Global Health Watch 1 in one file
Global Health Watch 1 in one file Global Health Watch 1 in one file
The wider health context | D2 Box D2.4 Water privatization hits the poor in the Philippines With the support and advice of the World Bank, Manila agreed to one of the world’s biggest water privatizations in 1997, when 25–year rights to operate and expand water and sewerage services were granted to Manila Water (co-owned by Bechtel and the Ayala family from the Philippines) and Maynilad Water (co-owned by Ondeo/Suez and the Lopez family from the Philippines). Suez promised to lower rates and expand the infrastructure for the 7.5 million households covered by the concession. While the government promised a price freeze until 2007, the contract had several mechanisms permitting ‘extraordinary price adjustments’. Other promises included 100% infrastructure coverage by 2007 and US$ 7.5 billion of new investments over 25 years. Unaccounted water would fall to 32% in 2007 and the city would save US$4 billion over 25 years. Maynilad asked for the first rate increase only a year into the contract. The Asian Labor Network calculated that an ordinary Filipino family would therefore have to forgo 87–147 pesos a month, effectively depriving them of three full meals or three kilos of rice. The ordinary householder now has to spend a day’s income on water. Shortly before Maynilad took control almost 2000 workers were retired to lower costs. Six months into the contract, a further 750 were laid off. But it continued to seek contract renegotiations, including rate increases and postponement of obligations to meet investment targets. This should have caused it to forfeit its performance bond, but the company used legal action to block it. The most controversial contract renegotiation involved passing foreign exchange losses on to consumers. This ensured that Suez could continue to use its major foreign corporate suppliers and consultants (rather than local sources) while billing consumers to cover for the effects of peso devaluation. However, this demand was refused by the government. The companies threatened to terminate their contract when, after six previous rate increases, they were unable to persuade the regulator to approve another one. (Source: Public Citizen 2003b) ized where services or water projects have been defined by contracts between governments and for-profit contractors. When problems arise, blame is shifted to and fro between governments and contractors. 216
The private sector overestimates the cost of expanding water services. Investment needs to rise from an annual US$ 75 million to US$ 180 billion to achieve the MDG targets (Winpenny 2003), but the International Rivers Network says the targets could be met with an additional US$ 10 billion a year if more cost-effective and appropriate approaches were used, while Women in Europe for a Common Future agrees that much less money is needed if the technology is right (European Public Health Alliance 2003). A socially oriented approach to water services is often cheaper and politically more sustainable. Donor focus should therefore shift to other key players – government officials, NGOs, small-scale and micro enterprises and civil society organizations. Finally, the argument that privatization fills the public financing gap (it Box D2.5 Civil society fights back In 1999, at the insistence of the World Bank, the Bolivian government awarded a concession to a private company to manage and supply water in Cochabamba. The local press reported that foreign investors acquired the city water system, worth millions of dollars, for less than US$ 20,000 of up-front capital in a sale in which they were the only bidder. The government had promised no more than a 10% rise in prices as a result of the privatization, but Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of the Bechtel Corporation, implemented massive hikes up to three times higher. Families earning a minimum wage of US$ 60 a month suddenly faced water bills of US$ 20 a month. Cochabamba residents shut down their city for four straight days in 2000, with a general strike led by a new alliance of labour community leaders and academics. The government was forced to agree to a price cut. When nothing happened, the residents took to the streets again. In response, the government declared martial law, arrested protest leaders and shut down radio stations. Protesters were shot at and even killed. But finally the government conceded and agreed to every demand. Bechtel’s contract was cancelled and replaced with a community-controlled water system that is providing water more equitably and universally than before. Bechtel responded with an unsuccessful US$ 25 million lawsuit for lost profits. Five years later a new privatization scheme was attempted in the city of El Alto, again with the full backing of the World Bank. Civil society fought back and once again won the battle through mass mobilizations (Source: Public Citizen 2003b). Water 217
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The wider health context | D2<br />
Box D2.4 Water privatization hits the poor <strong>in</strong> the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es<br />
With the support and advice of the World Bank, Manila agreed to <strong>one</strong> of<br />
the world’s biggest water privatizations <strong>in</strong> 1997, when 25–year rights to<br />
operate and expand water and sewerage services were granted to Manila<br />
Water (co-owned by Bechtel and the Ayala family from the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es)<br />
and Maynilad Water (co-owned by Ondeo/Suez and the Lopez family from<br />
the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es).<br />
Suez promised to lower rates and expand the <strong>in</strong>frastructure for the 7.5<br />
million households covered by the concession. While the government<br />
promised a price freeze until 2007, the contract had several mechanisms<br />
permitt<strong>in</strong>g ‘extraord<strong>in</strong>ary price adjustments’. Other promises <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
100% <strong>in</strong>frastructure coverage by 2007 and US$ 7.5 billion of new <strong>in</strong>vestments<br />
over 25 years. Unaccounted water would fall to 32% <strong>in</strong> 2007 and the<br />
city would save US$4 billion over 25 years.<br />
Maynilad asked for the first rate <strong>in</strong>crease only a year <strong>in</strong>to the contract.<br />
The Asian Labor Network calculated that an ord<strong>in</strong>ary Filip<strong>in</strong>o family would<br />
therefore have to forgo 87–147 pesos a month, effectively depriv<strong>in</strong>g them<br />
of three full meals or three kilos of rice. The ord<strong>in</strong>ary householder now has<br />
to spend a day’s <strong>in</strong>come on water.<br />
Shortly before Maynilad took control almost 2000 workers were retired<br />
to lower costs. Six months <strong>in</strong>to the contract, a further 750 were laid off.<br />
But it cont<strong>in</strong>ued to seek contract renegotiations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g rate <strong>in</strong>creases<br />
and postp<strong>one</strong>ment of obligations to meet <strong>in</strong>vestment targets. This should<br />
have caused it to forfeit its performance bond, but the company used legal<br />
action to block it.<br />
The most controversial contract renegotiation <strong>in</strong>volved pass<strong>in</strong>g foreign<br />
exchange losses on to consumers. This ensured that Suez could cont<strong>in</strong>ue<br />
to use its major foreign corporate suppliers and consultants (rather than<br />
local sources) while bill<strong>in</strong>g consumers to cover for the effects of peso devaluation.<br />
However, this demand was refused by the government. The companies<br />
threatened to term<strong>in</strong>ate their contract when, after six previous rate<br />
<strong>in</strong>creases, they were unable to persuade the regulator to approve another<br />
<strong>one</strong>. (Source: Public Citizen 2003b)<br />
ized where services or water projects have been def<strong>in</strong>ed by contracts between<br />
governments and for-profit contractors. When problems arise, blame is shifted<br />
to and fro between governments and contractors.<br />
216