Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
On Two Recent Defenses of The Simple Conditional Analysis of Disposition-Ascriptions — Kai-Yuan Cheng<br />
analysis. How to provide such a list is, as Choi himself<br />
acknowledges, “a nontrivial <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed hard problem”<br />
(2006, p. 377). What seems to be worse is that it is hard to<br />
see how this task could be done without hav<strong>in</strong>g to presuppose<br />
<strong>the</strong> very dispositional concept fragility, or even <strong>in</strong>vok<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept itself. Doesn’t <strong>the</strong> concept of fragility, when<br />
put <strong>in</strong>to an overtly dispositional locution, simply becomes<br />
one “which noth<strong>in</strong>g prevents it from be<strong>in</strong>g fragile”? This<br />
would be strik<strong>in</strong>gly circular.<br />
The difficulty <strong>in</strong>volved here is, <strong>in</strong> my view, not different<br />
from <strong>the</strong> problem for proponents of <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al simple<br />
conditional analysis who try to h<strong>and</strong>le <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>k cases by<br />
add<strong>in</strong>g a ceteris paribus clause to <strong>the</strong> antecedent of <strong>the</strong><br />
conditional. The trick is to enable us to treat <strong>the</strong> presence<br />
of f<strong>in</strong>ks as a condition where o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs are not be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
equal, <strong>and</strong> thus allow us to legitimately exclude <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>k<br />
counterexamples to <strong>the</strong> conditional analysis. As Mart<strong>in</strong><br />
(1994, p. 5-6) conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>gly po<strong>in</strong>ts out, however, <strong>the</strong> idea of<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ceteris paribus clause is to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> set<br />
of all <strong>the</strong> events which would br<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> same effects<br />
as f<strong>in</strong>ks, <strong>and</strong> this simply amounts to stat<strong>in</strong>g that noth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
happens to make it false that <strong>the</strong> disposition <strong>in</strong> question is<br />
<strong>in</strong> place. This modified simple conditional analysis is blatantly<br />
circular. It seems to me that <strong>the</strong> simple conditional<br />
analysis <strong>in</strong> Choi’s two-step approach merely transfers <strong>the</strong><br />
circularity problem from <strong>the</strong> level of a conditional (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
second step) to <strong>the</strong> level of formulat<strong>in</strong>g an overtly dispositional<br />
locution (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first step), without mak<strong>in</strong>g a genu<strong>in</strong>e<br />
progress over <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al version discussed by Mart<strong>in</strong>.<br />
IV. Gundersen’s Appeal to St<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
Conditions <strong>in</strong> Subjunctive Conditionals<br />
The basic objection to <strong>the</strong> simple conditional analysis SCA<br />
relies on an <strong>in</strong>tuitive <strong>and</strong> gripp<strong>in</strong>g picture of <strong>the</strong> world,<br />
which is nicely expressed by Bird (2000, p. 229) as follows:<br />
Some object might possess a disposition, <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ue<br />
to have it, <strong>and</strong> also receive <strong>the</strong> appropriate<br />
stimulus, yet fail to yield <strong>the</strong> manifestation.<br />
Bird’s explanation of this widespread phenomenon is also<br />
a natural one: antidotes (might) exist <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terfere with <strong>the</strong><br />
causal process lead<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> manifestation of a disposition.<br />
Gundersen (2002) exam<strong>in</strong>es several ways of constru<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>and</strong> defend<strong>in</strong>g Bird’s antidote counterexamples to<br />
SCA, <strong>and</strong> argues that none of <strong>the</strong>m works. Below I shall<br />
focus on one of <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>in</strong>es of argument, <strong>and</strong> show why I<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k Gundersen does not make a compell<strong>in</strong>g case for <strong>the</strong><br />
defense of SCA.<br />
Gundersen first po<strong>in</strong>ts out that Bird’s antidote counterexamples<br />
can be given a modalized read<strong>in</strong>g, as suggested<br />
by Bird’s own expressions:<br />
The state of <strong>the</strong> world we are <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> is one<br />
described, albeit <strong>in</strong>completely, <strong>in</strong> my illustrative<br />
story. It is one that <strong>in</strong>cludes among o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong><br />
context of <strong>the</strong> boron rods be<strong>in</strong>g lowered <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
presence of <strong>the</strong> relevant stimulus for [<strong>the</strong> pile’s disposition<br />
to cha<strong>in</strong> react]. I shall call this state w. It is<br />
sufficient for a counter-example to <strong>the</strong> conditional<br />
analysis to show that w is possible, where it is <strong>the</strong><br />
case that <strong>in</strong> w, [Fx] is true <strong>and</strong> m is false. It is<br />
