Global Health Watch 1 in one file
Global Health Watch 1 in one file Global Health Watch 1 in one file
Health care systems | B2 chapter recognizes that the pharmaceutical sector has largely been shaped by a powerful and politically influential corporate sector intent on protecting its own interests (see Box B2.3). Civil society needs to mobilize when these interests conflict with the social aims of equity and health for all, and the chapter concludes with recommendations for action. Intellectual property rights, monopolies and high prices The price of new medicines is largely governed by an intellectual property rights (IPR) regime that grants patents to any company that registers a new medicine. Patents are granted by governments and give a company monopoly power to manufacture and sell a medicine free of competition from any other manufacturer in that particular country. This monopoly power allows the patent-holder to set a price many times greater than the cost of production. Patents are usually granted for a fixed period after which other companies are permitted to manufacture generic versions of the same medicine. Big Pharma argues that patents are vital incentives to companies to invest in pharmaceutical research and development. It also says the revenue from profitable products can be used to support research into new treatments for diseases, ‘including those which particularly affect the developing world’ (IF- PMA 2005). Initially, IPRs were governed internationally by the Paris Convention and administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). However, in 1986, the developed countries, led by the United States, brought IPR issues into the realm of trade policy and negotiations. Although certain developing countries argued that IPRs were not free trade issues, the developed countries, supported by Big Pharma, pushed through the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (Drahos and Braithwaite 2004). Developing countries gave up their resistance to the Agreement in the face of the overwhelming influence of the US, EU and Japan. The power imbalance of negotiations is reflected by the fact that only about ten developing countries actually sent intellectual property experts to the TRIPS negotiations (Matthews 2002). TRIPS stipulates that by January 2005, all member states of the WTO must grant patents on all medicines for a period of 20 years. Whereas patents were previously granted by governments on a country-by-country basis, there is now a single and standard patent agreement that applies to all countries. A particular concern is the potential impacts on countries, such as India and China, that are important sources of generic medicines, including antiretrovirals. There is presently a campaign against the amendment to Indian patent 104
7 Selling medicines at the back of a bus. law which will potentially destroy the generic drugs manufacturing capacity in India (Sen Gupta 2005). A degree of flexibility has been built into TRIPS, following intensive lobbying by civil society and some developing country governments. This led to Medicines 105
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<strong>Health</strong> care systems | B2<br />
chapter recognizes that the pharmaceutical sector has largely been shaped by<br />
a powerful and politically <strong>in</strong>fluential corporate sector <strong>in</strong>tent on protect<strong>in</strong>g its<br />
own <strong>in</strong>terests (see Box B2.3). Civil society needs to mobilize when these <strong>in</strong>terests<br />
conflict with the social aims of equity and health for all, and the chapter<br />
concludes with recommendations for action.<br />
Intellectual property rights, monopolies and high prices<br />
The price of new medic<strong>in</strong>es is largely governed by an <strong>in</strong>tellectual property<br />
rights (IPR) regime that grants patents to any company that registers a new<br />
medic<strong>in</strong>e. Patents are granted by governments and give a company monopoly<br />
power to manufacture and sell a medic<strong>in</strong>e free of competition from any other<br />
manufacturer <strong>in</strong> that particular country. This monopoly power allows the<br />
patent-holder to set a price many times greater than the cost of production.<br />
Patents are usually granted for a fixed period after which other companies are<br />
permitted to manufacture generic versions of the same medic<strong>in</strong>e.<br />
Big Pharma argues that patents are vital <strong>in</strong>centives to companies to <strong>in</strong>vest<br />
<strong>in</strong> pharmaceutical research and development. It also says the revenue from<br />
profitable products can be used to support research <strong>in</strong>to new treatments for<br />
diseases, ‘<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those which particularly affect the develop<strong>in</strong>g world’ (IF-<br />
PMA 2005).<br />
Initially, IPRs were governed <strong>in</strong>ternationally by the Paris Convention and adm<strong>in</strong>istered<br />
by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). However,<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1986, the developed countries, led by the United States, brought IPR issues<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the realm of trade policy and negotiations. Although certa<strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
countries argued that IPRs were not free trade issues, the developed countries,<br />
supported by Big Pharma, pushed through the Agreement on Trade Related<br />
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) <strong>in</strong> 1994 under the auspices<br />
of the World Trade Organization (Drahos and Braithwaite 2004). Develop<strong>in</strong>g<br />
countries gave up their resistance to the Agreement <strong>in</strong> the face of the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence of the US, EU and Japan. The power imbalance of negotiations<br />
is reflected by the fact that only about ten develop<strong>in</strong>g countries actually<br />
sent <strong>in</strong>tellectual property experts to the TRIPS negotiations (Matthews 2002).<br />
TRIPS stipulates that by January 2005, all member states of the WTO must<br />
grant patents on all medic<strong>in</strong>es for a period of 20 years. Whereas patents were<br />
previously granted by governments on a country-by-country basis, there is<br />
now a s<strong>in</strong>gle and standard patent agreement that applies to all countries. A<br />
particular concern is the potential impacts on countries, such as India and<br />
Ch<strong>in</strong>a, that are important sources of generic medic<strong>in</strong>es, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g antiretrovirals.<br />
There is presently a campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st the amendment to Indian patent<br />
104