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30 May 2013 - ICTY

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49283<br />

issued a directive to VRS forces, in which he instructed the Drina Corps in the wider Podrinje<br />

region to force the enemy to leave the Birač, Žepa, and Goražde areas together with the<br />

Muslim population. 4987 The evidence further indicates that immediately prior to the 1993<br />

operations, Mrkšić gave a speech to VJ troops saying that Bosnian Muslims had taken the<br />

town of Skelani and that the area had to be cleansed of Muslims, because Serbia was in<br />

danger. 4988 The evidence does not establish that Mrkšić or Mladić discussed their intent with<br />

Stanišić or that Stanišić was otherwise informed of the directives and speeches Mrkšić and<br />

Mladić gave to the members of their armed forces. Nonetheless, in light of the totality of the<br />

evidence before it, the Trial Chamber considers it likely that Stanišić would have been aware<br />

of their intent, but still deployed the Unit in operations in which it cooperated with members<br />

of the VRS and the VJ and was subordinate to Mrkšić. The Trial Chamber will further<br />

address this matter below.<br />

2325. The Trial Chamber understands the above crimes in Bosanski Šamac and Doboj to<br />

have been committed in the context of the Unit’s operations in those areas in early 1992.<br />

These operations involved taking over territory that was not yet under the exclusive control of<br />

the Bosnian Serb municipal leadership and the Bosnian Serb armed forces. 4989 In this respect,<br />

these operations resemble the Unit’s other operations. For example, the evidence indicates<br />

that the Unit’s early operations in the SAO Krajina and the SAO SBWS in mid-to-late 1991<br />

included reconnaissance activities of and attacks on territory not yet under the exclusive<br />

control of the SAO Krajina and SAO SBWS authorities and armed forces. 4990 Further, the<br />

evidence indicates that the Unit’s later operations, including the Bratunac and Skelani<br />

operations in 1993 and the SBWS operations in 1995 were undertaken in response to military<br />

attacks by opposing forces, namely Naser Orić’s forces’ attacks in the Drina valley region in<br />

January 1993 and the Croatian forces’ Operation Storm in the RSK in August 1995. 4991 With<br />

the exception of the Bosanski Šamac and Doboj operations in 1992, the Trial Chamber has<br />

not found that Unit members committed crimes during the operations in which they were<br />

involved.<br />

4987 The Trial Chamber refers to the VRS directive in evidence as P385 reviewed in chapter 6.10.<br />

4988 See the evidence of Witness JF-033 reviewed in chapter 6.3.3 in relation to the Skelani camp.<br />

4989 The Trial Chamber refers to its findings in 3.4.2 and 3.5.2 on the attacks and take-overs of territory,<br />

including the take-overs of Doboj town and Bosanski Šamac town.<br />

4990 The Trial Chamber refers to its findings in chapters 3.1.7, 6.3.2, and 6.3.3 on the attacks and take-overs of<br />

territory, including attacks on Glina and Struga and reconnaissance operations in the SBWS.<br />

4991 The Trial Chamber refers to the evidence reviewed in chapter 6.3.3 in relation to the Tara, Skelani, and<br />

Bratunac camps and chapter 6.5.3 in relation to the SBWS operations in 1995.<br />

Case No. IT-03-69-T 835<br />

<strong>30</strong> <strong>May</strong> <strong>2013</strong>

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