Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
68<br />
who’s pull<strong>in</strong>g it. When we f<strong>in</strong>d such <strong>in</strong>dividual – how<br />
do we know that it is him, his pull<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> cause of<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> rope is mov<strong>in</strong>g? Do we establish<br />
that through a series of experiments?” CE, p. 15.10<br />
We don’t. The ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>the</strong> causality issue is that,<br />
when someth<strong>in</strong>g happens we look for (what we call) <strong>the</strong><br />
cause of it. At <strong>the</strong> root of <strong>the</strong> grammar of causality are not<br />
scientific facts, logical categories, or direct <strong>in</strong>tuitions. There<br />
is action: <strong>the</strong>re are acts of <strong>in</strong>vestigation. Investigation is<br />
not modelled on science, but vice-versa. The search for<br />
causes is a non-scientific, em<strong>in</strong>ently practical activity. We<br />
react to <strong>the</strong> cause, our eyes runn<strong>in</strong>g from one th<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r:<br />
3.<br />
“… to call someth<strong>in</strong>g a ‘cause’ is like po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
someone <strong>and</strong> say “He did it!” CE, 24.9<br />
“He who follows <strong>the</strong> rope <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ds who’s pull<strong>in</strong>g<br />
can take a fur<strong>the</strong>r step, <strong>and</strong> conclude: so this was<br />
<strong>the</strong> cause, - or ra<strong>the</strong>r, is it not <strong>the</strong> case that all he<br />
wanted to f<strong>in</strong>d was whe<strong>the</strong>r someone was pull<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
<strong>and</strong> who?”CE, 16.10<br />
The practice of scapegoat<strong>in</strong>g is anthropologically ubiquitous.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>dividuation of scapegoats is not an experimental,<br />
much less a logical enterprise. The cha<strong>in</strong> between <strong>the</strong><br />
scapegoat <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> misfortune it is said to have caused<br />
does not need to be spelled out scientifically. All that matters<br />
is that someone did it: if that is <strong>the</strong> case, <strong>the</strong>n someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
can be done back.<br />
“In one case ‘he is <strong>the</strong> cause’ simply means: he<br />
pulled <strong>the</strong> rope. In o<strong>the</strong>r cases it means someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
like: <strong>the</strong>se are <strong>the</strong> facts that I must change <strong>in</strong> order<br />
to elim<strong>in</strong>ate this phenomenon … But how do I get to<br />
<strong>the</strong> idea of chang<strong>in</strong>g a circumstance <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ate a phenomenon? ... Yes, it may be said<br />
that this presupposes that I am look<strong>in</strong>g for a cause,<br />
that from a phenomenon I go look for ano<strong>the</strong>r”.<br />
CE, p.20<br />
The search for a cause is a human reaction to <strong>the</strong> social<br />
facts of existence. We do not observe causal relations, we<br />
do not project causality onto <strong>the</strong> world, nor do we experience<br />
it <strong>in</strong>tuitively. These are chit-chats (CE, 22.10). We<br />
proclaim it.<br />
“… In alternative to what? Certa<strong>in</strong>ly to never pull <strong>the</strong><br />
str<strong>in</strong>gs, always rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g uncerta<strong>in</strong> about what<br />
really is <strong>the</strong> cause of <strong>the</strong> phenomenon; as if it made<br />
sense to say: strictly speak<strong>in</strong>g it is impossible to<br />
know with certa<strong>in</strong>ty, so that what would come closer<br />
to <strong>the</strong> truth would be to leave <strong>the</strong> question open.<br />
This idea is based on a total misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong> roles that perta<strong>in</strong> to exactness <strong>and</strong> doubt”<br />
CE, 21.10<br />
“The simple form (<strong>and</strong> this is <strong>the</strong> primitive form) of<br />
<strong>the</strong> game of cause <strong>and</strong> effect is <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
<strong>the</strong> cause, not <strong>the</strong> doubt” CE, 21.10<br />
The primitive form of <strong>the</strong> causality game is <strong>the</strong> hunt for a<br />
scapegoat, guilty of all bad, even <strong>and</strong> especially when <strong>the</strong><br />
trajectory of emergence of such bad is un-reconstruct-able.<br />
The proclamation needs not be substantiated scientifically<br />
– all is needed is that <strong>the</strong> general mechanism not be questioned.<br />
In CE, <strong>the</strong> genealogical argument starts with an <strong>in</strong>spection<br />
of <strong>the</strong> grammar of doubt: l<strong>in</strong>guistic games <strong>in</strong><br />
The Scapegoat Theory of Causality — Marcello di Paola<br />
which we doubt (that someth<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> cause of someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
else) orig<strong>in</strong>ate as complications of simpler games, <strong>in</strong> which<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is no doubt.<br />
