Global Health Watch 1 in one file

dispute settlement mechanism, which was not considered in the 2004 report)
and other trade policy institutions conform to this principle.
On the second point, recognition is growing of both the desirability and
the difficulty of devising some mechanism of global income transfers. Yunker
(2004) uses a global econometric model (the World Economic Equalization
Programme, or WEEP) to simulate the effects over a 50–year period of a ‘global
Marshall Plan’ to raise economic growth in the developing world using major
increases in development assistance financed by national treasuries. While
he is candid about the huge uncertainties inherent in such simulations, he
concludes that if such a programme were implemented, ‘the living standards
of what are the poorest countries of today would have improved sufficiently,
by the end of the period, to be comparable to those of the richest countries
today’. This result, inconceivable in a business-as-usual scenario, is relatively
insensitive to variations in key assumptions. However, it would require annual
development assistance commitments by the rich countries on the order of
2–4% of GNI or GNP – far higher than the 0.7% target, now reached by only a
few countries (see part E, chapter 5).
If such national commitments are unlikely, what international revenueraising
mechanisms might be considered? Taxes on arms trade and international
air travel have been proposed, although neither would raise
substantial revenue (US$ 5–20 billion annually). A carbon tax on high-income
countries only (at a rate low enough not to be a drag on consumption) would
generate around US$ 125 billion annually; the rationale for not imposing it
universally is that some low-income countries with small populations could
pay higher amounts of their income in such a tax than people in high-income
countries, rendering it regressive rather than progressive. A currency transaction
tax of 0.25% (the so-called Tobin tax) would generate over US$ 170
billion annually, according to one estimate (others suggest it may be considerably
less), and is perhaps the least difficult to implement.
Other suggestions to address the problem of MNEs and wealthy individuals
shifting assets and operations around the world include the issuance of one
tax identification number that ensured corporate or personal confidentiality,
but would allow all jurisdictions believing they had a tax claim to levy it; and
national withholding taxes on all capital leaving a country, to limit the possibilities
for capital flight (Clunies-Ross 2004).
These policy options, even more than others we have described, face formidable
political difficulties. They challenge the orthodoxy of neoliberal economics,
and would involve fundamental shifts in the global distribution of wealth
and power. History suggests that such changes demand radical (and not always
Health for all in a ‘borderless world’?
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