-October, CNPC started extracting oil from its
field in Afghanistan’s northern Amu Darya basin. At
1,950 barrels per day, the project is a relatively small one,
but is being promoted by the Afghan government as a
model for how Kabul can raise revenues and wean itself
off of foreign aid (Reuters, October 21). Completed
at CNPC’s signature blistering speed, plans call for the
Amu Darya project’s oil to be refined across the border
in Turkmenistan until the Chinese state-owned enterprise
(SOE) builds a refinery close to the site in two to three
years. CNPC won the tender for the project partly due
to its very generous terms: 50–70 percent of profits
will go to the Afghan government together with a 15
percent royalty on top of a 20 percent corporate tax
(Reuters, October 21). While Chinese aid to Afghanistan
is relatively low—partly due to domestic intolerance of
sending funds abroad—projects such as the oil extraction
in the Amu Darya basin appear to be an indirect form of
“corporate aid.”

ChinaBrief Volume XII s Issue 21 s November 6, 2012
The relatively small oil project, however, may well be a
foot in the door for access to major natural gas deposits
in northern and northwestern Afghanistan. It was
CNPC geologists from Turkmenistan with the world’s
fourth largest natural gas reserves that scouted out the
Amu Darya oil project and they have their eye on gas
formations that straddle the border [2]. With possible
recent major gas finds close by in Tajikistan, CNPC is
positioning itself to reap the natural resource benefits of
a long-neglected area. In June, it announced plans to run
a fourth string of the Central Asia-China pipeline from
Turkmenistan to Xinjiang through northern Afghanistan
(Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 19). CNPC also reportedly
expressed interest in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline at the project’s
Singapore roadshow event in September [3].
Whether or not CNPC moves forward with these projects,
the prominent Chinese SOE is signaling that they see
northern Afghanistan as a stable area going forward
(Cnpc.com.cn, June 7). Until a few months ago, militias
loyal to Afghan Army Chief of Staff and local warlord
Abdul Rashid Dostum harassed Chinese workers in the
area, but a deal seems to have been struck where these
incidents have ceased (Reuters, June 11). Should CNPC
move forward with its announced plans for a natural
gas pipeline, it will likely find itself working closely with
Dostum and other warlords.
In contrast to the opportunities blossoming in northern
Afghanistan, just southeast of Kabul in Logar province
the once highly touted Aynak Copper mine project is
languishing. Described by President Karzai as “one of the
most important economic projects in Afghan history,” the
project led by Chinese SOEs Metallurgical Corporation
of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper was valued at
around $4 billion and was the largest investment project
in Afghanistan (Xinhua, May 22, 2011). It, however,
has been beset by problems, including an archeological
dig atop the site, security concerns and now financial
troubles at the parent company MCC. One report
from late September stated Chinese workers had been
spooked by security concerns and had left the country
with only a skeleton crew left to watch over equipment
(Reuters, September 27). This state of affairs seems to
have reinforced skepticism of Beijing’s commitment to
the project—and possibly even to Afghanistan itself—
among Kabul-based officials and experts [4].
12
A final element that has not been sufficiently analyzed is
the implication of China’s growing relationship with Kabul
and its interactions with historical ally Islamabad. Whilst it
is clear that China sees the importance of Pakistan in any
long-term solution in Afghanistan, it is also increasingly
clear that Beijing is concerned about how security in
Pakistan continues to deteriorate. It thus seems likely that
China’s growing focus on Afghanistan is at least in part
out of recognition that it can no longer simply abrogate
its strategy toward Kabul to Islamabad—a default setting
Beijing previously employed. As the security situation in
Afghanistan (and Pakistan) continues to muddle along
in a negative direction, Beijing now has realized that
it must do more to stabilize its restive neighbor. Zhou
Yongkang’s visit is merely the culmination of this new
focus on Afghanistan that is going to continue to develop
as the 2014 deadline approaches. Whether this new
attention translates into new policy resources, however,
remains to be seen and probably will have to wait until
after next March’s National People’s Congress, when
China’s leadership transition will be completed.
Raffaello Pantucci is a Visiting Scholar at the Shanghai Academy
of Social Sciences and Alexandros Petersen is the author of
The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate
of the West. Their joint research is available at http://www.
chinaincentralasia.com.
Notes:
1. The authors visited Tashkurgan, Xinjiang (near
the Sino-Afghan border) in May 2012.
2. Authors’ Interviews in Kabul, May 2012.
3. Authors’ Interviews in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan,
September 2012.
4. This is a key topic of conversation with
interviewees with whom the authors spoke,
including local analysts, foreign diplomats,
international donors and journalists who all
reached similar conclusions. Author Interviews
in Kabul, May 2012.
***