Global Health Watch 1 in one file
Global Health Watch 1 in one file Global Health Watch 1 in one file
Holding to account | E3 The reform agenda Many critics say the Bank and Fund are unreformable. Those who advocate reform call for different kinds of actions from many sections of civil society: activists generating pressure for change in the streets; academics providing evidence; public servants defending the right to essential services; parliamentarians reclaiming national sovereignty over policy-making; and NGOs carrying all these messages to governments and the institutions. Reform should address a number of issues, as follows: Organizational structure The Bank must be governed and managed by directors and senior staff appointed through open and meritocratic rules. The composition and voting power of the boards must reflect fairer representation of the recipient countries, rather than the rich countries’ influence and corporate interests. The staff of the Bank and the Fund must become more diverse. Decision-making and transparency Voting procedures on the board must become transparent and formalized and key documents published. Final authority for national development strategies must rest with sovereign parliaments, not with the board (Bretton Woods Project 2004). Public accountability Greater powers must be given to independent evaluation bodies. The Bank and the Fund must become subject to international law. Reform measures specific to the Fund include: Mandate Create regional monetary funds to encourage a tailored response to financial imbalances; eliminate loan conditions other than those relating to repayment and transparency. Lending Return to original mandate to provide short-term finance to address short-term crises; remove the ‘seal of approval’ function. Surveillance and monitoring The same discipline should apply to all member countries, including powerful actors; surveillance should be exercised by independent evaluators, not Fund staff. Reform measures specific to the Bank include: Mandate Roll back the Bank’s ‘mission creep’ into national policy-making and issue areas for which other specialized agencies have a mandate, e.g. health. Projects The repayment terms of credit instruments should be suited to the revenue-generating potential of the project funded. Social and environmen- 304
tal policies should explicitly refer to international standards and the Bank should respond to judgements by international treaty bodies. Private sector arms should not subsidize transnational corporations and instead should assist small and medium enterprises from developing countries. Independent arbitration should ensure that when Bank projects fail because of poor design, the costs are shared with the borrower government. Structural adjustment Eliminate all conditions except those relating to transparency and the prevention of corruption in public spending. Introduce peer review mechanisms for countries. Respond to the analysis of UN specialized agencies on broader governance issues, rather than conduct such analysis. Knowledge End role as global think-tank on all development policy issues; subject all Bank research to peer review; end pretensions to leadership on global public goods; and stop training and capacity-building of journalists, parliamentarians etc. Resources and further information The Bretton Woods Project is a UK-based watchdog of the World Bank and IMF (http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org). IFIwatchnet connects organizations worldwide monitoring the international financial institutions (http://www.ifiwatchnet.org). World Bank Bonds Boycott (http://www.worldbankboycott.org). References Bretton Woods Project (2003a). Harmonisation and coherence: white knights or Trojan horses? (http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B126%5 D=x-126–16735, accessed 25 February 2005). Bretton Woods Project (2003b). US, Europeans trade blows over lack of progress on Bank, Fund governance reform (http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article. shtml?cmd[126]=x-126–16567, accessed 25 February 2005). Bretton Woods Project (2004). Parliaments reign in IFIs: international campaign gains momentum (http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd[126]=x-126- 72225, accessed 25 February 2005). CNES (2004). Judge and jury: the World Bank’s scorecard for borrowing governments. Citizen’s Network for Essential Services (http://www.servicesforall.org, accessed 28 February 2005). Killick T, Gunatilaka R, Marr A (1998). Aid and the political economy of political change. London and New York, Routledge. Kruse T (2003). The IMF and the Bolivian crisis (http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/doc/boliviaimf.pdf, accessed 26 February 2005). Stewart F, Wang M (2003). Do PRSPs empower poor countries and disempower the World Bank, or is it the other way round? Working paper 108, May, Queen Elizabeth The World Bank and the IMF 305
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Hold<strong>in</strong>g to account | E3<br />
The reform agenda<br />
Many critics say the Bank and Fund are unreformable. Those who advocate<br />
reform call for different k<strong>in</strong>ds of actions from many sections of civil society:<br />
activists generat<strong>in</strong>g pressure for change <strong>in</strong> the streets; academics provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />
evidence; public servants defend<strong>in</strong>g the right to essential services; parliamentarians<br />
reclaim<strong>in</strong>g national sovereignty over policy-mak<strong>in</strong>g; and NGOs carry<strong>in</strong>g<br />
all these messages to governments and the <strong>in</strong>stitutions. Reform should<br />
address a number of issues, as follows:<br />
Organizational structure The Bank must be governed and managed by directors<br />
and senior staff appo<strong>in</strong>ted through open and meritocratic rules. The composition<br />
and vot<strong>in</strong>g power of the boards must reflect fairer representation of<br />
the recipient countries, rather than the rich countries’ <strong>in</strong>fluence and corporate<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests. The staff of the Bank and the Fund must become more diverse.<br />
Decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g and transparency Vot<strong>in</strong>g procedures on the board must become<br />
transparent and formalized and key documents published. F<strong>in</strong>al authority<br />
for national development strategies must rest with sovereign parliaments,<br />
not with the board (Bretton Woods Project 2004).<br />
Public accountability Greater powers must be given to <strong>in</strong>dependent evaluation<br />
bodies. The Bank and the Fund must become subject to <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
law.<br />
Reform measures specific to the Fund <strong>in</strong>clude:<br />
Mandate Create regional m<strong>one</strong>tary funds to encourage a tailored response to<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial imbalances; elim<strong>in</strong>ate loan conditions other than those relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
repayment and transparency.<br />
Lend<strong>in</strong>g Return to orig<strong>in</strong>al mandate to provide short-term f<strong>in</strong>ance to address<br />
short-term crises; remove the ‘seal of approval’ function.<br />
Surveillance and monitor<strong>in</strong>g The same discipl<strong>in</strong>e should apply to all member<br />
countries, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g powerful actors; surveillance should be exercised by<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent evaluators, not Fund staff.<br />
Reform measures specific to the Bank <strong>in</strong>clude:<br />
Mandate Roll back the Bank’s ‘mission creep’ <strong>in</strong>to national policy-mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
and issue areas for which other specialized agencies have a mandate, e.g.<br />
health.<br />
Projects The repayment terms of credit <strong>in</strong>struments should be suited to the<br />
revenue-generat<strong>in</strong>g potential of the project funded. Social and environmen-<br />
304