agreed that <strong>in</strong> w, [Fx] <strong>and</strong> [- m if <strong>the</strong> boron rods are<br />
lowered]. S<strong>in</strong>ce, as just remarked, w <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong><br />
context [of <strong>the</strong> boron rods be<strong>in</strong>g lowered], it follows<br />
that <strong>in</strong> w, [- m]. (Bird, 2000, p. 232; c.f. Gundersen,<br />
2002, p. 400)<br />
In Gundersen’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, Bird regards a disposition<br />
as an <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic property, which renders <strong>the</strong> analys<strong>and</strong>um (a<br />
disposition-ascription) of SCA true <strong>in</strong> whatever context <strong>the</strong><br />
disposition is (or might be) <strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> is also simultaneously<br />
committed to an ultra-contextualism, accord<strong>in</strong>g to which<br />
<strong>the</strong> mere possibility of a world state w renders <strong>the</strong> analysans<br />
(a subjunctive conditional) of SCA false.<br />
Gundersen <strong>the</strong>n ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that an ultracontextualism<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g subjunctive conditionals is untenable.<br />
The reason is that it amounts to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that a<br />
super-causal l<strong>in</strong>k exists between stimulation <strong>and</strong> manifestation;<br />
put differently, it gives us an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of subjunctive<br />
conditional <strong>in</strong> terms of strict entailment where <strong>the</strong><br />
consequent is true <strong>in</strong> every possible world <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong><br />
antecedent is true. Gundersen contends that this is a <strong>the</strong>sis<br />
too strong <strong>and</strong> unreasonable to be accepted, stat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that “no one believes an object has a certa<strong>in</strong> dispositional<br />
property if <strong>and</strong> only if <strong>the</strong> characteristic manifestation must<br />
be displayed whenever stimuli conditions obta<strong>in</strong>” (2002, p.<br />
401). Gundersen claims that SCA is as good as it st<strong>and</strong>s,<br />
<strong>and</strong> what needs to be discarded is <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g modalized<br />
version of SCA:<br />
SCAm. Necessarily, someth<strong>in</strong>g x has <strong>the</strong> disposition<br />
at time t to give response r to stimulus s Iff, if x were<br />
to undergo s at time t, it would give response r.<br />
(c.f. Gundersen, 2002, p. 401)<br />
Gundersen thus seems to suggest that SCA holds, even<br />
given counterexamples such as those raised by Bird. This<br />
means that Gundersen must th<strong>in</strong>k that <strong>the</strong>re are certa<strong>in</strong><br />
cases, cases that do not <strong>in</strong>clude counterexamples, <strong>in</strong><br />
which a subjunctive conditional <strong>in</strong> SCA is rendered true.<br />
What <strong>the</strong>n are those cases?<br />
Gundersen has an answer to <strong>the</strong> above query. It<br />
goes as follows (2002, p. 402):<br />
… subjunctive claims only require for <strong>the</strong>ir truth a<br />
causal l<strong>in</strong>k which typically associates <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard,<br />
or better, sufficiently nearby environments.<br />
We may cont<strong>in</strong>ue to ask: What are those environments,<br />
which are deemed st<strong>and</strong>ard, or sufficiently nearby, <strong>in</strong><br />
which subjunctive claims are rendered true? To this question,<br />
Gundersen admits that “that surely is a hard question”,<br />
but <strong>in</strong>sists that subjunctive semantics depends on an<br />
implicit acknowledgement of such st<strong>and</strong>ard conditions”<br />
(2002, p. 402). Gundersen claims that <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>in</strong><br />
question is objective, which serves as <strong>the</strong> ground for our<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g subjunctive claims. None<strong>the</strong>less, Gundersen appears<br />
to leave such a st<strong>and</strong>ard unspecified.<br />
This is highly unsatisfactory. In a simple conditional<br />
analysis, we rely on a subjunctive conditional to <strong>in</strong>form us<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r a disposition-ascription is true. In <strong>the</strong> version<br />
recommended by Gundersen, it is a subjunctive<br />
conditional under st<strong>and</strong>ard conditions that fulfills this task.<br />
However, we are not provided with any explicit<br />
specification of what those st<strong>and</strong>ard conditions are or any<br />
method of how to identify <strong>the</strong>m. We are <strong>the</strong>n on no sound<br />
ground to determ<strong>in</strong>e whe<strong>the</strong>r a disposition-ascription is<br />
true or not. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> simple conditional analysis<br />
faces a dilemma. On one horn, it lacks a clear specification<br />
of <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard conditions <strong>in</strong> question, <strong>and</strong> hence renders<br />
a subjunctive conditional of SCA vague <strong>and</strong> undeterm<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>in</strong> its truth-value. On ano<strong>the</strong>r horn, to specify it would risk<br />
presuppos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> disposition under <strong>in</strong>quiry, <strong>and</strong> hence<br />
renders <strong>the</strong> analysis circular. Ei<strong>the</strong>r horn of <strong>the</strong> dilemma<br />
seems to render Gundersen’s defense of <strong>the</strong> simple<br />
conditional analysis futile.<br />
43