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30 May 2013 - ICTY

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49249<br />

activity of the Serb forces was triggered by military operations of the enemy forces. 5108 I fully<br />

acknowledge that establishing and maintaining Serb military and civilian control was often<br />

accompanied by the commission of crimes, including crimes against humanity. The<br />

Judgement finds so on many occasions. A full analysis of the facts in this case thus requires to<br />

keep in mind this duality in the operations.<br />

2411. The formation of Serb units, their training, supporting, financing, supplying, or<br />

organizing their involvement and directing them in combat operations, as described in detail<br />

in the Judgement, furthered by their very nature the territorial claims of Serb leaders in wide<br />

areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It may also have furthered the forcible and<br />

permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs from those areas and the crimes committed<br />

to that end.<br />

2412. Is there any need to determine whether the intent of the Accused was limited to, or<br />

whether it went beyond, the establishment and maintenance of Serb military and civilian<br />

control, when the operations were accompanied by the commission of crimes resulting in the<br />

departure of non-Serbs? Is it not enough that the Accused knew of the reasonable risk that<br />

crimes would be committed in various operations by forces which had previously shown their<br />

propensity to criminal behaviour? Forces that were sometimes under their control, as<br />

explained in the Judgement. Does it make any difference whether the Accused intended the<br />

crimes to be committed as a means to achieve the common purpose of the forcible and<br />

permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs or whether they were just aware of the<br />

likelihood that those crimes would be committed in the operations they supported and that<br />

they were indifferent to their commission? From a legal perspective, it does.<br />

2413. Much evidence on the formation, training, organizing the involvement, financing,<br />

directing, supplying, and supporting of Serb forces focused on practical matters such as: who<br />

provided the weapons, how training camps were set up, who provided training to whom,<br />

where the money came from, under whose command the Serb forces operated, and to whom<br />

they were subordinated in the context of that operation. All of these activities are consistent<br />

with providing support to either the establishment and maintenance of Serb military and<br />

civilian control, or with furthering the commission of crimes aimed at achieving the common<br />

purpose, or both. In my view, establishing and maintaining Serb military and civilian control<br />

need not go hand-in-hand with moving out the non-Serb population. As such, even if one<br />

were to find that establishing and maintaining such control was accompanied by crimes like<br />

5108 See e.g. the Skelani operation in 1993, see chapter 6.3.3 in relation to the Skelani camp.<br />

Case No. IT-03-69-T 869<br />

<strong>30</strong> <strong>May</strong> <strong>2013</strong>

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