I now submit that Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s position is best<br />
made sense of by an evolutionary <strong>in</strong>terpretation.<br />
4.<br />
The evolutionary position has it that some functions of our<br />
m<strong>in</strong>d, which philosophers, struck by <strong>the</strong>ir pervasiveness,<br />
have hypostasized as transcendental categories, or direct<br />
<strong>in</strong>tuitions, are <strong>in</strong>deed specializations that have evolved <strong>in</strong><br />
response to social situations humans have found <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
<strong>in</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir history as a species.<br />
Such hypo<strong>the</strong>sis was explored by Cosmides <strong>and</strong><br />
Tooby (1992), who ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that problems we f<strong>in</strong>d confus<strong>in</strong>g<br />
when expressed <strong>in</strong> naked logical terms become<br />
very clear when coated <strong>in</strong> social ones — we score high at<br />
logical <strong>in</strong>ference if <strong>the</strong> latter refers to contexts of <strong>in</strong>teraction:<br />
<strong>and</strong> those are <strong>the</strong> contexts faced by our ancestors<br />
when establish<strong>in</strong>g patterns of socio-economic connection.<br />
Our m<strong>in</strong>d has evolved a specialized capacity to tackle<br />
socially significant problems, such as <strong>in</strong>dividuat<strong>in</strong>g those<br />
who defect from covenants.<br />
When confronted with social problems, a specialized<br />
mental mechanism moves our eyes from one th<strong>in</strong>g to ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Thous<strong>and</strong>s of years of social negotiation have<br />
equipped us with a somewhat automatic drive to look for,<br />
<strong>and</strong> ability to f<strong>in</strong>d, who’s pull<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rope.<br />
Now, keep<strong>in</strong>g all that <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, as well as our brief<br />
discussion on scapegoat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s Gedankexperiment,<br />
consider <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g statement:<br />
“… If I say: history cannot be <strong>the</strong> cause of development,<br />
that does not mean that I cannot foresee development<br />
start<strong>in</strong>g from history, for this is precisely<br />
what I do; but it means that I do not call this a<br />
‘causal connection’, that this is not about predict<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> effect from <strong>the</strong> cause.<br />
To say: ‘There must be a difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> seeds,<br />
even if we cannot f<strong>in</strong>d it, pla<strong>in</strong>ly displays how powerful<br />
it is with<strong>in</strong> us <strong>the</strong> impulse to see everyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
through <strong>the</strong> scheme of cause <strong>and</strong> effect … ‘<strong>the</strong>re<br />
must be’, that is: we want to use this image <strong>in</strong> any<br />
case”. CE, 26.9<br />
Causality <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scientific sense means predict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> effect<br />
from its cause. In evolutionary, genealogical, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>ian<br />
sense, it means track<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cause from its effects.<br />
This is <strong>the</strong> scapegoat <strong>the</strong>ory of causality.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> group is hit by misfortune, <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic<br />
game of explanation is enacted <strong>in</strong> causal terms, with reference<br />
to a violation of social trust, which <strong>in</strong> turn implies a<br />
violation of <strong>the</strong> group’s covenant with its natural context,<br />
which expla<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> misfortune. The mysterious cause of<br />
nature’s operations is thus searched for <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuated<br />
with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> group. The elim<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong> guilty scapegoat is<br />
a necessary <strong>and</strong> sufficient condition for <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uation of<br />
social life. But what is important is that <strong>the</strong> causal cha<strong>in</strong><br />
l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> scapegoat to misfortune actually runs <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
way: from misfortune to scapegoat. The cause can only be<br />
genealogically reconstructed: before <strong>the</strong>y break <strong>the</strong> social<br />
covenant, community members are, as members, <strong>in</strong>dist<strong>in</strong>guishable,<br />
just like <strong>the</strong> two seeds <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gedankexperiment.<br />
In both cases, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ability to predict effects is ubiquitous:<br />
<strong>the</strong> grammar of a genu<strong>in</strong>ely causal explanation <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> scientific sense has no application.