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30 May 2013 - ICTY

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49247<br />

maintaining Serb military and civilian control and that they possibly did not care whether<br />

non-Serbs would stay in Serb-ruled areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (and perhaps be<br />

suppressed) as long as they would not be in power.<br />

2416. My task is not to assess what likely was the intent of the Accused but whether the<br />

evidence allows me to establish beyond a reasonable doubt what they intended. It may be that<br />

the Accused silently adhered not only to establishing and maintaining Serb military and<br />

civilian control but also to creating purely Serb areas through the forcible and permanent<br />

removal of non-Serbs. Yet, the evidence is ambiguous in that respect. It shows that the<br />

Accused were involved in many activities, often meetings, which may well have served either<br />

or both of these purposes. For example, if the evidence showed that the Accused met with<br />

Milošević or Hadžić or others, it often does not provide details about the content of the<br />

discussions and the positions taken by the Accused. It is very tempting to interpret the<br />

meaning of the Accused’s presence at such meetings in light of the events that followed. But<br />

then one must also keep in mind that these events did not solely involve the commission of<br />

the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer but also the military operations of taking over<br />

towns or villages. To go too easily from presence at meetings via the commission of crimes to<br />

the intent for crimes of each participant of that meeting comes dangerously close to attributing<br />

guilt by association. Another example is the meeting of 28 February 1993 between Simatović,<br />

Mladić, Panić, and Ojdanić at Mount Tara, of which we do not know much more than that its<br />

subject was the planning of Operation Udar. I do recall, apart from that, that the Judgement<br />

states that the evidence was insufficient to find that any crimes were committed during, or as<br />

part of, this operation. The lack of information as to the content of many discussions or<br />

meetings obscures my view on issues which are vital to establishing the mens rea of the<br />

Accused. 5111 Where the evidence does indicate the subject matter of certain meetings, the<br />

discussions often focus on logistical or financial matters. I refer, by way of example, to the<br />

meetings in late 1991 in the SUP Belgrade in relation to policemen to be sent to the SAO<br />

SBWS for training local policemen, and in 1991 in Belgrade about equipment and assistance<br />

to be provided to the SAO SBWS police (see chapter 6.7). Lastly, I want to address<br />

5111 For example, see chapters 6.9 and 6.10 in relation to a meeting attended by Stanišić in Dalj prior to the fall of<br />

Vukovar, and another meeting attended by Simatović prior to the fall of Vukovar. There was insufficient<br />

evidence about the content of these meetings. Must I now assume that the Accused not only discussed the<br />

military operational aspects of the operation, but that they also discussed the forcible and permanent removal of<br />

the majority of non-Serbs and shared the intent to achieve this aim by crimes committed during the operations? It<br />

is perhaps likely that they did, but it is not the only reasonable interpretation. Indifference as to the crimes that<br />

might be committed, and a focus on the military aspects of the operation is still an inference that I cannot qualify<br />

as so unreasonable that I can exclude it.<br />

Case No. IT-03-69-T 871<br />

<strong>30</strong> <strong>May</strong> <strong>2013</strong>

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