Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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whereas <strong>the</strong> former question can be answered by<br />
uncover<strong>in</strong>g new facts about <strong>the</strong> practices, <strong>the</strong> latter<br />
question requires a different k<strong>in</strong>d of solution.<br />
In attempt<strong>in</strong>g to expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se practices, by ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
reveal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> beliefs of <strong>the</strong>ir practitioners or fitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m<br />
with<strong>in</strong> a developmental hypo<strong>the</strong>sis (a method of Frazer’s<br />
that we will consider later), Frazer is succumb<strong>in</strong>g to what<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> calls <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se remarks <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong> foolish<br />
superstition of our time” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 129), which<br />
is to believe that every puzzle can be remedied by a<br />
scientific explanation. In one of his transcripts,<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> identifies this as <strong>the</strong> “scientific way of<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> says:<br />
74<br />
What is disastrous about <strong>the</strong> scientific way of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<br />
(which today possesses <strong>the</strong> whole world) is that<br />
it wants to respond to any disquiet with an explanation.<br />
(TS 219, p. 8; author’s translation)<br />
The disquiet that Frazer suffers from, that which motivates<br />
him to seek an explanation for <strong>the</strong>se practices, is caused<br />
by <strong>the</strong>ir strangeness <strong>and</strong> unfamiliarity. However, this cannot<br />
be remedied through an explanation. Instead, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
says <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se remarks, <strong>in</strong> a variation on his advice to<br />
philosophers, that “one can only describe <strong>and</strong> say: this is<br />
what human life is like” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 121).<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> uses a concept that plays an important<br />
role <strong>in</strong> his discussions of <strong>the</strong> treatment of philosophical<br />
problems to characterize <strong>the</strong> sort of description that can<br />
provide <strong>the</strong> desired underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g: “perspicuous<br />
representation” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 133). Such a<br />
representation will help us see that “<strong>the</strong>re is also<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> us which speaks <strong>in</strong> favor of those savages’<br />
behaviour” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 131). He provides an<br />
example of this <strong>in</strong> a passage that has been used to<br />
support both <strong>the</strong> expressivist <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ctive <strong>in</strong>terpretations<br />
of his “Remarks on Frazer”:<br />
When I am furious about someth<strong>in</strong>g, I sometimes<br />
beat <strong>the</strong> ground or a tree with my walk<strong>in</strong>g stick. But I<br />
certa<strong>in</strong>ly do not believe that <strong>the</strong> ground is to blame<br />
or that my beat<strong>in</strong>g can help anyth<strong>in</strong>g. “I am vent<strong>in</strong>g<br />
my anger”. And all rites are of this k<strong>in</strong>d. Such actions<br />
may be called Inst<strong>in</strong>ct-actions.—And an historical<br />
explanation, say, that I or any ancestors previously<br />
believe that beat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ground does help is<br />
shadow-box<strong>in</strong>g, for it is a superfluous assumption<br />
that expla<strong>in</strong>s noth<strong>in</strong>g. The similarity of <strong>the</strong> action to<br />
an act of punishment is important, but noth<strong>in</strong>g more<br />
than this similarity can be asserted.<br />
Once such a phenomenon is brought <strong>in</strong>to connection<br />
with an <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct which I myself possess, this is<br />
precisely <strong>the</strong> explanation wished for; that is, <strong>the</strong> explanation<br />
which resolves <strong>the</strong> particular difficulty. And<br />
a fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>vestigation about <strong>the</strong> history of my <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct<br />
moves on ano<strong>the</strong>r track.<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 137)<br />
A description alone can reveal such a connection<br />
between an opaque practice <strong>and</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g I do. In do<strong>in</strong>g<br />
this, it would satisfy Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s criterion for a<br />
perspicuous representation:<br />
This perspicuous representation br<strong>in</strong>gs about <strong>the</strong><br />
underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g which consists precisely <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact<br />
that we “see <strong>the</strong> connections.” Hence <strong>the</strong> importance<br />
of f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g connect<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>ks.<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 133)<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> on Frazer <strong>and</strong> Explanation — Keith Dromm<br />
That Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> puts <strong>the</strong> connection <strong>in</strong> terms of a shared<br />
“<strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct” should not be taken as a commitment by him to<br />
some biological account of <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>s of ritualistic practices.<br />
Such an account, as well as any version of <strong>the</strong> expressivist<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory, would be as <strong>in</strong>capable as Frazer’s explanations<br />
of mak<strong>in</strong>g an alien practice seem less strange.<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> also says that an <strong>in</strong>vestigation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct’s<br />
history “moves on ano<strong>the</strong>r track,” suggest<strong>in</strong>g that an exact<br />
characterization of it is irrelevant to <strong>the</strong> purposes served by<br />
its identification.<br />
Instead of reveal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> emotional or biological roots<br />
of ritualistic actions, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> is draw<strong>in</strong>g our attention<br />
to what he elsewhere calls <strong>the</strong> “common spirit” that<br />
underlies <strong>the</strong> practices be<strong>in</strong>g compared:<br />
All <strong>the</strong>se different practices show that it is not a<br />
question of <strong>the</strong> derivation of one from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, but of a<br />
common spirit. And one could <strong>in</strong>vent (devise) all <strong>the</strong>se<br />
ceremonies oneself. And precisely that spirit from which<br />
one <strong>in</strong>vented <strong>the</strong>m would be <strong>the</strong>ir common spirit.<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 151)<br />
It is only by recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “common spirit” <strong>in</strong> which<br />
a practice is performed that it can be relieved of its<br />
strangeness. The recognition is not a matter of know<strong>in</strong>g<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> facts about <strong>the</strong> practice, facts that an explanation<br />
can provide. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it <strong>in</strong>volves be<strong>in</strong>g able to occupy<br />
imag<strong>in</strong>atively <strong>the</strong> place of a participant <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
practice. Our ability to do this can be facilitated by a<br />
description of <strong>the</strong> practice that highlights a “common spirit”<br />
or “connect<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>k” between <strong>the</strong> alien practice <strong>and</strong> one <strong>in</strong><br />
which we are already a participant. A description that is<br />
able to do this will provide <strong>the</strong> “satisfaction,” as<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> puts it, that Frazer sought through his<br />
explanations:<br />
I believe that <strong>the</strong> attempt to expla<strong>in</strong> is already <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
wrong, because one must only correctly piece<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r what one knows, without add<strong>in</strong>g anyth<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> satisfaction be<strong>in</strong>g sought through <strong>the</strong> explanation<br />
follows of itself.<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 121)<br />
If we fail to recognize <strong>the</strong> “common spirit” <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong><br />
practices are performed, <strong>the</strong>n no amount of new <strong>in</strong>formation<br />
provided by an explanation will make <strong>the</strong> alien practice<br />
any less opaque.<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> does admit a role for explanations <strong>in</strong><br />
facilitat<strong>in</strong>g our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of alien practices. However,<br />
<strong>in</strong> serv<strong>in</strong>g this role <strong>the</strong>y are importantly different than <strong>the</strong><br />
explanations that Frazer offers (as well as those<br />
sometimes attributed to Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>). For example, <strong>in</strong><br />
order to account for <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ister quality a contemporary<br />
spectator would discern <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beltane Fire Festival, Frazer<br />
offers a developmental hypo<strong>the</strong>sis for <strong>the</strong> ritual that<br />
locates its orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> human sacrifice. But this explanation’s<br />
ability to <strong>in</strong>crease our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> practice does<br />
not depend upon <strong>the</strong> explanation’s truth. As Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
expla<strong>in</strong>s:<br />
The deep, <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ister, do not depend on <strong>the</strong> history<br />
of <strong>the</strong> practice hav<strong>in</strong>g been like this, for perhaps it<br />
was not like this at all; nor on <strong>the</strong> fact that it was<br />
perhaps or probably like this, but ra<strong>the</strong>r on that<br />
which gives me grounds for assum<strong>in</strong>g this.<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1993, p. 147)<br />
The explanation can function as a “perspicuous representation”<br />
of <strong>the</strong> practice that is able to highlight those features<br />
of it by which we can, as Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> puts it, discern<br />
its “connection with our own feel<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> thoughts” (Witt-