Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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But <strong>the</strong> problem is not evaded: (i) if we accept<br />
microlevel regularities as hav<strong>in</strong>g a real—yet nonproductive—causal<br />
role, why should we still hold that <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility of mental causation rests necessarily on that of<br />
reduction? In fact, reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> reduced phenomena do<br />
not differ with respect to <strong>the</strong> “genu<strong>in</strong>ity” of <strong>the</strong>ir causal<br />
features; (ii) if we claim that real causation exists or<br />
emerges only at higher levels, why is reduction of mental<br />
phenomena to microphysical phenomena necessary, given<br />
that <strong>the</strong> microworld lacks <strong>the</strong> essential feature which<br />
secures <strong>and</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>s mental causation? To say that<br />
causal relations emerge at higher levels does not help,<br />
once entities <strong>and</strong> features of <strong>the</strong> microworld are taken as<br />
paradigmatic <strong>and</strong> ontologically prior.<br />
Far from regard<strong>in</strong>g only Kim, <strong>the</strong> problem regards<br />
Antony too. As mentioned, she fails to specify what she<br />
means by physical causation. None<strong>the</strong>less, she claims that<br />
a physical model of causation is to be applied to mental<br />
events. If by physical causation she means production, <strong>the</strong><br />
same objections aga<strong>in</strong>st Kim hold. If she means someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
different, mental causation is not different from, <strong>and</strong> no<br />
more genu<strong>in</strong>e than, microphysical causation.<br />
5. Conclusion<br />
The reason underly<strong>in</strong>g Kim’s Reductive Physicalism <strong>and</strong><br />
Antony’s Non-Reductive Physicalism is that only <strong>the</strong><br />
mechanisms at work at <strong>the</strong> microlevel can secure <strong>and</strong><br />
expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth of psychological generalisations. I have<br />
shown that, if <strong>the</strong> supposed feature that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
mechanisms should have, <strong>and</strong> that mental ones <strong>in</strong>herit<br />
from <strong>the</strong>m, is that <strong>the</strong>y conform to a CQ model of causal<br />
production, <strong>the</strong>n psychological <strong>and</strong> microphysical laws are<br />
on a par with respect to <strong>the</strong>ir causal features. In fact, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are microphenomena not expla<strong>in</strong>able <strong>in</strong> terms of<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uous sequences of causal <strong>in</strong>termediaries <strong>in</strong><br />
spacetime, as <strong>the</strong> CQ model requires.<br />
Antony <strong>and</strong> Kim have gone to great effort to conv<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
us that—<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of—a systematic<br />
l<strong>in</strong>k between mental properties <strong>and</strong> regularities <strong>and</strong> physical<br />
entities <strong>and</strong> mechanisms is necessary, because only<br />
<strong>the</strong> latter, so <strong>the</strong>y argue, can secure <strong>and</strong> expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth<br />
of <strong>the</strong> explanations given by means of <strong>the</strong> former. But <strong>the</strong>y<br />
do not put <strong>the</strong> same effort <strong>in</strong> tell<strong>in</strong>g us on what features of<br />
<strong>the</strong> microlevel, which <strong>the</strong> mental level lacks, <strong>the</strong> truth of<br />
our psychological generalisations depends. I would urge<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to specify what it is that dist<strong>in</strong>guishes physical<br />
mechanisms from mental regularities, <strong>and</strong> renders <strong>the</strong><br />
former <strong>the</strong> secure basis for <strong>the</strong> latter, <strong>in</strong> order to conv<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
us about <strong>the</strong> necessity of <strong>the</strong>ir enterprises, whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
explanatorily or ontologically reductive.<br />
40<br />
Mental Causation <strong>and</strong> Physical Causation — Lorenzo Cas<strong>in</strong>i<br />
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